In this issue

The United States and World Health Organization
Searching for Bob McNamara
Impacts of the Nazi Spy Case of 1938

And more...
ca. 1918 or 1919. “Precautions taken in Seattle, Wash., during the Spanish Influenza Epidemic would not permit anyone to ride on the street cars without wearing a mask. 260,000 of these were made by the Seattle Chapter of the Red Cross which consisted of 120 workers, in three days.” Call Number: LC-A6195-3955 [P&P], Collection: American National Red Cross photograph collection, Library of Congress. Digital Id: anrc 02654, LOC Control Number: 2017668638.
In This Issue

4  Contributors

6  Presidential Message
    Kristin Hoganson

13  A Roundtable on Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Do Morals Matter?: Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump

25  A Roundtable on Monica Kim, The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History
    Mitchell Lerner, Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, Arissa H. Oh, Zachary M. Matusheski, Peter Banseok Kwon, and Monica Kim

33  The United States and the World Health Organization
    Theodore M. Brown

39  A Roundtable on Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall, “Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations”
    Chester Pach, Cindy Ewing, Kevin Y. Kim, and Daniel Bessner & Fredrik Logevall

45  A Forgotten Scandal: How the Nazi Spy Case of 1938 Affected American Neutrality and German Diplomatic Opinion
    Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones

49  A Roundtable on Timothy J. Lynch, In the Shadow of the Cold War: American Foreign Policy from George Bush Sr. to Donald Trump
    Jeffrey A. Engel, R. Joseph Parrott, Heather Marie Stur, Steven J. Brady, and Timothy J. Lynch

58  Searching for Bob McNamara
    Aurélie Basha i Novosejt

60  Immaculate Deception
    Roger Peace

63  SHAFR Awards

68  SHAFR Spotlights

73  Minutes of the June 2020 SHAFR Council Meeting

77  Diplomatic Pouch

83  In Memoriam: Lawrence S. Kaplan
    Mary Ann Heiss
Contributors

Passport 51/2 (September 2020)

Aurélie Basha i Novosejt is Lecturer in American History at the University of Kent. She is the author of I Made Mistakes: Robert McNamara's Vietnam Policy, 1960-1968 (2019).

Steven J. Brady is Assistant Professor of History at The George Washington University. He is the author of Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance under Pressure (2009), and the forthcoming Chained to History: Slavery and American Foreign Relations to 1865. His current project is a study of American Catholics and the Vietnam War.

Daniel Bessner is the Anne H.H. and Kenneth B. Pyle Associate Professor in American Foreign Policy in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and a Contributing Editor at Jacobin. He is the author of Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual (2018).

Theodore M. Brown is Professor Emeritus of History and Public Health Sciences at the University of Rochester. His research includes the history of U.S. and international medicine and public health; the history of U.S. health policy and politics; and the history of psychosomatic medicine, “stress” research, and biopsychosocial approaches to clinical practice. He has served as editor of Rochester Studies in Medical History, a book series of the University of Rochester Press, and during his eighteen year tenure oversaw the publication of 45 monographs in the history of medicine and public health. He has also served as History Editor of the American Journal of Public Health since 1997. His books include Comrades in Health: U.S. Health Internationalists Abroad and at Home (2013, with Anne-Emanuelli Birn) and The World Health Organization: A History (2019, with Marcos Cueto and Elizabeth Fee).

Lori Clune is Professor of History at California State University, Fresno. She completed her Ph.D. in History at the University of California, Davis. She is the author of Executing the Rosenbergs: Death and Diplomacy in a Cold War World (2016), as well as several essays on the Cold War and U.S. propaganda. Her current research concerns the history of the video game industry.

Jeffrey A. Engel is Professor of History and Director of the Center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University. He is the author or editor of twelve books, including Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy (2007), which received the Paul Birdsell Prize from the American Historical Association; When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War (2017), which received the 2019 Transatlantic Studies Association Prize; and Fourteen Points for the Twenty-first Century: A Renewed Appeal for Cooperative Internationalism (2020, edited with Richard H. Immerman).

Cindy Ewing is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Missouri, specializing in global history, modern South Asia, and modern Southeast Asia. She is currently working on her first book, which examines how postcolonial internationalism shaped human rights and other key ideas of global order.

Mary Ann Heiss is Associate Professor of History at Kent State University. She is the author of Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954 (1997), and has published numerous essays in edited collections and professional journals including the International History Review, Diplomatic History, and the Journal of Cold War Studies. She has co-edited volumes on the recent history and future of NATO, U.S. relations with the Third World, intrabloc conflict within NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the national security state and the legacy of Harry S. Truman. Her latest book, Fulfiling the Sacred Trust: The UN Campaign for International Colonial Accountability in the Era of Decolonization, will be published later this year by Cornell University Press.

Kristin Hoganson is Stanley S. Stroup Professor of United States History at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She is the author of Consumer’s Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920 (2007); American Empire at the Turn of the Century (2016); Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (1998); and, most recently, The Heartland: An American History (2019). She serves as SHAFR president in 2020.

Seth Jacobs is Professor of History at Boston College. His most recent book is Rogue Diplomats: The Proud Tradition of Disobedience in American Foreign Policy (2020).

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones is Professor Emeritus of American History at the University of Edinburgh, and honorary president of the Scottish Association for the Study of America. His latest work is The Nazi Spy Ring in America: Hitler’s Agents, the FBI, and the Case that Stirred the Nation (2020), also available in a UK edition as Ring of Spies: How MI5 and the FBI Brought Down the Nazis in America (2020). He is currently researching for his eighteenth book, a history of the CIA.

Kevin Y. Kim is Assistant Professor of History at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has written articles in Diplomatic History, Pacific Historical Review, Modern American History, and other publications. He is currently completing a book project, tentatively titled, Worlds Unseen: Henry Wallace, Herbert Hoover, and the Making of Cold War America. In 2018-2019, he was a faculty fellow at the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History at Harvard University.

Monica Kim is Assistant Professor and the William Appelman Williams & David G. and Marion S. Meissner Chair in U.S. International and Diplomatic History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her book, The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History (2019), received the 2020 Distinguished Book Award in U.S. History from the Society for Military History and the 2020 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize from SHAFR. She is the co-editor, with Amy Chazkel and A. Naomi Paik, of “Policing, Justice, and the Racial Imagination” (issue 37) of Radical History Review.

Peter Banseok Kwon is Assistant Professor of Korean Studies at the University at Albany, SUNY, and Associate in Research at the Korea Institute, Harvard University. Previously, he was 2017-2018 Soon Young Kim Postdoctoral Fellow in Korean Studies at Harvard University. He received his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University.
Mitchell Lerner is Professor of History and Director of the East Asia Studies Center at The Ohio State University. He is the author of The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy (2002), which received the John Lyman Award, and is the editor of Looking Back at LBJ: White House Politics in a New Light (2005); A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson (2012), and The Cold War at Home and Abroad: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy since 1945 (2018; co-edited with Andrew L. Johns). He is also associate editor of the Journal of America-East Asian Relations.

Fredrik Logevall is the Laurence D. Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Kennedy School and Professor of History in the Faculty of Arts & Sciences at Harvard University. He is the author or editor of nine books, including Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (2012), which won the Pulitzer Prize for History, the Francis Parkman Prize, and the Arthur Ross Book Award. A past president of SHAFR, his new book, JFK: Coming of Age in the American Century, 1917-1956, will be published in fall 2020.

Timothy J. Lynch is Associate Professor in American Politics at the University of Melbourne. He is the author of Turf War: The Clinton Administration and Northern Ireland (2004); U.S. Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion (2013); After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy (2008, co-authored with RS Singh), which won the Richard Neustadt Book Prize; and In the Shadow of the Cold War: American Foreign Policy from George Bush Sr. to Donald Trump (2019).

Zachary M. Matusheski is the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency post-doctoral historian-in-residence in the Department of History at The Ohio State University. Before coming to Ohio State, he served as a contracted oral history editor with the U.S. Army History Institute in Carlisle, PA. His current book project centers on Dwight D. Eisenhower’s foreign policy in East Asia from 1953-1956.

Kelly M. McFarland is Director of Programs and Research at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, where he also teaches courses on history’s influence on foreign affairs and U.S. diplomatic history. Prior to joining Georgetown, he served seven years at the U.S. Department of State, including a two-year stint in the Office of the Historian working on the FRUS series, and five years in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research as an Arabian Peninsula Analyst. He also spent 2014-2015 on a joint duty assignment at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Presidential Daily Briefing Book briefer to the Secretary of State and other State Department principals. He is currently working on a number of projects, including a book on the United States and Egypt in the 1950s.


Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus and former Dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. A prolific scholar, he is the author or editor of nearly forty books, including Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004) and DoMorals Matter?: Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump (2019). In addition to his academic work, he has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and Chair of the National Intelligence Council.

Arissa H. Oh is Associate Professor of History at Boston College, where she teaches and researches migration in U.S. history, particularly in relation to race, gender, and kinship. She is the author of To Save the Children of Korea: The Cold War Origins of International Adoption (2015).


R. Joseph Parrott is Assistant Professor of U.S. Foreign Relations and Transnational History at The Ohio State University. Interested in the intersection of foreign policy, race, and domestic politics, he is currently revising a manuscript that considers Portuguese decolonization in Africa as a noteworthy component in transforming western engagement with the global south. His work has appeared in Modern American History, Radical History Review, and Race & Class, and he is co-editing a volume that examines the radical form of Third World solidarity known as Tricontinentalism.


Danielle Richman is a graduate of California State University, Fresno who recently completed a B.A. in Political Science and a B.A. in History. Alongside competing for the CSUF Women’s Golf Team (an NCAA Division I program), Richman was also a scholar in the SmithCamp Family Honors College. She will attend the University of Cambridge beginning in the fall of 2020 to pursue an M.Phil. in Politics and International Relations.

Heather Marie Stur is Professor of History at the University of Southern Mississippi and a Fellow in the Dale Center for the Study of War & Society. She is the author or editor of four books, including, most recently, Saigon at War: South Vietnam and the Global Sixties (2020). In 2013-2014, Stur was a Fulbright Scholar in Vietnam, where she was a Visiting Professor in the Faculty of International Relations at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City.

Vanessa Walker is Morgan Assistant Professor of Diplomatic History at Amherst College. She is the author of Principles in Power: Latin America and the Politics of U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy, which is forthcoming in fall 2020 from Cornell University Press.

Judy Tzu-Chun Wu is Professor of Asian American Studies and Director of the Humanities Center at the University of California, Irvine. She is the author of Radicals on the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism During the Vietnam Era (2013) and Doctor Mom Chung of the Fair-Haired Bastards: The Life of a Wartime Celebrity (2005). Her current book project, a collaboration with political scientist Gwendolyn Mink, explores the political career of Takemoto Mink, the first woman of color U.S. congressional representative and the namesake for Title IX.
The past months have been wrenching: our in-person conference canceled, our Summer Institute and Second Book Workshop on hold, our endowment on a roller coaster ride (with more dips than rises as of this writing), our individual and collective prospects more uncertain than they seemed just a few months ago. There was a lot of talk, when the virus took off and public health officials urged people to shelter in place, about life on the other side. But there is, at present, no certainty that we will get to the other side, and less that we will do so soon.

If we do make it to the other side, what will that mean? In my first few months of teaching via Zoom, I heard many references to “normal life.” Reporting in from attics, basements, and bedrooms, my students fervently wished for a return to campus life as they had known it. But as the protestors who have taken to the streets around the world have insisted, normal is not good enough. Normal has meant inequality, injustice, exclusion, precarity, and suffering. We—meaning individuals, governments, corporations, and organizations such as SHAFR—need to do better.

For this reason, Council has adopted the following statement:

“The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) affirms that Black Lives Matter and condemns state and non-state violence against racialized communities in the United States and abroad. We stand in solidarity with those who have been fighting anti-Black racism and work to continue working for the full inclusion and equality of all peoples in all institutions and communities to which we belong, including SHAFR.

Consistent with SHAFR’s mission to promote ‘the study, advancement, and dissemination of knowledge of American foreign relations,’ we believe in identifying the inequities and imbalances of power and influence between and within states and highlighting the connections between racism, patriarchy, economic exploitation, and imperialism. We hope you will join us in fostering research and dialogue including diverse constituencies, working towards meaningful change, justice, and healing.’”

SHAFR owes a great debt to its Committee on Minority Historians (CoMH), which has worked since its inception to make SHAFR a more diverse and inclusive organization and to advance scholarship on people of color, the shameful history of racist policies and practices, and related topics. I’d like to recognize and thank committee co-chairs Christopher Fisher and Perin Gurel and committee members Ronald Williams, Jeannette Jones, Dan Bender, Benjamin Montoya, Penny von Eschen, Tessa Ong, Winkelmann, and Eilin Raphael Perez for their contributions to our organization and field.

One of the CoMH’s current endeavors is to rethink its name, but the fundamental goals of equity, justice, and inclusion will continue to guide its efforts. The adoption of the solidarity statement underscores a point that I hope has been clear all along: these goals are not just committee goals—they are SHAFR goals. SHAFR’s Council, along with its many committees and task forces, its publication teams, staff, and members need to work collectively to advance these core goals. We can do better; we must do better. I hope that all of SHAFR will join me in taking this statement to heart and striving to live up to the principles it expounds.

Another inclusivity issue that has been brought before Council is making SHAFR less U.S.-centric. Following a recommendation to this effect, I am appointing a task force on further internationalizing SHAFR, with two leading concerns being equity and access. These concerns played a major role in deliberations over the shape of the 2021 conference. In the face of uncertainty over travel restrictions, prohibitively expensive health insurance for travel to the United States, safety, and economic constraints—issues of concern to all SHAFR members yet of heightened concern to members located outside the United States—Council has decided to make the 2021 conference a hybrid event, meaning that there will be an in-person component at the Arlington Renaissance and a virtual component.

SHAFR Vice President Andrew Preston and the 2021 conference co-chairs, Megan Black and Ryan Irwin, are tackling the challenge of blending the cherished aspects of our in-person gathering with new kinds of sessions that will allow for broader participation and enhance the experience of all participants in our first hybrid gathering. Though prompted by crisis, the novel format of the 2021 conference will allow for new modes of scholarly connection and exchange. Adding virtual participation options will also enable us to move in a more sustainable direction, as will the decision to experiment with remote participation in Council meetings even after these meetings can again have an in-person component.

Among the long-term issues that has been magnified by the pandemic is archival access. Archival closures and impediments to on-site research have massively amplified earlier hurdles to on-site research. In response to the problem of archival access, Karine Walther and James Stocker have organized an on-line sharing group to connect researchers with unrestricted documents and researchers in search of documents. The newly constituted Task Force on Freely Available Research Databases, consisting of Victoria Phillips (chair), Melanie Griffin, Philip Nash, and Carole Finke, has proceeded on a parallel track, curating a list of
freely available electronic collections. This resource can be found on the Research tab of the SHAFR website (under Archives and Resources), along with contact information for submitting more entries.

SHAFR members have long advanced the precept that normal is not good enough, both in their scholarship and in teaching that casts a critical eye on the exercise of power. Our new public engagement committee—Brad Simpson (chair), Augusta Dell’Omo, Kaeten Mistry, Luke Nichter, Amira Rose Davis, Brian Etheridge, and Kimber Quinney—has been charged with helping SHAFR members reach larger audiences, thereby affecting change through the dissemination of knowledge.

Another way that SHAFR can push for a new normal is through direct advocacy on matters such as adequate funding for the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Matt Connelly has agreed to chair a new Task Force on Advocacy that will work in tandem with the Historical Documentation Committee and with Amy Offner, our representative to the National Coalition for History, to amplify the voices of SHAFR members on policies and procedures that affect our work.

When everything went haywire and the 2020 conference chairs, Julia Irwin and Gretchen Heefner, were working with the Conference Contingency Planning Task Force to take down the in-person conference they had worked so hard to produce and to develop an alternate format in conditions of great uncertainty, Julia referred me to Rebecca Solnit’s *A Paradise Built in Hell*. Her email directed me to an Amazon review that read as follows: “The most startling thing about disasters...is not merely that so many people rise to the occasion, but that they do so with joy. That joy reveals an ordinarily unmet yearning for community, purposefulness, and meaningful work that disaster often provides. *A Paradise Built in Hell* is an investigation of the moments of altruism, resourcefulness, and generosity that arise amid disaster’s grief and disruption...”

That text kept me going through the last few stressful months because it rang true. The 2020 Program Committee, the Conference Contingency Planning Task Force, Council, Executive Director Amy Sayward, and IT Director George Fujii rank high among the SHAFR leaders who rose to the occasion. Julia and Gretchen deserve particular credit for their resourcefulness, purposefulness, and altruistic dedication to SHAFR in a time of crisis.

These are not easy times. But SHAFR will weather them. What’s more, SHAFR will continue to strive to go beyond normal, so as to serve its members and advance its mission in creative ways. It has indeed been a joy to be part of this collective effort.
Attention SHAFR Members

The 2020 SHAFR elections are upon us, and neither the coronapocalypse nor the possibility of no college football season can undermine SHAFR’s democratic process. Once again, Passport is publishing copies of the candidates’ biographies and statements by the candidates for president and vice-president as a way to encourage members of the organization to familiarize themselves with the candidates and vote in this year’s elections.

Additional information, including brief CVs for each candidate, will be available on the electronic ballot. Passport would like to remind the members of SHAFR that voting for the 2020 SHAFR elections will begin in early August and will close on September 30. Ballots will be sent electronically to all current members of SHAFR. If you are a member of SHAFR and do not receive a ballot by the beginning of September, please contact the chair of the SHAFR Nominating Committee, Mitchell Lerner (lerner.26@osu.edu), as soon as possible to ensure that you are able to participate in the election.

Last year in the 2019 SHAFR election, over 600 members of SHAFR voted. Passport would like to encourage the membership of SHAFR to take the time to participate in our organization’s self-governance once again this year. As we know, elections have consequences.

2020 SHAFR Election Candidates

President
Andrew Preston, Cambridge University

Vice President/President-Elect
Laura A. Belmonte, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Jeffrey A. Engel, Southern Methodist University

Council
Roham Alvandi, London School of Economics
Daniel Immerwahr, Northwestern University

Council
Emily Conroy-Krutz, Michigan State University
Jayita “Jay” Sarkar, Boston University

Council (Graduate Student)
Shaun T. Armstead, Rutgers University, The State University of New Jersey
Addison Jensen, University of California, Santa Barbara

Nominating Committee
Kenneth Osgood, Colorado School of Mines
Jason Parker, Texas A&M University

“Elections belong to the people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters.”

Abraham Lincoln

“We do not have government by the majority. We have government by the majority who participate.”

Thomas Jefferson

“The exercise of the elective franchise is a social duty of as solemn a nature as [a person] can be called to perform.”

Daniel Webster

“We do not have government by the majority. We have government by the majority who participate.”

Thomas Jefferson

“The exercise of the elective franchise is a social duty of as solemn a nature as [a person] can be called to perform.”

Daniel Webster
2020 SHAFR Election Ballot Issues

Proposed By-Laws Amendment #1: To shorten the post-presidential term by one year. This proposal originated with immediate past President Barbara Keys, with the goal of increasing the pool of potential candidates for the presidency by lessening the term of service. Amend Article III, Section 1 to read: . . . A retiring President shall retain membership on the Council for two years after the expiration of his or her term of Office as President. If approved, the shortened term would begin January 1, 2022.

Proposed By-Laws Amendment #2: To add a designated teaching-centered member to Council. This proposal originated with SHAFR’s Nominating and Teaching committees and then was submitted to Council via a petition signed by 24 members of SHAFR. Amend Article II, Section 5 (c) to read: The Nominating Committee shall also present a slate of two candidates for each of the following offices: Vice President/President-Elect, members of the Council, graduate student member of Council (in appropriate years), teaching-centered member of Council (in appropriate years), and member of the Nominating Committee. Amend Article IV, Section 1, subsections (b) and (c) and add subsection (d) to read: The Council of the Society shall consist of . . . (b) seven members (three year terms) elected by the members of the Society; (c) two graduate student members (three year terms) elected by the members of the Society; and (d) one member (three year term) in a teaching-centered position, elected by the members of the Society. If approved, the first candidates for the teaching-centered seat on Council would stand for election in August 2021.

Proposed By-Laws Amendment #3: To ensure at least one member of Council is not based in the United States
Amend Article IV, Section 1, adding subsection (e) to read: (e) Additionally, at least one member of Council, including the President and Vice President/President-Elect, shall reside outside of the United States (at time of election), thereby requiring the Nominating Committee to put forth a pair of qualifying Council candidates if necessary to meet this minimum number. In the event of a vacancy on the Council caused by death or resignation, the vacancy shall be filled at the next annual election. If approved, this amendment would take effect in the August 2021 election.

2020 SHAFR Election
Candidate Biographies and Statements

Vice President/President Elect

Laura A. Belmonte, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Laura A. Belmonte is Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences and Professor of History at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. She received her A.B. in History and Political Science from the University of Georgia and her M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Virginia. She is co-author of Global Americans: A Transnational U.S. History, author of Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War, and editor of Speaking of America: Readings in U.S. History. Her next book, The International LGBT Rights Movement: A History, will be published in January 2021 by Bloomsbury. She is currently finalizing a contract with Bloomsbury to edit a series called History in 15.

Before accepting the deanship at Virginia Tech in 2019, she taught at Oklahoma State University for twenty-three years. While at OSU, she co-founded the Gender and Women’s Studies and American Studies programs. Her administrative roles included Director of American Studies, Head of the Department of History, and Associate Dean for Personnel and Instruction for the College of Arts and Sciences. She has extensive non-profit board experience including cofounding and leading Freedom Oklahoma, a statewide LGBTQ advocacy organization. She served on the U.S. Department of State’s Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation from 2009 to 2019.
Her SHAFR experience includes terms on the SHAFR national council, the editorial board of *Diplomatic History*, the Nominating Committee, the Link-Kuehl Prize Committee, the Committee on the Status of Women, and other ad hoc committees. In this year unlike any other, SHAFR has critically important work to do and if elected vice-president, I would be honored to use my expertise and energy to help lead the organization.

**Statement**

In the nearly three decades that I have been a member of SHAFR, I have watched proudly as the organization has greatly diversified its leadership and membership. We have made great strides in broadening the scholarship presented in *Diplomatic History* and at the annual meeting. SHAFR has provided tremendous support for graduate students, international scholars, and recognition of outstanding publications and service. We have changed policies and taken difficult stands in order to protect the collegiality and community that define us.

We must safeguard SHAFR's capacity to continue its efforts in all of these areas through prudent fiscal management, thoughtful and transparent governance, strong communication, and attentiveness to larger trends in the academy. We must also simultaneously recognize and address the grave threats facing for some of our colleagues who are battling budget crises, program cuts, and furloughs. Many early-career scholars and graduate students live in precarity triggered by the academy's overreliance on contingent labor and endure tremendous pressures while competing for a shrinking pool of secure academic positions. We must redouble our efforts to provide mentorship, professional development guidance, and internship opportunities.

Finally, we must keep the voices of SHAFR experts engaged in the public sphere. Through our publications, programming, and digital resources, we must continue to speak with authority on issues of vital international importance.

*Jeffrey A. Engel, Southern Methodist University*

Jeffrey A. Engel is the founding director of the Center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University. Author or editor of thirteen books on American foreign policy and the American presidency, including *Cold War at 30,000 Feet* (2007), which received the American Historical Association's Birdsell Prize; *When the World Seemed New* (2017), short-listed for the Council on Foreign Relations Transatlantic Studies Prize and recipient of the Transatlantic Studies Association Book Prize; he also co-edited *The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush's Decision to Surge in Iraq* (2019), honorable mention for SHAFR's Link-Kuehl Prize.

A SHAFR member since 1995, he shared its 2000 W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship and delivered its 2012 Bernath Lecture. In his twenty-five years with the organization, he has served on *Diplomatic History*’s Editorial Board, and on SHAFR Council; Ways and Means Committee; Contract Renegotiation Committee for *Diplomatic History*; Ferrell Prize Committee; as 2018 conference program co-chair; and co-directed the SHAFR Summer Institute.

Educated at Cornell University under Walter LaFeber and at the University of Wisconsin-Madison under Tom McCormick, he further served as a CENFAD Fellow with Richard Immerman, and as a post-doctoral fellow at Yale University with John Gaddis and Paul Kennedy. At Texas A&M University from 2004-12 he taught public policy students, receiving teaching distinction at the college, university, and system levels. At SMU he has taught undergraduates and graduate students in American history, and created a post-doctoral fellowship program. In 2018 SMU’s Residence Life Students voted him their campus-wide HOPE Professor of the Year.

**Statement**

SHAFR has been my intellectual and professional home for a quarter-century, years in which we have grown the definition of “American foreign relations.” Its members today teach, research, and write on every cutting edge of the historical profession.

We have advanced far, but can yet do more. The 2020 global pandemic has already strained resources and employment opportunities within and beyond the traditional academy, and thus further strained our membership's individual prospects for greater professional development and our organization's plans for even greater diversification. We should respond by expanding, in particular deploying greater resources towards our most professionally vulnerable members, our newest PhDs and our growing cadre of continent faculty, whose need for travel, research, and writing support will only increase as universities shrink their rosters and budgets. This will demand both further broadening our outreach—expanding even further our usable definition of American foreign relations—and most critically, tapping new funding streams including non-profit partnerships, government grants (should they still exist), and foundation sponsorships.

Our members will need even more from SHAFR in the trying year to come, and we should see this as an opportunity not only to help, but to widen our ranks and interests. The 21st century no longer affords the comfort and safety of a truly isolated ivory tower, and to serve our current-day academy and world, SHAFR must continue to grow like it, with it, and for it.
Council: Race #1

Roham Alvandi, London School of Economics

I am an Associate Professor of International History and Director of the Cold War Studies Project at the London School of Economics. I was born in Iran, raised in Australia, and educated in the US and the UK. I worked at the United Nations before completing my doctorate at the University of Oxford. My research has focused on Iran's global history in the Pahlavi era. My first book, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (OUP 2014) was selected by the Financial Times as one of its history books of the year. Currently, I am working on a global history of the Iranian Revolution, with a focus on human rights activism in the 1970s. Like many international scholars of US foreign relations history, SHAFR first became my intellectual home as a graduate student. I subsequently served on the Membership Committee and the Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship Committee and I worked with SHAFR's Task Force on Advocacy to draft a public statement in opposition to Trump's Muslim travel ban in 2017. I am proud that this marked the first time that our Society issued such a public statement in its history.

Daniel Immerwahr, Northwestern University

I am a professor in Northwestern University's history department. My research brings themes from global history—such as empire, development, and climate change—into conversation with U.S. history. I've written two books, Thinking Small (Harvard, 2015), which won the OAH's Merle Curti Prize in U.S. intellectual history, and How to Hide an Empire (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019), which was a national bestseller and appeared on critics' year-end lists for both the New York Times and Chicago Tribune. I also write for newspapers and magazines: the New York Times, The Guardian, the Washington Post, The New Republic, The Nation, Slate, n+1, Jacobin, Dissent, and Mother Jones. I am now working on two projects: a book about ecological catastrophes in the age of settler colonialism and a series of studies of popular culture (comics, movies, science fiction novels) and U.S. hegemony. I have been an active member (and booster) of SHAFR since I was a graduate student. I've served on SHAFR's program committee, dissertation completion fellowship committee, and Myra Bernath Prize committee. In 2015, I received SHAFR's Bernath Lecture Prize.

Council: Race #2

Emily Conroy-Krutz, Michigan State University

I am an associate professor of history at Michigan State University and author of Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic (Cornell, 2015). I have served SHAFR on the Stuart Bernath Book Prize Committee (2017-2019) and the Program Committee (2020). I sit on the editorial boards of Diplomatic History and the US in the World Series at Cornell. My research interests include the 19th century, religion (especially the foreign mission movement), American imperialism, and gender. I am currently writing Missionary Diplomacy: Religion and 19th-Century American Foreign Relations (Cornell) and co-editing Making a Republic Imperial (Penn). Outside of SHAFR, I co-founded the Second-Book Writers' Workshop at SHEAR. My work has been recognized with the Jane Dempsey Douglass Prize (2019, ASCH), a China Residency Fellowship (2018, OAH/Zhejiang University), and a Charles Warren Center Fellowship (2020-2021). I attended my first SHAFR meeting in 2014 and have found it to be a supportive scholarly community that is working to diversify itself in the academic approaches of its members as well as its gender and racial makeup. There remains much work to be done, and I would be honored to work towards these goals as part of the Council.

Jayita “Jay” Sarkar, Boston University

Jayita Sarkar is an assistant professor at Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies, where she teaches diplomatic and political history. She is the founding director of the Pardee School’s Global Decolonization Initiative. In 2020-21, she is a fellow with Harvard University’s Weatherhead Initiative on Global History, and an Ernest May Fellow in History & Policy.

Her first book, Ploughshares & Swords: India’s Nuclear Program in the Global Cold War, examines the first forty years of India’s nuclear program through the prisms of the geopolitics of state-making, and the technopolitics of national development and national security. It is under contract to be published with Cornell University Press.

Concurrently, she has two ongoing book-length projects: one, on the U.S. government’s export of light water reactors from the 1950s to the 1980s to expand U.S. global power through nonproliferation, and the other, on the global intellectual history of territorial partitions from the 1900s to the 1970s. She has been a member of SHAFR since 2012, has served on the SHAFR Program Committee in 2019, and obtained SHAFR travel grants in 2013 and 2012. Born in Calcutta, India, she obtained her doctorate in History from the Graduate Institute Geneva in Switzerland in 2014.
Shaun T. Armstead, Rutgers University, The State University of New Jersey

Shaun T. Armstead is a doctoral candidate in history at Rutgers University. She studies global activism in the twentieth century with a focus on Black women's international history. In her dissertation, “Imagined Solidarities: The Liberal Black Internationalism of the NCNW, from Afro-Asian to Pan-African Unity,” she examines the liberal Black internationalism that the National Council of Negro Women, one of the largest African American women's federations in history, articulated between 1935 and 1975. She considers how Black American women reconfigured U.S. liberal democratic ideals and incorporated them into an international women's movement that presumed the indignities of racism and imperialism unified all women of color. Shaun served on the Research Committee for Slavery and the Disenfranchised at Rutgers, producing Scarlet & Black, a three-volume series on Rutgers history from slavery to the present. She contributed to several essays in the series. She has also presented papers at Gothenburg University as well as at numerous conferences in the U.S. As a prospective SHAFR graduate student representative, she welcomes the opportunity to render service to an organization supporting scholars who have shaped her own intellectual development and research interests.

Addison Jensen, University of California, Santa Barbara

Addison Jensen is a doctoral candidate in the History Department at UCSB. Her dissertation analyzes the intersections of foreign policy and popular culture by exploring how the countercultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s reached men and women of diverse racial, ethnic, and class backgrounds serving in Vietnam, and how these movements impacted both soldiers’ attitudes towards the war and their postwar re-assimilation into American society.

For her work, Addison received the History Department's 2019 DeConde/Burns Prize, which recognizes graduate students “judged to be the best in outstanding accomplishment in foreign relations.” In 2019-2020, Addison served as the first graduate student representative for the PCB-AHA program committee, coordinated a SHAFR 2019 panel on “Culture and the Vietnam War,” and contributed to a H-Diplo roundtable for Seth Offenbach’s book, The Conservative Movement and the Vietnam War. In 2020-2021, she will continue in her position as Graduate Fellow at UCSB's Center for Cold War Studies, organizing the spring international graduate student conference. As a member of SHAFR's council, Addison will represent her peers by advocating for expanded career development opportunities and diversity and inclusivity. She will support networking within SHAFR by creating avenues for individualized professor and graduate student exchange and mentorship.

Nominating Committee

Kenneth Osgood, Colorado School of Mines

I have been active in SHAFR since 1996. I twice served on SHAFR council, including as graduate student representative. I co-led a SHAFR summer institute, chaired a committee to increase SHAFR's online presence, served on search committees, led an overhaul of SHAFR’s fellowship process, and served on a documentation committee that prodded much-needed reforms at the U.S. National Archives. I also worked as associate editor of Diplomatic History, and on the editorial boards of DH and Passport. Throughout, I’ve advocated making SHAFR a diverse, inclusive, and intellectually stimulating association that promotes transformative research and teaching. Much of my research explores the intersection between domestic and foreign affairs, focusing on propaganda, culture, and media. I've published five books, including Total Cold War and volumes on propaganda, international history, and civil rights. A Professor of History at Colorado School of Mines, I have been a Harvard fellow and NEH recipient.

Jason Parker, Texas A&M University

Jason Parker is Professor of History and Cornerstone Faculty Fellow at Texas A&M University. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Florida and taught at West Virginia University for five years before coming to Texas. He is the author of Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World (Oxford UP, 2016); Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962 (OUP, 2008) which won the SHAFR Bernath Book Prize; and articles in the Journal of American History, Diplomatic History, and elsewhere. His professional service includes terms on the SHAFR Bernath Article Prize Committee, the DH editorial board, and the Truman Library Institute. His research has been supported by the Fulbright Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and other entities, including for his current research project: a global history of postwar federations.
A Roundtable on Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Do Morals Matter?: Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump


Introductory Essay to the Roundtable Review of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump

Kelly M. McFarland

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.’s new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, and the process of reviewing it, takes on new relevance in today’s world. For over three years now, President Donald J. Trump has moved the United States away from the international order that it had a leading role in creating and perpetuating. The current president has tossed aside allies, cozied up to authoritarians from Moscow, to Beijing, to Brazil, and has pushed (while also riding a wave of) nativist policies that Nye criticizes in his new work. The current COVID-19 pandemic and Trump’s go-it-alone nationalist response is the starkest, and most troubling, recent example.

As I write this, protests over the murder of George Floyd have enveloped cities across America, and the world, putting issues of domestic morality front and center. As the Black Lives Matter movement and others gather momentum, we have already seen Russia, China, and Iran focus on the United States, especially in post-colonial Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. While this book does not focus on presidential morals in domestic affairs, Nye points out the connected nature of morals at home and morals abroad. As Nye himself ends his work, “the future success of American foreign policy may be threatened more by the rise of nativist politics that narrow our moral vision at home than by the rise and decline of other powers abroad.” (218)

Nye’s book uses mini-case studies of each president from FDR to Trump to provide a grade for each president’s moral decision-making, and more broadly to make the case for the role that morals play in foreign policy decision-making. Like the ethical scorecards that Nye uses, reviewers’ scores of Do Morals Matter? run the gamut. In many ways, the differences between reviewers speak to the long-standing and ever-present difference between how political scientists and historians approach their craft. If you picked up Nye’s newest offering looking for a historical tome steeped in primary source research that ponders all of the nuance and complexity of each presidential administration, then you’ll have to look further. If you’re looking for a rejoinder to realist theory, a book that questions those that find morals no more than presidential rhetorical tools justifying policies after that fact, and offers up arguments for bringing morals to bear upon future foreign policy decisions, then this is your book.

On the issue of realist theory, multiple reviewers applaud Nye’s attempt to not only show the faults in realist theory, and any single theory for that matter, but to offer up a more nuanced approach that encompasses morals. Seth Jacobs highlights how Nye “argues that we must combine realism with two other ‘mental maps of the world,’ cosmopolitanism and liberalism, both to understand the challenges American presidents face when they venture abroad and to evaluate how successful they have been in meeting those challenges.” Vanessa Walker, for her part, notes that Nye’s work is “not just a championing of morals in international affairs, but a concerted effort to grapple with how values shape presidential thinking, and how we, as scholars and citizens, in turn assess presidential politics.”

A major plus, and minus, depending on which reviewer you are reading, has to do with Nye’s assessment of each president’s performance. A unique, and useful, aspect of this book is the author’s creation of a “scorecard” that can be used to judge a president’s moral performance. The reviewers are markedly split on where they stand on the scorecards and the methodology used to score them. Jacobs
founds Nye’s guidelines – weighing intentions, means, and consequences – “as both innovative and sound.” He is also drawn to the “complexity and flexibility” of Nye’s scorecards. Jacobs points out correctly that Nye acknowledges the built-in biases in his assessments, but as the reviewer highlights, “what matters to Nye are the scorecards and how they help structure and discipline our thinking about ethics and foreign policy.” Others do not find the scorecards as useful. “Each moral scorecard is somewhat selective and markedly biased,” according to Lori Clune and Danielle Richman, “and that is the problem.” Wilson D. Miscamble calls the scorecards Nye’s “vaguely-defined criteria,” and finds a lot to fault in the book overall.

One of the largest points of contention a number of reviewers had with Do Morals Matter has to do with the obvious issue of the book’s scale and selectivity. A relatively small book such as this, that produces scorecards on morals for every president since FDR, is bound to be selective. Clune and Richman, for example, take the author to task for “omitting and mischaracterizing widely-accepted historical facts” in his analysis of the Eisenhower presidency, as well as what they view as the lack of complexity in his cases. Miscamble is blunter, noting that “Nye does not effectively till sufficient historical soil to harvest any yield of consequence regarding morality and foreign policy.” As multiple reviewers note, there are a few areas of sloppy history.

The author confronts these critiques head on, noting that while the historical and political science fields overlap, “they clearly differ,” which is apparent in the reviews. Nye defends his selectivity as a necessity in a short book, especially one whose major purpose was “an exercise in moral reasoning about international relations.” Nye uses his historical cases, selective as they may be, to prove his theory that one cannot begin and end with realist theory. With that done, he then “wanted to suggest a more careful approach to moral reasoning,” which he spends the latter portion of his book doing. It is here that Nye extends his historical cases to the future. The author spends the first half making a case that morals did matter in presidential decision-making since 1945, and he spends the latter half arguing for their continued use in the future, as the United States faces major challenges in the decline of the liberal order and a rising China.

The reviewers of Nye’s newest endeavor are certainly up to the task in the reviews that follow. They are quick to highlight the book’s positive contributions, and just as forthright in discussing its shortcomings. Morals do matter, that much Nye, and historians before him have made clear. They will be all the more important as the United States, and the world, tackles an ever more complicated world in the years to come. The author calls his work “applied history,” and if this is the case, in part “a robust questioning of the morality of Pax Americana,” as Vanessa Walker notes, “has the potential to check interventionism and superpower conceit and reshape U.S. power in the service of an interdependent global community.” Perhaps Clune and Richman sum the book up best: “Nye writes a somewhat imperfect historical analysis to support a completely valid argument in favor of a collaborative, liberal-leaning approach to international relations, stressing the use of soft power tactics in the face of extraordinary twenty-first century challenges.”

Notes:

Review of Joseph Nye Jr., Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump

Joseph Nye Jr., a self-described “old practitioner” of American foreign policy and the scholar who coined the term “soft power,” asks, Do morals matter? His answer is yes, and he spends the subsequent two hundred pages evaluating the history of modern American foreign policy to provide examples of moral versus immoral decision-making. In this historical analysis, Nye outlines some of the most important and alarming conflicts confronting international relations in the twenty-first century, providing insight into how the United States should maneuver the foreign landscape. The book is a political science/history crossover volume that uses realism, cosmopolitanism, and liberalism as foundations for emphasizing and exploring the importance of morality in foreign policy decision-making.

Nye assesses immoral versus moral foreign policy strategy by creating “moral foreign policy scorecards” to compare the American presidents from the 1930s to the present, using Woodrow Wilson as a baseline “thought leader” (5). In his assessment, he balances a president’s stated values and personal motives, evaluates the effectiveness and ethical means of his stated foreign policy agenda, and analyzes the domestic and international ramifications of his administration. Each president receives a scorecard summarizing their qualitative grades (good, mixed, or poor) in three categories: intentions, means, and consequences. The parameters of those categories are suggested via questions that encourage the reader to examine all dimensions of a president’s actions (37).

Nye ultimately argues that it is only with a strong moral compass grounded in “an ‘open and rules-based’ world order”—and balancing hard and soft power—that future presidents will be able to tackle key twenty-first-century challenges to American foreign policymakers. In particular, he points to the rise of China and its Asiatic partners and to a power shift from state to non-state actors with the advent and rise of new technologies (203). In confronting these challenges to a moral foreign policy agenda, he urges future presidents to employ soft power tactics, to provide grand strategies and global public goods in cooperation with others, and to refrain from isolationism or protectionism (217).

The majority of Nye’s book consists of concise foreign policy summaries of each president since Franklin D. Roosevelt, culminating at the end with a moral evaluation of some of the most notable decisions made by the president under consideration. Because of the sheer number of presidents Nye evaluates, however, it is difficult for him to give an equitable assessment of each president’s foreign policy. Consequently, he approaches each presidential administration knowing that he will have to be selective. Moreover, he admits towards the end of his book that “even when there is broad agreement on the facts, different judges may weigh them differently” (185).

For example, in citing Michael Beschloss, Nye claims that Harry Truman “resisted the use of nuclear weapons after the war [in Korea] bogged down,” but several scholars (including Conrad Crane and John Gaddis) have argued that Truman seriously considered military plans that included the possible use of nuclear weapons (55). Historian Sean L. Malloy has emphasized that Truman indeed tried to find a nuclear response that could break the military stalemate, a nuance overlooked in Nye’s analysis.

Nye does admit that Eisenhower “showed little respect for democracy” and demonstrated little restraint “when it came to overthrowing elected regimes,” yet he seems to give Ike a pass in ethics, claiming he was “good on nuclear” (63–
64, 67). Are we to accept that Eisenhower's use of the CIA was morally acceptable because he didn't drop a nuclear bomb anywhere? And does “a set of prudent judgments” that resulted in “avoiding” a land war in Vietnam let Eisenhower off the hook for years of American involvement that, according to Kathryn Statler, undermined the French and set a precedent of U.S. intervention in Vietnam (61)? These judgments oversimplify the complexity of eight years of foreign policy. Also problematic is Nye's reliance on Stephen Ambrose, who claimed that Eisenhower's handling of the Soviet downing of a U-2 spy plane in May 1960 was “a magnificent performance” (64). Omitting and mischaracterizing widely accepted historical facts tends to weaken Nye's portrayal of Eisenhower's presidency and, therefore, his overall argument concerning morality in foreign policy.

Setting individual administrations aside, Nye also overlooks some of the broad circumstances and consequences of U.S. diplomacy. For example, he groups Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower together as “the founders” of the American liberal international order—a well-respected and fair assessment. But this conventional approach to the foundational years of the Cold War overlooks the possibility that these presidents, particularly Truman and Eisenhower, should be held responsible for the U.S. contribution to the moral discontinuity surrounding the Cold War and decolonization, as scholar Heonik Kwon and others have argued. As a result of these presidents' policies, the United States constructed a global system that favored its own economic and territorial ambitions at the expense of the so-called Third World. Surely Nye sees this as morally problematic?

Even when there is a clear case of international condemnation, Nye appears to minimize the offense. For example, Nye notes that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 1986 that Ronald Reagan's actions in Nicaragua—including supporting the Contras and mining Nicaragua's harbors—were in violation of international law. He then adds that Reagan “ignored the verdict” (121). But should we? Nye scores Reagan as “mixed” in the means category on his ethical scorecard, but the ruling of the ICJ suggests he might deserve a more damning judgment.

Perhaps equally problematic is the evaluation of the presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The story for both is incomplete. Document declassification—essential to the writing of the history of U.S. foreign relations—will continue to uncover the intricacies of the Obama administration for decades to come. And how can a scorecard for Trump be accurate and complete when his administration is ongoing? While we can perceive the short-term rewards or consequences of both presidents' actions, the effects of foreign policy often take years or decades to unravel.

Consequently, each moral scorecard is somewhat selective and markedly biased, and this is a problem. Is the author simply playing an academic parlor game? Is he encouraging readers to compare presidents by their own ethical scorecards, the way fans compare baseball players and their averages and RBIs? If Nye is using presidential history to bolster a case in favor of moral sentiment within the foreign realm, why wouldn't he take care to present more complete and accurate histories?

While the majority of his book reads like a historical analysis of American foreign policy, Nye ultimately seems to be providing a guide for future politicians and foreign diplomats. He devotes considerable time to explaining key international relations concepts, such as bipolarity throughout the Cold War, the U.S. ascension into global hegemony with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and U.S. leadership in creating the contemporary liberal economic order. He then devotes the last few chapters to assessing future challenges in foreign policy and argues for the continued use of soft power tactics and international collaboration.

Yet, the bulk of Nye's book is devoted to recounting the morality of past presidents' foreign policy decisions. As a result, a key question emerges: Why did the author spend the majority of his short book assessing history when his premise in writing the book was to guide future American presidents on how to confront such dilemmas as climate change or global spikes in immigration? His historical analyses, which together make up a majority of the manuscript but are all exceedingly brief and subjective, detract from his arguments about diplomacy. While he has a firm grasp of international relations, his selectivity and narrowness in considering different aspects of American history detract from the purpose of the book, which is to determine whether morality matters in the foreign sphere.

The question about his emphasis on historical analyses leads us to yet another query: Who is Nye writing for? When he claims that “Reagan is often credited with ending the Cold War, but the story is more complex,” he sounds more like a professor lecturing undergraduates than a scholar urging fellow scholars to widen their understanding of ethics and foreign policy (118). If his purpose is to provide a rudimentary guide to international relations, then he makes intelligible and grounded claims. Framed within his wealth of international relations experience, Nye's appeal for embracing a liberal world order, one that calls for international cooperation over isolationism, is perfectly valid.

For example, individual states that are attempting to employ their own unique policies to conquer climate change or address pandemics are proving ineffective and inefficient in the face of rising globalization. Nye successfully argues that the United States should work in collaboration with the international community to elevate and strengthen transnational organizations and the general rule of law. The United States can assume a leadership position in confronting such dilemmas as preventing regional polarity, correcting the consequences of global climate change, and mitigating the economic inequality that accompanies globalization. In this way, he provides the optimal platform for diplomatic experts to create foreign policy for future presidents.

In summary, this slender volume makes a thought-provoking contribution to the fields of international relations and the history of American foreign policy. It will certainly prompt conversation. As with any book, how readers choose to use it is up to them. Nye writes a somewhat imperfect historical analysis to support a completely valid argument in favor of a collaborative, liberal-leaning approach to international relations, stressing the use of soft power tactics in the face of extraordinary twenty-first-century challenges.

Review of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump

Wilson D. (Bill) Miscamble, C.S.C

Joseph Nye is a renowned scholar of international relations who taught for decades at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. In addition to publishing many books, he also served at a senior level in both the Carter and Clinton administrations and, most recently, advised the Obama administration. He is best known for coining the term “soft power” and for developing the notion that the United States should persuade other nations to follow its lead more by utilizing its culture, institutions and values than by resorting to force or coercion.

Nye's commitment to this approach is evident in Do
Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump. In this book Nye poses questions regarding the role of morals in the making of American foreign policy. Spoiler alert: he believes that morals do matter, and he seeks to demonstrate this by evaluating the foreign policy performance of each president from Franklin Roosevelt through to the current occupant of the White House. Sadly, his work provides little of intellectual substance or practical value on the important questions he poses.

The bulk of Nye's book consists of his evaluations of the presidents and his grading of each of them according to his own vaguely defined criteria. Surprisingly, given his long involvement in U.S. foreign policy as both practitioner and observer, Nye's cursory analyses fail to advance an understanding of the way in which morality influenced any of the presidents' foreign policies. He relies largely on familiar secondary sources, supplemented by some selective memoir literature.

Those who want more insightful overviews of presidential character and leadership styles might read the fair-minded portraits in Fred Greenstein's The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama (3rd ed., 2012). Those who want quick introductions to the actual making of foreign policy by these presidents would benefit more from the lively portrayals in Stephen Sestanovich's Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama (2014). Indeed, Nye himself borrows from both Greenstein and Sestanovich in shaping his presidential sketches, which have something of the quality of decent undergraduate lectures derived from a decidedly soft-power, liberal perspective. This point must be emphasized because Nye does not effectively till sufficient historical soil to harvest any yield of consequence regarding morality and foreign policy.

Missing from Nye's analyses is any serious discussion of either the moral framework out of which the presidents operated or how they utilized moral reasoning in making decisions. Nye provides well-known biographical information, but he offers no sense of the moral and intellectual formation that presidents brought with them to the Oval Office. There is little discussion of how any president determined right from wrong or who they turned to for guidance on such concerns. Nye largely fails to show how the ethical or religious outlooks of the presidents connected in any demonstrable way to the policy decisions they made. One wishes that he had examined the rich ground that Andrew Preston covers in his Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American Diplomacy (2012), which does a good job of exploring the intertwining of religion and statecraft throughout American history.

Furthermore, Nye neglects to examine how each presidential administration engaged in debate and deliberation on those policy issues that had profound moral implications. He provides no entry into the world of policymakers, with its inevitable compromises and constantly competing pressures (both foreign and domestic) that confuse and complicate policy vision. And he largely fails to relate deliberations on foreign policy to the broader moral debates that occurred contemporaneously. For example, there is no discussion here of how the Reagan administration sought to counter the morally based criticisms of its nuclear arms policy during its first term. Yet dealing with these matters occupied a number of senior administration policymakers and forced them to provide a moral defense of nuclear deterrence against the criticisms of those who favored a nuclear freeze or nuclear disarmament.

One could multiply such examples; the moral debates surrounding both the decision of George H. W. Bush to enter the Gulf War and that of his son to launch the war in Iraq are classic cases. Questions as to whether these wars met the criteria for just wars were canvassed in serious public debates. Yet Nye pays no sustained attention to how each president engaged these debates. This seems a significant limitation in a book dedicated to the role of morality in the making of U.S. foreign policy.

Another limitation of Nye's approach is that it focuses so heavily on the presidents as individuals rather than on the administrations they led. Nye acknowledges that Truman's foreign policy emerged from the efforts of an able group of policymakers, but he provides nothing on the moral convictions that motivated them. There is nothing in this work on what reportedly made George Kennan describe the Christian realist theologian Reinhold Niebuhr as "the father of us all." Further, Nye evaluates both JFK and LBJ and gives them their "scores," but he doesn't step back to examine the mentality of the "best and the brightest" set who counseled these leaders. Men like Robert McNamara, to choose a representative figure, seemed to move beyond issues of right and wrong into the technocratic realm of number-crunching and determining what would work. What is one to make of such an approach to policymaking? Where do morals fit in here? Nye doesn't thoughtfully consider such questions.

In short, Nye's study does not provide an examination of how morality influenced foreign policy in the past seventy-five years. Rather, he delivers summary evaluations of each president, using criteria he constructs in his opening chapters. Here, he erects a rickety analytical framework that allows him to assess (if that be the term) each president's foreign policy with three criteria. Firstly, he advances intention, and he apportions this measurement between both moral vision and prudential judgment. Then come the means that presidents utilized, and this category is somehow divided out into elements such as necessity, proportion, discrimination in the use of force and respect for international rules and institutions. Finally, Nye puts forward consequences, a category that includes overall impact on U.S. interests and the extent of damage to others. Each president is then assigned a score of good, mixed or poor in each area, based solely on Nye's judgment calls.

The lack of serious intellectual rigor in applying these criteria is notable and seems apparent to Nye himself. In a telling observation, he notes that "of course, judgments can differ when assessing presidents of the same period. Anyone who has engaged in student exams or watched Olympic figure skating or the Westminster Dog Show knows that judging is not a science. Even when there is broad agreement on the facts, different judges may weight them differently." (185) As a matter of fact, the idiosyncratic nature of the judging process shows that the book is not a systematically grounded assessment of the role of morality. It merely presents Nye's verdict on the moral quality of each president's foreign policy.

Needless to say, his views are rather predictable. Appraised on the morality measures that Nye employs, the administrations in which he served—those of Carter, Clinton, and Obama—all do very well. Yet, Nye himself obviously worries about offering that list as his top group, given the noteworthy limitations of these presidents in overseeing U.S. foreign policy. So he pivots quickly and asserts that morality should be combined with "effectiveness" (183). This then allows him to come up with a very different ranking. When the two benchmarks are merged, Nye places FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, and Bush 41 in his top group. Then there is a middle cluster, consisting of Reagan, Kennedy, Ford, Carter, Clinton, and Obama. At the bottom are Johnson, Nixon, Bush 43, and Trump.

Would this list surprise anyone familiar with Nye's published writings as well as his general sympathies regarding the importance of soft power and international organizations for American foreign policy? Hardly. Suffice it to say that thoughtful historians could readily contest these rankings. Indeed, their subjective nature calls into
question the practice of presidential ranking so favored by certain political scientists.

Nye has a secondary purpose to his study. He can't resist turning it into a critique of the Trump administration's foreign policy and what he presents as Trump's dangerous turn away from a firm commitment to the Wilsonian-inspired liberal international order that, he argues, the United States constructed after World War II. The language of “America First” troubles Nye greatly. He can't concede that Trump's efforts to rebalance American trade and security commitments and to slow the pace on globalization might reflect domestic opinion.  

Yet Nye's censuring of Trump is his departure point for looking ahead to review the challenges for a “future moral foreign policy” for the United States. Ironically, he draws very little on his evaluations of the previous presidents in charting a future course. There don't seem to be any significant specific lessons to be drawn from the past as to how morality might be applied effectively in the present, aside from a vague renewal of the American commitment to the liberal international order. Instead, in what reads like a typical Foreign Affairs essay, Nye focuses on two “global power shifts” that are already underway and to which the United States must respond. One is “horizontal,” comprising the rise of Asia and especially China, and the other is “vertical,” involving technological developments that empower non-state actors.

What is most striking about Nye's treatment of these challenges is how infrequently moral questions enter into his discussion of them. For example, in dealing with China, he shines no light on the vast number of Chinese human rights violations and the re-education camps that imprison over a million Uighurs. Rather, the moral issue is nebulously defined as “whether the United States and China will develop attitudes that allow them to cooperate in producing global public goods” (204). Given the recent history of Chinese deception and antagonism, prudence surely requires American policymakers to exercise caution in dealing with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Similarly, Nye's confidence in the value of international organizations might be tempered by a recognition that the CCP has managed to compromise some of these same institutions.

Obviously, there are challenging times ahead for the United States in dealing with Xi Jinping's China. The prudent and moral course for Americans is to determine how China relates to the liberal international order so favored by Nye. They must also determine how to go about promoting their support for democratic institutions, the rule of law, and political and religious freedom, as global public goods.

I am glad to report that Joseph Nye provides a generally favorable evaluation of Harry Truman's foreign policy in terms of both its morality and effectiveness. Yet he might have benefited from examining at greater depth the moral dilemmas Truman faced and the difficulty that decisions sometimes caused him.  

Truman understood that decisions made in the confusing fog of heightened tensions or of war place policymakers in circumstances where they sometimes have neither a clear nor easy moral option. Some years after he left office, Truman gave a discourse on decision-making in which he observed that “sometimes you have a choice of evils, in which case you try to take the course that is likely to bring the least harm.” It would have benefited Nye's book if he had grappled more with the difficulty of actually forging a moral foreign policy, about which he assuredly must know a great deal. Instead of the superficial exercise of tabulating a “score” for each president, he might then have offered more explicit guidance on how morals should be applied in pursuing a principled foreign policy that aims to secure America's national interests and purpose.

When reading Nye's book, I could not help but think of the recent memoir by his Harvard colleague, Samantha Power, entitled The Education of an Idealist.  

It is in part a revealing case study of the difficulty of translating moral convictions to the actual making of foreign policy—and, interestingly, Nye does not draw upon it. Power found it challenging in her work at senior levels of the Obama administration to balance her ideals and her quest to foster human rights with the hesitant way in which Obama applied American power and pursued American interests. Her defensive explanations for the fiascoes in Libya and Syria are less than convincing, but they serve to illustrate that the task of resisting evil in the world and of working to fashion a more just and realistic foreign policy is not an easy one.

One hopes that the Kennedy School and other places that claim to train future foreign “policymakers” equip them to have both some grasp of American moral principles and how these should be integrated with the use of American power and the pursuit of the national interest. They will need, however, to go far beyond Joseph Nye's Do Morals Matter? to prepare their students well for this work. Might I suggest that policymakers—both present and future—could still benefit from engaging the Christian realism reflected in the thinking of Saint Augustine and given its best twentieth-century expression by the aforementioned Reinhold Niebuhr? Over twenty-five years ago, George Weigel identified the following elements as key to Niebuhr's moral outlook: “Understanding the inevitable irony, pathos, and tragedy of history, being alert to the problem of unintended consequences, maintaining a robust skepticism about all the schemes of human perfection (especially those in which politics is the instrument of salvation), cherishing democracy without worshipping it.” These elements are surely still applicable, and the work of good historians can make this more clear.

Perhaps Nye's book might serve as a challenge to historians of American foreign relations to explain better how morals have and haven't mattered in the making of American foreign policy. Such studies of American statecraft could provide helpful guidance and perspective for those who would make American foreign policy more moral.

Notes:
3. Harry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen (New York, 1960), 263.

Review of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump

Seth Jacobs

A s fate or luck would have it, Andy Johns invited me to review this book right after I had finished reading Stephen Walt's The Hell of Good Intentions and John Mearsheimer's The Great Delusion.  

Walt and Mearsheimer were two of my favorite teachers in graduate school, the
best lecturers it has been my privilege to witness, absolutely convincing in their prescriptions for a realist foreign policy that eschews sentiment and recognizes the irrelevance of international institutions in an anarchic world. I invariably left their classes certain that I knew how to remedy the ills afflicting American geopolitics and frankly contemptuous of the naïve, idealistic boobs in the White House, State Department, and Pentagon who had made such a hash of things because they refused to face facts.

Since its debut, I have been an avid reader of Walt’s weekly column in Foreign Policy magazine, and it never fails to register as a cold dose of common sense amid the noise and chatter that attends America’s often maladroit blundering on the global stage. I found myself nodding in agreement when Walt pronounced in 2016, “Had realists been at the helm of U.S. foreign policy over the past twenty years, it is likely that a number of costly debacles would have been avoided.”

And yet there is a reason I became a historian rather than a political scientist. Unlike many of my grad-school classmates in the 1990s, I was never able to subscribe so unconditionally to an international-relations theory—realism, Marxism, constructivism, and the other usual suspects—that I could screen out or gloss over discordant information, evidence that simply did not fit the ism set forth by the sage behind the pulpit. The intellectual glow I felt after attending Walt’s and Mearsheimer’s lectures would wear off after a while as I thought about recent international developments and identified phenomena I was unable to squeeze into the realist Procrustean bed. For example, I had seen the United Nations functioning more or less as its framers intended when it orchestrated free and fair elections in Haiti. In addition, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had brought wars in Bosnia and Kosovo to a close and established that ethnic cleansing—at least in Europe—was a thing of the past.

These triumphs were only partial and qualified, but in a realist world they ought never to have occurred. “History has a way of escaping attempts to imprison it in patterns,” Barbara Tuchman wisely noted over half a century ago, adding, “A historian cannot pick and choose his facts; he must deal with all the evidence.” And dealing with all of the evidence means being comfortable with mess. Isms are orderly. History is messy. History goes its own way. Reading Walt’s and Mearsheimer’s latest efforts brought back to me the cerebral allure—but ultimate insufficiency—of realism and, indeed, of any prefabricated system purporting to cover all historical situations.

I was thus ideally prepared to appreciate Joseph Nye’s terrific new book Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump. Nye, of course, is not a historian—he is one of our most eminent political scientists—but he has spent considerable time outside the ivory tower filling high offices in the Carter, Clinton, and Obama administrations and he understands the untidiness and contingency of policymaking. Although he draws upon several IR schools of thought in Do Morals Matter?, he is not their captive. “When [national] survival is in jeopardy,” he observes, “realism is a necessary basis” for U.S. foreign policy (32). Yet that only applies to a limited number of circumstances: “Some foreign policy issues relate to our survival as a nation, but most do not.” None of the wars America has fought since 1945 were essential for our survival, and many of the controversies present-day policymakers attempt to resolve—“human rights or climate change or Internet freedom”—do not require taking up arms at all (x). In other words, realism does not present an accurate picture of international politics.

Nye argues that we must combine realism with two other “mental maps of the world,” cosmopolitanism and liberalism, both to understand the challenges American presidents face when they venture abroad and to evaluate how successful they have been in meeting those challenges. Cosmopolitanism stresses the shared humanity of the global community and insists that human rights are universal. No respecter of borders, it affirms that we must sometimes violate another nation’s sovereignty to preserve the rights of its citizens. Liberalism accepts the realist precept that the world is anarchic but argues that anarchy is not the same as chaos. Complicated financial interdependence, multinational corporations, and institutions such as the UN, NATO, the Organization of American States, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization ensure a degree of order and predictability in international affairs that allows presidents enough leeway to raise an issue that legendary realists like George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau maintained should never enter into statecraft: namely, whether or not a given policy is moral.

As anyone who has studied U.S. geopolitics knows, Americans tend to be highly moralistic in framing their foreign policy, or at least to use moralistic language in justifying that policy. This sententious bent has not stopped Americans from doing horrible things in the world (think Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Chile, Panama, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador—and that is just the Western Hemisphere!), but they have generally been uncomfortable with admitting that, for example, they chose to engage in hostilities for the un-idealist objective of keeping the price of oil down. When Woodrow Wilson went before Congress in 1917 to ask for a declaration of war against Germany, he did not proclaim that U.S. shipping in the Atlantic had to be protected against the menace of the submarine; rather, he declared, “The world must be made safe for democracy.” When, thirty years later, Harry Truman requested $400 million to fund the Truman Doctrine, he did not announce that the corrupt, inefficient Greek monarchy needed to be propped up because, whatever its faults, it was not communist; instead, he insisted that America must “help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.”

While such blood-and-thunder rhetoric may have appalled the realists in the audience, Wilson and Truman were aware that they would never be able to persuade the American people to support their policies unless they appealed to a well-established sense of moral purpose. As Nye notes, presidents have traditionally “expressed formal goals and values that were attractive to Americans. After all, that is how they got elected” (182). This emotional fortification also had an impact beyond the American homefront, a point Nye stresses in his assessment of the Carter presidency. The “soft power of Carter’s human rights policy,” he observes, “contributed to the change that eventually culminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989” (112). After all, the wall did not come down because of American rockets and bombs; it was torn down by people disgusted with the communist system and drawn to the culture of the West. Values made up a big part of that culture: freedom of speech and assembly, the dignity of the individual, equality of all citizens before the law—these ultimately proved more important than ICBMS, NATO divisions, Green Berets, and Stinger missiles for the mujahids in securing Western victory in the cold war. Morals did matter,” Nye concludes (182). That being the case, and assuming that such soft-power attraction can continue to work in America’s favor in a post-Cold War world, are there any steps we ought to take to ensure that our foreign policy meets the requisite moral standards?

Nye believes there are, and his guidelines strike me as both innovative and sound. First, he contends that we should approach the task of policymaking from a three-dimensional perspective, weighing intentions, means, and consequences. As noted above, presidents typically express their intentions in noble terms. Lyndon Johnson
claimed to be sending hundreds of thousands of American troops to South Vietnam to save an ally from the evils of communism, while George W. Bush justified his invasion of Iraq by insisting that Saddam Hussein, along with possessing weapons of mass destruction, had subjected the Iraqi people to decades of tyrannical rule from which they deserved to be liberated into pro-American democracy.

The high-mindedness of those policies cannot obscure their inability to pass what Nye calls the “feasibility test” (15). LBJ’s and Bush’s goals proved unobtainable, at least with the means they chose—carpet bombing, napalm, Agent Orange, waterboarding, extraordinary rendition, Abu Ghraib—which were not only ineffective strategically but damaging to America’s global reputation. As for consequences, the unification of Vietnam under communism and the morass of present-day Iraq are such obvious U.S. failures that they speak for themselves.

By contrast, Harry Truman’s 1948-49 campaign to keep the citizens of West Berlin from starving in the face of a Soviet blockade was a masterful combination of altruistic intentions, pragmatic (and nonviolent) means, and positive consequences. American foreign-policy initiatives all fall somewhere along the continuum between the Berlin airlift and Vietnam/Iraq, with most, alas, tending to cluster toward the latter pole.

Do Morals Matter? employs what Nye terms a “3D scorecard” to assess the performance of presidents from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Donald Trump, the men who presided over America’s period of greatest international power and influence. Which of the chief executives qualified as “a moral foreign policy leader,” and which fell short of that standard? In terms of intentions, did a president articulate “attractive values,” and did he have the “contextual intelligence” to understand the risks his policy entailed? With regard to means, did he apply a use of force proportional to the challenge faced? Finally, were the consequences of his policy beneficial to the United States in the long term, and did he “minimize unnecessary damage” to others? Did he “respect the truth and build credibility” while “broaden[ing] moral discourse at home and abroad” (37)?

What I like about this scorecard are its complexity and flexibility. Nye knows that it is not always possible for a president to check all the right boxes. Sometimes the leader needs to deceive the people in order to obtain an essential result, as was arguably the case when FDR lied about the so-called Greer incident to build popular support for aiding the Allies in World War II. Sometimes innocent parties have to be sacrificed for the greater good, as Truman rationalized in ordering the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Much of policymaking involves choosing between unattractive options, and the most we can expect of our presidents is that they hew as closely as possible to an ethical line as they navigate the shoals of an unpredictable and treacherous world.

So, who scores highest? It is a close contest, but Jimmy Carter seems to come out on top. Although Carter is consistently “ranked by historians in the middle of the pack” of chief executives and served only one term before suffering the worst defeat of any incumbent present ever (including Herbert Hoover in 1932), he beats out Dwight Eisenhower, Ronald Reagan, and even FDR in terms of the morality of his foreign policy (104).

Here Nye contributes to the growing—and glowing—revisionist scholarship on the Carter years, best represented by Stuart Eizenstat’s recent tome President Carter. However, he also revisits the question raised frequently when Carter was in office: “Can a man be too good to be a good president?” (105). Nye is right to note that Carter had “four major foreign policy accomplishments”: returning the Panama Canal to the Panamanians, orchestrating the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, extending full diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China, and “raising the profile of human rights issues in American diplomacy” (106, 110). Still, we have to weigh these successes against such train wrecks as Carter’s overreaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and especially his mismanagement of the Iran hostage crisis. Carter’s actions during and public statements on this latter crisis, although motivated by compassion and rectitude, had the effect of immensely enhancing the value of the hostages to the Iranian government. A deeply religious man, he publicly prayed with their families, and he told journalists that his every waking moment was spent agonizing about them. Basically, he allowed the crisis to paralyze his foreign policy for over a year.

Would a more hardheaded and cynical president like Richard Nixon have put the fate of fifty-three Americans ahead of all other considerations? One doubts it. And, of course, there was Carter’s botched attempt to rescue the hostages, a poorly planned and executed military operation in which eight Americans were killed when two helicopters collided. This fiasco made the United States look impotent and pathetic and contributed to Reagan’s landslide victory in the 1980 election. In light of such events, it puzzles me that Nye rates Carter’s foreign-policy means as “good/mixed” rather than “poor” (113).

That brings me to another aspect of this book that I like: the author’s acknowledgement of bias. Scholars are people. People have biases. “I realize that my scorecards for Carter and Clinton may have been unwittingly affected by my participation in those administrations,” Nye notes, adding, “I respect my close friends who served in the [George W. Bush] administration . . . [and] told me that I scored him too low.” Nye further observes that “some realists rate Nixon’s foreign policy more highly than I did” because of the famous opening to China and the fact that Nixon ended the Vietnam War. (These people ignore Nixon’s pre-1972 opposition to a rapprochement with Beijing and the 21,000 American lives sacrificed in obtaining a “decent interval” between U.S. withdrawal and the fall of Saigon.) “Judging is not a science,” Nye writes. “Even when there is broad agreement on the facts, different judges may weight them differently” (185-86). What matters to Nye are the scorecards and how they help structure and discipline our thinking about ethics and foreign policy. They will not lead to perfect moral reasoning in every circumstance, he notes, but they constitute “modest steps in that direction” (xii). How refreshing such statements are when set against the triumphalism and smug pseudo-omniscience of Walt and Mearsheimer! I do have some quibbles. Since every book by Nye is a scholarly event, I wish Oxford University Press had engaged a more conscientious copyeditor. There are occasional jarring errors of fact: “Nixon expanded the [Vietnam] War to Cambodia in May 1971 [sic];” the “Christmas bombing” campaign finally produced a peace deal at Paris in early January 1972 [sic]” (92). The final chapter, “Foreign Policy and Future Choices,” could, I think, be cut by half without losing anything essential. But these are minor considerations. In all, Do Morals Matter? displays in abundance the deep learning, subtlety, and imaginativeness we have come to expect from Joseph Nye, and it superbly fulfills Einstein’s (possibly apocryphal) injunction to make everything as simple as possible, but no simpler.

Notes:
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Donald Trump's approach to foreign policy thus far has been its rejection of an almost two-century-old premise of U.S. exceptionalism, that what is good for America is good for the rest of the world. Although this premise has often been self-serving and contradictory, it is also rooted in the belief that U.S. fortunes are tied up with the rest of the world, even if it is in a way that was often dictated by America's own interests. Since World War II, this idea's corollary has been that America's prosperity, security, and stability rests on a world order conducive to its interests and values. This assumption has led to some breathtaking lapses in moral and strategic judgment. Witness the fifteen-year war in Vietnam. It has also enabled a hubris that often ignored the interests and values of other nations. Yet it has also emphasized the ways that U.S. fortunes are connected to the global community and reinforced a sense of stewardship for the international system.

A robust questioning of the morality of Pax Americana has the potential to check interventionism and superpower conceit and reshape U.S. power in the service of an interdependent global community. Yet “what's good for the world is good for America” does not seem to be the inversion our current president has derived from his criticism of the liberal international order. Trump's “America First” logic—that “it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first”—instead seems to reject, rather than just reconsider, the role of American values and international ethics in the exercise of U.S. power (I).

So how should we understand the role of morals in foreign policy, and are they diabolically at odds with national interests? Joseph S. Nye's new work, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, seeks to transcend the tired debate between values and interests to explore where and how moral thinking has defined national interests in the past seven decades. Nye clearly takes issue with the simplistic nihilism of Trump's “America first” rhetoric, and he also challenges realists who assert that power, not values, shapes national interests. “It is tautological or at best trivial to say that all states try to act in their national interests,” Nye writes in the preface to his book. “The important question is how leaders choose to define and pursue that national interest under different circumstances” (x).

Challenging the premise that moral arguments were simply window dressing to make hard-nosed national interests more palatable to an idealistic American public, Nye instead argues that the very construction of national interests is in itself a moral act (35). Certainly, national survival and security are the first moral and strategic imperatives of foreign policy. Yet international affairs, particularly for a powerful nation such as the United States in the twentieth century, is rarely reduced to strategies for survival. Instead, it encompasses a diverse array of objectives and interests, defined substantially by a nation's values and identity, which must be balanced against one another.

Given Nye's groundbreaking work on soft power, it is not surprising that he would argue that “higher purpose” is a critical component of American power and influence in the international sphere. Yet this is not just a championing of morals in international affairs, but a concerted effort to grapple with how values shape presidential thinking, and how we, as scholars and citizens, in turn assess presidential policies. Looking at the state of politics today, it seems difficult to imagine that Americans could arrive at any sort of consensus on morals. Nye argues, however, that great moral reasoning has manifested itself in a way that transcends political and ideological proclivities and divides.

Nye lays out a three-dimensional rubric, explaining that a moral foreign policy “is not a matter of intentions versus consequences but must involve both as well as the means that were used” (xi). In assessing a president's choices, then, we must look at how they paired their intentions with the means used to realize them and balance that against the outcomes of these choices. In defining and evaluating ethical means, Nye draws heavily on Michael Walzer's work on just war theories, emphasizing the proportional and discriminate use of force. He pairs that analysis with philosopher John Rawl's work on liberal imperatives to limit intervention and minimize the impact on the sovereignty and rights of peoples beyond their own national borders (37). Nye is thus asking us to think about the moral development of a simple blind idealism, and rather to consider it a crucial factor in defining interests and, in pursuing those interests, “adjusting means and ends to each other” (189).

Do Morals Matter? is not a history of presidential decision-making, as Nye himself acknowledges, but rather “an exercise in normative thinking applied to the period since 1945 when the United States has been the most powerful country in the world” (xii). In many ways, Nye is not assessing the morality of all foreign policy, but rather, the morality of presidential choices operating within the Wilsonian liberal international order. This order—emphasizing collective security and economic interdependence, and promoting values like democracy and human rights—sought to structure an anarchic international system through the development of international norms, institutions, and laws. The importance of international institutions and reciprocal obligations at the center of this order is evident in Nye's emphasis on their maintenance as part of moral decision-making. “One of the most important moral skills of presidents is to design and maintain systems and institutions, not simply to make immediate decisions” (23). He argues that “by enhancing the long shadow of the future, international regimes and institutions encourage cooperation with moral consequences that go beyond any single transaction” (190). Unlike the imperial balance-of-power politics it supplanted, this system of institutional commitments and norms, as Nye presents it, brings not only stability but also shared values to the ordering of the international system. Thus, his assessment of individual presidents' records of moral decision-making resides within this framework, and he assesses the presidents on their ability to function within this system on their legacy of preserving and advancing it.

One of this work's most compelling contributions is its exploration of “nonactions” in evaluating the records of presidents. “Causation,” he writes, “seems more immediate, visible, and calculable. Yet omission may have larger moral consequences for more people” (25). Nye notes that his metrics give both Carter and Ford, for example, good marks for their moral decision-making, yet conventional wisdom holds that both presidents' foreign policies were “weak” and ineffective (113). The bias towards action is perhaps
most clearly articulated by President Obama’s advisor Ben Rhodes, who observed that “even as the Syria red line episode demonstrated that public opinion was skeptical of war, the political frame for national security debates remained the same: Doing more was tough, anything else was weak” (194).

Indeed, prudence in foreign affairs is often constructed in opposition to the hard choices necessary for securing national interests. Carter’s efforts to reorient U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s have been criticized as naïve at best and dangerous at worst. Realists equated Carter’s emphasis on incorporating human rights and democratic values into foreign policy mechanisms with ineptitude, as though focusing on ethical frameworks was immoral in its disregard for global power politics. Yet Ford’s and Carter’s high marks from Nye come in part from the fact that both recognized the limits on American power in the 1970s and adjusted their means accordingly. If policymaking is the “art of the possible,” as President Kennedy asserted, then Carter and Ford deserve credit for their prudence and foresight on the long-term consequences that aggressive actions might have (78).

Although being too cautious can also have moral implications, what was not done can be as important as what was. Perhaps the best example of this in Nye’s work is his exploration of the so-called “nuclear taboo.” Despite real moments of risk or earnest mobilization for their use, American leaders have demurred from actually using nuclear weapons since August 1945, when the United States detonated its two nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The staggering size of the United States’ nuclear arsenal and the world’s numerous brushes with nuclear war reinforce Nye’s emphasis on prudence and non-action as part of the moral calculus of foreign policy leaders and underscore the impact of moral thinking on decision-making.

This book is not a history of Wilson’s liberal international order or a categorical examination of the presidencies it contains, nor does it claim to be. Although a more rigorous examination of that liberal internationalist framework could have helped illuminate the moral dimensions of the choices each president faced in balancing the means and consequences of his policies, there are plenty of works out there already that do this. Moreover, the difficulty of assessing moral outcomes of policy choices is evidenced by his own chapters on each president. Do we ever know a president (or ourselves) well enough to definitively identify intentions in selecting particular policy paths? As any presidential scholar will note, leaders are a bundle of human inconsistencies and are motivated by any number of political, ideological, and emotional variables, and those inevitably inform their decision-making.

Undoubtedly, many historians would apply Nye’s criteria very differently and challenge his presidential scorecards. Nye accepts that a “mixed verdict” on each presidency is likely. The process of historical revision means we will constantly revisit the meaning and morality of different decisions as we uncover new documents and as new priorities emerge to inform our inquiries. Of greater value is Nye’s endeavor to account for moral factors in political decision-making, because, as he convincingly argues, “the history shows that, even though scoring can be contested, morals did matter” (186).

When exploring presidential morality in 2020, it is impossible to escape the specter of Donald Trump. The current U.S. president undoubtedly informed Nye’s thinking throughout this work. As he writes in the preface, “the advent of the Trump administration has revived interest in what is a moral foreign policy and raised it from a theoretical question to front-page news” (x). Trump, ironically, is one of the few presidents to openly challenge assumptions about U.S. morality, famously commenting in a 2017 interview with Bill O’Reilly that the United States isn’t “so innocent” and that it has done “plenty of killing too.” But this admission has not marked a moment of self-reflection or atonement for moral lapses. Rather, it serves to justify a caricature of realist policy and to deflect demands for U.S. action on human rights violations, like the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

In his assessment of Trump’s foreign policy, Nye demonstrates the very prudence and restraint he champions. When questioned in a recent interview about Trump’s comments about America’s history, Nye conceded that “for once, Trump is right. American exceptionalism has made us too sanctimonious about our past and about our intentions.” Nye, who is measured in his praise for and critiques of individual presidents throughout the work, does his best to dispassionately assess Trump’s legacy thus far, with all the usual disclaimers about it being incomplete and the value of historical distance. Even so, he cannot escape the judgment that Trump’s moral failures signify a rupture between his foreign policy and that of the thirteen presidents who preceded him. Trump’s blatant and daily lies, his unapologetic association with autocrats, and his overt dismissal of liberal norms and international institutions all deeply trouble Nye, who sees the Wilsonian international liberal order as a source of much-needed stability in a chaotic world.

It is clear that the cynical exercise of power espoused by the current president alarms the author. This book, however, is not solely a rebuttal to Trump’s unapologetic and self-justifying “America first” rhetoric. In foreign policy, as in many areas, Trump is the symptom as much as the cause of larger power shifts, and Nye’s efforts to account for the importance of moral thinking is driven by his concerns about the decline of the liberal order more generally. Pointing to the rise of China and the “diffusion away from governments” driven by technological innovation, Nye notes that the era of Wilsonian liberalism is ending, “so we should learn to use moral reasoning better in constructing its successor” (xii).

While there is plenty to criticize about the world order propagated by Pax Americana, Nye maintains that its promise of an open and rules-based international order, in which U.S. presidents mobilize soft power to encourage cooperation with other states, holds promise for a stable, peaceful international system (218). Yet even as he looks to the changing international system beyond the current political moment, Nye cannot help but end with a final warning against the danger of Trumpian politics: “The future success of American foreign policy may be threatened more by the rise of nativist politics that narrow our moral vision at home than by the rise and decline of other powers abroad” (218). A moral foreign policy, it seems, begins at home.

Notes:

Author’s Response
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

Every author should be grateful when a group of historians spends time reading and critiquing his or her work, particularly if he or she is a political scientist. While our fields overlap, they clearly differ, and it is interesting to note how these historians approached their task. As I say at the start of Do
Morals Matter?, “this book is not a history. I make no effort to be complete or to consult all sources in describing the ethical aspects of presidents’ foreign policies since World War II.” Yet Wilson Miscamble faults me for “relying on familiar secondary sources supplemented by some selective memoir literature,” and Lori Clune and Danielle Richman call the book a “political science/ history crossover volume” that “approaches each presidential administration with selectivity and omission.” These are indeed sins for a historian, but as a political scientist, I approached my logical task quite differently, and selectivity was crucial for a short book.

To answer the question in the title, I needed only to prove an existence theorem, not to survey all cases. Moreover, the book is an exercise in moral reasoning about international relations, not a detailed examination of the ethical behavior of all significant actors in the fourteen administrations since 1945. Instead, I used selected historical examples to complexify the often simplistic treatment of morality by my political science colleagues and by international relations theorists. And to be fair, Clune and Richman admit that “if Nye’s purpose is to provide a rudimentary guide to international relations, then he makes intelligible and grounded claims.” As a political scientist, that was my purpose. Call it applied history. I did not pretend to make an original contribution to post-1945 history.

Seth Jacobs grasped this purpose, perhaps because, as he recounts, he escaped “the realist Procrustean bed” that was so seductive in the political science courses he took in graduate school. That experience, he says, made him “ideally prepared to appreciate Joseph Nye’s terrific new book,” which shows that while realism is a necessary basis for U.S. foreign policy, it “does not present an accurate picture of international politics.” That indeed is the purpose of my book. Conventional wisdom holds that national interests bake the cake and politicians sprinkle a little moral icing to make it look pretty. I wanted to show that when realists espouse this cynical view, in some important cases they will get the history wrong.

Having proven my existence theorem—that, in some cases, the moral views of the president were an important ingredient in the cake, not just rhetorical icing—I then wanted to suggest a more careful approach to moral reasoning about this difficult topic. The American traditions of moralism and idealism are not the antidote to shallow realism. As Vanessa Walker properly points out, the tradition of American exceptionalism has led to “some breathtaking lapses in moral and strategic judgment.” And she correctly describes my purpose: “Nye is thus asking us to think about morality beyond a simple blind idealism, and rather to consider it a crucial factor in defining interests and, in pursuing those interests, ‘adjusting means and ends to each other.’”

One of my favorite classical realists, the Swiss-American theorist Arnold Wolfers, argued that “a moral foreign policy means making the best choices that the circumstances admit.” Long before the 2016 election of Donald Trump, I often cited this statement in the course on foreign policy I taught at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. But while I agreed with Wolfers, I came to feel that his statement lacked the detail that students (and practitioners) needed when faced with hard choices. To add that detail, I developed a framework for examining three dimensions of intentions, means, and consequences that can help us to look more carefully into how presidents appraised “what circumstances permit” and the choices they made under the circumstances.

Miscamble refers to this framework as “rickety,” and, not surprisingly, he would have preferred that I use the Christian realism of Augustine and Niebuhr (whom I also admire). But he does not accurately describe the framework he condemns. As Walker correctly points out, “Nye draws heavily on Michael Walzer’s work on just war theories, emphasizing the proportional and discriminate use of force. He pairs that analysis with philosopher John Rawls’ work on liberal imperatives to limit intervention and minimize the impact on the sovereignty and rights of peoples beyond their national borders.”

The resulting scorecards are debatable, and designedly so. They oversimplify history as a way to encourage people to unpack the phrase “the best choices that the circumstances permit,” and to focus their comparisons. The scope of the scorecards is admittedly arbitrary. Lyndon Johnson does not get credit for the good he did on the domestic front when it comes to his foreign policy choices. And I argue that the brief tenures of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, who had notably moral foreign policies in all three dimensions, illustrate that a moral foreign policy is not the same as an effective one. Conversely, Richard Nixon had an effective foreign policy in some dimensions, but not a particularly moral one.

Miscamble claims that my scorings are predictable. As a historian, I wonder whether he knows that I played a significant role in the effort in 1988 to defeat George H.W. Bush, whom I nonetheless put near the top of my rankings in the book. That surprised even me. But when he misreports that Nye “cannot concede any of Trump’s efforts to rebalance America’s trade and security commitments,” I wonder if he read the book as carefully as he might have. There are several such references. As Walker more accurately observes, “in his assessment of Trump’s foreign policy, Nye demonstrates the very prudence and restraint he champions.”

More important, I repeatedly say in the book that my personal rankings may be biased, and I may wish to change them in the future because of new information. It is important—far more important than my rating—that the scorecard encourage people to go beyond the exceptionalism of good intentions or the easy consequentialism of “it worked.” Historians (and others) should criticize my scoring, as many of these critics properly do. Nonetheless, I think Seth Jacobs summarizes accurately when he says “what I like about this scorecard is its complexity and flexibility. Nye knows that it is not always possible for a president to check all the right boxes. . . . Much of foreign policymaking involves choosing between unattractive options, and the best we can expect of our presidents is that they hew as closely as possible to an ethical line as they navigate the shoals of an unpredictable and treacherous world.”

In conclusion, let me thank all these critics for the attention they have given to my book. I may have to rethink some of my ratings and judgments. But I did not expect otherwise. What I wanted to do with the book was to get political scientists and practitioners to go beyond simplistic realism of modern international relations. As I say in the book, start with realism, but don’t stop where you start. I do not expect my framework for moral reasoning about foreign policy to be the last word on the subject. I just hope it provokes renewed debate on a topic that has been rather neglected in international relations analysis.
A Roundtable on
Monica Kim
The Interrogation Rooms of the
Korean War: The Untold History

Mitchell Lerner, Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, Arissa H. Oh, Zachary M. Matusheski, Peter Banseok Kwon, and Monica Kim

Editor’s note: Passport would like to thank Mitchell Lerner for organizing this roundtable. AJ

Roundtable Introduction

Mitchell Lerner

Although the United States had not won on the Korean War battlefields, many Americans happily claimed a resounding victory in the post-war months. Communist prisoners of war in Panmunjom, the New York Times reported in November 1953, were resisting pressure from their home countries and were renouncing the communist ideology (despite the fact that they had been subjected to communist propaganda sessions that the paper described as an affront to those who “believe in Anglo-Saxon justice”). More than 20,000 detained Chinese and North Korea prisoners of war had “dared to pit their desires and beliefs against the conformist doctrine of communism. And so far, the men had won.” The result, crowed the Times, might be an important legacy of the war. If American military efforts had not proven victorious, the world’s diminished views of communism that would inevitably emerge from the prisoners’ reluctance to return home might nevertheless tilt the Cold War scales in the U.S. direction. “The unwilling puppets at Panmunjom,” the paper concluded, “by their exposure of Communist weakness may yet influence the course of history.”

Monica Kim’s ambitious book, The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War, offers a broad and provocative analysis of this Cold War frontier. On a most immediate level, the work offers a wonderful “bottom-up” approach to the Korean War, delving deeply into the lives of everyday people from multiple backgrounds as they struggle within the changing world around them. The book, however, also aspirers to make much broader points about that world. Taking the reader beyond the traditional battlefields, Kim situates the struggle over the fate of the POWs within the emerging Cold War competition and the larger movements towards decolonization. Along the way, she asks provocative questions about personal and national identity, about the inherent conflict between American militarism and American rhetoric, and about the relationship between the individual and the state. In the end, she concludes, the interrogation room itself had become a contested space, one where “the ambitions of empire, revolution and international solidarity converged” (5).

The four reviewers here find much to applaud. All praise Kim’s ability to tell the story from the ground up, focusing not on the generals and the diplomats but taking instead what Peter Kwon calls a “people-centered approach.” They are all impressed by the book’s ability to connect the struggles of the interrogation room to the effort of the American empire to co-exist with the growing calls for decolonization. They also laud many other specific contributions. Arissa Oh singles out Kim’s contribution to our understanding of postwar migrations, and to the relationship between language and war. Zach Matusheski likes the way the book fits into the longer arch of American military projects overseas, and Judy Wu calls it a tour de force, noting its deep dive into the relationship between individuals, freedom, and the state. Peter Kwon lauds its efforts to open a window into American efforts to represent itself as both a liberal and a hegemonic power, and praises its contributions to our understanding of propaganda and psychological warfare efforts.

To the extent that the reviewers have criticisms—and they do—they are of the type that one expects of a book as ambitious and sophisticated as Interrogation Rooms. Some wish for a more specific definition of the author’s terms and concepts and more evidence directly connecting Korea with the larger forces of change. Matusheski thinks Kim sees a more coherent and conscious plan than truly existed in the reactive and improvised reality on the ground, while Wu looks for more analysis of the way that self-perceptions of masculinity and personal strength played a role, as they surely did in such militarized and confrontational settings. Still, the reviewers are unanimous that the book makes a significant contribution. Interrogation Rooms, concludes Judy Wu, “is an amazing work, one that brings together the intimate and the epic; the racial, cultural, and philosophical with the diplomatic and the military; the focus on political subjectivity with the study of subjugation.” Overall, Kim has written a thoughtful, challenging, and provocative work, one that stands at the forefront—along with Masuda Hajimu’s Cold War Crucible and David Cheng Chang’s The Hijacked War—of the emerging literature that unites social, military, diplomatic, and international in ways that broaden our understanding of the Korean War.
especially as hopes and desires change over time and in the midst of warfare. These challenges were compounded by the high stakes involved: literal life and death or a more protracted social life or death, not just for the individual but for family members not in the immediate vicinity of the interrogations.

Second, these difficulties of discernment were compounded by linguistic and racial differences. Kim points out the asymmetry between the interrogations north of versus south of the 38th parallel. The Chinese and Korean interrogators demonstrated their fluency in English and understanding of American history and culture. In contrast, the U.S.-led interrogations tended to rely upon linguistic translation and were often fueled by Orientalist beliefs of inscrutability and/or barbarity. What is particularly fascinating for me in these analyses of encounters is the roles of racialized Americans—most notably Japanese American and African American soldiers—who themselves had conflicted relationships with the United States. Sam Miyamoto, for example, the subject of the chapter entitled “The Interrogator,” was in essence rendered stateless by both the U.S. and Japanese governments during World War II. Yet he became a recognized American spokesperson, an interrogator, due to his linguistic abilities and, perhaps, his racial affinities with his interrogates.

Equally intriguing is the life of Clarence Adams, an African American soldier from Memphis who chose not to return to the Jim Crow United States after the 1953 armistice. American racism extended to the military abroad and into the POW camps north of the 38th. Self-designated patriots formed KKK units to surveil and discipline U.S. soldiers suspected of communist sympathies and collaboration. This conflation of whiteness and U.S. national identity shaped political choices (albeit not always in expected ways), everyday strategies of survival, and approaches towards interrogation encounters.

Third, in shifting our historical attention away from the battlefields, Kim also illuminates the unending nature of war. This is a political fact, given that the armistice devolved into an ongoing conflict, a persistent “state of emergency,” on the Korean peninsula. In addition, the book points to the continual, seemingly unending process of interrogation that persisted after the official/unofficial conflict ended. There were the “interrogations” on the 38th parallel, conducted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to determine whether a POW repatriated, stayed, or chose a third country. There were “interrogations” after the release of POWs, conducted on board U.S. military ships crossing the Pacific, a method of transportation selected to prolong the process of “debriefing.” There were the unauthorized interrogations that occurred within POW camps by factions for or against particular political ideologies or sides. There was social and cultural suspicion of returnees, especially given the public discourse regarding “brainwashing.” This charge implied that U.S. soldiers might constitute human time bombs. They physically resembled their former identities but were fundamentally altered and lacked the will to affirm their loyalty to their homelands. In detailing and illuminating the unendingness of war as well as the psychological and physical ordeals of POWs, Kim’s work joins and expands upon the insights of critical refugee studies.

Kim is a master at narration and analysis. She illuminates the political and the ideological as she draws us into tense and unexpected encounters of intimacy. At times she overstates her argument. For example, she claims that in the post-1945 world, Western powers recognized that “war
I see in Kim’s book three arguments for the value of this new military history. First, she shows how looking beneath the seemingly smooth narratives produced through interrogation reveals layers of historical processes, including “the intimate (and indispensable) relationships between language and war-making, race and historical memory, and bureaucracy and violence” (128). By focusing on the Japanese Americans who did the vital translation work in the interrogation rooms, Kim brings into sharp relief the afterlives of U.S. and Japanese imperial projects in the Pacific.

In chapter 3, Kim introduces a Nisei (U.S.-born Japanese American), Sam Miyamoto, who was incarcerated with his family by the U.S. government after Pearl Harbor, then sent to Japan as part of a POW/hostage exchange in which Japanese and Japanese Americans were barred for white Americans. After the war, Miyamoto returned to the United States and was drafted by the military to serve in Korea, where he interrogated Korean prisoners of war. Having been recategorized from enemy alien to citizen-soldier, Miyamoto now helped the U.S. government categorize the people he questioned on its behalf into new bureaucratic categories, namely communist or anti-communist POW. He did this by speaking Japanese to Korean prisoners, who knew Japanese from that nation’s occupation of Korea, and translating their responses into English. Here we see the many entanglements and ironies of overlapping U.S. and Japanese empires.

Second, a consideration of the Korean War from the vantage point of the interrogation room connects war to postwar migrations, which are very much part of the story of war but are more often discussed by historians of immigration rather than military historians. We know that Japanese colonization and the Korean War, and their aftermaths, acted as centrifugal forces that sent Koreans abroad—as workers, political exiles, students, independence activists, war brides, adoptees—creating a diaspora of millions. Kim shows that this group also included former POWs who rejected both North and South Korea in favor of a neutral third country. Thinking about former POWs as migrants allows us to reflect on questions at the intersection of war and migration. How was the non-repatriate POW’s experience similar to or different from those of other Koreans abroad? How did POWs come to choose to emigrate rather than repatriate? Where do people belong and who has the right to decide? Whose decisions are legitimate and deserving of recognition? What are the conditions under which people make those decisions (in an interrogation room or, for some of the Nisei interrogators themselves, in a Japanese internment camp)?

Kim reminds us that the label ‘POW’ was not a temporary, bureaucratic status relevant only for the duration of the war but one that marked them permanently. It followed them overseas, too, as did other stigmatized statuses like ‘war bride’ or ‘Red’—statuses, like POW, which were imposed from the outside and could be rooted in nothing more than mere suspicion.

I also believe Kim could have extended her analysis of gender in her work. She discusses the gendered implications of protecting U.S. masculinity in POW camps north of the 38th parallel, but I wanted to learn more about the women (clearly the minority but present nonetheless) in POW camps south of the 38th. How did they understand their role in warfare and decolonization? In addition, how did the Korean and Chinese men who were captured understand their masculinity and obligations to their states, communities, and families? Given the intimacy of the interrogation room, it seems particularly fitting to try to understand how immobility, surrender, capture, and resistance (all of which have gendered connotations) challenge, and resistance (all of which have gendered connotations) challenge, and alter one’s subjectivity.

The Interrogation Rooms is an amazing work. It brings together the intimate and the epic; the racial, cultural, and philosophical with the diplomatic and the military; the focus on political subjectivity with the study of subjugation. I highly recommend this work to scholars and students interested in understanding the messiness and complexities of war.

Review of Monica Kim, The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War

Arissa H. Oh

Recently, historians inside and outside the United States have published a stream of books that have done much to deepen and enhance our understanding of the Korean War. Taking its place alongside existing diplomatic and military histories of the war is scholarship that seeks to expand our understanding of the significance of the Korean War by looking at it from ten thousand feet—by situating it in a larger Asia-Pacific or global frame. Another, more granular strand of scholarship looks at the war close up, documenting the war on the ground and through the lived, everyday experience of ordinary people, whether civilians or combatants.

Monica Kim seeks to do both. In The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War, she places the Korean War at the nexus of century-shaking global processes of colonialism and decolonization and also locates it in the context of Korean history: of the Japanese imperialism before the war, and the red-baiting and lingering suspicions that would dog Koreans at home and abroad long after the war had been paused—not ended—in 1953.

Also in the last few years, some have bemoaned the seeming decline of military history, dismissing what others call the new military history. Yes, they say, the social histories of war that recount the experiences of noncombatants, women, and children are all very nice, but the real history—the important, substantive history—is to be found in the traditional places: on the front lines and at the negotiating tables. Kim represents the new military history with the questions she poses early in her book: What can we learn about a war by looking beyond the battlefield? What can we learn about a nation or a war—or warfare itself—by looking at the refugee camp, the GI barracks, or the interrogation room?
is, to see them as a monolithic category of people and to elide their individual humanity. Kim asks questions that emphasize the interiority of the Korean POW. For example, what did Koreaness mean to the POW from an undivided but colonized peninsula—from a Korea that was whole but not independent?

Whether communist or anticommunist, POWs saw the stakes of the war as nothing less than what a postcolonial, free Korea would look like. In a poignant example, Kim describes POWs singing to mark liberation day, expressing their belief that it was liberation, not divisions of North and South, that was their predominant concern and ultimate goal. The anecdote nicely illustrates that the Korean War was not just about the Cold War but also the inner subjectivities of individuals not bound by the externally imposed categories of communist, POW, or enemy. In the examples that remind us of the complicated, multilayered humanity of POWs, Kim shows what gets missed when we think of the Korean War in the familiar and hardened terms of North Korean versus South Korean, communist versus anticommunist.

Kim’s study is ambitious, contributing to the scholarship of the Korean War, the Cold War, empire and decolonization, and discussions of the meanings of concepts like sovereignty, humanity, and recognition. The book is stuffed with the fruits of years of labor in archives. The ambitiousness of her project sometimes seems to prevent her from getting into specifics, however. Her book is aimed not at the layperson or undergraduate who needs detailed information about the Korean War, the POW repatriation issue, and the armistice negotiations, but at the reader who already knows a good deal. Moreover, her reader must be willing and able to follow her into frequent abstraction.

In chapter 4, for example, Kim juxtaposes two physical sites. The first is a POW camp on Koje Island, where communist POWs kidnapped the U.S. camp commander, Brigadier General Francis Dodd, and held him for three days in 1952. The second is Panmunjom, at the 38th parallel, where negotiations dragged on for eighteen months before an armistice was signed in July 1953. At stake in both locations, she says, were “the meanings of effective postcolonial liberation and sovereignty” and “the legitimacy of the 1947 elections held in the north and south” (174). Her point seems to be that although the UN and the United States did not recognize North Korea as a sovereign state, they went to war against North Korea anyway.

She sees a parallel on Koje Island, where the POWs who held Dodd captive “were essentially reenacting the sovereign claims of [North Korea] over their own selves, using the Geneva Conventions as the framework and General Dodd as the medium for their claims” (189). But the connections between Panmunjom and Koje Island threaten to get lost under a pile of (very fascinating) observations about Dodd’s kidnapping. The reader might gain a tentative grasp on what she means when she says the POWs and Dodd were having a one-day Panmunjom, but her arguments would be clearer and more effective if she more explicitly connected the concrete and the conceptual.

Kim’s capacious arguments often cut across received knowledge. She questions, for example, whether something should be understood using the typical Cold War axes of communism and anti-communism or viewed through a larger, different, or more conceptual lens that looks at humanity, or liberalism, rather than the familiar boundaries of nation-states or power politics. Even her starting point, the interrogation room, reframes conventional wisdom: as Kim shows, rather than spaces of torture and coercion, U.S. military interrogation rooms were imagined by American leaders to be liberal spaces that featured persuasion, free will, and choice. In these rearrangements of what we think we know, Kim not only offers new ways to think about the Korean War and the Cold War but may also suggest some ways forward in the ongoing debate about what counts as military history.

Review of Monica Kim, The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History

Zachary M. Matusheski

One of the most compelling reasons to study the Korean War is the way that it can be examined simultaneously as an international Cold War confrontation, a civil war, a regional war, and a war of decolonization. Monica Kim’s book, The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History, analyzes the war and the prisoner of war (POW) repatriation process through a lens of decolonization and shows how the war influenced contests over statehood, the international system, and national identity. There are a couple of issues on which I think her analysis misses the mark—the first having to do with the role that morality played in the decision to demand voluntary repatriation, the second involving POW camps run by the United Nations Command (UNC). On the whole, however, the book makes an important contribution to discussions of the ways in which ideas about identity and the international order influenced the war.

Kim views the Korean War primarily as a war of decolonization, and she argues that the United States brought an occupation ideology to the peninsula that drew on traditions of American imperial rule. This ideology held that Koreans were not mature enough for independence, either culturally or politically. Kim views the Korean War primarily as a war of decolonization, and she argues that the United States brought an occupation ideology to the peninsula that drew on traditions of American imperial rule. This ideology held that Koreans were not mature enough for independence, either culturally or politically. In the postwar era, Kim writes, the United States and other Western powers ‘were moving unevenly from the tropes of ‘civilization’ to markers of ‘governance’ in how they racialized the global order.’ At the same time, the United States was promoting an international order that tied legitimacy and peace to international engagement in the United Nations.

Koreans contested these views, asserting, where possible, claims to a historically determined identity. This showdown between the United States and Korea further escalated around the question of state recognition when the United States embraced nonforcible repatriation. This policy held that Korean and Chinese POWs could choose whether to return to the country they were fighting for. Kim portrays this policy as solely aimed at delegitimizing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Here she is able to depict the intersection between Korean POW history and U.S. Cold War strategy.

Kim’s sophisticated argument about identity, decolonization, and ideas about the international order connects with Korean War historiography related to POWs and social history. Her emphasis on the significance of political contestations over Korean War POWs fits well with Charles Young’s book, Name, Rank, and Serial Number: Exploiting Korean War POWs at Home and Abroad. Her representation of the central role played by average Korean POWs also matches the findings in Masuda Hajimu’s book, Cold War Crucible: the Korean Conflict and the Postwar World. Whether in portrayals of the choreographed capture of General Francis Dodd on Koje-do island in 1952 or the Korean POW blood petitions of 1953, Kim’s depictions of
Koreans adds to a continuing discussion of how Korean people “came to accept and participate in the reality of the Cold War,” to use Masuda’s apt phrase.2 Intersection with these texts on the Korean War underscores the value of this book.

Overall, the book has much to recommend it. Kim’s framing of the war’s history as part of the “American genealogy of overseas military projects and interests,” a lineage that includes U.S. rule in the Philippines, helps show how U.S. involvement in the Korean War can be reimagined outside the boundaries of the Cold War.3 Kim also captures new voices by using interviews she conducted with Japanese-American interpreters. These oral histories show how American policy in the Pacific in the first half of the twentieth century shaped the experiences of Korean people. It is impossible to read this book and not walk away with a new appreciation for the way the Korean War shaped the experience of Korean people.

Kim’s depiction of U.S. policy and choices is more problematic. She doesn’t account for the improvisational nature of the U.S. administration’s approaches to the Korean War.

In a later chapter, Kim reviews the goals that Indian leaders brought to the repatriation hearings and discusses how the few combatants who chose neutral nations as their repatriation destination fared. Throughout the book, she links readers with the voices and stories of average Koreans stuck in POW camps and explains why they made certain choices. It is impossible to read this book and not walk away with a new appreciation for the way the Korean War shaped the experience of Korean people.

Reactive responses instead of thoughtful action typified the U.S. approach to the larger war itself. The first U.S. units deployed to Korea from the Eighth Army were woefully unprepared for combat; as a result, American forces suffered. When the tide changed after Inchon, and the UNC allies started capturing large numbers of enemy soldiers, they found themselves unprepared to house, care for, and manage those who had surrendered.5 Among other places selected for camps, Koje-do Island became overcrowded quickly. Guard understaffing made this combustible situation worse.6 Lack of preparation by the United States and the UNC was a central factor in the rise of rightist and other groups in the camps, something Kim could have analyzed more closely.

In addition to being unprepared for the war, the U.S. administration had a moral vision that shaped the decisions it made about Korea. Kim misses the mark when discussing the motives behind nonforcible repatriation. She simplifies the Truman administration’s debates on this issue by claiming that the only reason U.S. leaders embraced nonforcible repatriation was that they wanted to delegitimize the DPRK and the PRC. She also labels Truman’s words about forced repatriation being a moral injustice “propaganda” that “signaled a more fundamental injustice” than a simple claim to morality in the post-World War II international order.

Review of Monica Kim’s The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History.

Peter Banseok Kwon

Did the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) during the Korean War (1950–1953) give rise to the American liberal empire in world politics from the mid-twentieth century onwards? Such is Monica Kim’s claim in The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History.
Kim’s groundbreaking study offers significant insights into the POW camps during the Korean War, a topic that up to now has not been extensively treated.

Her account begins against the backdrop of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which mandated the repatriation of POWs at the end of hostilities. In January 1952, the UN (backed by the United States) proposed that each POW be given voluntary repatriation—i.e., the freedom to choose whether to “return to his own side or join the other side”—in spite of North Korean and Chinese insistence on mandatory repatriation (8). This issue became the central obstacle in the armistice negotiations between the two sides, which dragged on for over a year. During this period, as Kim argues, a major diplomatic and psychological battle was waged in the interrogation facilities, as both the US-led UN coalition in South Korea and the communist forces in North Korea (backed by China) tried to convince POWs where to relocate after the war. For both sides, their decision would represent to the world which of the two Korean governments should be recognized as the sovereign Korean state.

In the age of de-colonization, the US treatment of POWs became central to the broader American effort to refashion its imperial identity as the guardian of the free world and an exemplar of liberal democratic values. The repatriation choice of POWs became critical for authenticating the American project of liberation in Korea; more specifically, the refusal by North Korean and Chinese POWs to repatriate would legitimize the US military occupation and nation-building efforts in South Korea. According to Kim, the importance of the American manipulation of POWs to produce the “correct subjects”—i.e., foreign natives who supported the United States—did not lie simply in the vindication of its role in the Korean War. The United States would use this experience to establish a template that it would continue to employ to justify its post-Korea “wars of intervention” abroad (358).

Kim’s people-centered approach is significant in that her work provides an alternative to traditional military historiography of the Korean War, which focuses on the Cold War superpower conflict and state-level battle tactics while minimizing the significance of POWs—oftentimes reducing them to faceless victims of state propaganda machines. Kim expands our understanding of the complexity of POW experiences as she shows how forces such as liberalism, decolonization, orientalism, Western and Japanese imperialism, and anti-Black racism converged and played out in the personal narratives that emerged from the interrogation rooms.

Kim’s people-centered approach is significant in that her work provides an alternative to traditional military historiography of the Korean War, which focuses on the Cold War superpower conflict and state-level battle tactics while minimizing the significance of POWs—oftentimes reducing them to faceless victims of state propaganda machines. Kim expands our understanding of the complexity of POW experiences as she shows how forces such as liberalism, decolonization, orientalism, Western and Japanese imperialism, and anti-Black racism converged and played out in the personal narratives that emerged from the interrogation rooms.

Kim also expands both the local and international perspective of the Korean War through vivid accounts of the diverse individuals in the POW camps run by the US military, the North Korean and Chinese militaries, and the Indian Custodian Force. In her hands the POW accounts become a microcosm of global politics, offering a new interpretation of the impact of the Korean War on the United States and the world. Her book is poignant, personal, deeply touching, and complex, a penetrating reflection on the multiplicity and variegated realities of this war, beyond the prevailing approaches towards the conflict.

The book aptly captures the totality of modern warfare in the twentieth century, which involved a complete erosion of territorial and ideological boundaries. The interrogation rooms of the Korean War became a new battlefront, substituting for geopolitical territory the terrain of “human interiority” (7). The reader should be aware that the book is not designed to provide a comprehensive account of the Korean War per se, nor an account of the POW experiences themselves, as the author herself notes (16). Rather, it uses select case studies of POWs and interrogators to provide an in-depth look at the ideological warfare over political subjecthood during the Cold War and in the process weaves together the “trans-Pacific histories of the interrogation room, the prisoner of war, and the interrogator of the Korean War” (26).

Kim’s book will be of interest to scholars of the comparative history of imperialism and empire-building. This vast empirical study, drawing from multi-lingual archival sources—including declassified U.S. military investigation files of POWs as well as the author’s interviews with former POWs and interrogators—results in an unprecedented insider’s account of the POW camps during the Korean War. Through these fascinating narratives of lesser-known historical figures, Kim offers a unique bottom-up perspective from which to re-analyze this war. Her reframing of the conflict not only brings what was peripheral into the center of analysis but puts a human face on larger movements and structural forces occurring during the war.

Kim presents many illuminating and previously unknown accounts of POWs and interrogators such as Clarence Adams, an African-American POW who decided not to repatriate to the United States but to stay in China (343–44; 352–53); and Sam Miyamoto, one of the formerly interned Japanese-Americans who was recruited to serve in the US military in Korea as part of Washington’s plan to showcase its embrace of “Orientals” to Korean and Chinese POWs (123–29; 138–40; 160–64; 167–68). She even sheds new light on more familiar tales, such as the story of the communist POWs in “Compound #76” who took their US camp commander hostage to demand the cessation of the US military repatriation screening that forced POWs to renounce North Korea’s sovereign claims over them (171–89).

Spanning the years from the US military occupation of Korea in the aftermath of Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945) through the post-Korean War release of the POWs, the book is at its best and most revelatory when discussing the US side of the war and its trans-Pacific history through the stories of American POW repatriates (who journeyed from North Korean POW camps back to the US) and Japanese-American interrogators in the US POW camps in Korea. The book also excels in its explanations about the US reactions and adaptations to the postcolonial world and its new methods of self-representation as a liberal hegemon. In comparison, the passages that discuss the Korean side of the conflict are generally less detailed and conceptualized.

Kim’s treatment of South Korean experiences under the US military occupation, for example, often follows the postcolonial viewpoint found in the work of historian Bruce Cumings.

Having finished The Interrogation Rooms, I pondered the truism that one’s greatest strengths can become one’s greatest weaknesses. Kim’s ambitious attempt to set the struggle over Korean War POWs in its larger international context can make it appear that she has stretched her research to incorporate too many diverse elements, actors, and themes. Is it really the case that the key to unlocking the new winds of US imperialism, the postcolonial re-
conceptualization of statehood, and the non-alignment movement can be found in the Korean War interrogation rooms?

While the insights provided into those rooms are invaluable, the broader connections Kim finds can appear to be unevenly argued, with some links not as tightly drawn as others. Likewise, the extent to which the US project with Korean War POWs can be said to have both reflected and given impetus to the emergence of a new US liberal paradigm remains a bit vague, especially since it is hard to clearly define and trace this new US framework that was born, as Kim claims, during the Korean War. Her argument likely would have been even more compelling had it been more tightly constructed, with a focus on fewer key actors and fewer dimensions, or if the study had been presented as two separate works dealing with different aspects of the Korean War’s consequences.

Despite the numerous details of individual accounts excavated from the discrete archival and oral sources, the limitations of archival sources still make themselves felt. Though no fault of her own, many of Kim’s examples fall short of providing adequate context, and readers may find themselves lost in the narrative chronology, as anecdotes sometimes appear incomplete or fragmentary. One of the consequences of the missing archives is that there is a noticeable imbalance between Kim’s accounts of US/South Korean interrogation camps and their interrogation tactics and the Chinese/North Korean side, which likely stems from Kim’s lack of access to classified material in North Korea and China. These gaps, including the largely missing narrative of the Chinese POWs, make it difficult to ascertain whether the book’s findings truly reflect the larger trends of POW camps implicated in Kim’s book, or whether significant differences existed between each side’s interrogation facilities on the Korean peninsula. In this sense, David Cheng Chang’s recent publication, The Hijacked War (2020), which highlights the experiences of Chinese POWs during the Korean War, complements Kim’s work well.

Overall, Kim’s narrative enriches our understanding of the war by incorporating rarely seen personal narratives and non-traditional themes such as US imperial ambitions within a trans-Pacific frame. At the same time, the book powerfully demonstrates how the ideological Cold War found its way into the furthest reaches of the POW camps. Despite her efforts to give primacy to the people’s history over the state-centric analysis of the Cold War, Kim’s work in some ways is a convincing example of how Cold War-driven national interests and powerful state propaganda machines penetrated deeply into the minds of ordinary people. The book’s depiction of highly effective psychological interrogation tactics by the POW institutions, including how much POW camps and their personnel adopted, bought into, and implemented state agenda, affirms both the binary power struggle and the top-down features of Cold War historiography. The ideas and arrangements implemented in the interrogation rooms reflected the goals and values endorsed by major superpowers of the Cold War and illustrate that the POWs trapped in the recesses of interrogation rooms were first and foremost subject to the competing binary forces of capitalism and communism.

Response to Roundtable

Monica Kim

June 2020 marks the seventieth year of the Korean War, the one “hot war” of the Cold War that has never officially ended. A ceasefire signed in 1953 is the only thing that has held outright physical conflict in abeyance on the peninsula. For me as a historian, the unending and ongoing nature of the Korean War presents a fundamental question: How does one write a history of a war that has not ended? Or, more to the point, how do I write a history of a war in a way that points to and insists upon noticing how this war has not ended? Beneath these questions about crafting historical narrative are the more urgent and fundamental political questions of why and how a perpetual state of war on the Korean peninsula is, in fact, useful for the different states involved—and has been, for seventy years and counting.

The task, then, is not to write a story of the Korean War as a discretely bounded event, but rather to write a story about the war that locates it in the most ordinary and everyday moments. And I am honored to have the scholars involved in this roundtable engage so thoughtfully and generously with the book, when their own work on U.S. warfare has pushed the bounds of where we locate “war” temporally, geopolitically, and materially.

Mitch Lerner has put together a roundtable of scholars whose scholarship spans the three fields that inform how I approached the challenge of unsettling mainstream narratives of the Korean War: critical ethnic studies, critical Asian studies, and the historiography of U.S. empire and diplomatic history. Although each of these fields have pointedly different origins in Cold War academia, one common thread that can be selectively pulled through the fields is the anti-imperial critique of U.S. militarism and warfare.

I bring up these genealogies of critique, protest, and resistance within academia because although I did not set out to write a “new military history,” as Arissa Oh puts it in her review, I do believe that particular scholars in these fields had already been challenging what is considered to be in the purview of military history. As a result, I am very gratified that each of the reviewers in the roundtable articulated and distilled the interventions of the book in how we conceptualize the story of the Korean War.

I began this project with a commitment to writing a history of the Korean War that was more “bottom-up” than “top-down.” Peter B. Kwon’s comment on my “people-centered approach” is indeed an accurate depiction of the driving force behind how I eventually arrived at the interrogation room as the site for my research and narrative. I begin my story of the Korean War inside the interrogation room because such a move undermines and explodes two hallmark characteristics of mainstream stories about U.S. imperial warfare: that the wars are exceptional, and that they happen “over there.” The interrogation rooms in my book are ordinary. They are part of the everyday. They can be spontaneously improvised, or they can be highly ritualized. And this framework for the book came out of my determination to begin with a social history of the war, with people’s experiences that would be more instructive to the reader and myself about how to pay attention to military occupation, violence, and policies.

Take, for example, the story of a Korean peasant farmer named Chang Sung Sum, whose home and rice paddy fields were supposedly along the 38th parallel (his story serves as the introduction to chapter 1). In April 1946, South Korean and U.S. military interrogators all went together as a group to question this humble peasant farmer. Why? Well, Chang had hung up a sign on the side of his house that said, in three languages—Korean, Russian, and English—“Beyond this house is South Korea.” This sign was absolutely brilliant. What did it mean? Did it mean that his house was in South Korea? The story of Chang is important because his trilingual sign not only denaturalizes the 38th parallel, but it also immediately shows how the ordinary, non-elitist person on the ground was already understanding and navigating global geopolitics. To begin the story of the Korean War with the interrogation of Chang Chung Sum in April 1946 is to tell the story of the war as one about decolonization. What did liberation, power, loss, negotiation look like on
the ground? Chang was negotiating right there and then to keep access to his home and his livelihood, which was literally land, and he did not trust the foreign occupation powers.

Social microhistory as a way to examine international diplomatic history is an important methodology I employ in the book. Judy Wu describes how my focus on the interrogation room reveals “the personalized nature of these encounters [which] made them, in essence, expressions of intimacy.” What I discovered was that the intimate scale opened up a global history. The book is a prolonged investigation into a sudden political phenomenon that occurred during the early years of the Korean War: the interrogation room became the flashpoint of a heated, international debate over how to regulate warfare, a controversy that, at its most fundamental, was a struggle over determining what kind of governance would shape the post-1945 world. Every state, every organization was claiming to have the interrogation room that best exemplified democratic or liberatory ideals. I trace this global history of the Korean War through four different military interrogation rooms: those created by the U.S. military, South Korean paramilitary youth groups, the North Korean and Chinese militaries, and the Indian Custodian Force.

Opening with Japanese American internment and the U.S. occupation of Korea, the book spans three continents as it follows two generations of people creating and navigating landscapes of interrogation in the United States and Asia from 1940 through the 1960s. It accompanies a thousand Japanese Americans to Korea after the United States drafted them as internees for the Korean War; traces the postwar journeys of Korean prisoners of war as they were subsequently shipped by the United Nations and Indian military to India, Brazil, and Argentina; and maps out the experiences of American POWs through the Chinese and North Korean interrogation network within POW camps. Arissa Oh’s remark on my focus on migration very much touches upon an important narrative intervention I wanted to make: the expansion of our field of vision regarding wartime movement not only of migrants but also military personnel. And indeed, what happens when the migrant becomes the soldier, or vice versa?

The critical geography of war that emerges from the book radically departs from the usual periodization and scope of the Korean War, as both Americans and Asians became central to the story of the making of liberal warfare in an era marked by WWII internment, the Korean War, and the non-alignment movement. The interrogation rooms of the Korean War position the war undeniably within the histories of anti-imperial neutrality and internationalism. Those two facets of the war simply have not been part of the public or scholarly consciousness, whether in the United States or in South Korea.

The central stakes of the book reside in my focus “on the Korean War as a war of decolonization,” as Zachary Matusheski writes. I would push this formulation even further and say that I claim that we can understand the Korean War as a war over decolonization. Because the Korean War is still ongoing, many of the histories written on the war focus on the question of who “started” the war, and for that reason these histories focus a great deal on the top-level decision-making on the battlefields and in the rooms where diplomatic negotiations took place. With our focus on the process (and not the event) of decolonization, we can see the Korean War within the broader colonial context of the British in Kenya or the French in Algeria in the mid-twentieth century. The liberal preoccupation in the United States with individual “interiority” as the terrain of warfare and liberation must be seen within the geopolitical and temporal frames of colonial preoccupations with a populace demanding sovereignty.

In his review, Peter B. Kwon asks about the Chinese POWs, and I certainly refer everyone to David Cheng Chang’s excellent The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War (Stanford, 2020), where Chang has conducted analysis and research that lie beyond my linguistic and scholarly capacities. But it is important to note that the U.S. military focused much of its retrospective narrative of the POW experience on the Chinese POWs, because the U.S. military officials could not quite imagine the Korean Communist POWs acting independently from the difference between the Chinese and Korean Communist POWs in terms of political stakes was critical: for the Korean Communist POWs, what was at stake was the question of postcolonial liberation, along with a previous relationship with the United States military as a foreign occupying force. I wanted to bring these often-effaced politics to the forefront in the story, and The Interrogation Rooms was the result: it is a trans-Pacific history of twentieth-century decolonization told through the prism of the military interrogation room.

I want to underscore that my framing of the Korean War as a war over decolonization should not be construed as a claim that this mode of warfare on the terrain of interiority is new. I insisted on the decolonization framework because I wanted to bring the Korean War explicitly into a comparative and connective historical context in terms of U.S. empire and twentieth-century colonialism. The earliest historical moment I analyze in depth within the book is the mission of the three Korean emissaries who traveled to the 1907 Hague Convention to protest the Japanese protectorate treaty that would lead to the annexation and colonization of Korea. I position the struggle over sovereign political recognition at the center of my narrative to highlight how the Korean War was not simply the usual wartime contest over territorial sovereignty. At the heart of the struggle was the question of political recognition, the key relational dynamic that formed the foundation for the post-1945 nation-state system.

During the Korean War, the ambitions of empire, revolution, and international solidarity converged upon an intimate encounter of military warfare: the interrogator and the interrogated prisoner of war. Thus, temporally, I wanted to expand how we situate the Korean War—less as the “forgotten war” bookended by the “good” war of World War II and the “bad” war of Vietnam—and more in the critical timeline of the Philippine-American War, U.S. counterinsurgencies in Latin America, the Asia-Pacific War, and the long anti-colonial wars of Vietnam.
reasoning” that Zachary Matusheshki states that I overlook is, in fact, embedded in the Truman administration’s turn to the figure of the POW in 1951, when it became clear that the war was at a stalemate.

At this point, the initial reasoning Truman had given for entering the conflict—that North Korea had violated a sacred border, the 38th parallel—did not hold anymore. He had previously given General Douglas MacArthur the greenlight to make the war of “containment” into one of “rollback” by crossing northwards over the 38th parallel towards China. Since there was no compelling enemy figure for this “police action,” the Psychological Strategy Board fashioned a figure to be “rescued”: the prisoner of war. Through the POW repatriation proposal, we can see the development of a hallmark of latter twentieth-century U.S. wars of interventions for regime change, where the individual person becomes both the terrain for warfare and the *jus ad bellum.* Or in other words, the United States supposedly does not go to war for its own state interests, but rather on behalf of an individual elsewhere. The POW repatriation proposal, I argue, cannot be examined solely on the terms Truman himself was referencing, because the Psychological Strategy Board purposefully drew up the POW repatriation proposal with an eye to impacting the public’s enthusiasm and support for the Truman administration’s actions from the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference to the eventual Korean political negotiations. It is the utility of warfare we must keep in focus.

To return to the unending nature of the Korean War, I would like to follow Judy Wu’s lead in noting “the continual, seemingly unending process of interrogation that persisted after the official/unofficial conflict ended.” We often think of interrogation as singular events, although those who are more familiar either politically or personally with police and carceral systems will state that interrogation is a violent landscape. The challenge of breaking down the notion of the interrogation room as an isolated space and experience was two-fold for me. The first part of the challenge was the archive. Certainly there was the difficulty of tracking a multi-sited and multi-national archive around interrogation practices and the prisoner-of-war from the Korean War. But we could also take for granted, quite easily, the coherency of the U.S. military interrogation report, where the bureaucratic language presents a narrative as self-evident and transparently total. My aim was to dismantle that documentation, to show, as Arissa Oh puts it, “how looking beneath the seemingly smooth narratives produced through interrogation reveals layers of historical processes.”

For example, I read through these U.S. military interrogation documents carefully—and a large archive of these remains the basis for writing the history of the U.S. military occupation of Korea—but it took some time before I finally noticed the names of the interrogators on the reports or even grasped what they signified: George Yamamoto, Jimmy Tanaka. And thousands of others. When I realized that the U.S. military interrogators could have been Japanese Americans, I was stunned at my own acceptance of the presentation in the interrogation reports. I had no idea, in fact, exactly who was in the room and what languages were being spoken. Subverting the bureaucratic coherence of the interrogation report in order to examine the experiences of interrogation also required extensive work with community oral history organizations. I conducted oral history interviews with former interrogators who were Japanese American and former POWs who were Korean.

The second challenge lay in presenting interrogation not as a singular event, but rather as an experience embedded in much larger and historical ecosystems of violence, surveillance, and self-presentation. For any official, state-sanctioned infrastructure of interrogation, there were multiple informal (yet critical) networks of interrogation in operation, working either in opposition to each other or in tandem to support each other. Briefly in this response, I would like to bring the histories of these informal networks from my book towards the present to lay out the ways in which the dynamics operating during the early 1950s Korean War have had deep structural afterlives in the present.

In my book, I show that the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) was pivotal not only for the U.S. military occupation in South Korea, but also for interrogating U.S. POWs repatriating after the signing of the ceasefire. Through my years of research, I was able to outline the intimate dependency of the CIC during the occupation on the rightist paramilitary youth group called the North West Young Men’s Association (NWYMA), which was notorious for its brutality in the Cheju-do massacres in 1948. This relationship not only had implications for the U.S. military government during the occupation but also for the later iterations of the South Korean national security state. The CIC helped found the Korean Counterintelligence Corps, which then later developed into the Korean Counterintelligence Agency (now known as the National Intelligence Service). And more immediately, in terms of the Korean War, the CIC replicated this relationship with a rightist paramilitary youth group as a core form of intelligence-gathering within the POW camps by supporting the establishment of the Anti-Communist Youth League by Korean rightist POWs.

In other words, we cannot view the POW controversy of the Korean War as isolated from the long-reaching historical arc of the United States’s actions in creating the network, infrastructure, and practices for a South Korean “national security state.” This anti-communist “national security state” as fashioned by the United States during the cold war is dependent on sustaining a perpetual state of “war” in order to facilitate and justify U.S. militarization of the region (and in the case of Korea, the militarization of the Asia-Pacific).

The one critical element of the enduring archive created by the CIC and the NWYMA during the wartime and occupation years were the lists of Koreans labelled black (enemy threats), grey (possible sources of information but loyalty unconfirmed), or white (loyalty favorable to United States). The South Korean state stored these lists, and in the decades after the 1953 ceasefire reanimated them, using them especially to punish or threaten those deemed to be leftists, or those associated with them. These fissures of suspicion, which could open up at any time to bodily death or social death, have deep implications in the politics of people’s everyday lives, whether on the Korean peninsula or in the United States. The recently published works by Heonik Kwon (*After the Korean War: An Intimate History*) and Crystal Mun-hye Baik (*Reencounters: On the Korean War and Diasporic Memory Critique*) both trace the contours of this war in how people already understand and then navigate this precarious landscape into the present.²

The U.S. military archive revealed another informal network of interrogation that operated alongside the North Korean and Chinese military ones. It houses a collection of over one thousand case files of U.S. military interrogation
reports on repatriating U.S. POWs and was declassified over a period of nine years past my initial Freedom of Information Act filing.

As the reviewers have mentioned, white ethnic Americans who were POWs recreated white supremacist groups modeled on the Ku Klux Klan in the camps along the Yalu River. These POWs often physically beat and threatened the others, usually racial minorities or men of white working-class backgrounds, if they suspected them of developing non-adversarial positions toward the internationalism offered by the North Korean interrogators. Judy Wu notes that my gender analysis of masculinity is the most sustained in this chapter about U.S. POWs, and indeed it was the gender analysis that was key to addressing the challenge of how to analyze a kind of archive that was like a room full of mirrors.

Without access to Chinese or North Korean state archives on Korean War interrogation, I had to develop an approach to this seemingly over-determined U.S. military archive on U.S. POWs. But through this one-thousand-plus case files, I was surprised at how much detail about everyday camp life could come to the fore, despite the efforts of the CIC interrogators and the POWs’ own fears about being labelled a possible communist sympathizer. Ultimately, this chapter enabled me to challenge the longest-standing trope and myth of the U.S. POW experience during the Korean War: brainwashing. The U.S. military and government framed what was at stake in the North Korean and Chinese interrogation rooms for the ordinary U.S. POW was the preservation of a national self and geopolitical space. Marilyn Young once commented that “what is odd about Korea is that even as it was being fought, it was deemed forgotten.” Through this roundtable that Mitch Lerner assembled, I very much appreciated being able to reflect upon how critical scholars are not arguing simply to remember the Korean War, but rather to stay with the “odd” character of this war, and to think through the strange, subtle, or spectacular violence that this unending war facilitates even today.

Notes:

In the next issue of Passport

» A roundtable on Seth Jacobs, Rogue Diplomats
» A roundtable on Lauren Turek, To Bring the Good News to All Nations
» Keywords and U.S. foreign relations

and much more!
The United States and the World Health Organization

Theodore M. Brown

Editor's note: Passport would like to thank editorial advisory board member Kelly McFarland for arranging with Dr. Brown to write this timely essay. AJ

A little more than two months ago, U.S. President Donald Trump began to lash out at the World Health Organization, blaming it for what he claimed were missteps, failures, and prevarications in its handling of the coronavirus pandemic. Then, on April 14, after several days of threats, he announced that U.S. funding for the WHO would be frozen for sixty to ninety days while his administration conducted a review to “assess the World Health Organization’s role in severely mismanaging and covering up the spread of coronavirus.”

Widely seen as a transparent attempt to deflect attention from his own inconsistent, incompetent, and irresponsible response to the crisis, Trump’s threatened withdrawal of funds from the WHO at a critical moment drew widespread condemnation from medical and public health leaders. Richard Horton, the editor-in-chief of Lancet, called Trump’s decision a “crime against humanity.” Dr. Georges Benjamin, the executive director of the American Public Health Association, “denounced” the Trump administration’s decision to halt U.S. contributions to the WHO, which, he said, would “cripple the world’s response to COVID-19 and would harm the health and lives of thousands of Americans.”

However outrageous and dangerous President Trump’s freezing of WHO funds may be, it is by no means the first time that the United States has used its political muscle and the power of the purse to threaten and coerce the WHO. In fact, the United States has bribed and bullied the WHO from the earliest days of the organization until the present. The very notion of an international health organization was, in fact, an American idea, part of its blueprint for the post-World War II capitalist world—a world stabilized by a set of multilateral institutions that facilitated technical cooperation and the hegemony of the United States.1

The United States held the purse strings of the WHO, initially contributing more than 35 percent of the multilateral health organization’s budget. The U.S. State Department made sure to insert loyalists to American foreign policy priorities in key positions, as when it insisted on the appointment of Martha May Eliot as one of the first three assistant directors general. The United States also threw its weight on the side of a regional as opposed to a tightly centralized style of organization, because it wanted to preserve its influence over public health in the Americas via the Pan American Health Organization, which became the American Regional Office of the WHO. Then all of the WHO was forced to follow suit, creating, as some have said, not one WHO but seven.

The United States also insisted on the early launching of a naively ambitious WHO Malaria Eradication Program despite the hesitancy of some of the world’s leading malarologists. It did so because the State Department saw malaria eradication as an effective Cold War strategy and realized that by providing funds to the new multilateral health organization it could gain legitimacy and at the same time leverage its funds, multiplying the impact of its fiscal contribution.

The United States’ aggressive tactics in using the WHO as “its” international health agency was one of the reasons the Soviet Union and its allies withdrew from the supposedly multilateral organization in 1949. When the USSR returned in 1956 and again attended the WHO’s governing body, the World Health Assembly, in 1958, it proposed a new eradication program aimed at smallpox. The program was approved by the WHA, but the United States was unenthusiastic, because it had major resources tied up in malaria eradication.

Thus, budgetary support for smallpox was meager, and the program languished until the United States decided in the mid-sixties that smallpox eradication could serve its foreign policy objectives. Then the WHO very quickly came around, declared a major new initiative in the worldwide Smallpox Eradication Program (SEP), and worked out a deal that would combine U.S. and Soviet resources and personnel under American leadership and with the major involvement of the rapidly rising American public health agency, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Smallpox eradication proved a great public health and geopolitical success, but even as the WHO was celebrating its global triumph in 1980, it was again feeling the heavy hand of the United States.

Concurrent with the final stages of the SEP was another heralded initiative of the WHO, the campaign for health equity and primary care, crystallized in the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978. This call for the just distribution of health both between and within countries in order to achieve “Health for All by 2000” was the articulation of a long-sought social medicine ideal and an expression of the voice of the developing world. That voice was also expressed through the “New International Economic Order” endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1974; and in the WHO it was channeled through Halfdan Mahler, “Nordic socialist” and charismatic director general from 1973 to 1988.

Mahler and many of those at Alma Ata (in Kazakhstan) prized the affirmation of the declaration as a “spiritual moment,” perhaps the most hallowed in the WHO’s history. But the United States saw it as a clear signal that it and other developed nations had lost control of the World Health Assembly, which was now numerically dominated by representatives of countries from the Global South. These countries were often former colonies that had achieved independence and now occupied the world stage as “developing nations” that were demanding reparations-like economic assistance and morally justified access to services and technological aid. The United States’
assessment of shifted political realities was also reflected in its anger about the World Health Assembly's decision in 1977 to create a list of "Essential Medicines," defined as those to which all people should have access at all times in sufficient quantities and at generally affordable prices.

The United States' response to what it saw as the WHO's frightening turn in the seventies came first in a small meeting in Bellagio, Italy, attended by representatives of the wealthy Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the American-dominated World Bank, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), an arm of the U.S. government responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance. The outcome of this meeting was a plan for "Selective Primary Care" as an alternative to the multi-sectoral and politically empowering approach of Primary Health Care adopted at Alma Ata.

With Ronald Reagan's election as president in 1980 and his administration's hostility to both governmental and intergovernmental authority, the U.S. budgetary commitment to multilateral organizations like the United Nations and the WHO very quickly diminished in the eighties. As a result of pressure from the United States (and other industrialized countries), the World Health Assembly froze the WHO budget, and in 1985 the United States refused to pay its assessed dues on the grounds that the latest version of the Essential Medicines list was contrary to the interests of U.S. pharmaceutical companies. The United States' actions led immediately to a massive fiscal crisis at the WHO, and this crisis in turn led to a dramatic tailspin in the organization that many feared would be a death spiral.

What saved the WHO financially was a shift to "extrabudgetary" or "voluntary" contributions as opposed to continuing primary reliance on assessed dues that made up the "regular" budget. The regular budget was approved by votes in the World Health Assembly, but the "voluntary" budget was utilized largely according to donors' wishes. The shift to extrabudgetary programs also provided an open opportunity for the World Bank, which was controlled by America and by the 1980s under the sway of "neoliberal" ideology that devalued national and multilateral authority, to exercise wide influence in international health initiatives once considered the WHO's domain.

The bank was not initially focused on health, but its interest grew significantly during the presidency of Robert McNamara, former U.S. secretary of defense and bank president from 1968 to 1981. McNamara was first drawn to health issues through his concern with population control, but then, with some pressure from President Jimmy Carter, he turned his attention to nutrition and disease control. By 1979, the bank had tackled onchocerciasis ("river blindness") in Africa, established a Population Health and Nutrition (PHN) Program, and allowed stand-alone health loans. In 1980 World Development Report, the bank argued that under special conditions and with World Bank assistance, both malnutrition and ill health could be countered by direct government action.

In the 1980s the bank began extending nutrition loans, and in 1981 it offered a loan to Tunisia to expand its basic health services. In 1987, under the presidency of former U.S. Congressman Barber Conable, the bank published a study on Financing Health Services in Developing Countries, and by 1990 its loans for health totaled USD 263 million, which surpassed the WHO's total budget. In 1993, under the presidency of former J.P. Morgan executive Lewis T. Preston, the bank published its first World Development Report entirely devoted to health, which the Lancet claimed marked a shift in leadership in international health. In 1995, the bank appointed Richard Feachem, dean of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, as head of PHN, and by 1996 the bank held a USD 8 billion portfolio of health programs, making it the world's single largest financier of international health activities.

Not long after the World Bank ascended into global health leadership, it began to play a major role in facilitating the creation of new institutional entities and alliances that in various ways crowded and confused the international health landscape and further challenged the WHO's authority and standing. Three of the most notable of these were Roll Back Malaria (RBM, 1998), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI, 1999), and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund, 2002).

RBM began with a broad multi-factoral agenda but soon narrowed its focus to DDT spraying to kill mosquito larvae and the distribution (initially the sale of) insecticide-treated bed nets. GAVI's goal was to work with scientists and pharmaceutical companies to stimulate the development of new vaccines and bring them to market at reasonable prices. In the process, however, and like RBM in its anti-malaria initiatives, GAVI seriously undermined the WHO's role in the world's immunization efforts. The Global Fund raised enormous sums of money but it too forced the WHO to accept a very much diminished role as a junior partner as the price of survival in the new global health order.

In each case, the World Bank was a major player; and in the case of the Global Fund, it served the role of trustee while Richard Feachem, former director of the bank's PHN program, served as the Global Fund's executive director from 2002 to 2007. In GAVI and the Global Fund, the American-controlled World Bank's efforts were substantially supported by the newly created and massively funded Gates Foundation, started and controlled by American software-billionaire-turned-philanthropist Bill Gates.

WHO-diminishing initiatives also came directly from the U.S. government, which supported RBM, GAVI, and especially the Global Fund. In fact, in the latter case the U.S. Congress voted substantial budgetary support, and President George W. Bush's secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, served as chair of the Global Fund board. But in 2003 the Bush administration went beyond support for the Global Fund with the creation of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which committed USD 15 billion in bilateral aid to be spent over the next five years in fifteen selected countries, twelve of them "focus" countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Not only did the amount of money overwhelm anything that the WHO could possibly accomplish by itself with HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment in those countries, but it also cast a shadow on the work of the Global Fund, in which the WHO had at least a nominal role.

To make matters even more difficult for the WHO, PEPFAR came with stipulations important to the Bush administration and its political base that directly undermined several of the WHO's long-term HIV/AIDS priorities. First, PEPFAR steered away from generic medications that the WHO had come around to supporting strongly for developing countries, and it clearly signaled its rejection of the generic campaign by appointing Randall Tobias, former CEO of the American pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly and Company, as U.S. global AIDS coordinator. Second, the Bush administration stipulated that at least one-third of PEPFAR's prevention funds should be directed toward ineffective abstinence-based programs that required all participants to sign an oath against engagement in "prostitution," which undermined the WHO's careful harm reduction work with sex workers.

Both of these stipulations directly undermined the WHO's long-term and far more sensitive prevention programs. It was only with the Obama administration that PEPFAR reversed some of these policies, yet continuing U.S. bilateral aid not only undermined the WHO's credibility and effectiveness but also substantially compromised and undercut sub-Saharan public health systems that the WHO had worked hard for many years to strengthen and
One final and historically ironic way in which intrusive intervention by the United States undermined the WHO’s international standing followed from the American insistence in the 1990s that the agency place considerable new emphasis on emerging infectious diseases and their epidemic and pandemic surveillance. These diseases became an American preoccupation in the final decade of the twentieth century and were the focus of high-level concern on the part of the National Institutes of Health, the Institute of Medicine, and the Centers for Disease Control, marked most notably by the CDC’s launching of a new journal, *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, in 1995. An important item on the U.S. agenda was to transfer this preoccupation with emerging infectious diseases to the WHO and to prod it to take on the upgrading of the International Health Regulations (IHR) that it oversaw but that were quite out of date.

The WHO responded in various ways to U.S. pressure. It appointed Dr. David Heymann, an American physician and epidemiologist who had spent thirteen years with the CDC, as the WHO’s first director of its new Program on Emerging and Communicable Diseases. Heymann served in that role from 1995 to 1998 and was then appointed the executive director of the WHO Communicable Disease Cluster from 1998 to 2003, helping guide the WHO’s response to Ebola, Avian Flu, and SARS outbreaks during his eight-year tenure. His work led directly to the reformulation of the IHR in 2005, a priority strongly pushed by the CDC.

The irony is that the IHR as reformulated are quite problematic, in that they very strictly limit the WHO’s data collection and enforcement authority, which means that its response to epidemic and pandemic outbreaks is legally circumscribed and, per necessity, of only limited effectiveness. In a classic “blaming the victim” scenario, that circumscribed response, for which the heavy hand of the United States is ultimately responsible, is now President Trump’s rationale for drastically cutting U.S. financial support for the agency.12

There were many additional examples of unilateral U.S. intervention in the WHO’s history all of which hampered or completely sidetracked the international health agency, preventing it from achieving the goals articulated with such idealistic fervor in 1948, when the organization was formally launched and reaffirmed at Alma-Ata. Space limits their exploration now, but their study will yield a deeper and more granular understanding of how the WHO has been shaped over the course of its history by U.S. perceptions, priorities and blatant interventions. So if President Trump follows through on his threat, it will surely not be the first time that the United States has shown its heavy hand. And if the WHO in some fashion survives this latest assault, it will almost certainly not be the last, as the organization staggers into the future.

Notes:
Call for Papers

The 2021 Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations
Arlington, VA, June 17-20, 2021

Variations on a Theme

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for its first-ever “hybrid” annual conference.

In June 2020, SHAFR Council decided that next year’s meeting would operate both onsite and online. The onsite conference will be smaller—recognizing the contingencies of the current public health situation—but registrants will be able to access and participate in the conference from any offsite location. The resulting event will be both local and delocalized, synchronous and asynchronous.

In order to facilitate planning, the program committee will organize next year’s annual meeting around themed sessions. Each session will include traditional panels plus a signature roundtable and a networking exercise that brings graduate students and junior scholars into dialogue with senior and mid-career scholars. The objective will be to bring onsite and online participants into a sustained, multidirectional conversation about topics of shared importance among U.S. foreign relations historians. We hope to apply the best practices from remote and hybrid learning to next year’s conference.

The 2021 meeting will highlight themes drawn from recent conference programs: Borders, Capitalism, Decolonization, Development, Domestic Politics, Empire, Environment, Gender, Ideas, Immigration, Law, Race, Religion, Rights, Science & Technology, Security, Strategy, and War. In addition to welcoming proposals that speak to these core themes, the program committee welcomes proposals with other emphases. We hope that the “hybrid” format will celebrate SHAFR in all its diversity and showcase a broad range of methodological, temporal, and geographic approaches.

More details are available on SHAFR’s website. The deadline for proposals is December 1, 2020.

Proposals

SHAFR is committed to inclusion and diversity, and encourages proposals from members of groups historically under-represented within the organization. We particularly encourage proposals from women, scholars of color, colleagues residing outside of the United States, and scholars working in other disciplines. Graduate students, international scholars, and scholars whose participation might expand the organization’s breadth are encouraged to apply for SHAFR grants to subsidize the cost of attending the conference. Please see below for details.

For planning purposes, each paper and panel submission will be invited to self-associate with the conference themes that best resonate with their research agenda. During the conference, each panel will be associated with one theme. There will also be time each day devoted to panels that take up alternative organizing principles and work beyond the conference themes. Each themed session will feature panels with a chair, commentator, and up to three panelists. Panelists will have the opportunity to pre-circulate 12-page papers.
Each panel round will last approximately 75 minutes—regardless of whether participants are in a conference meeting space or in an online meeting space—and the presenters will be asked to briefly frame their papers before turning over to the moderator and audience for questions and discussion.

The committee is open to and encourages alternative formats, especially those that can articulate well with the hybrid format. These might include:

- **Pedagogical Panels**: discussions might include lessons learned for teaching under the banner of this theme in a residential or remote learning environment.
- **Methodological Panels**: discussions might include questions and debates about approaches to archives and history writing.
- **Primary Source Panels**: discussions might be framed around close readings and contextualization of single artifacts such as speeches, memos, and cultural products that crystallize key debates, stakes, or insights in a field.
- **Social Media Panels**: social media events that work to organize scholarly activity around an intellectual project, such as generating Wikipedia page entries, hashtags, etc.
- **Interview Panels**: dialogues between colleagues in the field.
- **Archival Databases**: compilations of documents from archives across borders to help facilitate knowledge exchanges and mitigate challenges of access.
- **Reading Groups**: studied dialogues about a pivotal text, engaging platforms that allow participants to contribute and view marginal comments.

Individual paper proposals, especially those that articulate a connection to the designated conference themes, are also encouraged. Those seeking to create or fill out a panel should do so with the themed sessions in mind and consult the Panelists Seeking Panelists Forum at https://shafr2021panelistsseekingpanelists.blogspot.com/ or Tweet #SHAFR2021.

The program committee hopes to develop a pool of potential commentators/chairs for panels constructed from individual proposals. The volunteer application form will be available online closer to the application deadline.

### Policies

All proposals and funding applications should be submitted online. Applicants requiring alternative submission means should contact the program co-chairs at program-chair@shafr.org. Although it is difficult to anticipate conditions related to travel in the context of COVID-19, for planning purposes applicants will be asked to indicate their likelihood of attending the event in person. Onsite programming will be tailored to meet the needs of socially distancing, whatever they may be in June 2021. The hybrid format offers onsite flexibility, as well as an infrastructure if SHAFR is forced to eventually adopt an all-virtual model.

Each participant may serve once in any capacity on the program (for example as a presenter or commentator) and not more than twice during the conference.

Generally, annual membership in SHAFR is required for those participating in the 2021 meeting. The president and program committee may grant some exceptions to scholars whose specializations are outside the field. Enrollment instructions will be included with notification of accepted proposals.

### Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants

SHAFR will award several Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants to assist graduate students presenting papers at the 2021 conference. The following stipulations apply: (1) no award will exceed $300; (2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and (3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The program committee will make decisions regarding awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal.
Applications for the Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants should include: a 1-page letter from the applicant and a reference letter from the graduate advisor that confirms the unavailability of departmental travel funds. The two items should be submitted online when the panel/paper proposal is submitted. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee’s decisions on panels/papers, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s submission is accepted by the program committee in a separate decision. Application deadline: December 1, 2020.

**SHAFR Global Scholars and Diversity Grants**

SHAFR also awards Global Scholars and Diversity Grants to help defray travel and lodging expenses for the 2021 conference. These grants are aimed at scholars whose participation in the annual meeting helps to diversity the organization. Preference will be given to those who have not previously presented at annual meetings. The awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR, scholars who offer diverse and complementary intellectual approaches, and scholars from outside the United States. “Scholars” includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further integrate grant winners into SHAFR, awards include one-year membership that includes subscriptions to Diplomatic History and Passport.

Applicants should submit a copy of their individual paper proposal along with a short cv (2-page maximum) and a 2-3 paragraph essay addressing the fellowship criteria (including data on previous SHAFR meetings attended and funding received). Please submit your application via the on-line interface. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee’s decisions on panels/papers, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s submission is accepted by the program committee in a separate decision. Application deadline: December 1, 2020.

**Other Conference Events**

The 2021 conference will continue SHAFR’s commitment to graduate student and newly minted PhD professionalization in anticipation of the job market through innovative themed networking sessions that will allow students an opportunity to receive individualized feedback on their projects from experienced faculty members. The program will also create space for teaching workshops, including those oriented to best practices and syllabus design.

Those interested in participating in either or both workshops can indicate this on the conference registration form, which will be available in Spring 2021.

For more details about the conference please visit the main conference site, https://shafr.org/events/shafr-2021-annual-meeting.

**We look forward to seeing you next June in Arlington and online!**

SHAFR 2021 Program Committee co-chairs,

_Megan Black and Ryan Irwin_
A Roundtable on
Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall,
“Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations”

Chester Pach, Cindy Ewing, Kevin Y. Kim, Daniel Bessner & Fredrik Logevall

Much Ado About Nothing New
Chester Pach

Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall have set SHAFR astir with their article on “Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations.” Even before its publication, their piece was the subject of hallway conversations at academic conferences, presumably those that occurred just before the COVID-19 pandemic closed down all such gatherings.1 SHAFR had scheduled a debate between Logevall and his critics at its annual meeting in New Orleans. Had the New Orleans conference not been cancelled, that session might have produced the same anticipation as the diplomatic history heavyweight match over post-revisionism a generation earlier between John Lewis Gaddis and Bruce Cumings. I attended that epic battle when SHAFR met at Bentley College in 1994, and I left the auditorium convinced (perhaps) that Gaddis had won on points but disappointed that the intellectual fisticuffs had been far less exciting than Muhammad Ali’s Rumble in the Jungle with George Foreman. H-Diplo has provided a substitute for the cancelled New Orleans session by publishing commentaries from several critics, including those who were slated to participate in the SHAFR session, along with a reply from Logevall and Bessner. While the H-Diplø forum has been valuable, it can’t produce the same drama as face-to-face debate. We’ll never know who would have left that Brawl on the Bayou more decentered.

As Daniel Immerwahr has asserted in his introduction to the roundtable, H-Diplø rarely publishes forums on articles—the same is true of Passport—but Logevall and Bessner haven’t written a typical article.2 Perhaps Immerwahr is right. One still wonders, though, why there’s so much fuss over this article. That question arises not because the article lacks significance—it is important—but because Logevall has been saying the same thing for more than fifteen years. Hasn’t anybody been paying attention? In the current article, Bessner and Logevall make two main arguments. First, they maintain that international politics and foreign policy was “a proclivity to avoid looking closely at the United States . . . is to risk being ahistorical, by assigning greater influence to some actors than they may in fact deserve. The United States is not merely one power among many and has not been for a very long time.” Logevall recommended “an America-centric international history” that paid more attention to the “intimate” relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.3

Logevall elaborated his critique of international history in 2009 in a forum on the state of the field of diplomatic history in the Journal of American History. “I am also troubled by the effort of some international historians in their scholarship . . . to ‘decenter’ the United States,” he declared. “To privilege the foreign as much as the United States’ . . . is to risk being ahistorical, by assigning greater influence to some actors than they may in fact deserve. The United States is not merely one power among many and has not been for a very long time.” Logevall recommended “an America-centric international history” that paid more attention to the “intimate” relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.4

Logevall made similar criticisms of international history, even while praising the explanatory power of that approach, in his coauthored study with Campbell Craig, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (2009). Once again he decried “the stated desire among many practitioners of international history to ‘de-center’ the United States in their studies and to ‘privilege’ the foreign . . . For the fact is that the United States was never, after 1945, merely one power among many. It was always supreme; as such, it had primary responsibility for much that happened during the epoch, both for good and for bad.” Logevall advocated a large infusion of “the ‘intermestic’ (international-domestic, whereby the two are dynamically intertwined) dimension of policy, which . . . is too often nowhere to be found” in

projection of power.” Second, they believe “an important task for historians of U.S. foreign relations in the coming years will be to recenter the United States and concentrate their analytical lenses more squarely” on domestic politics and processes.

Logevall began to sketch these arguments in his Bernath Lecture in 2004 on “A Critique of Containment.” He concentrated on why U.S. policymakers were reluctant to engage in negotiations with Communist adversaries during the early years of the Cold War. At the end of his analysis, however, Logevall wondered why there was so little attention in the scholarly literature to the role of domestic politics in the Cold War policies of President Harry S. Truman. Among the reasons were “numerous exhortations in recent years for historians of U.S. foreign relations to be less America-centric in their work, to be first and foremost ‘international historians.’” The result, according to Logevall, was “a proclivity to avoid looking closely at the internal sources of a state’s external behavior,” including domestic politics.5

Logevall elaborated his critique of international history in 2009 in a forum on the state of the field of diplomatic history in the Journal of American History. “I am also troubled by the effort of some international historians in their scholarship . . . to ‘decenter’ the United States,” he declared. “To privilege the foreign as much as the United States’ . . . is to risk being ahistorical, by assigning greater influence to some actors than they may in fact deserve. The United States is not merely one power among many and has not been for a very long time.” Logevall recommended “an America-centric international history” that paid more attention to the “intimate” relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.4

Logevall made similar criticisms of international history, even while praising the explanatory power of that approach, in his coauthored study with Campbell Craig, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (2009). Once again he decried “the stated desire among many practitioners of international history to ‘de-center’ the United States in their studies and to ‘privilege’ the foreign . . . For the fact is that the United States was never, after 1945, merely one power among many. It was always supreme; as such, it had primary responsibility for much that happened during the epoch, both for good and for bad.” Logevall advocated a large infusion of “the ‘intermestic’ (international-domestic, whereby the two are dynamically intertwined) dimension of policy, which . . . is too often nowhere to be found” in

Much Ado About Nothing New
Chester Pach

Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall have set SHAFR astir with their article on “Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations.” Even before its publication, their piece was the subject of hallway conversations at academic conferences, presumably those that occurred just before the COVID-19 pandemic closed down all such gatherings.1 SHAFR had scheduled a debate between Logevall and his critics at its annual meeting in New Orleans. Had the New Orleans conference not been cancelled, that session might have produced the same anticipation as the diplomatic history heavyweight match over post-revisionism a generation earlier between John Lewis Gaddis and Bruce Cumings. I attended that epic battle when SHAFR met at Bentley College in 1994, and I left the auditorium convinced (perhaps) that Gaddis had won on points but disappointed that the intellectual fisticuffs had been far less exciting than Muhammad Ali’s Rumble in the Jungle with George Foreman. H-Diplo has provided a substitute for the cancelled New Orleans session by publishing commentaries from several critics, including those who were slated to participate in the SHAFR session, along with a reply from Logevall and Bessner. While the H-Diplo forum has been valuable, it can’t produce the same drama as face-to-face debate. We’ll never know who would have left that Brawl on the Bayou more decentered.

As Daniel Immerwahr has asserted in his introduction to the roundtable, H-Diplo rarely publishes forums on articles—the same is true of Passport—but Logevall and Bessner haven’t written a typical article.2 Perhaps Immerwahr is right. One still wonders, though, why there’s so much fuss over this article. That question arises not because the article lacks significance—it is important—but because Logevall has been saying the same thing for more than fifteen years. Hasn’t anybody been paying attention? In the current article, Bessner and Logevall make two main arguments. First, they maintain that international politics and foreign policy was “a proclivity to avoid looking closely at the United States . . . is to risk being ahistorical, by assigning greater influence to some actors than they may in fact deserve. The United States is not merely one power among many and has not been for a very long time.” Logevall recommended “an America-centric international history” that paid more attention to the “intimate” relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.3

Logevall elaborated his critique of international history in 2009 in a forum on the state of the field of diplomatic history in the Journal of American History. “I am also troubled by the effort of some international historians in their scholarship . . . to ‘decenter’ the United States,” he declared. “To privilege the foreign as much as the United States’ . . . is to risk being ahistorical, by assigning greater influence to some actors than they may in fact deserve. The United States is not merely one power among many and has not been for a very long time.” Logevall recommended “an America-centric international history” that paid more attention to the “intimate” relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.4

Logevall made similar criticisms of international history, even while praising the explanatory power of that approach, in his coauthored study with Campbell Craig, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (2009). Once again he decried “the stated desire among many practitioners of international history to ‘de-center’ the United States in their studies and to ‘privilege’ the foreign . . . For the fact is that the United States was never, after 1945, merely one power among many. It was always supreme; as such, it had primary responsibility for much that happened during the epoch, both for good and for bad.” Logevall advocated a large infusion of “the ‘intermestic’ (international-domestic, whereby the two are dynamically intertwined) dimension of policy, which . . . is too often nowhere to be found” in
The current Bessner/Logevall article expands the arguments of these earlier publications and provides more detail. But the criticisms of the international and transnational turns are essentially the same. Maybe the current article is attracting so much attention because the authors’ appeal for striking a new balance in U.S. foreign relations historiography isn’t a subordinate theme in a work with broader scope. Still, Bessner’s and Logevall’s take on the strengths and limitations of U.S. international history should be no more of a surprise than was Ronald Reagan’s famous declaration in his first inaugural address in 1981, after years of inveighing against the excesses, inefficiencies, and foolishness of the federal government, that “in this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.”

What Bessner and Logevall propose is modest and measured. They believe there should be more U.S.-centered studies of such topics as the national security state, the role of domestic politics in Cold War foreign policy, and the waging of “endless” war in recent decades. They call for more analysis of state processes and the role of organizations and individuals in shaping U.S. international engagement. What they advocate is similar to what they have done in their own scholarship. Their publications include sophisticated studies of the role of structure—domestic and international—and contingency in the decisions of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson to escalate the war in Vietnam and the ways that defense intellectual Hans Speier helped build formal and informal networks of expertise and influence in U.S. national security policy. In bestowing book prizes or awarding research grants, the authors believe that scholarly committees should judge those who write about U.S. foreign relations not by the number of international archives they visit but the significance of the questions they ask and the sophistication of their analyses. It’s hard to see how anybody could reasonably object.

The Bessner/Logevall article resonates with me because it describes my own scholarly work. My first major project concluded that the main reason for the startling growth of U.S. military aid programs in the late 1940s was to provide critical reassurance to friendly nations and only secondarily to raise their military capabilities. I could have explored the effects of those assistance programs on recipient nations through a range of international sources, but the question I asked about the motivation of the Truman administration could be answered only with U.S. sources. My current research on U.S. television news concentrates on how the major networks covered the war and the effects of war reporting on White House policymaking. I’ve found that Lyndon Johnson believed that winning the war in American living rooms was critical to U.S. success in Vietnam. It’s possible to write a global history of news coverage of the Vietnam War. That’s a different project. Mine isn’t incomplete, limited, or flawed because it focuses on U.S. television networks.

Assessments of our field can be valuable. A good example is Charles S. Maier’s caustic analysis of diplomatic history forty years ago as “marking time” while other fields were vibrant and innovative. Maier’s article produced hand-wringing and recriminations, but it also contributed to a reinvigoration of international relations history in the ensuing decade. Maybe Bessner’s and Logevall’s critique will also have salutary effects, although U.S. foreign relations history is in far better shape than when Maier wrote. Their recommendations are as sensible and timely today as when Logevall began making them more than fifteen years ago.

Still, there are bigger issues to confront. As a pandemic ravages the globe, as systemic racism and economic inequality provoke outrage and protest, businesses collapse, jobs vanish, and universities face unprecedented financial challenges, there are many things—lives, communities, alliances, democracy—that more urgently need recentering.

Notes:
2. Ibid.

Review of Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall, “Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations”

Cindy Ewing

D aniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall offer a welcome reminder of the importance of domestic politics in U.S. foreign relations history. They assert that “domestic processes and phenomena . . . often have had more of an effect on the course of U.S. foreign relations than international processes.” Out of this provocative claim comes a set of recommendations that they say scholars should incorporate into their research, writing, and field service.

At first glance, it is difficult to see any problem with a general call for historians to deepen their engagement with the domestic dimensions of U.S. policymaking. But Bessner and Logevall’s altogether reasonable prompt sits on top of a specific vision of the U.S. in the world, which begs a few questions about the assumptions underlying their diagnosis, the claims that emerge out of that assessment, and the subsequent changes they hope to see in the field.

The framing of the United States as the dominant power of the post-1945 global order bolsters a familiar story about the “American century.” Woven into the empirical assertion quoted above is a supposition of monocausal agency: that the authors of America’s history and its foreign relations are Americans. Surely that is part of the story, and Americans have often taken center stage in the design and execution of U.S. foreign policy. But as a starting point, this focus on Americans in their domestic setting would be unnecessarily limiting for, and perhaps even counterproductive to, understanding the complex ways that different kinds of actors, interests, and institutions have shaped international relations as a whole.

Historians have shown the roles played by a wide range
of other actors outside of U.S. policymaking circles who shape how U.S. foreign policy is transmitted, extended, and circulated beyond the United States, sometimes in support of U.S. objectives and at other times, in direct opposition to them. The scope of interactions and activities that comprise foreign relations, including formal policy, are not developed in a vacuum but involve the interplay of actors and institutions within and beyond U.S. borders, including its large diplomatic apparatus and overseas basing as well as informal networks, civil society, and interest groups that in turn shape political and policy debates in Washington. How the United States has projected its power and maintained that power through a wide range of relationships, including alliances and client states, suggests that its foreign relations cannot be understood from within the United States alone.

To declare that domestic politics “had more of an effect” than the sum of all aspects of the global context in which the United States operates is to situate this history in a narrow causal hierarchy, one that is antithetical to the thick description and contextualization that historians prize. The key conceptualization of the United States that Bessner and Logevall put forth is one of its “overweening power.” But is power the most important dimension of which one should frame U.S. foreign relations history? The call to “recenter” the United States is not only a question of deepening the level on which historians are willing to engage American sources or the policymaking process within the United States; it also entails a more significant “rebalancing” of the field around one specific dimension of American primacy that folds into international history an underlying assumption about the U.S.’s unremitting influence in the world when that power was not always deterministic.

To situate the United States in international history as the “sun” around which the world rotates is both a methodological and historical proposition. Methodologically, even historians of other regions of the world utilize U.S. sources and probe deeply into the nature of U.S. involvement and into the intricacies of U.S. policy and American political discourse. Historically, the United States was not always or in all places the primary driver of change. For example, the anticolonial movements that surged after 1945 in South and Southeast Asia were not in the throes of another Wilsonian moment—simply deciding between alignments and foreign aid—they were responding directly to the collective trauma of Japanese occupation and the colonial systems of rule that were re-imposed in the vacuum created by Japan’s withdrawal. In Vietnam, it is commonplace to tell the stories of the First and Second Indochina Wars (to the extent those wars are discussed at all) as wars against imperialism without beginning with the United States. Historians still debate the extent to which U.S. decisions and actions were more decisive to the Vietnam War’s ultimate outcome on a grand scale or at specific turning points than the agency of local actors in Vietnam at a more granular level.

What kind of histories would we tell if we started with U.S. hegemony as our working premise and examined American dominance from primarily an American point of view? Even American exceptionalism was first formulated outside of the United States, whether one attributes its coinage to Tocqueville or Stalin. If the United States is international history’s sun, then Bessner and Logevall’s call for rebalancing is not simply to see domestic and international approaches as complementary, but to position the United States squarely in the center, as both object and site of inquiry, thereby undermining an international history approach that not only contextualizes U.S. history but also reveals the limits of that dominance through the excavation of other histories.

As historians continue to problematize the place of the United States in international history, returning to a U.S.- and Western-centric perspective risks undoing the significant decolonial work of which the international and transnational turns were just a part. That work also enabled us not only to tell the histories of peoples onto whom U.S. power was projected, but also to look more closely at how the construction of the United States itself involved sustained interactions and collisions with the world. Moreover, postcolonial approaches, still uneasily situated in foreign relations history, integrate other modes of critique that help reframe policymaking and other forms of political expertise as a kind of knowledge-making bound by culture and other social forces.

This rich story of projection, construction, and constraint has opened many new areas of research and suggests that U.S. power was not only of American making but constitutive of a larger story about a global order that was constantly contested and remade across the latter twentieth century.

Perhaps Bessner and Logevall state their case too strongly, given the ways that the United States and its position in the world are constructed both in and beyond its borders. While Bessner and Logevall are careful to note that a domestic approach would not displace attention to international factors, to separate the domestic from the foreign may be to risk drawing a distinction without a difference. One need only look outside at recent militarized police action to see how swapping out the operational use of munitions can blur such lines.

Finally, the approach that Bessner and Logevall call for, which is grounded in interpretations that they worry have already become “deemphasized,” need not compete or exclude a plurality of narratives, perspectives, and critiques. Rather than delineate fixed causal hierarchies, embracing complexity has served SHAFR well and fruitfully brought historians of U.S. foreign relations and international history into closer contact with other scholars of area studies and different thematic lenses. This approach did not come at the expense of studying policy and politics but rather, helped us move towards a deeper understanding of them while attending to the problematic construction of U.S. power as a source of global change. As a gesture of invitation, Bessner and Logevall’s article raises worthwhile questions for SHAFR members as a community to contemplate. What vision of U.S. and international history should we work to realize? How should we engage the many approaches that have emerged and since expanded the horizon of inquiry, not only in method but in our very definition of what the United States was and is?

Recentering the United States in the World—Without Exceptionalism’

Kevin Y. Kim

In August 1946, at the dawn of a global era after World War II, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong sat with American journalist Anna Louise Strong at a table outside his Yan’an hideout in north China. Before Strong, Mao laid out a four-zone theory of world politics. On one side of the table he put a big teacup, which represented the United States’ “reactionary” imperialists. On the other side stood a full set of teacups: the Soviet Union. Between these two zones, Mao chuckled, was a chaotic assemblage of capitalist nations, a third, intermediary zone, which he drew with loosely strewn cups, matches, and cigarette boxes. More important, he argued, was a fourth zone—a
ring of small wine cups—which he placed around the first zone of U.S. reactionary elites.\(^2\)

Hemming in their imperialist leaders, this ring of cups stood for “the American people,” who did “not want war.” Mao inferred this from recent congressional debates over price controls and trade policies, which CCP leaders followed intently as part of the United States’ shifting domestic scene. (Why dump U.S. goods abroad, Mao asked Strong, “when the American people could use those goods themselves”?) To launch a “Third World War” across the table, U.S. reactionaries would have to conquer this fourth zone by imposing a neo-“fascist” system to hold down U.S. society. “I think the American people might resist this,” Mao predicted. “I do not think they would accept fascism easily.”\(^3\)

Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall have stirred considerable controversy for making several points that Mao and many global actors instinctively grasped after the Second World War. First, in a post-1945 world, U.S. power mattered enormously. Second, U.S. power was not fixed or monolithic, but dynamic and complex. The United States was a major power, in a constellation of competing powers, whose movements bore close watching. Finally, those movements might have nothing to do with the international system, but much to do with the internal system of the United States. “[D]omestic processes,” Bessner and Logevall write, “often have had more of an effect on . . . U.S. foreign relations than international processes.”\(^4\) Or, as Mao put it, the big cup only moves with the little cups, if at all.\(^5\)

So why such controversy? Judging from the wide-ranging reactions to Bessner and Logevall, it is not because many historians deny these points. Rather, many critics seem to perceive the authors’ call for reviving a U.S.-centered historiography as a call for dominating, distorting, or even reversing the entire field. They do so even as Bessner and Logevall stress that U.S. foreign policy (a potent force with significant “limits”) must reclaim “a—not the—central place” in a field of diverse approaches and “spatial geographies.” Restoring balance, not hegemony, is what these authors are after.

Yet, the image many of Bessner and Logevall’s critics probably imagine, upon reading their article, isn’t Mao projecting a restrained United States in a polycentric world, but rather President Lyndon B. Johnson, at the height of the Vietnam War, trying to manage, at once, the Green Revolution in India, U.S. global leadership, and his domestic Great Society agenda—all of which comprised, historian Nick Cullather has aptly argued, an arrogant “package” of U.S. power that U.S. presidents often misuse. \(^6\) A turn toward U.S.-centered historiography, in other words, carries the great traumas of U.S.-centered history as it actually unfolded, committed by a polity imbued with exceptionalist views of its global destiny.\(^7\)

Such concerns are understandable. As a supporter of Bessner and Logevall’s viewpoint, I also share them. There is a perilous line between studying preponderant U.S. power and normalizing it. As both authors insist, the United States was a “global hegemony”; as “the sun” around which the world orbited, it “could afford to remain parochial.” This begs the question: can our field host a resurgence of U.S.-centric approaches, particularly domestic-focused ones, without reinscribing the U.S. state and society’s worst tendencies?\(^8\)

I believe we can, but only if we exercise a methodological self-consciousness that recenters the United States without exceptionalism. For decades, “U.S. in the World” historians (diplomatic historians, we once called ourselves) produced a vibrant literature addressing Bessner and Logevall’s concerns. Through the work of scholars like Robert Divine, John Lewis Gaddis, Lloyd Gardner, Michael Hogan, Melvyn Leffler, Marilyn Young, and many others, we know a great deal about the U.S. state and its domestic and global dimensions. However, Bessner and Logevall’s proposed new wave of U.S.-centered scholarship is needed precisely because much prior work too comfortably assumed—or, at the other extreme, polemically dismissed—the views and interests of the U.S. state. Focused on leading policy elites (those same dozen or so presidents, secretaries of state, and bipartisan “wise men”), reliant on actors’ categories (“containment,” “internationalism,” “anti-Communism”), confined by Washington-defined frameworks (“nuclear deterrence,” “U.S. credibility,” “the Marshall Plan”), our predecessors left us with many questions concerning the national security state, private interest groups, Cold War “consensus,” the economic aspects of U.S. diplomacy, and other issues identified by Bessner and Logevall.

As we search for answers, reasons for optimism abound. Ideologically, “U.S. in the World” historians routinely challenge the analytical confines of “American Century” exceptionalism. Practically, we possess an array of technological and linguistic skills as well as social backgrounds, making our field more productive and diverse than it has ever been. But these positive factors will not help us if we recenter the United States merely to reinstate its imperial center. We will fail if we do not enrich traditional conceptions of U.S. political power—presidential elections, White House decision-making, military and intelligence agencies—with new actors and themes infused not only with international and transnational approaches, but social, cultural, economic, and domestic political ones.

In my own work on Cold War America and postcolonial Korea, I try to avoid exceptionalism by approaching U.S. power as an unstable, pluralistic phenomenon whose meaning and scope are contested by U.S. and non-U.S. officials, businessmen, soldiers, activists, and citizens. Inspired by Emily Rosenberg’s call, some thirty years ago, for SHAFR historians to boldly “walk the borders” of the U.S. state to illuminate its central halls of power, I am struck by how dialectically linked the acts of decentering and recentering U.S. power were in the lives of historical actors we study. Following their lead, we must widen our definitions of U.S. state-making, expose the state’s complex interconnections with civil society, and diversify our archives and geographies domestically as well as globally. Only then can we fully grasp, as Bessner and Logevall are urging, how U.S. power shaped and was shaped by the domestic and global arenas.\(^9\)

To international and transnational historians still skeptical of a de-exceptionalized U.S.-centered turn, I ask why, then, do so many of you write about the United States? Many of you do so tangentially or equally alongside other global actors; some of you, admittedly, don’t write about the United States at all. But as there is a place for pure international history, so is there a place for domestic history. Furthermore, the specific chronology here is crucial. We are concerned here with the post-1945 Pax Americana: an immensely consequential but comparatively brief period. Today, as we live in its shadow, a reinvigorated debate about its inner-driven dynamics seems as crucial as international history’s different, equally pioneering work on its external ones. Both approaches are vital if we are to comprehend a global age of total war, unleashed by the First and Second World Wars, where the line between “domestic” and “foreign”—indeed between “war” and “peace,” as Mao’s and LBJ’s radically different dilemmas suggest—was tragically blurred.\(^10\)

Historians are creatures of their own history. It is no surprise that, during the United States’ global ascendency,
historians pressed, sometimes too eagerly, the research agenda Bessner and Logevall now invoke at a very different historical moment. Nor is it surprising that international history rose to prominence as post-Cold War globalization connected our world as never before. Today, when familiar, menacing winds of nationalism blow across the globe and divisions—of all kinds—have become the malign symptom of our age, it is high time that “U.S. in the World” historians consider “rebalancing,” in the broadest sense, the domestic and global aspects of our field. To do otherwise is to risk neglecting the shared historiographical rewards of smashing many global shibboleths—not just U.S. exceptionalism. Moreover, we would be neglecting our field’s civic responsibility to help define the vexing relationship between our nation, the world, and other seemingly irreconcilable entities, especially in an era which greatly needs public voices reminding us just how contingent, complex, and slippery our simplest historical categories can be.

Notes:
1. The author would like to thank Rebecca Herman, Katherine Marino, Michaela Hoenicke Moore, Kenneth Osgood, Jason C. Parker, Thomas Alan Schwartz, Philip Thai, and Jessica Wang for their valuable feedback on this essay; any errors or foibles remain mine.

Authors’ Response
Daniel Bessner & Fredrik Logevall

We’d like to thank Cindy Ewing, Kevin Kim, and Chester Pach for their thoughtful responses to our article. We very much appreciate their engagement and are happy that our essay seems to have sparked widespread discussions about the future of the historiography of the U.S. in the World.

Though we hoped to stir the pot with the piece, we’re pleased that Pach refers to our claims as “modest and measured.” To reiterate, we don’t argue—and don’t want to be seen as arguing—that the international and transnational turns should be relegated to the sidelines of scholarly inquiry. Quite the contrary. We consider these approaches crucial (and we adopt them in our own scholarship) and believe they should continue to be embraced and explored.

Our primary point is that these methodologies should be bolstered with a renewed and reinvigorated domestic approach that takes national politics and processes seriously. In so doing, we hope, as our original article insisted, that this “will enable the writing of scholarly works that encompass a diversity of spatial geographies and provide a fuller account of the making, implementation, effects, and limits of U.S. foreign policy.” The domestic, international, and transnational approaches are each needed, and each complements the others in diverse and illuminating ways.

We are thus glad that Kim noted that our “call for reviving a U.S.-centered historiography” was very much not “a call for dominating and distorting the entire field” of U.S. foreign relations history. Indeed, we agree with him that any attempt to recenter the United States in diplomatic historiography must be careful not to “normalize[] U.S. power, and we believe his suggestion to embrace a “methodological self-consciousness” that rejects American exceptionalism offers an important way for the field to “host a resurgence of U.S.-centric approaches, particularly domestic-focused ones, without reinscribing the U.S. state and society’s worst excesses.” Furthermore, as our original essay suggested, we are in firm agreement with Kim that future historians must focus on both “traditional conceptions of U.S. political power—presidential elections, White House decision-making, military and intelligence agencies”—and new actors and themes infused not only by international and transnational approaches, but social, cultural, economic, and domestic political ones. Finally, we concur with Kim that recentering the United States might help historians of and in this country “help define the vexing relationship between the nation and the world,” an especially crucial task in our current troubled age.

We are puzzled by Ewing’s claim that our argument contains “a supposition of monocular agency, that the author of America’s history and its foreign relations are Americans.” We reject this position, a fact demonstrated by our own scholarship (Bessner’s first book was about a German exile from National Socialism, while Logevall has long incorporated international actors into his work) and by our original essay! In fact, we agree with Ewing that adopting a viewpoint in which only Americans mattered “would be unnecessarily limiting and perhaps even counterproductive to understanding the complex ways that different interests, institutions, and actors have shaped U.S. foreign relations in its many manifestations.” Our point was that in the history of U.S. foreign relations domestic politics and processes often mattered more than international ones in determining what actions Americans took, not that they always did.

The same may be said about our claim regarding the centrality of the U.S. state to diplomatic history. Although we agree with Ewing that “historians have shown the important role played by non-state actors and civil society traveling, networking, and reaching beyond the U.S. to effect change at a large scale,” we nonetheless insist that these actors were generally of less causal consequence to U.S. foreign relations and world history than U.S. state actors themselves. Moreover, we don’t quite understand why our argument about causal importance “is antithetical to the thick description and contextualization that historians practice.” Our assertion might be incorrect—the historiography will either bear out our claims or not—but it is not opposed to either thick description or contextualization.

Ewing further argues that “in a globalized world, to separate the domestic from the foreign may be to draw a distinction without a difference. One need only to look outside at recent militarized police action to see how munitions blur such lines.” Here, Ewing is highlighting that, as numerous scholars have shown, U.S. domestic policing was shaped by experiences abroad. Quite right: one cannot understand the history of U.S. policing without incorporating the history of the U.S. empire. This, in fact, is why international and transnational approaches, as we have always claimed, remain crucial. Our point is simply
that the importance of these approaches should not be assumed, but proven—as scholars of policing who have adopted international and transnational lenses have done.

That said, we disagree strongly with the assertion that there is no distinction between the domestic and the foreign. As we stated in our H-Diplo roundtable response:

Several of the respondents [to our original piece] criticize our supposed reification of the foreign/domestic dichotomy, asserting that recent scholarship demonstrates that this dualistic framing is a construction that doesn’t reflect the complexities of historical “reality.” Well, yes, but the same can be said for all categories of analysis—not only foreign and domestic, but international and transnational as well—each of which necessarily introduces its own conceptual and interpretive narrowness. No historical phenomenon is ever solely “foreign,” “domestic,” “international,” or “transnational.” As scholars, we decide which of these constructed categories we privilege and why we are doing the privileging.

We hold firmly to this claim.

We concur with Ewing that after 1945 “the U.S. was not always and in all places the primary driver of change.” Would any responsible historian suggest otherwise? Rather, we maintain that, regardless of whether or not the United States was the main impetus of change, most world powers and movements at most times needed to consider potential U.S. behavior (as Kim’s anecdote about Mao in this forum confirms). Moreover, we disagree with Ewing’s claim that “American exceptionalism was first formulated outside of the U.S.”—as early as John Winthrop’s 1630 sermon “A Model of Christian Charity” (delivered on the ship The Arbella as it crossed the Atlantic Ocean), proto-Americans were expounding exceptionalist themes.

Ewing is surely correct to say that “the construction of the U.S. itself involved sustained interactions and relations with the world”; “that U.S. power was not only of an American making but part of a larger story about global order that was constantly contested and remade”; and that “other modes of critique from literary studies and political theory … can be applied to policymaking as a kind of knowledge-making bound by culture and other social and political forces.” (The latter was indeed the method adopted in Bessner’s first book.) The United States has always operated on a crowded international stage. After 1945, however, it was the world’s most powerful country, and this power enabled it to have preponderant impact on international history.

Finally, a word about causality. Ewing writes that “the approach that Bessner and Logevall call for … need not compete or exclude a plurality of narratives, perspectives, and critiques” and that “embracing complexity [as opposed to constructing causal hierarchies] has served SHAFR well” in various ways. We agree; not every historian must focus her or his attentions on developing a causal narrative that explicates why a particular event or phenomenon proceeded as it did. Yet to abandon, or even downplay, the search for causality seems to us to abandon one of the most important goals of historiography—and one of the most powerful justifications for the historical profession itself. If we don’t construct causal narratives, we present history as being just “one damn thing after another,” which is hardly a compelling or interesting way to understand the past.

The search for causality seems likely to be a central component of Pach’s much-anticipated study on U.S. television news and the Vietnam War. As Pach notes, his study could have adopted an international approach that surveyed how foreign TV reporters and networks interpreted developments on the ground and articulated those findings to their viewers. But that book would not have done much to explain the effect U.S. television news had on the war’s course. Put another way, expanding his purview to include foreign coverage would have made Pach’s story more complex, but not necessarily superior, richer, or more compelling; as we note above, expanding the field of vision in one area often means narrowing it in another. What mattered to most Americans in the late 1960s, including the occupant in the White House and his advisers—and, therefore, what mattered to U.S. policymaking—was the war’s portrayal on U.S. nightly news, not what was being beamed into living rooms in Japan or Australia or France.

Our thanks once again to Ewing, Kim, and Pach for their thoughtful responses and critiques. We’re glad that our article has inspired a field-wide discussion that, we hope, will make all of our work stronger.

Notes:
2. See, for example, Stuart Schrader, Badges Without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019).
Historians tend to ignore the role of intelligence in foreign policy decision-making. The reason for this is obvious. As intelligence historians themselves have noted, presidents have tended to neglect findings based on secretly obtained information. Why, then, should the foreign policy historian give intelligence more than its due?2

There is one facet of intelligence history to which scholars normally do pay attention—spy scandals. The corrupt intent of French agents in the XYZ Affair occasioned, when exposed, a scandal and a diplomatic crisis that historians have by no means ignored. The scandal of the Zimmermann telegram helped draw the United States into World War I, and it has inspired a proper measure of attention. In later years, historians linked the Alger Hiss spy scandal with increasing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such events appear not just in foreign policy tomes, but also in the narratives of general textbooks.3

The Nazi spy case of 1938 was also a major scandal in its day, yet it received only scattered references in the literature.4 As we shall see below, this was in large measure because FBI director J. Edgar Hoover suppressed a key dimension of the story. The story needs to be revived because, as we shall also see, the scandal helped to erode American neutrality, and German diplomats thought it ruined the chances of Washington-Berlin harmony.

On the FBI's official website there is a reference to one of America's greatest detectives, Leon Turrou. The website explains that in 1938, Turrou was the bureau's lead investigator into a German spy ring. However, this official FBI narrative observes that his “background simply did not prepare him for the nuances of an espionage case” and notes that he stood “accused of being an overzealous government agent motivated by profit and fame.”5

FBI records from the 1930s, accessed through the Freedom of Information Act, tell a more rounded story. Initially, Turrou was the apple of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover’s eye. According to Hoover’s trusted confidant Clyde Tolson, the detective had “an uncanny knack of securing information.” Chicago special agent in charge Earl Connelley said he was the “best investigator of criminal violations in the bureau.”6 Yet by the end of the decade he had been fired.

How did he fall so precipitously from grace? In the 1930s the FBI was, as it is today, the nation’s premier detective agency. To have been the best detective in the best detective agency is quite an achievement. A most singular series of events must have occurred to cause Turrou to fall out of favor and into historical obscurity.

Turrou’s personal history was a tangle of half-truths and lies. He was born Leon Turovsky, in the Russian-controlled town of Kobryn, Poland, on September 14, 1895. He gave widely divergent accounts of his early years. He said he was not Jewish, but he was. He said he was an orphan, but he was not. He said he fought with the French Foreign Legion on World War I’s Western Front and had a shrapnel wound to show for it. An FBI medical examination confirmed the wound, but on another occasion Turrou claimed to have fought on the Eastern Front. So cavalier was his approach to the truth that it gave ammunition to his future detractors. But it may also have been a trait that contributed to his ability to detect mendacity in criminal suspects.

This much we know for sure. He arrived at New York’s Ellis Island immigration processing depot on March 12, 1913. After casual employment and an unhappy love affair with a girl called Olga, he does appear to have returned to Europe to fight against Germany. Recovering from his war wound in a Paris hospital, he met his future wife, Teresa Zakrewski. Eventually they had two sons.

In 1921, Turrou was in Russia with the American Relief Mission, led by Herbert Hoover. By then the master of seven languages, he was a translator with a mind of his own. When corrupt communist soldiers held up U.S. grain deliveries, he prodded his boss to confront the notorious Soviet secret service chief, Felix Dzerzhinsky. According to Turrou, it was a tense meeting, but he helped to persuade...
Dzerzhinsky to release the grain. Dzerzhinsky issued an order to his comrades “with not a trace of emotion on his deathmask face”, “The trains will move, and if you fail, the supreme punishment is waiting for you.”

By 1921, J. Edgar Hoover wanted Turrou for his agency (then called the Bureau of Investigation). Turrou could not join because he lacked the normative law degree and because of a postwar contraction in bureau hiring. However, in the presidential election of 1929, he used his linguistic skills to campaign on New York’s multi-ethnic East Side for the ultimate victor, Herbert Hoover. His reward was an appointment to the bureau as a special agent.

Though physically tough, Turrou was a cerebral person. By the time he was assigned to the spy case in February 1938, he had applied his forensic faculties to over 3,000 cases. He developed certain interrogative techniques, such as offering a cigarette at the right moment, or springing a witness on an off-guard suspect just when the suspect was telling critical untruths. Building on an uncanny ability to understand and exploit people’s personalities and weaknesses, he had a mesmerizing effect on those he questioned.

Criminals who knew that to talk to him meant signing their own death warrants did so anyway. An example occurred in the course of the Lindbergh kidnapping investigation. In March 1932, Bruno Richard Hauptmann climbed into the second-floor bedroom of Charles Lindbergh’s twenty-month-old son at the Lindbergh home near Hopewell, New Jersey, abducted him, and sent a ransom note to Lindbergh. By the time the bureau caught up with Hauptmann, the little boy was dead.

Fearing the death penalty, the murderer proved a hard nut to crack. Turrou sat with Hauptmann for hours. The killer knew he should not supply an example of his handwriting that could be compared with the handwriting on the ransom note. Yet Turrou persuaded him, against his better judgment, to write out passages from the Wall Street Journal. Hauptmann went to the electric chair in April 1936.

The German intelligence operation exposed in 1938 was often called the “Rumrich spy ring” after Guenther Gustave Maria Rumrich, a minor cog in the greater machine who just happened to be the first spy arrested. Turrou insisted in calling it instead the “Nazi spy ring,” and showed it to be a much more serious affair. A section of American opinion disagreed with him—the New York Times declared that in an age of transparency espionage was redundant, and warned that the outbreak of spy hysteria might lead to the formation of an American “super-espionage” agency that was not “wanted or needed here.”

Turrou was certainly correct in emphasizing the menace posed to American values and national security by the Abwehr, the German spying organization. The Abwehr had come into being in 1918, in breach of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Abwehr agents sought and obtained information about new military technology. Hitler, aware of the emergence of U.S. technological superiority, wanted America’s secrets so that Germany could duplicate them and so that his armed forces would know what they faced if and when they fought against the United States. Hitler’s spies sent home a lot of trivia, but also some vital secrets: for example, details of the Norden gyroscopic bombsight; the hull design of the new generation of top-speed destroyers; information on the computerization of code setting and breaking; the design of aircraft retraction devices on the latest class of aircraft carriers; and blueprints of the new generation of American fighter planes.

In the wider, wicked world that lay beyond the United States, such peacetime espionage was standard practice. But it shocked Americans, who were not as accustomed to having their country spied upon. There were, moreover, some nastier than usual aspects to spying by the Abwehr, which was increasingly penetrated and influenced by Nazi political officers and the fascist secret police, the Gestapo. There was an element of ruthlessness that one would not have expected anywhere in peacetime: a plan to kidnap and possibly murder a U.S. Army officer who knew about America’s East Coast defenses; the infiltration of Gestapo agents into New York; the probable murder of two innocent Californian women in an effort to pressure a San Francisco industrialist into cooperating with the Abwehr; and a plan, discussed with Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Abwehr, to set up a high-class brothel in Washington, DC, to honeytrap military officers and government officials.

Finally, although the German word abwehr means “defense,” the agency had an aggressive program that went far beyond the mere theft of technology. The Abwehr chased after data on American defense installations, not just along the East Coast, but also in other strategic areas such as the Panama Canal. It was interested in potential bombing targets. It planned to use a member of its charm squad, Kate Moog, to open an avenue to strategic thinking in the White House. Once Hitler had taken care of Europe, his next target for aggression was the United States.

With his customary shrewdness and intuition, Turrou exposed most of the personnel of the Nazi spy ring in America and revealed their aims and methodology. He made mistakes. Notably, he allowed one of his prize informants to leave the United States. Ignatz Griebel was a New York gynecologist and prominent anti-Semite who doubled as a local coordinator of Abwehr espionage. Moog was his mistress, and he promoted the Washington brothel idea. Griebel told Turrou he was afraid to return to Germany, since it was known he had talked to the FBI. But before he could appear in the courtroom, he suddenly left for his homeland, where the Berlin regime rewarded him handsomely, expropriating a Jewish vacation property in Bavaria and a Jewish medical practice in Vienna and gifting both to its valued spy.

Nevertheless, armed with information he had extracted from Griebel, Rumrich, Moog, and many other interviewees, Turrou pieced together the evidence that led to the conviction of four spies in a widely publicized trial in the fall of 1938. But before the trial began, the ace detective resigned from the FBI to start a financially rewarding but honorable career in Europe, his next target for organizing American capitalists to help arm Europe. Once Hitler had taken care of Europe, his next target for aggression was the United States.
Turrou’s enthusiastic embrace of publicity was the reason he fell from grace. Hoover wanted to keep control of his agency’s image. As on other occasions, he aimed to deter the desertion, for more lucrative pastures, of the special agents the FBI had so painstakingly selected and trained. He dismissed Turrou retrospectively, “with prejudice,” from a date prior to the special agent’s resignation, thereby depriving him of pension rights. He then tried to blacklist him from further federal employment. In spite of this treatment, the gifted detective helped the United States fight down genocidal criminals in World War II. However, he then emigrated to France to take charge of security for the petro-industrialist J. Paul Getty. By the time he died in Paris in 1986, he had joined the list of America’s forgotten heroes.

The 1938 spy scandal had a number of consequences. It spurred President Roosevelt to expand America’s capability in counterespionage. It enabled J. Edgar Hoover to take action that would directly affect the neutrality debate and thus make it clear that he knew the Nazis had penetrated the Abwehr. In another potential embarrassment—the Abwehr’s plan to sabotage ships on the Baltimore waterfront—Thomsen warned his foreign office that such deeds were “the surest way of bringing America into action on the side of our enemies and of destroying the last vestiges of sympathy for Germany.”

That message went right to the top: Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop forwarded Thomsen’s warning directly to the Fuehrer. And when news of the Duquesne spy ring arrests reached Ribbentrop in 1941, he complained to Admiral Canaris, warning the Abwehr chief that he would be held personally accountable should the United States declare war on Germany.

Dieckhoff, Thomsen, and Ribbentrop believed that the 1938 spy case and its aftermath had changed American opinion, and that public opinion steered U.S. foreign policy. In one way it was a simplistic assumption, perhaps springing from an awe-struck faith in American democratic process, a faith fostered by the lack of democracy and press freedom in Germany, where, in contrast to the rest of the world, there was scarcely any reporting on the U.S. spy scandal. But logically, there was a tactical advantage in blaming Germany’s spies for the change in American opinion. It was an evasion of the less palatable truth that there was a growing disgust with fascism in the United States.

With dismay, leading German diplomats wrote off the chances of maintaining good relations with America. Hitler’s stance gave no grounds for reassurance. He had once been an admirer of the United States, and for strategic reasons Germany still hoped for American neutrality. But North America figured in his plans for world domination, and his views were plain. In 1938, he denounced America as a “Jewish rubbish heap” and in the spring of 1941, he assured Japan’s foreign minister Yosuke Matsuoka that Germany country would intervene “immediately in the event of conflict between Japan and America.”

That promise was made in the hope that Japan would attack the British Empire rather than the United States, but the anti-American sentiment was unmistakable. Hitler knew that Japan’s minister for war and soon to be prime minister, Hideki Tojo, held Germany in high esteem and the United States in contempt.

When Germany’s diplomats fatefully wrote off the United States as a friend, they did so knowing about Hitler’s attitude, and also believing, or pretending to believe, that their country’s spies had ended the possibility of continuing friendship between the two nations.

Notes:
1. This essay is drawn from my forthcoming book, The Nazi Spy Ring in America: Hitler’s Agents, the FBI, and the Case that Stirred the Nation (Washington, DC, September 2020).
remarks on Roosevelt’s reaction to the case and notes without comment the German diplomatic reaction to it; see Batvinis, *The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence* (Lawrence, KS, 2007), 24, 255.


10. Hoover, Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, June 30, 1938, FBIT 1/2/1.


17. Ribbentrop-Canaris meeting reported by the new head of the American desk at the Abwehr’s Berlin headquarters, Friedrich Busch, in “History of the Special Intelligence Service Division” (1947), II, 435, FBI Vault.

18. One exception was an oblique mention in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, 19 June 1938.


Introduction to Passport Roundtable: Timothy Lynch, In the Shadow of the Cold War

Jeffrey A. Engel

“American policymakers believed.” Most if not all Passport readers have written such words, or some useful variation thereof. Perhaps “the White House concluded,” or “her generation remembered Vietnam.” These are useful statements, even if we know they carry an ingrained untruth. Clearly, not every baby boomer carried histories equally, nor did every self-aggrandizing member of the “greatest generation.” Going to Yale upped one’s odds of joining the CIA in the early 1950s, as did being white and male. Yet a pattern of behavior and thought is no guarantee. Some white and male Yalies rallied public opinion against Washington’s foreign policy establishment, showing the same strain—albeit on a far broader canvas—as our own academic departments. We all know similarly-aged colleagues educated at the same institution who can barely agree upon its location, let alone its ideological imprint. They often cannot even agree upon lunch, let alone who should teach the survey.

Our ability as historians to both perceive and convey consistency nonetheless matters, especially when what matters are a nation’s strategic priorities. In the Shadow of the Cold War, a thoughtful and ambitious work by Timothy Lynch, seeks and presents consistencies within U.S. foreign policy since the Cold War’s surprisingly peaceful end. That end, by the way, occurred a quarter-century ago. Many a historian’s career was made during the early 1970s writing about Yalta, or the Berlin Airlift, or the origins of the Cold War, each equally distant at the time. Knowing full well his word “choice,” for example, to describe the geopolitical provocation. Stur in particular questions Lynch’s praise of the Cold War’s end—in his response.

Each reviewer similarly called Lynch’s tailoring to task in ways that demonstrate their engagement with the text and that should prompt Passport readers to join their insightful debate by reading both their analysis and Lynch’s provocation. Stur in particular questions Lynch’s praise of an American-centric world view derived by reviewing the perspective of U.S. policymakers, while Brady found fault in Lynch’s reading of the U.S. Constitution’s 25th Amendment among other vocabulary and factual choices that reveal more wisdom the more they are considered. What seems a quibble at first glance—questioning Lynch’s use of the word “choice,” for example, to describe the geopolitical options for small states during the Cold War—upon reflection leads to insight. Parrot, meanwhile, questioned the author’s fundamental understanding of the Cold War’s causes, continuities, and conclusion, noting the absence of a fundamental rationale for why the conflict occurred and thus no similar deep reading of American rationale following its demise.

All good points, which Lynch equals in thoughtfulness and civility—two increasingly rare qualities a quarter-century after the Cold War’s end—in his response. In the Shadow of the Cold War is therefore clearly a book designed to make readers think and, one suspects, designed to include seminars and lecture halls of our students in the discussion. This is a Passport roundtable discussion worth reading more than once, before and then after putting its subject on our syllabi as one of the best texts in print for their origins in policies conceived and deployed decades before. Yet this was Lynch’s ambitious charge, one pulled off with aplomb according to the reviewers selected for this Passport roundtable. Joe Parrot praised his “bold argument within a broad, cogent analysis of U.S. foreign policy since 1989,” noting as well the text’s “neat and readable package.” Heather Stur similarly found it a “compelling and highly readable book.”

Steven Brady, too, found Lynch “quite convincing in his repeated treatment of the shadow of the Vietnam War,” and I, for one, join Brady’s intention to steal Lynch’s succinct description of the war’s ongoing influence over American politics through the start of the 21st century. “Legitimacy in the current war was made to depend upon fidelity to the previous one” is succinct, accurate, and ironic given that the American war in Vietnam, the “previous one” of Lynch’s sentence, ended in defeat. Yet those who called out its flaws and failures at the time found evidence of their prior wisdom a burden a generation later. Those who noted the emperor’s nakedness, in other words, found subsequent emperors—and the American public—less impressed with their prescient insight than dismayed by their honesty.

Passport September 2020

Page 49
understanding a period in American diplomacy: post-Cold War, pre- and post-9/11, culminating in whatever Donald Trump’s presidency means, thus in sum a period as yet unnamed.

**Review of Timothy Lynch, *In the Shadow of the Cold War***

R. Joseph Farrott

It is an interesting time to be a scholar of international relations. Covid-19 has humbled the global economy and upended national politics (and closed libraries!). President Donald Trump spurns collaboration with even close European allies. It feels like the starkest illustration of something international observers have predicted for a decade or more: the decline of U.S. power and influence.

Still, much of the world continues to look to the United States for leadership, even as our politicians fail to respond. Timothy J. Lynch’s *In the Shadow of the Cold War* addresses this conundrum by providing a broad-ranging if relatively familiar account of U.S. foreign policy since 1989 that emphasizes “its durability, elasticity, and popularity—not its infallibility” (3). Though the narrative reveals repeated attempts to move beyond the Cold War, there in fact existed a great deal of continuity from this earlier period in terms of U.S. strategy and its reception abroad. Lynch makes the case that while presidents have waffled in their ambitions and approaches to international policy, the lessons and frameworks created by the Cold War persist and continue to serve the goals of U.S. power relatively well.

Lynch explores two main themes. First, given that Cold War legacies proved so durable, presidents have struggled to escape them and have fared better when simply adapting the conflict’s “strategic lessons” (4). Administrations from Bush 41 to Obama have sought to transcend the bipolar conflict, only for old issues to bubble back to the surface. Al Qaeda had its origins in the mujahideen of Afghanistan, while Russian insecurities and a nostalgia for a glorified Soviet past have led Vladimir Putin to become the bête noire of several hopeful occupants of the Oval Office.

It has been largely by adapting and revisiting Cold War solutions that U.S. presidents have most ably managed tensions new and old. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provides an obvious example; it facilitated a transition from containment to “enlargement” of market democracies. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush also came to rely on military interventions as a means to achieve elusive stability in strategic regions, first in the Balkans and then in the Global War on Terror. Lynch contends that these trends provided an element of continuity in terms of how the United States viewed the world and acted in it.

Second, the appeal of the U.S. system miltigated against decline, despite foreign policy missteps and the “rise of the rest,” which pundits like Fareed Zakaria have predicted since the late aughts. Lynch attributes this surprising staying power to two factors, namely the massive but cost-efficient U.S. military and the popularity of democratic capitalism. While pointing out poor preparation and outright mistakes—including the botched occupation of Iraq and the abandonment of Syria—the author notes that the United States has remained the primary champion of a liberal international order. It has pursued this goal from the creation of institutions such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) to a series of controversial if well-intentioned military interventions.

To cite an example that runs through the book, Lynch provocatively claims that many of the most dramatic U.S. actions abroad from the 1990s onward “aimed to liberate Muslims from bad government” (180). This statement reanimates America’s Cold War self-image, even if it simplifies the underlying motivations for specific policies. Still, Lynch finds support for this idea in the Arab Spring movements that demanded political reform in the Middle East, arguing that “the Bush Doctrine, rather than a series of exaggerations, might stand muster with Truman’s: as the basis for a world order in which democratic rights expand where many experts have said, then and since, that they cannot” (160). This ideological appeal has allowed the United States to remain the preeminent power in the world despite its involvement in endless wars and supposed arrogance. Rising states like China have chosen to ally with the United States, and alternatives from autocratic Russia to Latin American leftists have failed to overcome the appeal of U.S. values and (though not explored extensively) relative economic success.

In *The Shadow of the Cold War* sets out these bold arguments within a broad, cogent analysis of U.S. foreign policy since 1989 that ties together disparate policy strands into a neat and readable package. Rather than following trends or examining specific regions, Lynch organizes his chapters chronologically around four-year presidential terms. The focus is on big events that grabbed headlines—military conflicts and high-profile diplomatic negotiations—with an emphasis on the Middle East and Russia. China and a few economic discussions round out the main roster.

This approach obscures subtler trends that stretched across administrations, but it does a good job of recounting the personalities that occupied the oval office and how policies evolved as presidents shifted personnel and learned on the job. The resulting narrative is smooth and accessible, enlivened by Lynch’s wry sense of humor. Archival research is understandably limited, given that most records remain sealed, but the author captures the worldviews and actions of the administrations by using a mixture of declassified material, public statements, contemporary reporting, memoirs, and secondary sources. The constant flow of analysis situates these events in their political and strategic contexts in ways both familiar and novel. My copy now has margins filled with notes on what ideas I will steal to update the final weeks of my undergraduate survey of U.S. diplomatic history.

Lynch, a political scientist with previous books on Clinton- and Bush 43-era diplomacy, deserves praise for the work. Since the Vietnam War, the international history field has fetishized archival research, tiring itself to increasingly delayed archival declassification schedules and thereby avoiding serious study of the near past. This has contributed to the myth of the distinct break in policy after 1989/91, as historians have remained entrenched in the Cold War era while other fields have trudged on.

Still, there are limitations to the book. The most glaring issue is that Lynch never fully explains how he understands foreign policy as fractured, indecisive, or even delusional. His contention that continuity has defined a relatively successful set of policies provides a corrective to the developing trend that sees post-Cold War foreign policy as fractured, indecisive, or even delusional.3 Though there are limitations to the book. The most glaring issue is that Lynch never fully explains how he understands foreign policy as a period—
though guided broadly by the ideas of containment and democratic capitalism—was far from static, and various transformations and redirections occurred over fifty years and half a dozen administrations. There is no sense that any single grand strategy replaced or modified containment after 1989; most of the presidents sought to move beyond the Cold War and repeatedly sought resets for their most challenging relationships, notably Russia and China. Without a detailed understanding of the bipolar conflict, the monograph struggles to establish a clear set of “strategic lessons” for successful presidents.

Moreover, Lynch is prone to generalizing events and cherry-picking examples from conflicting aspects of the Cold War to assess presidents and their policies, making historical comparisons fluid and sometimes banal. Obama displayed “Carterish tendencies” a page before his preference for reaction earns the moniker “JFK-like” (164–65), while his Middle East policy resembled Ronald Reagan’s. At times, this tendency leads to historical events justifying contradictory actions in ways that paper over distinct worldviews and minimize complex calculations that informed decisions. Aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis help explain Clinton’s attempt to buy cooperation from a nuclear North Korea, Bush 43’s drive to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and Obama’s version of “Flexible Response” (65, 127, and 207).

As a result, arguments for continuity of action and the analysis they promote vary in quality throughout the monograph. There are worthwhile comparisons that reveal insights into the conduct of American policy during both the bipolar and unipolar eras. Lynch argues that the Cold War and the War on Terror devolved into national debates about means, rather than ends, hinting that ways of assessing threats and imagining U.S. security frontiers carried over from one conflict to the other. Similarities between NATO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and NAFTA demonstrate that the limitation of legal obligations continues to distort the creation of U.S. alliances.

Less useful are the similes that simplify Cold War ideas or deploy them out of context. One glaring example is the offhand comparison between George Kennan—originator of the decades-long global strategy of containment—and the architect of the more limited 2007 Iraq surge, Frederick Kagan (141). These rhetorical allusions create artificial connections, thus weakening the analysis. Instead, they distract from where former State Department official James Steinberg calls “personal (historical) experience” that policymakers gained from post-1989 events, which often subtly reflected the pervasive legacies of the Cold War. Lynch deploys historical comparisons so quickly that he misses opportunities to use the rich historical literature to frame probing questions about contemporary events. His rapid-fire comparison of “Islamist terrorism” with communism seems especially problematic (161). There are similarities in the ideologies and U.S. perceptions of them, but he does not approach this equation critically. Lynch regularly notes that policymakers came of age during the Cold War, but how they understood the conflict and adapted complex constructions of anti-communism after 9/11 remain unclear. The historiography on the topic—its merging with anti-fascist ideas, perception of monolithic threats, and difficult relationship with Third World nationalism—begs for attention. Not only might it provide parallels for how the Bush 43 administration defined threats and security, it would help answer how a global war against diverse non-state sponsors of wanton violence came to mirror a bipolar conflict fought with massive economies and nuclear weapons.

In the Shadow of the Cold War has a few shortcomings, but it deserves attention for its ambition, accessibility, and broad coverage of foreign policy. More importantly, its reframing of events over the last thirty years provides a timely intervention. When the Trump administration articulated its narrow national response to the current crisis, I wondered if we had reached the point where the collaborative and ideologically attractive foreign policy Lynch depicts would finally disappear. But after rereading the book, I am not so sure. European and Third World institutions have continued to sustain the desire for U.S. leadership. Institutions and informational networks created and funded by the United States continue to promote international collaboration and stability even as politicians balk. And rivals such as China and Russia that have sought to fill the void left by the United States have seen their success limited by international and domestic suspicion fueled by their autocratic tendencies. I find holes in Lynch’s argument, but the book recasts recent history in ways that explain the world just a little better. In our current moment, when no one seems to have many hard answers about what the future will hold, you cannot ask much more of historical scholarship.

Notes:
1. Scholars writing on the Middle East such as Douglas Little, Melani McAlister, and Peter L. Hahn offer one exception, with some contemporary analysis often concluding longer histories of U.S. policy in the region, albeit with limited connections to broader U.S. strategy.
Money in Resurgent Russia (Chapel Hill, NC, 2018).
6. After the introduction, Lynch references few Cold War histories – mostly broad overviews such as Westad’s Global Cold War (2009) and Leffler’s For the Soul of Mankind (2007) – while presenting debatable elements as facts. More detailed studies on the strategic and cultural foundations of anti-communism from Melvyn P. Leffler, Marc J. Silverstone, Mark Philip Bradley, Hajimu Masuda, and others would have provided interesting food for thought when considering Bush era anti-terrorism policies.

Idealism vs. Realism: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1989
Heather Marie Stur

On an August afternoon in 1989, a break in the iron curtain on the Austria-Hungary border at the Hungarian city of Sopron unleashed a flood of East Germans into Austria and the Western bloc. The breaching of the boundary between East and West was part of an event nicknamed the “pan-European picnic,” a pro-democracy protest during which Hungarian prime minister Miklos Nemeth opened his country’s border. Nemeth thought it would be a temporary and symbolic move to allow Europeans from either side to move freely across the border. Soviet troops stationed in Hungary stood down and did not stop the exodus. Timothy J. Lynch, author of In the Shadow of the Cold War: American Foreign Policy from George Bush Sr. to Donald Trump, a compelling and highly readable book about U.S. diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, sees the event as marking the end of the Cold War.

Also in the summer of 1989, world leaders met in Paris to discuss options for establishing a government in Cambodia once Vietnam withdrew its troops in September. Vietnam and Cambodia had been at war with each other for a decade following four years of genocidal horror at the hands of the communist Khmer Rouge. At issue was whether a Khmer Rouge representative should be included in a coalition government. President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker stated publicly that the Khmer Rouge should have no place in a Cambodian government, but in a private conversation with Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen at the Paris conference, Baker stated that involving the Khmer Rouge in the government was the only way to avoid a civil war in Cambodia.

These stories illustrate the two sides of the Cold War, the era between the end of World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its name refers to one aspect of the era, the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for power and influence that never exploded into direct armed confrontation between the two superpowers. The other side of the Cold War was hot, and it centered on chaos and conflict in the Third World, also known as the “global South,” where decolonization produced new nations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

This is an important distinction that Lynch does not address explicitly but that is implicit in his book. Lynch argues that, regarding U.S. foreign relations, the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era was one of steady continuity rather than stark change. He focuses on the importance of Russia, and to a lesser extent China, in the minds of U.S. presidents from George H.W. Bush to Donald Trump, but his argument is most convincing when he details how presidents have responded to wars, politics, and perceived national security threats in the Third World.

Lynch takes readers through the foreign relations highlights of each presidency, from George H.W. Bush’s through Barack Obama’s, and ends with a conclusion focused on Donald Trump’s tenure to date. Along the way, he argues that Cold War foreign policy frameworks have endured because they have worked, and U.S. foreign policy has succeeded more often than it has failed. Success defies easy definition, though. Lynch offers examples of certain types of success, such as the quick military victory of coalition forces in Iraq in 1991 or the effectiveness of NATO air strikes in ending the Bosnian War. But the primary continuities from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era that his book reveals are inconsistency, tension between realism and idealism, and a lack of presidential resolve to go all in and stay the course toward lasting political change after wars have ended. Despite policy flaws and missteps, the United States remains a global hegemon, and it has protected national interests and increased its team of allies over the past thirty years. For Lynch, these are measures of success.

George H.W. Bush’s presidency bridged the Cold War and post-Cold War worlds. He was inaugurated in 1989, the year of the “velvet revolutions” in the Eastern bloc, and he presided over the first major U.S. war since Vietnam, which began and ended before the official collapse of the Soviet Union. In his foreign policy, Bush was measured and moderate, avoiding involvement in the Yugoslav civil war and remaining quiet on China’s human rights abuses in the wake of Tiananmen Square.

In preparing for war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Bush assembled a multinational coalition to demonstrate that Saddam was on the wrong side of international law, not just on the bad side of the United States. Yet even in the lead-up to the invasion, Bush’s foreign policy actions presented challenges. Despite Bush’s hands-off approach to Iraq, he details how presidents have responded to wars, politics, and perceived national security threats in the Third World.

The post-Cold War presidents all grappled with the questions of what the purpose of U.S. foreign policy should be and to what degree the U.S. military should participate in its implementation. For George H.W. Bush’s cabinet, if not for the president himself, there was broad agreement that international interventions should aim to make a world in which America’s democracy would be safe. Whether democracy could exist safely elsewhere was not America’s concern. When Chinese tanks mowed down citizens demanding democratic political reforms to match China’s economic opening, Bush withheld censure. Lynch sees Bush’s hands-off response to China as an example of economically driven realism, in which the benefits of a close trading relationship with China outweighed the ideological challenge Chinese authoritarianism posed to democratic enlargement in the post-Cold War era. A cautious Bush viewed the ancient ethnic and religious antagonisms that exploded into the Yugoslav civil war as posing little threat to American security and not warranting a U.S. military response.
If George H.W. Bush practiced cautious militarism, his successor, Bill Clinton, wielded the power of the U.S. military more than eighty times during his two-term presidency. During his first term, Clinton heeded to Bush's line on the use of military force. His policy of democratic enlargement envisioned the power of U.S. economic investment as the strongest tool for shaping the post-Cold War world. When he did deploy the U.S. military, as in Iraq following an assassination attempt on Bush Sr. and in Haiti following a coup that removed democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide from the presidency, critics decried the efforts as half-hearted and weak. In Haiti, all it took was a mob of locals wielding machetes and pitchforks to turn the USS Harlan County away from Port-au-Prince. Was the commitment to democratic enlargement worth it?

The Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 pushed Clinton to action. UN dithering had prevented Bosnians from accumulating arms to fight the well-equipped Serbians in the Balkan conflict. A UN peacekeeping contingent of mostly Canadian and Dutch forces could only stand by as Serbs bused Bosnian Muslims out of the town as part of ethnic cleansing efforts. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the Security Council’s obsession with egalitarianism and unanimity prevented NATO air strikes until Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke demanded authorization of air strikes in the wake of Srebrenica. It was the first time NATO had used military force in its history, and its intervention stopped the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II.

Lynch asserts that NATO is key to understanding why the massacre of nearly eight thousand Bosnians motivated Clinton to intervene when the Rwandan genocide, which killed one hundred times that many Tutsis and their sympathizers, did not. The expansion of NATO to include former Warsaw Pact nations was central to Clinton’s policy of democratic enlargement. If Clinton did not prove that NATO had the chops to bring peace to the Balkans, it would be difficult for him to convince Eastern Europeans that NATO was worth joining. It is through the expansion of NATO that Lynch draws a line of continuity from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. Locking Russia’s former allies into the U.S. orbit looked like the old geostrategic power play between the United States and the Soviet Union.

By the time President George W. Bush took office, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were already plotting the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. Taliban support of al-Qaeda put Afghanistan in the crosshairs of the U.S. military and its NATO allies. In less than three months and with only about five thousand American ground troops, coalition forces seemed to have achieved military success in taking out the Taliban. A war won with five thousand troops might win public approval, but in order to prevent the Taliban or another extremist group from taking power again in Afghanistan, the United States and its allies needed to build a new nation. Nation-building was the longer, more difficult, and more critical fight, but Bush and his cabinet, taking cues from the Kosovo war that ended the twentieth century, were obsessed with “military minimalism.” Just as his father left unfinished business in Iraq by not taking out Saddam Hussein in 1991, Bush was unable to commit to nation-building in Afghanistan and thus created the conditions that have kept the United States at war there for nearly two decades.

Lynch identifies 9/11 as the catalyst for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, too. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon shattered America’s illusion of security and revealed the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania to be part of a terrorist plot against the United States that culminated in 2001. Clinton had missed the signals, so the Bush administration took the opposite approach and made preemption central to the Bush doctrine. When Bush and his advisors realized that democracy would not easily take root in Iraq, Bush authorized a troop surge meant to establish enough stability so that Iraq would not be in chaos as the U.S. military withdrew from the country. Americans would be liberators, but they would not be occupiers, even though occupation was necessary for nation-building.

President Barack Obama entered office promising to coax belligerents over to the “right side of history” (197), and he captivated international audiences so effectively with his diplomatic style that he won the Nobel Peace Prize less than a year into his presidency. But Obama’s approach assumed that global menaces cared about the ideals that defined the right side of history. Not even the most charismatic president can shame the leaders of Communist Party of China, ISIS operatives, or Syria’s Bashar al-Assad into addressing their human rights abuses or illiberal politics. Obama sought the advice of “humanitarian hawks” like Samantha Power but also selected Republican Chuck Hagel, a Vietnam veteran and opponent of Bush’s Iraq War, as his secretary of defense in 2013. The tension between “Obama the realist and Obama the liberal” (197) made the Obama Doctrine stand for everything and nothing. Lynch contends that Obama’s foreign policy was mostly a continuation of Bush’s international strategy.

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 may have seemed like the dawn of a new era to both his detractors and his supporters, but Lynch argues that Trump’s foreign policy remained grounded in a Cold War worldview, just as his predecessors’ had been. From a symbolic standpoint, his meeting with Kim Jong-un in June 2018 was not much different from Obama’s trip to Cuba in 2016. Lynch also points out that Trump continued Obama’s policies toward Syria and Afghanistan. The differences between the two presidents were matters of style rather than substance. Obama on al-Qaeda: “To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism—it is a recognizing of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason” (178). Trump on ISIS: “The United States will “bomb the shit out of ‘em” (232). One statement was graceful, the other crass, but both conveyed a message about America’s willingness to use force against international terrorists.

Lynch’s conclusion about the success of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era and its connection to the Cold War rests on the continued existence of NATO; Russia’s and China’s dependence on global capitalism; and regime change in rogue states such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. NATO outlasted the Warsaw Pact, capitalism bested communism, and the United States still eliminates leaders and organizations that threaten its national security. America’s more limited success in nation-building abroad is not a sign of failure, Lynch argues, but of the tension between realism and idealism across presidencies since 1989. Lynch opens his book with the hopeful story of the pan-European picnic because it validates his view of the U.S.-led Western bloc’s victory over Soviet totalitarianism. Had he opened with the story of George H.W. Bush’s willingness to accept a world in which the Khmer Rouge had a place in a new Cambodian government, he would have told an equally true but uninspiring tale of U.S. realism regarding nation-building in the third world.

By privileging the former as the primary measure of U.S. success, Lynch obscures the latter, even though much of his book focuses on American presidents’ tendency
Deep Continuity

Steven J. Brady

There are advantages and disadvantages to writing the history of recent events. One advantage is the likelihood that all future historians of the episodes under investigation will address one’s work. This gives one’s scholarly labors legs. On the negative side of the ledger, it is certain that future historians will be addressing that work in order to “revise” it. This assures that a skeptical eye will be turned on the work of those bold enough to go first. Doing diplomatic history presents a special challenge. Given the (over-long) declassification process, future revisionists will have access to a wealth of documentation unavailable to those who went before. Thus, the newspaper articles, memoirs, and interviews on which pioneers had to rely will, without a doubt, prove inadequate at best.

With In the Shadow of the Cold War, Timothy J. Lynch has taken up the challenge. In this engagingly written book, he addresses and assesses the foreign policies of Ronald Reagan’s successors in the presidency, arguing forcefully that these men all made policy in what he calls—as the title suggests—the “shadow” of that long twilight struggle. By this he means above all that the Cold War “conditioned how they made foreign policy the way they did, and why” (4). According to Lynch, this shadow “was the cause of considerable continuity in foreign policy from one era to the next and of continuity in the post-Cold War years themselves.” This assessment leads him to the striking conclusion—no doubt to be debated in this roundtable—that the end of the Cold War “was not a decisive turning point, and neither was 9/11” (4).

One of the most important questions to address is the extent to which the continuity that Lynch detects was in fact an outgrowth of matters specifically related to the Cold War—if, in other words, continuity was evidence of the “shadow” cast specifically by that conflict. If one stipulates that there was plenty of continuity to be found in post-Cold War American foreign policy—and on this, Lynch is generally convincing—the questions remains: Continuity with what? Here, things become less clear than Lynch would have them be.

Lynch hints at this point when discussing, for example, the war in Kosovo, “the most controversial war since Vietnam” (90). Anglo-American policy in this conflict was informed, we are told, by a “more ancient enmity toward Russian interests” (92). This is certainly the case on the British side. The British effort to check Russian power in the eastern Mediterranean would in fact cast a “shadow” of its own when Truman proclaimed his famous doctrine after London declared its inability to continue trying to contain communism in Greece and Turkey. American relations with Tsarist Russia had traditionally been far more irdic than Britain’s: writing about the period between American independence and the purchase of Alaska in 1867, Norman Saul labels the two nations “distant friends.” Indeed, the United States would offer its good offices to the Russians during the Crimean War, when they contended with an Anglo-French-led coalition almost one hundred years before the onset of the Cold War.

That offer of help, together with the lack of any real disputes between the two nations, had left a reservoir of goodwill towards America in St. Petersburg. In fact, had Britain and France intervened in the American Civil War, Russian entry on the side of the Union was a strong possibility. The Bolshevik coup in 1917, however, radically altered Russo-American relations and helped set the stage for the hostility that would follow the temporary alliance against Hitler. The Russians never forgot the American intervention in their Civil War, an intervention that lasted from 1819 to 1920.

Here one is struck by a lacuna in Lynch’s book, namely, the complete absence of any reference to Woodrow Wilson. Even when mentioning the “Slavic alliance that helped spark the First World War” (93), America’s twenty-eighth president—in office at the time, and thus dealing with this conflict—never rates a mention. Regarding the war in Kosovo, Lynch asserts that “its character was rooted in the Cold War” (94). Yet its “character” was certainly shaped prior to the Cold War, prior even to Wilson’s ascendency to the presidency. Similarly, British interests in the Balkans were not created during the Cold War. Nor was the perceived imperative to “contain and constrain Russian power” (94) a Cold War development. British opposition to a “big Bulgaria” prior to the conclusion of the Berlin Treaty of 1878 was, rather, a use of diplomatic power to contain Russian influence in that region. Lynch is certainly correct in stating that the war in Kosovo was “waged by and through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Cold War international institution par excellence” (94). However, employment of tools developed during the Cold War does not demonstrate that the policies those tools were supporting resulted from traditions that had their roots in that conflict.

Wilson’s curious absence is palpable at other points in the book as well. When discussing the aggregation of presidential power in wartime, Lynch makes a hat tip to Lincoln but not to Wilson, whose power grew exponentially during the Great War (120). Most strikingly, “Wilsonianism”—whatever one means by that protean term—makes no appearance in the discussion of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy. Madeleine Albright enters the story as Clinton’s first UN ambassador and was later elevated to become the first-ever female secretary of state. The reader learns that Albright’s “frame of reference was explicitly the ideological struggle of the Cold War; the world remained a moral arena in which the righteous must be prepared to make war” (78). This was vintage Wilson. So too was Clinton’s second-term foreign policy ideology of liberal interventionism (80). Lynch describes Clinton’s second term as being marked by the “return of old think.” But the “think” is older than he seems to realize.

A similar observation can be made regarding American post-Cold War interventionism in the Caribbean Basin. This also had pre-Cold War precedents, especially during the Wilson years, when the United States intervened militarily in Mexico (twice), Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. One cannot challenge Lynch’s assertion, made in the context of George H. W. Bush’s military intervention in Panama, that the United States rarely sought UN sanction for its foreign interventions. But even here one must note that prior to the Cold War, the United States felt little compunction about unilateral intervention in Latin America, intervention unsanctioned by international law. In this sense, both Cold War and post-Cold War U.S. interventions in the Western Hemisphere were conducted
in the shadow of a much older pattern.

One may also raise an objection to Lynch’s assertion that American fear of surprise attack—realized on 9/11—is “grounded historically in the Cold War” (127). That fear has deeper roots than the Cold War; it is inextricably linked in the American mind with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. While Lynch does not mention Pearl Harbor, American policymakers during the Cold War certainly did. Dwight Eisenhower justified U-2 reconnaissance flights over the USSR by referring to the need to avoid “another Pearl Harbor” in the nuclear age. Bobby Kennedy recalled opposing an American surprise attack on Soviet missile installations in Cuba in 1962 because he didn’t want his brother to be the “Tojo of the 1960s.” The point is not that post-Cold War presidents did not live in the shadow of the Cold War, but rather that the Cold War was fought in the shadow of a much older set of traditions in American foreign policy. Some issues were definitely new—the fear of nuclear annihilation being a monumental example. But other tendencies in U.S. Cold War policymaking were conditioned by previous shadows that outlasted the Cold War itself.

On some points of Cold War history, Lynch paints his picture with an overbroad brush. He is no doubt correct in stressing “the importance of American hegemony in stabilizing global politics” after the end of World War II. But was it true that “states were given a choice: to side with Washington or Moscow” (233–34)? A number of states had this choice, but some—e.g., Poland—did not. And other states—Indonesia, for example—never made the choice at all.

Finally, some of Lynch’s attempts to draw parallels between Cold War events and developments after 1989 work better than others. The comparison of Clinton’s policy toward Northern Ireland with that of Dwight Eisenhower during the 1956 Suez Crisis is not terribly convincing. George W. Bush’s reelection in 2004 may bear comparison to the unlikely turn of events that sent Harry Truman back to the White House in 1948, but Bush held on to the office despite getting the United States mired in an unpopular war. Truman was able to run for office two years prior to doing the same. Nor is it factually correct that Truman was term-limited by the Twenty-second Amendment, which specifically exempted the person in office when that amendment was proposed by Congress (88). The stalemate war in Korea helped Truman decide not to run for re-election in 1952. Bush, despite the fiasco in Iraq, won a narrow victory over Democrat John Kerry. In this sense, the experiences of the two presidents differed significantly.

Yet Bush’s 2004 victory over Kerry points to one of the many strengths of this book. Lynch is, for example, quite convincing in his treatment of the shadow of the Vietnam War, America’s most controversial Cold War conflict. Kerry, though a Vietnam veteran, was damaged significantly by a Republican campaign to besmirch his war record. As Lynch puts it, “legitimacy in the current war was made to depend on fidelity to the previous one” (135). It is difficult to think of a more efficient way of phrasing this important insight. Lynch, moreover, sees “profound” similarities between the wars in Vietnam and Iraq—so much so that “Iraq became a direct echo of Vietnam” (144–45). If this appears hyperbolic, then it is an overstatement that was similarly expressed by policymakers who followed Bush. Chuck Hagel, Barack Obama’s ill-starred secretary of defense—like Kerry, a veteran of the Vietnam War—had proclaimed in 2005 that Iraq was a “new Vietnam” (199). In detecting a significant parallel between the two wars, Lynch is in good company.

He is likewise on solid ground in asserting that the attraction that America exerted during the Cold War has survived the end of that conflict. Geir Lundestad has written of America’s Cold War “empire by invitation.” Lynch holds that this gravitational pull is still very much in force: “All the advantages that gave the United States the edge in the Cold War still obtain” (235). In fact, the “the great fear of America’s allies is that Donald Trump will withdraw and retreat US power—not that he will overextend it” (237). Given how long it takes to get a scholarly book in print, it is understandable that Lynch does not deal with American foreign relations under Trump after 2018. Thus, a key question will have to await scholars yet to come: Has Trump escaped the shadow of the Cold War in a definitive way?

Lynch couldn’t say as of the time of his writing. He asserts that the sight of presidential advisor Steve Bannon reading The Best and the Brightest “illuminates how far the Cold War still colors American thinking” (227). Yet he also concedes that “the transactional emphasis [Trump] placed on diplomacy” during his presidency “was deliberately crafted to downplay values as the source of Western cohesion” (226).

This issue—Western cohesion—raises a final point. Lynch—with justification—makes much of NATO and its durability as a Cold War institution that has served a significant purpose in the post-Cold War period. It is worth adding, however, that the purpose of NATO was never simply the limited one of containing the Soviets. NATO was also meant to be a means of maintaining American engagement with Europe and thus cementing the unity of the West. If Trump has in fact set U.S. foreign policy on course to undermine Western cohesion, then the Cold War shadow over American foreign policy has lifted in a conclusive way. If that “shadow” has lifted, we may come to regret it.

Author’s Response

Timothy Lynch

I am very grateful to these three scholars for the time they have taken to read and respond to my book and its arguments. Each reviewer captured the thesis of the book well: that to understand post-Cold War American foreign policy our essential (though not exclusive) lens is the Cold War itself. While each enjoyed the style and ambition of the book, they all highlight various omissions.

Steve Brady identifies a key lacuna in the book: the absence of Woodrow Wilson. On reflection, Wilson does indeed merit greater attention, though he is mentioned in the text and his influence can be detected in the general tenor of the book’s argument. In a longer book, the development of Wilsonianism would have been tracked against the Clinton and Bush 43 democracy promotion efforts.

On reflection, Wilson does indeed merit greater attention, though he is mentioned in the text and his influence can be detected in the general tenor of the book’s argument. In a longer book, the development of Wilsonianism would have been tracked against the Clinton and Bush 43 democracy promotion efforts.
of Russia, would have further extended my analysis of Putin's grievances after 2000. The same holds true for Kosovo in 1999. Russian animosity to Western intervention did not begin in the Cold War. That bipolar struggle has an important genesis in the decades that preceded it. The containment of Russia, as Brady reminds us, did not begin with George Kennan.

Brady sees the book as wanting the Cold War to be the definitive start of things, when in reality that conflict itself was a bag of continuities, some of which obtained after 1989. Again, I accept some of this critique. My one reservation would be how far any war could cast a shadow without inviting a continual regression in the focus of inquiry. My intention was not to trace the evolution of every twist and turn of American foreign policy of the last thirty years—to identify the source of every single event. Rather, how far what was post-Cold War was explained by the Cold War.

So while I accept, of course, “that the Cold War was fought in the shadow of a much older set of traditions in American foreign policy,” as Brady says, the book does not set out to examine all of them. It could not have done so and fulfilled its own design and that of the Cambridge Essential History series, of which it is a part. I will come back to the ambition issue later on—since each reviewer both commends the ambition and wants it to be larger—but in response to Brady, let me make clear the parameters of the book. These were to offer a critical assessment of over three decades worth of foreign policy with enough coverage to make the narrative and the attendant arguments digestible—not inexhaustible. I am happy if that narrow approach to a large historical terrain, which grew inexorably with every day that the book went unfinished, invites consideration of themes, issues, and arguments that it necessarily had to elide or ignore in order to fulfill its design. I note that even large historical accounts of U.S. foreign policy miss what some might consider key episodes. George Herring’s *From Colony to Superpower* (2008), for example, makes no mention of Panama, the first U.S. invasion of the post-Cold War era.

Several other omissions are tabulated constructively by Joe Parrot. Again, my thanks for another very close reading of the book. While the gaps, Parrot says, are several, he does acknowledge how I have situated the work in research terms: as an attempt to document an essential continuity when the paucity of actual archival documents post-1989 creates the illusion of a decisive break. Time and archivists will ultimately decide whether that claim is validated.

Whereas Brady wants to extend the regression into the first half of the twentieth century, Parrot wants the book to deal with the post-Cold War events that informed subsequent post-Cold War policymaking. What provided a template for dealing with nuclear states was not so much the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), suggests Parrot, as it was North Korea (in 1994) and Libya (after 2001). The book does not disavow this connection. It does prioritize a different interpretation: that Clinton mimicked JFK’s approach by appeasing Pyongyang, as his predecessor had Moscow. If Clinton had made this allusion would we be more persuaded of the shadow the book describes? Could that precedent not operate in ways unseen or unacknowledged by the policymakers subject to it?

Parrot takes issue with the book’s “cherry-picking” of the Cold War itself. The narrative progression of analysis post-1989, divided by four-year presidential terms, has not been met, Parrot says, by a similarly close reading of the Cold War itself. I will not belabor the “that isn’t what the book is about” defense here. The book deals with a shadow of the Cold War, not its mirror. It does not link every notable Cold War event with its post-Cold War refraction. All scholars are tempted to find greater consequence in the issues that fascinate them than in those that do not. Winston Churchill’s *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples* (1956–58) was gently criticized for containing only the parts of the story Churchill liked. Could I have been more systematic in raising Cold War history? Yes, possibly. But the method did not require it. I have not argued that the Cold War was the exclusive template for what came after it. Rather, the book depicts a substantial shadow, but one that is shifting and from which escape, post-1989, was possible. It did not dictate a perfect continuity. Rather, as shadows do, it threw issues into a certain relief.

Parrot’s claim that the book needs to systemize more and cherry-pick less is well taken. However, to have incorporated his preferences—which include military budgets, force structure, Global South development, U.S. foreign policy, Begin military/police training, and the War on Drugs—would have meant writing a different book entirely (certainly a longer one). The danger of traveling across three decades with reference to the preceding four is that subject specialists in each will inevitably demand coverage that cannot be realized—at least without the project being, like Herring’s, a decades-long one. Again, I hope the book succeeds in tempting its readers to explore further some of the fare that these reviewers think is undercooked. I am grateful for Parrot’s claim that “the book recasts recent history in ways that explain the world just a little better,” though, inevitably, not fully.

Heather Marie Stur, in the same constructive vein, identifies gaps that, if filled, would have enhanced the book’s analysis. Her addition to the August 1989 Hungarian picnic, which I use to open the book and which, I argue, marks the end of the Cold War, would be the nearly contemporaneous Paris negotiations over Cambodia. The compromises at Sopron (by the USSR) and at Paris (by the United States) make for a fascinating parallel disavowing of ideology (and a newfound realism) by both Cold War protagonists that I had reluctantly chosen not to include.

Stur also does a fine job of laying out my central arguments as well offering emendations. I agree that the realist character of U.S. foreign policy in this period was worthy of more assessment. I do think, though, that my treatment of George H. W. Bush (over Tiananmen Square) and of Barack Obama (over Syria) reinforces their realist credentials. These were men who spoke about new world orders and change we can believe in but who, when we might have expected hawkish humanitarianism, delivered hard-nosed realism. Heather Stur is right to acknowledge my fence-sitting on this tension. The book more often indicts the insufficiency of military power in pursuit of liberal ends (in Iraq most obviously) than it applauds the avoidance of conflict in conformity to realist dispositions (as in the former Yugoslavia). But it engages in both.

The coronavirus pandemic and race protests have necessarily shifted the focus of our assessment away from the usual foreign policy terrain. In his approach to China, Trump has disavowed the decades-long pursuit (from Nixon to Obama) of Beijing’s integration into the global economy. Likewise, he has abandoned the friendly discourse between America’s Cold War and post-Cold War allies, preferring to see them as freeloaders. However, he remains wedded to the instruments of U.S. power that have obtained for over sixty years: military preeminence, economic power, and, despite appearances to the contrary, reliance on allies because they are friends, whereas China has allies because they are clients. I want to thank these reviewers once again for their patient and close reading of the book. I am delighted that they found the work accessible, readable, and clearly argued—even if they did not share my all of my ideas about those arguments.
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY

CONGRATULATES

JOSEPH A. FRY

WINNER OF THE
BARONDESS/LINCOLN
AWARD FROM THE
CIVIL WAR ROUND
TABLE OF NEW YORK

This award-winning release is one of the many offerings in the University Press of Kentucky's Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace series, which examines the United States' engagement with the world, its evolving role in the international arena, and the ways in which the state, non-state actors, individuals, and ideas have shaped and continue to influence history, both at home and abroad. The series editors welcome new research in the form of original monographs, edited volume studies, biographies, and anthologies from historians, political scientists, journalists, and policymakers.

Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace
Series Editors: Stephen C. Herding, Andrew L. Jonas, and Kathryn E. Steller

Soccer Diplomacy
International relations and football since 1984
Edited by Heather L. Dichter

Foreign Friends
Syngman Rhee, American Exceptionalism, and the Division of Korea
David P. Polsky

Lincoln, Seward, and US foreign relations in the Civil War Era
Recipient of the 2020
Barondess/Vroman Award
Joseph A. Fry

The Turkish Arms Embargo
Stags, Gunmen, Treachery, and US Communist Politics
James F. Cooper

Fourteen Points for the Twenty-First Century
A Renewed Appeal for Cooperative Internationalism
Edited by Richard H. Immerman and Jeffrey A. Engel

America's Israel
The US Congress and American-Israeli Relations, 1967-1974
Kenneth Kranzberg

JFK and de Gaulle
How America and France Failed in Vietnam, 1951-1969
Sean M. McLaughlin

Brezhnev's Willing Hand:
American Diplomacy and the Soviet Union, 1961-1980
Barbara Tuchman

Peacemakers
American Leadership and the End of the Cold War
James W. Parnell

Submission Inquiries
Natalie O'Neal
University Press of Kentucky
600 South Limestone Street
Lexington, KY 40508
nalineatul@kentucky.edu

UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY
In 1967, Robert McNamara commissioned a study that would gather key records of the decision-making that led to the Vietnam War. By that point, McNamara was distressed with the direction of the war and the realization that his legacy would be intertwined with it. Beyond that, his motives for ordering the study are less clear. Was it "so that future historians would have access to them, could reappraise the decisions and draw lessons from them," as he later argued? Was it for the purpose of a classified internal study or, as others have suggested, for the benefit of Robert F. Kennedy’s prospective presidential campaign? Like many of McNamara’s other decisions, this one still puzzles scholars.

We do know, however, that McNamara was furious when, in 1971, one of his former aides, Daniel Ellsberg, leaked the collection of documents that became known as the Pentagon Papers. When Ellsberg’s lawyer reached out to McNamara during his client’s trial (Ellsberg was facing the prospect of 115 years in prison), McNamara’s alleged response was to threaten to “hurt [Ellsberg] very badly.” By contrast, former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy testified that Ellsberg’s actions had not meaningfully endangered national security.

McNamara, who had by then left government, experienced the publication of the Papers as a personal humiliation, even though close friends like Katharine Graham recalled that he had supported the New York Times in its confrontation with the Nixon administration over the leaked documents. He had not informed President Lyndon B. Johnson or Secretary of State Dean Rusk that he had undertaken his study in 1967, and it was a source of personal pain for him to be seen to have acted deceptively or disloyally towards them.

His family was also experiencing pain that was linked to his governmental service. His wife, Margaret, was in the hospital after struggling for many years with what her friends called “Bob’s ulcers.” His only son, Craig, was living in Salvador Allende’s Chile, working on a dairy farm on Easter Island. Craig had little contact with his parents and did not even know about his father’s visit to Chile in 1972 until he read about it in a local newspaper. At that time, many financial institutions, including the World Bank, which his father then presided over, were cutting off funds to Chile because of the leftist government’s putative economic mismanagement. Craig would have been distressed about that, perhaps all the more so as life in Chile habituated him to political views that were far to the left of his father’s. In 1971, just two weeks after Ellsberg surrendered himself to the police in Boston, Craig was listening to Fidel Castro address rapturous crowds in Santiago.

Today Craig McNamara and Daniel Ellsberg are friends and live not far from each other in the Bay Area. In generational terms, Ellsberg is interesting: he is neither a member of the “greatest generation” nor a “baby boomer.” He is, in many ways, a perfect bridge for conversations across the generational divide, somewhere between Craig and his father. Although theirs is the most unlikely of friendships, it is meaningful and moving to witness.

What unites them includes an engagement with social and environmental issues. Ellsberg lists Greta Thunberg as one of his heroes and has a photo of himself with Greta on his mantelpiece. Craig is an organic walnut farmer and has won awards for his work on conservation and sustainability issues. His career seems a world apart from his father’s, although his physical features make the filial connection unmistakable.

There is the same intensity and absence of frivolousness, and some of the same habits and predilections. He drives a Ford pickup truck, and as soon as we sit down to talk, pulls out a large yellow notepad to take notes on. I will tell him later that some of the most revealing findings in my book on his father came from his many hand-scrawled notes on yellow notepad paper.

These are two of the people most eagerly engaged with the subject of my research over the last ten years. And they are, like me, troubled by the questions he left unanswered. As a historian, I am moved by the humbling realization that the questions we ask often reverberate intimately within communities of colleagues and families. There is no doubt that the Vietnam War cast a dark shadow on the children of U.S. decision-makers, contributing even to suicides decades later. Theirs was a hidden trauma.

Craig McNamara is writing his memoirs, which will include more personal insights into the conflicts that many of the Vietnam-era decision-makers experienced within their families. Ellsberg has written of his time working for McNamara in the Department of Defense and has detailed his frustrations with his colleagues’ mafia-like silence. Both are important to understanding the mental space that U.S. decision-makers navigated as they made, and then grappled with the consequences of, their decisions.

In many respects, Ellsberg and Craig McNamara were two casualties of Robert McNamara’s personal weaknesses, in particular his aloofness and lack of transparency. McNamara accepted as much in his memoirs when he recalled that “there was much Marg and I and the children should have talked about, yet at moments like this I often turned inwards instead—it is a grave weakness.” Craig speaks candidly of the “boundaries” that kept him away from his father and asks, “Why didn’t he tell me the truth?” Likewise, Ellsberg describes the professional detachment that kept many of his Department of Defense colleagues at a distance from Robert McNamara. He was “Bob” only to the rarest of confidants.
Unlike many of his colleagues, McNamara became more introspective in later years. His memoirs (In Retrospect, 1996), his groundbreaking “critical oral history” work with historians such as James Blight and Robert Brigham, and his participation in Errol Morris’s Academy Award-winning documentary The Fog of War, present a more reflective McNamara, a man more candid about the misgivings that he hid behind his façade of confidence during the Vietnam War. While Ellsberg suspected that McNamara had doubts about the war long before the release of his memoirs and subsequent work, Craig admits to learning of them only with the release of In Retrospect and, especially, The Fog of War.

Perhaps what unites Craig and Ellsberg most, and what separates them from Robert McNamara just as much, is their commitment to the truth and their impatience with lies. Very early on in our meeting, I waffled about a “lack of candor,” using that or some other ambiguous turn of phrase that scholars often rely on. Craig interrupted me to interject, “We have a word in the English language for that: lies.” Similarly, Ellsberg recalled his incredulity when his boss John McNaughton described the self-censorship that he, like McNamara, exercised to ensure that President Johnson would continue to rely on their counsel.

In his own way, McNamara dissented from official policy. He spoke out at various points, including in a speech that he delivered in Montreal in May 1966; and he used press leaks to voice his discomfort with the direction of policy and try, ultimately with little success, to restore his image. But his dissent was always within fairly constrained limits that preserved his career as well as his social and professional standing.

Ellsberg’s actions in 1971 posed a moral challenge to McNamara. In his personal archive, Ellsberg has a note on McNamara’s concept of loyalty, an idea that I return to many times in my book and that drove McNamara’s silence on Vietnam. In trying to explain McNamara’s decades-long hostility to him, Ellsberg writes that “less consciously, I suspect, my example of what it was possible and perhaps right to do challenged the priority he gave to his role of protecting his boss, the president. That example exposed him potentially to the thought that in lying for the president and helping him carry out his doomed policy he was doing something he didn’t ‘have’ to do. He was making a choice; and as a result, he shares with the president responsibility for all the deaths and turmoil that resulted.”

It is at that “less conscious” level that key questions remain. The Fog of War ends with a striking exchange between Morris and McNamara:

Morris: After you left the Johnson administration, why didn’t you speak out against the Vietnam War?
McNamara: I’m not going to say anything more than I have. These are the kinds of questions that get me in trouble. You don’t know what I know about how inflammatory my words can appear. A lot of people misunderstand the war, misunderstand me. A lot of people think I’m a son of a bitch.
Morris: Do you feel in any way responsible for the war? Do you feel guilty?
McNamara: I don’t want to go any further with this discussion. It just opens up more controversy. I don’t want to add anything to Vietnam. It is so complex that anything I say will require additions and qualifications.
Morris: Is it the feeling that you’re damned if you do, and if you don’t, no matter what?
McNamara: Yeah, that’s right. And I’d rather be damned if I don’t.

My research has shown that McNamara doubted U.S. prospects for victory in Vietnam far earlier than he would admit and that he resisted escalation more than most. This discovery, which was made possible through new sources, including John McNaughton’s private diaries, is an uncomfortable one, as it raises questions about McNamara’s ethical failings, questions that he avoided whenever they were asked of him, including in the terse exchange with Morris. McNamara’s defensiveness with Morris shows that his capacity for self-reflection was stunted. Many historians’ criticisms of In Retrospect hinge on his disingenuousness, because for all his ex post ruminations, Robert McNamara was remarkably cagey. He apologized for failing to view the problems in Vietnam outside of a Cold War mindset but not for the personal failings that helped the war to go on as long as it did.

Ultimately, Ellsberg and Craig McNamara represent noble parts of McNamara’s legacy, aspects of his career that his mistakes on Vietnam have overshadowed. Ellsberg’s moral stance on nuclear issues paralleled McNamara’s efforts to rein in the United States’ reliance on nuclear weapons. Craig’s work with the Vietnamese artist Danh Vo, who carved beautiful objects out of the wood from Craig’s orchards, tells another story. Craig has the human skills that his father lacked—the ability to empathize, to imagine the pain of others—but an impulse toward social and public service drives his work, just as it did his father’s.

Perhaps most important of all, the younger men share the elder McNamara’s intellectual hunger. Repeatedly throughout his career, including in his books, at the end of The Fog of War, and in a television interview that he gave as he left office, McNamara returned to the same T.S. Eliot quote. It reads, “We shall not cease from exploration/ And the end of all our exploring/ Will be to arrive where we started/ And know the place for the first time.” His personal papers and work reveal that, like Craig and Ellsberg, he searched for answers, especially on Vietnam. Ethical considerations animated his efforts that sit uneasily with his mistakes during the war. However, at the end of his exploration, he failed to look more deeply into the one place Ellsberg, Craig, and I returned to: himself.

Notes:
*This essay is based on a meeting that occurred in September 2019 after the publication of my recent book, ’I Made Mistakes’: Robert McNamara’s Vietnam War Policy, 1960–1968 (Cambridge, UK, 2019).
2. Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston, MA, 1993), 484.
4. With the notable exception of H.R. McMaster, who unapologetically used the word “lies” in his book’s title: H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York, 1997).
5. John T. McNaughton was McNamara’s assistant for international security affairs and his closest advisor on Vietnam.
Immaculate Deception: The Truman Doctrine

Roger Peace

On March 12, 1947, in a speech before a joint session of Congress, President Harry Truman set forth what would become known as the Truman Doctrine, which became the standard justification for nearly all U.S. military and foreign policies over the next four decades. This essay argues that the Truman Doctrine was to the Cold War what the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was to the Vietnam War: a foundational deception. In addition to critiquing the particular falsehoods of Truman’s speech, I examine the strategic uses of the Cold War ideology that it fostered. Political commentator Walter Lippman called the Truman Doctrine a “strategic monstrosity,” which it was if examined from the vantage point of legitimate national security requirements; but if global hegemony was the goal, it was a rather clever design.1

The idea that the United States should lead the world, replacing the British Empire, had been advanced by various U.S. leaders and influential citizens since the late nineteenth century.

This ambition was in keeping with the age-old aspirations of many great states and empires, and also with the trajectory of U.S. history. The United States expanded across North America in the nineteenth century, became an imperial power in Asia in 1899, declared Latin America an exclusive sphere of influence in the early twentieth century, and became the foremost global economic power prior to the First World War. In 1941, publisher Henry Luce wrote that Americans should “accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation of the world . . . to assert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such means as we see fit.”2

The Truman Doctrine was not so forthright. It framed U.S. aspirations to world power in defensive terms, as protecting “free peoples” from aggressive communism. In his speech, Truman artfully connected the civil war in Greece to Soviet control in Eastern Europe, to a mythical struggle between freedom (representing, presumably, the United States) and totalitarianism (the Soviet Union). This framing made it appear that Greece was the immediate target of a grand Soviet-communist plot to take over the world.

In fact, the Soviet Union did not aid the Greek communists. Joseph Stalin held to an agreement made with Winston Churchill in October 1944 to stay out of Greece. Indeed, Churchill later wrote that Stalin had “adhered strictly and faithfully to our agreement of October.”3 In short, where Greece was concerned, “containment” of the Soviet Union had already been achieved through a quiet big-power agreement.

The foreign nation intruding into Greece was not the Soviet Union, but Great Britain, which had sent tanks in December 1944 to crush the Greek left, then supported a despotic rightist government under Admiral Petros Voulgaris. Truman labeled the Greek government “democratic,” despite its repressive features, while painting the communist-led rebels as engaged in “terrorist activities,” though repression had pushed them into a state of rebellion.4 His statement that “the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required” belied the fact that the United States was acting against the spirit, if not the letter, of the UN in abetting war rather than seeking a mediated solution.

Truman dealt with Eastern Europe only briefly in his speech, saying that the “peoples of a number of countries of the world”5 (and he mentioned Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria) “have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will.” While it was true that the Soviet Union had imposed pro-Soviet governments on these nations, doing so was technically a right of occupation, and the United States had acted similarly in Japan and South Korea. Truman also failed to note that America’s allies, Great Britain and France, had been imposing their wills on a far greater number of people in their African and Asian colonies. Indeed, at that very time, France was engaged in a colonial war to restore its imperial control over Vietnam.

Truman addressed the situation in Turkey as well. He said the Turks needed U.S. aid “for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity,” and he intimated that the Soviet Union was pressuring Turkey in some way. What the Soviets had actually done was request base rights in the Dardanelles region, a crucial shipping lane bordering the Black Sea. According to Melvyn Leffler, “the Soviets had not submitted an ultimatum and had not engaged in any threats or intimidation.”6

None of these international situations posed a serious threat to U.S. national security—unless they were tied to a grand plan by an expansionist totalitarian power to take over the world. Truman made only one reference to “communist” in his speech, but he used the word “totalitarian” four times, presumably to connect the alleged “communist threat” to the well-grounded Nazi threat of World War II. According to George Herring, “In portraying the war in Greece as a struggle between Communism and freedom, U.S. officials misinterpreted or misrepresented the conflict, ignoring the essentially domestic roots of the insurgency, blurring the authoritarian nature of the Greek government, and greatly exaggerating the Soviet role.”7

Truman framed the historical moment as a choice between two “alternative ways of life,” one “based upon the will of the majority,” the other “based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed on the majority.” The latter, of course, was aimed at the Soviet Union, not America’s imperial European allies. The president’s call to action followed. “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” he declared. “If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.”8 With this invocation, Truman broadened the idea of “national security” to encompass the world. Henceforth, any loss of U.S. influence anywhere would be viewed in Washington as a security threat. It was the perfect formula for establishing American global predominance—and creating unrelieved empire anxiety.

Though Truman succeeded in persuading a majority in Congress to approve the aid package to Greece and Turkey, his hyperbolic rendition of the “communist threat” came back to haunt him. Since he had raised the specter of communism as a global menace, some members of Congress asked why he had not asked for more aid for Chiang Kai-
Soviet Union, U.S. leaders connected them to Moscow by War. Although none of these alleged threats arose from the too open to communists—all in the first decade of the Cold governments in Iran and Guatemala that were judged to be suppress a communist-led national liberation movement in Vietnam, and covertly overthrew democratically elected the United States suppressed a communist-led rebellion in Greece, undermined democratic socialist and communist the First Twenty-Five Years), their mandate, which patriotic pride was joined to global predominance. In truth, U.S. aspirations to power, often described as “leadership,” existed independently of any alleged threats from abroad. This became clearer in the aftermath of the Cold War, as the pursuit and maintenance of U.S. global hegemony continued and new threats were found to justify it. Finally, U.S. Cold War ideology was immensely useful in rallying Americans to the cause and mobilizing public support for America’s turbo-charged interventionist role in the world. The more ominous the specter of communism, the less likely that Americans would retreat into isolationism, question the wisdom of U.S. missions abroad, or withhold their tax dollars from the burgeoning military-industrial complex. This ideological framework was also beguilingly simple. It allowed Americans to reduce the complexities of the world to a pat formula, easily understood, that verified American righteousness in all cases. Through patriotic inculcation and intimidation—via loyalty oaths, congressional investigations, and blacklists—anti-communist ideology became part of American national identity. Indeed, Americans developed what might be called a national empire-identity complex, in which patriotic pride was joined to global predominance.

Winning hearts and minds

To be sure, it was easier for U.S. leaders to convince American citizens of the benevolence of U.S. global designs and intentions than to convince the rest of the world. U.S. leaders promoted capitalism as the road to prosperity, yet for many poor peoples and nations on the periphery of industrial production centers—a majority of the world’s population—capitalism was more likely to be associated with economic dependency, exploitation, inequality, and foreign control. The debilitating results of Western European imperialism in Asia and Africa, and of “Yankee imperialism” in Latin America, which conquered foreign markets to serve home industries, were ultimately more convincing to many in the Third World than the plethora of economic development platitudes and propaganda emanating from Washington.

It is important to clarify here that the “free market” capitalism promoted by the United States abroad was not the same as the reformed capitalism that had developed within the United States over the previous half-century, pushed by populist, progressive, socialist, and New Deal reformers. By the end of the New Deal, the United States had a mixed (capitalist-social welfare) economy that included antitrust laws, business regulations, higher taxes on the rich, and socialist-oriented programs such as Social Security. The difference in the foreign and domestic versions of capitalism is explained by the fact that in the domestic sphere, the federal government challenged and limited corporate power and compensated for its deficiencies to some degree, whereas in foreign affairs, the government worked in tandem with business interests to secure foreign resources and markets to the advantage of home industries.

Had U.S. leaders promoted a New Deal type of social welfare capitalism abroad, it is likely that many poor peoples and nations would have been more receptive to U.S. economic prescriptions. As it was, U.S. officials pushed a hard-edged, austerity-minded capitalism that relegated poor nations to positions as suppliers of industrial nations, sustaining seemingly permanent economic underdevelopment.
American ideals of political freedom and democracy were more welcome the world over, but here the problem was that the United States did not always practice what it preached. The United States, to its credit, fostered democratic institutions in Occupied Japan and West Germany following the Second World War, but elsewhere the Americans supported numerous repressive regimes, in large part to secure their corporate interests and prevent the establishment of successful socialist models. During the first decade of the Cold War, the United States took an active part in fostering reactionary governments in Greece, South Korea, Vietnam, Iran, and Guatemala. It was clear to many people around the world that the United States prioritized its economic and geopolitical interests, and the establishment of pro-American governments, over its ideals of freedom and democracy.

Americans, of course, were inclined to believe that their government and leaders were committed to the promotion of freedom and democracy abroad. Statements to that effect were voiced by the nation's highest officials, echoed in the mainstream media, and inculcated in the body politic through the educational system, leading to their internalization as part of American identity. It was thus difficult for many citizens to understand the profound contradiction between the nation's oft-stated ideals and its actual foreign policy practices; and not a few followed U.S. leaders in ignoring or denying the contradiction, reveling in America's mythic identity as “leader of the free world.”

Americans were not misguided in identifying the Soviet Union as a repressive authoritarian state and the United States as a democratic one. What was not generally understood, however, was that the foreign policies of each nation were not based on its domestic institutions; that repression within the Soviet Union did not automatically translate into aggression without; and that democracy within the United States did not exclude aggression, a point clearly proven by the histories of the United States, Britain, and France.

**Choices**

The Cold War was not fated. The Truman administration had options. It could have met the Russians “halfway,” as advised by Eleanor Roosevelt, continuing the wartime entente established under Franklin Roosevelt.11 It could have placed more reliance on the United Nations and international law. It could have pursued Henry A. Wallace's idea for a Global New Deal, aiding underdeveloped nations, encouraging international law. It could have pursued Henry A. Wallace's idea for a Global New Deal, aiding underdeveloped nations, encouraging international law. It could have pursued Henry A. Wallace's idea for a Global New Deal, aiding underdeveloped nations, encouraging international law. It could have pursued Henry A. Wallace's idea for a Global New Deal, aiding underdeveloped nations, encouraging international law.

Fredrik Logevall argued as much in his 2004 Bernath Lecture: “The [Cold War] confrontation resulted from decisions by individual human beings who might have chosen otherwise, who might have done more, in particular to maintain the diplomatic dialogue, to seek negotiated solutions to complex international problems. . . . American planners from the start defined their policy choices vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in remarkably narrow terms, and there is little evidence they ever gave close consideration to doing otherwise.”12

The choices made in Washington had far-reaching consequences. Had the straitjacket of Cold War ideology not been imposed on U.S. foreign policy, the Truman administration might have responded affirmatively to Ho Chi Minh's plea for U.S. support, thereby avoiding a later U.S. war in Vietnam. Subsequent administrations might have refused to support right-wing dictatorships and repressive regimes, thereby fostering democratic and human rights principles across the world. Working together with the Soviet Union, U.S. leaders might have called off the nuclear arms race and curbed proliferation, greatly enhancing international security. Had the fervent anti-communist mission not gained traction, the “imperial presidency,” McCarthyism, the “military industrial complex,” and gargantuan military budgets might have been reined in, all to the benefit of the American people. Perhaps, too, Americans would have found better ways to express their unity and patriotism than rallying around America's superpower status and wars.13

Notes:

4. John O. Iatrides and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, “The International Dimension of the Greek Civil War,” *World Policy Journal* 17, no. 1 (2000): 87–103. In January 1936, the All People Front, a political coalition that included the Greek Communist Party, won fifteen seats in the three-hundred-seat national legislature. In August, General Ioannis Metaxas suspended the Greek constitution and instituted a dictatorship, citing the threat of communism. Despite the trashing of democracy, the U.S. ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, wrote to President Roosevelt in 1938, “Mr. Metaxas is quite the best man in Greek political life today.” Cited in David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're on Our Side: The United States & Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999), 115.
10. Secretary of State Dean Acheson used this term in the fall of 1948, judging that Ho Chi Minh and Stalin were de facto allies by virtue of their Marxist ideological orientations. Cited in David A. Welch, *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change* (Princeton, NJ, 2005), 123.
The 2020 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize goes to Monica Kim, *The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History* (Princeton University Press, 2019). The committee (Madeline Hsu, chair; Amanda McVety; and Ryan Irwin) commend this compelling, original account of the Korean War that foregrounds the elevated stakes of interrogation rooms, which staged the heightened politicization of the interiorities of prisoners of war (POWs). To bolster its sovereignty claims and forestall legitimation of either the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or the Republic of Korea, the United States insisted on “voluntary repatriation” for POWs during the Korean War, producing fraught attempts to channel the complex positionalities of individual soldiers into Cold War binaries. The boldly titled introduction, “War and Humanity,” conveys Kim’s ambitious critique of how liberalism and emerging new strategies for U.S. imperialism came to focus on the “hearts and minds” of captives. Kim’s substantive chapters remain attentive to the human scale of wartime upheavals into larger structures of how U.S. interference aborted Korean decolonization in ways that conditioned the Cold War’s remaking of the world order and emerging systems of unequal sovereignties. Drawing on extensive transnational research, *The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War* is an exceptionally accomplished first book.

The committee also recognizes Amy C. Offner’s *Sorting out the Mixed Economy: The Rise and Fall of Welfare and Developmental States in the Americas* (Princeton University Press, 2019) with Honorable Mention. Another outstanding book, *Sorting out the Mixed Economy* makes new and vital contributions to the already formidable scholarship on development and twentieth-century economics. Offner uses expansive archival work and multiple oral history
interviews to trace the export of U.S. expertise on poverty to Colombia, which produced programs and institutions for privatization, state decentralization, and austerity that were later repatriated to the United States as strategies that conservatives deployed during the 1980s to dismantle New Deal programs. Like The Interrogation Rooms, Sorting out the Mixed Economy explicates the multidirectional flow of state-making processes and influences that shaped the United States even as it sought to exert superpower influence on various client states.

The Myrna F. Bernath Committee (Sayuri Guthrie Shimizu, chair; Daniel Immerwahr; and Theresa Keeley) awarded the 2020 Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize to Lucy Salyer for her book, Under the Starry Flag: How a Band of Irish Americans Joined the Fenian Revolt and Sparked a Crisis over Citizenship (Harvard University Press, 2018). The committee lauded Lucy Salyer’s engaging prose in telling the gripping story of how a group of Irish Americans exploited differences between U.S. and British understandings of citizenship in their push for Irish independence. Their legal battle dramatized the idea of citizenship as an inalienable right, as natural as freedom of speech and religion, ultimately leading to passage of the U.S. Expatriation Act of 1868, the legislation guaranteeing the right to renounce one’s citizenship. Placing Reconstruction-era debates over citizenship and a human rights revolution sparked by Fenians within a global context, Under the Starry Flag raises important questions about citizenship and immigration that are still relevant today.

The Link-Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing goes to David Reynolds and Vladimir Pechatnov, eds., with the assistance of Iskander Magadeyev and Olga Kucherenko, for The Kremlin Letters: Stalin’s Wartime Correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt (Yale University Press, 2018). Decision-making during World War II has long been a key topic of study for diplomatic and military historians, not only because the consequences of those decisions continue to shape the world today, but also because of absences in the primary source record stemming from a variety of factors. One key absence has been Soviet documents, and The Kremlin Letters makes a vital contribution by bringing Soviet sources to light and making them available in English.
The committee (Nicole Phelps, chair; Christopher Dietrich; and David Nickles) commend the editors’ considerable, commendable work to contextualize the correspondence among Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, weaving their interpretations and introductions together with the primary sources to create a book that is best read cover-to-cover, rather than used strictly as a reference collection of documents.

The committee also commended Timothy Andrews Sayle, Jeffrey A. Engel, Hal Brands, and William Inboden for their volume, The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush’s Decision to Surge into Iraq (Cornell University Press, 2019), recognizing it with Honorable Mention. In 2015 and 2016, the editors of this book conducted interviews with a variety of G. W. Bush administration officials who participated in the decision-making process regarding U.S. strategy in Iraq, and The Last Card is the fruit of those interviews. The book includes an account of decision-making in 2006 produced by integrating the interviewees’ remarks as well as several chapters by a variety of scholars that interpret and contextualize those remarks. The interviews are also available in video format on an accompanying website. It too is a book to be read cover-to-cover as a first interpretation of these relatively recent events, and the editors are to be commended for their efforts to create a primary-source record for scholars’ future use.

The Dissertation Prize Committee of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (April Merleaux, chair; V. Scott Kaufman; and Erez Manela) is pleased to announce that the 2020 Oxford University Press-USA Dissertation Prize, which recognizes outstanding dissertation research in international history, goes to Cindy Ewing in recognition of her work, “The Asian Unity Project: Human Rights, Third World Solidarity, and the United Nations, 1945-1955,” completed at Yale University in 2018 under the supervision of Ben Kiernan. Ewing’s dissertation is an impressive international history that shows how postcolonial nations inscribed the principle of self-determination into postwar human rights discourse, especially at and through the United Nations. The dissertation makes an important intervention in debates on decolonization and human rights histories, drawing on archives on four continents, nine countries, and multiple languages. Ewing highlights the role played by nationalists and postcolonial elites
from Asia in shaping the postwar international system, ultimately showing that Asian postcolonial internationalism was a critical precursor to the idea of the “Third World” and the institutionalization of human rights norms.

The committee has also awarded **Honorable Mention** to **Ruth Lawlor** whose dissertation, “American Soldiers and the Politics of Rape in World War II Europe” was completed in 2019 at the University of Cambridge under the advising of Gary Gerstle. Drawing on archives in Germany, Great Britain, France, and the United States, Lawlor’s well researched and clearly argued dissertation shows that women’s testimony about rapes committed by American soldiers during World War II made the U.S. military courts-martial into a site for debating the parameters of race, gender, and nation across Europe. Bringing together gender studies, military history, and legal history, Lawlor highlights the differences among German, French, and British treatment of sexual violence and the role the military trials played in articulating racialized and gendered senses of nationhood. Lawlor’s approach demonstrates the value of international history methods for showing how ideas shift across space and time.

The **Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship** goes to **An Nguyen** of the University of Maine. Her dissertation, “Third Force: South Vietnamese Urban Opposition to the Nixon Doctrine in Asia, 1969-1975,” examines the impact of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia from the perspectives of urban antiwar movements in South Vietnam from 1969 to 1975, based on an analysis of four case studies of important groups involved in the urban struggle. These groups condemned American imperialism and rejected Communist doctrine, thereby constituting an informal Third Force coalition that subscribed to nonviolent nationalism and political neutralism. By exploring the viability of the Third Force as potential actors that could have enabled the United States to pursue a different course of action, Nguyen’s project returns historical contingency to our understandings of American policies in Vietnam. At the same time, it expands the boundaries of historiography on the Vietnam War, which has traditionally focused on either American determinants or North Vietnamese officials as the main agents of change. She is working with Professor Ngo Vinh Long and Professor Elizabeth McKillen.
The Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association invites submissions for the 2021 Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award.

The prize honors Tonous Hanna and Warda Paulis, who immigrated to the United States from Syria in 1900, married in 1906, and became U.S. citizens along with their children in 1919. Tony and Warda Johns, as they became known, emphasized the importance of education, hard work, and philanthropy to their children and grandchildren, and had a deep and abiding love for their adopted country and its history. These values—shared by so many other immigrants to the United States—profoundly shaped the lives of their descendants. In celebration of these ideals and in recognition of Tony and Warda’s continuing influence on their family, the Johns family created this endowment in the hope that Tony and Warda’s legacy will be felt and appreciated by the PCB-AHA community and that the award will encourage and recognize excellent historical scholarship.

The Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award will recognize the outstanding book (monograph or edited volume) in the history of U.S. foreign relations, immigration history, or military history by an author or editor residing in the PCB-AHA membership region.

Copies of books submitted for consideration for the award should be sent directly to each of the three members of the prize committee by February 15, 2021. More information is available at https://www.pcbaha.org/tonousandwardajohnsfamilybookaward.

Questions about the award or inquiries regarding donations to the endowment should be directed to Michael Green, PCB-AHA executive director, at michael.green@unlv.edu.

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association was organized in 1903 to serve members of the American Historical Association living in the western United States and the western provinces of Canada. With over 4000 members, it is one of the largest professional historical organizations in the United States.
When I was in grade school it seemed like all of my friends knew exactly what they wanted to be when they grew up. I never had a clear answer to that question, mostly because I was interested in everything (except a career in medicine). Not much has changed. I ended up a historian because I love writing and because I had outstanding history teachers and mentors at the secondary, undergraduate (SUNY Fredonia), and graduate (University of New Hampshire) levels. I am currently an Assistant Professor at Virginia Tech and am close to finishing my first book, which explores the role of refugee politics in post-1975 U.S.-Vietnamese relations (title TBD). Because I remain interested in everything, however, my work has appeared in the *Journal of the Early Republic*, *The Cold War at Home and Abroad: Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945* (University of Kentucky Press, 2018), and I hope to pursue a wide range of future projects. When I’m not writing or teaching, my favorite pastimes are spending time with my husband and son, running, baking, and being outside as much as possible.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

TV: *Friends, 12 Monkeys*. Movies: *The Holiday, Hidden Figures, Before We Go, Miracle*

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

In 2017 I was lucky enough to get to share some of my dissertation research at the Massachusetts Historical Society’s Modern American Society and Culture Seminar. About half an hour before I was to present, I was in a coffee shop down the block with a group of fellow UNHers who came to support me (thanks Kurk, Lucy, and Jordan). I’m not a coffee drinker so I ordered a hot chocolate and, as fate would have it, the barista didn’t snap the lid on entirely and…you guessed it. The entire cup went right down the front of my dress. But that is not all. I had decided to let the chocolately goodness cool down for a bit before drinking it, so I was seated when I doused myself, which meant the liquid covered not only the entire front of my dress but also pooled in my seat. I don’t have to tell you what the back of my dress looked like. Thankfully, I was wearing a forgiving, wrinkle-free fabric and the café bathroom had an electronic dryer. I went in, washed the dress in the sink, dried it as best as I could, and went and gave my presentation. No one seemed to notice anything amiss (and my colleagues insisted no one could tell), but for the entire evening all I could smell was hot chocolate.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

I’m sure all of us at SHAFR have endless answers to this question and I’m no exception, but right now my top choice would probably be Ginetta Sagan. I hope to write a biography of her one day and I would love to get a cooking lesson, as Sagan was, by all accounts, as accomplished in the kitchen as she was in the field of human rights activism (which is really saying something).

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

That much money is simply unfathomable to me. I would make sure my family had everything they needed and travel without concern for the cost, but beyond that I would have to do some serious thinking and imagining about what one could accomplish with that much money. I’d love to have that problem.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Do I have to use the time machine and unlimited budget for a music-related purposes? And are we sure handing out time machines is a good idea? Anyway…my incredibly selfish answer to the question is I would rather meet and get to write with some of the best musicians in the business (see question 7) than put on a big show. Sorry, would-be-festival-goers.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

I’ll share 5 things I’ve crossed off in the past 5 years: get my Ph.D., beat my half marathon PR after ACL surgery, go to a World Cup game (the USA vs. Germany 2015 semifinal in Montreal, it was incredible), become a mom, and write a book (which will be out next year via Cambridge University Press).

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

If I were kicked out of academia today, I would probably be a stay at home mom for a few years before deciding my next move. My guess is I would end up teaching history at the secondary level and coaching soccer, but finishing my novel and opening a bakery would also be contending considerations. If I had the whole thing to do over again but academia wasn’t an option, I think I would have pursued law, engineering, or song writing.
I was born and raised in Rochester, New York, the fourth of seven kids, a true middle child. My father was a World War II veteran who became a firefighter, my mother ran the Schwartz daycare as an unpaid domestic worker. (I'm joking, but housewife is such an inadequate description.) Both my parents had only finished high school, but they got all seven of us to college. They sacrificed so that I could go to a great Jesuit high school. That made all the difference.

I am proud of the work I’ve done, especially my recent book on Henry Kissinger. That took me a long time, but it can be read by both scholars and a wider public. Compared to most professors I haven’t been very prolific in my publishing, but I have been fortunate, both in my teaching at Vanderbilt and in some of the professional opportunities I’ve had. I treasure the friendships with colleagues and students, and have always loved SHAFR. My greatest joy in life has been my three daughters, who have grown up to become wonderful people. I’m really a very lucky man. To quote John Prine’s last song, “When I get to heaven, I’m gonna shake God’s hand, and thank him for more blessings than one man can stand.”

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?
   Star Trek (The Original Series), Dallas, Hill Street Blues, The Sopranos, and Modern Family (I’ve watched too much TV!)

Favorite Movies – It’s a Wonderful Life, Casablanca, Groundhog Day, Scrooge (Alistair Sims version), and the Manchurian Candidate (The original 1962 film and not the mediocre 2004 remake.)

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

In the midst of expounding on my brilliant dissertation topic, gesticulating far more than a normal human being should, I spilled a glass of red wine on the beautiful, white, and antique tablecloth at my doctoral adviser’s home. It was the first and only time I was ever there.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

This will sound like a strange combination, but here goes:

Paul of Tarsus – My Christian faith has meant the world to me and I would love to meet the man who spread it. (JC would be far too intimidating.) One highlight of my life was on a trip to Turkey, we visited an ancient amphitheater in the city of Izmir, once Ephesus, where Paul preached.

Vince Lombardi – I grew up loving NFL football because of his Packers, and even though I’m a lifelong New York Giants fan, I always appreciated what Lombardi accomplished.

Robert Kennedy – My first political hero. I saw him in a motorcade in Rochester when I was ten years old, and he had the bluest eyes of anyone I’ve ever seen.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

After using a chunk of it to provide a subsidy and financial safety net for my large – but economically challenged and dysfunctional extended family – I would give the rest away to worthy charities that help poor kids. I’m not sure which ones, but I’d hire a team of unemployed history Ph.Ds. to research the issue.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

I realize this might sound like the movie, “A Mighty Wind,” but I’d invite Woody Guthrie, Pete Seeger, the Kingston Trio, the Chad Mitchell Trio, Joan Baez, Bob Dylan, John Denver, Harry Chapin, Peter, Paul, and Mary, Steve Goodman, Joni Mitchell, Judy Collins, and John Prine. My older brother Bob, whom I revered and who died way too young, was a folk musician at night and a high school teacher by day, and I grew up listening to these artists.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

This is a hard one to answer, since I don’t really have a bucket list. If I did it would be travel-related, which seems strange to mention during this pandemic. Maybe to make it to all 50 states. Maybe to see the Great Wall and the Kremlin. Maybe to visit Antarctica. But my real bucket list is personal – to dance at my daughters’ weddings and to play monster with my grandchildren.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

Probably some type of lawyer. That’s where I was headed before I walked into Jim Shenton’s 19th Century US history class in my sophomore year at Columbia. He was the most inspiring teacher I ever had, and he got me hooked.
Megan Black has just joined the History Department at MIT as an associate professor specializing in the history of U.S. environmental management, international relations, and political economy. She previously taught at the London School of Economics and is currently on fellowship at Dartmouth College. Her recent book, The Global Interior: Mineral Frontiers and American Power (Harvard University Press, 2018), examines the role of the U.S. Interior Department in pursuing minerals beyond borders and maintaining the fiction of a primarily inward-looking American nation. This work has received four top prizes in history, including the George Perkins Marsh Prize, Stuart L. Bernath Prize, W. Turrentine-Jackson Prize, and British Association of American Studies Prize. Her articles have appeared in the Journal of American History and Diplomatic History, and she recently published a “photoarticle” on the critique of U.S. exploitation of Mexico in the classic film The Treasure of the Sierra Madre (a personal favorite, see below) in Modern American History. She developed a passion for history while an unsuspecting undergraduate at the University of Nebraska (thanks, Tim Borstelmann!) and cultivated a practice for navigating dynamic archives while a PhD student in American Studies at George Washington University (thanks, Melani McAlister!).

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

   Parks and Recreation
   Schitt’s Creek
   Notorious
   It’s a Wonderful Life
   The Treasure of the Sierra Madre
   The Third Man
   Before Sunset
   Love & Basketball
   The Hunt for the Wilderpeople

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

   While a graduate student, I was so flustered when meeting an intellectual hero unexpectedly in the coffee line at the conference hotel that chaos ensued. In my excitement, I dropped the blueberry muffin I was holding and then, unsure what to do next, proceeded to eat it to the surprise of my hero. 5 second rule, I guess?

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

   Harriet Jacobs, who (as scholar George Sanchez pointed out) did so much work coordinating a network of allies and resources from the confines of a six-inch crawl space as part of her daring escape from slavery.

   Rachel Carson, a citizen-scientist who provoked mainstream environmental concern and faced no shortage of gaslighting from official institutions along the way.

   Winona LaDuke, very much alive and historic for so many reasons, she has brought immeasurable passion, intellect, tenacity, and humor to the fight for indigenous sovereignty and environmental justice—starting with her Anishinaabe community but also reaching so far beyond it.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

   Pay 99 percent taxes.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

   Sam Cooke
   Patti Smith
   Amy Winehouse

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

   Become some dog’s human
   Make an enjoyable dinner made entirely of things grown in my garden.
   Serve on a jury
   Do as many pushups as Ruth Bader Ginsburg
   Make a half-court shot

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

   Move to Hollywood, grind it out trying to make it as a screenwriter or showrunner.

Megan Black
I'm an Associate Professor of History at the University of South Florida, where I've worked since 2010. Here in Tampa, I live with Sacco and Vanzetti (cats), Stella (dog), Steve (human), and a rotating cast of lizards and palmetto bugs. My research focuses on the place of humanitarian aid in 20th century U.S. foreign relations and international history. My first book, *Making the World Safe*, was published in 2013. Now, I'm writing (and hopefully soon finishing!) my second book. Tentatively titled *Catastrophic Diplomacy*, it examines the politics of U.S. foreign disaster relief throughout the early to mid-20th century world. For a sneak peak, check out “Raging Rivers and Propaganda Weevils” (*Diplomatic History*, 2016) or “The ‘Development’ of Humanitarian Relief” (*The Development Century*, 2018). I first went to grad school to study the history of medicine and health, but found my way into U.S. international history thanks to a first-year cultural history seminar, where then-new books by Melani McAllister, Christina Klein, and Kristin Hoganson showed me that “foreign relations” could be a very different field than I had once imagined.

1. **What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?**

When I was in elementary school, I was obsessed with Get Smart (then in reruns), the 1960s spy series that satirized the CIA and the Cold War. I suspect the show must have had a lasting influence, inspiring both my interest in U.S. foreign relations and my deep appreciation for mod fashion – I still want to be Agent 99 when I grow up. In college, I fell for *Nuovo Cinema Paradiso*; it remains my favorite movie of all time. These days, I’m into anything and everything that Phoebe Waller-Bridge or Taika Waititi act in, direct, write, or produce. Finally, as someone who loves to cook (and eat) and who spends many of my waking hours daydreaming about my next meal, I never miss a season of *Top Chef*.

2. **What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?**

Hmm…. If I were to answer the “embarrassing” part of this truthfully, it would implicate several of my dearest SHAFR friends and colleagues. So, no comment! As for nerve-wracking or anxiety-producing professional moments, well, I just do my best to avoid those – I find it’s a much more pleasant career that way!

3. **If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?**

I would invite three alchemists: the first person who decided to harvest beans, roast them, and transform them into coffee; the first person who realized you could set milk out, let it ferment, put it in a cave (and even let it grow mold), and transform it into cheese; and the first person who figured out how to boil corn and other grains, distill the liquid, and transform it into bourbon. For our menu, I’d start them out with a Paper Plane (the best bourbon cocktail), then serve bucatini cacio e pepe with a heavy dusting of well-aged Pecorino Romano, finishing it all up with a perfectly pulled espresso. And the reason for the meal, of course, would be to thank these individuals for the invaluable contributions they have made to my life.

4. **What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?**

First, I would endow a party fund for all future SHAFR conferences. $100 million should just about cover the costs of a renting a villa for a week each year, complete with a pool, multiple pool tables, and an open bar – cocktails, mocktails, and a lavish cicchetti spread for all attendees! Then, I’d invest the rest in university unionization campaigns so that grad students, adjuncts, and other faculty and staff can count on decent work standards, benefits, and a living wage.

5. **You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?**

I’d organize a three-day festival, with Nirvana, David Bowie, and Leonard Cohen as the headline acts. During the days, attendees would enjoy a rotating assortment of Brazilian, French, and Italian bossa nova & new wave artists/bands (Antônio Carlos Jobim, Nouvelle Vague, Marchio Bossa… the list goes on). And for the late-night/wee-hours-of-the-morning sets, I’d bring out all the best New Orleans funk and brass bands (Rebirth, Soul Rebels, Dirty Dozen, Hot 8… again, the list goes on).

6. **What are five things on your bucket list?**

1. Attending the next Fête des Vignerons, a wine-making festival that takes place in Vevey, Switzerland just five times per century. By happy coincidence, I was able to spend a day at the last one, in July 2019. Upon learning about it, my dad made me promise that we I would take him the next time. He’ll be in his 90s by that point, so it was a promise I could hardly refuse!
2. [redacted: classified information]
3. Somewhere on here, I should probably include finishing my dang book…
4. Spending a year in each of the twenty regions of Italy, tasting, savoring, and learning about all of the foods, dishes, and wines that each region is known for. If I retire at 65, I’ll complete this task by 85. That’s definitely doable!
5. Just once, I’d really love to win a game of *Twilight Struggle*.

7. **What would you be doing if you were not an academic?**

I would be Agent 99 (see question 1).
I am a PhD student at THE Ohio State University, studying U.S. evangelical missionaries in Brazil during the World-War II and Cold-War era. I also currently identify as a stay-at-home dad (until daycare centers reopen) and Hahn advisee. And then you ask why they say that all millennials suffer from anxiety?!

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?
Movies: Crash, Downfall, Fahrenheit 11/9 (one of the rare sequels that is better than the original), About a Boy, Borat, and so many more. As a teenager, my pocket money went into hoarding DVDs. Thankfully, my pocket money was bounded, and streaming was unheard of—otherwise, I might have never finished high school.

Series: Making a Murderer, Peep Show, The Office (USA) and Stromberg (its German equivalent), Breaking Bad, Idiot Abroad, Survivor (what else conflates game theory and Trash TV so seamlessly?)

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking professional moment?
Where to start? Perhaps when I addressed a Brazilian archivist as “father,” even though he was just a Catholic archivist? Or maybe the day I asked Evan McCormick in front of a sizable audience how he was liking Fayetteville, NC, only to be told that he lived in Dallas? (All those pesky universities with “Methodist” in their name!) Then there was the time at SHAFR when I thanked OSU alumno—I will stand by my declensions of “alumnus” any day—Paul Chamberlin gleefully that I had stolen his engagement idea and proposed to my fiancée in Columbus’s Goodale Park. Turns out this had been the idea of another Buckeye alumni, Ryan Irwin. Upon alerting me to this, Paul was kind, but I still cringe when thinking about it. Now let us hope it really was Ryan when I next approach him!

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why? Do I approach humanity's worst to ask the tough questions about genocide, slavery, and torture or do I interrogate artistic complexity by inquiring about the lives of characters like Kahlo, Goethe, and Hemingway? Considering my partial Polish heritage, it would probably behoove me to stick to painters and authors—excluding failed Austrian painters, of course.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
Where to start, considering that our planet is melting down, inequality persists, and we are dealing with a global pandemic? I would probably give the lion’s share to organizations like Oxfam International who have a decent track record in tackling issues sustainably and bottom-up. SHAFR would also receive ample support in a clear "QUID-PRO-QUO" scheme—something I will subsequently deny on Twitter.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
Incurring the danger of sounding like a snob—by no means a mean feat for me—I would invite classical behemoths like Bach, Shostakovich, and Villa-Lobos. Lastly, I would force Wagner to comment on Hans Zimmer’s movie scores. No politics allowed!

6. What are five things on your bucket list?
1) Walk the Camino de Santiago. Everyone cries at some point, they say, overwhelmed by exhaustion and Spain’s beauty.
2) I am plagiarizing this from someone else, but it would like to write a book that someone deigns to read twice.
3) To boldly make split infinitives great again (time to print those "MSIGA" hats!).
4) Speak Russian beyond entry-level Rosetta Stone levels. Seriously, how far does “the little green men walk” get you outside of Donbass?
5) Start a fake birther controversy surrounding a prominent white guy in office. Install golden toilets in all my apartments and airplanes (my “golden throne”). Then, I would create a bunch of eponymous businesses. “Schoof Steaks” and “Schoof Vodka” have a certain ring to them.

7. What would you do if you were not an academic?
I would host a progressive political YouTube channel, only to see my life wither away as I deal with death threats, bots, and Ben Shapiro’s fast-talking acolytes.

Markus Schoof
SHAFR Council Minutes
Thursday, June 18, 2020
8 a.m.-12:45 p.m. EDT
via Zoom

Council members present: Kristin Hoganson, presiding; Vivien Chang; Mary Dudziak; Peter Hahn; Andrew Johns; Adriane Lentz-Smith; Kyle Longley; Brian McNamara; Andrew Preston; Kelly Shannon; Lauren Turek; and Karine Walther.

Also attending: Amy Sayward (ex officio), Faith Bagley, Anne Foster, Petra Goedde, Mitch Lerner, and Patricia Thomas.

Introductory Business

Kristin Hoganson commenced the meeting at 8:05AM EDT. After thanking Council for its service, she proposed a procedure whereby business items not covered before 12:45PM would be divided into those items that could be tabled until the January 2021 Council meeting and those that should be discussed at an interim meeting before January. Additionally, she noted that there were items listed at the end of the agenda that would be considered the equivalent of “consent calendar” items, which would be handled administratively (by the President and Executive Director) unless a Council member moved that any item should be moved to the agenda for discussion and/or vote. There was consensus for this procedure.

Mary Dudziak moved to thank retiring committee and task force members:
- 2020 Conference Committee: Gretchen Heefner (co-chair), Julia Irwin (co-chair), Megan Black, Andrew Buchanan, Jeffrey Byrne, Emily Conroy-Krutz, Konstantine Dierks, Rebecca Herman Weber, Humberto Garcia-Muñiz, Molly Geidel, Daniel Immerwahr, Kevin Kim, Jeannette Jones, Stephen Macekura, David Milne, Corinna Unger, Ngoei Wen-Qing, and Ronald Williams II;
- Development Committee: Richard Immerman, Robert Brigham, and Andrew Preston;
- Graduate Student Committee: Brian McNamara (Co-Chair) and Alvita Akiboh;
- Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize Committee: Madeline Hsu (Chair) and Amanda McVety;
- Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize Committee: Tehila Sasson (Chair);
- Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize Committee: Susan Carruthers (Chair) and Nancy Mitchell;
- Norman and Laura Graebner Award: Edward G. Miller (Chair);
- Dissertation Prize Committee: April Merleaux (Chair);
- Michael H. Hunt Prize for International History: Alan McPherson (Chair);
- Myrna Bernath Book Award and Fellowship: Sayuri Shimizu (Chair);
- Conference Conduct Task Force and Reporting Team: Aaron O’Connell; and
- SHAFR Delegate to the National Coalition for History: Matthew Connelly.

The motion was seconded by Brian McNamara and passed unanimously (8-0-0).

Amy Sayward recapped the votes that Council had made since its January meeting in order to reaffirm those votes. Those included Council decisions to approve the minutes of its January 2020 meeting, to cancel its face-to-face 2020 conference and related contracts, to roll the sponsorships of that conference to a future New Orleans conference, and to establish a virtual conference page. The affirmation of those votes was unanimous (8-0-0).

Financial Matters

David Engerman, the Endowment Liaison of the Ways & Means Committee, was admitted to the meeting to represent the committee, as its chair, Barbara Keys, was not able to attend the Council meeting. Sayward provided a brief overview of the financial reports provided ahead of time to Council.

Engerman reviewed the Ways and Means Committee’s recommendations related to the 2021 conference hotel contract. Additionally, the committee recommended that Council 1) provide those planning the 2021 Conference with flexibility within the overall goal of providing a high-quality, fiscally-prudent conference, 2) step back from the membership rate increases passed by Council in January in light of current economic concerns, 3) add those who are precariously employed into the student rate, and 4) waive the membership fee of those who are precariously employed/low income and serve on SHAFR committees. Karine Walther joined the meeting at this point. A brief discussion ensued about the different types of conferences that might be possible (hybrid vs. entirely on-line) as well as their financial implications. Informing these conversations was an update on SHAFR’s 2020 conference cancellation.

There was also discussion about membership rates. Differences in cost of living, the on-going uncertainty of the pandemic, and its financial implications—especially on higher education—were issues raised in support to rescinding the earlier rate increases. Arguments in favor of maintaining the increases for those with higher incomes and creating a higher-income bracket were that it is progressive and that it is in line with the suggestion of the Jobs Crisis Task Force to provide greater support for those who are precariously employed. Dudziak made a motion to postpone the membership increases for one year (to go into effect for the 2022 calendar year) and to include the precariously employed within the student rate category. The motion was seconded by Andrew Johns and passed unanimously (9-0-0). Engerman left the meeting, and Peter Hahn and Kyle Longley joined the meeting at this point.

There was a discussion of three other membership issues. There was general support for the idea of a one-time
memebership “sale,” meant to encourage people who had not renewed to do so; these late renewers would not receive paper back issues of SHAFR publications but would receive all publications for the rest of the year. It was hoped that this invitation back—combined with the easier renewal process now available through the Member Clicks website—would result in a net gain in members. A proposal for a three-year renewal would lock in rates and would be more convenient for some members. Hoganson moved that SHAFR provide a one-time discount of 50% for the remainder of the year and adopt a three-year renewal option. The motion was seconded by Adriane Lentz-Smith and passed unanimously (11-0-0). Dudziak suggested that SHAFR broadly advertise the membership discount in order to attract new members as well as encourage lapsed members to renew. Hoganson made a motion to adopt the Ways & Means Committee’s recommendation to waive SHAFR membership fees for precariously employed/low income members serving on committees and task forces. Hahn seconded the motion, which passed unanimously (11-0-0). Dudziak left the meeting at this point.

Discussion of 2021 Conference Plans

Andrew Preston then talked about the discussions around and progress in thinking about the format for the 2021 Conference and why the task force had settled on the suggestion of a hybrid conference, meaning that some elements will be (potentially) in-person and others will be on-line or mixed. Preston explained that the difficulty of running a hybrid conference will be in making the in-person events and on-line events link up and work together. This will be complicated and will probably necessitate a new format that will be very different to the normal format of the annual conference. One suggestion was to potentially partner with C-SPAN to engage in some cost-sharing. Walther wondered if SHAFR might include information about international travel health insurance issues on its conference website. There was a discussion of the many unknowns related to a hybrid conference, especially the cost of a high-quality provider and what the conference rates might be.

There was significant discussion of satellite events that could be connected to the conference. These were seen as a way to keep overseas members of SHAFR meaningfully connected to the organization and providing, on a smaller scale, the in-person networking that members so appreciate at the conference. The downsides to these events would be the additional planning required in a year in which there will be an unprecedented amount of planning required for a hybrid conference. There would also be some expense incurred in order to support these satellite events and their participants on a fair and equitable basis, though potential satellite organizers anticipated that university facilities could be used without additional cost.

Hoganson moved to adopt the proposed budget (which included the hybrid conference and contractual reductions to the hotel obligation). The motion was seconded by Longley and passed unanimously (10-0-0).

Discussion of Council Representation Issues

Following a break, Mitchell Lerner of the SHAFR Nominating Committee joined the meeting to discuss the proposal for having a Council seat designated for a member in a teaching-focused position as a way of diversifying Council and representing this large segment of the membership. Council also entertained motions for a designated non-U.S.-based member on Council as well as a proposal to reduce the post-presidential term of Council service (which is currently three years). Lerner said that the Nominating Committee did not favor the designation of a non-U.S. designated seat on Council. In part, this was based on the fact that there are currently several non-U.S. members who are serving on Council and others who have recently run for seats. He also argued that there might be more similarities between U.S. and non-U.S. members of SHAFR from research-focused institutions than between research-focused and teaching-focused institutions within the same country. Some concerns were also expressed about the prospect of a Council composed of members expected to advocate for specific constituencies, of which there are many in SHAFR.

After Lerner left the meeting, Council continued its deliberations. Most expressed the belief that a teaching-centered Council member would provide valuable input for Council discussions. There was also a discussion of including more non-U.S. Americans on Council, regardless of where they might live/teach.

In discussing the post-presidential term, there was discussion of the important institutional memory and guidance provided by past presidents serving on Council. However, reducing the term might attract others to consider running for the office. It was pointed out that reducing the post-presidential term by one year would open up a seat on Council and make “adding” a designated seat revenue-neutral. Additionally, the possibility of greater virtual participation in Council meetings (another proposal before Council) might make it easier for past presidents to continue their service and/or make it easier for SHAFR members located outside of the United States to serve on the Council. Hahn recused himself from further discussion at this point. Lentz-Smith moved the by-laws amendment that Council reduce the post-presidential term by one year, starting on January 1, 2022. Preston seconded the motion, and it passed with none opposed and Preston and Hoganson abstaining (7-0-2). Hahn then rejoined the meeting.

Longley moved a by-laws amendment to add an additional teaching-centered seat to Council, beginning with the 2021 election (if the by-law is approved by the membership). Lauren Turek seconded the motion, which passed unanimously (10-0-0). Brian McNamara then moved that at least one member of Council must be located outside of the United States (at the time of election), thereby requiring a pair of international Council candidates in a SHAFR election should the situation exist that otherwise there would be no non-U.S. based members on Council. Walther seconded the amendment, which passed 8-2-0.

Council also considered the report of the task force on remote participation, which recommended guidelines for what circumstances would justify remote participation by a Council member and recommended that Council re-evaluate the issue after its first “mixed” meeting (partly in person and partly remote). Hoganson moved to accept the report's
recommendations, Lentz-Smith seconded, and the motion passed unanimously (10-0-0).

**Terms of Michael J. Hogan Fellowship:**

Walther, former chair of the Hogan Fellowship Committee, had proposed in January that the terms of the fellowship be expanded to include those who want to conduct research in foreign-language archives as well as those who want to pursue foreign-language instruction. This would potentially expand the pool of applicants, which has been small, and would potentially be useful to a larger number of SHAFR graduate student members. There was discussion about shifting the language in the fellowship's description to clarify the meaning of “foreign,” especially given that many SHAFR members have acquired English through formal instruction, the context surrounding the founding of the Hogan Fellowship, and whether to prioritize training vs. research. Ultimately, Kelly Shannon moved to adopt the original language of the proposal from the Hogan Fellowship Committee. The motion was seconded by Longley and passed unanimously (10-0-0).

**Publication Matters:**

Following a break, Anne Foster and Petra Goedde, the editors of *Diplomatic History*, joined the meeting to discuss the written report they had made to Council. Foster talked about the desk-rejection process, which means that fewer low-quality pieces are being sent to referees, which explained the reduction in the number of reviewers listed. Longley thanked the editors for their work with the Open Access Task Force. Preston commended the editors for the high number of non-U.S. submissions and requested a breakdown the acceptance rate among this group of submitters. Foster mentioned that they are trying to figure out which international submissions could become publishable with additional work on English-language issues. She also talked about the COVID-19 feature and developing efforts to better utilize social media to promote *DH* content. Foster and Goedde left the meeting, and Council considered their proposal for new editorial board members. Hoganson moved to accept the recommendations, Lentz-Smith seconded the motion, and 9 voted in favor with McNamara abstaining (9-0-1).

Trish Thomas of Oxford University Press joined the meeting, highlighting some elements from the publisher's report. She stated that the pandemic had not significantly affected the printing and production of OUP journals to date, although international mailings had been held back. She lauded the *Diplomatic History* editorial team's timeliness in producing journal content. Asked about the likely long-term effects of the pandemic, she thought there might well be more of a focus on online-only subscriptions moving forward, even among libraries. Thomas then left the meeting.

Council reviewed the proposal to enter into a partnership with CIAO (Columbia International Affairs Online) utilizing *Passport* content that would be selected by the *Passport* editor in conjunction with the editorial board—ceding no rights and incurring no expenses. Hoganson moved to accept the proposal, Vivien Chang seconded the motion, and it passed (9-0-1) with Andrew Johns abstaining.

**2022 SHAFR Conference:**

Hoganson asked for formal Council approval for planning to have the 2022 SHAFR conference in New Orleans (with Toronto becoming the location of the 2024 conference), given the work of the local arrangements committee for the 2020 conference and the membership's excitement about the location. She also spoke about some of SHAFR's options for that 2024 conference. Her motion was to reschedule the 2022 conference for New Orleans—empowering the President and Executive Director to identify the best location for the conference—and to have Toronto serve as the 2024 conference venue. Longley seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously (10-0-0).

**Solidarity Statement:**

The soon-to-be-renamed Committee on Minority Historians in SHAFR recommended that SHAFR adopt the following statement:

“The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) affirms that Black Lives Matter and condemns state and non-state violence against racialized communities in the United States and abroad. We stand in solidarity with those who have been fighting anti-Black racism and vow to continue working for the full inclusion and equality of all peoples in all institutions and communities to which we belong, including SHAFR.

“Consistent with SHAFR's mission to promote ‘the study, advancement and dissemination of knowledge of American foreign relations,’ we believe in identifying the inequities and imbalances of power and influence between and within states and highlighting the connections between racism, patriarchy, economic exploitation, and imperialism. We hope you will join us in fostering research and dialogue including diverse constituencies, working towards meaningful change, justice, and healing.”

Several members commented that the statement was better than others they had seen and commended the committee for its work. Hoganson said that Council should do more to center the goals of the statement within the organization. She moved acceptance of the resolution, Walther seconded it, and it passed unanimously (10-0-0).

**Issues Related to Archives:**

Hoganson highlighted the key elements of the proposal from Matthew Connelly to establish a Task Force on Advocacy to supplement and amplify the work of SHAFR's Historical Documentation Committee, the State Department's Historical
Advisory Committee, and the National Coalition for History. Hearing no objections from Council, she stated that she would create the proposed task force on a three-year trial basis, which is within her purview as SHAFR President, instructing the Task Force to adhere to the following guidelines, to ensure compliance with not-for-profit and SHAFR policy:

- **Internal communications:** Working through a MemberClicks or other list-serve and social media to alert interested members to NARA and other SHAFR-related appropriations and policy matters. The Advocacy Task Force should work with the HDC, SHAFR representative to the NCH, and other professional associations (such as the AHA) to identify alerts and then to circulate alerts related to the kinds of research that SHAFR members conduct. If the implications for SHAFR members of some of these alerts are not clear, the Task Force can provide explanatory text, in consultation with the HDC. This work should be informational. In its general internal communications efforts, the Task Force must not urge or advocate specific actions to be taken by members.

- **Agency advocacy:** Mobilizing members to call for departments or agencies to change policies, rules, or regulations or adopt new ones.

- **Legislation:** Developing a slate of advocacy issues and general policy positions that are not reduced to specific legislative proposals that would go through the Council and membership approval process stipulated by our bylaws and then to engage in direct lobbying on those issues. (Since this would not be a funded effort, we would easily fall within the financial guidelines for non-profit organizations, and since it would represent a small fraction of SHAFR's overall work, it would fall within allowable limits for non-profits).

- **External communications:** Publicizing the general policy positions that are not reduced to specific legislative proposals that have been approved by Council and the membership.

Council then considered a proposal from the Historical Documentation Committee to establish the Anna Kasten Nelson Outstanding Archivist Award, which would not include a monetary award. Hoganson moved to accept the recommendation, which was seconded by Longley and passed 9-0-1, with Shannon as the abstention.

**Business Tabled until January 2021:**

- A proposal to host 1 out of 10 SHAFR conferences outside of the United States.
- *Passport* permission-to-publish template and draft MOU
- Evaluation of Conference Consultant
- Conflict of Interest policy clarification
- Proposal on recording Council votes and on publishing committee reports
- Proposal on public engagement podcasting

As no items were judged to require an interim meeting before January 2021, such a meeting will not be held unless urgent business requires it.

**Concluding Business:**

Hoganson reminded Council that she would be appointing a task force on the position of the executive director so that a review could be concluded by June 2021, providing sufficient time to either renew the current executive director or to ensure an orderly and timely transition to a new executive director.

Hearing no requests from Council to move any items listed in the agenda’s consent calendar to the agenda for discussion, Hoganson affirmed her commitment to work with the committees to handle their requests and recommendations administratively, along with the Executive Director.

*Meeting adjourned at 12:46 PM EDT*
Professional Notes

Mark Philip Bradley, Bernadotte E. Schmitt Distinguished Service Professor of International History and the College at the University of Chicago, has been named editor of the *American Historical Review* beginning in August 2021.

Cindy Ewing will be Assistant Professor of History at the University of Missouri beginning in Fall 2020.

Kyle Longley will be Professor of History and Director of the War and Society Studies Graduate Program at Chapman University beginning in Fall 2020.

Kelly Shannon, Associate Professor of History at Florida Atlantic University, has been appointed Director of FAU’s Peace, Justice, and Human Rights Initiative as of July 1, 2020.


Silke Zoller will be Assistant Professor of History at Kennesaw State University beginning in Fall 2020.

Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

January 1-December 31, 2019

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation to the Department of State (HAC) has two principal responsibilities: 1) to oversee the preparation and timely publication of the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series by the department’s Office of the Historian (OH); and 2) to monitor the declassification and release of State Department records.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-138 [105 Stat. 647, codified in relevant part at 22 U.S.C. § 4351 et seq.]) mandates these responsibilities. Known as the Foreign Relations statute, it requires publishing a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of US foreign relations no later than 30 years after the events that they document. This timeline reflects Congress’s commitment to transparency and an informed public, two pillars of democratic governance. The statute also obligates the HAC to review the “State Department’s declassification procedures” and “all guidelines used in declassification, including those guidelines provided to the National Archives and Records Administration [NARA].”

The challenges that threaten the future viability of both the *FRUS* series and NARA that the HAC identified in 2018 continued throughout 2019. The pace of the reviews of *FRUS* volumes submitted to the interagency review process was again disappointing. Notwithstanding some slight improvement, the Department of Defense (DoD) remained the principal obstacle.

OH’s inability to halt the decline in the number of *FRUS* volumes it published was particularly frustrating because in 2019 it migrated from the Bureau of Public Affairs to the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), a more natural fit. Further, it filled the position of Historian (office director), which had been vacant throughout 2018. Although during this interregnum OH was ably co-directed by Deputy Historian Renee Goings and *FRUS* General Editor Adam Howard, Dr. Howard’s appointment as Historian in 2019 and the selection of Kathleen Rasmussen as General Editor allowed Dr. Howard to focus exclusively on his responsibilities as office director as Dr. Rasmussen concentrated on overseeing *FRUS*. Both are exceptionally experienced and well qualified. Yet phenomena beyond their control thwarted *FRUS*’s production.

**Publications of the *Foreign Relations* Series**

Researching the multiplicity of records that document an administration’s foreign relations, culling from them the limited number that can be managed in one volume while still providing a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary history, steering the draft volume through the interagency declassification review process, and editing it for publication poses a
demanding and time-consuming challenge. Nevertheless, despite publishing only 6 FRUS volumes in 2018, the average number of volumes OH has published since 2015 is 8. That is the number the office calculates it must publish in order ultimately to achieve the 30-year timeline mandated by the Foreign Relations statute.

In 2019, however, it published only 2 volumes, fewer than any year in a decade. Their titles are:

1. FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia (August 8)
2. FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–76 (October 23)

The HAC can report some good 2019 news regarding FRUS. In 2018 OH completed its 10-year project to digitize all 512 previously-published FRUS volumes dating back to the series' origin in 1861. In 2019 it began to digitize the microfiche supplements released between 1993 and 1998 that contained additional documents from the Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy FRUS subseries. It completed the digitization 484 documents totaling 2,046 pages and covering Arms Control, National Security Policy, and Foreign Economic Policy during the Kennedy administration. One of the supplements it plans to digitize next is on the Cuban Missile Crisis.

These microfiche supplements, coupled with the 2 volumes OH did publish in 2019, brings the FRUS digital archive to a total of 307,105 documents from 538 volumes published in the 158 years between 1861 and 2019. The archive is accessible without charge online, searchable by full-text or by date, and downloadable in multiple ebook formats.

The Challenge of the 30-Year Requirement

OH's relentless efforts to gain approval through the interagency process to declassify documents for publication in FRUS continue to encounter obstacles. As the number of volumes declines as a result, the progress OH has made toward reaching the mandated 30-year timeline has stalled. Indeed, the gap is likely to begin to widen again.

The explosion of documents that OH's historians are statutorily required to locate among the multiple departments, agencies, and executive offices that contribute to the foreign relations process makes some decrease in the annual rate of publication unavoidable. Currently the office has submitted for declassification dozens of volumes from the Carter and Reagan FRUS subseries, stretching the interagency process to the breaking point. The reasons are readily understandable. An increasing number of the documents selected for publication concern sensitive intelligence information. In most cases, diverse agencies and departments hold an “equity” (interest) in these documents; they are entitled to approve or deny their release in part or full. Thus, the time required to complete the interagency process is frequently prolonged. Further, as explained in last year's report, the same declassification offices in many agencies are responsible for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requests as well as FRUS systematic reviews and declassification. Responding to time-sensitive FOIA/MDR requests must take priority over FRUS reviews.

The responsibility of the contributing agencies for the breakdown of the process varies dramatically. The State Department's Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS) should serve as a model for other agencies and departments. The quality and timeliness of is reviews reflect the existence of team dedicated FRUS coordination and the expertise and experience of the former Foreign Service Officers that IPS employs to conduct the reviews. As in past years, State reviewed more volumes more promptly than any other agency.

The HAC also judges favorably the contributions of The National Security Council’s (NSC’s) Office of Records and Information Security Management. It both reviews documents with White House equities and comments on the declassification decisions of other reviewing agencies. Like State, its reviews were timely and of high quality. Further, the NSC was pivotal to resolving a seemingly intractable dispute between OH and DoD over one particular volume when National Security Advisor John Bolton intervened directly to support OH’s request to refer the volume to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).

That it required Mr. Bolton's intervention to overcome DoD’s resistance to submitting the disputed volume to ISCAP was symptomatic of its attitude toward FRUS and the review process. In 2018 the HAC criticized DoD for violating “egregiously” the Foreign Relations statute's requirements that 1) it conduct a declassification review of a FRUS compilation within 120 days of receiving it from OH; 2) it respond to any appeals of the first review within another 60 days; and, in order to make releasable a record that contains sensitive national security information; 3) it make an effort to redact the text. In 2019 DoD's violations of timeliness and quality were equally egregious. It responded to less than one-third of the volumes that OH submitted for its review, it took more than 4 times longer than the mandated timeline when it did respond, and its few responses were of poor quality. OH’s inability to publish more than 2 volumes in 2019 can be attributed largely if not exclusively to DoD's failure to provide timely and quality responses.

The HAC has reason for some cautious optimism, nevertheless. The Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR), which coordinates FRUS declassification reviews within DoD, came under new leadership in 2019. Far more frequently than in past years, this new leadership attended HAC meetings, providing fuller briefings, and pledging to do whatever was within its limited authority to improve. For this purpose, DoD has adjusted some of its internal processes. Yet DoD's ability to comply with statutory responsibilities, and by doing so set OH back on the path of meeting the statutory timeline for publishing FRUS volumes, will require the commitment and direction of high-level DoD officials.

Toward this end OH has received strong support from the Foreign Service Institute, most notably Ambassadors Daniel B. Smith (Ph.D. in History) and Juliesta Valls Noyes, FSIs Director and Deputy Director, respectively. Under Secretary of State Brian Bulatao provided further support by personally engaging his DoD counterpart. As a result, direct discussions
regarding resolving the issues have begun between the State and Defense Departments. The HAC strongly believes that integral to a viable resolution must be DoD’s establishment of a centralized FRUS declassification coordination team similar to those established by both State and CIA.

In addition, the HAC worked with staff on the US House Armed Services Committee to include a section in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019 (NDAA) aimed at promoting DoD compliance with the Foreign Relations Statute. The provision requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on the “progress and objectives of the Secretary with respect to the release of documents for publication in the Foreign Relations of the United States series or to facilitate the public accessibility of such documents at the National Archives, presidential libraries, or both.” This report should make more transparent DoD’s performance and the reasons for its declassification delays, an important step in precipitating improvements.

The HAC urges DoD to take its cue from the CIA, notwithstanding the challenges that agency confronts in declassifying documents and meeting the mandated timelines for FRUS reviews. In fact, CIA’s suspension in 2016 of the High Level Panel (HLP) mechanism that plays a vital role in evaluating OH’s requests to acknowledge covert actions has contributed to the drop in the rate of FRUS publications, and OH still awaits 9 overdue responses from CIA on documents that OH submitted for declassification review. Still, CIA had resumed its participation in the HLP process, and in 2019 it approved the first HLP issue since 2016. It also provided final responses on five volumes OH referred to it in previous years. Further, the CIA’s declassification reviews and its responses to OH appeals are of the highest quality. This performance is a direct consequence of the dedicated FRUS coordination team that the CIA has in place. DoD should follow its lead.

The Review, Transfer, and Processing of Department of State Records

The HAC monitored the review and transfer of State Department records and their accession and processing at NARA.

Consistent with past several years, the Systematic Review Program of the State Department’s Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS) made excellent progress in meeting its systematic declassification review requirements, responding to FOIA and MDR requests, and reducing its backlogs of both. Similarly, a new director appointed at the National Archives’ National Declassification Center (NDC) reinvigorated the Center's promotion of interagency cooperation, resulting again in reducing its FOIA backlog and processing hundreds of thousands of pages with a withholding-from-declassification rate of less than 10%.

What is more, signaling both tangible and symbolic progress, a joint venture by both State’s IPS and NARA, led by the NDC, portends the resolution of problem that has festered for years. The two offices have formulated a yet-to-be-finalized plan by which IPS will perform the initial declassification review of the 1981 and 1982 N and P reels (microfilm of previously destroyed documents), perhaps at the secure NDC site. If implemented, this strategy will overcome the security and technological obstacles that have brought these reviews to a standstill.

The HAC compliments IPS and NARA on this initiative and will monitor progress toward bringing it to fruition. Yet it is concerned with other potential problems that loom ahead, all of which the HAC raised in the 2018 report and have if anything become more acute. These include budget-driven reductions in NARA’s personnel that slowed the accessioning and processing of State Department records and adversely affected researchers’ experiences by, for example, normatively producing skeletal finding guides rather than the detailed ones that researchers require. A greater concern is the capacity of both NARA and the State Department to manage the explosion of electronic records.

Developments in 2019 all but assure that this management challenge will intensify. A memorandum issued jointly by NARA and the Office of Management and Budget in June directs all agencies to manage in their entirety their permanent records electronically by December 31, 2022. This directive demands that the agencies digitize all their remaining paper records because NARA will no longer accept paper records after that date.

This policy confronts each agency with an unfunded mandate that, in an era of constrained budgets, staff shortages, and an urgent need to purchase advanced technologies, imposes a cost that creates a severe burden on them. The HAC imagines a scenario in which departments and agencies hold their documents hostage and do not transfer them to NARA until they receive additional appropriations. In worst-case scenarios, the poor quality of the digitized records renders them unusable, or agencies even destroy records.

The State Department anticipated the digital deluge, and according to IPS, “is currently developing plans to comply with the June 2019 OMB and NARA mandate for transitioning to electronic records.” The HAC did not receive a briefing on those plans. (The HAC chair and another member received abbreviated briefings.) In December, however, the IPS director distributed to the HAC a paper on its modernization program. It made explicit that IPS applauded NARA’s establishing benchmarks for achieving a fully-digitized records management system and enthusiastically embraced the challenge of meeting those benchmarks. The HAC understands that enthusiasm for modernizing records keeping. Yet it is concerned that the IPS paper neglects to discuss the costs of the modernization program and the potential risks that inhere in such a rapid transition from paper to electronic records management.

The paper focused on the development of new records disposition schedules, a core concern of the HAC. IPS has pledged to present full briefings in 2020. The HAC intends to use these briefings to raise fundamental questions about the costs and risks. It anticipates asking: 1) How the consolidation of records into “big bucket” schedules will affect their discoverability by researchers? 2) What is the likelihood that in the rush to transition to big bucket records schedules valuable records will be mistakenly categorized as temporary and thus earmarked for destruction? and 3) Is it realistic to expect IPS to complete the modernization program in two years, and what if it does not?

The HAC also worries about the effects of budgetary and staff shortages on the Presidential Library system. NARA is
transferring to the NDC all classified records held at the libraries, anticipating an expedited declassification review. The processing and classification review of emails from the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations continue to be stalled for lack of resources. Solving these problems is central to the future research needs of FRUS compilers and the public at large.

**Recommendations:**

- Senior State Department Officials should work with counterparts at DoD to establish a centralized FRUS declassification coordination team which can more effectively meet DoD’s mandate for the timely review and release of historically significant information that no longer needs to remain classified.
- NARA and IPS should solicit public comment on plans to convert to technologically-driven records management and big bucket records disposition schedules.

Minutes for the HAC meetings are at https://history.state.gov/about/hac/meeting-notes.

*Richard H. Immerman, Chair (American Historical Association)*  
Laura Belmonte (Organization of American Historians)  
Mary L. Dudziak (American Society of International Law)  
David Engerman (Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations)  
William Inboden (At Large)  
Adrian Lentz-Smith (At Large)  
Trudy Huskamp Peterson (Society of American Archivists)  
Susan Perdue (At Large)

**Recent Books of Interest**


 Eggers, Nicole, Jessica Lynne Pearson, and Aurora Almada e Santos, eds. The United Nations and Decolonization. (Routledge, 2020).


 Falola, Toyin and Raphael Chijioke Njoku. United States and Africa Relations, 1400s to the Present. (Yale, 2020).


 Heiss, Mary Ann. Fulfilling the Sacred Trust: The UN Campaign for International Accountability for Dependent Territories in the Era of Decolonization. (Cornell, 2020).


 Morgan, Jason. Information Regimes During the Cold War in East Asia. (Routledge, 2020).


Reid, Peter H. *Every Hill a Burial Place: The Peace Corps Murder Trial in East Africa*. (Kentucky, 2020).


In Memoriam: 
Lawrence S. Kaplan 
(1924-2020)

Lawrence Samuel Kaplan, university professor of history emeritus and director emeritus of the Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies at Kent State University, died on 10 April 2020 in Delray Beach, Florida, at the age of 95. Born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 28 October 1924, Larry began his undergraduate study at Colby College in 1941. Like millions of other men of his generation, he was drafted during World War II. From 1943-1946, he served in the U.S. Army Signal Corps; his wartime experience included taking Japanese fire in the Philippines and helping to liberate a Filipino town on the island of Samar. Larry completed his B.A. at Colby in 1947 and went on to graduate study at Yale University (M.A. 1948, Ph.D. 1951) under the direction of one of the field’s giants, Samuel Flagg Bemis. His dissertation, published in 1967 as Jefferson and France; An Essay on Politics and Political Ideas, reflected his life-long interest in Jeffersonian America, but the need for steady employment at a time when academic positions were scarce pushed him toward more contemporary—and practical—pursuits.

In 1951, he took a position in the Pentagon’s Office of the Historian, where he was officially tasked with writing a comprehensive history of the Military Assistance Program. That work held little appeal for Larry, but he found himself increasingly drawn to the fledgling North Atlantic Treaty Organization—perhaps because it marked the end of the nation’s adherence to Jefferson’s “no entangling alliances” philosophy. When he found policymakers uninterested in his detailed exploration of the alliance’s origins, Larry concluded that he needed to switch directions and attempt to secure an academic position. In 1954, he was appointed an instructor at Kent State University, where he quickly rose through the ranks. In 1977, he was named a university professor; in 1986, he received the President’s Medal, the highest honor conferred by Kent State. It recognizes faculty and administrative staff who have made outstanding contributions to the advancement of the University through extraordinary and unique service. Larry retired from Kent State in 1993 after thirty-nine years of service.

Larry’s graduate training and work at the Pentagon combined to give his research and teaching a distinctive dual character, reflected in his singular achievement of being the only scholar to hold the presidencies of both the Society for Historians of American Relations (1981) and the Society for Historians of the Early American Republic (1991). (Those who knew Larry well will no doubt note that SHAFR honored him first.) Larry’s work on the early national period ranged from explorations of the concept of isolationism, to thought-provoking analyses of the War of 1812 and dissections of all aspects of Jefferson’s foreign policy thought. His published scholarship on NATO addressed issues such as the alliance’s origins and evolution, its place within U.S. foreign policy, the broad theme of isolation/entanglement, and the continued vitality of the alliance through a series of difficult challenges. In 1979, Larry founded the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies, unique as a U.S. academic institution studying all aspects of the Organization’s work. (The Center has adapted to changing times and is currently known as the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies.) All told, he published a dozen monographs and dozens more articles and book chapters over the course of his career. In a clear testament to his commitment to life-long learning and scholarly engagement, five of those books appeared after he officially retired from Kent State.

Beyond his amazing scholarly productivity, Larry was also a skilled public speaker and dedicated teacher, famous for delivering perfectly formed presentations without the aid of notes. For years after his retirement from Kent State he returned to campus annually for a public address on some NATO-related topic. Over the years, he held Fulbright lectureships and other visiting appointments in Louvain, Nice, Malta, London, Florence, and Bonn, as well as at Michigan State University, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, the University of Maryland, and Georgetown University. Kent State University honored him for his classroom excellence in 1967 with its Alumni Award for Distinguished Teaching, the university’s highest prize for instructional activity; the Ohio Academy of History awarded him its Outstanding Teaching Award in 1981.

Larry was instrumental in the establishment of Kent State University’s doctoral program in history in 1961 and played an extraordinarily active role in the Department’s graduate program, directing 44 M.A. theses and 28 Ph.D. dissertations over the course of his career. In a reflection of trends within the field, most of those theses and dissertations dealt with Cold War-related topics, but several, especially early on, focused on the early national period. Larry took great pride in following the accomplishments of his many advisees, going out of his way to attend their presentations at SHAFR and other conferences and maintaining an active correspondence with them long after they graduated. His influence as a graduate mentor is reflected not only in the many publications of his advisees but also in their widespread employment in and outside the academy. He was also a generous mentor to younger scholars across the profession.

Larry was a devoted husband and father. His wife of more than seventy years, Jan, passed away earlier this year; plans for their joint burial at Arlington National Cemetery have been delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. They leave behind their daughter Debbie and son and daughter-in-law Josh and Christina.

SHAFR friends who wish to remember Larry can do so by contributing to the Lawrence S. Kaplan Scholarship at Kent State University. At the KSU Online Gift Portal, please indicate that you would like to support the “Kaplan Endowed Fund,” account #12650.

—Mary Ann Heiss
For more SHAFR information, visit us on the web at www.shafr.org