"The views expressed in this article by Peter Roady are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or of the U.S. Government."

**Editor's note:** “Seven Questions On...” is a new regular feature in Passport that will ask scholars in a particular field to respond to seven questions about their field’s historiography, key publications, influences, etc. It is designed to introduce the broader SHAFR community to a variety of perspectives for a given field, as well as serving as a primer for graduate students and non-specialists. **AJ**

1. **What drew you to this field and inspired you to focus on your specific area of intelligence history?**

**Richard Immerman (RI):** I “entered” the field of intelligence history, more commonly referred to these days as intelligence studies because of its interdisciplinary nature, through the back door. My interest and concentration subsequently evolved incrementally and somewhat serendipitously. My engagement with intelligence history started when I decided to examine the CIA’s project to overthrow the Arbenz regime in Guatemala as a dissertation. That developed into *The CIA in Guatemala*. What’s notable for our purposes, however, is that I approached the subject as a historian of US foreign policy, not of intelligence. Over the next years, decades in fact, I only dabbled in intelligence history, as I wrote about Vietnam and other dimensions of US foreign relations. The next step began when I worked with the political scientist Fred Greenstein on the Eisenhower administration. That drew me to studying and assessing policy- and decision-making processes. It also led me to another political scientist, Bob Jervis, who mentored me, and I use that verb purposefully, in the application of psychological theories to international relations, including decision making. Bob, of course, is a leading expert on intelligence history. So the combination of Fred and Bob moved me in the direction of exploring the influence of intelligence on policy/decision-making.

Intensifying my engagement further was Athan Theoharis’s invitation several years after the 9/11 attacks, the flawed National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, and US invasion of Iraq to write a chapter on the history of the CIA for a volume he was editing. Writing that chapter, which came out in 2006 and turned out to be a relatively lengthy one, prompted the subject of my SHAFR presidential address the following year: “Intelligence and Strategy.” What is more, literally months before I gave that talk, and unbeknownst to the audience at the time, I accepted an offer to serve as Assistant Director of National Intelligence. The insight I acquired from that position into the intelligence process, particularly the analytic arm, “converted” me to intelligence history. I have subsequently written primarily in the field, including a book on the CIA, and have taught courses on the History of the CIA and US foreign Policy at the US Army War College, Temple University, and Williams College.

**Sarah-Jane Corke (SJC):** I imagine I came to intelligence history like many others, through a completely different field. That field was US Foreign Relations. For my MA degree, in the early nineties, just as the Cold War was winding down I was researching the “containment” policy. After going through the National Security Council documents of the late forties and early fifties I concluded that the strategy outlined in these documents did not seem to match what historians had described as “containment.” As I result I started to look for evidence that US foreign policy toward the Soviet Union was more aggressive than had been previously acknowledged. This led me to a series of books and articles on early American covert operations.

Around the same time, Robert Gates, who went on to become director of the CIA, announced the Gates Commission on Openness. The stated mandate was to declassify a number of documents on early American covert operations. With Gates promise in the back of my mind I began my Ph.D. that fall. My dissertation was on early American covert operations during the Cold War. Of course, the release of the documents took much longer than anyone expected but I was still able to find the story I was looking for by poking around the periphery of the documents that were released on the Psychological Strategy Board, a little know organization set up by President Truman in 1951.

**Kathryn Olmsted (KO):** I study popular perceptions of U.S. intelligence agencies. I’m interested in how culture affects intelligence, and how intelligence affects culture. I’m not sure what drew me to these issues, except a general interest in how political conservatives use intelligence to preserve existing hierarchies of power.

**Hugh Wilford (HW):** I came to intelligence history via a rather eccentric route. I trained in the U.K. as a U.S. cultural and intellectual historian then, in the latter stages of graduate school, encountered the strange story of the CIA’s covert funding of American artists and intellectuals in the “Cultural Cold War.” I was busy publishing in scholarly venues on the subject when my fellow Brit Frances Stonor Saunders came along in 1999 with her controversial blockbuster *Who Paid the Piper?* (published in the United States as *The Cultural Cold War*). This really put the topic on the map and ensured some public interest when I came out with my own history of CIA “front” operations a few years later (The Mighty Wurlitzer, 2008). The trouble with working on anything to do with spies is you rapidly get pigeonholed but, on balance, I don’t regret my move from intellectual into intelligence history. I’m still fascinated by the CIA’s
relationship with the wider culture and I was recently reminded, when writing lectures for a Great Courses video series on the Agency, how, Zelig-like, it constantly crops up at critical junctures in post-World War II U.S. and international history. You can hang so much from the study of covert U.S. power in the world.

**Peter Roady (PR):** My own experience in government made plain the centrality of intelligence activities to American foreign policymaking. As a historian, I focus on signals intelligence (SIGINT) and covert action. Those two lines of effort remain among the least developed areas of intelligence history and have not been fully integrated into larger historical narratives about U.S. and global history since the late 1940s.

2. **Which scholars do you see as having laid the groundwork for the study of intelligence history?**

**RI:** That’s a tough one. I’m not sure I’d describe authors who laid the groundwork for intelligence history as “scholars” per se. I’m thinking of David Wise, Thomas Powers, Bradley Smith, Richard Smith, and their ilk. They were great story tellers. But as a subfield of international history and category of analysis, not until the 1980s and 1990s, with the release of more documents, did scholars begin to lay a foundation. Ernest May and John Prados are among the very few US historians who’d I’d include in this category. I would classify Ray Garthoff as a historian as well. Political scientists, like Bob Jervis, Richard Betts, and Gregory Treverton have more commonly served as pioneers than historians. Still, British scholars such as Christopher Andrew and Richard Aldrich, most of whom were trained as historians, without question were far ahead of Americans in writing about intelligence history as a distinct subfield. They have collectively trained a number of today’s leading lights in intelligence history.

**SJC:** In Canada, in the nineties and double aughts, we were very lucky to have a number of excellent intelligence historians who worked at our universities: In alphabetical order they were: David Charters, Stuart Farson, John Ferris, Greg Kealey, Wesley Wark, and Reg Whittaker. Together they created a wonderful and supportive community for young scholars working in the field. Please note that I recognize that all of these scholars are men. While the field is finally beginning to change, we still have a long way to go.

**KO:** A lot of the most important texts of the early years of the field were written by British scholars: Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Christopher Andrew, Richard Aldrich, and John Ranelagh. Then the Americans and Canadians started producing field-defining books: for the CIA, John Prados, Richard Immerman, and Sarah-Jane Corke; and, for the FBI, Athan Theoharis and Ellen Schrecker.

**HW:** It’s hard to trace a clear intellectual genealogy in U.S. intelligence history. It is, frankly, a rather weird historical sub-field, dominated more than any other in the discipline by journalists, starting with the great 1970s investigative reporters such as Seymour Hersh. But there’s also a big Political Science/International Relations presence in the literature, with some cross-over to the policy world and the intelligence community itself, represented by senior figures like Robert Jervis and Loch Johnson. Stranger still, Canadians and Britons such as myself are everywhere in U.S. intelligence history, perhaps the best-known in the U.S. being Christopher Andrew, Richard Aldrich, and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones—although there are many, many more I could name. Finally, there are, of course, several U.S. historians who have written major works on intelligence themes, although they probably wouldn’t self-identify as intelligence historians in the same way as the Brits: Richard Immerman, Nick Cullather, Kathryn Olmsted, and the extraordinarily prolific John Prados—again, not a comprehensive list.

**PR:** Christopher Andrew, on intelligence broadly. Thomas R. Johnson and Matthew Aid have done important work on the still comparatively underdeveloped topic of signals intelligence (SIGINT). Matthew Jones is working on a book on the National Security Agency that promises to be just as valuable. On covert action, Nick Cullather deserves special mention, as do the two generations of journalists who have tried with some success to lift the veil of secrecy and fill gaps in the historical record.

3. **Discuss how the field has evolved to include different approaches to analyzing the history of intelligence.**

**RI:** That’s a far easier question to answer than the previous one. Intelligence agencies, most notably the CIA, are unusual among the constellation of contributors to the US national security enterprise in that they have responsibilities for both the formulation and execution of policy. Many of the early works, as I mentioned, were journalistic or popular histories, which not surprisingly concentrated on the former. They told tales of daring adventures (often failures) and other covert actions, with a little bit about the CIA’s foundations thrown in. Then, as reflected in the writings of Jervis and Betts, intelligence’s contributions to the formulation of policy became a much more prominent feature of the literature, incorporating a more theoretical dimension. Hence the literature gave more attention to the Directorate of Intelligence (analysis) than the Directorate of Operations (responsible for covert action and collection). That has continued, although the pendulum has swung back a bit because of drone warfare and other paramilitary endeavors. What is more, 9/11, the Global War on Terror, and the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 generated multiple institutional histories of the Intelligence Community. In this regard, scholars focused on elements of the Intelligence Community other than the CIA (the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, etc.), on the IC itself, and on community management as a historical problem.

**SJC:** Unfortunately, although there was an enormous amount of talent in the field of intelligence history in Canada when I completed my PhD, today, twenty plus years later, the majority of these scholars have retired; and given the staff shortages at Canadian Universities they have not been replaced. At present there are very few scholars who consider themselves primarily intelligence historians at major research universities. The same argument has been made about Intelligence History at American Universities. This means that the majority of intelligence history is coming out of the UK and Europe. However, when compared to fields such as American Foreign Relations, our field still has a long way to go in meeting the former’s standards for theoretical sophistication.

**KO:** As with many sub-fields, intelligence history began as institutional history, but has broadened to include examinations of culture, gender, and imperialism. In particular, there’s a lot of exciting new work on culture and intelligence by Patrick Iber, Christopher Moran, Timothy Melley, Hugh Wilford, Jonathan Nashel, Simon Willmetts, and Tricia Jenkins.

**HW:** I’m not sure how much it has evolved. The dominant approach remains narrative history, often done extremely
well—Christopher Andrew, for example, is a delight to read. This might reflect another unusual feature of intelligence history as a field: the influence on it of spy fiction. I can’t think of another historical subject that has been so shaped by a particular literary genre. Whatever the reason, compared with the history of American foreign relations or “America in the World” and all its recent “turns,” intelligence history remains surprisingly under-theorized. This isn’t true of the PoliSci/JR literature known as “Intelligence Studies,” which employs an interdisciplinary variety of social scientific concepts, but the approach here tends to the ahistorical, treating intelligence as a closed hermeneutic “cycle” somehow sealed off from the rest of society, so it’s not necessarily that helpful to historians. Still, there are signs of intelligence history starting to take its own set of turns, of which more below in the response to Q 5.

PR: Because the American portion of the documentary record of U.S. covert action remains largely closed to outside researchers, historians have had to come up with alternative ways of learning about the track record of this important foreign policy tool. Most promisingly, Piero Gleijeses and Kaeten Mistry have both shown the value of relying on archives in the countries and regions affected by American covert actions. According to public records, the United States carried out an enormous number of covert actions in the years after World War II. Only a very small number of these have benefited from the approach championed by Gleijeses and Mistry a huge opportunity for future research.

4. What are some of the challenges faced by scholars working in the field?

RI: Some would argue that a great challenge to the “field” is establishing an identity. Is intelligence history a distinct field or subfield? If the latter, is it a subfield of history, international relations, perhaps even sociology or anthropology? I personally don’t care and don’t think the label matters. I would, nevertheless, like to see intelligence history or intelligence studies included in job descriptions. It almost never is, except in intelligence programs. And these programs rarely include a history component. Consequently, there remains in my judgment only one great challenge confronting intelligence historians. It’s the one we’ve always confronted and from which flow all other challenges: access to and the declassification of archives. For a brief moment in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War, we saw a flickering light at the end of the archival tunnel. That’s, alas, been largely extinguished, albeit not completely.

SJc: The primary challenge revolves around the system of declassification. Those of studying American intelligence tend to rely on four key sources: The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, the CIA online database CREST, the Freedom of Information Act, and Mandatory Reviews. All four systems are rife with problems. While we now have retrospective collections from the Foreign Relations of the United States available on the Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Iran, and Guatemala, the route to publication for each volume was a torturous one. And although, we have been told that future FRUS volume will include intelligence documents, if past is prologue, they will not appear without a fight. That said, historians will have a wealth of new documents available to them because of a law suit that was filed by Mark Stout, Hugh Wilfred, Jeff Scudder, and Kenneth Osgood that seeks the release of hundreds of internal CIA organizational and functional histories. As they become available the full list of documents will be posted on the North American Society for Intelligence History’s website; https://www.intelligencehistory.org/. At some point in the future we hope to be able to archive all of the documents on the website.

The CIA’s CREST system has been an absolute disaster as of late. When the CIA upgraded it system a few months ago all of its links were broken. This meant that for those of us who relied on documents or readings in CREST for our courses and research, the old links did not work and I personally found it impossible to find documents on the new website. Luckily a friend suggested that I try the “Wayback Machine,” which is part of the Internet Archive. As a result, I was able to find most of the documents through this website. http://web.archive.org/. However, the CIA does have an obligation to fix the problems associated with the CREST system.

Using FOIA during the pandemic has also been an exercise in futility. I had requests returned to my home university when we on lock down that I could not access. When I was able to respond, my six month appeal deadline had passed. Although I did write a letter alerting the CIA to the problem I never heard back. Finally, as a Canadian citizen I do not have access to Mandatory Declassification Review. The Obama Administration changed the laws in 2009 so that this tool is no longer open to foreign nationals.

In sum, researching covert operations over the last two decades has been difficult. However, that said good work is still being written. Two edited collections on the topic are in the works. The first is edited by Rory Cormac, Genevieve Lester, Mark Stout, Damien Van Puyvelde, and Magda Long. It is tentatively titled, Covert Action in Comparison: National Approaches to Unacknowledged Interventions. The second is edited by Stephen Long, SarahJane Corke, and Francesco Cacciatore. It is tentatively titled Covert Operations in the Early Cold War: Rethinking Western Intervention Against International Communism. Both volumes are just in their initial stages of research and are a few years out, but they indicate a growing interest in the field.

KO: The greatest challenge is access to records. Sometimes intelligence documents remain classified for many decades. Scholars must continue to push for more declassifications— and also to try to put together the puzzle as best they can, even if some of the pieces are missing.

HW: The obvious one is official secrecy. Again, the field is perhaps unique in the extent to which governments withhold relevant documentation or release it selectively, thereby directly, and often deliberately, shaping the historical record. That said, intelligence historians have shown some (as Richard Aldrich puts it) “fancy footwork” accessing non-official sources as well as playing honorable roles in campaigns to compel greater freedom of information. This, by the way, might be another reason for the field’s under-theorization: the hunt for sources is so all-consuming it’s hard to find the time for abstract reflection. Related to this is what I see as the field’s second great challenge. I might be being paranoid but I’ve developed the distinct impression that historians in other sub-fields look askance at intelligence history because of this conjoined scarcity of sources and theory. I also wonder whether the generally low regard in which U.S. intellectuals hold the world of secret intelligence hasn’t rubbed off on perceptions of its historians too. This leads to a paradoxical situation in which, despite there being tremendous public interest in intelligence history, American academic funding bodies tend to shy away from it. Certainly, there is strikingly more support available for the non-applied study of intelligence history in the U.K. than there is in the U.S.
PR: Secrecy is both the most obvious and the most difficult challenge that intelligence historians face. It is not simply a problem of access to documents. On the most sensitive matters, as Henry Kissinger noted in 1970, often the “Documents have nothing to do with it.” Kissinger concluded that “you can't write history after you've seen a thing like that.” But of course historians can. They just have to work harder to assemble the facts, looking critically at the documents that are available and supplementing them with information gleaned from other sources and methods. At least in the American context, succeeding at this task requires coming to terms with how our system of secrecy functions in practice and in particular with the way the holders of secrets selectively reveal information. David Pozen's work is a great starting point on this topic.

A second challenge is that the intelligence world has its own language and culture, including myriad local dialects and practices, much of which is slippery by design and by habit. This presents enormous difficulties to outsiders and sometimes manifests in confusion. For instance, it is quite common to see the words “covert” and “clandestine” conflated as they are even in the FRUS “Note on Covert Actions.” The problems are even greater when dealing with technical intelligence, unless the researcher happens to be a specialist in electrical engineering, computer science, or another relevant discipline. Interviews with insiders and collaborations with technical experts can help scholars learn the language(s) and gain the tacit and explicit knowledge needed to meet this challenge.

5. What are some of the significant questions in the field that you feel need to be addressed in greater detail or, alternatively, which questions need to be reconsidered by contemporary scholars?

RI: In the classes I teach, I have my students debate the efficacy of covert action: Is it ever constructive and productive? Is it really the “quiet option”? If paramilitary operations are to be continued, should they become the responsibility of the military, which would require revising titles 10 and 50 of the US code? On the analytic side, the question are no less controversial, albeit perhaps more theoretical. How do we define the politicization of intelligence, and are there institutional prophylactics? Similarly, how faithful has the intelligence community been to the prohibition against advocating or prescribing policy initiatives (sometimes euphemistically referred to as Opportunity Analysis)? Should they be faithful to the prohibition? Which leads to the larger question of what kind of support decision makers should expect from intelligence.

SJC: To my mind one of the most important questions in the field goes to significance. What do these operations tell us about the more important issues of strategy and policy? The operations themselves, while interesting, are only important in the larger historical context. Our stories need to reflect this. A second question, that has continued to preoccupy me of late, revolves around language. As of yet we do not have a consensus on the terminology to describe these types of operations. Today scholars refer to them as either: psychological warfare, psychological operations, covert operations, political warfare, covert action, disinformation, or active measures. Understanding why these terms were used and when, can tell us a lot about their history. Debates over language speak to a both a national consciousness and to bureaucratic battles and turf wars that were happening behind the scenes at the time. There are important stories here. I encourage anyone who is interested in the evolution of the terms to spend some time with Google NGram (https://books.google.com/ngrams) or The History Lab to examine documents released under FOIA. (http://historylab.org/).

KO: Intelligence historians have been integrating cultural analyses into their work for the past two decades, but there’s still much to be done. I’m eager to read the next books of Jonathan Nashel and Simon Willmetts, who are each working on cultural histories of the CIA, and of Hugh Wilford, who’s writing an imperial history of the Agency. Kaeten Mistry and Hannah Gurman have also done exciting work on whistleblowers. Finally, I’d love to see more gender analysis in intelligence history.

HW: So, a customary response to this question from intelligence historians would be to contrast the large literature on covert action – coup operations, psychological warfare, and the rest of it – with the relative dearth of works about intelligence gathering and analysis, especially signals intelligence, as shown, for example, in the unequal scholarly attention paid the CIA and the National Security Agency. Or, they might see the question as an opportunity to reproach the larger field of international history for its inattention to both intelligence and covert action – the old “missing dimension” lament. While both these complaints still have a lot of truth to them, I would instead encourage historians of U.S. intelligence to think about what they themselves might stand to learn from recent developments in the parent field of America in the World and its various conceptual turns, especially the Cultural, Global, Emotional, and Imperial ones. Some of these, it seems to me, have tremendous potential for illuminating subjects of traditional interest to intelligence history: thinking about the collection of secret intelligence from human sources (HUMINT) in light of recent developments in the History of Emotion or post-colonial histories of intimacy, for example, or reconceiving intelligence alliances in the context of new imperial history scholarship about entangled empires and “transimperial” connections. Showing a willingness to join in these recent turns would, I suspect, not just recast old questions in interesting new ways, it would also help intelligence history as a sub-field win the attention and respect it deserves from other historians. Fortunately, there are signs of the field opening up to new voices and ideas, as seen in, for example, the recent growth of the North American Society for Intelligence History, and the launch of new publishing initiatives such as Edinburgh University Press’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Secret Warfare series. I suspect intelligence history is set for an intellectual rejuvenation by younger scholars like the one that has already occurred in America in the World. For more about these changes, see Simon Willmetts “The Cultural Turn in Intelligence Studies,” Intelligence and National Security 34 (2019): 800-817.

PR: The existence of official secrecy presents a basic epistemological question for anyone writing about intelligence, which is: how do you know what you think you know about intelligence activities? Historians of science, including Peter Galison and Alex Wellerstein, have grappled with secrecy’s epistemological effects in the context of nuclear weapons research and development. But the secrecy associated with intelligence activities differs from the nuclear weapons context in ways that make it important for historians of intelligence and foreign relations, particularly those writing about covert action, to undertake similar explorations.
6. For someone wanting to start out in intelligence history, what 5-8 books do you consider to be of seminal importance—either the “best” or the most influential titles?

RI: That’s another tough one, because the field has evolved and there has been, if not an explosion, a proliferation of good books on intelligence over the past half-dozen years or so; maybe a little longer. But I’m old school, so you’ll see that a number of my choices connect to my answer to #2. I note that I’m trying to cover the waterfront while at the same time stressing books that I consider foundational to the historiography’s current wave, which also dovetails with my interests. I’m going to punt on labeling them the “best” or “most influential,” but they are all very good, influential, and of “seminal importance.” I’m taking advantage of my full allotment of 8 books, and listing them alphabetically so as avoid drawing any inferences as to my rankings:

Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only
James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace
David Barrett, The CIA and Congress
Richard Betts, Enemies of Intelligence
Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy
Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails
Gregory Treverton, Covert Action

SJC: As I mentioned above Intelligence History has traditionally been dominated by male scholars. That is changing, however. Some of the best new works in this area are written by women. In alphabetical order I would recommend:

Mary Barton, Counter Terrorism Between the Wars, An International History 1919-1957
Helen Fry, M19: A History of the Secret Service for Escape and Evasion in World War Two
Melissa Graves, Nixon’s FBI: Hoover, Watergate and a Bureau in Crisis
Nancy Greenspan, Atomic Spy: The Dark Lives of Klaus Fuchs
Aviva Gottmann, The Origins of International Counter-Terrorism: Switzerland at the Forefront of Crisis Negotiations, Multilateral Diplomacy and Intelligence Cooperation (1967-1977)
Joanna Iordanou’s Venice’s Secret Service: Organizing Intelligence in the Renaissance
Kristie Macrakis, Prisoners, Lovers & Spies: The Story of Invisible Ink from Herodotus to al-Qaeda.

It is also worth mentioning that the 2021 winner of the Bobby R. Inman Award was Dr. Alexandra Sukalo. The publication of her Ph.D. thesis, “The Soviet Political Police: Establishment, Training and Operations in the Soviet Republics,” will also be an important contribution to the field.

KO: For histories of the CIA, one might begin with these books:

John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA
Richard Immerman, The Hidden Hand
Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy
Sarah-Jane Corke, U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare, and the CIA

For the relationship between intelligence and culture, I’d recommend starting with:

Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer
Timothy Melley, The Covert Sphere

HW: This is a tricky one for the reasons already alluded to in the response to Q. 2 above, and my choices might not please some intelligence historians, but here goes anyway:

Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men. Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (New York, 1996) (for me still the pick of intelligence history books by U.S. journalists for its rich evocation of the social world of the early CIA)
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 3rd ed. (New Haven, CT, 2003) (my selection to represent the “British invasion” because of its author’s wider interest in U.S. history and lovely prose)
Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, Wesley K. Wark, eds., Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 2nd ed. (London, 2020) (a very useful, up-to-date compendium of the “Intelligence Studies” literature)
Alfred McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison, WI, 2009) (a deservedly influential account of the role of intelligence in American imperialism and its “boomerang” domestic effects)

And, finally, three books that approach the subject from a cultural or literary angle and in doing so suggest particularly promising future directions for the field:

Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War (Amherst, MA, 2005)
Andrew Friedman, Covert Capital: Landscapes of Denial and the Making of U.S. Empire in the Suburbs of Northern Virginia (Berkeley, CA, 2016).

PR: Christopher Andrew, The Secret World: A History of Intelligence is a useful general starting point. On secrecy’s profound and often overlooked effects on policymakers and intelligence officers, see Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy: The American Experience and David Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information.” On covert action, Nick Cullather’s Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 is a good starting point. On signals intelligence, see Matthew Aid, The Secret Sentry and Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology During the Cold War.

7. For someone wanting to teach a course on intelligence history or add intelligence history to an existing course on U.S. foreign relations, what core readings and/or media would you suggest?

RI: I should state up front that in the class I’m currently teaching, I assign few books and about 50 articles. For this purpose, nevertheless, I’m going to concentrate on books, albeit not exclusively. It’s obviously awkward for me to suggest my Hidden Hand, but I wrote it primarily for use in a course on intelligence history. It’s a manageable
introductory survey, and I honestly can't identify an alternative that serve the same purpose. I would also strongly suggest including Thomas Finger's *Reducing Uncertainty* on one hand, and Richard Betts's *Enemies of Intelligence* on the other. Bob Jervis's article in *Political Science Quarterly*, "Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash" frames them both. Harold Ford's, *CIA and Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes* is a valuable addition to any course. So is Greg Treverton's somewhat dated but still thought-provoking "Covert Action: From 'Covert' to Overt" in *Daedalus*. And to add some contemporary flair, at the end of the course I'd assign Robert Draper's 2020 *New York Times* magazine article, "Unwanted Truths: Inside Trump's Battles with the U.S. Intelligence Agencies." For those who are ambitious, last year the journal *Intelligence and National Security* published a special issue on the controversial and very instructive 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program. That's a lot to assign. But in my judgment, it's worth it. Moreover, Bob Jervis and Jim Wirtz have collected these articles, added a few more, and will soon publish the result as an anthology. There's nothing quite like it. I currently assign one of the articles. But if I teach this course again, I will figure out a way to assign them all.

**SJC**: I teach three courses on intelligence history: A first year course on the spy in history, a third year course on the history of the CIA and a fourth year course on the NSA. For my first year course I have my students examine a number of spy cases throughout history. In order to prepare them for the reading required in our field I have them choose two books on famous spies. These often include the work of Ben Macintyre. I find students really enjoy *Agent Sonya: The Spy Next Door; A Spy Among Friends: Kim Philby and the Great Betrayal;* and *The Spy and the Traitor: The Greatest Espionage Story of the Cold War*. Although I have to say I am really looking forward to the publication of Calder Walton's forthcoming book *Spies: The Hundred Years Intelligence War between East and West*, which is due out in 2023. In my third year course I used Richard Immerman's *The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA*. I then supplement this book with a number of journal articles. For my fourth year course I use Mathew Aid's *The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency*. I also supplement this with a number of articles.


**PR**: In an existing course on U.S. foreign relations, devoting a class or two to the American overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 works well. Students can read Nick Cullather's *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, which provides unique insight into the nuts and bolts of the American covert action and is quite accessible. The documents Cullather includes in the Appendix are also a great starting point for a discussion about evaluating a covert action’s impact across different time horizons and the related importance for policymakers of what Ernest May and Richard Neustadt called “thinking in time.”

For a standalone course on intelligence history, Christopher Andrew's *The Secret World: A History of Intelligence* provides an amusing and insightful tour of several thousand years of intelligence activities. Andrew's book shows that intelligence activities are as old as humanity—a useful temporal corrective for readers inclined to think that the history of intelligence began in the 20th century. Andrew's book also brings a much needed global perspective to a subject that remains confined mostly to national silos.