In this issue

A Conversation with David Langbart
*Principles in Power: A Roundtable*
FDR and the Transformation of Power

...And More
Passport

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review

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Benjamin Coates is Associate Professor of History at Wake Forest University, where he teaches courses in the history of the U.S. and the World. His first book, *Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century* (2016) received an honorable mention for the Vincent P. DeSantis book prize from the Society for Historians of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. He has also published articles in *Diplomatic History*, *Journal of American History*, and *Modern American History*, and has won the Binkley-Stephenson Prize from the Organization of American Historians. His current research investigates the history of economic sanctions in the 20th century. He is also co-editor of the United States in the World series with Cornell University Press.

Thomas C. Field, Jr. is Professor of History and Social Science at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He is co-editor of *Latin America and the Global Cold War* (2020) and author of *From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era* (2014), which won the McGann Award from the Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies. He received the 2021 Cherny Article Award from the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association and the 2013 Bernath Article Prize from SHAFR. He is currently writing a book on Cold War Bolivia and the United States in the era of Ernesto “Che” Guevara.

James Goode is Professor Emeritus of History at Grand Valley State University. He lives in San Luis Obispo, California.

Mateo Jarquin is Assistant Professor of History at Chapman University, where he began teaching after earning a Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2019. His scholarship asks how 20th century revolutions in the so-called Third World have framed global debates about development, democracy, and international relations. His forthcoming book explores the rise and fall of Nicaragua’s Sandinista Revolution (1979-1990) in the context of the global Cold War.

Andrew Johnstone is Associate Professor of American History at the University of Leicester. His publications include *Against Immediate Evil: American Internationalists and the Four Freedoms on the Eve of World War II* (2014) and (as co-editor with Andrew Priest) *U.S. Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Campaigns, Candidates and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton* (2017). His current book project examines the relationship between the rise of the American public relations industry and the rise of the United States as a world power.

Autumn Lass is Associate Professor of History at Wayland Baptist University. She specializes in U.S. foreign relations, Cold War propaganda, and public diplomacy.

Kyle Longley is Professor of History and Director of the War and Society program at Chapman University. He is the author or editor of nine books including, most recently, *In Harm’s Way: A History of the American Military Experience* (2019), and his opinion pieces appear regularly in the *Washington Post* and other venues.

David F. Schmitz is Robert Allen Skotheim Chair of History at Whitman College. He is the author or editor of ten books including, most recently, *The Sailor: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of American Foreign Policy* (2021).

Jeffrey F. Taffet is Professor of History at the United States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point. He is the author of *Against Aid: A History of Opposition to U.S. Foreign Aid Spending* (2021), *The United States and Latin America: A History with Documents* (2017, with Dustin Walcher), and *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (2007).

Vanessa Walker is Gordon Levin Associate Professor of Diplomatic History at Amherst College, where she teaches classes on U.S. politics, foreign relations, and human rights. She is the author of *Principles in Power: Latin America and the Politics of U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy* (2020) and several articles on the Carter administration’s human rights policy.

Evan R. Ward is Associate Professor of History at Brigham Young University. His research focuses on twentieth-century Inter-American relations, with a particular interest in the relationship between the United States and Mexico.
Attention SHAFR Members

The 2021 SHAFR elections are upon us. Once again, Passport is publishing copies of the candidates’ biographies and statements by the candidates for president and vice-president, as well as biographies for the candidates for Council (including the new teaching institution-focused seat) and the Nominating Committee, as a way to encourage members of the organization to familiarize themselves with the candidates and vote in this year’s elections. Additional information, including brief CVs for each candidate, will be available on the electronic ballot.

“Elections belong to the people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters.” Abraham Lincoln

Passport would like to remind the members of SHAFR that voting for the 2021 SHAFR elections will begin in early August and will close on September 30. Ballots will be sent electronically to all current members of SHAFR. If you are a member of SHAFR and do not receive a ballot by the beginning of September, please contact the chair of the SHAFR Nominating Committee, Sarah Snyder (ssnyder@american.edu), as soon as possible to ensure that you are able to participate in the election.

“The exercise of the elective franchise is a social duty of as solemn a nature as [a person] can be called to perform.” Daniel Webster

Last year in the 2020 SHAFR election, nearly 600 members of SHAFR voted. Passport would like to encourage the membership of SHAFR to take the time to participate in our organization’s self-governance once again this year. As we know, elections have consequences.

“We do not have government by the majority. We have government by the majority who participate.” Thomas Jefferson

2021 SHAFR Election Candidates

President
Laura A. Belmonte, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Vice President/President-Elect
Mary Ann Heiss, Kent State University
Alan McPherson, Temple University

Council (At-Large)
Susan Colbourn, Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University
Vanessa Walker, Amherst College

Council (At-Large)
Sarah Miller-Davenport, University of Sheffield
William Michael Schmidli, Leiden University

Council (Teaching)
Joy Schulz, Metropolitan Community College
Molly Wood, Wittenberg University

Council (Graduate Student)
Benjamin V. Allison, University of Texas at Austin
Kelsey L. Zavelo, Duke University

Nominating Committee
Julia Irwin, University of South Florida
Aileen Teague, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University
2021 SHAFR Election

Candidate Biographies & Statements

President

Laura A. Belmonte is Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences and Professor of History at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. She received her A.B. in History and Political Science from the University of Georgia and her M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Virginia. Her latest book, The International LGBT Rights Movement: A History, was published in January 2021 by Bloomsbury. She is also co-author of Global Americans: A Transnational U.S. History, author of Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War, and editor of Speaking of America: Readings in U.S. History. She is currently contracted with Bloomsbury to edit a series called History in 15.

Before accepting the deanship at Virginia Tech in 2019, she taught at Oklahoma State University for twenty-three years. While at OSU, she co-founded the Gender and Women's Studies and American Studies programs. Her administrative roles included Director of American Studies, Head of the Department of History, and Associate Dean for Personnel and Instruction for the College of Arts and Sciences. She has extensive non-profit board experience including co-founding and leading Freedom Oklahoma, a statewide LGBTQ advocacy organization. She served on the U.S. Department of State's Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation from 2009 to 2019.

Her SHAFR experience includes terms on the SHAFR national council, the editorial board of Diplomatic History, the Nominating Committee, the Link-Kuehl Prize Committee, the Committee on the Status of Women, and other ad hoc committees.

It is a singular honor to be SHAFR President-Elect and I am eager to use my expertise and energy to help lead the organization. I am especially happy that the marvelous SHAFR community will soon be able to reconvene together face-to-face.

In the nearly three decades that I have been a member of SHAFR, I have watched proudly as the organization has greatly diversified its leadership and membership. We have made great strides in broadening the scholarship presented in Diplomatic History and at the annual meeting. SHAFR has provided tremendous support for graduate students, international scholars, and recognition of outstanding publications and service. We have changed policies and taken difficult stands in order to protect the collegiality and community that define us. We must safeguard SHAFR's capacity to continue its efforts in all of these areas through prudent fiscal management, thoughtful and transparent governance, strong communication, and attentiveness to larger trends in the academy.

We must also simultaneously recognize and address the grave threats facing some of our colleagues who are battling budget crises and program cuts. Many early-career scholars and graduate students live in precarity triggered by the academy’s overreliance on contingent labor and shrinking pool of secure academic positions. We must redouble our efforts to provide mentorship, professional development guidance, and internship opportunities.

Finally, we must keep the voices of SHAFR experts engaged in the public sphere. Through our publications, programming, and digital resources, we must continue to speak with authority on issues of vital international importance.

Vice-President/President-Elect

Mary Ann Heiss is a professor of history at Kent State University. My research interests focus on the early Cold War period with a particular emphasis on Anglo-American relations. Thematically, my work has explored such issues as North-South relations, the intersection of decolonization and the Cold War, and the interplay between foreign and domestic policy. I've published two monographs, Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954 (Columbia University Press, 1997) and Fulfilling the Sacred Trust: The UN Campaign for International Accountability for Dependent Territories in the Era of Decolonization (Cornell University Press, 2020), coedited four volumes, and published more than a dozen articles and book chapters. My service to SHAFR includes fifteen years on the staff of Diplomatic History, a term on the journal's editorial board, terms on the Stuart Bernath Article Prize, Kuehl Book Prize, and Myrna Bernath Book and Fellowship Committees, elected terms on the Council and Nominating Committee, and chair of the Conference Committee since its inception in 2016. I also cochaired the 2008 Program Committee with Amy Sayward and served on the committee for two other conferences. Beyond SHAFR, I've been secretary-treasurer, archivist, and president of the Ohio Academy of History, served on the Harry S. Truman Library Institute's Committee on Research, Scholarship, and Education and Board of Directors, and edited the book series “New Studies in U.S. Foreign Relations” for the Kent State University Press.
As a SHAFR member for more than three decades, dating back to my days as a graduate student at Ohio State, I’ve seen firsthand how pivotal the organization can be for graduate students and young scholars. I delivered my first major professional paper at a SHAFR conference and benefited from important financial support through the W. Stull Holt Fellowship when I was writing my dissertation. I am also fortunate to count a number of distinguished SHAFR members as informal mentors, research sounding boards, and discriminating manuscript critics. From my perspective, one of SHAFR’s signature strengths has been the willingness of its most senior members to help pull those behind them up the professional ladder. A top priority for me as vice president/president would be to work with the graduate student members of the SHAFR Council and others to develop this element of the organization’s identity more fully. Current initiatives like the job workshop that’s become a regular element of the annual summer meeting already support this goal, of course. As vice president/president, I’d work to create more opportunities for intergenerational interactions and collaborations of all sorts, at both the annual meeting and throughout the year. SHAFR’s most senior members are incredible resources well beyond the formal service they provide to the organization on its various committees and the impressive research they’ve published over their careers. I’d like to see SHAFR do more to draw on their collective professional experience for the benefit of all of us.

Alan McPherson is Freaney Professor of History and Director of the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy (CENFAD) at Temple University. He teaches broadly in U.S. foreign relations and publishes mostly in U.S.-Latin American relations. He has written and edited eleven books, including the prize-winning Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations (Harvard, 2003) and The Invaded: How Latin Americans and their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations (Oxford, 2014). His latest is Ghosts of Sheridan Circle: How a Washington Assassination Brought Pinochet’s Terror State to Justice (North Carolina, 2019). He also authored Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945 (2006), The World and U2: One Band’s Remaking of Global Activism (2015), and A Short History of U.S. Military Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean (2016). Finally, he has edited or co-edited four additional books and has been a fellow at Harvard University and twice a Fulbright Fellow.

For SHAFR, he has been the General Editor of The SHAFR Guide Online: An Annotated Bibliography of United States Foreign Relations since 1600, soon to produce its next edition. He has presented at most SHAFR conferences since 1997 and has served a term on SHAFR Council. He served as co-chair of the Michael H. Hunt International Book Prize fundraising committee and, in 2019, its inaugural prize committee chair. Finally, he currently serves as Associate Editor of Diplomatic History.

SHAFR has a stellar record of expanding not only the definition of its field of study to include far more than interstate relations but also the profile of its membership. I would be devoted to enhancing both those worthwhile efforts because more can always be done. As a French Canadian, I am especially excited about the internationalization of our membership and its continuing embrace of multinational research as a way to truly capture multiple perspectives of U.S. international history. Perhaps it’s even time to hold a SHAFR conference outside North America…

Another major area of concern in these difficult times is looking out for the most vulnerable among our members (and members-to-be). SHAFR must work to help students at all levels and those looking for meaningful employment to secure the resources they need to do advanced research, form networks, and build careers that promote the goals and values of SHAFR. Among many other possibilities, there is much more we can do to reach out to undergraduates, help contingent faculty, and connect with the broader public while embracing innovation, diversity, and fiscal discipline.

Council (At-Large seat #1)

Susan Colbourn is Associate Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, based at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. A long-time SHAFR-ite, she is a diplomatic and international historian specializing in the Cold War. Her current research focuses, in particular, on NATO, the politics of European security, and the role of nuclear weapons in international politics and society. She is the author of Euromissiles: A Transatlantic History, forthcoming from Cornell University Press in 2022, and the editor, with Timothy Andrews Sayle, of The Nuclear North: Histories of Canada in the Atomic Age, published with UBC Press. Her work has appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies, The International History Review, Cold War History, and the Washington Post, among other outlets. Prior to joining TISS, Susie held postdoctoral fellowships at International Security Studies at Yale University and at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. She earned her Ph.D in History at the University of Toronto.

Vanessa Walker: I am the Gordon Levin Associate Professor of History at Amherst College. My research and teaching explore the intersection of human rights, foreign relations, and grassroots activism. I am the author of Principles in Power: Latin America and the Politics of U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy (Cornell, 2020) and several articles on the Carter Administration's human rights policy. I also periodically write op-eds for outlets like Politico. I am the recipient of several national awards including a Graduate Fellowship at the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and the Stanton Foundation Applied History Fellowship. My SHAFR service includes terms on the Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation
This sort of representation is critical for SHAFR, especially at this time of upheaval in higher education. As a council member, I would help SHAFR be responsive to these efforts, particularly supporting educators in this precarious time for higher education.

**Council (At-Large seat #2)**

**Sarah Miller-Davenport:** I am Senior Lecturer in U.S. history at the University of Sheffield and author of Gateway State: Hawai‘i and the Cultural Transformation of American Empire (Princeton 2019), which received support from SHAFR and honorable mention for the British Association of American Studies book prize. My new project explores the reinvention of New York as a global city in the 1980s.

I'm honored to be nominated for council. SHAFR is my main professional organization and intellectual community. I joined as a graduate student at the University of Chicago and have attended nearly all conferences since 2015. I have served on both the graduate student fellowships committee and task force on open access. I would love to expand my service by serving on council and would bring an international perspective with my experience working in the UK. I am also committed to furthering the project of making SHAFR more inclusive in both membership and scholarship, which are mutually reinforcing goals. As a historian of the U.S. and decolonization, I am particularly excited to see the growth in historiography on U.S. colonialism, a subject attracting a diverse cohort of scholars interested in the intersections of race, power, and U.S. foreign relations.

**William Michael Schmidli:** I am University Lecturer at Leiden University in the Netherlands (equivalent to associate professor in the U.S.). My research focuses on the significance of human rights and transnational networks from the Cold War to the present. I am the author of The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy toward Argentina (Cornell 2013), articles in Diplomatic History, Cold War History, and Diplomacy and Statecraft, and co-editor of The Reagan Administration, the Cold War, and the Transition to Democracy Promotion (Palgrave 2019). I have received fellowships from the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, and the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study.

I have been an active member of SHAFR since 2004. I attended the Summer Institute, and received the William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grant and the honorable mention in the Stuart L. Bernath article prize competition. I served on the Michael J. Hogan Fellowship Committee and I have participated on panels at nearly a dozen SHAFR conferences. I would bring to the Council a commitment to facing the challenge of academic precarity and a desire to build bridges with students, academics, and scholarly organizations outside of the United States.

**Council (Teaching seat)**

**Joy Schulz** is a history instructor at Metropolitan Community College in Omaha, Nebraska. Her book Hawaiian by Birth: Missionary Children, Bicultural Identity, and U.S. Colonialism in the Pacific (University of Nebraska Press, 2017) won the Western History Association's Sally and Ken Owens Award for best book on the history of the Pacific West in 2018. Schulz has published in Diplomatic History and the Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth (Johns Hopkins Press) and has served SHAFR as a member of the Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship Committee and the Diplomatic History editorial board. Her second book on 19th century Polynesian women in political leadership and US foreign policy in the Pacific is forthcoming from the University of Nebraska Press. If elected to the Council, Joy would work to increase the attendance at SHAFR conferences of teaching faculty and high school instructors who are responsible for teaching dual enrolled American and world history courses.

**Molly Wood:** I am professor of history at Wittenberg University, where I have taught U.S. history and U.S. Foreign Relations history since 1999. My research focuses on gender and American diplomatic representation, and includes an award-winning article, “Diplomatic Wives,” in the Journal of Women’s History. I continue to publish numerous journal articles, book chapters, and reviews every year. I serve in multiple capacities as an external reviewer, and I participate regularly in national and international conferences, including the annual SHAFR meeting. My administrative and professional service experiences include Department Chair, Director of the Honors Program, and service on most of the major faculty committees at Wittenberg. In addition, I am president of the Wittenberg Chapter of the AAUP and I have served as President of the Ohio Academy of History. My service to SHAFR includes the Junior Faculty Award committee, the program committee in 2017-2018, and two terms on the Teaching Committee. I am delighted that SHAFR members voted to set aside a position on Council for a representative from a small undergraduate teaching-focused institution, where I have spent my entire career. This sort of representation is critical for SHAFR, especially at this time of upheaval in higher education.
Benjamin V. Allison is a second-year Ph.D. student at the University of Texas at Austin specializing in US foreign and national security policy since 1945, especially toward the Middle East and Russia. He recently published his first scholarly article in Perspectives on Terrorism. Ben is also revising several papers for publication and is the lead author of a book project on the logic of violence in jihadist insurgencies. He has authored entries in several encyclopedias and reviewed books for numerous journals. Both as an undergraduate and graduate student, Ben has placed in several Phi Alpha Theta National Paper Prize Competitions, and is the recipient of two FLAS fellowships from the US Department of Education.

Beyond this, Ben served on the executive councils of the Phi Alpha Theta chapters at Grove City College and Kent State University, helped plan several conferences, and sat on the Kent State University History Department’s Graduate Student Advisory Council. A SHAFR member since 2018, Ben is committed to amplifying student voices. This is demonstrated most clearly in his active participation in SHAFR (he organized conference panels in 2020 and 2021) and his July 2021 Chronicle of Higher Education piece on solving the academic jobs crisis.

Kelsey L. Zavelo is a doctoral candidate in history at Duke University, where she is also completing certificates in African & African American Studies and college teaching. Her research emphasizes the intersection between domestic and foreign affairs. Kelsey is particularly interested in exploring how “outsiders” participate in the making of the American experience. Her dissertation, “Apartheid Diplomacy: South Africa and the Remaking of the American Right,” maps the intellectual and material ties between the apartheid state and movement conservatives in the United States to show how South Africa, as an idea as well as a state in search of international legitimacy, shaped U.S. politics and culture during the Cold War. For her teaching, Kelsey received an “Outstanding Graduate Student Teaching Award” from NC State and a Bass Instructional Fellowship from Duke to teach a new course, “U.S. Social Movements in Global Perspective.” She has represented graduate students at public and private universities. In addition to holding multiple leadership positions in graduate student associations, for two years Kelsey worked as the graduate services coordinator for history and public history programs at NC State. She welcomes the opportunity to support a broader community of graduate students as a member of SHAFR’s Council.

Nominating Committee

Julia Irwin is an Associate Professor and Associate Chair of History at the University of South Florida. She earned her Ph.D. in History from Yale University in 2009. Her research focuses on the place of humanitarian assistance in 20th century U.S. foreign relations and international history. Her first book, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening (Oxford, 2013), is a history of U.S. international relief efforts during the First World War era. She is now completing a second book, Catastrophic Diplomacy: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance in the American Century. Julia has published in such journals as Diplomatic History, Journal of American History, the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, First World War Studies, and Passport, and in edited volumes published by Oxford and Cambridge University Presses. In 2011, she was a co-winner of SHAFR’s Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize, and in 2020, she received SHAFR's Bernath Lecture Prize. Julia has served SHAFR in many capacities over the years, including as a member of Council (2017-2020), as Program Committee co-chair for the 2020 annual meeting, on the Robert Ferrell Book Prize Committee (2016-2018), and on the Development Committee (since 2021).

Aileen Teague: Aileen Teague is an Assistant Professor in the International Affairs Department at Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public Service. She previously held a postdoctoral fellowship at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. Teague earned her Ph.D. in History from Vanderbilt University in 2018. Her research focuses on issues of interventionism, militarization, drug control, and security. She is currently drafting a book manuscript, based on her dissertation, that examines the effects of U.S. drug policies and policing efforts on Mexican politics and society from 1960 to 2000. The study incorporates a transnational approach, using archival sources from Mexico and the U.S. to explore the origins of bilateral drug enforcement measures and their relationship to Mexican state formation and U.S. drug addiction. Teague’s work has been published in journals including Diplomatic History and the Social History of Alcohol and Drugs. Her research has received support from organizations including Fulbright, SHAFR, and the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the UC, San Diego, where she served as a visiting fellow. Born in Panama, Teague travelled the world as part of a military family and served in the Marine Corps. She teaches classes on American history and U.S.-Latin America relations.

2021 SHAFR elections will begin in early August and will close on September 30. Ballots will be sent electronically to all current members of SHAFR.
Franklin Roosevelt's twelve-year term in office was not only one of the most dramatic presidencies in U.S. history, it was arguably the most transformative in terms of U.S. foreign relations. When Roosevelt came to office in the depths of the Great Depression, his primary focus was domestic politics. By the time of his death in 1945, the place of the United States in world affairs had changed almost beyond recognition. Just four years earlier, the nation struggled over how to respond to war in Europe and Asia. Now, it approached the end of the Second World War as the world's most powerful nation, and one that was setting the terms of the postwar order. More than anyone else, Franklin Roosevelt enabled that transformation.

Unsurprisingly, historians have spent the last eighty years debating America's rise to power and Roosevelt's role in that process between 1933 and 1945. Was Roosevelt an "isolationist" in his first term as he prioritized domestic affairs? How did Roosevelt react to the growing presence of fascism in Germany, Italy, and Japan as the 1930s progressed? How did he try to persuade a non-interventionist nation to play a more international role prior to 1941? How successful was the wartime Grand Alliance? Did Roosevelt "sell-out" Eastern Europe to Stalin at the Yalta conference? More generally, did Roosevelt move in a reactive style from crisis to crisis, or did he have a broader foreign policy vision?

David Schmitz's portrayal of Roosevelt in The Sailor: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of American Foreign Policy is one of a president who held a consistent worldview and foreign policy. While the direction of policy travel may not always have been straight, the destination was always clear: a role for the United States "as a world leader with its power and influence extended globally" (ix). Using the nautical analogy invoked in the book's title, Schmitz argues that Roosevelt's inconsistencies were examples of "tacking," or necessary changes in direction in order to achieve an ultimate goal. There were rhetorical and policy diversions, but they were undertaken in order to navigate the United States to its rightful place on the world stage. For Schmitz, Roosevelt's destination was one that entailed multilateral cooperation with other nations, and that followed the path charted by the Good Neighbor Policy, the Four Freedoms, and the Atlantic Charter.

Unsurprisingly, there is an enormous literature on Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy. Yet as Schmitz notes, "it is surprising that there is only a single, one-volume study of FDR's foreign policy, Robert Dallek's Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945" (x). Schmitz clearly sees The Sailor as a successor to Dallek's 42-year-old book, and the books certainly have their differences. Dallek's book, which still holds up well, is more dense and encyclopaedic and less overtly argument-driven than The Sailor, which in turn is more digestible. As Benjamin Coates notes in his review, Schmitz's easily readable book offers "an accessible and engaging portrait of an important era." They are however, less different in argument that Schmitz suggests. Schmitz's opening assessment of Dallek's book attempts to put clear water between the two works, with Schmitz claiming that Dallek "sets out the prevailing view that Roosevelt was an isolationist who became, due to pressures outside the Western hemisphere, a reluctant interventionist in world affairs" (x). However, Dallek's 1995 afterword states, "in his approach to foreign challenges, Roosevelt was a model of consistency," and the book's subheadings make it clear that Dallek saw Roosevelt as an internationalist throughout his presidency. Still, The Sailor is definitely a different book, as it offers a more positive interpretation of Roosevelt's diplomacy than Dallek, or most other historical works on Roosevelt for that matter.

The two reviewers differ overall but both find material to commend in The Sailor. Autumn Lass's review is extremely positive and describes The Sailor as both a "comprehensive evaluation of President Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy" and "a must read for scholars of U.S. foreign policy in the 20th century." Lass highlights Schmitz's focus on Roosevelt's foundational beliefs of internationalism and American exceptionalism as well as the importance of his experiences during the Great War. Lass also praises Schmitz's emphasis on the Good Neighbor policy in revealing continuity in Roosevelt's vision. She also acknowledges Schmitz's main criticism of Roosevelt: that he relied too heavily on personal diplomacy, which made it all too easy for the Grand Alliance to collapse after FDR's death. Otherwise, both reviewers comment on the generally sympathetic portrayal of Roosevelt presented in The Sailor. Lass and Coates acknowledge how Schmitz generally defends Roosevelt on the most controversial issues of his administration (the internment of Japanese Americans being the one indefensible exception), notably the Pearl Harbor attack, his policy towards the Holocaust, and his negotiations with Stalin over Poland. Other controversial issues where Schmitz takes a positive view of Roosevelt's policies include Roosevelt's deception of the American public regarding the 1941 attack on the USS Greer, and the American deal with Nazi collaborator Admiral Jean Darlan in 1942 to ease the invasion of North Africa. Yet Coates is almost certainly correct when he writes, "it is difficult to dispute Schmitz's claim that Roosevelt 'made the correct decisions on the major issues.' Beyond that, Coates asks questions of the broader implications of the book's positive view of Roosevelt's legacy. In particular, with an eye on subsequent history and
David Schmitz’s *The Sailor* has a clear message for readers: “Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the most important and most successful foreign policymaker in the nation’s history” (242). In Schmitz’s view, FDR managed to blend idealism and realism into a pragmatic optimism that could achieve principled ends. Even as he continued to operate within the constraints of domestic and international politics, Roosevelt transformed America’s global role, led the nation through a victorious war, and lay the groundwork for a peaceful postwar world.

Schmitz harvests metaphors from FDR’s long experience with sailing to describe his ability to adapt to political winds. Roosevelt’s “ability to tack” taught him “at a young age patience and flexibility, and that there was more than one route to a final destination” (2). Roosevelt changed course frequently without deviating from his ultimate goal, Schmitz contends. A United Statesworksheet is a term, FDR famously bragged that he had written the “most successful foreign policymaker in the nation’s history.” Whomever you ultimately agree with, the nature of the exchange shows how Schmitz is correct when he says, “the postwar world was, in numerous ways, Roosevelt’s world” (242). It also shows that the debate over Franklin Roosevelt’s foreign policy shows absolutely no signs of abating. This is of course no surprise. After all, in many ways we all still live in Franklin Roosevelt’s world.

At its heart, *The Sailor* is a crisp chronological narrative history of U.S. foreign relations between 1933 and 1945. Focusing on presidential decision making and rhetoric, it covers familiar ground with light and eager steps.

Schmitz explains that Roosevelt’s “sense of American exceptionalism was the source of his internationalism” (26), and suggests that his unwavering belief in America reflected a secular faith. FDR condemned European imperialism as backward and defended America as “an unselfish nation” (25). Aside from a brief mention of Roosevelt’s “paternalistic outlook” (25), Schmitz does not dwell on the hypocrisy of America’s simultaneous military occupations of multiple Caribbean nations (FDR famously bragged that he had written Haiti’s constitution [25]). Schmitz does show how, during his first presidential term, FDR proclaimed a Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America, ended the U.S. occupation of Haiti, and abolished the Platt Amendment in Cuba.

Schmitz helpfully highlights the role of economics in FDR’s early policies. Roosevelt held an essentially liberal world view: market relations, properly regulated by the state, left everyone better off. Like his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, he believed that economic competition and irrational arms races underlay most world conflicts. Careful diplomacy and free trade would show even Hitler and Mussolini that cooperation offered more benefits than war. Accordingly, FDR embraced a policy of economic appeasement toward the dictators during his first term. But for the Germans, the appeal of power overrode any promise that long-term cooperation might have held. “These trade treaties are just too god-damned slow, the world is marching too fast,” FDR complained (86).

By the end of 1930s FDR had abandoned his view of fascists as frustrated victims of a botched Versailles peace. They were instead menaces to international society. Hitler was “the enemy of mankind” (124), and American security depended on halting the Nazis. But the American people weren’t ready, and so FDR embarked on a twin program of increasing U.S. aid to Britain while laying the rhetorical groundwork for American participation in European war. Schmitz’s narrative hits the familiar highlights: the goodwill that underlay most world conflicts. Careful diplomacy and free trade would show even Hitler and Mussolini that cooperation offered more benefits than war. Accordingly, FDR embraced a policy of economic appeasement toward the dictators during his first term. But for the Germans, the appeal of power overrode any promise that long-term cooperation might have held. “These trade treaties are just too god-damned slow, the world is marching too fast,” FDR complained (86).

By December 1941 the United States was a co-belligerent in all but name, and FDR had convinced a majority of the American people that U.S. security required a Nazi defeat, though they still hoped that might be accomplished without the United States officially joining the war. At the same time, FDR believed that economic coercion could discourage Japanese imperialism without leading to war. The attack on Pearl Harbor proved this faith misguided.

Schmitz’s coverage of the 1941 to 1945 period emphasizes wartime strategy and postwar planning. He provides a detailed description of American disagreements with Churchill over the desirability of a cross-channel

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**Note:**

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**Trustling Franklin with the Tiller**

*Benjamin Coates*

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Current affairs, Coates raises the issue of tension between Roosevelt’s foundational beliefs of internationalism and American exceptionalism. What happens when other nations are unwilling to go along with an American vision? How did Roosevelt envisage dealing with such cases? In his response, Schmitz reaffirms his strong belief that Roosevelt did not see internationalism as a willingness to use armed forces unilaterally. He also argues that Roosevelt’s foreign policy cannot be reduced to a desire for global dominance. Of course, other Americans with similar internationalist worldviews struggled with that tension before, during, and after the war. Some became world federalists, while others became staunch supporters of containment and the Truman Doctrine. How Roosevelt’s policies would have evolved through 1945, 1946, and 1947, we will of course never know.

Coates raises other criticisms, notably of Schmitz’s rather generous view of the Good Neighbor policy (which saw the United States support some dubious authoritarian regimes), and the way he “explains away” some of Roosevelt’s inconsistencies as “simple tactical maneuvering.” Indeed, what one observer might see as frequent tacking another might see as policy inconsistency (and there was a lot of tacking in Roosevelt’s first term). More broadly, Coates sees Schmitz’s sympathetic portrait of Roosevelt as “one unlikely to fully persuade those who do not already share this faith.” In response, Schmitz defends his overall conclusion that Roosevelt was “the most successful foreign policymaker in the nation’s history.” Whomever you ultimately agree with, the nature of the exchange shows how Schmitz is correct when he says, “the postwar world was, in numerous ways, Roosevelt’s world” (242). It also shows that the debate over Franklin Roosevelt’s foreign policy shows absolutely no signs of abating. This is of course no surprise. After all, in many ways we all still live in Franklin Roosevelt’s world.

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invasion. Clear accounts of the meetings at Casablanca, Tehran, and Yalta show how FDR, Stalin, and Churchill hashed out the terms of the postwar military settlement and global governance (more on this later). FDR’s public speeches helped to define the war as one not only for the present but also for the future. “It was Roosevelt more than anyone who provided a unifying purpose to the fighting for the American people as, throughout the war, he consistently invoked the Four Freedoms and the idea of the United States,” Schmitz writes (140). He portrays FDR as simultaneously optimistic (he never doubted that the Allies would win the war) and pragmatic (he believed it necessary to compromise with Britain and the Soviets).

Schmitz offers brief asides that address FDR’s most controversial policies. He acknowledges the internment of Japanese Americans as “Roosevelt’s greatest failure” (147) but otherwise defends the president against his critics. There is no evidence, he notes, to sustain the charge that FDR “manipulated Japan into war” or purposefully left Pearl Harbor undefended (136). On the Holocaust, Schmitz endorses the argument of Richard Breiman and Allan J. Lichtman that “FDR was neither a hero of the Jews nor a bystander to the Nazi’s [sic] persecution and then annihilation of the Jews” (178). Roosevelt might have taken a stronger stand (incurring political risks in the process), but doing so would have made little impact in any case. Defeating Hitler was the only way to stop the killing.

Finally, Schmitz defends FDR’s actions at Yalta against those who have alleged that the president “was duped by Stalin, appeasement Russia, and gave away Eastern Europe” (221). All sides made compromises, he insists, and while FDR was forced to implicitly acknowledge the reality of Soviet control over the areas occupied by the Red Army, the Declaration of Liberated Europe at least established “a principle” of self-determination “as an aspiration . . . even if it did not change anything immediately” (228). Most importantly, negotiations at Yalta maintained Big Three unity and cooperation to finish a war whose end was still not yet guaranteed, especially in Asia. FDR sought to maintain a productive relationship with Stalin in the hope that continued partnership would assuage the Soviet Union’s fears and, in the words of Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, “influence its evolution away from dictatorship and tyranny” (227).

Schmitz’s research relies heavily on FDR’s public speeches, supplemented (especially in later chapters) by documents from relevant FRUS volumes. He occasionally includes sources from the FDR Library. In putting FDR at the center of his study, for the most part Schmitz ignores how other actors shaped the world in which the president acted. Experts will find little that is new. But I suspect that undergraduates will love this book. Its extensive quotations of the president and succinct explanations make for an accessible and engaging portrait of an important era.

What are scholars to make of Schmitz’s interpretation of FDR? When it comes to wartime strategy or his political inclinations, it is difficult to dispute his claim that Roosevelt “made the correct decisions on the major issues” (240). The president maintained an approval rating above 70 percent during the war (152)—a war that resulted in total victory and relatively few American casualties. (That the victory came at a great cost to Soviet, Japanese, and German civilians as well as soldiers is a fact that gets less attention here).

More contentious is the debate over just what sort of world order FDR built. Stephen Wertheim has recently argued that the significance of FDR’s leadership lies not in the creation of the UN and other multilateral organizations but in the establishment of a commitment to American primacy: the belief that U.S. and world security required American military dominance worldwide. In his telling, WWII birthed not a “liberal world order” but rather America’s “Endless Wars.” The United Nations, Wertheim contends, was simply a fig leaf for American power, one that “imbue[d] postwar American supremacy with a legitimacy it could not have otherwise obtained.”

Schmitz disagrees. He sees FDR as a pragmatic leader seeking to build a cooperative world order in which U.S. leadership would be the means of preventing war rather than enabling it. The Good Neighbor Policy serves as a key example. Roosevelt trumpeted it as “proof that an internationalist approach to national security could work” (49) and held it up as a model for the world. Built on “cooperation, nonaggression, and multilateral exchange,” U.S. relations with Latin America showed how to “replace empire with collective security. . . . There was no balance of power in the Western Hemisphere, yet there was no imperial empire either” (156). This statement nicely encapsulates FDR’s exceptionalist beliefs in the beneficence of America even as it downplays the economic and diplomatic hegemony that continued to characterize U.S.-Latin American policy in the 1930s.

Schmitz’s description of the Good Neighbor Policy is also an example of what I find most frustrating about this book: a tendency to uncritically adopt the categories of historical actors and to use vague terms in obfuscating ways. When FDR asserted, in Schmitz’s paraphrase, that “only American leadership could bring postwar peace, prosperity, and stability,” or that “permanent peace and continuous prosperity could only be secured in a world where the United States took up its rightful role and responsibilities,” what exactly did he mean?

Depending on how the terms are defined, “leadership” can be exercised through negotiation or coercion. A nation’s “rightful role and responsibilities” could mean providing a good example and giving material aid, or it could mean exercising military domination. “Internationalism” has often been used to imply multilateral cooperation when in practice it has really meant the willingness to use armed force unilaterally.

Schmitz too often lets these terms stand uncritically, but he does acknowledge FDR’s inconsistencies. He notes that despite his nominal embrace of multilateralism, FDR rejected Churchill’s suggestion that the Atlantic Charter include a call for an “effective world organization.” This might come eventually, FDR suggested, but only after a period “during which an international police force composed of the United States and Great Britain had had an opportunity of functioning” (127). Roosevelt’s later actions indicate that he believed such a period would last indefinitely.

The United Nations may have projected an image of multilateral cooperation, but FDR saw the General Assembly as “an investigative body only” (235). “[The real decisions,” FDR explained, “should be made by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China, who would be the powers for many years to come that would have to police the world” (173). FDR also explicitly warned Americans on multiple occasions that future peace would require a willingness to use force (196, 209). Careful readers will note the limits of Roosevelt’s commitment to cooperative internationalism.

Schmitz at one point notes that FDR considered jettisoning multilateral cooperation altogether. While he hoped that the Grand Alliance would continue after the war and create peace through great power cooperation,
he was also willing to seek peace “based on American power and unilateral planning by the West” (197). This is why he refused to share the secret of the atomic bomb with the Soviets. Schmitz explains it this way: “With his characteristic optimism, the president believed that time would allow him to unite his two courses and overcome the conflicts through personal diplomacy” (8). He thus explains away FDR’s conditional commitment to cooperation as simple tactical maneuvering: “Roosevelt did not care about the exact route taken as long as he hailed the ship of state to a secure port that would protect American interests and values, prevent future wars, and secure the necessary balance to produce postwar peace and prosperity” (7).

The precise nature of that destination port requires more critical attention. Roosevelt’s internationalism was instrumental. It accepted cooperation when useful but relied on unilateralism when necessary. In the end the American “ship of state” found a fortified harbor from which it launched an endless series of deadly projectiles into peasant villages around the world. Had he lived, perhaps Roosevelt might have found more pacific waters, but it is important to recognize that this violent outcome lay within the parameters of the course that FDR set. Launching an armed flotilla made war a constant possibility, even if Roosevelt’s internationalist vocabulary implied a more peaceful heading.

Notes:
5. It also overlooks the importance of Latin American organizing and pressure that made non-intervention a hemispheric norm. See, among others, Greg Grandin, “Your Americanism and Mine: Americanism and Anti-Americanism in the Americas,” _American Historical Review_ 111, no. 4 (November 2006): 1042–1066, esp. 1054. _The Sailor_ briefly acknowledges the role of dictators in maintaining order during the Good Neighbor period (42), and Schmitz himself has written about the topic more extensively elsewhere. See David Schmitz, _Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States & Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965_ (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999), chaps. 2–3.

Unwavering Commitment to Internationalism & Exceptionalism: A Review of David Schmitz’s _The Sailor: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of American Foreign Policy._

_Autumn Lass_

David Schmitz’s _The Sailor_ provides a comprehensive evaluation of President Franklin Roosevelt’s foreign policy. While many historians – Warren Kimball is one example – have examined FDR’s wartime foreign policy, not since Robert Dallek, with his _Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy_, has a historian examined FDR’s entire approach to foreign policy.

Schmitz laments this historiographical lacuna and seeks to rectify it in _The Sailor_. Schmitz argues Roosevelt’s approach to foreign policy was not only transformative but consistent throughout his entire political career. His argument challenges the common historical interpretation that President Roosevelt was an opportunistic leader who lacked “continuity” in his foreign policy implementation (x). Instead, Schmitz maintains that Roosevelt was unfailing in his belief in internationalism and the United States’ place in the world.

Schmitz utilizes a plethora of sources to demonstrate that Roosevelt’s support for internationalism was longstanding. His thorough inspection of archival evidence is one of Schmitz’s greatest strengths, and his examination of the sources clearly shows that Roosevelt was neither fickle nor arbitrary in his world view. Instead, he had a definite picture of what the world should look like following World War I and how the United States fit into that world, and one of Roosevelt’s main goals as a public servant was to make his worldview a reality.

Throughout the book, Schmitz repeatedly links Roosevelt’s foreign policy approach to two foundational beliefs: American exceptionalism and internationalism (4). He argues that “Roosevelt believed that American values were universal…. He was an internationalist who consistently worked to expand America’s role in the world through multilateral institutions and collective security” (8). Schmitz claims that examining Roosevelt’s entire presidency (1933 – 1945) proves that his approach to international affairs was always consistent. He sought to advance about anti-imperial ideals, spread American values, and create international institutions to promote world peace throughout his presidency.

One of Schmitz’s most important contributions to Roosevelt scholarship is his analysis of Roosevelt’s early expressions of his foreign policy beliefs and the important lessons he learned from the Great War. First, Schmitz argues that FDR learned early on, as assistant secretary of the navy, that “domestic affairs and international relations were inseparable” (20). He saw firsthand the importance of having public opinion coalesce around foreign policy (14). When the U.S. public did not support Wilson’s goals, it prevented Wilson from achieving those lofty ambitions in 1918.

Roosevelt also concluded that in the aftermath of the Great War, Americans simply did not understand that the United States’ national interests were directly tied to assuming its place as a world leader. Nor did they fully comprehend that peace and prosperity were directly linked to the United States leading the world into the future (13). He felt, therefore, it was his job to “properly guide” them and show them that their best interests were connected to the United States assuming its role as a global power (19).

FDR saw the Great War “as a continuation of the fight for freedom at home that had marked the nation from the outset and an opportunity to create a new international system” (24). He was so committed to the ideas presented in the League of Nations that he helped to establish the Woodrow Wilson Foundation to help promote Wilson’s international vision. Even after the Great War, he promoted these ideas in his public speeches and published essays. For example, in a _Foreign Affairs_ article published in 1928, he argued “that the United States was an exceptional nation destined for world leadership” (29). He pushed back against Republican interpretations of American exceptionalism, which he believed were rooted in unilateralism, imperialism, and neutrality. Instead, he outlined what he believed were the true tenets of American exceptionalism, tenets that would ultimately serve as the foundation of his foreign policy: international cooperation, anti-imperialism, and collective security (30–31).

After examining the underpinnings of Roosevelt’s foreign policy assumptions, Schmitz goes on to show how he began to implement those ideas early in his presidency with the Good Neighbor Policy. Even though his number-
one priority was addressing issues related to the Great Depression, he believed that improving U.S. foreign policy was still vital to securing long-term peace and prosperity, first in the Western Hemisphere and then eventually in the world.

Schmitz contends that through the creation and implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy, Roosevelt was able to “make concrete in the Western Hemisphere his principal conceptions about international relations that would guide American foreign policy through World War II” (36). He took steps to bring about hemispheric cooperation, end imperialistic policies in Latin America, foster multilateral institutions, and promote collective security (38). And he used the policy not only to bring about bold changes to U.S. foreign policy, but also to begin the process of educating the public about the “proper role of the United States in the world” (38).

Roosevelt focused on two large goals in the years after the 1936 election and just prior to the start of World War II. First, he worked on implementing the successes of the Good Neighbor Policy globally to help create peace and prosperity, especially with conflict growing in Asia and Europe. Second, he set out to “redirect public opinion” in order to gain support for his internationalist foreign policy (64). To do this, he started a national conversation about America’s place in the world to sway the public away from neutrality to internationalism and to lead them to appreciate their position in the world, particularly in regard to international tensions especially in Europe (63). In his inaugural address in 1937, he claimed that the Good Neighbor Policy had brought peace to the Western Hemisphere and encouraged Americans to see that hemispheric peace was not all they should seek.

Schmitz identifies the Quarantine Speech of October 1937 as “the most significant statement of [FDR’s] internationalist understanding of world events up to date” (77). In the speech, Roosevelt argued that the United States would not be able to avoid growing violence in Japan and Germany. He implored Americans to understand that they should help other countries that were standing up for peace and liberalism not only for the sake of U.S. national security but also because it was the moral thing to do. He ended the speech by reaffirming that while America had to actively search for paths to peace, it could not remain passive (79). This speech marked the start of a nearly four-year public campaign—often referred to as the Great Debate—to persuade Americans to support their allies.

Roosevelt also needed to change minds in Congress, where neutrality was strongly preferred to internationalism. He had some mild success when Congress finally agreed to amend the Neutrality Acts to allow his cash-and-carry proposal. Roosevelt saw this as a step in the right direction, because the provision would aid to Great Britain, increase security (38). And he used the policy not only to bring about bold changes to U.S. foreign policy, but also to begin the process of educating the public about the “proper role of the United States in the world” (38).

According to Schmitz, 1941 was the pivotal year for Roosevelt’s goal of transforming American foreign policy. The president’s public messaging shifted to the creation and promotion of his Four Freedoms – his foundational principles – and the Lend-Lease Policy. Schmitz contends that Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms provided the “ideological justifications” for the war and Lend-Lease was the policy to make the United States the defender of those freedoms abroad (96). The combination of these two, he writes, served as Roosevelt’s “fulcrum” to launch his internationalist policies.

Schmitz claims that the Four Freedoms created the justifications for a just war and provided the foundational concepts for Roosevelt’s postwar world. Lend-Lease then provided the early methods, short of war, to defend the values embodied in the Four Freedoms overseas. The program allowed the administration to claim publicly that it was trying to keep the nation at peace while simultaneously standing for freedom abroad. Roosevelt linked Lend-Lease to the Good Neighbor Policy. Both policies were used to promote cooperation and internationalism, champion democratic ideals, and protect American interests. The message created overwhelming support from Americans by the mid-spring of 1941 (100 – 101).

From 1941 onward, Roosevelt also focused on developing his Grand Strategy. He wanted to immediately aid Great Britain. He wanted to tackle the Nazi regime first, because he believed it posed the greatest threat to democracy in the world (116). He also expanded his interpretation of the scope of the Monroe Doctrine to include protecting the Atlantic Ocean (119). The Lend-Lease program helped Roosevelt realize those goals even before the U.S. officially entered the war.

In August 1941, the United States and UK agreed upon the Atlantic Charter. The charter was composed of the fundamental components of Roosevelt’s international worldview and the Grand Alliance (127), which remained the most important goal of Roosevelt’s Grand Strategy (123). Schmitz argues the agreement to build a “permanent peace built upon international cooperation” by establishing “a wider and permanent system of general security” was the most essential element of the charter to Roosevelt (127). In meant that by the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, the president had completely transformed American foreign policy. It was now an internationalist policy, rooted in protecting the concepts of the Four Freedoms, promoting collective security (as would be seen in the Grand Alliance),
and establishing a new “multilateral, international organization” that encouraged American ideals abroad (138).

According to Schmitz, nothing symbolized Roosevelt’s vision for the postwar world more than the Grand Alliance, because out of it would come the foundations for the United Nations’ Security Council (141). Keeping the alliance together took all of Roosevelt’s skills as a leader and personal diplomat. The biggest obstacle Roosevelt faced was getting the British and the Soviets to work together and set aside national interests for the greater good. Tensions related to the Soviet Union’s role in the Grand Alliance continued until Roosevelt’s death in 1945. Although it was his presence and commitment to the alliance that held it together, it was, according to Schmitz, his “overreliance on personal diplomacy” in managing Churchill and Stalin that left the Alliance vulnerable to future problems (241).

The zenith of Roosevelt’s foreign policy aspirations lay in the creation of the various international institutions that came out of the war. The establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank institutionalized and internationalized the ideas behind the Good Neighbor Policy (207). The Bretton Woods Conference created the framework for the United Nations and served as the shining achievement of Roosevelt’s foreign policy transformation (229). These institutions promoted peace, prosperity, and American values (208). They institutionalized and globalized the Four Freedoms and continued building upon the principles outlined in the Atlantic Charter (217).

Schmitz argues establishing the international system based on American values, collective security, and cooperation was Roosevelt’s greatest legacy (242). He maintains that FDR’s commitment to American exceptionalism and internationalism created the postwar world. Ultimately, he concludes these contributions make Franklin Roosevelt the “most important and most successful foreign policy maker in the nation’s history” (242).”

_The Sailor_ provides an extensive examination of Roosevelt’s foreign policy aspirations and shows how he made that worldview a reality. Schmitz hammers home throughout the book that the most important elements of FDR’s foreign policymaking were rooted in internationalism and American exceptionalism. He excels at illustrating that FDR’s foreign policy approach was consistent and rooted in the same ideals throughout his time as a public servant, and that consistency is made abundantly clear in his analysis and discussion of the influence of the Good Neighbor Policy on FDR’s entire foreign policy throughout the 1930s and 1940s. His analysis adds to the historiography of the Good Neighbor Policy’s importance when it comes to assessing and understanding Roosevelt’s larger foreign policy goals.

Since Schmitz’s analysis focuses solely on FDR’s foreign policymaking ideology, it does not thoroughly examine FDR’s failures, such as Japanese internment or provide a detailed discussion of what influence the Holocaust had on his foreign policy approach. While Schmitz acknowledges these issues, they are not at the forefront of his analysis. He does explore FDR’s struggles in managing the fate of Poland while maintaining the Grand Alliance. Poland was the fly in the ointment for the alliance, and the unresolved tensions over Poland almost immediately created problems for the Truman administration, which eventually morphed into larger tensions between the Soviet Union and the rest of the Grand Alliance. While Schmitz indicates that FDR laid out a roadmap for Harry Truman to follow to achieve postwar peace, he acknowledges Roosevelt’s emphasis on personal relationships meant that after his death, problems would inevitably arise, particularly in the Grand Alliance (238 & 241).

Overall, however, _The Sailor_ provides an excellent evaluation of the foreign policy ideas of FDR’s presidency. Schmitz clearly demonstrates that FDR’s vision of a world with peace, prosperity, and collective security were always at the forefront of his mind, whether in the Good Neighbor Policy, the Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, Lend-Lease, or the management of the Grand Alliance. He achieves his goal of showing continuity in Roosevelt’s approach to foreign policymaking, and he shows that Roosevelt’s methods were always rooted in internationalism and American exceptionalism. His work enhances both the historiography of FDR’s foreign policy and U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century.

**Author’s Response**

David F. Schmitz

I thank Andrew Johns for organizing this roundtable and Benjamin A. Coates, Andrew Johnstone, and Autumn Lass for their participation.

Autumn Lass has provided an excellent summary of my work and has engaged with the central arguments of _The Sailor_, with a particular focus on the ideas and concepts that formed the basis of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s foreign policy and how it marked a transformation of the U.S. approach to the world and its security. I am pleased that she highlighted the importance of FDR’s views on foreign policy prior to becoming president. Roosevelt’s experience as assistant secretary of the navy under President Woodrow Wilson and his numerous statements on international relations during the 1920s have not been widely examined even though they set out the key assumptions FDR held about the United States and its role in the world when he became president. As Lass correctly notes, Roosevelt entered the White House convinced that only an internationalist approach to foreign policy could ensure America security and prosperity. This understanding shaped the Good Neighbor Policy, which was the president’s first step to implementing his internationalist policy.

Lass is also correct to note that the implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy was linked to Franklin Roosevelt’s efforts to challenge the existing view of American security as being best maintained through a policy of hemispheric defense that relied on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans for protection, neutrality, and territorial integrity. The thirty-second president saw these views as outdated, ineffective, and dangerous and set out to change the American public’s understanding of their nation’s place in the world. To Roosevelt, the only means to protect American security and interests was through an internationalist approach based on the United States taking up its role as a world leader, collective security, preparedness, and working with other nations through multilateral institutions to create a world order conducive to American values and interests. His long-term effort to change the basis of American foreign policy culminated in the shift in public opinion in 1940 in support of his position.

As Lass points out, I see these views coming together in what I termed the “fulcrum” of Roosevelt’s foreign policy in December 1940 and January 1941 with the announcement of Lend-Lease and the Four Freedoms, along with the president’s declaration that the United States would be the
importance of his faith to both Roosevelt's confidence and the form of a prayer (203). To me, this all demonstrated the I quote from his D-Day message to the nation that was in fireside chats invoking God's blessings and guidance, and throughout the book of Roosevelt in his speeches and certain in the end” (5-6). Furthermore, there are examples up-curves are always the longer, and the net advance is progress has had its periodic ups and downs but that the master, Mr. Peabody, teaching us that material and spiritual Roosevelt stated in 1926: “I well remember my old school and the school's emphasis on Christian character had on its director, the Episcopalian minister Endicott Peabody, out the influence of his time at Groton and the impact that Christian and a Democrat—that's all,” and note that “these asked what his political philosophy was, he stated “I am a and I set out in the introduction that when FDR was “little about Roosevelt's religious background” and the basis it provided for the president's confidence. I agree that religion did play a crucial role in Roosevelt's confidence, and I set out in the introduction that when FDR was asked what his political philosophy was, he stated “I am a Christian and a Democrat—that’s all,” and note that “these were the two central points of his worldview” (2). I point out the influence of his time at Groton and the impact that its director, the Episcopalian minister Endicott Peabody, and the school's emphasis on Christian character had on Roosevelt and his view of American exceptionalism. As Roosevelt stated in 1926: “I well remember my old school master, Mr. Peabody, teaching us that material and spiritual progress has had its periodic ups and downs but that the up-curves are always the longer, and the net advance is certain in the end” (5-6). Furthermore, there are examples throughout the book of Roosevelt in his speeches and fireside chats invoking God’s blessings and guidance, and I quote from his D-Day message to the nation that was in the form of a prayer (203). To me, this all demonstrated the importance of his faith to both Roosevelt's confidence and policymaking.

Coates’s primary concern with The Sailor is in regards to definitions. Neither reviewer commented on my analysis of how Franklin Roosevelt developed the concept of national security as part of his internationalist policy, and how it shaped the president’s “grand design” for the postwar world (200). Yet, this is what Coates found “most frustrating” about my work: “a tendency to uncritically adopt the categories of historical actors and to use vague terms in obfuscating ways.” Coates is correct that terms can have different definitions, and employed in different ways by different people. The meaning of key terms and concepts is certainly a worthy issue for discussion and an area where there can be disagreement. I believe that my use of terms is clear and reflects how President Roosevelt intended them, and, therefore, disagree that Roosevelt used internationalism to mean “the willingness to use armed forces unilaterally.”

Coates notes that I do address the times when Roosevelt was inconsistent in his policies. Often, as Coates points out, I see these inconsistencies as tacking by Roosevelt, necessary maneuvering and compromises to reach his ultimate goal. This gets back to the greatest weakness of FDR's policymaking, his reliance on personal diplomacy. It left room for other people to interpret his views and follow policies that I do not believe Roosevelt intended or would have done had he not died in April 1945. The “fortified harbor” that Coates notes was not Roosevelt's creation. Although I agree that Roosevelt's policies, as I note, “shaped the thinking of the next generation of American leaders and Cold War policy;” (10) I do not believe post-World War II American foreign policy can be reduced to just a quest for “military dominance worldwide.” As I state in the book's conclusion, “the postwar period, of course, did not turn out entirely as President Roosevelt desired,” (241) with the breakdown of the Grand Alliance and the emergence of the Cold War. Nonetheless, I did find that Roosevelt's “grand strategy was sound; the Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the Nuremberg trials, and the concept of universal human rights, all became cornerstones of the Western alliance system.” Along with the victory over fascism in World War II, these are significant achievements and explain how Roosevelt transformed American foreign policy from hemispheric defense to internationalism and why I hold to my conclusion that “Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the most important and most successful foreign policymaker in the nation’s history” (242).

Kyle Longley, Jeffrey F. Taffet, Evan R. Ward, Mateo Jarquin, Thomas C. Field, Jr., and Vanessa Walker

Roundtable Introduction

Kyle Longley

Scholars of the United States and Latin America will recognize that the arguments of the human rights advocates of the 1970s and 1980 sound eerily familiar to those of American activists in the 1920s who opposed Washington’s interventions in the Caribbean Basin. Several non-governmental organizations joined together to protest U.S. interventions, especially in Haiti and Nicaragua. They called for withdrawal, highlighting widespread reports of Marine atrocities including the bombing of civilians and mutilation of corpses.

In particular, the All-American Anti-Imperialist League led the charge. Its members raised money for medical supplies for the insurgents led by Augusto César Sandino and hosted speeches of his brother, Socrates. They collaborated with like-minded congressmen as well as members of the media led by Carleton Beals at *The Nation* and a young Ernest Gruening. Ultimately, they helped pressure the Coolidge Administration into starting the process of withdrawing, a process aided by the Great Depression and the beginning of the Good Neighbor policy during the Hoover Administration.

Such activities in the 1920s and 1930s reinforce several valuable contributions of Vanessa Walker’s *Principles of Power: Latin America and the Politics of U.S. Human Rights* including the diverse actors concentrating on human rights, the centrality of Latin America as America’s workshop, and the challenges faced by the “movement” in changing the direction of U.S. foreign policy relating to Chile and Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s. It is a complex topic that Walker handles very deftly, making a significant contribution to the historiography on foreign relations and human rights as well as the larger context of the United States and Latin America.

A diverse group of scholars have reviewed the book for this forum. They generally praise the work including Thomas Fields who characterizes the book as “elegantly organized and beautifully written” and “among the most engaging recent works on U.S. relations with Latin America.” He also highlights how Walker employs transnational historical methods and how she underscores the importance of non-state actors such as the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS). He concludes that Walker’s “sober conclusions make Walker’s book an uncomfortable yet urgent read.”

Fields finds little to criticize and focuses primarily on the many positives. Ultimately, Fields only notes that the “body of this book seems . . . to cut against the optimism of its conclusions” where the author recommends that U.S. citizens, especially vis-à-vis debates on human rights, continue to challenge U.S. policy. But this reflects more on the conclusions rather than the overall quality of the book.

Mateo Jarquin also compliments the book, highlighting that “Vanessa Walker’s new book is a welcome scholarly intervention” in a fresh understanding of the origins of human rights policy. He adds: “Her historical analysis persuasively argues that any 21st century human rights policy should be both self-reflective—acknowledging violations at home as well as U.S. complicity in abuses abroad—and meaningfully integrated with broader strategic goals.” He concludes that “*Principles in Power* is both valuable and timely.”

Jarquin, however, critiques one element of the book, primarily its “laser focus on the Chilean and Argentine cases” that “undermines its aspirations to Latin Americanize the history of U.S. human rights policy.” Instead, he proposes that the “books arguments might have been bolstered by a minimal discussion” of the differences in U.S. policy toward the region including Cuba (Fidel Castro only receives one mention) as well as Nicaragua and the efforts against Anastasio Somoza Debayle (where Carter had some successes). Here, Jarquin believes even a minimal discussion would have strengthened elements of the argument and further highlighted how the region perplexed the Carter Administration including the fact the Argentine government provided funding governments in Nicaragua and Guatemala when Congress and the White House cut off aid. He concludes “these omissions do not detract from Walker’s careful analysis of the Chilean and Argentine cases” but “they do raise questions about the use of those two countries as proxies for ‘Latin America.’”

Jeffrey Taffet shares the impression of the others. He observes: “Among Walker’s significant contributions in her well-executed and well-researched” book “is explaining the difficulties in transforming Carter’s idealistic vision for a ‘new American foreign policy’ into practice.” He adds: “Walker’s emphasis on the role of human rights activists...is effective in illustrating the difficulties in developing a national human rights policy and in showing how the Carter administration changed over time.”

Taffet does raise some areas to consider. First, he asks about “addressing cultural and historical ideas about Latin Americans” or “discussions over internationalism or...
political power from a philosophical perspective,” both of which could relate to answering the questions about what motivated people to focus on human rights. While difficult to develop for the heterogenous group, it appears that asking questions on cultural and possibly socioeconomic positions might have been useful.

Finally, he notes the book “harkens to a different and earlier moment when US-Latin American relations was firmly a subfield of U.S. foreign relations history rather than of international history. The point of this book is not to explain how U.S. efforts in Latin America transformed Chile and Argentina, but in understanding how they transformed the United States.” However, he stresses: “This is not a critique, but rather an observation from a historian who would like to see this kind of work appreciated as vital.”

Evan Ward also finds many strengths in the work, highlighting that Walker “dettly creates a sophisticated model of how non-governmental organizations, Congress, and the executive branch influenced a more compassionate foreign policy.” She does so by diving deep into the existing source material, both government and non-governmental.

He praises other elements, emphasizing: “Walker’s signal contribution to the scholarship of U.S.-Latin American relations rests on her examination of how left-leaning advocacy organizations’ including WOLA, IPS, and the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) ‘collectively known as ‘The Movement’ pressured for increased legislative oversight of presidential negotiations with Cold War allies that repeatedly violated the human rights of their citizens.” Beyond the NGOs, Ward also highlights the role of Carter and government agencies including the State Department and Pentagon played in shaping what sometimes seemed a battle between the idealism and realpolitik, often leading to disconnects between major actors. By doing so allowed, Ward believes Walker developed the story vis-à-vis especially Chile and Argentina.

But Ward finds some challenges, largely and probably relating to his own focus as a Latin Americanist rather than foreign relations scholar. “The chief weakness of the study lies in the absence of an explanation of the tepid response of Latin American nations to U.S. Cold War policy generally.” Part of this may relate according to Ward with “the heavy reliance on English-language documents” as well as what he feels is a “solid grounding in the contemporary and historical context of Latin American politics and history” which limited telling the story from the Latin American perspective, a problem often caused by the lack of availability of foreign archival sources as opposed to that found in places such as the United States or England.

In response, Williams directly addresses Ward’s critique by highlighting other excellent works including those of Kathryn Shikkink, Michael Schmidli, and Patrick Cone was uniquely influential in establishing the working assumptions and mechanisms which started before Carter’s tenure.” Here, there appears to be some disconnect between Williams and Jarquin. It appears Jarquin really seems to want not a full-scale examination but some acknowledgement in the introduction or conclusion that the Central American and Caribbean Basin cases mattered vis-à-vis human rights during the period discussed. But Williams clearly articulates a reasonable explanation of her choices.

In the final part of her response, Williams underscores one of her most significant contributions as she responds to Fields. “It seems to me we often fall into a no-win situation in conversations about where human rights fits into the U.S. foreign policy agenda,” she notes. “I believe that my work shows that human rights is not necessarily a trade-off between morality and objectives like national security or economic development,” she observes, adding, “the universalist rhetoric that accompanies human rights often makes tradeoffs and compromises unpalatable.” But she concludes “like all interests, there are hard choices and moment when one issue will surpass another.” This leads her to stress: “We need to accept compromise and grapple with these complexities in this as in all issues if we want to have viable policies.” This complexity and nuance clearly show the author has addressed some of the major challenges of not only human rights policy, but the general challenges of issues including ideology in U.S. foreign policy.

In conclusion, these reviews clearly articulate the importance of this work in the historiography of U.S. foreign relations (particularly with Latin America) and human rights and its growing significance as a cornerstone of various administrations since the Carter Administration. Williams has shown the centrality of the Latin American case studies in countries that many people overlook, including some Latin Americanists. She skillfully weaves into the narrative the importance of non-governmental actors and shows both their successes as well as failures. Ultimately, this is a timely book as the Biden Administration tries to reestablish some credibility on the global stage relating to human rights after four years of the president gravitating towards dictators throughout the world, showing just how much the issues remain unacknowledged the same as the 1970s.

Review of Vanessa Walker, Principles in Power: Latin America and the Politics of Human Rights Diplomacy

Jeffrey F. Taffet

As Vanessa Walker explains, President Jimmy Carter’s May 1977 speech at Notre Dame laid out a “philosophical expression of the goals of integrating human rights into a broader reorientation of U.S. policy and interests that transcended old Cold War paradigms” (96). She quotes Carter’s most poetic line, that “For too many years, we’ve been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We’ve fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty.” Carter argued later in the speech that “it was a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy - a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.”

Among Walker’s significant contributions in her well-executed and well-researched Principles in Power: Latin America and the Politics of Human Rights Diplomacy is
explaining the difficulties in transforming Carter's idealistic vision for a "new American foreign policy" into practice. As she writes, in addressing the brutal dictatorships in Chile and Argentina, congressional leaders and human rights activists wanted immediate action and results. They wanted Carter to cut diplomatic ties and expected him to ostracize and isolate their leaders. But Carter, both instinctively and practically, believed such a course would not lead to the freeing of political prisoners and the end of repression. He thought it was more likely that critical engagement with the Chilean and Argentine regimes would lead to change; closing the door to bi-lateral conversations would just limit U.S. influence. He believed that without engagement repression might get worse, as there would be no reason for military regimes to modify their systems. As importantly, in considering how to push Latin American leaders, Carter was sensitive to charges that human rights policies could be understood as a form of imperialism. Chilean and Argentine leaders would become stronger and less resistant to external pressure if they could make the case to their citizens that the United States was trying to exert hegemonic power. Yet for activists and congressional leaders, a nuanced course of action seemed to legitimize dictatorship. It was realpolitik, of a kind, to critics who saw evil, and the critics abhorred compromising with that evil.

Walker's emphasis on the role of human rights activists, generally considered together in the text as "The Movement," is effective in illustrating the difficulties in developing a national human rights policy and in showing how the Carter administration changed over time. Groups such as the Institute for Policy Studies and the Washington Office on Latin America coordinated their efforts through the Human Rights Working Group to lobby sympathetic congressional leaders to cut U.S. aid to the South American dictatorships. Tracing their impact in the policy process allows Walker to tell a bigger and more meaningful story about public engagement in the making of foreign policy and to demonstrate the vital point that Carter was, in many ways, a follower as much as a leader in the construction of the human rights foreign policy agenda.

In the first chapter, Walker's deft exploration of U.S. responses to Augusto Pinochet's Chilean dictatorship from 1973 to 1977, before Carter's election, sets the framework for the rest of the text. Calling Chile a "cause célèbre," she argues that "The Movement" emerged in this period. She describes how efforts to challenge Pinochet's regime, and resistance from the Nixon and Ford administrations, energized leaders such as Joe Eldridge from the Washington Office on Latin America, as well as legislators like Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Donald Fraser (D-MN).

Emphasizing this pre-Carter period allows Walker to explain the larger human rights moment, and to contextualize Carter within that moment. It also allows her, toward the end of the text, to effectively explain how Carter's 1980 defeat was not the end of the human rights era. She emphasizes that Ronald Reagan's administration embraced its own rhetorical version of a human rights agenda. The key distinction, Reagan administration officials explained, was that Carter had overlooked the abuses of Communist regimes. Communists the world over had consistently violated the basic human rights of their people, and their global aspirations made them a far more potent threat than the military regimes in South America that were only doing their best to counter radical leftism.

The emphasis on Chile as a catalyst also raises questions though. It is not entirely clear why Movement leaders cared so much about human rights there, or about human rights in general. The same question can be asked about activist congressional leaders. Why did they emphasize human rights? Why did they commit so much energy to this cause? Certainly, one obvious answer could be that they saw wrong in the world, and believed they had the power and the responsibility to become involved. But what distinguished them from other social justice activists?

For some Movement activists, especially exiles or those connected to Orlando Letelier's assassination, Chilean repression was obviously personal. That is a harder case for the bulk of U.S.-based activists for whom these issues were more abstract. Yes, Allende's saga was an international cause célèbre, but was that enough of an answer to call for a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy? Walker does not make the case that engaged officials and activists somehow felt responsible for the Chilean and Argentine coups. This was not about righting a historical wrong, it was about fixing Latin Americans, and it involved a kind of moral paternalism.

Walker does not go down this road though, and there is little in the text that addresses cultural and historical ideas about Latin Americans, or that engages discussions about internationalism or political power from a philosophical perspective. Without detours in these directions, the reader is left with questions about personal motivations, and the analysis remains at the level of what activists did, rather than why they did what they did. This is the case, as well, to some extent for Carter and his inner circle. They cared about human rights, but there is a missed opportunity in the text to place their concerns within a deeper vein of the national experience or their personal position on this question might have been interesting to interrogate with different kinds of evidence that explored his background and its connection to his moral vision.

Greater engagement with cultural questions might have also allowed Walker to engage the Reagan administration's critique in other ways. Walker discusses Jeanne Kirkpatrick's infamous essay, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," and explains that its philosophy pervaded Reagan's inner circle. It is easy to critique Kirkpatrick's view as morally bankrupt and a shallow justification for changing tack on military dictatorships. But Kirkpatrick and Reagan were not completely wrong. Carter's administration was more engaged in fighting right-wing totalitarianism than left-wing totalitarianism, and with the exception of Jewish groups, the Movement looked south but not east.

For Carter, that may have been a concession to fighting the Cold War and a recognition of the limits of his power, but it also flew in the face of his own call for a "new American foreign policy" rooted in "constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision." It also left him politically vulnerable as he had no effective response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; it seemed that his human rights agenda was blindly naïve in a world where neither Chile nor Argentina represented much of a threat to global security and where Communists were on the march. Starting the text with the story about Chile and its impact on the development of the Movement also leads to questions about the longer history of human rights. Walker does not offer a full explanation about how concerns with human rights and criticisms of U.S. foreign policy as supportive of dictatorship predated the Chilean coup in 1973. Unquestionably, they gained prominence in its aftermath, and Chile may have been an accelerator, but human rights concerns were rooted in a longer narrative that challenged national direction and national morality on the global stage.

Walker does explain that the traumas of Vietnam
were in the ether in which the Movement and human rights activism matured, but it might have been helpful to explore the connections between anti-war protests, the counterculture, and human rights concerns in greater depth. It would also have been fruitful to explore how movement leaders stood on fields sown by iconoclasts like Wayne Morse (D-OR). Throughout the 1960s, Morse waged a lonely battle to challenge U.S. foreign aid to dictatorships in places like Thailand, Egypt, and Indonesia. His opposition to the fighting in Vietnam, and his brave vote against the Gulf of Tonkin resolution (along with his ally Ernest Gruening (D-AK)) were functions of his belief that the central problem in Vietnam was that the United States was backing a repressive military dictatorship whose behavior was incompatible with U.S. national values.

Beyond Morse, and after his failed 1968 reelection effort, his colleagues in the Senate, including notably Frank Church (D-ID) and Jacob Javits (R-NY) increasingly prioritized human rights in their consideration of foreign aid bills. Opposition to supporting the Greek military, and anger about Nixon's lack of interest in the issue, was a key reason for the Senate’s decision not to pass the foreign aid bill in October 1971 – the first time an aid bill had failed. Thus, a counterargument, or perhaps an extension or modification of Walker’s argument, is that the Chilean regime’s brutal repression began after human rights activism had already developed and that Chile should be seen instead as a vital accelerant to its maturation.

Walker is certainly well aware of the scholarship on the earlier roots of the human rights movement. She includes works by leading scholars on the issue, including Barbara Keys, William Michael Schmidli, and Sarah Snyder in her bibliography, and thanks all three in the acknowledgments. I suspect she would agree with my suggestion about Chile’s place in the history of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Her choices on this issue, if I read her correctly, are more about making a point about the centrality of U.S. relations with Latin American states. She wants to demonstrate how the Latin American timeline, with the Argentine coup following the Chilean one, created concerns within the United States about the region. She wants to explain how responses to Chile and Argentina advanced the cause of human rights policy in the United States government. Most importantly, she wants to emphasize that Chile and Argentina were the focus of human rights policy at the moment that human rights concerns were the most intense in U.S. history.

Considering Walker’s text in this respect, as a study in how people in the United States understood Latin America, and how they tried to transform Latin American states, makes this book something of a throwback in the evolving historiography of U.S-Latin American relations. Most recent scholarship in the field has pursued a transnational approach in which U.S. policy is decentered in an effort to understand multiple perspectives within international relationships. The wide acclamation of Tanya Harmer’s Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (2011) suggested that scholarship had to follow this model, and recent superlative work such as Eric Zolov’s The Last Good Neighbor: Mexico in the Global Sixties (2020) and Amy Offner’s Sorting Out the Mixed Economy: The Rise and Fall of Welfare and Developmental States in the Americas (2019) has demonstrated its continuing vitality.

Walker’s book swims against this current and harkens back to a different moment when US-Latin American relations was firmly a subfield of U.S. foreign relations history rather than of international history. The point of this book is not to explain how U.S. efforts in Latin America transformed Chile and Argentina, but explaining how they transformed the United States. Her narrative is firmly planted in the United States, and while the text does explain aspects of Chilean and Argentine history, it does so mostly to explain U.S. action. This is not a critique, but rather an observation from a historian who would like to see this kind of work appreciated as vital. There is room for both kinds of scholarship, especially when done well, and perhaps Walker’s considerable successes might free other scholars of U.S. foreign policy to embrace their inner U.S. domestic historian.

Note:

An Inconvenient Presidency: James Earl Carter, the Battle for Democracy, and Vanessa Walker’s Principles in Power: Latin America and the Politics of U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy

Evan R. Ward

In his highly anticipated opening statement on foreign policy, President Joseph Biden linked American “values” to the nation’s objectives abroad. “We must start with diplomacy rooted in America’s most cherished democratic values,” he announced, “defending freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights, respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity.” It was this constructive expression of human rights that would form the core, then, of his administration’s comportment abroad. “That’s the grounding wire of our global policy—our global power,” Biden affirmed. “That’s our inexhaustible source of strength. That’s America’s abiding advantage.”

Months earlier, when he was pitching his new biography of Jimmy Carter, the architect of modern human rights as a matrix for U.S. foreign policy, journalist-turned-biographer Jonathan Alter predicted that Biden would push for human rights. But Alter envisaged a push for human rights. Contrasting the absence of a policy, not to mention a Department of State human rights appointee, during the Trump presidency, Alter envisaged that “within days of taking office, former Vice President Joe Biden and his choice for secretary of state [will] revive the human rights policy begun under [Jimmy] Carter and move to stem the authoritarian tide [of the early twenty-first century].”

Released about the same time as Alter’s His Very Best: Jimmy Carter, A Life (New York, 2020), Vanessa Walker’s Cornell University imprint, Principles in Power: Latin America and the Politics of U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy (2020), provides a sophisticated prism for understanding the battle for democracy that lay at the heart of a Carter-driven human rights policy in U.S. foreign relations, forged in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the Watergate Crisis. Like historian Greg Grandin, who contends that Latin America has served as a testing ground for U.S. foreign policy more generally, Walker contrasts the narrow interpretation of human rights as a policy directive (on display during the Ford and Reagan presidencies) with the more expansive approach the Carter administration took in its dealings with Argentina and Chile. On the domestic front, Walker’s study links the growing influence of non-governmental organizations on the decisions of Congress and the presidency following Vietnam and Watergate.

Walker’s analysis begins in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam and Richard Nixon’s resignation. These events called into question the status of democracy and the rule of law in the United States. With this succession of events, failures in foreign policy and presidential probity brought
to light disfunctions in the governing apparatus.

Walker considers the posture of the executive and legislative branches toward U.S. foreign policy in Argentina and Chile following the rise of authoritarian regimes in each South American republic. In Chile, Augusto Pinochet carried out a devastating attack on the Salvador Allende regime, punctuated by an air assault on La Moneda, Chile’s seat of governing power, on September 11, 1973. Shortly thereafter, military generals in Argentina called an end to the chaos generated by Juan Perón’s second administration (as well as the short-lived government of his third wife), mounting a coup that would give rise to a “dirty war” (1976–1983) against alleged communist agitators.

Walker’s signal contribution to the scholarship of U.S.-Latin American relations rests on her examination of how left-leaning advocacy organizations, including the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), collectively known as “The Movement,” pressed for increased legislative oversight of presidential negotiations with Cold War allies that repeatedly violated the human rights of their citizens. She effectively mines organizational newsletters and citizen-driven letter campaigns to sympathetic senators and congressional representatives during the Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies, and she notes a growing responsiveness in the executive branch to congressional and non-governmental critiques of official postures toward Argentina and Chile. These domestic displays of democratic practice were of great importance, as they led to closer executive oversight of military funding of the offending allies, particularly during the Carter presidency.

The structure of the book highlights the anomalous nature of Carter’s sensitivity to universal human rights. In chapter 1, Walker contrasts Carter’s human rights policy with the narrower formulation adopted by Gerald Ford’s administration. The second chapter probes the complexities of Carter’s articulation of a human-rights-focused foreign policy, and the following two chapters examine his efforts to persuade Chile (chapter 3) and Argentina (chapter 4) to abandon their authoritarian practices. Finally, chapter 5 points up the unique moment that was the Carter presidency by demonstrating Ronald Reagan’s return to a more narrowly constructed human rights approach that privileged support for anti-communist regimes in Chile and Argentina.

While Walker deftly creates a sophisticated model of how non-governmental organizations, Congress, and the executive branch influenced a more compassionate foreign policy, the chief weakness of the study lies in the absence of an explanation for the tepid response of Latin American nations to U.S. Cold War policy generally.

If these were the musings of a Soviet specialist sizing up New World republics that had nurtured liberal institutions with varying degrees of success since the first quarter of the nineteenth century, they still resonated during the Eisenhower presidency with John Foster Dulles’ low estimation of these same nations’ abilities to develop democracy as an antidote to Soviet onslaughts.

Indeed, as David M. Schmitz argues in Thank God They’re on Our Side: the United States and Right Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965 (Chapel Hill, 1999), Cold War security often trumped promotion of democracy in the face of totalitarian threats. According to Dulles himself, the United States had “to take a realistic view of the situation and recognize that at this time, to support a somewhat backward situation, it is the lesser of two evils, because the possibility of peaceful change is very much diminished by the fact that you have constantly with you, for instance, the tactics of the Soviet Communist forces which take advantage of every opportunity to capture and lead the so-called reform [read, democratic] and revolutionary movement.”

These conservative policies, bereft of—or even antagonistic to—the ideals of open society, fell still further below what Latin American diplomats, domestic leaders, or even citizens hoped to gain from Cold War collaboration with the United States. When presented with the Charter of the Organization of American States at Bogota in 1948, the United States exacted full support for anti-communist initiatives throughout Latin America. This support materialized in the form of the National Security Doctrine, in which the United States, borrowing from the Monroe Doctrine, pledged to thwart hemispheric challenges to liberal republics of the Americas while ceding internal control of communist threats to national governments (and militaries) that would be supported with United States military aid.

As historian Robert Trask has noted, however, assenting Latin Americans aspired to greater economic and social support in exchange for their loyalty. To their consternation, Trask writes, “the Latin American delegates, still concerned about the political and economic dominance of the United States in the hemisphere, hoped that the OAS would lead to genuine equality of nations in the region and provide a framework for the economic development of the American republics.” What they received was much different, for “the United States, as events later would make clear, looked upon the OAS mainly as an agency for collective defense in the Americas; from this perspective, the new OAS was consistent with and a part of the containment policy.”

If Walker elides much of this background, which is inevitable in part because of her heavy reliance on English-language documents, she effectively identifies the source and methods through which Carter articulated his constructive formulation of human rights as a foreign policy objective. As for the source of his ideas, Walker notes that Carter’s agenda closely followed the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Rights (1948).
According to her analysis, Carter used an expansive definition of human rights that went far beyond the absence of torture and genocide and the suppression of basic freedoms and provided for the very economic and social benefits envisioned by Latin American delegates at the OAS’s opening conference in Bogota a generation earlier.

Thereafter, Walker points to this more positive formulation of human rights as a key distinguishing factor, in addition to greater transparency in dealing with Congress, between Carter’s administration and the Ford and Reagan presidencies, which interpreted human rights more narrowly. It was for this reason that Latin American governments were joined by U.S. officials during the Reagan presidency in acknowledging the singularity of Carter’s interpretation of human rights, which included “a broad spectrum of rights, including food, health care, and education, as well as bodily integrity and personal liberty” (188).

Indeed, as Robert Pastor, Carter’s go-to advisor on Latin America, observed in retrospect, “Carter is clearly viewed as a man of great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately, sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. Carter’s stature has translated into real influence unlike anything the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America, which we had almost lost” (188).

In addition to identifying the source of Carter’s human rights agenda, Walker’s book also examines his modus operandi: the application of persuasion through dialogue with allies and adversaries alike. In the case of Argentina and Chile, members of the Movement decried the president’s invitation to Augusto Pinochet and Jorge Rafael Videla to the ceremonial return of the Panama Canal to Panama in Washington in 1978. Carter had hoped his engagement would persuade them into compliance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

Walker underscores the frustration of citizens, bureaucrats, and politicians sympathetic to Carter’s vision, though not his methods. In this she concurs with Hal Brands, one of the more recent analysts of the Cold War in Latin America, who writes that “Carter’s human rights policies were continually contested and impervious. The State Department, NSC, and Defense Department bickered over both the ultimate aim of the policy and how strictly it should be enforced.” It would only be in retrospect, during the Reagan presidency, Walker notes, that members of the Movement would come to appreciate what they had lost.

A secondary theme throughout Walker’s book is the elevated status that Latin America held in foreign policy considerations during Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Some of this may have been personal preference. Carter spoke Spanish and in an earlier era spent time evangelizing barrios in Springfield, Massachusetts, with a Cuban American pastor. It was more likely, however, that the geographic exigencies of the Cold War, with the closing of the Vietnam theater and the proximity of Cuba, led him to attend more closely to problems closer to home. If Carter’s overtures to South American dictators raised the hackles of the Movement, his dialogues with Castro, as well as his support for home-grown democracy in Nicaragua, raised questions among hawkish conservatives as to his fitness for Cold War standoffs.

Greg Grandin has written extensively about Latin America as a testing ground for more expansive U.S. policies farther afield, particularly in relation to the post-9/11 context of the U.S. War in Iraq. Walker, in turn, situates the region in that same role during the struggle of human rights and U.S. policy in the Southern Cone. While foreign policy initiatives further abroad may have attracted more attention, Walker writes, “Chile, and later Argentina, became the place to test the United States’ commitment to human rights and measure both the administration’s effectiveness and sincerity” (111). In that spirit, key mechanisms for decertifying military aid to unsavory allies took root, as did a human rights verification process often seen as interventionist by offending nations (including Chile and Argentina).

In the final chapter of the book, Walker illustrates how Latin America exposed the Reagan administration’s neglect of human rights and its penchant for focusing instead on Soviet violations of the Helsinki Accords (1975). In this sense, Reagan’s approach to foreign affairs was a return to the days of John Foster Dulles and George Kennan: anti-communist measures trumped the promotion of democracy. Walker underscores how this about-face—from what was viewed as Carter’s inconvenient policy—put the ruling juntas back into the good graces of the Reagan administration, negating progressive strides achieved in the late 1970s. She quotes Iowa congressman Tom Harkin, who noted that “we all acknowledged that the Carter policy has flaws, but in comparison with what we have seen in the past 11 months, it is a model of sobriety and effectiveness. [The] new administration has launched a full-scale attack on the policy of human rights” (242–43).

The significance of Walker’s contribution to the history of human rights as a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy generally and of her treatment of human rights more particularly in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s cannot be overstated, given the growing importance of the constructive interpretation of human rights envisioned not only by Carter, but increasingly, by his successors, whose world was more sensitive to environmental, economic, and social inequities—they that the Reagan administration refused to acknowledge. Ultimately, Walker notes, Carter’s “was a legacy that helped legitimize human rights in international relations and moved the U.S. government to embody those concerns in its policies and procedures” (252).

Carter biographer Jonathan Alter concurs in his recent work, observing that “Carter’s emphasis on human rights proved surprisingly durable. Even after Reagan’s first secretary of state, Alexander Haig, said human rights would take a ‘backseat’ to fighting terrorism, neither he nor other Reagan-era policymakers fully abandoned the Carter policy.” Ultimately, Walker’s analysis transcends the narrow temporal constraints of her study, identifying Carter’s brand of self-critical assessment as a model followed by later occupants of the Oval Office, most notably Barak Obama (his 2009 speech in Cairo comes to mind) and now President Joseph Biden.

Walker’s study could benefit, I believe, from a more solid grounding in the contemporary and historical context of Latin American politics and history. Providing more background in these areas would add deeper significance to the import (as well as the weaknesses) of Carter’s work. However, the absence of such backgrounding is compensated for by the dual articulation of how democracy and diplomacy interacted in the late twentieth century to redefine foreign policy objectives in ways that were more consonant with the values espoused by Carter and his successors.

Notes:
Any reset should be historically informed. In particular, fresh perspectives on the origins of U.S. human rights policy can help us better understand why powerful states sometimes advance the cause of human dignity and justice abroad, how such policies overlap with their economic and security interests, and what basic tradeoffs emerge when diplomats attempt to modulate the behavior of rights-abusing regimes. Vanessa Walker’s new book is a welcome scholarly intervention in this regard. Her historical analysis persuasively argues that any 21st-century human rights policy should be both self-reflective—acknowledging violations at home as well as U.S. complicity in abuses—and meaningfully integrated with broader strategic goals.

Walker bases her claims in a careful examination of U.S. policy toward Chile and Argentina under the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. These two South American countries offer a good vantage point for students of human rights policy. Like most Latin American countries in the 1970s, both were ruled by military dictatorships guilty of systematic human rights violations against dissidents including torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. Notably, Chile’s Pinochet and Argentina’s Military Junta committed these crimes in the name of values espoused by the United States in the global Cold War. Because these governments firmly aligned with Washington, dutifully collaborating with (and at times exceeding) U.S. anti-communist campaigns in the Western Hemisphere, American policymakers found it harder to condemn abuses in Santiago and Buenos Aires than in, say, Hanoi or Bucharest. And because their government was complicit in Chilean and Argentine misconduct through arms sales and diplomatic backing, U.S. activists and human rights-oriented political voices paid special attention to these South American countries.

Chile and Argentina were emblematic of a broader shift in U.S. diplomacy in the 1970s. Under the Carter administration, American diplomats became more vocally critical of abuses by allies in the Global South such as Iran and South Korea. In the case of Chile and Argentina, a real decline in U.S. military assistance accompanied the changing rhetoric. Principles in Power forces us to rethink the causes and nature of this policy change. Interestingly, the debates that emerged in Washington about Pinochet and the Argentine junta did not revolve exclusively around the best way to moderate their behavior. Nor was the human rights conversation within the Carter administration strictly concerned with appeasing an increasingly rights-conscious electorate. Walker demonstrates that there was much more at stake. After all, unlike abuses in the Eastern Bloc, one could make the argument that human rights violations in Latin America’s Southern Cone—where Soviet involvement was virtually non-existent and the threat of a “second Cuba” was remote—actually stemmed from U.S. policy. Therefore, the push for a human rights-oriented policy encompassed a broader discussion of U.S. Cold War interventionism abroad, the growing power of the presidency, and the lack of transparency and accountability in the making of foreign policy.

In nuancing the origins of contemporary U.S. human rights policy, Walker makes several contributions to the broader literature. First, she expands the list of key actors. The traditional elite players are still there; for instance, the tension between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski is a familiar theme. But the book places special emphasis on a constellation of left-leaning human rights activists—including NGOs such as the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)—which she refers to as “the Movement.” Congressional dynamics, electoral politics, and bureaucratic knife-fighting also play important roles. A multidimensional portrait serves key purposes in the wider argument. For the Movement, advocacy was designed not only to mitigate abuses in countries like Chile and Argentina, but also to curb U.S. interventionism in the so-called Third World and, at the same time, devolve greater foreign policy decision-making to the legislative branch. South American activists also helped set the agenda, demonstrating that foreign actors can be part of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, too. This multiplicity of viewpoints is nicely integrated into the well-written narrative. Taken together, they show that the Movement’s core principles—that human rights abuses in Latin America


Mateo Jarquín

Most observers of international politics seem to agree: The United States has arrived at a critical juncture in its relationship with the world. Both critics and supporters of the outgoing administration recognize that Trump’s diplomatic strategies disrupted decades-old doctrines and standard operating procedures. Thus, the Biden administration is confronted with the opportunity—the imperative, perhaps—to reset U.S. foreign policy, rethinking its primary aims and tools. As Kathryn Sikkink and John Shattuck recently explained in Foreign Affairs, the Trumanian disruption was decidedly for the worse when it came to human rights advocacy. As a result, restructuring in this realm is especially urgent.

Any reset should be historically informed. In particular, fresh perspectives on the origins of U.S. human rights policy can help us better understand why powerful states sometimes advance the cause of human dignity and justice abroad, how such policies overlap with their economic and security interests, and what basic tradeoffs emerge when diplomats attempt to modulate the behavior of rights-abusing regimes. Walker bases her claims in a careful examination of U.S. policy toward Chile and Argentina under the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. These two
were connected to U.S. hegemony in the region, and that the persistence of those abuses helped erode democratic norms and procedures at home— informs the Carter administration's dealings with the Chilean and Argentine regimes.

The book's multinational archival base and multilateral framing helps it illustrate the numerous tradeoffs that U.S. policymakers encountered as they sought to promote rights in those countries. For example, the Carter White House worried about how to distance itself from these abusive allies without sacrificing the leverage necessary to influence their behavior. U.S. officials also grappled constantly with the relative efficacy of using “carrots” versus “sticks” as tools to that end. In Santiago and Buenos Aires, Carter also faced a uniquely Latin American dilemma. How could an updated U.S. foreign policy acknowledge its past history of interventionism in the region, while at the same time promising to more aggressively police the behavior of its governments when it came to human rights? Right-wing Chilean and Argentine leaders often used the anti-imperialist rhetoric of national sovereignty—more often associated with the region's revolutionary Left—to counteract American human rights promotion. In addressing this understudied dynamic, Principles in Power contributes to a historiographical shift where, rather than seeing these South American governments as “puppets” of the United States, scholars increasingly treat them as autonomous, “fractional” allies with some power in the relationship.

More generally, Walker also works to position Latin America as an important site for the development of basic U.S. foreign policy approaches to the rest of the world. Historians have long seen Latin America as a sort of “workshop” where the United States has tested out policies and strategies it would later apply elsewhere. For example, Greg Grandin has explored how 20th-century interventions in the Western Hemisphere informed 21st-century military adventures in the Middle East. But Principles in Power shows that Latin America matters beyond the realm of military interventionism. The first chapter describes how Chilean politics catalyzed the rise of the Movement in the Ford years. The bulk of the book's chapters focus on the Carter administration, when “Latin America policy became a crucible for policy pairing human rights with greater respect for national sovereignty, and for challenging traditional Cold War alignments and interests.”

A final chapter on Reagan shows how his administration did not reverse but instead reinvented human rights policy. Under his watch, policymakers construed rights violations as a problem caused by communist subversion rather than U.S. policies, and argued that rights-abusing allies like Chile and Argentina—“partners in arms for human freedom”—were part of the solution rather than the problem. The narrative leaves no doubt that, to understand Carter's approach to the Helsinki Accords or Reagan's aggressive condemnation of human rights abuses in Eastern Europe, one should first look at how they approached Latin America.

Unfortunately, the book's laser focus on the Chilean and Argentine cases undermines its aspiration to Latin Americanize the history of U.S. human rights policy. Walker acknowledges that these two neighboring countries on the southern extreme of the continent “do not represent the experiences of all Latin America.” She also succeeds in showing that these two countries played a special, motivating role in the rise of the Movement and organizations such as the Washington Office on Latin America; “I find that it's appropriate,” wrote the institution's first director, “to mention Chile and WOLA in the same sentence.”

The roughly coterminous anti-communist dictatorships in nearby Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay simply did not receive the same combined emphasis from American policymakers and activists. But the book's arguments might have been bolstered by a minimal discussion of how U.S. human rights policy varied in those countries as a result of what Walker would call their “context-specific” attributes. Absent such an analysis, one is just left to assume that the dilemmas of rights promotion in Montevideo or Brasilia were similar, rather than different, to those in Santiago and Buenos Aires.

Readers almost certainly would have benefited from brief comparisons to Central America, where Carter and Reagan faced human rights challenges of a different scope and nature than the ones they encountered in South America. In the 1970s and early 1980s, allied governments in Guatemala (with Argentine support, incidentally) committed abuses on such a monstrous scale that a United Nations report later argued that genocide had taken place. In neighboring El Salvador, a U.S.-backed military regime behaved similarly; in the first year of Reagan's presidency, it perpetrated what WOLA officially considers to be “the worst massacre ever against civilians by state actors in Latin America.”

Given the magnitude of these and other crises, Walker's repeated emphasis on the centrality of Chile and Argentina sometimes feels unnecessary.

More importantly, Central America was essential to the policy debates described in Principles in Power. Consider the unmentioned case of Nicaragua which, as Walker has written elsewhere, was a crucial test of Carter's human rights policy. Scholars of the 1979 Sandinista Revolution agree that U.S. human rights policies helped determine the overthrow of the allied Somoza dictatorship by Cuban-aligned rebels because, as in Tehran, the Carter administration felt uneasy about providing potentially decisive military aid to a notoriously abusive government in Managua. Reaganite conservatives subsequently used the rise of the Sandinistas to portray Carter's human rights promotion as hypocritical (because, in their view, socialist guerrillas were inherently worse for human rights than right-wing dictators) and counterproductive (because the U.S. was dealt a strategic blow as a result). In discussing how Reagan “reinvented” human rights to suit his virulent anti-communism and militarized foreign policy, Walker rightly refers to an influential 1979 essay by top diplomat Jeane Kirkpatrick. In “Dictatorship and Double Standards,” she blasted Carter for chastising friendly anti-communist authoritarians instead of focusing on crimes committed in socialist countries. But in developing her argument, Kirkpatrick mentions Brazil, Chile, and Argentina only in passing, alongside other allies such as Taiwan. Instead, Iran and Nicaragua were the prime examples she explored in great detail to argue that under Carter, the U.S. “had never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third World."

While these omissions do not detract from Walker's careful analysis of the Chilean and Argentine cases, they do raise questions about the implied use of those two countries as proxies for “Latin America.” After all, Central America posed a fundamentally different dilemma to U.S. human rights policy than the Southern Cone of South America. Though Chilean and Argentine leaders justified their abuses as a logical response to communist subversion, their regimes were never really threatened by armed revolution. In Guatemala, by contrast, the state committed its abuses in the context of a decades-long armed conflict against leftist guerrillas. In El Salvador, the armed Left twice came close to toppling a U.S.-backed government. It succeeded in Nicaragua. In this much more heated Cold War environment, the cost-benefit analysis of human rights promotion surely looked different. Connecting
Walker’s insights on Southern Cone policy to the broader regional context – including the Cuban Revolution, which surprisingly is largely absent from this story – would enhance the discussion of Cold War Latin America as a staging ground for the germination of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policies.

These issues aside, Principles in Power is both valuable and timely. Its detailed study of U.S. policy in Chile and Argentina complicates the origins of official human rights advocacy and, as the book promises, shows historians the varied and sometimes conflicting purposes of this policy. At the same time, it raises deep questions for activists and policymakers currently pondering the future of human rights at a time of potential change in U.S. foreign policy.

Notes:
5. Ibid., 207.
6. Ibid., 5.
7. Ibid., 253.
11. See, for example, Robert Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (New York: Routledge, 1987).


Thomas C. Field Jr.

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, historians have produced a growing body of research on the role of human rights in United States foreign policy. It is a rich literature, offering a mixed assessment of the interplay between and relative capabilities of transnational nonstate activists, national governments, multilateral organizations, and superpowers. Like the contemporary human rights movement itself, this historiography has centered on parallel threads of human rights activism in Latin America and Europe that were sparked by disparate events, such as the 1973 Chilean coup d’état and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.1

As the subfield developed, scholars reached further backward to answer broader questions about the origins of the discourse in United States and world history.2 In the process, historians of human rights helped to pioneer the transnational turn in diplomatic history, ushering in fresh narratives of moments when nonstate activists shaped superpower foreign policies and international politics as a whole.3

Despite these accomplishments, international historians have identified frequent counterexamples where assertive governments were able to coopt, or “capture,” the activities of nonstate actors, oftentimes gaining the upper hand.4 Something of a historiographical stalemate has been reached, with existing literature pointing to a longstanding contradiction in which nonstate activist diplomacy emerges as both anti-imperial and interventionist, as social democratic and liberal capitalist. In short, it appears as both a leftwing and a rightwing political discourse. Those reading or writing histories of transnationalism and human rights may find this dualism rather disorienting.

Vanessa Walker’s powerful new book Principles in Power wrestles with these complex paradoxes. Elegantly organized and beautifully written, it is among the most engaging recent works on U.S. relations with Latin America. The book traces the emergence of the post-Vietnam human rights movement, a surviving expression of New Deal left-liberalism that quickly metastasized to include contradictory ideological currents from the Marxist left to the neoconservative right. The former took advantage of a 1970s spirit of détente to mount a human rights defense of Chile’s ill-fated socialist democracy, while the latter doubled down on longstanding U.S. opposition to leftist governments in Latin America by blending human rights with resurrected “traditions of American military strength and liberal internationalism” (249).

Taking up over half the book, Walker’s reconstruction of the emergence of human rights politics toward Latin America just before and during the early Jimmy Carter administration is invaluable. After four decades of Cold War triumphalism and “humanitarian intervention” from Cuba to the Philippines to Vietnam to Iraq to Libya to Venezuela, it is difficult even for many historians to recall how a specific discourse of Latin America human rights briefly emerged in détente-era United States as “a self-critical policy to address the failings of Cold War paradigms for domestic and foreign political power….a way to demonstrate an increased respect for sovereignty in the region and divorce the United States from interventionist legacies” (5, 10).

Despite representing a temporary departure from the liberal interventionism of earlier twentieth-century versions of human rights and humanitariansm, the anti-interventionists proposed a logical premise: the United States should apply human rights criteria primarily to its domestic sphere and to territories under allied control. To reverse this logic, as previous and subsequent administrations did by principally condemning enemies’ human rights abuses, would be futile at best. At worst, it would fuel regime-change operations that resulted in new waves of deprioritized human rights abuses by the United States and its allies.

To explain the brief emergence of an idiosyncratic, anti-interventionist version of human rights politics, Walker employs transnational historical methods to highlight the role played by nonstate activists like the progressive liberal Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the leftist Institute for Policy Studies (IPS). Catalyzed by widespread revulsion to Washington’s material support for far-right military governments in Latin America, especially in post-coup Chile, this collection of religious progressives, mainstream liberals, and the emergent left took advantage of the spirit of détente to redefine human rights politics as requiring a hands-off, non-interventionist foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere.

Unlike the original Good Neighbor Policy four decades earlier, however, the 1970s version called for cuts to U.S. military and economic support to dictatorships, resulting in Latin American juntas responding aggressively (and with nationalist vitriol) to what they suspected to be liberal imperialist meddling. In 1977, the minister-counselor at the U.S. embassy, Thomas Boyatt, met with Augusto Pinochet and reported that the dictator had raged at U.S. interference, declaring that “Chile was not a US colony.” That statement was ironically becoming increasingly true in the wake of Congress’s restrictions on U.S. military aid after the passage
of the Harkin amendment two years earlier (47–57, 126).

When the Carter administration and its erstwhile allies ran out of tools to wield against abuses in Chile and Argentina, they became painfully aware of the limitations of an anti-interventionist human rights discourse. It didn’t accomplish much beyond merely disassociating the United States from ongoing abuses. Nor was the administration wrong to suspect that Latin American militaries would not hesitate to reassess their alignment with the United States if it were deemed necessary for their own survival (150, 197–98). Indeed, after Congress succeeded in ending direct U.S. complicity in human rights abuses in Chile and Argentina by implementing wholesale pauses in new military contracts, progressive activists showed their true anti-interventionist colors by pushing for further punitive policies, such as pressuring international financial institutions to condition their lending on human rights records. Those suggestions were followed by proposals for U.S. government measures against Wall Street banks that conducted business with the South American dictatorships.

By meticulously reconstructing the chronologies of these competing tendencies within human rights politics, Walker’s study brilliantly reveals how short-lived its anti-imperialist version was and how quickly human rights discourses reverted to their entrenched tradition of liberal interventionism. It was one thing to convince Congress to cut off aid to human rights abusers. It was another thing entirely to mobilize U.S. foreign policy behind economic sanctions or regime change policies targeting allied countries.

These sober conclusions make Walker’s book an uncomfortable yet urgent read. Its surprisingly gripping narrative takes place almost entirely in Washington, DC, and to a lesser extent in Santiago, Chile. Argentina appears relatively late in the book (page 154–204), though it provides an excellent counterexample to Chile, in that the United States was less directly complicit in Argentinian human rights abuses. This lack of direct involvement obliged the Carter administration to resort to interventionist tones from the beginning and almost immediately provoked strong nationalist reactions from the Argentine government. (Walker includes priceless interviews with U.S. embassy officer “Tex” Harris, a fearless crusader against the junta in Buenos Aires.)

While this material is a bit jarring, coming after so many pages on the more obvious U.S. role in military Chile, the Argentina chapter nonetheless serves an important purpose. It was at this juncture that U.S. human rights politics approached their limit; and at this moment one can already sense the emergence of more traditional, interventionist versions of human rights diplomacy, tendencies that were easily repurposed by the rightist Reagan administration.

Walker concludes her book with a series of observations that call into question the long-term capacity of human rights politics to achieve anything resembling an anti-interventionist movement in the United States. Concluding that it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile human rights discourses with the overriding discursive imperative of national interest, her book implicitly suggests that human rights will always be a weak foundation for foreign policy making. Instead, human rights politics nearly always operate as a vehicle for concrete (though slightly veiled) ideological visions and are easily repurposed to defend (or attack) anything from fascist dictatorship to liberal capitalism to social democracy to hard-left communism. Like the term “democracy” during the Cold War and beyond, “human rights” appeals seem to be fungible to the point of meaninglessness, a conclusion supported by its dual adoption in the 1980s by Fidel Castro and Reagan’s human rights guru, Elliot Abrams (237–47).

Meaningless, perhaps, but compelling and politically useful. At least for interventionist purposes, as Jimmy Carter himself recognized once his administration started running out of anti-interventionist tools in the summer of 1978. The body of this book seems, therefore, to cut against the optimism of its conclusion, in which Walker recommends human rights discourse for anti-interventionist U.S. citizens who wish to engage in “patriotic criticism” of U.S. foreign policy and to pressure policymakers to “address the United States’ own shortcomings and problematic behaviors” (252–53). Unless movements articulate an alternative foreign policy of their own, their human rights discourse calling for a more “self-reflective policy” will likely continue to be marginalized by more interventionist voices persisting for “modern iterations of nation building and human rights as regime change” (250).

Notes:

Author’s Response
Vanessa Walker

I would like to start by thanking the participants in this roundtable. This past year has been uniquely demanding, and I am grateful that this group of accomplished scholars was willing to engage with my work so thoughtfully. I appreciate that each was able both to capture my argument and to raise compelling questions about the fields and topics I sought to engage. Their reflections and insights remind me what a complex and exciting moment it is to be writing about the intersection of U.S.-Latin American relations and human rights.

Rather than respond to each reviewer individually, I want to address a few central, interconnected themes that run through their comments and my book. First, I found it necessary to place Latin America at the center of the 1970s human rights moment. Principles in Power is certainly not the first scholarly work to stress the importance of Latin America to human rights in the late Cold War. Other excellent books, including those by Patrick Kelly, Michael Schmidl, and Kathryn Sikkink, have illuminated the essential work done by Latin American actors in elevating human rights on the global stage in the late Cold War. Moreover, as Jeffrey Taffet notes, there has been a proliferation of scholarship on what Gil Joseph called the “Latin Americanization” of the Cold War that decenters the United States and contextualizes its international power. Despite these innovative works, Latin America is often treated as peripheral to the key ideas of U.S. foreign policy and political history. Ongoing debates about human rights as Eurocentric, for example, underscore the work that still needs to be done to treat Latin America as more than a subfield of U.S. foreign relations and integrate it into U.S.
and international history and historiography beyond the hemisphere.

My work seeks to build on the robust literature centering Latin American perspectives and dynamics by bringing the insights offered by these scholars “home” to U.S. political history. In a 2005 essay, Robert McMahon argues that the history of U.S. foreign relations is “intrinsically, a Janus-faced field, one that looks both outward and inward for the wellsprings of America’s behavior in the global arena.”

Principles in Power stresses how central Latin American actors and ideas were to the conception of human rights and reform of power within the United States itself, which in turn had broad implications far beyond the hemisphere. As Evan Ward rightly notes, a central goal of this work is to articulate “how democracy and diplomacy interacted in the late twentieth century to redefine foreign policy objectives more consonant with the values espoused by [Jimmy] Carter and his successors.”

Focusing on Latin America reveals that the notion of U.S. complicity in human rights abuses was essential in linking democracy and diplomacy in the 1970s. In the Western Hemisphere, human rights discourse emerged not as a way for governments to criticize one another, but as a language citizens could use to challenge their own governments’ practices and policies. In Chile and Argentina, human rights movements, catalyzed by repression in their own societies, challenged military governments’ self-depictions as guardians of their nations and Western values. The information generated by these advocates helped fuel emerging human rights movements in the United States and challenged Cold War policies that axiomatically supported these repressive regimes in the name of anti-communism. The Carter administration, influenced by debates generated in the Latin American context, formulated a human rights policy that sought to mitigate the harm done by U.S. Cold War intervention and support for right-wing allies.

Jeffrey Taffet wonders why U.S. activists responded so strongly to the Chilean coup and subsequent human rights abuses under Pinochet. Many of the early activists had been personally involved in Chile even before the coup, but its broader reach in U.S. politics was a result of U.S. citizens seeing Chile not just as a tragedy “over there,” but also a tragedy of U.S. power. The United States’ well-documented interference in Chilean politics since the 1960s, particularly its role in orchestrating the 1973 coup, made the problems of Cold War intervention and repressive alliances particularly salient to a U.S. audience. A sense of U.S. complicity in and responsibility for the human rights crisis in Chile defined their activism.

Taffet is right that my intention was not to argue that Chile created this interest in human rights and prompted this questioning of U.S. Cold War policies. This reaction was only possible because of the human rights work that had preceded it. My work labels Chile as a “catalyst,” an accelerant of preexisting trends and activism rather than their genesis. Concerns about human rights clearly predate 1973, and other scholars have explored the origins of such concerns more ably and expansively than I could in the context of my work.

Indeed, one of my primary goals for this book was to reassert Carter in the broader context of 1970s human rights activism, particularly the activism that challenged the assumptions of U.S. Cold War power at home and abroad. This is, in part, what led to my project’s emphasis on the Southern Cone. Chile, as I noted above, took on an outsized role as it became emblematic of broader problems with U.S. power and Cold War paradigms of national security. The legacy of U.S. intervention throughout the hemisphere informed in critical ways the self-reflective elements of the U.S. human rights policy that took shape at this time. The advocates I looked at time and again placed Chile at the center of their campaigns, but not because its human rights abuses were most egregious or because U.S. support for the junta was exceptional. Rather, the unprecedented revelations of the Church Committee as well as the dense activist networks disseminating information throughout the world made U.S. complicity in its abuses uniquely visible. That visibility revealed dynamics that often worked more subtly and less directly in U.S. relations with other countries, and it made connections between U.S. policies and foreign abuses perceptible to a broad audience.

For the left-liberal actors at the core of my project, it was this connection that gave moral urgency to their work in Chile, Argentina, and other “friendly” right-wing dictatorships. Abuses in the Soviet sphere, while certainly egregious, had not been materially supported and sustained by U.S. government policies. This logic also directed the Carter administration’s efforts to craft a human rights policy that prioritized areas that most implicated the United States in systems of repression.

Mateo Jarquin points out that Central America, particularly Nicaragua, came to occupy an important part of the Carter administration’s human rights agenda and embodied many of the dynamics at the core of my work. Central America was certainly important to the evolution of human rights policy during the Carter years, but I would argue that the Southern Cone was uniquely influential in establishing the working assumptions and mechanisms behind the policies, which started before Carter’s tenure. This is due in part to the politics of complicity and visibility of Chile I noted above, amplified by critical mass of Chilean and Argentine activists active in U.S. policy circles—a result of the politics of exile and expulsion that marked the Southern Cone dictatorships. Indeed, Debbie Sharnak’s work makes a compelling case for Uruguay being an important part of this early conversation. Central American advocates would become similarly instrumental in U.S. political debates in the later years of the Carter administration and into the Reagan administration, but they were not as prominent in the first half of the decade.

Central America becomes important in ways the Carter administration did not anticipate, pushing human rights policy in new directions and raising new challenges. Close studies of how these dynamics unfolded in Nicaragua, as well as El Salvador and Guatemala, would undoubtedly lend much to the initial survey my book offers. The nuances and particularities of each case make it unwise to generalize, and I hope that other scholars will explore these cases in depth. I believe, however, that we will find that tensions resulting from the legacy of U.S. intervention in the region and the limits of U.S. power will remain familiar, even if the Carter administration and their local partners resolve these dilemmas differently in each case.

I would like to end by engaging with the contemporary implications of my study, which Thomas Field thoughtfully raises in his review. I see the 1970s construction of human rights as a uniquely self-critical moment for U.S. policymakers. My hope was that this study would call attention to this alternative model for U.S. human rights policy—one less dependent on intervention—and also engage with the tradeoffs involved in implementing these policies, and the limits of U.S. leverage to change the internal workings of other countries. I would argue that part of the United States’ struggle to develop successful human rights policies emanates from the belief that human rights abuses are something perpetrated by foreign governments and actors that the U.S. government needs to fix, rather than something that results from the intersection of local...
particularities and an international system that the United States is part of and often helps to shape. U.S. human rights policies need to start by engaging the consequences of U.S. power, addressing areas where the United States is most embedded in the dynamics that enable and perpetuate abuses.

Further, it seems to me that we often fall into a no-win situation in conversations about where human rights fit into the U.S. foreign policy agenda. If human rights are corralled into understandings of the national interest, many are quick to dismiss them as “self-serving.” But excluding them from understandings of national interests sets up an inherent conflict between rights and “real interests.” I believe that my work shows that human rights policy does not necessarily entail a trade-off between morality and objectives like national security or economic development. But as with all interests, there are hard choices and moments when one issue will surpass another in importance. In this, human rights are not unique, but the universalist rhetoric that accompanies human rights often makes compromises unpalatable. We need to accept compromise and grapple with complexities in this as in all issues if we want to have viable policies.

Understanding limits and tradeoffs is important not only for policymakers but also for those outside of government who wish to see a more vigorous human rights policy implemented. Principles and Power, along with works by Kathryn Sikkink, Lauren Turek, Sarah Snyder, Patrick Kelly, Barbara Keys and others, reveals that non-government actors can play a decisive role in raising issues, mobilizing public opinion, offering information and expertise to frame policy, and creating bridges between international and domestic concerns. There is, of course, an unresolved tension here: advocacy, by definition, should be constantly pushing policymakers to rethink what is possible and reshape priorities. But advocates also need an awareness of the dilemmas that their partners in government face so they can offer viable options that serve their agendas.

Do human rights matter at all, or are they a concept “fungible to the point of meaninglessness,” as Fields worries? It is easy to be cynical about human rights, and in exploring and studying these complexities and competing tensions, I have often felt a sense of pessimism creeping into my thinking. I have been heartened, however, by the people I had the privilege to talk to in the course of working on this project. Tex Harris, Joe Eldridge, José Zalaquett, Patricia Derian and others underscored for me that human rights policy does not have to be free of contradictions to have a positive impact on the lives of real people. We should not let the lack of easy answers deter us from holding our own governments accountable for their behaviors, confronting the shortcomings of U.S. power, and pushing for policies that help us secure human rights for more people and reflect our nations’ best values.

Notes:
CALL FOR PAPERS

2022 Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

New Orleans, Louisiana, June 16-19, 2022
&
Possible Virtual Days TBD

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for its 2022 annual conference. We are excited to be back in person in New Orleans, Louisiana, with possible additional virtual days (dates TBD). SHAFR is dedicated to the study of the history of the United States in the world, broadly conceived. Given that the production, exercise, and understanding of U.S. power takes many forms and touches myriad subjects, the Program Committee welcomes proposals reflecting a broad range of approaches and topics. The deadline for proposals is December 1, 2021.

Proposals

SHAFR is committed to inclusion and diversity, and encourages proposals including members of groups historically under-represented within the organization. We particularly encourage proposals from women, scholars of color, colleagues residing outside of the United States, junior and contingent scholars, and scholars working in other disciplines. Your proposal must include a diversity statement that describes how it will advance this SHAFR commitment.

Graduate students, international scholars, and scholars whose participation might expand the organization’s breadth are encouraged to apply for SHAFR grants to subsidize the cost of attending the conference. Please see below for details.

The Committee is open to alternative formats, especially those based on discussion and engagement with the audience, which should be described briefly in the proposal. The Program Committee welcomes panels that transcend conventional chronologies, challenge received categories, or otherwise offer innovative approaches and fresh thinking. The Committee also welcomes proposals for linked series of panels that share a common theme.

Individual paper proposals are also welcome, though complete panels with coherent themes will be favored over single papers. Those seeking to create or fill out a panel should consult the “Panelists Seeking Panelists Forum” (which will be made available online) or Tweet #SHAFR2022.

Policies

All proposals and funding applications should be submitted via shafr.org. Applicants requiring alternative submission means should contact the program co-chairs at program-chair@shafr.org.

Each participant may serve only once in any capacity on the program (for example as a presenter or commentator) and not more than twice during the conference.

AV requests, along with a brief explanation of how the equipment is essential to the presentation, must be made at the time of application and included in your proposal. AV access is limited and expensive. As such, please carefully assess your AV needs and realize that such requests can place limits on when and where we schedule accepted panels. Any special scheduling requests (e.g., that a panel not take place on a particular day) must be made at the time of application and included in your proposal.

Generally, annual membership in SHAFR is required for those participating in the 2022 meeting. The president and program committee may grant some exceptions to scholars whose specializations are outside the field. Enrollment instructions will be included with notification of accepted proposals.

Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants

SHAFR will award several Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants to assist graduate students presenting papers at the 2020 conference. The following stipulations apply: 1) no award will exceed $300; 2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and 3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The Program Committee will make decisions regarding awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal. Applications should include: a 1-page letter from the applicant; reference letter from the graduate advisor that also confirms the unavailability of departmental travel funds. The two items should be submitted via the on-line interface at the time the panel/paper proposal is submitted. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee’s decisions on panels/papers, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s submission is accepted by the program committee in a separate decision. Application deadline: December 1, 2021.
In response to a proposal by then-SHA FR President Kristin Hoganson and Julia Irwin and Gretchen Heefner, the program chairs for the 2020 meeting, David A. Langbart (DAL) agreed to hold an informal conversation with Richard H. Immerman (RHI) at a luncheon plenary. Alas, the Covid-19 pandemic forced the cancellation of the 2020 meeting, and with it the cancellation of this conversation. Serendipitously, however, in 2021 David received the inaugural Anna K. Nelson Prize for Archival Excellence. This year’s program chairs, Ryan Irwin and Megan Black, appropriately requested that in conjunction with his receipt of the Nelson Prize David agree to an interview with Immerman along the lines of their intended conversation last year. What follows, then, is David’s responses to questions posed by Immerman.

All opinions expressed in the answers to the following questions reflect those of the respondent and do not necessarily reflect those of any agency of the U.S. Government.

RHI: As a point of departure for our conversation, why don’t you tell us a little about your career, which has encompassed both appraisal and research services. I’m particularly interested in how your training, especially but not limited to your undergraduate study with Walt LaFeber at Cornell, prepared you for your work at the archives, and beyond that, how you would characterize your “on-the-job training.”

DAL: I began work at the National Archives as a Federal Summer Intern while still in college more than four decades ago. I was a history major and immediately became enthralled with working with the records and changed my career aims to archival work. I started out in the Legislative, Judicial and Fiscal Branch as a part-time employee. I became full-time when I joined the Diplomatic Branch after graduation and then moved to the Military Field Branch. In all of those jobs I performed the primary archival functions of arrangement, description, and reference. As a result of working in different branches, I became familiar with the records of many different agencies and the wide variety of recordkeeping. I spent the middle twenty-plus years of my career in the area of archival appraisal, working on the disposition and scheduling of records, which I’ll discuss further in response to your later question. I had responsibility for a variety of agencies but spent most of my time working with the agencies in the foreign affairs community, in the Executive Office of the President that create federal records, and with the national-level intelligence agencies. A bit more than a decade ago, I moved back to working directly with records, again undertaking arrangement, description, and reference activities. In there, I also went back to school and earned my master’s degree.

Based on my experience, the best training to be an archivist is in some field that requires retrospective documentary research as a fundamental part of professional preparation. I think training to be an historian is the absolute best route. In order to understand the records with which one deals and to understand the work processes and assist researchers, you have to know the topic as well as the history and organization of specific agencies and what researchers are trying to accomplish and have at least some practice in using records. Almost all the technical aspects involved in the work are easily be learned on the job, but understanding the historical perspective takes more in-depth training.

Besides giving me a great grounding in the history and variety of issues involved in American foreign policy, the most important thing Walt [LaFeber] and political historian Joel Silbey did was to impress upon me the importance of archives, archival work, and knowledgeable archivists to the success of historians and others who use the records.

RHI: Following up on the above, can you provide us with some insight on some of your “less conventional” assignments or your appraisal work on the records of various intelligence agencies and the records of foreign affairs agencies throughout the Cold War. What did this work entail?

DAL: I have had the privilege of working with some very important records and underwriting many interesting and exciting assignments over the years. At the risk of boring you with a long list, here are some that I remember fondly: providing special support to the House Assassination Committee investigating the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; locating truly unique and unknown Department of State records relating to Marcus Garvey; handling the paperwork and other actions necessary to accession the Charter of the United Nations; processing the large volume of intermingled records of the World War II China-Burma-India, India-Burma, and China Theaters of operations; travelling to Berlin to locate, identify, appraise, and schedule the records of all elements of the unique operations; travelling to Berlin to locate, identify, appraise, and schedule the records of all elements of the unique U.S. Mission Berlin covering the period from 1945 to 1990; ferreting out the unappreciated and unscheduled records of USIA; scheduling the records of the Department of State’s principal officers; leading the appraisal team that scheduled the Department of State’s electronic Central Foreign Policy File; handling the complex and sensitive reappraisal of CIA Operational Activity records; appraising the National Security Agency records relating to the VENONA project; appraising, scheduling, arranging, and describing the CIA’s records of the early 1950s operations in Guatemala; appraising the records of the September 11 Commission; serving on the team NARA contributed to the extensive interagency effort to schedule and appraise the records of the National Reconnaissance Office when that agency...
was publicly acknowledged after more than 30 years of existence as a covert special access program; serving on the working group carrying out a detailed review and appraisal of complex Federal Bureau of Investigation files; and contributing diverse posts to the Text Message Blog (https://text-message.blogs.archives.gov/).

This is but a small sample of the variety of projects I have worked on. Others, of an administrative nature, were important to the mission of NARA but of less interest to members of SHAFR. To all of that work, I always brought the perspective of the historian and the potential user of the records. Given the agencies and records with which I worked, the interests of SHAFR members were paramount.

RHI: In the some 4 decades that you’ve worked at NARA, what would you identify as the most significant, or perhaps fundamental changes that you’ve observed from the perspective of the researcher’s experience? Or put slightly differently, what have been the pivotal changes within NARA, and how have they affected researchers visiting NARA?

DAL: The biggest change is that the National Archives and Records Administration became an independent agency in April 1985. Despite a more than doubling of the size of the holdings, the addition of several presidential libraries, and the creation of the necessary overhead staff for an independent agency, however, NARA’s staff level is almost exactly the same as when it became independent. Major changes include a huge increase in the volume of records; increased complexity in the records; increased access restrictions on the records; a transition from paper records to electronic records with all the attendant problems that have yet to be identified or figured out; a decrease in the number of staff working directly with the records to process and describe them and to provide reference service on them; a decrease in the overall knowledge of the staff about the records and the almost total lack of persons with deep knowledge of the records and associated academic fields.

Associated with the last point is a growing reliance on automated tools to replace human knowledge just as the records are getting overly complex. While automation has its strengths, it cannot replace the human element. It only tells you if something that exactly matches your search is there; it won’t help you find what you do not know to ask for. Automated tools are great when looking for the specific name or title, but terrible for concepts or the general subject search. This is where the human element comes to the fore. They also make it very difficult to undertake general searches of the finding aids, thus inhibiting the serendipitous discovery of relevant records that might otherwise escape attention. With the overall decline in staff knowledge of the records, however, the result is that researchers are almost forced to be self-reliant when it comes to locating records. Sadly, that message may have percolated out to the point that they do not take advantage of the expertise that still exists.

RHI: Over the years members of SHAFR have benefited immeasurably from the advice you have provided on the NARA website, at SHAFR meetings, and in person (and less directly through your briefings at HAC meetings). What are the key “mistakes” that researchers make that cause you the most frustration?

DAL: The worst thing a researcher can do is show up without making advance contact or taking advantage of the information that is available on line, such as the extensive pages beginning at https://www.archives.gov/research/
Under an earlier model of scheduling, the approved schedules had sufficient detail so they could serve as a sort of guide to records in the custody of agencies and then serve as initial descriptions of the records transferred to the National Archives. The current model is very different. The descriptions of the records are so broad that they can serve neither of those important functions. They also leave a lot to be desired from other perspectives.

RHI: Looking to the future, what impact do you estimate that NARA's transition to electronic records will have on records management, on the one hand, and how historians of US foreign relations will conduct their research, on the other?

DAL: The answer to this question goes far beyond the foreign relations researcher; it applies to everybody who uses the records in the National Archives. I've touched on some of the problems above, but the issue is much larger. There are questions about infrastructure, management of electronic records both in the agencies and at the National Archives, and how the electronic format affects declassification and review for other types of restrictions, among others. Certainly, researchers will have to deal with a more amorphous body of materials rather than the organized papers files with which they are familiar and rely on automated tools to find documents of interest. Whether there will be enough context in which to understand those isolated hits is an open question. One need only consider the documents available on agency FOIA websites; there is a lot of interesting stuff there, but what it means is not clear without the context provided by surrounding documents which may be difficult to find in the automated world. Some argue that the electronic format will allow other types of analysis and open up new vistas; I am sure some of that is true, but old vistas will be closed off to the detriment of all.
We have recently marked the fortieth anniversary of the release of the American hostages in Tehran on January 20, 1981. We know how diplomats eventually resolved the 444-day crisis. What we tend to overlook are the imponderables facing U.S. officials at the outset of such events. Diplomats often work under the stress of limited time, unpredictability of adversaries, or fear of what might come next. On rare occasions these elements combine. Consider, for example, Berlin in 1948 or the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

The Iranian Hostage Crisis belongs on this short list. As radical students forced their way into the American embassy on November 4, 1979, seizing sixty-six U.S. citizens, they shocked the American public. The captors had violated international law respecting the rights of diplomats, and they soon gained the support of Ayatollah Khomeini himself. No one in the Carter administration knew what might happen next or when. Officials needed to prepare immediately for every contingency.

During the first days of the crisis, members of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff set to work drawing up a number of outline statements, each appropriate to a particular outcome. Designed as presidential communications to the American people, one draft announced the freeing of all the hostages; another, a partial release, with other hostages being put on trial. Finally came this grim message:

Contingency E: All the Hostages are Killed

—We mourn. For brave Americans who were senselessly and brutally murdered. For their loved ones. For a crime, not only against our nation, but against mankind.
—The price of freedom is high. But inhumanity also has a price.
—I have today ordered that the following actions be taken against Iran:

—These actions are taken in accordance with international law.
—Time and again, our nation has stood in defense of the principles we cherish:
  —the sanctity of life
  —the preservation of freedom; and
  —the rule of law
It is in defense of those fundamental principles that I have acted tonight.
—Let us demonstrate, as a nation united, our firm resolve that the enemies of those sacred values must be defeated. But let us not, in our anger and outrage, break faith with those very principles. We will not take innocent lives. We will not assault freedom. We will not tear down the rule of law.
—We will honor our colleagues who have fallen, by defending—and upholding—the fundamental principles for which they gave their lives.

Thankfully, President Carter had no need to console the nation, and since his time in office, this document has lain unused and forgotten in the archives. Yet it remains a powerful expression of a terrible possibility, a reminder of the grave threat confronting American officials during those first unpredictable days.

Notes:
1. No actions were listed on this draft.
In the inimitable words of Admiral Stockdale, who am I and why am I here? I’m an Associate Professor of History at the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, who spends a lot of time in Houston, Texas since that’s where my wife, Leandra Zarnow, teaches. We have one of these complicated academic relationships that involves a heck of a lot of travel for us and our beagle, Bosco. Bosco’s predecessor, Aldo, made cross-country road trips every year of his life, though Bosco, being one of those pooches who has made out fairly well in the pandemic, hasn’t had to suffer through the long car ride since December 2019 as we’ve been working remotely from our home in Houston since Covid started. That will change this summer.

I’m the author of *J. Edgar Hoover Goes to the Movies* (2012). I am currently working on a project focusing on race and American Cold War culture. I’ve got an article in the pipeline on how the FBI and CIA confronted racial themes in early Cold War movies. Spoiler alert: they weren’t too enthused about the so-called ‘racial problem’ films.

I was born and raised in Southern California. I did my BA at UC Riverside and did grad school at UC Santa Barbara, where Andy Johns took me under his wing in exchange for the promise that I write this *Passport* “Spotlight” piece within the next 25 years.

1. **What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time**
   Since I think comedies often get short changed in these lists, here are my lists of the 5 greatest sitcoms and the 5 greatest comedy films, not ranked, but in chronological order. TV: *M*A*S*H*, *Cheers*, *Seinfeld*, *The Larry Sanders Show*, *Arrested Development*. Movies: *Duck Soup*, *The Great Dictator*, *Dr. Strangelove*, *Life is Beautiful*, *Borat*. Honorable mention to *Planes, Trains and Automobiles* which may not be as “great” as my top 5, but is the funniest film I ever saw.

2. **What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?**
   My first thought is my job interview where somehow I managed to shuffle up the papers of my job talk right before my presentation and didn’t notice until I was halfway through the talk. Canadians are so nice they gave me the job anyway.

3. **If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?**
   Harry Truman, Doris Day, and Johnnie Ray, so I could have them do a sing-along of “We Didn’t Start the Fire.”

4. **What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?**
   I can’t even fathom that kind of money. I’d certainly donate my share to a few choice charities (refugee aid and pet rescues), but I also have to admit there’d be a fair bit of playing golf.

5. **You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?**
   Easy… The Traveling Wilburys, which would be especially cool since I am almost certain they never performed live.

6. **What are five things on your bucket list?**
   Follow the Dodgers and/or Lakers on a road trip, break 90 in golf, become fluent in Spanish, retire one day in California, finish the book review I am late on.

7. **What would you be doing if you were not an academic?**
   My parents always expected me to become a lawyer since I argued my own case so much from the time I was quite little. So maybe that.
Years of German language study plus negative encounters with a fetal pig, calculus, Munich, and a Political Science essay deemed “too historical” combined to overcome a childhood aversion to reading and frustration with social studies courses taught by football coaches, ultimately resulting in my entry into the PhD program at the University of Minnesota to study Habsburg Central Europe. Working there as the assistant editor for the Austrian History Yearbook instilled a deep appreciation for the Chicago Manual of Style. I also decided to incorporate more of my undergraduate International Affairs studies, so I trained fully as a Modern Europeanist and an Americanist. That dual focus gave rise to my dissertation-based book, U.S.-Habsburg Relations (Cambridge, 2013). In 2007, I was hired as a US diplomatic historian at the University of Vermont, so I have gravitated more toward US history. In 2021, my textbook on Americans & International Affairs to 1921 will be out with Cognella, and I am working on a book and digital humanities project on the history of the US Consular Service. That project, along with my service work on campus with curricular affairs and Phi Beta Kappa, engages my interest in how large bureaucracies work and how humanity, tact, diplomacy, and organization can make them function more effectively.

I am an only child, so I have significant elder care responsibilities. Apart from that, I live amongst books, LEGOs, and writing implements.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

Stretching the instructions to recorded performances more generally: Anything and everything directed by Edgar Wright or Wes Anderson, The Princess Bride, Clue, the Kenneth Branagh version of Much Ado About Nothing, Psych, Phineas & Ferb, John Finnemore’s BBC radio series Cabin Pressure, Jim Dale’s performance of the Harry Potter novels.

And the apparent outlier: A Few Good Men. But my love is all about the scenes with Noah Wyle as Cpl. Barnes, not Jack Nicolson telling us we can’t handle the truth.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

I am terrible at pronouncing many names. I can spell them, I can hear the proper pronunciation in my head. When it comes time to say it out loud, I choke more often than not. It’s awful when I’m introducing a speaker or recognizing a student.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Ugh. Are all four of us having dinner together? Where? When? I think that would be awful. I don’t want them to be fish out of water – it’s not really interesting to me what Abraham Lincoln might think of Chipotle – and if I was at a dinner in their time and place with their social norms, they’d probably ignore me or patronize me. That wouldn’t be fun.

But if I was choosing people to observe directly in their time and place, I would pick Woodrow Wilson and Empress Maria Teresa because I would like to be able to form my own opinion about these controversial figures, rather than having to wade through all the hagiographic and libelous prose that has been generated about them. My other choice would be Edith Carrow Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt’s second wife. Theodore used so much figurative language that applied gendered interpersonal norms to international affairs and other subjects; I’d like to have a better understanding of how Edith fit into those conceptions.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Assuming that it’s possible to win without actually entering, I would probably buy myself a very nice fountain pen and a lengthy trip to Disney World; donate some to preservation efforts at Mount Hope Cemetery in my hometown of Rochester, New York; and then find a way to put the rest toward helping libraries and archives maintain their physical collections.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Day 1: Drum corps and marching bands with John Philip Sousa and Percy Grainger during the day; an afternoon interlude from the Canadian Brass; Louis Armstrong and Stan Kenton in the evening.

Day 2: Music from the stage performed by Juan Diego Flórez, Bing Crosby, Barbara Streisand, and Bernadette Peters. Hosted by Neil Patrick Harris.

Day 3: I like hearing what different artists do with the same source material, so this day would be covers of a couple of songs by a bunch of different popular artists from the last 100+ years, including but not limited to Sam Cooke, Elia Fitzgerald, Johnny Mercer, the Platters, Dion & the Belmonts, Roger Miller, Teresa Brewer, the Turtles, Bobby Darin, Paul Simon, Stevie Wonder, the Fifth Dimension, Sweet Honey in the Rock, Eric Clapton, Elton John, Billy Joel, Harry Connick Jr., and Pentatonix. As for the songs, there are so many possibilities, but perhaps “Simple Gifts,” “Orange Colored Sky,” and “We Can Work It Out.”

Day 4: During the day, They Might Be Giants. Then at night, the Ukulele Orchestra of Great Britain opens for “Weird Al” Yankovic.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

I was having more fun planning my music festival, so I’ll just go with two: make it all the way through an organization of my Zotero and iTunes libraries and finish my consular project.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

Perhaps I’d be a university registrar? If that’s still too close to academics, then maybe a forensic accountant. Something complex and detail-oriented.
I’m professor of history at California State University, Long Beach (CSULB), and the author of several books about Cold War U.S. culture and America in the World, mostly focused on the CIA. These include *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Harvard University Press, 2008) and *America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (Basic Books, 2013). Most recently, I recorded a video lecture series about the CIA for *The Great Courses* (The Agency, 2019). I’m currently working on two projects: an imperial history of the CIA, and an emotional history of Anglo-American relations. This last choice of topic probably has something to do with the fact that I was born and raised in the UK, where I trained as a cultural and intellectual historian. I moved to California in 2006 at age 40 to be with my now-wife, Patricia Cleary (another U.S historian), whom I had met during an earlier trip when I was attached to the (fabulous) Center for Cold War Studies at UC Santa Barbara. We are lucky enough to live in Long Beach with our young son and two cats.

So, reading the following questions for the first time, I was transported back to my youth in England and matchday soccer programs of the 1970s and ’80s, in which players were asked a series of questions about, for example, their favorite restaurant meal (usually steak and chips or, if they were feeling fancy, prawn cocktail). I’ll try to make my answers a little less culturally specific and more up-to-date.

1. **What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?**

At the moment, it has to be TV. There have been so many mind-bogglingly good drama series of late – the first season of *Westworld* and then *Watchmen* stood out for me – but I have to confess that during the pandemic I’ve found myself seeking comfort in old sit com favorites: John Cleese’s *Fawlty Towers*, *Father Ted* (about a bunch of Catholic priests on a remote Irish island in the 1990s – if you can get past that description, trust me, funniest show ever), and *Seinfeld* (not the last reference to Seinfeld in these answers, by the way).

2. **What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?**

So, so many to choose from, including some spectacular Q&A crash-and-burns, but my all-time-best/worst happened during my graduate days at an annual meeting of the British Association for American Studies, my organizational home prior to SHAFR, when the annual book prize was being awarded at the conference dinner. Unfortunately, I wasn’t listening when the short-list was announced. Had I been, I would have known I was sitting next to one of the nominees, a senior UK scholar of American literature. The winner turned out to be my doctoral adviser, film historian Richard Maltby, who was seated at another table. On hearing his name, I cheered, whooped, and generally shared my delight with my neighbor, the unsuccessful finalist, who regarded me with a look of, let’s say, bemusement. Fortunately, she’s a very nice woman, and was surprisingly gracious in our future meetings, but we never sat together again at a conference dinner.

3. **If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?**

OK, this is a little niche, but here goes: the famously witty cultural critic Dwight Macdonald, the hero of my doctoral research on the “New York Intellectuals;” Jessica “Decca” Mitford, one of the aristocratic English Mitford sisters and a communist who ended up as a leading light of the 1960s Bay Area left, and the only individual I’ve ever seriously contemplated writing a biography about; and, in a nod to my CIA research, James Angleton, the poetry-writing, orchid-growing, mole-hunting counterintelligence chief. Dining with this lot would provide a wonderful window into mid-twentieth-century U.S. culture – although, come to think of it, Angleton might not be very keen on Mitfords’ politics, and Macdonald would probably approve of neither. Hmm, back to the drawing board.

4. **What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?**

To be honest, this thought absolutely terrifies me, which is probably why I don’t play the lottery. Apart from giving a chunk to SHAFR (of course), I guess I’d spread it around my family in England and my wife’s in St Louis, various Long Beach good causes and international charities, BLM, student prizes at CSULB (and an endowed chair in America in the World?), and the supporters’ trust of Exeter City Football Club. Oh, and a fast new paddleboard to impress the old surfer dudes on my local beach.

5. **You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?**

Now you’re talking. Three acts I’d rank among my most memorable/fun/moving concert-going experiences: Led Zeppelin (Knebworth, 1979), James Brown (Hollywood Bowl, 2006), Lucinda Williams (Manchester, 2003/LA, 2016). And two artists I would truly love to have heard (and watched) live: Django Reinhardt and Nina Simone. If I had a time machine, I’d also use it to see some of the amazing performances captured in *The Jazz Ambassadors*, a 2018 documentary about the State Department’s Cold War Jazz tour program, especially Louis Armstrong in Ghana and Dave Brubeck in Poland. I choke up every time I show those clips to students.

6. **What are five things on your bucket list?**

Having a kid later in life and far from where I grew up means I’m constantly doing new stuff or old stuff I haven’t done in a long time, like skateboarding (which, by the way, seems to have changed from the British skate scene of the 1970s. Go figure!). To be honest, this doesn’t leave me with much energy for anything else. Where would I most like to travel at the moment? England, to visit family and friends I haven’t been able to see in several years. I’m hoping I will have made it back by the time this is published.

7. **What would you be doing if you were not an academic?**

Marine biologist, architect, importer-exporter.
My research interests run the gamut but I’m currently trying to **finally** get my dissertation into monograph state. It considers how conservative ideologies associated with 19th century American “Negro education” were transplanted to Angola and how Angolans used these ideas to help frame a formidable counter-narrative to Marxist revolutionary ideas about the future of international society and Angola’s inclusion in that world. I’ve published several articles on the subject but ten years of marinating and teaching has really changed the project. I teach at CSU Fullerton and live in Long Beach with my husband, Matt, and my two kids Fiona (8) and Jack (6). We have one fish, who’s name gets longer and longer but is currently: Black Panther Bubble Bee Arthur Knightly. We were also parents to a hamster, Rosie, but she has gone on to the big hamster in the sky. My original interest in history came from both my family but also from incredible high school history teachers who took us regularly to the Boston Public Library Archives. I nearly majored in math as an undergraduate at Barnard College. However, my first college-level calculus class quickly rid me of that idea. I LOVE to travel. My decision to write about Angola was partially inspired by the completely unacademic fact that I couldn’t find a guidebook to tell me about it. I soon learned that it was every bit the adventure that I thought it would be.

1. **What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?**

I mostly collapse in complete exhaustion at the end of the night but, when I can muster the energy, I love watching anything on Masterpiece Theater. No one else in my family can stand it, or stay awake through the shows, so it’s my personal escape. Falling in that genre is also *The Crown* and *Victoria*. I also love to watch the British design show, *Grand Designs*. And for pure entertainment that everyone in my house likes, *Rustbelt Restorers*.

2. **What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?**

Even thinking about this still makes me sweat! I was asked to give a talk in Washington DC to the US Ambassador to Angola, who was about to take up his position. I had NO IDEA what to expect and should have asked. In any event, I gave an academic paper and that was all wrong. It was supposed to be a policy paper. I was surrounded by a number of people from throughout the US government and it was clear about 10 seconds into my paper that I was a sinking ship. A few of my fellow panelists, who had done these things before, came to my rescue. But I wanted to disappear into the wall. Luckily, it was so nerve-wracking that if I ever feel nervous giving a talk, I go back to that moment tell myself it could never be that bad again!

3. **If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?**

Since I’m writing right now about several African-American and African figures, it would likely be them. Their voices are so hard to find and I would love to sit down and ask them tons of questions. The lives of these three men collided in Angola in the late 19th century. The first person I would invite would be Samuel Miller, a former slave who graduated from Hampton Institute in 1874 and went to become a missionary in Angola. The next two guests would be ruling competing sobas, Ekuikui II and Ndunduma. The end of the global slave trade rocked ruling lineages in Angola and the economic structures that had been built around slavery. The switch to commodity trade undermined powerful leaders and ruling structures. Following the Berlin Conference, those still in power in Angola were trying to find ways to stave off further European conquest, albeit with power undermined by changing global trade patterns. Ekuikui and Ndunduma were two of these individuals. Having these three people at a dinner party and trying to unpack all that was going on in their lives, their perspectives on the world, and their predictions for the future would be incredible.

4. **What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?**

Oh man!! I would pay off my debt, buy a house (in Long Beach?) with a rental unit for extra income, buy another house in the Sierra Nevada mountains, buy a cabin in Western Massachusetts, create a scholarship fund at CSUF for students with children, and buy a plane to fly around the world. Then, I would take whatever was left over, invest it and live off the interest.

5. **You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?**

I listen religiously to KCRW in Los Angeles. I would hand this all over to them. I would love these people to make an appearance: Sam Cooke, Nina Simone, John Coltrane, Johnny Hartman, McCoy Tyner, Rosa Passos, and Sylvester.

6. **What are five things on your bucket list?**

I want to:
- Learn how to play the guitar
- Bike across the United States
- Travel across Asia for a year
- Travel to Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon
- Take an overland trip around all of Africa with no schedule and no time-table.

7. **What would you be doing if you were not an academic?**

I probably would be working for an investment bank as a political risk analyst or for the federal government in either the Department of State or one of the intelligence agencies.
I am Chair and Professor of Modern History in the History Program of the Department of Social Sciences, part of the School of Liberal Arts at Henry Ford College in Dearborn, Michigan. I have published a trilogy on US national security policy toward the Pacific Basin between 1945 and 1947 and another trilogy on the transition of the US Naval War College from the Pacific War to the Cold War in the Pacific in the same time period. I am now working on a history of American naval planning in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for the defense and administration of the Pacific Basin, again from 1945-1947. I am also a Graduate Senior Instructor in Norwich University’s online Master of Arts in History Program, an occasional Adjunct Lecturer of Strategy and Policy in the U.S. Naval War College’s Non-Resident Fleet Seminar Program, and both the Recording Secretary and the Midwest Regional Coordinator for the Society for Military History. I have been married for more than thirty-two years to my lovely wife Lisa. We have a son Jeffrey who turned thirty this July and since August 2019 he has been married to our beautiful daughter-in-law Ashley. Lisa and I also have a two-year old, fifteen pound cat named Zebulon Pike.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

The Crossing; The Sand Pebbles; Tora! Tora! Tora!; Midway (1976); Twelve O’Clock High (movie); Black Sheep Squadron (tv); Command Decision; A Bridge Too Far; Battleground; and Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

Some years ago, we had a program at Henry Ford College called the Speakers’ Bureau, where we would invite local historians to come talk to our students about some topic related to what they were being exposed to in the classrooms. I decided to invite John Wukovits, one of the most renown Pacific War historians who is a retired middle school history teacher from my hometown, Trenton, Michigan, which is about a twenty-minute drive from the College. Normally, we hold one of these talks in the large lecture hall in our Liberal Arts Building and we bring at least a couple of classes, just in case. I figured, though, that John was such a major figure that we didn’t have to do that. I thought instead that we could hold his talk in our new administration building and fill the room by putting the word out here and there. A total of eight people—including John—showed up. I’ve never been more embarrassed. John was very gracious about it, but I was appalled, especially at my own stupidity.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

George Kennan, to find out as much more as I could about Containment; Colin Powell, to find out as much as I could as to why he didn’t resign as Secretary of State in 2002-2003; and Raymond Spruance, to find out as much as I could about what made this military intellectual tick.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

If I won, I would try to set up SHAFR and the Society for Military History on as firm and long-term of a financial security basis as possible after I set up the Friedman family in the same manner.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

I’m a 1970s person when it comes to music, so it would be Jim Croce, Led Zeppelin, Dan Fogelberg, Journey, ELO, Boston, Deep Purple, Bruce Springsteen, Billy Joel, Neil Young, Heart, and as many more along these lines as I could manage, as long as they stayed to a pre-1981 schedule of music.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

I don’t have a bucket list, but if I did it would be to travel as much as my wife and I could after retirement; to be as good of a grandfather as possible in the future; and to keep working professionally in the field.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I really don’t know what else I would be doing. Working in the intelligence community or for one of the Federal military history agencies, but that’s pretty academic, so . . .

Hal Friedman
I grew up in Massachusetts in the waning years of the Cold War. With dramatic events occurring almost daily, I became fascinated by international affairs. At first, I was sure I wanted to pursue this interest as a journalist, and, after graduating from Stanford University, I worked for *New York Times* and then the Associated Press. But my interest in writing books ultimately led me to a PhD program at Yale University, where I was fortunate to study with giants in international history, including Paul Kennedy, Gaddis Smith, and John Lewis Gaddis. I was fortunate as well to land a faculty position at the University of Texas at Austin in 2000. At that time, UT had barely any program in diplomatic history, but over the next two decades I helped build it into a leader in the field. I’ve written three books, including my *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era* (2021), which draws on research at the LBJ Presidential Library on the UT campus. In 2020, I became the Library's director. I live in Austin with my wife Steph, my two daughters, and a golden retriever named Hamley.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

We are lucky to live in a golden age of television. My all-time favorites shows are *Curb Your Enthusiasm*, *The Wire*, *Deadwood* (the brilliant first season, at least), *Veep*, and (with my kids) *Arthur*. As for movies, my favorites are ones that made the deepest impressions on me when I first saw them: *The Killing Fields*, *Amadeus*, and *Meet the Parents*, and *Brave*.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

Though hardly embarrassing, a nerve-wracking moment came in 2019, when I decided to leave the UT Department of History and become director of the LBJ Library. Although I was excited about the leadership opportunity, I worried about giving up the advantages of the academic life – teaching great students, pursuing my intellectual interests, and having almost total control over my time. But I was confident I could still be a productive author and find ways to teach. So far, so good!

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

I’d start with LBJ, the most complicated political leader I’ve ever encountered. I’m not sure I’d make much headway toward understanding him over a single dinner, but it’d be a start. I’d also choose Robert Oppenheimer, an equally elusive figure who’s always fascinated me. The third would be Jane Austen, especially if I could bring my daughters.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

I’d probably have to split the winnings with the person who bought the Powerball ticket for me. But I’d use some money to purchase a vacation house somewhere in New England, a refuge from the Texas heat and a springboard for using the Patriots season tickets that I’d also buy. And I’d give a lot away to environmental groups.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

My tastes are stuck in the eras I study, but it’d be an eclectic mix: Rolling Stones, Freddy Mercury, and R.E.M. but also Natalie Merchant, David Byrne, and Joan Baez.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

1. Travel to India.
2. Retire somewhere cooler than Austin, Texas.
3. Run another marathon.
4. Go on an African safari with my family.
5. Watch the Patriots win another Super Bowl.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

No question about it. I’d be a journalist. Journalism was, in fact, my intended career from a long way back. I worked morning, noon, and night at my college newspaper, did summer internships with daily papers, and worked for a time for the Associated Press after college. I loved the pace, the colleagues, and the opportunity to learn something new every day (or sometimes more than once a day).
**June 2021 Shafr Prize Announcements**

**Betty Miller Unterberger Dissertation Prize**

The 2021 Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize committee—Erez Manela (chair), V. Scott Kaufman, and Megan Threlkeld—is happy to announce that this year’s prize goes to Paul J. Welch Behringer. His 2020 dissertation was completed under the direction of Max Paul Friedman at American University. “U.S. and Japanese Intervention in the Russian Civil War: Violence and ‘Barbarism’ in the Far East” is a dissertation of substantial scope and originality. It embeds sophisticated interpretations in a narrative on an epic scale, which moves smoothly between high politics and ground-level perspectives on the dizzyingly shifting alliances and the gruesome violence that characterized the Russian Civil War and the foreign interventions in it. The dissertation also combines a sustained examination of the political and military developments with deft analysis of cultural images and social conditions, and it excels at highlighting and working through complexity and ambiguity – conflicting motivations, interests, and eyewitness accounts. Finally, the dissertation showcases an impressive command of several disparate historiographies and is based on archival research of extraordinary breadth and depth, including in Russian and Japanese-language documents.

**Honorable Mention:** Benjamin W. Goossen, whose dissertation—“The Year of the Earth (1957-1958): Cold War Science and the Making of Planetary Consciousness” — completed at Harvard University under Alison Frank Johnson. On its surface, the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-1958 offered an opportunity for science to break through Cold War differences in the name of acquiring data beneficial to the entire planet. Drawing on numerous archives in North and South America, Asia, Africa, Europe, and Oceania, Goossen demonstrates that in fact national self-interest underlaid the decision of more than five dozen countries to participate in this globalization of science. Superpower rivalry, economic development, territorial claims, and even the concept of white supremacy convinced countries as far afield as the United States, Soviet Union, Argentina, Chile, South Africa, India, Australia, and New Zealand to take part. Ultimately, the IGY, instead of encouraging a level playing field among developed and developing countries, advantaged the global North.

**Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize**

The SHAFR Bernath Article Award committee—Daniel Bessner (chair), Melani McAlister, and Alex Beasley—would like to congratulate Mira Kohl, the winner of this year’s award. In her deeply researched and beautifully written piece, “Between Louisiana and Latin America: Oil Imperialism and Bolivia’s 1937 Nationalization,” which appeared in Diplomatic History, Kohl explores how “an oil-driven narrative of the Chaco War laid the groundwork for the [Western] hemisphere’s first oil nationalization in Bolivia in 1937.” In particular, Kohl reveals the profound interconnections between U.S. and Latin American politics, demonstrating how public allegations made by Senator Huey P. Long “provided fodder for a Latin American approach to mediating U.S. influence in the region and advancing Latin American goals of resource sovereignty,” eventually leading to the aforementioned oil nationalization. In this way, Kohl highlights the centrality of transnational exchanges to hemispheric politics, bringing together Latin American history, U.S. history, and the history of racial capitalism in a profoundly engaging narrative.

In addition to Kohl’s essay, the award committee would like to recognize two other articles with honorable mentions. The first, written by Rebecca Herman, published in the American Historical Review and titled “The Global Politics of Anti-Racism: A View from the Canal Zone,” explores the complex history of anti-racist politics in U.S.-Panamanian relations. This capacious and richly researched essay links the history of global antiracist intellectual life and activism...
to the nuanced politics of labor and empire in Panama.

The second, written by Michael A. Hill, published in *Diplomatic History* and titled “Imperial Stepping Stone: Bridging Continental and Overseas Empire in Alaska,” analyzes the important role Alaska played as a bridge between the continental and overseas eras of U.S. imperialism. Focusing on an under-analyzed part of U.S. empire, Hill’s intelligent and thought-provoking essay is likely to become a standard in U.S. in the World courses.

Together, the award winners and the many other excellent articles the committee received demonstrate the continuing vibrancy of U.S. diplomatic and international history in an increasingly difficult environment for humanities students and scholars.

**Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship**

A graduate student at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Minami Nishioka is completing a dissertation titled “Civilizing Okinawa: Intimacies between the American and Japanese Empires, 1846-1939.” The project explores the expansion of U.S. empire into East Asia through the long history of American intervention in the island known today as Okinawa (formerly the Ryukyu Kingdom). Beginning with U.S. missionary collaboration with British imperialists in the mid-19th century, Nishioka reveals the critical role of American Protestants in multiple imperial structures taking shape over a century. Using Okinawa as a prism, she shows the long history of U.S.-Japanese intra-imperial collaboration, as American missionaries supported Japanese colonization of the island as a vanguard of Western civilization. Japanese missionaries similarly saw the American presence as advantageous to their own cultural and political objectives. Integrating religion into the methodologies of new imperial histories, Nishioka traces this imperial collaboration through the intimate relations that translate state power into the lived interactions of civilian society, and explores how these interactions in turn influenced Japanese and American empire in an uneven but mutual manner.

The committee—Vanessa Walker (chair), Ilaria Scaglia, and Tore Olsson—also awards honorable mention to Kevan Malone, a graduate student at the University of California, San Diego, studying with Nancy Kwak. Malone offers an innovative approach, merging diplomatic and urban histories in “Borderline Unsustainable: Urban Planning and Diplomacy at the Tijuana-San Diego Boundary.” Emphasizing the local dynamics of U.S.-Mexico relations, Malone shows how the built environment of the Tijuana-San Diego Metro area shaped relations between these neighboring countries, often driven by non-state actors and their cross-border economic and social interactions. In advancing his analysis, Malone brings together diverse sources from Mexico and the United States, including national governmental archives, local newspapers, collections from business groups, GIS mapping, and regional bureaucratic and municipal records. Malone makes a compelling case for the centrality of border cities to the history of U.S.-Mexico relations.

**Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize**

The specter of the 1930s is everywhere today. Stefan J. Link’s *Forging Global Fordism: Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and the Contest over the Industrial Order* reimagines that pivotal decade by telling a history about the engineers who flocked to Detroit to study the techniques of American automobile mass production after the United States’ ascendancy in the early decades of the twentieth century. Link’s research and methodological choices are superb. He roots his tale in the experiences of Soviet and Nazi specialists, showing how Fordism became a transnational language to comprehend world industrialization and why that language mobilized so many disparate populations for total war. In the process, his book reintroduces Fordism as an outgrowth of Midwestern populism, imbricated within an antiliberal outlook that appealed to the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Even as both regimes became antagonistic toward Franklin Roosevelt’s foreign policy, they imbibed what they saw as distinctly
American assumptions about how to organize a society. This insight challenges the premise that global mass production stemmed from post-World War II liberal internationalism while raising new and difficult questions about the United States’ role in spreading illiberalism during the twentieth century. The contemporary relevance of Link’s story is obvious, and the committee—Ryan Irwin (chair), Andrew Rotter, and Gretchen Heefner—found Forging Global Fordism to be a masterful example of what U.S. foreign relations history has become.

The Underground Railroad remains a potent symbol in the struggle against racism in the United States. Alice L. Baumgartner’s South to Freedom: Runaway Slaves to Mexico and the Road to the Civil War offers a totally original reinterpretation of that symbol, deftly weaving diplomatic, military, social, and cultural history to tell a story about the people who escaped slavery not by heading north but by crossing the southern border into Mexico. With a storyteller’s deft touch—and an astonishing collection of archival sources—she brings this world to life for her reader. The book asks new questions about the origins of the U.S. Civil War and situates its answers on a truly international canvas while evincing a nuanced appreciation of sectional politics (in the United States and Mexico) during the mid-nineteenth century. By revisiting an era when slaves fled south for freedom, Baumgartner invites us to pause and consider our own assumptions about the people seeking opportunity north of the U.S.-Mexico border today. Deeply researched and movingly written, South to Freedom is this year’s honorable mention.

Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize

This year’s Robert H. Ferrell Prize goes to Samuel Zipp for his book, The Idealist: Wendell Wilkie’s Wartime Quest to Build One World published by Belknap Press. Members of the committee found The Idealist enormously inventive, using Wilkie’s 1942 trip to full effect as a genuinely insightful window into the shape of U.S. internationalism in a moment of sweeping change. The prize committee—Paul Thomas Chamberlin (chair), Jussi Hanhimaki, Sheyda Jahanbani, and Sarah Snyder—found that Zipp’s book brings out a story that has sometimes been lost amid all the attention to figures such as Franklin Roosevelt during this period. That it also captured the brief moment between the beginning of decolonization and the arrival of the Cold War. A history of ideas, a social history of diplomacy, and an international history, The Idealist was richly researched and written with verve and artfulness.

The committee also awards honorable mention to Jana Lipman’s In Camps: Vietnamese Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Repatriates published by University of California Press. The committee commends Lipman’s study for its timely and important contribution to our collective understanding what refugee status means. Drawing on rich archival material and oral histories, In Camps approaches the question of refugees from many angles: migration, humanitarianism and human rights, NGOs, and empire.

The Michael H. Hunt Prize for International History

For 2021, the Michael H. Hunt Prize in International History is awarded to Toshihiro Higuchi. The committee—Jessica Gienow-Hecht (chair), Nathan Citino, and Max Paul Friedman—found his work best reflects the methodological approach of the historian whose name marks the prize: multi-archival and multi-lingual resources as well as an astute interpretation of both sources and context that significantly expand our knowledge of international history.

Higuchi’s Political Fallout: Nuclear Weapons Testing and the Making of A Global Environmental Crisis retraces the domestic and international politics around the control of radioactive fallout in a variety of countries including Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. Introducing the concept of the “Nuclear Anthropocene,” Higuchi shows how nuclear powers (Great Britain, United States, and Soviet Union) consistently downplayed fallout risk and deceived their populations in order to continue and expand nuclear testing for military purposes. As scientists and private citizens grew alarmed (and in Japan even organized to retrace and then protest the consequences of testing), the test ban and its attendant treaties can be
understood not only as a consequence of disarmament and arms control but also as a result of early anti-nuclear testing movements. *Political Fallout*’s principal strengths consist, first, in its in-depth research citing Russian, Japanese, and English primary sources. Second, Higuchi’s take and presentation on a complex issue – notably the science around nuclear fallout – strikes the committee as both comprehensible and fascinating. Third and most importantly, *Political Fallout* constitutes a timely, bold, and innovative reinterpretation of a seemingly familiar phenomenon at a moment in time when western societies once again engage in debates over the fallout of nuclear power.

The committee decided to extend an honorary mention to Stefan J. Link’s *Forging Global Fordism: Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and the Contest over the Industrial Order*. Link examines the economic and political impact of Henry Ford’s industrial vision as a transnational phenomenon resonating with both liberal and illiberal regimes. His research focus on sources located in Germany, Russia, and the United States enables the author to analyze these three countries not merely as ideological competitors but as different varieties of modern mass society prone to populism. *Global Fordism*’s strength consists, first of all, in its reinterpretation of a familiar phenomenon: Fordism was inherently modern and anti-elitist politically, which accounts for its attraction on the global level in the 1920s and 1930s. Second, it retraces the acceleration of Fordism’s attractiveness during the economic depression and the beginning of the Second World War. Third, its central argument focusing on the transition from admiration to antagonism enables historians to gain a more nuanced understanding of the interplay of technology, modernity, and populism at a time when people the world over question and challenge the central tenets of liberalism.

The Hunt Prize committee extends its profound thanks to all those who shared their publications with the committee members and to those who contributed financially and in countless other ways to the establishment of the prize, especially Michael Hunt’s widow, Paula Hunt, as well as his former doctoral students, Alan McPherson and Chris Jespersen, who organized the endowment effort for this prize.

**Anna K. Nelson Prize for Archival Excellence**

No member of SHAFR was better known for archival research and promoting archival access for other SHAFR members than Anna K. Nelson. It could not be more appropriate, therefore, to award the inaugural Anna K. Nelson Prize for Archival Excellence to an archivist who is equally identified with promoting and facilitating archival research and access. For that reason, SHAFR’s Historical Documentation Committee—Richard Immerman (chair), Doug Selvage, Kelly McFarland, Jim Brennan, and Hannah Gurman—voted unanimously and enthusiastically to bestow the 2021 Nelson Prize on David Langbart for his decades of service to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

David requires no introduction for SHAFR members. He has offered us, and our students, the expert advice that has assured that our visits to NARA were both efficient and productive. We have also benefited from reading the informative, insightful, and fascinating blogs that he regularly distributes. Still, we offer this snapshot of his career to explain fully why David is so richly deserving of this award.

A student of Walter LaFeber at Cornell and then Wayne Cole at the University of Maryland, David began working at NARA as an intern in the 1970s and has remained there in various capacities over the subsequent four decades. He held his first full-time position in what was then known as the Diplomatic Branch. There, he was mentored by Sally Marks and other legendary archivists renowned for their subject matter expertise, which they shared generously and eagerly with legions of SHAFR members. They passed on to David the same spirit and commitment along with their expertise. Few among us have not profited from a conversation with David during a visit to the research room at Archives II, at a SHAFR conference, from one of his detailed responses to an email inquiry, or from his analysis of a document featured in his blog.
But David has served us in countless ways that may have escaped the notice of SHAFR’s membership. At NARA David spent as much time in appraisal as he did in reference. During these decades, he received recognition from a variety of agencies, including the CIA and NSA, for his service to their records. He was even deployed to Berlin to appraise and develop disposition schedules for Cold-War-era records from the U.S. Mission there. Just as notably, the Society for the History of the Federal Government awarded David with its Thomas Jefferson Prize for his guide to the FBI’s records and classification system, “Unlocking the Files of the FBI.”

Through David’s decades of experience in both Research and Agency (Appraisal) Services, David developed unparalleled expertise in the complex division of responsibility between NARA and the agencies—the State Department above all—in terms of reviewing, processing, and preserving records and thus ensuring access to them for scholars as well as the general public. For this reason, David has been a sui generis contributor to the State Department’s Office of the Historian and its Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), which are so vital to the publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States series and other resources central to our teaching and research. The minutes of the HAC meetings abound with references to David’s briefings and his interventions in debates. In this way, he has not only raised awareness of contentious archival issues, but he has also contributed to their resolution.

One letter supporting David’s nomination concluded, “For some four decades he has served as an exemplar of NARA’s ideal archivist, and throughout those years SHAFR . . . has been the primary beneficiary.” Another read, “David’s accomplishments serve as a testament to the value of knowledgeable subject area experts who understand the significance of our research and who work ceaselessly to advance it.” For historians of U.S. foreign relations, archivists are unsung heroes. By honoring David Langbart today with the inaugural Anna K. Nelson Prize for Archival Excellence, SHAFR takes a small—yet significant and long overdue—step toward correcting this oversight.
SHAFR Council Meeting Minutes  
April 8, 2021

Present: Andrew Preston, presiding; Kelly Shannon, Karine Walther, Kyle Longley, Andrew Preston, Andrew Johns, Vivien Chang, Lauren Turek, Daniel Immerwahr, Peter Hahn, Barbara Keys, Shaun Armsstead, Laura Belmonte, Kristin Hoganson, Emily Conroy-Krutz

Others present: Amy Sayward, ex officio; Faith Bagley

Meeting started 10:00 a.m. EST

Andrew Preston welcomed the Council members and thanked them for attending this first interim meeting between the main January and June meetings. He raised the first issue for Council consideration of the proposal for registration fees that had been circulated ahead of the meeting. Preston also presented the preliminary program to Council for its information.

Because of the unprecedented difficulties of this year and the challenges of organizing SHAFR’s first entirely virtual conference under budget, Barbara Keys moved a motion of thanks for the two program chairs—Megan Black and Ryan Irwin—and proposed to recognize their extraordinary efforts. A variety of options were explored, and ultimately Kristin Hoganson moved that Council award them life memberships accompanied by a citation from Council citing their achievement, which would also be published as part of the conference program and in Passport. Daniel Immerwahr seconded the motion, which passed unanimously.

Council then moved to consideration of conference registration fees. Preston argued that since the conference was projected to be less costly than initially thought and well under Council directives in terms of the maximum subsidy, it made sense to offer free registration to SHAFR members (especially as SHAFR membership is relatively low compared to other organizations), with a $120 fee for those who either do not want to take a SHAFR membership or who have institutional support for attending, which would effectively function as a donation to the organization.

Some concerns were raised that free registration might mean that those who sign up are not as invested in showing up and participating in the full conference. But this concern was balanced with a concern that attendance might otherwise be low at the end of a difficult academic year in which many people are experiencing Zoom fatigue. There was also concern that a free conference might generate so many participants that the Pheedloop website might be overwhelmed. There was also concern expressed about communicating clearly about the membership discount and the desire to have those with institutional funding support SHAFR by paying the regular registration fee. At the end of the discussion, Preston moved the resolution in his report, which was seconded by Peter Hahn and approved unanimously.

The second item of business for the Council meeting was to revisit and clarify the sexual harassment procedures that had been discussed in January. Following January’s discussion, there had been some confusion among Council members about what exactly had been proposed and approved. Subsequent discussions about the minutes, with SHAFR legal counsel, and among Council members had helped to clarify issues and had been presented ahead of this meeting. But other elements of the procedures—including the appeals and sanctions processes—will require further discussion at the June meeting.

The task force proposed to revisit and reapprove the original motion. The proposal was to use SHAFR’s external ombudsman, at $375 per hour for approximately three hours (approximately $1,125 in total) for a preliminary investigation of every complaint brought to the task force. Kelly Shannon explained that if there is a complaint at the conference, the proposed procedure would be to refer any complaints automatically to our external ombudsperson to do an immediate investigation—not a final investigation—and make an immediate recommendation whether anyone involved in the incident should be asked to leave the conference. This process would not involve SHAFR officers in the initial step, preserving the objectivity of this initial process. Another advantage of this immediate referral to the external ombudsperson is that it provides clarity for the task force members (who are volunteers and not trained professionals) and provides for a consistent process. The ombudsperson’s investigation will be relatively quick and provide recommendations for the immediate term; SHAFR leadership will then follow up, deciding whether the complaint warrants further investigation and/or consequences. SHAFR’s counsel agreed that this process was legal.

Shannon argued that the costs involved with referring all complaints to an ombudsperson were worth it, because it shows SHAFR takes such complaints seriously; and it removes any conflicts of interest, as members of the intake team and/or SHAFR leadership are likely to know the parties involved. In the case where someone brought a complaint but did not want to take action, the intake team could take an informational report and pass it on to the SHAFR Executive Director as part of its confidential record-keeping. Such informational/informal reports allow people to come to the intake team to figure out the process without jumpstarting an automatic investigation.

Shannon proposed a motion “to retain an external professional investigator to conduct a preliminary investigation for all formal reports of code of conduct violations to assist SHAFR in determining how to respond to such reports.” Emily Conroy-Krutz seconded; 11 voted in favor, 1 opposed, and 2 abstained. The motion therefore passed with a majority vote; Keys voted against the motion. She argued that automatic investigation did not allow for appropriate consideration.
of complaints, such as a complaint brought by someone experiencing a mental health crisis where an investigation might worsen that crisis and harm the reputations of those accused. Complaints brought over issues where the facts are not in dispute or where the police were investigating also might not warrant investigation.

Daniel Immerwahr proposed an additional motion based on the discussion: “Members reporting misconduct may opt to have their reports be informal, which would not trigger an automatic investigation - unless the report indicates that there is a reasonable risk of harm to SHAFR members or others.” Karine Walther seconded the motion, 13 voted in favor, and 1 abstained.

Amy Sayward also informed Council that SHAFR was close to having a contract with Tulane University for the 2022 SHAFR Conference. Initial estimates show that the conference will be significantly less expensive than SHAFR’s traditional hotel-based conferences.

Meeting adjourned 11:30am EST.

SHAFR Council Meeting
15 June 2021 via Zoom, 9 a.m.-1:15 p.m. EDT

Present: Andrew Preston, presiding; Shaun Armstead; Laura Belmonte; Vivien Chang; Emily Conroy-Krutz; Peter Hahn; Kristin Hoganson; Daniel Immerwahr; Andrew Johns; Barbara Keys; Kyle Longley; Kelly Shannon; Lauren Turek; Karine Walther; and Amy Sayward, ex officio

Attending: Faith Bagley, Kelly Cook, Megan Black, Anne Foster, Petra Goedde, Ryan Irwin, and Trish Thomas

Meeting started at 9:05am EDT

Introductory Issues

Andrew Preston gave opening remarks and reviewed votes taken between meetings (no discussion or amendments). He also moved a resolution of thanks for outgoing committee members and task force members:

- Megan Black, Program Committee co-chair
- Ryan Irwin, Program Committee co-chair and Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize Committee chair
- Program Committee members Paul Adler, Michael Brenes, Brandon Byrd, Benjamin Coates, Kate Epstein, Adom Getachew, Daniel Immerwahr, Hideaki Kami, Monica Kim, Elisabeth Leake, Stephen Macekura, Aaron O’Connell, Kenneth Osgood, Katharina Rietzler, Daniel Sargent, Stuart Schrader, Sarah Snyder, and Lauren Turek
- Kristin Hoganson, Ways & Means Committee chair
- Richard Immerman, Historical Documentation Committee chair and Development Committee member
- Christopher Jespersen, Development Committee member
- Vivien Chang, Graduate Student Committee chair
- Varsha Venkatasubramanian and Savitri Sedlacek, Graduate Student Committee members
- Andrew Rotter, Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize Committee member
- Daniel Bessner, Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize Committee chair
- Erez Manela, Dissertation Prize Committee chair
- Paul Thomas Chamberlin, Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize Committee chair
- Jussi Hanhimäki, Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize Committee member
- Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Michael H. Hunt Prize for International History chair
- Theresa Keeley, Myrna Bernath Book & Fellowship Awards Committee chair
- Vanessa Walker, Marilyn B. Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship Committee chair
- Kelly Shannon, Conference Conduct Task Force and Reporting Team

Preston added a special motion of thanks to Richard Immerman for his great work and lengthy service to SHAFR’s Historical Documentation Committee and the U.S. State Department’s Historical Advisory Committee. Kristin Hoganson moved the motion, Daniel Immerwahr seconded it, and it passed unanimously (14-0-0).

Financial Issues

Amy Sayward summarized the mid-year financial report she had provided to Council as well as updated numbers regarding membership numbers and conference costs. She highlighted that *Diplomatic History* had earned above the contractual minimum; she stated that she was unsure if this was an aberration or the beginning of a trend, therefore she had not used the higher number in the projected budget for fiscal year 2021-22. In terms of income, she also pointed to one-time monies received from Oxford University Press as part of last year’s transition in the management of the membership and collection of membership fees. On the expense side of the report, Sayward pointed out that she had increased budget items for travel, hotel, and legal expenses in the proposed budget for next fiscal year.
On the long-term projections report, Sayward identified that it was likely that SHAFR would run deficits in the years when its conference was housed at a D.C. hotel but could potentially recoup that money in the off years by utilizing campus-based conferences. She also reviewed the endowment spending report, highlighting that SHAFR had not had to draw on its endowment for the past two years and had received a sizeable stock gift in honor of Michael Hunt. She also provided updated projections for the current fiscal year reflecting a higher-than-expected number of conference registrations, memberships, and donations as a result of this year’s conference registration process. She reported that current membership now exceeds 1,200, the highest number for the past six years at least.

Hoganson then summarized the Ways and Means Committee’s report. The committee endorsed the request to hire a communications manager for an initial two years. Committee members believed that a podcast coordinator could be a step following this hire. They also endorsed a request for $4,500 for a book manuscript workshop specifically for contingent faculty, which could serve as a model for future workshops. They also supported requests for $10,000 for the 2022 Summer Institute to help with participant travel; a proposal to offer the executive director a $2,000 raise (8.5%), effective immediately, that would carry through the remaining years of her term; and a $1,000 cash stipend for each of the program committee co-chairs, due to the extraordinary and unique circumstances of this year. Hoganson highlighted that all of these suggestions were subject to Council approval. Sayward recused herself before discussion of the renewal of the term for the executive director position.

Preston provided an oral report about the process undertaken for considering the renewal of the executive director’s term for an additional three years (to end on July 31, 2025). The recommendation to Council was for the renewal and for a raise of 8.5%, which was endorsed by the Ways and Means Committee. After discussion, Barbara Keys moved to approve the recommendation to renew the executive director’s term and provide a raise; the motion was seconded by Peter Hahn and passed unanimously (14-0-0).

On the recommendation from Ways and Means to increase the allocation for the Summer Institute by $10,000, Kelly Shannon abstained, since she will be one of the presenters at the institute. The final vote on this issue was 13-0-1. Council then turned to the Ways & Means Committee’s support for a $4,500 allocation for a manuscript workshop for contingent faculty. The Council expressed appreciation for Andrew Rotter’s initiative in developing the proposal in conjunction with the Task Force on the Jobs Crisis in Academia and for the willingness of all those who volunteered to read manuscripts as part of this project. Various Council members made suggestions for how the project might be improved and how it could become a model for additional workshops to serve SHAFR members. There was also some discussion, but no decision, about ways that the William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grant might be repurposed to provide additional support for contingent and precarious faculty. Hahn moved that Council approve the proposal in principle, empower the SHAFR President to discuss some possible changes with Rotter, and launch the project with a budget of $4,500. Immerwahr seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously.

On the proposal from the Development Committee to launch an inclusion initiative, there was broad consensus to move forward.

**Publication Issues**

Sayward summarized the reports on the website transition and affiliated requests from various committees. The consensus that emerged was that there was a need for a dynamic site, but there was no commitment from various stakeholders (such as SHAFR committees) to regularly provide such content. It therefore seemed that a paid staff person would be needed to move this forward; like an editor, this position would solicit and schedule content and would work in tandem with an advisory committee. Such a position might also include social media (thereby addressing a need identified by the Public Engagement Committee) and advancing content from SHAFR’s other publications. Ultimately, the decisions that Council needed to make were a commitment (or not) to a dynamic website platform and whether or not to hire a communications manager (or other appropriate title) to move the initiative forward. Council discussion included a concern that in the past SHAFR had sought to communicate the content that it had, but this seemed to be an effort to communicate without evidence that there was sufficient content. Another concern was that there might be some overlap with Passport content. Discussion of the type of person who would be needed included the comment that this would have to be someone who knows the field and can engage with issues as well as someone who would liaise with the Public Engagement Committee. Others mentioned that a more dynamic media presence could grow SHAFR’s profile beyond its membership. The consensus was that if Council approved the position for two years (the recommendation of the Ways and Means Committee), Council could then evaluate the success of the initiative. Keys moved to hire a communications manager for a two-year term; Immerwahr seconded the motion, which passed 13-1-0.

After considering all of the individual budget issues, Council approved the Ways and Means Committee’s recommendation to approve the budget for fiscal year 2021-2022 (as amended by the approved financial proposals) unanimously (14-0-0).

**Conference Issues**

Sayward then summarized the report on the New Orleans 2022 conference on the Tulane campus. She highlighted that the campus has easy access to public transportation and low-cost dormitory housing. Since the 2022 American Historical
Association meeting is also in New Orleans, it gives the Program Committee chairs and staff an opportunity to visit campus for planning purposes. The draft agreement is pretty standard and does not include any costs for AV. It does include cancelation arrangements in case of public health issues or hurricanes, but Sayward anticipated a low conference subsidy based on a current assessment of projected costs. The New Orleans conference might also include some virtual elements, given the success of this year's virtual conference registration.

Sayward also raised the question in the Conference Coordinator’s report (and the long-term projections report) about whether SHAFR might approach the local arrangements committee for the 2024 SHAFR Conference in Toronto about the possibility of a campus-based conference. Council was generally supportive of starting this conversation.

A brief discussion about Council meetings going forward ensued. Preston summarized some problems associated with the January Council meeting at the American Historical Association meeting. Some members may not be able to travel, and a hybrid meeting would require approximately $2,200 of AV expenses. There was discussion about decoupling future Council meetings from the historical conferences (like the present meeting) and having shorter quarterly meetings (as Council began doing with its meeting in April 2021). The consensus was to have a remote meeting in January and to consider whether or not to keep this model moving forward.

Megan Black and Ryan Irwin joined the meeting to summarize the Program Committee’s report. They highlighted the theme interviews that are available asynchronously as well as special events such as the graduate student happy hour, trivia night, and the Looking Back and Looking Forward plenaries. Preston expressed thanks and awe for Irwin and Black’s efforts before they left the meeting.

**Membership Issues**

Council considered the report from the Membership Committee on a retiree membership rate, recommending allowing retirees to opt for the reduced ($35) membership rate by listing “retiree” as part of this category in membership materials. The Ways and Means Committee supported this proposal, which passed unanimously (14-0-0).

Preston reported on his recommendations for creating a Sanctions and Appeals Committee to make final decisions on violations of SHAFR’s code of conduct. He proposed a Sanctions and Appeals Committee composed of five people that would render a verdict on a member who had been reported as violating the code of conduct and would determine whether or not to enact sanctions or grant appeals. Preston moved approval, Karine Walther seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously (14-0-0).

Vivien Chang and Shaun Armstead offered an oral report from the Graduate Student Committee. Its primary project over the last year has been the mentorship program, which has enjoyed lots of enthusiasm and support. The committee is also hosting a grad student happy hour at the conference. The committee had been charged with discussing the pros and cons of a virtual meeting from the graduate student perspective. Positives included more access to SHAFR and a broader audience, however, Zoom and social media shut-downs in certain countries prevent their participation; and the consensus was that face-to-face interactions were preferable overall. Other issues raised in the Graduate Student Committee were diversifying the reach of the committee and hosting virtual workshops on becoming adept at social media and getting involved in SHAFR.

Hoganson raised an issue that had come up in the most recent, broadcast meeting of the Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), which was that when the National Archives and Records Administration reopens its facilities, there are no budgetary resources to expand hours or staff in order to meet the pent-up demand by researchers, which would be especially acute for graduate students trying to complete their dissertations in a timely manner. The need to start hiring and training staff as well as a way of encouraging researchers who have flexibility to hold off visiting during the initial reopening are real challenges that will be forthcoming. The question raised was how to best advocate for needed budgetary resources and whether there was a need to create a task force to connect graduate students and other researchers (along the line of the pandemic document-sharing service). Preston suggested that he send a letter in his role as SHAFR President and that Council continue considering what it might do to have a positive impact.

Kyle Longley recommended that SHAFR's distinguished service award be made an annual award rather than its current biannual status, which can cause confusion about whether or not this was an award year. Longley moved approval of his proposal, which was seconded by Hoganson. Hahn (for whom the award is named) abstained, and the rest of Council voted in favor (13-0-1).

The report of the Jobs Crisis Task Force recommended renewal of the committee (with new members and chairs) and payment of the contingent and precariously employed members of the committee. Although the proposal had come in after the meeting of the Ways and Means Committee, this line item of the budget had been carried over to the 2021-22 proposed budget. Council unanimously approved this proposal from the task force (14-0-0).
Publication Issues (continued)

Trish Thomas and Kelly Cook of Oxford University Press joined the meeting. Thomas highlighted some areas of the Publisher’s Report. Given the pandemic, usage in 2020 had dropped in the spring but has returned to robust engagement in 2021, and interest in open access materials and digital subscriptions is growing. *Diplomatic History* has a good impact factor among its peers, and the editorial office is a model in the field for timely delivery of issues (any delays were due to distribution and most recently production issues in India). Cook discussed an increase in new-issue and advance-article alerts. She also highlighted a couple of successful campaigns for cross-journal collections that resulted in an uptick in usage for *Diplomatic History* articles.

Council unanimously passed a resolution of thanks for Trish Thomas upon her retirement and wished her well. Thomas and Cook then left the meeting.

*Diplomatic History* editors Petra Goedde and Anne Foster later joined the meeting, highlighting some aspects of their editors’ report for Council. The journal has not yet experienced a dip in submissions as a result of the pandemic but expects that this will occur in the near future. However, they have a sufficient backlog of quality submissions to be able to weather a temporary downturn. Foster and Goedde noted an increase in submissions from across the world, which in part resulted in a lower percentage of overall submissions being from women (as men are more likely to submit internationally). However, the editors noted that women have a higher publication rate than their male counterparts. Goedde and Foster also commented briefly on their suggested appointments to the editorial board, noting that they try to ensure that there is a balance in terms of expertise, background, geography, and other factors on the board. Emily Conroy-Krutz moved that Council approve the suggested appointments, Immerwahr seconded the motion, and it was approved unanimously (13-0-0, Longley having left the meeting).

New Business

After Goedde and Foster left the meeting, Walther raised an item of new business, requesting that SHAFR sign on to the American Historical Association’s “Joint Statement on Legislative Efforts to Restrict Education about Racism and American History.” Given time constraints, the length of the statement, and the desire to read the statement carefully, consensus was reached that Council should vote on the issue shortly following the conclusion of the conference and, if approved, the resolution would then be forwarded to the membership for final approval.

Before the meeting adjourned, Hoganson expressed gratitude to Preston and Sayward for their leadership of SHAFR during the pandemic, and Walther expressed gratitude for Shannon’s work on developing and instituting the code of conduct. There was general assent, and the meeting adjourned at 1:15pm EDT (ahead of schedule).
Carol Anderson (Emory University) has been elected to the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. Tim Borstelmann (University of Nebraska, Lincoln) received the 2021 Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award from the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association for his book, Just Like Us: The American Struggle to Understand Foreigners (2020). Luke Nichter has been named the inaugural James H. Cavanaugh Endowed Chair in Presidential Studies at Chapman University, beginning in Fall 2021. Carl Watts will be Assistant Professor of National Security Studies at the Air University, eSchool of Graduate Professional Military Education, beginning in summer 2021.

Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation
January 1-December 31, 2020

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation to the Department of State (the HAC) has two principal responsibilities: 1) to oversee the preparation and timely publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series by the Department’s Office of the Historian (OH); and 2) to monitor the declassification and release of State Department records.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-138 [105 Stat. 647, codified in relevant part at 22 U.S.C. § 4351 et seq.]) mandates these responsibilities. Known as the FRUS statute, it requires publishing a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of US foreign relations no later than 30 years after the events that they document. This timeline reflects Congress’ commitment to transparency and an informed public, two pillars of democratic governance. The statute also obligates the HAC to review the “State Department’s declassification procedures” and “all guidelines used in declassification, including those guidelines provided to the National Archives and Records Administration [NARA].”

In 2018 and 2019 the HAC reported debilitating obstacles to FRUS publication caused by the Department of Defense’s (DoD) review and declassification processes. The committee therefore welcomes the commendable reforms that DoD undertook in 2020. Offsetting these positive developments, however, were the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of OH’s leadership and historians, OH’s shift to telework and the closure of NARA’s facilities severely impaired OH historians’ ability to conduct the research essential to compiling FRUS volumes. The effects of Covid-19 impaired equally the individual and interagency processes essential to reviewing and declassifying documents for publication in FRUS. Of course, the pandemic also prevented researchers from accessing NARA facilities in College Park and across the county to conduct their research.

Covid-19 also impaired the HAC’s capabilities. The 1991 FRUS statute mandates that the HAC meet four times a year. Because of the pandemic, the HAC was only able to hold its March meeting in person; it held its other meetings virtually. This format did enable much greater public participation. Able to join remotely, more than 100 members of the public attended the September and December meetings, as opposed to the normal handful. The HAC and OH will take this phenomenon into account when setting the agendas for future meetings. Yet the HAC was deprived of the classified briefings that are fundamental to its mission.

Another impediment the HAC confronted was a deficit in its capacity. During 2020 three long-time HAC members rotated off the committee, one resigned, and a vacancy remained from 2019. Because of the time required for their replacements to receive the necessary security clearances and appointments as Special Government Employees, only 6 of the mandated 9 members of the committee were in place for two of the 2020 meetings. The HAC cannot judge the extent that the pandemic affected the pace of the State Department’s clearance and appointment processes. What is unambiguous is that at no time during 2020 did the HAC operate at full strength.

Publication of the Foreign Relations Series

Rigorously researching the multiplicity of records that document an administration’s foreign relations, culling from them the limited number that can be managed in one volume while still providing a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary history, steering the draft volume through the interagency declassification review process, and editing it for publication poses a demanding and time-consuming challenge. Nevertheless, from 2015-2018 OH published on average 8 volumes per year, the number the office calculates it must publish in order ultimately to achieve the 30-year timeline mandated by the FRUS statute.

Due to problems rooted in the interagency review and declassification process, which the HAC repeatedly attributed largely to the Department of Defense, OH managed to publish only two FRUS volumes in 2019, fewer than any other year.
in a decade. The HAC is optimistic that the publication rate will benefit significantly in the future from the improvements in DoD’s review and declassification structure and processes. But implementation of those improvements began only in the last half of 2020. Consequently, OH again published only 2 volumes in 2020. They are:


Because of volumes that were already in the technical editing or publication stage prior to the pandemic outbreak, OH projects it will be able again to publish at least 2 volumes in 2021. The consequences of compilers’ inability to access classified documents in 2020 and slowdowns in the interagency process will become manifest in subsequent years. To mitigate those consequences, OH historians have done everything they could when working remotely to lay the essential foundations for future volumes. In particular they have grounded themselves in the appropriate historiography, created finding aids and outlines for their research, assembled lists of individuals and other components of the volumes’ front matter, proofread, and conducted research in unclassified materials. The HAC commends their industry and resourcefulness.

OH’s scholarship, moreover, is not limited to FRUS. The HAC is pleased to report and congratulate the office for publishing “War, Neutrality, and Humanitarian Relief: The Expansion of U.S. Diplomatic Activity during the Great War, 1914–1917.” An important contribution to the office’s commemoration of the US entry into World War I, this online publication differs substantially from the conventional FRUS volumes. Rather than document high level decisions, it chronicles “on-the-ground” operations by providing a narrative history of the heroic efforts of State Department personnel to provide humanitarian relief in Europe and Russia during the years leading up to America’s becoming a belligerent.

The Challenge of the 30-Year Requirement

Even without the problems rooted in the interagency review and declassification process, the explosion of documents that OH’s historians are statutorily required to locate among the multiple departments, agencies, and executive offices that contribute to the US foreign relations process all but assures some decrease in the annual rate of FRUS publication. Currently the office has submitted for declassification dozens of volumes from the Carter and Reagan subseries, stretching the interagency process to the breaking point. The reasons are readily understandable.

An increasing number of the documents selected for publication concern sensitive intelligence information. In most cases, multiple agencies and departments hold an “equity” (interest) in these documents; they are entitled to approve or deny their release in part or full. This phenomenon frequently prolongs the time required to complete the interagency process. With the Covid-19 pandemic having seriously impeded the interagency process already for more than a year, there is no way to predict how long it will take for the contributing agencies to catch up. And even as they progress toward that end, OH will be submitting for declassification an ever-growing volume of documents for new compilations.

Prior to the pandemic’s crippling the interagency review and declassification processes, the performance of the contributing agencies had varied. The State Department’s Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS) performed in an exemplary fashion whether timeliness or quality is the criterion. FRUS production also benefited from the excellent work of the National Security Council’s (NSC’s) Office of Records and Information Security Management and, in recent years, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Energy.

By egregiously violating the requirements of the FRUS statute, since 2018 the Department of Defense, in contrast, was culpable for major delays in FRUS publications. The HAC’s 2019 annual report went so far as to attribute OH’s publication of a meager 2 volumes “largely if not exclusively to DoD’s failure to provide timely and quality responses” to the compilations of documents that OH submitted for its review.

It therefore requires repeating that the HAC is encouraged by recent reforms of DoD’s review processes and structure. The committee recommended in 2019 that DoD address the inadequacies of both the timeliness and quality of its reviews by following the examples of IPS and CIA. Specifically, it recommended that DoD establish a centralized FRUS coordination team, preferably with declassification authority, to manage the review of documents submitted by OH more efficiently and effectively. In June 2020, responding to a request for a briefing by Senators Ben Sasse and Angus King and Representatives Julian Castro and Mike Gallagher, DoD representatives met virtually to discuss declassification with congressional staffers, OH’s leadership, and HAC members. DoD finally pledged to establish a FRUS declassification team.

Within months, DoD initiated changes aimed at fulfilling that pledge. Most significantly, the department migrated the responsibility for FRUS review and coordination from the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR) to the Records and Declassification Division (RDD). The result is tantamount to establishing a dedicated and centralized FRUS coordination team for which both the HAC and OH had advocated. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has yet to comply with the requirement that it submit a report to Congress on its record of declassifying documents, as mandated by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The HAC understands, nevertheless, that RDD’s FRUS team has made excellent progress, returning to OH 622 high-quality reviews of more than 1100 documents from 15 FRUS volumes between August and December. The HAC is pleased and looks forward to the completion of the OSD’s report to Congress on its overall declassification record.
The pandemic has likewise severely hampered the CIA’s review processes. It was unable in 2020 to return any reviewed FRUS volumes or resolve High Level Panel (HLP) issues concerning covert actions. Prior to the Pandemic, moreover, the Donald Trump administration had allowed the CIA’s Historical Review Panel, an avid advocate for FRUS, to become moribund. The HAC is thus encouraged by the reconstitution of the HRP, which is now called the Historical Advisory Panel (HAP). It is scheduled to resume its meetings in early 2021. Once it does, the HAC recommends that the HAP regain its authority to report directly to the CIA’s director.

The Review, Transfer, and Processing of Department of State Records

The HAC monitored the review and transfer of State Department records and their accession and processing at NARA.

Because health concerns produced by the Covid-19 pandemic forced almost all employees of the State Department’s Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS) and NARA to telework, progress toward declassifying, accessioning, and processing State Department records was severely curtailed. What is more, while the National Declassification Center (NDC) received a shipment of classified presidential records—covering the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Ford, Carter, H.W. Bush, and Obama administrations prior to the outbreak of the pandemic—it has not received one since. Shipments are not expected to resume until the pandemic subsides sufficiently for NARA facilities to reopen partially if not fully. Although the HAC learned that some progress has been made on reviewing and declassifying emails from the early years of the Reagan presidency, progress on the emails from Reagan’s later years and the George H.W. Bush administration, during which time a different email system was used, remains at a standstill.

The HAC nevertheless commends the staffs of both IPS and NARA for their achievements under such difficult circumstances. IPS, for example, primarily but not exclusively exploiting the few months during which conditions allowed some staff to return to the office, managed to achieve its 25-year systematic review goals. Moreover, throughout 2020 IPS continued to process Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases and posted thousands of released documents to the virtual reading room on the Department’s public FOIA website. Similarly, NARA’s textual reference staff responded to inquiries, conducted processing and description work, created box and folder lists, prepared and submitted digitized files and metadata to upload into the National Archives Catalog, and performed as extensively as possible comparable operations that could be done while working remotely.

The progress IPS and NARA made on the collaborative project to review and release the post-1979 P-reels warrants special mention. As explained in last year’s annual report, the technological problems that inhibited reviews of the P-reels, which are microfilm copies of paper records that have been destroyed, has been a longstanding concern of the HAC. Even as the quality of the microfilm deteriorated, no progress had been made in resolving the issue until 2019, when NDC and IPS devised a joint strategy to create digital review modules that would allow for the discovery of sensitive information. Despite safety-related constraints, reviews of the 1980 P-reels began in 2020, and plans were put in place to extend the strategy to the 1981 and 1982 P-reels as well. The HAC will continue to follow the disposition of P-reels even after their digitization in an effort to prevent their destruction.

The HAC will also continue to monitor the progress IPS makes toward building a records-management system that fully complies with the joint Office of Management and Budget/NARA mandate (M-19-21) that all agencies transition to fully electronic record keeping by December 2022. By that date NARA will no longer accession paper records, requiring all agencies to digitize them. The HAC will monitor equally closely IPS’s project to modernize its records disposition schedules. In addition to drawing on technological advances, this project aims, among other goals, to compile an accurate inventory of all records across State’s offices and bureaus, reduce the quantity of records disposition items (creating so-called “big bucket” schedules), and updating/revising all records disposition schedules so that they accord with the Department structure as it currently exists today.

Both of the projects—digitizing all records and building a fully-electronic record-keeping system, and modernizing the records disposition schedules program—are tall orders. The HAC has raised a number of questions about them both that reflect its concerns. These include whether the paper records will be preserved after they are digitized, and if so, where they will be stored; to what extent will the projects to establish an electronic records management system and modernize the records disposition schedules rely on artificial intelligence (AI); how the transition to big bucket records schedules will affect the ability of researchers (including those at OH) to locate useful records; how the effort to reduce the quantity of records disposition schedules will affect the designation of records as temporary or slated for destruction; and whether funding and personnel will be adequate for records preservation, management, and access. Because the disposition of the Department’s records has a serious impact on the work of OH, the Office must have an opportunity to weigh in on the drafting of schedules.

The HAC intended to ask IPS leadership these and other questions at a series of briefings throughout 2020. Due to the pandemic, however, IPS was only able to brief the HAC in person at the March meeting. The IPS leadership did not feel comfortable providing extensive briefings on these subjects in an unclassified environment. It did provide the HAC with monthly updates, however, and the HAC hopes to resume the briefings as soon as conditions permit in 2021.

Recommendations:

- IPS and OH formulate a process that allows for OH’s input into the development of records disposition schedules before they are submitted for NARA approval
- NARA and OMB delay the implementation of M-19-21 to take into account delays caused by the pandemic and ensure adequate funding is in place.

Minutes for the HAC meetings are at https://history.state.gov/about/hac/meeting-notes.
Recent Books of Interest


Dallin, David J. *The Big Three: The United States, Britain, Russia*. (Routledge, 2021).

Dishman, Christopher. *Warfare and Logistics along the US-Canadian Border during the War of 1812*. (Kansas, 2021).


Fajardo, Margarita. *The World that Latin America Created: The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in the Development Era*


Gleijeses, Piero and Thomas Zeller. *America's Road to Empire: Foreign Policy from Independence to World War One.* (Bloomsbury, 2021).


Kolenda, Christopher D. *Zero-Sum Victory: What We’re Getting Wrong About War.* (Kentucky, 2021).


Nowowiejski, Dean A. *The American Army in Germany, 1918-1923.* (Kansas, 2021).


To the Editor:

For connoisseurs of 1980s American pop culture, defending Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. can be like defending the character Johnny from the *Karate Kid*. Like Johnny, Lodge was handsome, rich, arrogant, egotistical, and, most annoyingly, exceptionally good at what he did. Seth Jacobs in *Rogue Diplomats: The Proud Tradition of Disobedience in American Foreign Policy* elegantly and persuasively makes the case that Lodge was “the most obstreperous rogue diplomat” since Joseph Kennedy served as the Ambassador to England in the late 1930s. More seriously, Jacobs charges Lodge with rank insubordination and extralegal conduct in the overthrow of the government of Ngo Dinh Diem. But like Johnny’s redemption in the recent television series *Cobra Kai*, a defense of Lodge is warranted.

No other new American Ambassador arrived on a scene comparable to what Lodge encountered when he alit in Saigon on August 22, 1963. Lodge was not scheduled to arrive in Saigon until two days later, but when the Diem regime brutally raided Buddhist pagodas, he was ordered by President Kennedy to fly there at once. With the embers of the raids still burning, Lodge encountered threats to his life by the host government, a city under martial law, a hostile American press, and an American mission in total disarray.

Jacobs dutifully cites historians’ accounts of Lodge’s arrogance and lone-wolf style in managing the American embassy. To a certain extent, Lodge is guilty of the first charge, but the accusation is a frivolous one. A certain amount of arrogance was a useful asset for the situation in which Lodge was thrust. The same is true for the second charge. It was Lodge’s inclination to go it alone, but he soon discovered an American mission marred by two problems: it was directionless and leaderless, and it leaked a sieve to the press. The situation demanded a tightly controlled ship. The man who hired him was also described as an arrogant loner, so Kennedy appreciated the character of the man he sent to Saigon.

As skillful a writer as Jacobs is, to state that Kennedy’s “most trusted advisers staunchly opposed” a coup is a case of hyperbolic overstatement. Of the advisers cited—McNamara, Taylor, McCone, Johnson, and Bobby Kennedy—neither Johnson nor McCone were particularly trusted by the President. All five did express doubts about the coup, but given the chance on August 26 to recall the cable authorizing the coup, all demurred. When Lodge petitioned for the recall of Saigon CIA Station Chief John Richardson in early October, McCone acquiesced. In their early October report, McNamara and Taylor stated that the US should not stimulate a coup but should continue to maintain that it was not averse to a change in government, and that there should be continued contact with “alternative leadership.” As early as July 1963, the South Vietnamese generals had stated that they wanted a signal from the US government in the form a reduction in aid as an affirmation of American disavowal of Diem. The report provided just that. Bobby’s involvement in Vietnam matters was spasmodic in the fall of 1963, but his position was codified in a White House meeting on October 29—he was not against a coup, just an unsuccessful one.

It is unfair to characterize that Lodge, in his first several days, “pounced on every hint of rebelliousness in the AVRN and sought to exploit it.” What Lodge found when he came to Saigon was a dearth of intelligence and a government in Washington eager to understand the situation. The CIA, military, and embassy had all been taken by surprise by the pagoda raids. Lodge employed CIA operative Lucien Conein and USAID employee and former CIA agent Rufus Phillips, two people who Edward Lansdale told him were the most knowledgeable Americans in Saigon, to find out what the situation was. After decimating their reports from South Vietnamese military and political leaders, Lodge reported that the “situation is not simple,” and that any US action would be a “shot in the dark.” His advice was not heeded. The next day Cable 243 authorizing the coup was sent.

After meeting with Diem to present his credentials on August 26, Lodge was righteously exasperated with the obstinacy of the South Vietnamese President. But Jacobs is incorrect when he states that thereafter, “for weeks... [Lodge] did not speak to Diem or any member of his government.” Lodge’s actions, Jacobs asserts, were in direct contradiction of the State Department. Lodge “ignored no fewer than five commands by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to meet with Diem.” But the “commands” by Rusk were mere suggestions. On August 28, Rusk specifically stated, “this is not an instruction.” On September 3, Rusk requested Lodge meet with the South Vietnamese President, “as soon as in your judgement you think it is desirable.” Further, Lodge never ignored or disregarded the instructions from the Secretary of State, always cabling a response, even in disagreement. After nine years of American acquiescence to Diem—the United States had never tied its considerable largesse to reforms—Lodge was attempting to gain a modicum of leverage by isolating Diem. The crux of the matter is that Lodge met with Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem’s brother and chief counselor, on September 2 and again on September 7. Most important, Lodge *did* meet with Diem on September 9, a meeting that only affirmed Lodge’s frustration. The most valuable source here may be Rusk, who said of Lodge that the Kennedy administration was “lucky to have him” and called his service in Vietnam “gallant.”

A critical piece of Jacobs’ evidence of Lodge’s insubordination lies in Lodge’s response to the President’s cable of October 9. In discussing the coup—a coup that the Administration was explicitly “not encouraging”—Kennedy urged Lodge to “seriously consider” having Conein present detailed evidence that the plans for the coup “offer a high prospect of success.” Jacobs alleges that Lodge did not communicate the administration’s misgivings about the chances of success to Conein and subsequently to the generals. His evidence for this is the 1975 testimony of Conein to the Church Committee. Conein is one of the most colorful figures during the heyday of Cold War espionage. “Well, it will be an experience to meet him,” Maxwell Taylor told the historian Ted Gittinger, “but for God’s sakes, don’t believe all he says.” Stanley Karnow interviewed Conein for over 70 hours and planned to write a biography on him. In the end, he was unable to, recalling, “I did a tremendous amount of research on that, not only interviewing him, but then I had to cross-check a lot of what he told me, and a lot of what he says is very exaggerated and a lot of it is not even true at all.” In later interviews, Conein admitted
to keeping no notes of his time in Vietnam.\(^5\) Conein's testimony came twelve years after the coup in a setting where the Congress was investigating American involvement in the overthrow of foreign governments. Was there an expectation that Conein would implicate himself? The Conein angle is only an aside from the critical point endemic to the Lodge story. The President asked only that Lodge “consider” finding more detailed information, leaving the prerogative solely to Lodge's judgment. If Lodge did not convey this message, it was because he felt it unwise.

In the last week before the coup, Jacobs skillfully outlines the overheated debate between Washington and Saigon, but the central tenant of debate was not Lodge's disobedience, but Washington's need to be reassured that the coup would be successful. The South Vietnamese generals were rightfully reticent to share specific information with the Americans because they remembered that the 1960 coup attempt against Diem was thwarted in large part because of American interference. By demanding such information, Washington was disobeying its own instructions in piercing plausible deniability. Lodge was, in effect, saving them from themselves.

To steal the thought of Professor Etheridge in his review of Jacobs' book [Editor's note: the review appeared as part of the Passport roundtable on Rogue Diplomats in the January 2021 issue], the rogue quality of Lodge was not that he was dishonest or unprincipled, but that he was unpredictable and unmanageable. Like Johnny, Lodge merits a dose of redemption.

Daniel R. Hart
Independent Scholar
Boston, MA

Notes:

3. Jacobs, Rogue Diplomats, 318-320; Lodge to Hilsman, August 24, 1963, 11 p.m., Papers of John F. Kennedy, National Security Files (JFKNSF), Box 198.

Editor's note: Passport offered Professor Jacobs an opportunity to respond to Mr. Hart’s comments. He replied, “Seth Jacobs declines to respond directly to this letter, but suggests that interested observers review the roundtable published in the January 2021 issue of Passport to get a better sense of the quality of the book.” AJ
In Memoriam:
Walter LaFeber

It says a lot about Walter LaFeber, who passed away on March 9, at age 87, that at his retirement from Cornell University in 2006, he gave a farewell lecture at Manhattan’s Beacon Theater, to a packed house of 3,000 mostly former students. The event was supposed to be held at the American Museum of Natural History, also on the Upper West Side, but such was the clamor for tickets that it was moved to the Beacon.

I had joined the Cornell faculty two years earlier, in 2004, just as Walt was entering phased retirement. I hadn’t known him well before that, though of course I had read and reread his work and featured it in various historiographical essays I wrote in graduate school. (In a required essay accompanying my PhD application in 1989, on the topic “Which work of history do you wish you had read and reread his work and featured it in various historiographical essays I wrote in graduate school. (In a required essay accompanying my PhD application in 1989, on the topic “Which work of history do you wish you had written, and why?” I agonized over whether I should select William Appleman Williams’s The Tragedy of American Diplomacy or LaFeber’s The New Empire; I ultimately chose the former, but worked in a mention of the latter.)

Even before my arrival in Ithaca I had heard that Walt’s classroom lectures were legendary, and I decided I had to take one in for myself. One morning in my first semester I slipped into the back of the hall just as class began. The topic that day was the Louisiana Purchase and its aftermath, and as I took my seat I saw the great man down at the front, tall and imposing, his back turned, jotting a three-point outline on the blackboard. Then he launched in, low-key and without fanfare. Within minutes, I could see what made him such a mesmerizing teacher to generations of Cornell students, who routinely gave him standing ovations at the end of the semester. There was, to begin with, his astonishing ability to speak entirely without notes, in elegant, fully formed paragraphs, using clear concepts and ordinary language, while never losing sight of the broad topic. (When over lunch I asked Walt about this extraordinary talent, he offered a characteristically self-effacing reply: “When you’ve taught the course as long as I have, Fred, you just know the stuff.” Sensing that I thought there was more to it, he offered “Keep it simple, follow a clean line,” then changed the topic.) There was also his evident erudition, which he wore lightly but which came through with unmistakable force. Most important of all, I decided, the lecture revealed Walt’s remarkable talent for conveying, vividly and memorably, the interplay of structural forces and individual human beings in history. Thus we were informed of the geopolitical elements that were instrumental in the Louisiana Purchase, and the crucial role played by American institutions, but we also learned about Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr and their fascinating rivalry—all of it, again, without as much as a notecard on the lectern.

Not coincidentally, Walt’s superb U.S. diplomatic history textbook, The American Age, which first appeared in 1989, showed this same ability to weave together structure and human agency within a single narrative, reminding us that, although impersonal forces may make events in history possible, individuals make those events happen. I may have understood this aspect of the book better than most because I relied heavily on it in writing my own lectures, in 1993, in my first job, at UC Santa Barbara. Night after night, as I scrambled to get ready for the next day’s class, I would dip into TAA and pull out this or that colorful quote, this or that analytical formulation, to flesh out my lecture notes. One passage, concerning Woodrow Wilson’s transcendent importance in American foreign relations, sticks in the mind (perhaps because I’ve quoted in class so many times): “Wilson has become the most influential architect of twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy in part because he so eloquently clothed the bleak skeleton of U.S. self-interest in the attractive garb of idealism. Nothing, after all, could be more self-interested for Americans than to have the rest of the world act according to their principles.”

After his retirement, Walt continued to be active in campus life, frequently hosting, with his wife Sandy, groups of students, faculty, and spouses in their gracious home just above the Fall Creek Suspension Bridge. My wife and I treasured those evenings, but even more I loved the leisurely lunches Walt and I had on a regular basis. We would talk about books, about the profession, about Cornell, about our families, and it always felt like we were just getting started when time ran out. Two hours never moved faster. What Walt did not do in these encounters, however, was to talk about himself or his work. At most, I’d squeeze a few mumbled words out of him on his current project or most recent publication, whereupon he’d shift the conversation. Others noticed this same side of him, as Andy Rotter reminded me soon after we learned the tragic news. “But enough about me’ might have been Walt’s mantra,” Andy said. Exactly right. Still, I now wish I had pressed harder during the lunch conversations, asked more questions—about his youth; about the Wisconsin PhD program and the heady experience of working alongside the likes of Williams, Fred Harvey Harrington, Lloyd Gardner, and Tom McCormick, among others; about SHAFR’s early years; about the turmoil at Cornell in 1969, when he was department chair; about his approach to research and writing. So much left unsaid.

In my last communication with him, over email barely a month before he passed, he again deflected attention from himself and toward me, saying merely that he was grateful for his eighty-seven years. That’s who he was, to the end. It’s a great privilege of my life to have known and spent time with this extraordinary man: a master teacher, a distinguished scholar, a true gentleman, and, most of all, a deeply humane and generous person.

—Fredrik Logevall
Harvard University
In Memoriam:
Geoffrey Smith

The world shrank a bit this past April Fool’s day, for real—Geoffrey S. Smith, one of SHAFR’s truly larger than life characters, departed this earth, two weeks after his 80th birthday. “All those ideas. All that energy. So much passion,” his friend Pamela Ann Cornell wrote.

SHAFR’s own Chester Pach captured him well: “He was always someone who you wanted at your lunch table or in a group that was having a drink. He made SHAFR meetings so enjoyable.” Indeed, “He was a riot,” in the words of Andy Johns. Geoff’s brilliance and his booming voice were staples of SHAFR—“I can still hear him in my head as I write this—and if you were in his crew for dinner you knew you were in for a memorable evening. As I reached out to SHAFR friends while writing this obituary, I heard over and over about such gatherings, and they too are among my most treasured memories. I remember well our 2004 conference in Austin, for example, when perhaps eight of us, including Pach and Catherine Forslund, squashed into someone’s car headed to Threadgills—where Janis Joplin got her start—because of course we wanted to be wherever Geoff was going.

Geoffrey S. Smith was born in 1941 in San Francisco and grew up in nearby Hillsborough. He attended the University of California at Santa Barbara for both his bachelor’s and PhD, getting his doctorate under Alexander DeConde (1920-2016), a founder of SHAFR, and my advisor as well, some two decades later. In between, Geoff did a stint at UC Berkeley for his master’s, participating in the free speech movement there. He arrived at Queens College in Kingston, Ontario, in 1969, and stayed for thirty-seven years, first as Professor of History and later of Kinesiology, after beginning his career at Macalester College in Saint Paul. At Kingston, where one of his favorite courses to teach was “Conspiracy and Dissent,” he was beloved by his students and won the university’s top teaching award. He was a basketball enthusiast at Queens as well, and his canines, another passion, featured in his Facebook page as denizens of the “Dog Forest.” Geoff is survived by his wife, Roberta Hamilton, his children, David, Brian, and Kristin, and several grandchildren.


As this range of topics underlines, Geoff was always interested in new approaches to our field. On the eve of the millennium, this made him part of an important movement in SHAFR, when a number of our group became acutely aware that such change was long overdue. At 1999’s Council meeting, Marty Sherwin called for efforts to “expand SHAFR’s vision and activities, to become more inclusive, and to perhaps internationalize its orientation.” How better than making the next meeting itself international? Geoff did so by arranging for our first conference overseas (or at least over a border) in Toronto at Ryerson Polytechnic University the following year, so far the only time the organization has met outside the confines of the United States. By 2001, as Penny von Eschen recalled at 2021’s SHAFR conference, SHAFR members like Petra Goedde and herself were giving presentations on the importance of culture and gender, leading to an “avalanche” of such works in ensuing years.

Both outside our borders and within our organization, Geoff was among those who consistently pushed to broaden members’ research agendas, an approach that was significant in more ways than one. SHAFR was still largely a men’s club in those days (even as the Women’s Breakfast and the Committee for Women in SHAFR were emerging), and Geoff did his best to change that, always welcoming the small number of women in our midst as an important mentor and friend. Catherine Forslund recalled his allyship when she was a graduate student in the 1990s. She was giving a paper on Anna Chennault’s role in US-China relations when she faced the kind of question someone new to professional conferences might dread, one also laden with gendered undertones: “But how can you show that Chennault really had influence?” While Forslund thought about the best way to answer, Geoff stood up and in his unmistakable baritone retorted, “Well, I’m not sure that’s what’s most important here!” Indeed, this moment reminds us of how Geoff could switch his more typical tenor of a “humorous and light-hearted” colleague to “fierce advocacy,” as Pach recalls.

In a more light-hearted moment, as Marc Gallicchio remembers, Geoff questioned a fellow panelist’s contention on a late 1980s World War II session that FDR had promised Churchill the U.S. would intervene if Japan threatened Britain’s Asian possessions. There was another way to see the evidence, Geoff suggested; the paper put him in mind of Churchill the U.S. would intervene if Japan threatened Britain’s Asian possessions. There was another way to see the evidence, Geoff suggested; the paper put him in mind of Churchill the U.S. would intervene if Japan threatened Britain’s Asian possessions. There was another way to see the evidence, Geoff suggested; the paper put him in mind of Churchill the U.S. would intervene if Japan threatened Britain’s Asian possessions. “Well, I had ham and eggs. It takes a chicken and a pig to make that breakfast…the chicken was involved, but the pig was committed.” FDR may have been hatching something, in other words, but wasn’t necessarily going to be bringing home the bacon for Churchill.

Geoff certainly was well versed in traditional diplomatic history, as this story illustrates, but significantly, as Laura Belmonte affirms, “Geoff was such an inspiration for those of us applying gendered analyses to foreign policy when that was controversial in SHAFR circles.” At that time, such issues were avant-garde for SHAFR—scorned even. Geoff, however, actively promoted topics on gender, sexuality, race, sport—indeed all aspects of culture—within our Society. By going to the panels that explored these topics early on, and by encouraging such exploration of them, he helped push us in new directions. Certainly he encouraged me to visit the topic of gender and sexuality in a special issue of Diplomatic
History. I edited in 2012, picking up a theme he had addressed in its pages in commentary he wrote back in 1994.

SHAFR Executive Director Amy Sayward well recalls Geoff’s welcoming approach: “I remember how he introduced himself and engaged in conversation (purposefully) with a junior, female member of SHAFR rather than simply chatting with his peers and people he already knew. He knew what it meant to be welcoming and hospitable,” inspiring her to do the same. Geoff was “such a champion of the younger scholars seeking to broaden the field,” Belmonte affirms, and here she is echoed by Peter Hahn: “He was outgoing and generous to younger colleagues like me: he took an interest in my work, encouraged me to persevere, and included me in social outings where important networks and friendships were built.”

Among those outings were those to Geoff’s island off of Toronto, and I’m kicking myself that I never got to take the boat out there! Forslund was among those who went after the Ryerson conference and remembers it vividly to this day. Such social gatherings, both at SHAFR and at other venues, were a key part of Geoff’s magnetism—and of course, these were events from which new relationships and scholarship also emerged. Jim Matray recalls an AHA Convention in Chicago he attended with his family: “one evening, we went to Berghoff’s, a famous German restaurant, and at a table were a gaggle of SHAFR folks with Geoff naturally the center of attention—I remember that Anne Foster was there. Geoff immediately sprung from his chair to meet and exchange pleasantries with my wife and two children. He then gave me his card, which introduced him as “Bobby Knight Distinguished Professor of Physical & Health Education and Conflict Resolution at Queen’s University.” As Pach noted, Geoff “was sometimes a little outrageous, but never dull.”

This was only one of the masquerades Geoff would adopt. Hahn recalled another evening when Geoff “led a group to dinner near an OAH meeting...and the restaurant host told us they were booked full. Geoff turned on his charm, convinced the host he was the comedian Steve Martin, tipped him $50, and got us a large table in the corner, where we had a convivial evening.” David Anderson too recalled this episode—Geoff looked so much like the comedian! “We had our meal and left without the server ever being disappointed to learn that she had not had Steve Martin at her table.” As so many SHAFR gatherings, Anderson’s conversation with Geoff at that gathering led to a scholarly collaboration—in this case the Didrikson article.

In retirement, Geoff continued to pursue his many passions, and SHAFR friends were thrilled to receive copies of his photographs and his paintings, often under his penname of Smithers Jefferson. I loved them. Sayward kept several in the SHAFR office, which came in lovely cards he sent while making donations to the SHAFR Leaders’ Fund, another one of the ways Geoff supported our organization. We will all miss Geoff Smith’s enthusiasm, his broad-minded approach, and his generosity of spirit, especially to junior scholars. SHAFR is a better organization because of his legacy, and those of us fortunate enough to have experienced his presence know how important it is to broaden our perceptions of what is diplomatic history, and to always warmly welcome new members to our ranks.

—Katherine A. S. Sibley
Saint Joseph’s University

Note:
Calling someone “larger than life” is often easy and corny, but I guess that phrase exists for a reason, and it surely applied to Curt Cardwell.

In early January I was stunned and saddened to get an email from his wife Stephanie Cardwell telling me that Curt had died suddenly. She remembered our connection from the past and wanted me to know. When I was asked to write about him for this newsletter I began to think more about Curt, with whom I had a close relationship during his time as a graduate student and early in his career. I thought of the words of a senior professor from long ago, when I was in graduate school, who told me that some people write a lot of books or write about something splashy and become well-known, but we should aim to write something that tells people something new and endures. And that was Curt’s work. He wasn’t prolific, but what he wrote, and what we talked about, was as important as anything I’ve read from people who wrote a lot more than him, or than me.

Professionally, Curt’s book, *NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War*, should be known by every scholar of U.S. Diplomatic History, Political Economy, or the Cold War. It took on one of the most important documents in U.S. history, National Security Council Paper #68, which I consider as important as Hamilton’s *Report on Manufactures* in the creation of an American capitalist empire, and explained it not in the typically facile way—as a doctrine to challenge the Soviet Union in the Cold War—and explained it intricately as a blueprint for postwar political-economic-military hegemony. It is magisterial and will remain so.

Other historians, especially New Left scholars like Gabriel Kolko, Walter LaFeber, William Appleman Williams, and others, had presented NSC 68 as an economic document, but not with the precision and depth that Curt did. In his depiction, more than anyone else who’d written on it, he showed how NSC-68 expanded the Cold War to the entire globe. Wherever alleged communists existed, the U.S. would get involved to stop them, usually by offering large amounts of aid to the governments in those countries to kill off [often literally] the opposition. Less discussed, but more vital, NSC-68 created a program of permanent and increased military spending, and that was essential for the economy.

Remembering that World War II had begun when the U.S. was still suffering from the Great Depression, and it was the government’s massive war spending that finally ended it, American leaders understood that it was thus necessary to have a major program of public spending to keep the economy prosperous. But it had to be careful in its spending habits. It accepted the basic ideas of Keynes, who said that government spending, even if it created deficits, was essential to put people to work and enable them to get a paycheck.

This government spending, however, had to be done carefully. If the state spent money on public programs—like schools, roads, health care, education, and so forth—then it would likely be called “Socialist” by Republicans and conservatives, and the Democrats just as firmly believed in private ownership and had no affection for Socialism in any event. But if the state spent public money on the military—which would be considered necessary because of the fears created by the NSC-68 analysis of the “good” Americans and the “evil” Russians and would be contracted out to private firms—then politicians and the public would be far more likely to support it. So NSC-68 became both a military and an economic program.

NSC-68 made it possible to spend vastly larger amounts of money on the military. In 1950 the military budget was $13 billion [which would be $126 billion today, or about 20 percent of actual 2014 military spending]. The Korean War broke out that year, so it was inevitable that military spending would grow, but it went up to over $65 billion by 1953, the year the war ended. And then, after the war, when one might expect a significant decrease, military spending remained quite high—in the $35-40 billion range. Rather than spend money on politically risky things like clinics or schools, it would spend them on weapons and intervention.

In what I think was his most important contribution, Curt detailed how, along with this growth in military funding at home, NSC-68 led to a series of foreign military aid programs, where the U.S. would provide money to other countries for them to defend against Communsists, a term used against the leaders of virtually any nation that disagreed with or criticized U.S. policies. As with the Marshall Plan, however, these military aid programs had another purpose. Other countries needed money—it was called a dollar gap because they lacked the funds to trade—so the U.S. would provide them with aid that they would use to purchase military goods, usually from American firms.

NSC-68 thus thus enabled the government to support weapons makers at home with much larger military contracts [think of Halliburton in the Iraq War] and to send money abroad so that other countries would have the dollars they needed to buy goods from the U.S., another example of Military Keynesianism. From 1950 onward, that idea grew, so that military spending continually went up [today, the U.S. spends almost more money on the military, nearly $700 billion, than the rest of the world combined] while “public” programs like education and health care fight for scraps.

About a decade before his book was published in 2011, I met Curt and began talking with him about this subject. We met through his M.A. advisor and mentor, the late Frank Kofsky, who introduced us. Tragically Frank died not long after so Curt and I began to work together, informally, more closely. He gave a paper on this at a SHAFR conference and asked me to chair it, and I was a Curt Cardwell fan from that point on, and every time after that that I read the phrase “dollar gap,” I thought of him, and still do.

At that point, his academic and personal career intersected with mine. He was applying to graduate schools and, at Frank’s urging, talked to me about working with me at the University of Houston (and also with Frank
Costigliola at UConn, who also remained a friend and mentor. He went about it professionally, talking to me, studying the program, talking to other graduate students, and staying in frequent contact. At the end of the process, he decided to work with Lloyd Gardner at Rutgers, as he should have. But when he made that decision, Curt called me on the phone to let me know that he would be going to Rutgers and was almost apologetic about it. After several minutes I had to tell him that he could come to Houston and I’d go to Rutgers in his place. But that was Curt—professional and caring about others.

We stayed in close contact from then on, and when he’d gotten his job at Drake he continued to talk to me for advice. I was proud to recommend him to Cambridge and proud to blurb his book. I discussed the tenure process with him and I believe I wrote in support of his promotion at Drake. We continued to discuss his work on the post-World War II economy and military budgets, and he continued to work on that topic until his death.

But as much as I respected and valued his scholarship, it was his personality, his kindness, that stood out. One of the testimonials from Drake made it easy to understand— “he was utterly respectful of their opinions all while never hesitating to make his own convictions clear. You couldn’t walk out of one of his classes without understanding the American world better than before.”

And he was a big guy, hence “larger than life,” and everyone at Drake loved him based on the testimonials I’ve seen. As one colleague said, “his personality could fill a room.” He was a vet, serving in Germany as the Cold War ended, and a chef, so we also talked about food a lot. I think we had a kinship because neither of us came from a privileged or Ivied background, so we saw the world differently than most academics and I think that drove us both toward studying class struggles and economic oligarchs. He often asked me for advice, but I’m sure I learned as much or more from him as vice versa.

I also recall clearly that, not long after my son died and Curt found out, he called me one night to talk about it. Some people shy away from a conversation like that, but Curt stayed on the phone for probably two hours asking me about Kelsey and offering empathy and clarity. I’m still touched by his concern and the love he showed toward my son, someone he’d never met. And every time we talked after that, he’d ask me how I was doing. He was a “stand-up guy,” which coming from my background is probably the highest compliment I can offer.

Curt Cardwell, friend and comrade, rest in power!

—Robert Buzzanco
University of Houston
In Memoriam:
William Brinker

There are many unsung heroes in the history of SHAFR, but William John “Bill” Brinker should rank near the top of the list. For twenty-three years (1980-2003) – over half of his professional career – Bill served as editor of the SHAFR Newsletter. He published nearly 100 quarterly volumes, often operating with but a few work-study students, a borrowed administrative assistant, and a shoestring budget. Despite these limitations (and a four-four teaching load) he “oversaw tremendous growth in the quality and quantity of its articles”, and “built it into a publication that SHAFR members were eager to receive and read.”* Bill cleared a path on which the newsletter evolved into today’s Passport.

Bill passed away February 13, 2021 after a brief illness. He was 86. Bill was born in Drayton Plains, Michigan (halfway between Detroit and Flint) and graduated from Waterford County High School in 1952, after which he enrolled in the architecture program at the University of Michigan. Disappointed with his progress, he left in 1956 and joined the Army. After basic training the Army sent him to their language school in Monterey, California. Bill sometimes joked about this “tough assignment,” which included time at the beach, forays into San Francisco, and much frivolity. Bill became a German linguist for the Army Security Agency, and spent 18 months in Germany. The first six in Frankfort included some eye-opening experiences for a small-town Michigander. The year in isolated West Berlin featured occasional high culture, and continued efforts to overcome what he called “German distance keeping.”

Bill returned to the United States in 1959 and received his honorable discharge in June. He reenrolled at Michigan and received his B.A. and M.A., this time majoring in history. He taught for a time in Indiana, first at Valparaiso High School, and then Manchester College, before enrolling in the doctoral program at Indiana University. He married Marilyn (Hardman) Brinker, a native Indianan, in 1966. Under the mentorship of Robert Ferrell and David Pletcher, Bill received his Ph.D. in 1973.

Bill came to Tennessee Tech in 1971, after brief stints at Wisconsin-Oshkosh and Miami University of Ohio. He served for over 40 years as the Department’s Asian specialist, teaching popular courses on China, Japan, and Vietnam, as well as American Diplomatic History. Bill also taught American survey, including a specially designed section for foreign exchange students. Bill spent nine years as Department chair before retiring as an Emeritus Professor in 2003. He continued with part-time post-retirement teaching until 2012.

Bill returned briefly to Germany as part of a Bradley University seminar in the summer of 1987, but his professional focus remained in Asia. In 1988, he spent a month in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as a participant in the US-Indochina Reconciliation Project. This came at a time essentially devoid of diplomatic and economic relations with those countries. Not long after his return to this work.

Bill also published a variety of other works beyond the oral history of Vietnam. These ranged in topics from Cookeville’s interwar 109th Cavalry Troop to Harold “Mose” Sims, a career foreign service officer and local politician from Sparta, TN. Bill even collaborated with a political science colleague on an article about foreign firms relocating to Tennessee. As is the case with many editors, Bill routinely postponed his own pursuits while aiding the research of his colleagues. He genuinely liked to see others do well. This caring attitude not only benefited SHAFR, it also left an indelible imprint on his home department.

Bill hired roughly half of our current faculty. He helped foster a climate of cooperation that persists. When describing Bill, our faculty use adjectives such as professional, collegial, organized, focused, honest, caring, concerned, affable, generous, nice, respected, neighborly, witty, fun, sincere, and kind. Many students paid him the ultimate compliment: He was tough but fair. A few of the less motivated stopped at “tough,” (perhaps they should try architecture?) but some of our most gifted students found a true mentor in Bill. Many individuals were impacted by his professionalism and friendship. Personally, I owe much to Bill. While debating the positive aspects of a position at Tennessee Tech with the salary offer, Bill gave me a call. He spoke frankly as a man who had come to Cookeville not expecting to stay, but had grown quite fond of the town and university. I will always thank him for that.

Bill is survived by Marilyn, his wife of fifty-five years, a daughter and son-in-law, EveLynn and William Holden, a son, Nicholas, and two granddaughters, Lillie Katherine and Caroline Grace Holden.

Donations may be made to the William J. Brinker Scholarship for Study Abroad at Tennessee Tech, a fund established by one of Dr. Brinker’s successful advisees (Mr. Scott Hickman) in 2008.

—Jeff Roberts
Tennessee Tech University

*These two quotes are from Amy Sayward’s email to SHAFR sent February 25, 2021. I appreciate these statements and cannot think of a way to improve them.