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An Insider View of TED Talks
Commemorating 70 Years of Indonesian Independence
Passport Digitization Project

And more...
Passport
THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS REVIEW

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Todd Estes is Professor of History at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan. He is the author of The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of Early American Political Culture (2008). He is currently working on a book manuscript about the ratification debate over the U.S. Constitution.


Walter L. Hixson is Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Akron. He is the author of several books, including Israel's Armor: The Israel Lobby and the First Generation of the Palestine Conflict (2019); American Settler Colonialism: A History (2013); American Foreign Relations: A New Diplomatic History (2016); and The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy (2008).

Danielle Holtz is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Oregon State University’s Center for the Humanities. As a historian of U.S. political culture, intellectual history, and U.S. foreign policy, she focuses on conservatism and white supremacy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She is currently working on a book manuscript about racial nationalism and American politics based on her dissertation, “‘Who Are the True Conservatives?: A Critical History of American Conservatism in the Nineteenth Century.” She received her Ph.D. in History from the University of Pennsylvania in 2017. She also served as the assistant editor for the Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History (2013).

Richard Immerman recently retired from Temple University, where he was Professor of History, Marvin Wachman Director of the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, and Edward Butthuem Distinguished Faculty Fellow. The recipient of multiple honors for his teaching and scholarship and a past president of SHAFR, he was an Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence from 2007-2009, held the Francis W. De Serio Chair in Strategic Intelligence at the United States Army War College from 2013-2016, and has chaired the Historical Advisory Committee to the Department of State since 2010. His next book, Fourteen Points for the Twenty-First Century, which he co-edited with Jeffrey Engel, will be forthcoming in 2020 from the University Press of Kentucky.

Andrew L. Johns is Associate Professor of History at Brigham Young University and the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies. He is the author or editor of five books including, most recently, The Cold War at Home and Abroad: Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945 (2018). He serves as editor of Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review; is general editor of the Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace book series published by the University Press of Kentucky; and is President of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association in 2018-2019.

Robert David Johnson is Professor of History at Brooklyn College and the CUNY Graduate Center. He has published on topics in U.S. political and diplomatic history, as well as contemporary legal and policy issues. His books include Congress and the Cold War (2005).

Thomas J. Knock is Professor of History and Altshuler Distinguished Teaching Professor at Southern Methodist University. He is the author of To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (1992), which received the Warren F. Kuehl Prize; The Rise of a Prairie Statesman: The Life and Times of George McGovern (2016); and the co-editor of Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson: The American Dilemma of Race and Democracy (2010).

Michael Krenn is Professor of History at Appalachian State University. He is the author of numerous books, articles, and essays, including The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations (2006) and The History of United States Cultural Diplomacy: 1770 to the Present Day (2017).

Maarja Krusten retired in 2016 after 42 years in federal service as an archivist at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and as the agency historian at the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). At NARA, she was a disclosure review team leader in the Office of Presidential Libraries. Her other duties at NARA and GAO included records retention appraisal, historical research, exhibit curation, and writing history products. She now volunteers at NARA in its Education and Public Programs Division.

Cameron D. McCoy is Assistant Professor of Military History at the United States Air Force Academy. Before joining USAFA in 2019, he was Assistant Professor of History at Brigham Young University and a postdoctoral fellow at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He earned his bachelor's degree in International Studies at Brigham Young University, an M.A. in Military History at Texas A&M University, and a doctorate in U.S. History at The University of Texas at Austin. In addition to his academic career, Dr. McCoy is a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve; an infantry officer, he has held several positions of command while serving multiple combat tours and deployments around the world in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM.
Robert J. McMahon is Ralph D. Mershon Professor Emeritus at The Ohio State University. He is the author of several books, including Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-1949 (1981); Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (1994); and Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order (2009). He served as SHAFR president in 2001.

Christopher McKnight Nichols is Associate Professor of History and Director of the Oregon State University Center for the Humanities. He is the author or editor of four books, most notably Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age (2011). He is currently at work on another four books, including an exploration of the election of 1952—which serves as a lens on the changing dimensions of conservative foreign policy—and a pivotal moment in the sweeping history of American isolationism, work that he is completing as part of an Andrew Carnegie Fellowship. In addition, he and Danielle Holtz are collaborating with David Milne on a conference and book project on Ideologies and U.S. Foreign Policy.

Stephen Ortiz is Associate Professor of History at Binghamton University, SUNY. He is the author of Beyond the Bonus March and GI Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era (2010) and the editor of Veterans’ Policies, Veterans’ Politics: New Perspectives on Veterans in the Modern United States (2012).

Nicole M. Phelps is Associate Professor of History at the University of Vermont. She is the author of U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference: Sovereignty Transformed (2013). Her current projects include a history of the U.S. Consular Service and a U.S. diplomatic history textbook, both covering the long nineteenth century.


Cyrus Schayegh is Professor of International History at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. He previously taught at Princeton University in the Department of Near Eastern Studies from 2009-2017. His publications include The Middle East and the Making of the Modern World (2017); and The Routledge History Handbook of the Middle East Mandates (2015, with Andrew Arsan). His edited volume, Globalizing the U.S. Presidency: Postcolonial Views of John F. Kennedy, is forthcoming with Bloomsbury.

Jeremi Suri holds the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at the University of Texas, where he is also a Professor of History and Public Affairs. He is the author and editor of nine books, most recently The Impossible Presidency: The Rise and Fall of America’s Highest Office (2018). He frequently publishes in major newspapers and magazines, including the New York Times, Washington Post, Foreign Policy, The New Republic, and The Atlantic. His research and teaching have received numerous awards, including most recently the 2018 President’s Excellence Award for Teaching at the University of Texas and the Pro Bene Meritis Award for Contributions to the Liberal Arts. He also hosts a weekly podcast, “This is Democracy,” https://podcasts.la.utexas.edu/this-is-democracy.

Ellen D. Tillman is Associate Professor of History at Texas State University. She is the author of Dollar Diplomacy by Force: Nation-Building and Resistance in the Dominican Republic (2016). She is working on two separate monographs relating to U.S. relations with Central America in the nineteenth century, and currently serves as Regional Coordinator (Region VII) for the Society for Military History.

Jack (John M.) Thompson is Senior Researcher and Head of the Global Security Team at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich. Previously, he was Lecturer at the Clinton Institute at University College Dublin. He is the author of Great Power Rising: Theodore Roosevelt and the “Discovery” of Europe (2012, with Hans Krabbendam).

Jasper M. Trautsch is Lecturer in American History at the Universität Regensburg, Germany. He is the author of The Genesis of America: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Formation of National Identity, 1793-1815 (2018); articles in Early American Studies, Journal of Military History, and Global Affairs; and is the editor of Civic Nationalisms in Global Perspective (2019). In 2013, he received the Rolf Kentner Dissertation Prize for an outstanding work in the field of American studies.


Benjamin R. Young is Assistant Professor in Cyber Leadership and Intelligence at Dakota State University. He recently finished a postdoctoral fellowship at the U.S. Naval War College and is currently working on his first book, tentatively titled Guns, Guerrillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World, 1956-2018. His research primarily revolves around East Asian history, Cold War international history, Afro-Asian solidarity, security studies, and international relations.
From the Chancery: More Things I Think

Andrew L. Johns

At the SHAFR conference in Arlington last June, a few people asked why I had not answered the SHAFR Spotlight questions myself. Frankly, it had never occurred to me to do so. But then I figured, why not? So here is a little about your humble Passport editor, along with more things that I think I think (again, with apologies to Peter King).

And while it should go without saying, none of what follows should be interpreted, construed, or read as official SHAFR policy or as representing anything except my opinions....

1. I think that we, as individuals and as an organization, need to be keenly aware of the existing and emerging problems with the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the presidential library system (while it lasts), the obstructionist declassification regime, the impending loss of specialized archival knowledge, and the restriction of document access (damn algorithms!). These problems collectively qualify as an imminent crisis already, and if the federal government’s plans are any indication, things are only going to get worse....and will imperil our ability to conduct research on the history of U.S. foreign relations. We should not only be ready to go to the mattresses to fight against and strenuously object to these changes, but we need to do everything we can to support people like Richard Immerman and the U.S. Department of State’s Historical Advisory Committee, SHAFR’s Historical Documentation Committee, the AHA’s new NARA Review Committee, and others who are on the front lines of this struggle. This is worth your time and effort.

2. How did I get interested in history? Well, I was born on the day Richard Nixon was elected president—my parents always said at least something good happened that day (although they voted for Nixon, so I’m not really sure what they meant by that)—while my father was deployed with the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam....so I think that had something to do with it. My path to academia was not a straight one, however. I spent a semester in law school before going to grad school at U.C., Santa Barbara (loved law school, hated the idea of being an attorney), and then spent five years on the academic job market. During that time, I spent six months commuting from LA to D.C. while working at the Department of State, three months doing 14-hour days delivering packages across SoCal, and another six months commuting from LA to Spokane. At one point, I was three hours away from leaving the profession and going to work with Friends in Hollywood. But I finally landed in my current job at Brigham Young University in 2004. My research focuses primarily on U.S. foreign relations and the nexus of domestic politics and foreign policy, and I am desperately trying to finish a book on Hubert Humphrey and the Vietnam War that is just slightly (15 years) overdue.

3. I think that imposter syndrome is real. I am awed and intimidated every year at SHAFR as to how many intelligent, thoughtful, committed, and insightful people there are in our organization. Meanwhile, I sit in the bar at the Renaissance, humming Gotye’s “Smoke and Mirrors,” feeling like an illiterate fraud who should be delivering pizza or cleaning gutters instead of trying to pretend that I somehow belong in such impressive company.

4. Most anxiety-inducing professional moment? There are so many to choose from....but I distinctly remember my first SHAFR panel as a grad student in Boulder in 1996. I looked out at the audience and saw, among others, George Herring, Norman Graebner, Bradford Perkins, David Anderson, Bob Schulzinger, and Bob McMahon. I nearly walked out of the room....not to mention that I nearly lost my lunch. Showing up to my oral exams with my eyes looking like Arnold Schwarzenegger’s in Total Recall when he was outside the dome on Mars runs a close second.

5. I think that it is an absolute tragedy that the Summer Institute program has been suspended indefinitely by SHAFR. Having participated in the first SI in 2008 and having co-directed the program in 2015, I have a deep appreciation of what it has done for me and others who have been involved. While I objectively understand the financial reasons for the recommendation by the Ways and Means Committee given the projected fiscal crunch SHAFR could face, the rationale for doing so remains puzzling. The SI experience is invaluable to those who participate, and it creates relationships that pay dividends for the SI cohorts and for SHAFR for years to come. To be sure, the SI only engages 12-15 people each year—which may seem like a small number—but it does provide more opportunities than does a single dissertation fellowship at a comparable price....and that does not take into account the intangible benefits that accrue to the organization. SHAFR’s leadership should do everything that it can to figure out a way to restore the SI as quickly as possible—perhaps through a targeted campaign to create an SI endowment.

6. Favorite movies/TV shows: on any given day, this list could be completely different, but John Wick, Animal House, The Hangover, Grosse Pointe Blank, and The Godfather could play on a loop and I would be perfectly happy. And The League, The West Wing, The Sopranos, Breaking Bad, The Americans, Seinfeld, and Band of Brothers are among the shows that are definitely worth binge-watching.

7. I think that Kyle Longley has handled the outrageous “Hindenburg-crashes-into-the-Titanic-and-unleashes-Chernobyl situation” (to borrow a phrase from Jonah Goldberg) with the LBJ Library, the LBJ Foundation, and NARA with his typical grace and professionalism. If there is a better person in SHAFR, I do not know who it is. I hope that Kyle knows how much support he has within the organization (and beyond), and that we wish him all the best as he returns to the academic world.

8. If I won $500 million, I would take $25 million off the top and create a non-profit to support education and therapy for families with children with autism (my youngest son benefitted from the cutting-edge programs from the world-
renowned Center for Autism and Related Disorders in Los Angeles, and others should have that opportunity). I would donate $5 million to SHAFR for a permanent Summer Institute program, a book prize in honor of my parents, and an endowment for Passport...and then would give $10,000 to each of the 350+ graduate student members of the organization. I would pay off my parents’ home and send them on an around-the-world cruise for six months, and I would probably spend quite a lot of money on my wife, my kids, and my granddaughter. I would finally be able to afford HBO (since I’m told that Game of Thrones and The Wire were pretty good). And I would definitely play in the World Series of Poker main event every year for the rest of my life.

9. I think that the best present I got for Father’s Day this year was a sign that reads, “I don’t hold grudges. I remember facts.” It looks good next to my other favorite sign that quotes Barry Goldwater’s sage advice: “illegitimi non carborundum.”

10. Music festival lineup: again, subject to change depending on my mood, but it would definitely include Foo Fighters, Motley Crüe, Queen, Oingo Boingo, Sum 41, the Rolling Stones, Bowling for Soup, Def Leppard, Billy Squier, Violent Femmes, Kiss, AC/DC, Eminem, Nerf Herder, The Clash, The Police, Rush, INXS, and Van Halen (Dave and Sammy, but definitely not Gary).

11. Dinner with John Quincy Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Richard Nixon would be amazing. Few people in U.S. history saw or were involved with more key events that occurred in their lifetimes. Plus, listening to JQA scold Nixon would be entertaining as hell.

12. I think that Kelly McFarland, Kimber Quinney, Mitch Lerner, Marc Selverstone, and the rest of the organizers of the public engagement workshop at Georgetown University this year (which built on the ideas of a similar workshop at the Miller Center in 2017) should be commended for all of their efforts to help SHAFR and its members become more actively involved in advocacy, public outreach, and education efforts that highlight the expertise our organization collectively possesses. Given the misuse and misunderstanding of history—not just relating to U.S. foreign relations but throughout the public sphere—it is heartening to see so many of our members getting involved in these kinds of activities.

13. BUT....I think that we need to be careful in those efforts not to appear condescending, dismissive, and overly critical of the individuals and audiences that we engage or those with whom we disagree. To be sure, some people are clowns who are just begging to be treated that way. Yet I would suggest that going too far in those directions undermines what we are trying to do and makes it too easy for people to brush aside our opinions and expertise as the product of “academics in the ivory tower who think they are better than us.” There is nothing wrong with a little civility even in the course of making a passionate (or even a partisan) argument....

14. I think that the decision to go to New Orleans for the 2020 SHAFR conference is inspired. As much as we all love the Renaissance, it will be nice to have one or two different restaurant options....and live music....and some gaming options next year. Laissez les bons temps rouler.

15. Bucket list: finishing in the money in the aforementioned World Series of Poker main event; taking a cruise through the Panama Canal; finally traveling to Europe (I think I may be the only member of SHAFR to have never done so); getting another college degree....to break the tie with my father (we may be slightly competitive); and living long enough to see the U.S. men’s national soccer team actually be competitive in the World Cup (probably the least realistic item on the list).

16. I think that I have said this before, but it bears repeating: even as SHAFR continues to expand its tent by appealing to different audiences and embracing new approaches and ideas, it cannot (and should not) turn its back either on traditional methodologies or on people who have contributed so much to the organization over the years. It is disheartening and unfortunate that so many long-time members of SHAFR have disengaged—whether by not attending the conference or not renewing their memberships—because they feel that there is no longer a place for them in our organization.

17. I think that I do not understand the appeal of social media (and get off of my lawn!). While it may be a convenient way to stay current on the news and to keep up with friends, much of it—especially on Twitter, but not exclusively so—has morphed into a dystopian hellscape filled with endless and nauseating self-promotion (increasingly from academics), echo chambers of siloed opinions, and keyboard warriors who cannot contemplate that their opinions might be wrong. It has become ground-zero for snap judgments, perpetual grievance, out-of-control outrage mobs, and uninformed, sanctimonious, and virtue-signaling commentary from grifters, humorless scolds, and ultracrepidarians. And all of this spills over into actual human interaction, making it nearly impossible to have a civil conversation with those who do not share one’s very specific worldview. Moreover, it contributes significantly to the rising tide of anxiety and depression—not just with youth, but across demographic categories (yes, including our colleagues in academia). Unplugging, even temporarily, is not the worst idea.

18. I think that I will die on this hill: the Oxford comma, two spaces after a period, and WordPerfect is superior to Word.

19. If I were not a historian, I would probably be a sports agent, a political operative, or a professional poker player/ degenerate gambler. All three almost happened; frankly, all three could still happen....

20. I think that I could run my column on gratitude from January 2019 in every issue from now until the end of time and still not be able to adequately express my thanks to my friends in SHAFR for their support, examples, and advice....especially the past few weeks.

Finally, let me publicly recognize and thank Professor Neil York—my mentor, colleague, and friend for the past three decades—who retired this year after 42 years as a professor in my department. Neil studied with SHAFR founding father Alex DeConde at the University of California, Santa Barbara in the 1970s, and he is almost entirely responsible for inspiring me to pursuing a career as a historian (now you know who to blame). I owe him more than I can say, and I wish him all the best as he moves on to the next chapter in his life....whatever that may be.
**ATTENTION SHAFR MEMBERS**

The 2019 SHAFR elections are upon us. Once again, Passport is publishing copies of the candidates’ biographies and statements by the candidates for president and vice-president as a way to encourage members of the organization to familiarize themselves with the candidates and vote in this year’s elections. Additional information, including brief CVs for each candidate, will be available on the electronic ballot.

“Elections belong to the people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters.” Abraham Lincoln

*Passport* would like to remind the members of SHAFR that voting for the 2019 SHAFR elections will begin in early August and will close on September 30. Ballots will be sent electronically to all current members of SHAFR. If you are a member of SHAFR and do not receive a ballot by the beginning of September, please contact the chair of the SHAFR Nominating Committee, Laura Belmonte (belmonte@vt.edu), as soon as possible to ensure that you are able to participate in the election.

“The exercise of the elective franchise is a social duty of as solemn a nature as [a person] can be called to perform.” Daniel Webster

Last year in the 2018 SHAFR election, nearly 600 members of SHAFR voted. *Passport* would like to encourage the membership of SHAFR to take the time to participate in our organization’s self-governance once again this year. As we have seen recently, elections have consequences.

“Every election is determined by the people who show up.” Larry J. Sabato

**2019 SHAFR Election Candidates**

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<th>Position</th>
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<td>Kristin Hoganson</td>
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<td>Karine Walther</td>
<td>Georgetown University at Qatar</td>
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<td>Nominating Committee</td>
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<td>Kathy Rasmussen</td>
<td>Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State</td>
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2019 SHAFR Election
Candidate Biographies and Statements

Candidate for PRESIDENT (Choose 1)

Kristin Hoganson, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Candidate for President

Biographical statement

Kristin Hoganson is the Stanley S. Stroup Professor of United States History at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. A SHAFR member since 1998, she has served SHAFR as vice president, council member, Diplomatic History editorial board member, program committee member, program co-chair, representative to the National Coalition for History, Norman Graebner Prize committee member, and Bernath Book Prize committee member. She is the author of *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (1998), *Consumers’ Imperium: The Global Production of American Domestcity* (2007), *American Empire at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A Brief History with Documents* (2016), and *The Heartland: An American History* (2019). The latter may seem like an unusual topic for a SHAFR candidate, but be assured, it is a foreign relations history—peopled by consular officers, military aviators, a congressman active in the Inter-Parliamentary Union, bioprospectors, international students, displaced Native Americans, and other rural border crossers—that reconsideres the roots of the modern American empire. Hoganson has held the Harmsworth Visiting Professorship at Oxford University and a visiting Fulbright professorship at the Ludwig-Maximilians Universität. Her work has been recognized by the Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize, the Wayne D. Rasmussen Prize (offered by the Agricultural History Society) and the Ray Allen Billington Prize (offered by the Western History Association). She has a long track record of graduate student advising—whether as outside reader, committee member, or advisor—and is currently serving as her department’s Director of Undergraduate Studies.

Candidate statement

SHAFR has been a mainstay for me since I presented one of my first academic papers at its conference as a graduate student. Having benefitted tremendously from *Diplomatic History* and *Passport* as well as from SHAFR’s annual gatherings, website, ties to H-Diplo, summer institute, guides to the literature, and advocacy, I am running for office from a desire to give back. My vision for SHAFR is straightforward: keep it open, lively, and solvent, so that it can continue to advance the field of U.S. foreign relations history and particularly the scholarship and careers of student, contingent, untenured, working-class, non-U.S., and other members who face particular challenges in a tough labor market and in the face of constrained research resources. Although SHAFR has become larger and more diverse since I joined, thus adding to the vitality of our collective enterprise, it must continue to work toward inclusivity. As a nineteenth-century historian in an organization that tilts toward the Cold War and more recent past, I would especially like to advocate for chronological inclusiveness. As a historian with one eye on the future, I would also like to advance public outreach initiatives and ongoing efforts to safeguard federal records and promote access. Other important issues that I would like to tackle include a website refresh (prompted by the need to move to a new platform), more support for teaching, and continued attentiveness to open channels of communication and to our new professional conduct policy and its underlying principles.

Candidates for VICE PRESIDENT (Choose 1)

Melani McAlister, George Washington University
Candidate for Vice President

Biographical statement

Melani McAlister is Professor of American Studies and International Affairs at George Washington University. Her scholarship focuses on the cultural and political histories that shape U.S. encounters with the world. In 2018, she published *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals* (Oxford). She is also co-editor of volume 4 of *Cambridge History of America and the World* (forthcoming) with David Engerman and Max Friedman. Her other books are *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and US Interests in the Middle East* (2005, o. 2001) and *Religion and Politics in the Contemporary United States* (2008). She is currently working on two projects: an edited collection on evangelicals and empire, and a monograph on the cultural and affective history of U.S. humanitarianism in the Cold War.

McAlister has a Ph.D. from Brown University, and is recipient of fellowships from NEH, Princeton’s Davis Center, and several others. She has published in a broad range of academic and general interest publications, including the *New York Times, Washington Post, Atlantic,* and *The Nation.*

She is a member of the Board of Directors of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). She is also a member of SHAFR’s Ways and Means Committee and chair of its Development Committee. She serves on the editorial boards of *Modern American...*
History and American Quarterly, and has previously served on the boards of Diplomatic History, JAH, and others. She was for six years a member of the Middle East Studies Association’s Committee on Academic Freedom.

Candidate statement

We are in a time of reckoning for the role of the U.S. in the world, with foreign policy crises ranging from the border wall to the walled cites of Yemen, from climate collapse to global racist resurgence. Historians matter critically in this moment. SHAFR members can and should be heard. We can grow, increase our public profile, and speak forcefully about the relevance of our field.

SHAFR is increasingly diverse, and that diversity is crucial. If we are to help shape a future that might be other than the past, we must speak from, and to, an array of transnational, multifaceted, and political histories. If elected, I will push for increased resources for the committees supporting women and historians of color, and will work to expand the involvement of scholars from outside the U.S.

I am chair of the Development Committee for SHAFR and a member of the Ways and Means Committee, both of which focus on our long-term financial stability. I served twice on the conference program committee, including as co-chair with Salim Yaqub in 2016; we invited Robin D.G. Kelley to give an historic keynote. I have served on the editorial board of Diplomatic History, the Hogan Fellowship prize committee, and a number of other committees.

SHAFR has created an intellectual conversation like no other. It fosters diverse political and methodological approaches. It is a place of encounter. I would be honored to support our scholarship, and our broader engagement with the world, by serving as vice-president.

Andrew Preston, Cambridge University
Candidate for Vice President

Biographical statement

Andrew Preston is Professor of American History and a Fellow of Clare College at Cambridge University. He is the author of three books, including Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (Knopf, 2012) and, most recently, American Foreign Relations: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2019); he is also the editor of four books. He is currently writing a book on the idea of national security in American history, to be published by Harvard, and co-editing three forthcoming books: Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War, Volume 3 of The Cambridge History of America and the World, and Rethinking Grand Strategy, to be published by Oxford. He has been active in SHAFR for twenty years: his first paper at the annual meeting was in 2000, and he has participated on 18 panels since. He has also served a term on Council; sat on the editorial boards of both Diplomatic History and Passport; twice been on the search committee (including serving once as chair) for the editorship of DH; delivered the 2013 Bernath Lecture at the AHA; co-chaired the 2014 annual conference Program Committee; co-hosted the 2017 Summer Institute; and served on various other committees, including the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize committee and, currently, the Development Committee.

Candidate statement

Outside my university, no institution has shaped my career as much as SHAFR. I owe the Society and its members a huge debt. SHAFR has changed a lot since I first began participating in its activities nearly two decades ago. It is much broader now, both in its subject matter and in its membership. SHAFR is now the broadest of churches, with innovative projects on, for example, immigration and religion sitting alongside more traditional topics on the military and the state. SHAFR members have used theories about culture, race, gender, or the emotions to reinterpret our very understanding of interstate relations, but bottom-up socio-cultural and transnational approaches have brought new actors to our attention. This is all to the good, but there is still room for further development, not just intellectually in terms of the topics we explore and the methods and theories we use to do so, but in terms of the size and diversity of its membership. SHAFR has come a long way on gender, but there is still room for growth, and there is much more room for improvement regarding the racial diversity of the Society’s membership.

Longstanding commitments to internationalization need reinvigorating. SHAFR also needs to address a range of challenges confronting academia, from the casualization of teaching faculty and the declining membership in learned societies (including SHAFR) to the rapidly changing landscape of scholarly publishing. But SHAFR will flourish so long as we continue to meet these challenges with imagination and open-minded solidarity.
Candidate for COUNCIL RACE #1 (Choose 1)

Kyle Longley, Arizona State University
Candidate for Council Representative, Race #1


A member of SHAFR for thirty years, he has participated actively in the program committee, Robert Ferrell Book Prize Committee, and the W. Stull Holt Fellowship Committee. He has promoted U.S. foreign relations in the AHA program committee and been an OAH Distinguished Lecturer and president of the PCB-AHA. He also actively consults on immigration cases for those fleeing violence in Latin America.

A prize winning teacher, he has received the Pearce Award for Humanities Teaching and Student Association Centennial Professorship at Arizona State and several national teaching awards.

David Milne, University of East Anglia
Candidate for Council Representative, Race #1


David is a member of *Diplomatic History*’s editorial board, has served on the SHAFR Survey Task Force, and is on the program committee for SHAFR 2020 in New Orleans. He has held visiting fellowships at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the Gilder-Lehrman Institute for American History, the American Philosophical Society, and Yale University. David will be spending the fall semester of 2019 at Oregon State University, collaborating with Christopher McKnight Nichols and Danielle Holtz on a project that examines ideologies and U.S. foreign policy. Ordinarily, he lives in Norwich with his partner (Emma), two children (Ben and Anna), and dog (Bobby).

Candidates for COUNCIL RACE #2 (Choose 1)

Ryan Irwin, University of Albany
Candidate for Council Representative, Race #2

It is an honor to have an opportunity to run for Council. If elected, I would try to expand SHAFR’s membership, promote diversity, and strengthen graduate student programs.

I’m an associate professor at the University at Albany, a large public university in upstate New York, and I have been a SHAFR member since about 2006. My research explores the relationship between imperialism and liberalism. I won a Bernath prize for a 2009 article and published *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* in 2012. Currently, I am writing a book entitled *Vast External Realm: America and the Invention of the Free World*.

At Albany, I have held numerous leadership positions, including chair of the undergraduate committee and chair of the faculty development committee. Previously, I served as the associate director of International Security Studies at Yale University. Within SHAFR, I have served on Passport’s Advisory Board and the Bernath book prize committee, and I chair the ad hoc committee on third party affiliations. I’ve also been a member of the conference program committee and a mentor to graduate students on the job market.

Lauren Turek, Trinity University
Candidate for Council Representative, Race #2

Lauren Turek is an assistant professor of history at Trinity University in San Antonio, TX, where she teaches courses on U.S. foreign relations, modern United States history, and public history. She earned her Ph.D. in history from the University of Virginia. Her research centers on transnational religious networks and the influence of non-state actors on international politics, U.S.
foreign policy, and domestic political culture. Turek’s articles on religion in American politics and foreign policy have appeared in Diplomatic History, the Journal of American Studies, and Religions and her book, To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelicals, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Relations, is forthcoming from Cornell University Press. She has received grant and fellowship support for her research from the Institute for Political History, the American Historical Association, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the John C. Danforth Center on Religion and Politics at Washington University in St. Louis, among others. She currently serves on the SHAFR web committee and on the editorial advisory board of Passport.

Candidates for COUNCIL RACE #3 (Choose 1)

Ilaria Scaglia, Aston University
Candidate for Council Representative, Race #3

I am Lecturer (Assistant Professor) and Head of History at Aston University in Birmingham, UK. I was a Volkswagen–Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow for Research in Germany (2016–2017). I am the author of The Emotions of Internationalism: Feeling International Cooperation in the Alps in the Interwar Period (Oxford University Press, 2020; expected December 2019) and of several pieces dealing with the interplay of internationalism, aesthetics, and emotions. I am now researching the practice of reproducing primary documents in Europe and in the USA (1850–1950 ca) and the functions emotions performed in shaping this history. I am a Board Member of the Coordinating Council for Women in History (2016–2019), where I started a mentorship program. On the Women in SHAFR Committee, I have worked on issues as diverse as sexual harassment, accommodations for parents, and gender equity; as its current chair, I am leading an initiative to organize a second-book workshop to help increase diversity at the highest ranks. I have also served on the Program Committee and on the Membership Committee. I am committed to supporting efforts to make SHAFR as diverse as possible in terms of chronological eras and scholarly approaches and to increase its international outreach.

Karine Walther, Georgetown University in Qatar
Candidate for Council Representative, Race #3

Karine Walther is an Associate Professor of History at Georgetown University in Qatar. She holds a Ph.D. in history from Columbia University, a Maîtrise and Licence in Sociology from the University of Paris VIII, and a B.A. in American Studies from the University of Texas, Austin. She is currently working on her second book: Spreading the Faith: American Missionaries, Aramco and the Birth of the US-Saudi Special Relationship, 1889–1955, forthcoming with University of North Carolina Press. Her first book, Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821–1921, was published by UNC Press in August of 2015. She has been a member of SHAFR since 2005 and has served on the Michael J. Hogan Fellowship Committee for the last two years and, most recently, served on the SHAFR Program Committee.

Candidates for Nominating Committee (Choose 1)

Christopher T. Fisher, The College of New Jersey
Candidate for Nominating Committee

Christopher T. Fisher is an associate professor of history at The College of New Jersey (TCNJ) in Ewing, NJ. Dr. Fisher earned a B.A. in history and political science from Rutgers College in 1993 and a Ph.D. in history from Rutgers University in 2001. His focus within the discipline is on U.S. diplomacy in the late-twentieth century. At TCNJ, Dr. Fisher has served in various administrative capacities that include department chair of African American Studies, provost search chair, member of the Faculty Senate Executive Committee, and co-chair of the President’s Commission on Race and Educational Attainment. He has published in Pacific Historical Review and International History Review, and in 2017 he co-authored a textbook, Global America in the Twentieth Century, with Oxford University Press. Dr. Fisher is currently writing a book on cold war culture and consciousness in the 1970s.

Kathy Rasmussen, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State
Candidate for Nominating Committee

I am Chief of the Global Issues and General Division, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, where I research, prepare, and review volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Since 2002, I have compiled three volumes, researched a fourth, and reviewed more than twenty to ensure their stylistic and substantive integrity.

Outside of the Office, I have taught at George Washington University; most recently published “Canada and Bretton Woods” in Giles Scott-Smith and J. Simon Rofe, Editors, Global Perspectives on the Bretton Woods Conference and the Post-War World Order; and am writing a book on Canada and the postwar economic order.

From 2012-2018, I served on the Committee on Women in SHAFR; while I was chair, we released our third report on the status of women. I have also served on two task forces, including one that drafted SHAFR’s policy on sexual harassment and misconduct.

Todd Estes, William E. Weeks, Walter L. Hixson, David C. Hendrickson, and Jasper M. Trautsch


Todd Estes

This is an excellent and important book. It deserves to find a ready audience as much with scholars of early U.S. politics as with diplomatic historians, for it has things of significance to say to each. Jasper Trautsch studies the intersections of foreign policy with domestic politics from the Washington administration to the Madison presidency and finds new things to say about familiar topics by fitting them into a compelling thesis about nationalism, national identity, and the ways that U.S. foreign policy served crucial domestic political ends as well. It is also a work of great achievement. To write a book like this successfully, an author must master two related but distinct bodies of scholarship: on early American politics and on early American diplomacy and foreign policy. Trautsch has accomplished this difficult feat, and his erudite book confidently weaves in and out of the historiography, making important contributions to both subfields.

Trautsch seeks to discover the origins and growth of American nationalism in the early republic. Contrary to other scholars, he argues that national identity was “a process of external demarcation.” To develop a separate identity, “the American nation needed external enemies to create a sense of national particularity.” Moreover, he writes, “early American nationalism called for violent separation from America’s European reference points,” chiefly Great Britain and France (9). This book analyzes the process of disentanglement by which America nationalism emerged “within an international rather than merely a domestic context” and “[c]onsequently . . . identifies foreign policy as a vital instrument of nation building” (10). To explore this process, Trautsch looks at two main sources: newspapers, to examine the published record of debates that shaped understandings and constructions of nationalism and the discourse it created; and diplomatic sources, to understand the motives of policymakers as they charted a course for the new nation in relation to the great powers of Europe and the Atlantic world.

Throughout the book, Trautsch is sensitive to the ways in which the unexpected emergence of political parties and ideological partisanship affected the dynamics in the early republic. While initial divisions formed over domestic policies, specifically the measures of the Hamiltonian program—public credit, the national bank, and manufacturing, among others—partisan lines hardened and became clarified with the onset of foreign policy conflicts that increased with the unfolding of the French Revolution.

As the Revolution turned more radical, American support for it splintered and broke along party lines. Increasingly, Federalists became critical of revolutionary France, seeing it as a bastion of destabilizing radicalism, and they came to value Great Britain even more. Republicans remained linked to France and identified with their sister republic. Using these European rivals as contrasting reference points, “both parties thereby sought to represent their respective political creed as the only true form of Americanism” (60). But these were more than simply partisan differences. As Trautsch notes, the two parties “defined the U.S. in incompatible ways, the former setting the U.S. apart from France, the latter from Great Britain. As a result of their irreconcilable views on American identity and America’s significant Others, they accused each other of having foreign attachments and hence of being disloyal to the American nation” (69).

From these initial practices of othering by the nascent political parties flows the rest of the history of the early republic—and of this book. If the outlines of this narrative are familiar, then Trautsch’s points about external demarcation and disentangling create important new ways to think about these events. Beginning in 1793, around the time of George Washington’s second term, the United States was drawn nearly continuously into foreign policy issues, beginning with the questions of neutrality and Citizen Genêt and culminating with the 1794 Jay Treaty, the debate over which dominated American politics for the next two years. Trautsch notes insightfully that most historians have dealt with the treaty either as a diplomatic event or as a domestic political controversy. Since the treaty was likely the best that Jay and the United States could have obtained and since it preserved peace, it might have been expected to meet with approbation. The opposite, of course, was the case.

Trautsch suggests that the treaty debate is best understood “within the framework of the struggle between Federalists and Republicans over defining American identity” (87). Furthermore, he argues that Federalists had a three-stage goal in pursuing the treaty: preventing war with the British as a result of Republican efforts at commercial discrimination, efforts that they feared could provoke a social revolution; invalidating the 1778 alliance with France, on which Republicans staked their claims for a renewed U.S.-French alliance; and, in the long run, fortifying Anglo-American cooperation, “thus cementing Federalists’ conservative definition of American identity.”
Thus, it makes more sense to comprehend Republican opposition to the treaty by focusing “on its meaning with the political identity debates conducted in the U.S. at the time” (94). All the reasons that drew Federalists to support the treaty and its short-, medium-, and long-term goals were precisely the inverse of the reasons the Republicans opposed it so vehemently.

Two of the most insightful chapters, to my mind, are the ones dealing with the origins of the Quasi-War, which, in the author’s hands, becomes far more than a diplomatic footnote in the John Adams presidency. Here, perhaps most emphatically, Trautsch’s thesis about external demarcation and disentanglement in the service of creating nationalism shines through. “[I]t was Federalists in the Adams Administration and Congress who actively sought a state of belligerency with France in order to promote a Francophobic American nationalism” (109).

They did so deliberately to disentangle the nation from France, to discredit French-inspired definitions of American national identity, and to undermine “the democratic egalitarianism that the French Revolution represented” (126).

The Quasi-War transformed domestic politics in unintended and ironic ways. In fact, Trautsch argues convincingly that it was “not primarily waged for diplomatic aims but rather for domestic objectives: Federalist leaders considered it a suitable means to purge the U.S. of revolutionary principles and politically homogenize the American nation” (131–32). They expected, first, that an undeclared naval war against the French would detach many Republicans from the French and their egalitarian aims. Second, they knew they could use the wartime crisis to question the national loyalty of Republicans who did not, even when they were confronted with developments such as impressment and the XYZ affair, renounce their allegiance to France. The Quasi-War “changed the parameters for the debate on American identity .... it became increasingly difficult for Republicans to define American by positive reference to France, without appearing un-American, as Federalist newspapers kept reminding them” (135).

But the Federalists’ triumph in the battle for public opinion was not complete. If they proved “successful in dissociating America from France, they failed to unite the nation behind their conservative political ideology” (143). The infamous Alien and Sedition Acts must be understood in this context. Trautsch notes that it was not immigrants per se that Federalists feared but rather foreign ideas, especially democratic egalitarianism, which they considered dangerously un-American, at least according to their own partisan views. And they did not distinguish those views from national views: although they understood that their views were partisan, they also believed they were national—not just Federalist, but American in a fundamental way.

The transformations brought about by the Quasi-War represent one of Trautsch’s major interpretive contributions in this book. In his view, the Quasi-War even helps to explain why Republicans eventually disentangled the nation from Great Britain while simultaneously isolating and marginalizing the Federalists with the War of 1812. Examining the run-up to that conflict, he argues that the movement toward war makes more sense if seen as a political and ideological conflict, since support for the war was partisan rather than sectional: Republicans voted in favor of it even more than southerners and westerners. The reason, he demonstrates, is that Republicans understood British policy in the Jeffersonian years “as being primarily motivated by a desire to harm America” by ending her prosperity and discrediting her republican government, with the ultimate goal being to return the United States to its former colonial status (185–86). They equated British impressment with slavery, inflamed the issue, and made a resolution of the tensions it caused increasingly difficult, all the while making Federalist pleas for negotiation seem treasonous. Believing as they did, Republicans were always inclined—for ideological reasons that reached back into the 1790s—to pursue a hard line with the British. In the aftermath of the 1807 Chesapeake-Leopard incident, Jefferson and Madison opted to embark on a policy of “peaceable coercion,” the centerpiece of which was the embargo, which Trautsch rightly notes was “a coercive measure ... a decisive step towards war rather than a substitute or alternative for it” (198).

Undergirding the Republican approach was a belief that while European nations were naturally warlike, America was naturally a pacific nation. This “republican peace theory” placed the blame for war entirely on Britain’s monarchical form of government. Firm in their belief in America’s fundamental peacefulness, Republicans were convinced that the nation was threatened by Europe’s hostile monarchies “and that America’s wars were hence purely defensive” (210). Thus, Republicans saw their declaration of war against the British in 1812 as the defensive actions of a peaceful nation against an aggressive and hostile adversary.

The declaration of war had a second key premise as well. Republicans “sought to disassociate America from the former mother country and to discredit Federalists’ political persuasion,” but they did not see this as a partisan action. Rather, “they believed that democratic egalitarianism was the only true form of Americanism and that hence only the Republican party represented the American nation” (223). The war allowed Republicans to marginalize the
Federalists, who were “no longer able to publicly defend their Anglophilia without casting doubt on their national loyalty” (226).

These premises were reinforced by the violent nature of the British invasion in 1814, which played right into the Republican arguments about British aggression and hostility and further served to discredit Federalists and positive views of the British—despite the fact that a great many Federalists came to support the American war effort, which was now truly a defensive effort to repel invaders. Just as Republicans had wished, “in consequence of the war the majority of Federalists renounced their Anglophilia and instead defined America in opposition to Great Britain” (244). Their strategy of using the war to disentangle the United States from the British and unite the country in opposition had largely worked.

By 1815, American nationalism, which was only rudimentary in 1789, had firmly taken hold. Large numbers of Republicans and Federalists alike now thought of themselves as fully American in terms of national identity. Trautsch’s book amply demonstrates one of his core arguments: that “by arguing over American identity, they had created it and established the assumption that there was an American nation as a common point of departure for their debates. . . . [A]s a result, a consensus emerged by 1815 that America was defined by her otherness from Europe at large” (261). Finally, because of the twinned results of the Quasi-War and the War of 1812, “the notion of American exceptionalism” had become, by the time of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, “a central part of American identity that few Americans would question by defining America in appropriation of Europe” (263).

Beyond these interpretive insights, Trautsch’s book has many other considerable strengths. He writes clearly and straightforwardly, with an engaging style, and his arguments are effectively and persuasively put forth. He does an excellent job of reviewing familiar historical material but presenting it in service of an intriguing new thesis, thus giving the familiar the look of the new. The book’s organization is sound and effective in that it reinforces the thesis, chapter by chapter, tracking the role of successive arguments about foreign policy in shaping the ongoing, work-in-progress nature of creating national identity across more than two decades of early U.S. history. Lastly, this book’s historiography is absolutely up to date, reflecting the most recent scholarship and locating its own argument in the larger context of the current state of the fields of political and diplomatic history.

One of the other great strengths of the book is the frequent appearance of contemporary political cartoons as illustrations. Early American political cartoons can be difficult for today’s reader to navigate, given the busyness of their drawings and the typical prolixity of the dialogue on the page. Trautsch not only selects cogent examples that connect very well to his text, he also does an excellent job of explicating the statements being made by the cartoonists and situating them in the context of the drawings. His skill at reading and interpreting these cartoons adds a great deal to the effectiveness of his overall presentation. Such readings also highlight his cultural approach to early American political history, which is one of the goals of his book (33–34).

Even the best books leave readers and reviewers wanting more, or wishing that the author had explored some additional themes. Two in particular come to mind. First, as Trautsch moves from chapter four to chapter five, he effectively moves from Quasi-War to the War of 1812—essentially, from 1798 to about 1807. He raises the question of U.S. dealings with the Barbary States also represented a foreign-policy problem,” they were “comparatively small and weak: once the U.S had built a sizable navy, it was dispatched to the Mediterranean to protect American ships and attack the Barbary vessels” (17–18).

Fair enough, but it would have been interesting to see an analysis, in a book that argues for understanding the stark partisan differences in foreign policy and identity orientation, of the ways Federalists and Republicans thought about and acted on a foreign policy issue that did not involve European powers as a point of comparison. This issue would not have been central to the book’s thesis, but it might have provided an interesting angle on the broader foreign policy visions of both parties outside of the questions of national identity and nationalism.

Secondly, he skips quickly through the Louisiana Purchase and the domestic political controversies it raised in just a few pages. To be fair, he does subsequently back up and trace some of the foreign policy considerations regarding Louisiana and the bitter partisan conflict over its acquisition. But I think there is more that might be said on that matter, given that the Federalist-Republican debate touched very clearly on the crucial question of what kind of nation the United States should be. The acquisition and eventual settlement of Louisiana spoke directly to the interplay of foreign policy and national identity and might have been treated at greater length.

These quibbles aside (and they are nothing more than that), Trautsch has achieved a great deal with this book. His masterful command of the literature and his ability to demonstrate conclusively the foreign policy implications for domestic politics is deeply impressive. Trautsch adds new observations to oft-treated domestic and international events in the early republic. I have to end by paying him a very high compliment: his book will force me to rewrite some of my lectures for my early republic class and rethink the way I approach the era, so powerful and convincing is his evocation of the use of the international context in domestic politics in the early republic. His book has taught me things I did not know and made me rethink things I had long considered settled. I can think of no higher praise for a book than that, and for an author to achieve this with a first book suggests a very promising career ahead.

Identity Politics in the Early Republic

William E. Weeks

Jasper Trautsch had me in his corner as soon as I read in the prologue about his experience in a graduate seminar on the early republic at the John F. Kennedy Institute in Berlin: “While as a student I was initially more interested in the twentieth century U.S., I realized that the revolutionary and early national period was really the most significant era in American history” (ix).

I could not agree more. My own recognition of the era’s importance occurred in the process of researching an undergraduate term paper on the Chesapeake Affair. Digging into primary sources on the incident, I became convinced that the dominant American narrative was, at best, only partially correct. It was clear (to me at least) that a complicated international crisis had been reduced to a morality tale of Good vs. Evil in the service of American nationalism—and the ultimate cause of its foreign policy
manifestations—is to be found in the revolutionary and early national periods. Hence their fundamental importance to the study of American history.

Trautsch’s deeply researched and thoughtfully argued text advances this perspective. He displays a commanding knowledge of the rich newspaper culture of the early republic and is effective in showing how that newspaper culture was critical in framing the public’s reaction to foreign policy issues. “[E]arly American nationalism,” he writes, “was a demarcation process that was mainly carried out through the press and driven by a confrontational foreign policy” (19).

Trautsch argues that a distinctive American nationalism arose in the period 1789–1815, chiefly in opposition to Great Britain and France, the main rivals of the United States. It is not a wholly original thesis; The Genesis of America covers a lot of the same ground as Marie-Jeanne Rossignol’s now-classic text Le Fermente Nationaliste: Aux Origines de la Politique Extérieure des États Unis, 1789–1812 (1994). Yet Trautsch’s energy and erudition make his book a worthwhile revisiting of this critical moment in U.S. history. The presentation is aided by a splendid collection of ten contemporary engravings that illustrate the political and ideological themes of the text.

Trautsch details how Federalists and Republicans pushed their own versions of American nationalism. But there was considerable overlap between the two. No one “challenged the exclusive power of the central government to conduct external relations, as they acknowledged that a common foreign policy formed the basis of the union” (14). Along the same lines, he notes that since “the desire to allow for a common and effective U.S. foreign policy had been the most important reason for strengthening the union in 1787 and since the new Constitution enabled the U.S. to pursue a robust and coherent diplomacy, foreign policy would become a significant means to promote an American national consciousness” (15). Yes, the basis of forming a union of the states centered on the practical advantages it offered; and the preservation of this union required, in turn, the creation of a durable American nationalism. But Trautsch does not explore this connection between union and nationalism.

Also troubling is what appears to be an overemphasis on the period 1793–1815 in the creation of American nationalism. It is true, as Trautsch observes, that the Revolution failed to produce a national sentiment strong enough to maintain the union after the war. The centrifugal tendencies of the 1780s were headed off only by the ratification of the Constitution and the inauguration of George Washington as the first president, and then only temporarily. Yet it seems wrong not to appreciate the stirrings of American nationalism engendered by the revolutionary struggle. The blood sacrifices of the Revolution watered both the Tree of Liberty as well as the Tree of Nationalism. And before that, there was the anti-tax proto-nationalism of the Sons of Liberty of the 1760s; and before that, the emerging proto-national consciousness stimulated by the French and Indian War. Therefore, to situate the “genesis” of American nationalism during the period 1793–1815 ignores too much that went before.

Trautsch’s theoretical claim is that Americans needed to “disentangle” themselves from their dependent relationships with Great Britain and France if they were to establish their own distinct national identity. He argues that “as perceptions of threats are integral to processes of national integration, it is usually the most powerful nations and neighbors that are the most meaningful Others” (17).

The bulk of the text is dedicated to showing how Great Britain and France “were therefore essential foils against which American national identity could be forged. . . . [I]n order to invent themselves as a separate nation Americans had to disentangle themselves from their former mother country” (17, 18). Trautsch’s broader claim is that “the contest over American identity hence became intrinsically intertwined with the struggle over the direction of U.S. foreign policy,” particularly as it concerned relations with the two dominant powers of the time (71).

There is a lot of truth in this argument. In the case of Thomas Jefferson, hostility to Great Britain seems to have had a psychological dimension; it seemed to reveal an almost Oedipal need to slay an oppressive father. The lingering uncertainty relating to the alliance with France also posed a challenge to the creation of a distinctive American nationalism. France’s revolutionary upheaval, for a time, seemed likely to undermine the relative importance of the American Revolution. But Trautsch acknowledges that by the late 1790s, the violent excesses of the French Revolution, culminating in Napoleon’s dictatorship, made it a less threatening rival as a revolutionary state.

So yes, relations with Great Britain and France during this time are worthy of close examination as sources of American nationalism. But that does not mean that they were the sole backdrop against which American national identity was created. Trautsch minimizes the role of other international antagonists such as Spain or the Barbary States in fueling American nationalism. That the Barbary States were defeated relatively easily does not mean that they were insignificant foes in the popular mind. The quick reconstitution of the Navy in the 1790s and its effective projection of force in the Mediterranean should not be underestimated as nationalist triumphs. Relations with Spain, too, played a key role in the development of American nationalism. Spain’s declining status as a hemispheric power made it an ideal counterpart rhetorically and ideologically to the image of a rising United States.

Basically, any and all international rivals of the United States were potentially worthy grist for the nationalist mill. To suggest that these states were not important to the creation of that discourse because they “did not pose an immediate danger strong enough to create a sense of national solidarity” is to misunderstand the Self vs. Other nature of nationalist discourse (17). Both Spain and the Barbary States, in their way, posed perceived threats to American sovereignty and therefore served as fodder for American nationalism.

Similarly, I question Trautsch’s treatment of Native American relations as an “internal” affair. Native Americans were the first and most resilient external foe of white Americans, especially prior to 1815; and the wars waged against them were a prolific source of national heroes, Andrew Jackson first and foremost. Trautsch characterizes U.S. policy toward Native Americans as motivated by racism, and there is ample evidence for this view. Yet to attribute it all to racial prejudice seems too simple.

American nationalism was built on the assumption that American civilization was a superior form of social and political organization, one with a godly, ordained destiny to sweep away all that stood in its way. The various reasons advanced to legitimate Native American removal—i.e., theories of racial and cultural superiority, biblical injunctions regarding the “destined use of the soil,” various reasons advanced to legitimate Native American removal—i.e., theories of racial and cultural superiority, biblical injunctions regarding the “destined use of the soil,” avoiding Native American “extinction” at the hands of settlers—were all subsidiary to an overarching assumption that “Divine Providence” intended America to grow and expand.

Theories of race as a motivation for removal (as opposed to an excuse) would be more compelling to me had the United States not so ferociously resisted Great Britain, the nation it most resembled racially and culturally. At the heart of American nationalistic ideology in the Early Republic (and by extension, American foreign relations of the time) was a messianic conviction regarding its righteousness, a sense that American ideas and values were the measure of all things, be they racial, political, economic, or cultural.
This conviction lent a powerful internal logic to American nationalist ideology, a logic made stronger by the outcome of the War of 1812, which seemed to confirm that America’s “destiny” was indeed apparent.

Trautsch seems to minimize the messianic dimension of American nationalism, which leads him to underestimate the degree to which the War of 1812 greatly strengthened American nationalism, notwithstanding the haphazard way in which it was begun and prosecuted. The conflict dramatized that war was the ultimate cultural bonding agent of early American nationalism. In common struggle are the strongest nationalist bonds formed. By 1815, the British were taught a second lesson in American independence, the French were humbled as a revolutionary rival, the Barbary States were chastised and effectively subdued, and the determined Native American resistance in the Southeast was finally broken. Victory in war was the ultimate confirmation of divine favor, or so it seemed to many.

Trautsch repeats the point that the Treaty of Ghent offered little more than restoration of the prewar status quo and that the war, therefore, was at best a draw. But this conclusion misses the subjective popular experience of the last months of the war, as represented by America’s newspapers, most of which celebrated the battles of Lake Champlain, Baltimore, and (especially) New Orleans as decisive defeats of British invasion forces (which they were). Small wonder that the brief period of national unity spawned by the war’s perceived victorious outcome was known as “the Era of Good Feelings.”

Notwithstanding these criticisms, *The Genesis of America* is a valuable contribution to the ongoing rediscovery of the critical relationship between nationalism and foreign relations in the early republic. It should be required reading for American foreign relations scholars of all eras.


Walter L. Hisson

Jasper Trautsch argues that contentious debate over alliances and foreign relationships with Great Britain and France forged American national identity during the period from the American Revolution through the War of 1812. “Americans,” he explains, “having no shared history or unique culture, not to speak of a common ancestry, were in need of external enemies and foreign threats to invent America as a separate nation and to forget what set them apart from each other” (10).

My capsule evaluation of this book is that it is well-researched, especially in colonial-era newspaper debate and disputation but also in relevant diplomatic historiography, and well-crafted. The book reads well, is speckled with complementary illustrations from the era, and is handsomely produced by Cambridge University Press. It is also informational and well worth reading.

At the same time, much of this history is familiar. Moreover, I find the thesis less than compelling. This is a Eurocentric book by a European author who argues that American identity sprang from contentious debate on the part of a people who were not yet a nation until their interactions with Europeans made them one. There is certainly a lot of truth to this argument, but it is not especially original. The battle between Anglophobia and Anglophilia, or alternatively, between Francophobia and Francophilia, which is the pivot of the book, has long been recognized as central to the history of the early republic.

Through his exploitation of a wide range of colonial press accounts, however, Trautsch offers a rich contextualization of these issues and the intense debate they generated in the first generation of American national history. He argues that the colonial press offers the “best reflection of public opinion”, an argument he supports with an abundance of engaging and revealing evidence (31). His tireless research in the colonial press is the great strength of this book.

My chief problem with the book is the argument noted in the subtitle, that the formation of American national identity occurred from 1793 to 1815 and that it occurred as a result of contentious debate over whether to marry the American future to Britain or France. As is well known, this period saw the emergence of the first American political party system, which I would argue operated within a framework of an already existing albeit perpetually evolving national identity rather than functioning, as Trautsch would have it, to create one for the first time. I will offer some further reflections on this point below, but first, an overview of some of the author’s arguments.

In the body of the book Trautsch offers a re-reading of the events of the early national period and attempts to mold them to support his argument for national identity formation. He thus analyzes the Jay Treaty and its “meaning within the political identity debates” of the 1790s in the context of his newspaper evidence (94). The Republicans “were opposed to any treaty with Great Britain irrespective of its particular provisions” because the treaty was oppositional to the relationship they coveted with the “sister republic” of revolutionary France. The Federalists gained ground here, as they were able to depict the Republicans as warmongers who risked a conflict with Britain and its Indian allies rather than support a treaty in the national interest.

Turning to the Quasi-War, Trautsch makes the case that it has been understudied and that it was a real war that the Federalists—now the warmongers—wanted in order “to disentangle America from France, undermine Francophile definitions of American identity, and thereby discredit the democratic egalitarianism that the French Revolution represented.” Thus, they moved to “fabricate a war crisis” by dramatically exaggerating the XYZ Affair (126). “Whereas the Quasi-War encouraged Republicans to renounce their attachment to France and to endorse the notion of American exceptionalism,” he writes, “it prompted Federalists, by contrast, to increasingly define America by positive reference to Great Britain” (146).

In the end the Federalists were too successful for their own good. The rise of the Napoleonic dictatorship and the renunciation of the French alliance in the Convention of Mortefontaine in October 1800 ended the Republican love affair with France, now reactionary rather than revolutionary. “Ironically, their very success in disentangling America from France undermined Federalists’ political dominance,” Trautsch writes, as a Republican-backed French radical threat to America no longer existed. This transformation enabled the Republicans to champion “democratic egalitarianism” as “quintessentially American,” whereas “Federalists’ conservatism” was “inextricably tied to Great Britain” (167). The Federalists also paid a political price for the Quasi-War assaults on immigration and civil liberties, which lent credence to Republican charges that Federalists were warmed-over British monarchists.

As the British attempted to regulate American shipping and engaged in the odious practice of impressment, the Republicans built political support by emphasizing Great Britain’s “malignant designs” (183). Jefferson instituted the Embargo in the wake of the infamous attack on the USS Chesapeake in 1807, but the diplomacy of “peaceable coercion” failed to make the desired impression on Great Britain. Therefore, Madison eventually asked the Congress to declare war (197).

At first opposed to the war, which they perceived as part of a broader Republican conspiracy “to convert our mild republic into a furious democracy,” Federalists over time had little alternative but to embrace the wartime patriotic fervor (219). With the British and Indian allies
attacking Americans, “Federalists came to view the war as defensive and the U.S. in imminent danger” (238). Federalists were forced to give up their Anglophilia, and in the end American nationalism was defined in opposition to Great Britain. Americans subsequently turned inward and went down the road to disunion.

All of this is sharply analyzed by Trautsch but constitutes a familiar history of political parties rather than national identity formation. The formation of national identity argument rests on the premise that no national identity existed prior to the period under study, which at a minimum requires qualification and contextualization. No less an authority than John Adams famously pointed out that “the Revolution was effected before the war commenced” and was already in “the minds and hearts of the people.”

A process of “Americanization” had been going on for quite a long time before the Revolution of 1776. Part of the reason those of us who have long taught the first half of the U.S. survey course spend about a third of it on the pre-Revolutionary period is to track down the germination of an American identity.

As I have argued elsewhere, an imperial settler state emerged over centuries of borderland conflict and ethnic cleansing of the indigenous population, a process that was replete with all manner of ambivalence and ambiguity but nonetheless went a long way toward establishing, if not a fully formed “American” identity, at least the foundation for one. As a field, diplomatic history has made some but not nearly enough progress in taking Indians seriously when analyzing the history of foreign policy. In the traditional colonialist mindset, these foreign peoples and nations are treated as if they were somehow intrinsically part of “America” rather than being a legitimate external Other. Indians play a distinctly minor role in Trautsch’s Eurocentric account, even though considerable evidence can be marshaled to support the argument that relations with indigenous people did far more to forge an enduring American national identity than relations with the British and French.

If, as Trautsch argues, the “American nation needed external enemies to create a sense of national particularity” and separation from Europeans, Indians, or the combination of Indians and African-Americans arguably represented the Other required for identity formation better than fellow “white” European allies and adversaries (9). Trautsch tries to get around this problem by categorizing Indians and blacks as the “internal Other,” although he does acknowledge that “this is not to say that processes of external and internal demarcation were not intertwined” (21).

Near the end of his account, Trautsch notes that the Federalists gradually came to support the War of 1812, in part because of linkages made between the British and the blacks and Indians who took up arms against white Americans. This point suggests that an existing set of racial Others had already gone a long way toward establishing whiteness as a core element of American national identity (231). Trautsch does not spend much time exploring other factors contributing to American identity, either, such as religion and gender, although the uniquely American style of religiosity, expressed in the pre-Revolutionary Great Awakening (and still very much with us today), had also gone some distance toward defining a unique national identity. In sum, attributing American national identity to confrontion over Britain and France is far too narrow a frame.

In the end, we are left with a well-constructed history of political party formation in a foreign relations context with a great deal of revealing research into popular contention and debate. What we do not have is a convincing argument about the nature of American national identity or how and when it emerged.

In order to offer a convincing argument on identity formation, Trautsch would have had to present a more dedicated engagement with intellectual history and theorization, involving nations, nationalism, national identity, and the role of the external Other. He has some of this knowledge and cites a few relevant works, but what he ultimately offers here is a book especially well-grounded in traditional diplomatic history and well-seasoned with the discursive debate that raged in the colonial press. The ambitious effort to locate the moments when a distinctive American national identity emerged and was cemented into place and to frame those moments in a strictly Eurocentric context does not in the end convince.

Note:


David C. Hendrickson

The Genesis of America is a formidable piece of scholarship. The author has conducted indefatigable research into the primary and secondary sources of the early republic. It takes a certain bravery to enter the lists of this historiography, contending with such works as Elkins and McKitrick’s The Age of Federalism and Gordon Wood’s Empire of Liberty, to name only two of the outstanding works concerned with this period.1 Given that party rivalry has been the touchstone of this era’s historiographical controversy for some two hundred years, it is also very difficult to say anything new. Trautsch does manage that feat, though perhaps at the expense of a convincing interpretation.

Although novel in argument, Trautsch’s book stands out for the old-fashioned character of its methodological approach. The focus is on the relations of the United States with the two major European powers, Great Britain and France. There is little material on the relations with the Indian nations of the trans-Appalachian West or on relations with Spain. Instead, the emphasis is on the succession of crises with Britain and France that roiled America after the new government came into operation in 1789. The Genêt Affair and the struggles over neutrality in 1793, the Jay Treaty, the Quasi-War with France, the Louisiana Purchase, the Embargo, and the War of 1812 remain here, as before, the familiar landmarks. Scholars will find Trautsch’s deep dive into the historiography very useful and will admire his wide knowledge of the primary sources. Particularly enlightening are his expositions of the meaning of various etchings and engravings—the forerunners of today’s editorial cartoons—that satirized the misdeeds of various men and nations.

Trautsch’s argument is that foreign policy and military conflict were crucial to the formation of America’s national identity. America lacked a national identity in 1789, he argues, but had firmly acquired one by 1815. Why did this take place? In the 1790s, he writes, America came to be divided by a pro-British party (the Federalists) and a pro-French party (the Republicans). Neither side, he argues, wished for U.S. neutrality in the burgeoning conflict between Britain and France, which began in 1793 and stretched, with one brief interruption, to 1815. Instead, their fondest wish was to join in the European war. In 1794, the Republicans pushed for war with Britain; similarly, in 1798, the Federalists “deliberately instigated a foreign war and deceptively blamed France for it” (172). Though the Republicans successfully detached themselves from their pro-French bias after 1798, the Federalists remained stoutly
pro-British until the end and paid a heavy price for doing so. Throughout, Trautsch argues, the rival chieftains and their newspaper allies saw the promotion of foreign conflict as a means to smite domestic enemies.

It is a shrewd insight, and a useful point of departure, to see the arguments over foreign policy simultaneously as arguments over national identity. “Both parties,” he writes perceptively, “sought to represent their respective political creed as the only true form of Americanism” (60). Trautsch’s depiction of this struggle, however, strikes me as wrong on major points. Most uncharitably, he basically accepts the malicious interpretations of each party’s motives by the other as the correct ones. His argument that the Republicans were agitating for war in 1794 and 1795, for instance, adduces a number of voices, including James Monroe’s, to support his thesis, but downplays the stated Republican strategy of peaceable coercion in response to British depredations. James Madison, the leader of the Republicans in Congress, saw his commercial measures as a means to register America’s superior power position—Britain, he thought, would have no choice but to consult its interests and concede essential U.S. demands were it faced with U.S. economic sanctions.

It was the Federalists who charged that Madison’s strategy would lead inevitably to war, a charge the Republicans in Congress were very much concerned to deflect. Such an outcome, they reasoned, was certainly possible if Britain continued its domineering ways, but was unlikely and could not in any case be avoided through appeasement.

The Federalists made a strong case that Madison was deluded in his estimate of the relative power of the United States in a commercial war of privation with Great Britain, but the most persuasive conclusion from the evidence is that Madison was wrong in his projections, not insincere in his professions. Belief in the power of peaceable coercion, substituting interest for force, had been a hallmark of Republican thinking since independence, and Jefferson and Madison repeatedly attested to its importance. The grip this “ideology” had on them was just as far-reaching as any theory of the peaceableness of republics (to which Trautsch later attaches great importance as a major cause of the War of 1812).

Trautsch misunderstands the relationship of the Republicans and Federalists to the two great European belligerents. He writes repeatedly that it rests on a basic sympathy and admiration for these powers. The Federalists admired what monocrats and aristocrats had accomplished in England and wished to duplicate it America; Republicans pined for the Reign of Terror and a Jacobin future. But these were the wild insinuations of their respective enemies, invariably intended to wound and usually repudiated with fury.

We better understand the Republicans as anti-British rather than pro-French, and the Federalists as anti-French rather than pro-British. The Federalists saw Britain, the Republicans France, as useful bulwarks to ward off the unbearable oppression threatened by the power they feared most. Alexander Hamilton’s language in 1798 was characteristic: Britain, he wrote in The Stand, “has repeatedly upheld the balance of power [in Europe], in opposition to the grasping ambition of France. She has no doubt occasionally employed the pretense of danger as the instrument of her own ambition; but it is not the less true, that she has been more than once an effectual shield against real danger.”

The views of Senator George Cabot of Massachusetts on the European conflict reflected a similar sensibility. “It is a humiliating thought,” he told Rufus King, “but I reluctantly avow it, that our fate depends essentially upon the issue of the struggle between Britain & France. Why should this arch Federalist “reluctantly avow” such a conviction? Why was it a humiliating thought? Because Britain had been the archenemy for a generation, the very model of an obnoxious despotism. To be thrown into dependence on Britain could not but induce discomfort. That Federalists wished for Britain’s success in the war against France does not show that they wanted a king, lords, and commons in America. Hamilton had professed his admiration for the British constitution in his notorious speech at the Philadelphia convention, but the Federalists defended their policies by appealing to the Federal Constitution, which departed from the British constitution in vital respects.

Such sympathy with foreign powers undoubtedly existed at certain times for partisans of both parties, especially at the outset of the European war, but a sort of “loathing—of “Anglophobia” and “Antigallamony,” as Jefferson put it—was the mainspring, respectively, of both parties, and to it both counterposed the one true Americanism (69). As the French diplomat Louis-Guillaume Otto observed, French agents had long seen only a French party and an English party in the United States, whereas the “American party, which loves its country above all and for whom prejudices either for France or for England are only accessory and often passing affections,” was far more numerous.4

Trautsch argues that neither party “favored a policy of neutrality or saw the re-establishment of a balance of power in the life-and-death struggle between France and Great Britain as a primary objective” (71). Both those judgments seem mistaken to me. It would be more reasonable to say that both parties appealed to a “true” or “fair” or “honest” neutrality and charged their domestic adversaries with un-neutral attitudes and policies. Washington’s Farewell Address, sanctifying neutrality in the European war, was not just an entry in the party wars, as Trautsch argues; it expressed a general American feeling, one that Jefferson shared. Trautsch quotes one Federalist, William Loughton Smith, as counterposing America’s policy of “liberty, peace, order” with French “despotism, anarchy, wars,” but Republican leaders like Jefferson could be quoted to the same effect, differing only in charging Britain as the repository of such odious tendencies (62).

The puzzle with a policy of neutrality is that its purpose was to stay out of Europe’s wars, but as a scheme of rights and duties it also entailed a willingness to fight when the rights of the neutral were violated by one of the belligerents. Paradoxically, a nation had to threaten to get in if it wanted to stay out. The principal leaders in both parties maintained a commitment to staying out in theory, but each had “breaking points” where the assault on national dignity, usually delivered on the high seas, was seen to justify and perhaps require a forceful response. Jefferson had a conception of neutrality in 1793 that would keep America out of the war but be favorable to France, which Citizen Genêt did not appreciate. Trautsch writes that Jefferson encouraged Genêt’s outfitting of French privateers in American ports (75–76), whereas Jefferson, in fact strongly objected to the Frenchman’s violations of America’s neutrality.5 He winked at Genêt’s Louisiana enterprise, but reproved him for just about everything else. Genêt actually caused Jefferson no end of embarrassment and contributed significantly to his defeat in the epic contest with Hamilton for influence over President Washington.

Neither is it true to say that American leaders were generally indifferent to the balance of power in Europe. The leaders of both parties in fact saw that as very significant, but they differed in where they thought the threat to the balance lay. Republicans saw France as essential to the maintenance of the balance, Federalists saw Britain in the same light, but neither side was indifferent to the prospect that one or the other European power should achieve a decisive victory over its adversary. Thus, Madison in the Federal Convention had argued that to the rivalry between
France and Britain “we owe perhaps our liberty,” and Jefferson often voiced similar sentiments. After Britain’s naval victory at Trafalgar and France’s victory at Austerlitz, he recognized that a Britain dominant at sea and a France dominant in continental Europe would mutually check one another’s ambitions, to the benefit of the United States. There were, to be sure, many European quarrels that were products of what Washington in his Farewell Address called “European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor or caprice,” viewed by American leaders as having no ability to affect the destiny of the United States, but the conflict between these two European titans — and the implications of a complete victory by one or the other — was throughout the period a subject of anxious anticipation and foreboding. The maintenance of neutrality was an extremely challenging task. If the United States reached an accommodation with Britain, as it did with the Jay Treaty, it earned the enmity of France; if were complaisant to France, it earned the enmity of Britain. Sometimes the belligerent measures were rather extreme, as when Britain swooped down on unsuspecting U.S. merchant vessels in late 1793; or when France, responding to the Jay Treaty, attacked U.S. shipping and decreed that Americans impressed onto British warships would be treated as pirates (i.e., subject to summary execution); or when the British insisted on continuing their practice of impressment, often seen in America, as Trautsch observes, as equivalent in odium to the slave trade. If it were the obligation of the federal government to protect American citizens from depredations by the warring belligerents, there was plenty over two decades to become indignant about.

Trautsch minimizes these transgressions and treats sympathetically both British and French claims against the United States. He chastises U.S. envoys John Marshall and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney for their departure from France when asked for a handsome bribe and other humiliating concessions, in what became known as the XYZ affair. The bribe requested, preliminary to the discussion of an unequal treaty, was about fifty thousand pounds sterling, a sum nearly equivalent to the annual yield from America that the British hoped to get (but did not get) from their tax measures before the Revolution. If Marshall and Pinckney were sincerely desirous of peace, Trautsch argues, they should have stayed. In his hands, the episode supports the contention that the Federalists had an intense desire for war.

The brusque departure of the envoys, however, did show that the United States would not submit to insulting treatment. It did not preclude future negotiations, which as it happened were successful in composing the quarrel.

Trautsch also treats sympathetically the commanding necessities that led Britain to continue its practice of impressment and notes a memo by Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin estimating that half of the seamen on America’s merchant vessels were British subjects (194–95). That undoubtedly points to a real weakness in the U.S. position in the years before “The Second War of Independence,” but it does not show that Americans were being inordinately aggressive in objecting to impressment or in feeling indignation over its continuance.

Trautsch’s sympathetic portrayal of both belligerents is certainly unusual in the historiography of the period, as is his unsympathetic portrayal of both Republicans and Federalists as being seized with an aggressive impulse. Most American diplomatic historians over the last century have had unkind words about the conduct of Britain and France, and usually both. At the same time, historians generally divided into warring camps, as they were either pro-Hamilton and anti-Jefferson, or anti-Hamilton and pro-Jefferson. John Adams was the odd man out in these appropriations, and the Adams revival of the last two decades has made the historiographical picture more complicated.

Trautsch stands outside these controversies, and not only for his exculpating treatment of the European powers. He has unfavorable characterizations of all the principal American leaders — Jefferson is at the outset a pro-French fanatic, and throughout a lying dissembler, especially on issues of war and peace; Hamilton is the American Bonaparte, aiming at civil war and military dictatorship. Adams is driven by passion, not reason, his peace mission to France owing to a deep-seated Anglophobia. Forgive me the speculation, but it seems we have a German historian concerned with making light of British and French transgressions, and keen to find fault with the United States. In this reviewer’s opinion, that would be a better take for the early twenty-first century than for the early nineteenth century.

Trautsch notes the anomaly that in the prequel to the War of 1812, the commercial section of the country (the Eastern states) was set against the war, whereas the non-seafaring and agricultural sections provided the votes in favor. The best way to explain the anomaly is to give weight to considerations of honor as opposed to interest in prompting the decision for war. “What are we required to do by those who wish to engage our feelings and wishes” in Britain’s behalf? asked Henry Clay in late 1811: “To bear the actual cuffs of her arrogance, that we may escape a chimerical French subjugation! We are invited, conjured to drink the potion of British poison actually presented to our lips, that we may avoid the imperial dose prepared by perturbed imaginations. We are called upon to submit to debasement, dishonor, and disgrace — to bow the neck to royal insolence, as a course of preparation for manly resistance to Gallic invasion!” In a similar vein, John Calhoun rebuked John Randolph’s arguments for conciliation toward Britain, which Randolph thought necessary to forestall the greater danger posed by Napoleonic France, and called conciliation a species of “calculating avarice” that was “only fit for shops and counting houses, and ought not to disgrace the seat of sovereignty by its squalid and vile appearance.” A nation, he averred, “is never safe but under the shield of honor.”

Frontier resentment against Indian attacks — the war on the frontier began sooner than the war at sea — and the felt dishonor of submission to Britain were more important than material interests in prompting the congressional declaration of war in 1812. New England had no desire to conquer the French Catholics of Canada, or admit them into the union, and it was directly contrary to the interest of Virginia to do so, as Randolph trenchantly observed. Trautsch sees Republican peace theory — the doctrine that republics were naturally peaceful, monarchies naturally aggressive — as a major cause of the War of 1812, but that seems much less significant than the challenges to national honor that British actions entailed. Republican peace theory doubtless reinforced a sense of American innocence, but it did not engineer the provocations.

Considerations of honor, linked to national independence, were also crucial to Republican perspectives in 1794 and Federalist perspectives in 1798. A preponderance of leaders felt that it was in America’s interest to remain separate from the European system; our interest is in commerce, they said, not war. But such self-interest could not entirely govern the case if the United States were treated contemptuously by a European power. Jefferson’s language in 1794 reflects this sensibility: “We are alarmed here with the apprehensions of war: and sincerely anxious that it might be avoided; but not at the expense either of our faith or honor.” Hamilton would take the same ground. Even in their rabid disagreement, American leaders appealed to a common normative framework in their foreign policy, an important point in considering the formation of a national identity. Jefferson recalled these principles transcending party when he wrote, in his First Inaugural, “We have
called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all republicans: we are all federalists.”

In keeping with his larger portrait of American belligerence, Trautsch sees Jefferson as explicitly threatening Napoleon with war in 1802–3, and he argues that the Embargo of 1807–9 was “a decisive step towards war rather than a substitute or alternative to it” (198). But it is doubtful that Jefferson’s threats in 1802 were actually communicated to Napoleon, and they were almost certainly not the reason behind the French leader’s decision to sell Louisiana to the United States. Jefferson saw the French possession of New Orleans as inevitably producing conflicts that would end in war—it would be a formula for eternal conflict, he wanted Napoleon to understand—but he did not threaten war to block France from taking possession of New Orleans from Spain. Nor, given Jefferson’s antipathy to England, were his threats to “marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation” likely to be especially convincing, as neither Jefferson nor Secretary of State Madison was likely to accept any terms of alliance that Britain might find agreeable.10

So, too, the Embargo of 1807 cannot be adequately seen as simply a step toward war. As Trautsch insists, it did have a tendency to “foreclose the diplomatic options” with Great Britain, but the meaning Jefferson imputed to it actually shifted dramatically over time.11 It had multiple significations. That no one at the time could be exactly sure of what it meant—that Jefferson himself was not sure—was one of its most distinctive features. Only occasionally did Jefferson see its purpose as potentially preparatory for war. In the course of 1808 he increasingly justified it as an instrument of peaceable coercion; he recurred in crisis not to war, but to his long-held faith in economic sanctions. Initially furious after the British attack on the Chesapeake, and thinking war inevitable, he came to see the embargo, adopted in December 1807, as a valiant attempt at finding an instrument other than war for the resolution of national differences. Jefferson did occasionally rouse himself to the necessity of war with England, briefly in 1807 and then again in 1812. But he was also extremely leery of the dangers war might pose, and this more often informed his outlook and actions. “Our constitution is a peace establishment—it is not calculated for war,” he observed in 1806. “War would endanger its existence.”12 Jefferson was anxious that same year that he not be seen by the belligerents as proceeding from “Quaker principles,” but he had a very considerable attraction to those principles.

Trautsch’s crucial argument is that war was indispensable in the formation of national identity. He maintains that there was little sense of national identity in 1789; this was built only in the subsequent years of foreign war. The War of 1812, however, stirred national feeling in essentially the same way the War of Independence did. As Albert Gallatin observed, the second war with Britain “renewed and reinstated the national feelings and character which the Revolution had given, and which were daily lessened.”13 From the throes of the War of Independence, in the icy furnace of Valley Forge, rose the conviction that America most needed a “national character” in opposition to the European powers, but the existence of this sentiment did not really solve the problem of national identity. It certainly did not ensure a durable union or coexistence among states and sections with multiple loyalties and oft-conflicting interests. America’s weakness, if divided, showed dramatically that they needed to cooperate with one another, but it did not show a sure path to such cooperation. Depending on the circumstances, observers understood, foreign war might foster unity or disunity.

Trautsch’s own evidence shows how dangerous it would be to launch a foreign war for the purpose of pursuing a civil conflict, as he alleges both parties sought to do. He finds in the record considerable bravado from some Federalists in 1798, and some Republicans in 1812, about how war would afford an opportunity to crush domestic enemies. “As for internal enemies,” wrote one anonymous barker in 1798, “I am prepared in my own mind, as it respects internal enemies, to make it a war of extermination” (136). “He who is not for us,” wrote The National Intelligencer in 1812, “must be considered as against us and treated accordingly” (225).

Trautsch suggests that America’s leaders looked upon such a prospect with glee. I think most leaders looked upon it with alarm, as it could easily be seen as a formula for civil war. During the War of 1812, Madison did not pursue his domestic foes; he acquiesced in the effectively neutral posture of the eastern states, which during the war were connected to the other states “as dead to living bodies.” The war did not exactly produce a secession crisis—the Hartford Convention chose nullification, not secession—but it came close to doing so. In 1815, after the War of 1812 had drawn to a close, Jefferson observed to Gallatin that “the war, had it proceeded, would have upset our government, and a new one, whenever tried, will do it.”14

The fear that war would equal disunion had been of crucial significance for two decades in reinforcing Washington’s counsel against permanent alliances and departures from neutrality, a quest made far more problematic by the vitriol spewing from the press. Jefferson saw the point in the paroxysm of 1798, counselling “that nothing will secure us internally but a divorce from both nations.” If Americans engaged in a war that excited such divided passions, “our Union runs the great risk of not coming out of that war in the shape in which it enters it.”15 John Adams believed that devoutly in 1799. Trautsch attributes his renewed peace mission to France as owing to his Anglophobia; in fact, Adams was traumatized by the thought that foreign war with France would produce civil war in America, leading probably to military dictatorship, and he bravely stepped into the breach. He wanted his decision to send the peace mission on his tombstone as the most patriotic thing he ever did. There is no question that the War of 1812 served to heighten the sense of a national consciousness, and in that sense Trautsch’s basic point is unexceptionable. However, the decision for war or peace was recognizably momentous and always carried not only the possibility of greater unity but also the risk of dissolution.

Trautsch highlights the schism within the Republican Party. In contrast with the Federalists, styled here as the bearers of European conservatism, the Republicans were composed of an alliance between southern aristocratic slaveholders and the yeomanry and middling sort in the northern states, especially Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. The democratic egalitarianism of the latter, he argues, displaced the classical republicanism of the former (58). But this is a misleading way of putting the matter. What happened was that democratic egalitarians appropriated the language of the classical republicans. If, as “Democrat-Republicans” maintained, a democracy and a republic were the same thing, that appropriation was an entirely natural deduction from republican principles. America witnessed in these years the beginnings of a great broadening of the white political class, culminating in the democratic ethos of the 1830s; in the process, republicanism was transformed, but not displaced.

It is only fair to add as well that the northern Federalists, seen here as the party of order as opposed to liberty, often wailed about the insensate hypocrisy of southern slaveholders. Timothy Pickering, depicted here as an imperious aristocrat, was withering on that point for twenty years. Interestingly, Trautsch draws that characterization—the Republicans the party of liberty, the Federalists the party of order—from John Quincy Adams’s memorial to James Madison and James Monroe in 1836. Adams, a determined opponent of the Slave Power, was just being politic for the occasion. He well knew that this


7. For my critique of America’s domineering ways in the last two decades, see David C. Hendrickson, Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition (New York, 2018).

8. Henry Clay (December 31, 1811), and John Calhoun (December 12, 1811), cited in David C. Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over International Relations (Lawrence, KS, 2009), 58–59.


12. Trautsch quotes Jefferson as writing that “America ‘is a peace establishment’” (278), but it was the constitution to which Jefferson was referring. A truer rendition of his sentiment would be that the constitution was the indispensable element in the preservation of America’s peace. Without a federal tie, as he expressed the American consensus, the separate states “would be eternally at war with each other, & would become at length the mere partisans & satellites of the leading powers of Europe.” “Thomas Jefferson’s Explanations of the Three Volumes Bound in Marbled Paper (the so-called ‘Anas’), 4 February 1818,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-12-02-0343-0002.


Author’s Response

Jasper M. Trautsch

I am grateful that Andrew L. Johns selected The Genesis of America as the subject for a roundtable discussion for Passport, and I appreciate that my argument about the emergence of American nationalism in the early republic and the role that U.S. foreign policy played in the process has hereby been given the chance to become more widely known among historians of American foreign relations. Moreover, I am honored that four distinguished professors whose work has had a formative influence on my research on the topic have agreed to review my book, thoughtfully discussing the claims I am making in it. I will respond to the reviews one by one.

Todd Estes’ praise for The Genesis of America means a lot to me. When I began my research on American nationalism and early U.S. foreign relations by writing my M.A. thesis at Tulane University in 2005 on the national identity dimensions of the Jay Treaty, and Estes’ several articles on the debate that the treaty sparked (which he subsequently expanded on in his book The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of Early American Political Culture) shaped my thinking on this subject at the time. Therefore, I am happy that my book in turn has made a strong impression on him.

As for his argument that America’s relations to the Barbary pirates could have figured a bit more prominently in my monograph, I agree that the capturing of U.S. merchantmen by North African corsairs also triggered intense debates about the nature of American identity in the early republic, which in turn influenced how U.S. foreign policy makers reacted to this issue. In this regard, one could also mention the Haitian Revolution. Both topics have already received excellent scholarly analyses. I focused instead on Anglo-American and Franco-American relations, finding that Great Britain and France were the major foreign Others in the construction of American national identity. Not only were they the most powerful states that posed actual threats to the U.S. in its early years of existence; during the French Revolutionary Wars, they also served as the principal foreign templates for Federalists and Republicans, as they debated the political
character of the American republic. In the end, I found that this focus on Great Britain and France ensured maximum coherence for my larger argument, even if it came at the expense of completeness. I also think that Estes is correct when noting that my treatment of the Louisiana Purchase is relatively brief and that more could be said on the subject. Unfortunately, space limitations prevented me from providing a more comprehensive interpretation of the role that this territorial acquisition played in the identity debates between Federalists and Republicans.

William Earl Weeks’s review shares many features of Estes’. While he recommends the book and finds kind things to say about it, he also notes that, by focusing on Anglo-American and Franco-American relations, it neglects the importance of America’s relations to Spain and the Barbary states for negotiations about American identity. Again, I do not deny that nations other than Great Britain and France also became the object of external Othering processes in the early republic. However, I maintain that these two countries were the most essential foils against which American identity was constructed.

As for any other colony, detachment from the mother country, which continued to exert a strong cultural influence on the new republic, was most crucial for the “invention” of an independent American nation, which, after all, was predominantly inhabited by people of British descent. Moreover, coming to terms with the French Revolution was also essential for any attempts to construct an American identity, as it determined how Americans assessed their own revolutionary heritage. Was the American Revolution defined by its difference from the French Revolution or did they both form part of the same movement? The answer to this question largely defined the identity of the U.S. Spain and the Barbary states just did not have the same ideological significance for Americans, and no one suggested them as a model. Federalists and Republicans might have pursued different policies towards them, but these disagreements did not constitute grounds for high-pitched partisan polarization.

Weeks also claims that American nationalism began to emerge before 1793, i.e. during the bloody struggle for independence. I do not deny this. Nationalism is a complex, multifaceted, dynamic, open-ended, and contested process, for which it is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint a specific start and end date, particularly on the collective level. Certainly, the shared experience of fighting the British Army during the War of Independence created a sense of national unity among certain members of the Continental army. It was also a nationalizing experience for certain men serving in the Continental Congress or as America’s representatives abroad.

In fact, a major premise of The Genesis of America is that most federal office holders after 1789 were nationalists who had come to identify with the union during the revolution and afterwards were eager to use the powers that the Constitution had conferred upon the federal government to increase other Americans’ attachment to the union (15-17). Washington, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson, Madison among others could all be considered American nationalists whose career, fame, indeed identity was predicated on the continued existence of the United States.

However, nationalism was not yet a mass phenomenon in 1789. At that point in time it might better be described as an elite affair. The story that The Genesis of America tells is that of how, after the American Revolution, this elite took advantage of the French Revolutionary Wars, raging, with brief interruptions, from 1793 to 1815, to arouse nationalist sentiment across the population by pursuing a confrontational foreign policy towards the major belligerents in order to ensure the survival of the fragile union, and how, in response to these foreign crises, the early American press helped foster a national discourse on American identity.

Finally, Weeks questions my characterization of Native Americans as internal Others, arguing that they were rather a palpable external threat to white Americans before 1815. I admit that the question of whether Native Americans constituted external or internal actors is complicated and defies a clear answer. On the one hand, the federal government concluded peace treaties with Native American tribes, indicating that they regarded them as at least partially independent nations. On the other hand, it was the Department of War rather than the Department of State that managed Indian relations, and it was federal courts rather than international tribunals that resolved disputes between the federal government and Indian tribes, suggesting that Indian relations were regarded a domestic concern.

As my book is concerned with U.S. foreign policy makers rather than with the U.S. Army and War Department commissioners, I decided to regard the federal government’s handling of relations with Native Americans as an internal issue, but I willingly acknowledge that a different line of research would have justified treating them as subjects of foreign policy. In any case, Weeks’ remark made me realize that I should probably have moved this discussion of the nature of Indian affairs from the introduction’s lengthy footnote 67 into the main text.

Walter Hixson’s criticism is twofold. First, he disagrees with the timeframe, claiming that American national identity formed in the colonial period rather than during the early republic. The second point follows logically from the first: Hixson questions whether Americans’ relations to European powers were really as central to the formation of U.S. national identity as I argue, instead suggesting that conflicts with Native Americans provided the real foundation for “American” identity. Putting his critique in a nutshell, Hixson calls The Genesis of America “a Eurocentric book by a European author.”

On the one hand, of course, Hixson is right: the book has indeed been written by a European author, and I see no reason to deny that as a European I might have a particular perspective on the subject. On the other hand, I do not share his belief that having a European outlook is illegitimate. So let me clarify in how far my approach might be considered European and why this is not necessarily a bad thing.

When surveying the literature on American nationalism, one quickly comes to the conclusion that most scholars today concur that its emergence did not occur prior to the American Revolution, but in its wake. Moreover, still, scholars of the colonial and revolutionary periods such as Jack P. Greene, Timothy Breen, and John M. Murrin showed that the American colonists’ identification with the mother country was never stronger than on the eve of the American Revolution. They mostly took pride in being members of the powerful British Empire, boasted about their British liberties, sent their children to British schools and universities, and mimicked the British way of life, British tastes, and British fashions. Only during the American Revolution did an increasing number of colonists start to reconsider this loyalty to the British Empire.

Given American colonists’ profound attachment to Great Britain in the colonial period, the question of how to set America apart from her former mother country therefore became a pivotal challenge in the post-revolutionary period. Americans and Britons looked alike, spoke alike, and shared the same culture and history. Moreover, while America’s republican system might have made her politically unique before 1789, the outbreak of the French Revolution, which provided the U.S. with a new sister republic, also complicated political definitions of America as the exceptional “land of liberty.” But what then distinguished Americans from Great Britain and France if they were ethnically, culturally, historically, and politically...
so similar to their European reference points?

This question might very well be of a particular fascination for a European interested to find out how European settlers could re-imagine themselves as “un-European” if not “anti-European.” But analyzing the formation of American nationalism within a transatlantic rather than a purely continental context is not “Euro-centric.” Hixson is being polemical and using the wrong term here, as it implies an illegitimate assertion of European superiority.

Moreover, inquiring into how white Americans constructed and negotiated their differences from white Europeans on the other side of the ocean is not tantamount to denying the importance of racial Othing within North America. To the contrary, as I state clearly in the introduction, “a basis for the feeling of community among the disparate white peoples of various ethnic origins was their shared perception that they all had more in common with each other than with the Native Americans and African Americans and that the former posed a direct and the latter at least a latent threat to them” (19). I even quote Hixson approvingly to argue that race was the easiest way of transcending the ethnic differences between European settlers (20).

As Hixson points out in his review, this process of racial Othing had already started in the colonial period. Nonetheless, the emergence of white solidarity within the colonies did not fully settle the issue of what constituted American identity once the separation from the mother country occurred, as race actually bound Americans to their former brethren (as Weeks insists in his review, race cannot explain why Americans “so ferociously resisted Great Britain,” as she was the nation that the U.S. “most resembled racially and culturally”). I go on to say, therefore, that “after attaining independence, it now seemed paramount for Euro-Americans to, additionally [italics added], develop a consciousness of being different to their white brethren on the other side of the Atlantic in order to invent a separate American nationality” (20-21).

In the end, I do not find it particularly fruitful to treat these processes of internal and external Othing in a competitive way and as mutually exclusive, as if only one group could have been selected as a template against which to define the United States as a nation. Nationalists seeking to construct an American national identity were concerned both with finding (or inventing) and emphasizing differences from those inside the territory of the United States who were excluded from citizenship on racial grounds, such as Native and African Americans, and from those who shared the same ethnicity and culture but resided outside the territory of the United States such as Britons and Frenchmen.

Important work on how a racial identity among European settlers developed in the colonial and revolutionary period has been done by, inter alia, Peter Silver, Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, and Robert G. Parkinson. What I hoped to accomplish with The Genesis of America was not to challenge their research, but, like Sam Haynes and Kariann Akemi Yokota, to complement it by analyzing the painful evolution of a post-colonial identity during the early republic. For this purpose, I reinterpreted the familiar story of how American parties developed not simply as a struggle over economic interests and political principles, but as fundamental negotiations about the very identity of the emerging nation, and reinterpreted the tensions and actual wars between the United States and Great Britain and France not merely as diplomatic quarrels, but as the very battlegrounds on which the “anti-European” identity of the United States would be determined.

Thus emphasizing Americans’ need to disentangle themselves from Great Britain and France after the American Revolution does not mean that definitions of America in opposition to Native and African Americans lost importance. Nor does it mean that post-colonial and racial identity formations were completely separate processes. To the contrary, as I demonstrate in the chapters on the War of 1812, Republicans used race very effectively to arouse nationalistic rage against Great Britain by likening the issue of the British impressment of white American sailors to the institution of black slavery (188-192). Moreover, one of the two main reasons why Republicans were successful in making Federalists give up their Anglophilia during the War of 1812 was their public association of the British with Native American enemies, a rhetorical strategy encapsulated in the term “white savages” (231-236). In short: even though it might appear on the surface as if Hixson’s American Settler Colonialism and my The Genesis of America make conflicting claims, I think that both books actually work well together to offer a “full picture,” as they shed light on two equally significant aspects of early American national identity formation.

While Hixson’s review is mostly concerned with my argument about American nationalism, David C. Hendrickson focuses on my claims about early U.S. foreign policy. I have to admit that I was initially surprised that he takes such a critical view of my book, since my interpretation of early Anglo- and Franco-American relations has been strongly influenced by his works (even though we have never met in person). His Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding shaped my view on the Constitution and the fragility of American nationalism at the end of the 1780s, as I note in my book’s introduction. Moreover, his Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (co-authored with Robert W. Tucker) has informed my analysis of Jefferson’s foreign policy as president, as might become apparent in my chapter on the origins of the War of 1812.

What are Hendrickson’s criticisms then? He addresses three issues in particular. For one, he argues that I should have distinguished more clearly between what reckless newspaper editors wrote and what responsible political leaders said. Moreover, he charges me with taking at face value what politicians said about each other in a polarized public sphere (as when Federalists accused Republicans of being French-loving radicals and Republicans alleged that Federalists were pro-British monarchists) while at the same time not accepting as truth what they said about themselves (primarily that they were all neutral in the French Revolutionary Wars and unattached to either Great Britain and France from the beginning). Finally, he takes exception to the fact that I criticize American leaders for pursuing confrontational policies, while I allegedly exonerate the British and French governments.

I completely concur with Hendrickson that there was a difference both in style and substance between what Republican editors and Republican leaders wrote. While some Republican newspapers clamored for war in 1794, neither Madison nor Jefferson advocated a call to arms at that time (even though they were aware—and willing to take the risk—that the policy of peaceful coercion they recommended might lead to military conflict). When many newspapers demanded a declaration of war in 1807, Jefferson as president refrained from such a step. Finally, while Republican newspapers initiated an outright campaign for a declaration of war in 1810 and 1811, Madison stalled and only very reluctantly agreed to engage in armed hostilities in 1812. As I actually analyze in much detail at the beginning of chapter 5, Jefferson and Madison were firm believers in the theory of republican peace, fearing that warfare posed the greatest threat to the survival of republics (176-182). Many Republican leaders therefore agreed on war in 1812 only with the greatest reluctance—in contrast to Republican newspapers, which largely celebrated news of the war’s outbreak.

However, this aversion to war does not mean, as
Hendrickson implies, that Republican leaders were not influenced by the discourse conducted in newspapers and that diplomatic historians can therefore discard as irrelevant what editors had to say. To the contrary, at a time when neither public opinion polls nor other daily media existed, newspapers were the best barometers that foreign policy makers had to assess what “people” thought, particularly since the editorial process was not yet professionalized and newspapers regularly printed letters from readers, and reprints from public speeches and toasts given at public festivities. Indeed, demonstrating how the public discourse influenced what foreign policy makers considered politically feasible during the early republic is one of the major historiographical contributions that The Genesis of America seeks to make. In particular, I argue that Republican newspapers waged an Anglophobic campaign to push the nation into a war against Great Britain in 1812 and that it was the public surge in pro-war sentiment that ultimately made Madison, who had argued throughout his career that the government ought to follow public opinion, ask Congress for a declaration of war.

Hendrickson is correct in noting that the kind of vitriol and invective one reads in the newspapers of the time cannot usually be found to the same extent in the writings of leaders such as Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison. Nonetheless, it is problematic to dissociate public policy and public discourse, not only because public opinion influenced political decisions, as with the 1812 declaration of war, but also because foreign policy triggered public debates. After all, it was the Federalist leaders’ decision to bring matters with France to a head in 1798 that helped escalate the anti-French diatribes in Federalist newspapers, and it was Jefferson’s and Madison’s confrontational policy towards Great Britain that fueled the Anglophobic nationalism expressed by Republican newspapers. juxtaposing “enlightened” statesmen and “demagogic” editors, as Hendrickson does, can therefore be misleading.

I agree with Hendrickson that the accusations that Republicans and Federalists raised against each other should not be accepted at face value. Therefore, I in fact devote considerable space in the first chapter to outlining their ideological profiles, arguing that Federalists should not be understood as monarchists, as Republicans called them, but as conservatives, and that Republicans should not be viewed as anarchists, as Federalists described them, but as democratic egalitarians (40-51).

In addition, I make clear that both Republican and Federalist leaders were nationalists whose goal was to increase Americans’ identification with the union. In fact, that is the major premise of the book, as I pointed out above. Federalists were not anti-French because they allegedly admired the British monarchy, and Republicans were not anti-British because they allegedly favored the French democracy over the American republic. Rather, Great Britain and France had become external symbols for the competing ideologies over which Federalists and Republicans were arguing at home, and by choosing different foreign Others in opposition to which they constructed American identity, Federalists and Republicans tried to represent their respective creed not as a partisan outlook, but as the only true form of Americanism. They were nationalists, but they defined America in partisan ways: If America was the opposite of revolutionary France, then the established order would be legitimate. If America was the opposite of Great Britain, a further democratization of American society was warranted.

Not only should we refrain from simply reiterating what political opponents said about each other in the past, but, I would like to add, it is equally important for us to also be cautious about accepting as truth what they said about themselves. Both Federalist and Republican leaders repeatedly claimed that they were neutral in the European conflict. While partisan newspapers were more outspoken about taking a side in the French Revolutionary Wars, Hendrickson is right in emphasizing that leaders usually presented themselves as apostles of neutrality. Yet, it does not follow that, as Hendrickson argues, the foreign policies that they suggested were in fact such. Jefferson and Madison criticized Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, fearing that it was actually partial towards Great Britain. Hamilton in turn alleged that Republicans’ commercial policies, which they represented as balanced, would really favor France. If they all agreed that the United States should stay neutral in the European conflict, why would they attack each other so viciously and accuse each other of British or French attachments? Why would parties, which the Constitution did not foresee and which most Founding Fathers rejected as a threat to republicanism, form in response to foreign policy if there was widespread agreement that the United States should remain aloof from the European war?

While they might have claimed to follow a course of neutrality, Federalists in fact pursued an anti-French foreign policy—seeking to renounce the 1778 Treaty of Alliance and binding the United States closer to Great Britain—and Republicans pursued an anti-British foreign policy—enacting economic sanctions against the former mother country, while seeking to expand trade with France. What’s more, in 1797 and 1798, the Federalist leadership saw a distinct advantage in escalating tensions with France. Republicans in turn enacted an embargo, which they knew was more damaging to Great Britain than to France in 1807, and actively declared war against Great Britain in 1812.

How can the official commitment to American neutrality be reconciled with the actual un-neutral policies Federalists and Republicans pursued? My argument is that public professions of neutrality should be interpreted as part of the debate on American identity and not necessarily as the expression of a sincere desire to be as impartial as possible towards the European belligerents. Federalist leaders put great effort into publicly championing a position of neutrality between 1793 and 1798, as it allowed them to present themselves as “true” Americans and to accuse their pro-French Republican opponents of having mixed loyalties (126-128). Once Federalists became more overtly pro-British during the Quasi-War, Republicans in turn took up the mantle of neutrality and accused Federalists of having mixed loyalties (153-155). By thus analyzing the debate on foreign policy as one about American identity, I try to lay bare the domestic functions of public policy pronouncements such as Washington’s Farewell Address and to refrain from treating them as disinterested diplomatic wisdoms, as Hendrickson does.3

This brings me to the last point. Hendrickson is correct when pointing out that my portrayal of Anglo- and Franco-American relations in the early republic is unorthodox. It is commonly taken for granted that French depredations on U.S. trade and French attempts to secure a financial bribe from American diplomats caused the Quasi-War and that the British practice of impressment and interferences with American foreign trade caused the War of 1812. In each case, the American government seemed to have reacted to outside events, and what pro-Hamiltonian and pro-Jeffersonian historians, as Hendrickson calls them, argued about was whether the American response to these external provocations was clever or unwise. My interpretation indeed differs from such accounts, as I trace the interests that Federalist and Republican leaders had in both conflicts and how they tried to use them to bolster their domestic agenda.

However, in the end, the purpose of The Genesis of America is not to assign exclusive blame for the Quasi-War
and the War of 1812 to the U.S. and to “exculpate,” to use Hendrickson’s term, Great Britain and France. The French agents’ behavior during the XYZ Affair was haughty and “clumsy” (122) and “part of the blame for the outbreak of hostilities [in 1812] rests on policy makers in London” (213), as I state clearly. My goal was rather to show that American foreign policy makers played an active role in the onset of these conflicts. They were not merely reacting to aggressions by the European powers, even though both Federalist and Republican statesmen alike spent a great deal of time in depicting themselves as innocent republicans standing up to defend America’s honor against Europe’s corrupt and tyrannical despots to justify their conduct to the American public, as Hendrickson in fact nicely shows with quotes from Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Jefferson.

There can be a difference between the message a writer wishes to share and the message that a reader receives, and in Hendrickson’s case this is clearly the case. I take part of the blame. Possibly, The Genesis of America can be read as a “sympathetic portrayal of both belligerents” and an “unsympathetic portrayal of both Republicans and Federalists,” as Hendrickson puts it, simply because it is more concerned with the motives and actions of U.S. foreign policy makers than those of the British and French governments. In that case, I could have emphasized the latter’s war guilt more clearly to avoid the impression of being one-sided. However, Hendrickson is also misreading my book when he accuses me of depicting Jefferson as a “lying dissembler,” Hamilton as an “American Bonaparte, aiming at civil war and military dictatorship,” and Adams as “driven by passion.” Nowhere in the book do I characterize these leaders in such a way and when re-reading it I still cannot find any passage that would lend itself to such an interpretation. I do not know exactly how Hendrickson came to deduce such a message from The Genesis of America, but he gives a hint in his review when he speculates that as “a German historian” I would be “keen to find fault with the United States” and make “light of British and French transgressions.” I do not see why my German nationality would matter, but it seems that Hendrickson’s interpretation of The Genesis of America has been influenced by the assumption that it does.

I would like to conclude my response by thanking all reviewers for their meticulous reading of my book and for engaging with its arguments so thoroughly. Whether the reviews were very positive like Estes’ and generally sympathetic like Weeks’ or more critical like Hixson’s and scathing like Hendrickson’s, they all raise important questions, identify issues that need further exploring, and reveal constructive scholarly disagreements about such contested and relevant matters as the origins and nature of American nationalism, the domestic functions of foreign policy, and the role of public opinion in the policy-making process. I very much appreciate the opportunity this roundtable afforded me to clarify my arguments and hope that readers will have learned not only more about the book itself, but also about some of the issues that historians of early American foreign relations grapple with today.

Notes:
3. As to my argument that neither Federalists nor Republicans were primarily moved by balance-of-power considerations, this statement is made in the context of my discussion of the early French Revolutionary War and applies, at the beginning of chapter 2, to the years 1793 and 1794. The sources that Hendrickson quotes to argue that Jefferson and Madison did indeed champion the European balance of power are from 1787 and thus long before American parties developed and the ideologically charged war between Great Britain and France broke out.
CALL FOR PAPERS

2020 Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

“Gulfs, Seas, Oceans, Empires”

New Orleans, Louisiana
June 18-20, 2020

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for its 2020 annual conference, to be held in New Orleans, Louisiana, June 18-20, 2020. While particularly keen to explore the theme of “Gulfs, Seas, Oceans, Empires” – a theme inspired by New Orleans’ historic place as a port city and center of Caribbean exchange – the Program Committee welcomes papers and panels that address foreign affairs in all its varied forms. The deadline for proposals is December 1, 2019.

SHAFR is dedicated to the study of the history of the United States in the world, broadly conceived. Given that the production, exercise, and understanding of U.S. power takes many forms and touches myriad subjects, the Program Committee welcomes proposals reflecting a broad range of approaches and topics. The 2020 conference theme invites particular reflection on matters such as geography, region, the environment, and disparities in power. More generally, the theme suggests attention to connecting currents and deep divides stretching back to precolonial relations between Indigenous peoples, colonial encounters, and the Atlantic slave trade, and forward to our own time.

Proposals

SHAFR is committed to inclusion and diversity, and encourages proposals including members of groups historically under-represented within the organization. We particularly encourage proposals from women, scholars of color, colleagues residing outside of the United States, and scholars working in other disciplines. Your proposal must include a diversity statement that describes how it will advance this SHAFR commitment.

Graduate students, international scholars, and scholars whose participation might expand the organization’s breadth are encouraged to apply for SHAFR grants to subsidize the cost of attending the conference. Please see below for details.

Panel sessions for the 2020 meeting will run one hour and forty-five minutes. A complete panel typically includes three papers plus chair and commentator (with the possibility of one person fulfilling the latter two roles) or a conceptually more expansive roundtable discussion with a chair and three or four participants. Papers should be no longer than twenty minutes and must be shorter in situations where there are more than three paper presentations.

The Committee is open to alternative formats, especially those based on discussion and engagement with the audience, which should be described briefly in the proposal. The Program Committee welcomes panels that transcend conventional chronologies, challenge received categories, or otherwise offer innovative approaches and fresh thinking.

Individual paper proposals are also welcome, though complete panels with coherent themes will be favored over single papers. Those seeking to create or fill out a panel should consult the “Panelists Seeking Panelists Forum” (which will be made available online) or Tweet #SHAFR2020.

The Program Committee hopes to develop a pool of potential commentators/chairs for panels constructed from individual proposals. If you are interested in volunteering for this pool, please contact the program co-chairs at program-chair@shafr.org.

The Program Committee also welcomes panel proposals that have secured endorsements from other related professional organizations (including, but not limited to, the Society for Military History, the World History Association, the American Society for International History, the Business History Conference, and the American Society for Legal History). Members of these organizations wishing to submit a panel proposal to SHAFR should include a letter of endorsement from the organization’s appropriate officers. These must be submitted at the time of application and included in your proposal.

Policies

All proposals and funding applications should be submitted via shafr.org. Applicants requiring alternative submission means should contact the program co-chairs at program-chair@shafr.org.

Each participant may serve only once in any capacity on the program (for example as a presenter or commentator) and not more than twice during the conference.

AV requests, along with a brief explanation of how the equipment is essential to the presentation, must be made at
the time of application and included in your proposal. AV access is limited and expensive. As such, please carefully assess your AV needs and realize that such requests can place limits on when and where we schedule accepted panels.

Any special scheduling requests (e.g., that a panel not take place on a particular day) must be made at the time of application and included in your proposal.

Generally, annual membership in SHAFR is required for those participating in the 2020 meeting. The president and program committee may grant some exceptions to scholars whose specializations are outside the field. Enrollment instructions will be included with notification of accepted proposals.

**Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants**

SHAFR will award several Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants to assist graduate students presenting papers at the 2020 conference. The following stipulations apply: 1) no award will exceed $300; 2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and 3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The Program Committee will make decisions regarding awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal. Applications should include: a 1-page letter from the applicant; reference letter from the graduate advisor that also confirms the unavailability of departmental travel funds. The two items should be submitted via the on-line interface at the time the panel/paper proposal is submitted. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee’s decisions on panels/papers, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s submission is accepted by the program committee in a separate decision. Application deadline: December 1, 2019.

**SHAFR Global Scholars and Diversity Grants**

SHAFR also awards Global Scholars and Diversity Grants to help defray travel and lodging expenses for the 2020 conference. These grants are aimed at scholars whose participation in the annual meeting helps to diversify the organization. Preference will be given to those who have not previously presented at annual meetings. The awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR, scholars who offer diverse and complementary intellectual approaches, and scholars from outside the United States. “Scholars” includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further integrate grant winners into SHAFR, awards include one-year membership that includes subscriptions to *Diplomatic History* and *Passport*. Applicants should submit a copy of their individual paper proposal along with a short cv (2-page maximum) and a 2-3 paragraph essay addressing the fellowship criteria (including data on previous SHAFR meetings attended and funding received). Please submit your application via the on-line interface. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee’s decisions on panels/papers, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s submission is accepted by the program committee in a separate decision. Application deadline: December 1, 2019.

**Other Conference Events**

The 2020 conference will host SHAFR’s annual Job Search Workshop to help prepare graduate student members for the job market. Students will have the opportunity to receive individualized feedback on their cover letters and CVs from experienced faculty members. Those interested in participating can indicate this on the online conference submission form (although it is not necessary to be a panelist to participate). The Job Workshop is open to all current graduate students and newly minted Ph.D.s. Priority will be given to first-time participants.

The program will also continue SHAFR’s Syllabus Workshop, sponsored by the Teaching Committee. Graduate students and new Ph.D.s will have the opportunity to work with experienced faculty on their syllabi. Those interested in participating can indicate this on the online conference submission form (although it is not necessary to be a panelist to participate). The Syllabus Workshop is open to all current graduate students and recent Ph.D.s.

For more details about the conference please visit the main conference web page.

We look forward to seeing you next June in New Orleans!

SHAFR 2020 Program Committee co-chairs,

Gretchen Heefner (Northeastern University) and Julia Irwin (University of South Florida)
From the day he returned from Cuba in the summer of 1898 to the night he died at home in January 1919, Theodore Roosevelt was America’s most electrifying politician. No president before or since (with the possible exception of his distant cousin, Franklin) dominated his own times more completely, exercised power with greater relish, or personified his country more vividly than did the Republican Roosevelt. In addition to becoming the first great reform president of the 20th century and the original architect of Big Government, he carved out an equally significant legacy in the realm of international relations by setting the United States irreversibly on the path to world power.

Roosevelt the historian wrote in 1889, in The Winning of the West, that “the spread of the English speaking peoples over the world’s waste spaces” was the most profound development of the previous three centuries—and “ordained by God.” In his assessment, “in the long run civilized man finds he can keep the peace only by subduing his barbarian neighbor.” Together with the “civilizing mission,” the president’s deeds in foreign policy were guided by economic and strategic interests, patriotic nationalism, and the search for order. These considerations impelled him to take the Canal Zone, to dispatch Marines to Santo Domingo and issue his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and to send sixteen battleships and 12,000 sailors on a round the world cruise.

In a historiography large (and sympathetic) enough to please Roosevelt himself, popular writers and scholars have now engaged these matters for more than a century. Yet, as all four of our reviewers attest, John M. Thompson has admirably met the challenge of making an authentic contribution to this huge field of study. He has done so in an analysis and narrative that scrutinizes the role of domestic politics and TR’s grasp of public opinion. Thompson renders the latter crucial element through a careful examination of news reports and editorial pages that the president regularly read and his immense correspondence with influential journalists and politicians. Public opinion and domestic politics, the author finds, fundamentally “shaped his foreign policy agenda.”

Robert David Johnson is persuaded by Thompson that Roosevelt had no choice but to tutor and rally the public in order to counter committed anti-imperialist groups; and that his successes were a direct function not only of his considerable political skill, but also of supportive public opinion. Therein, Johnson observes, the volume “provides several fresh ways to examine long-explored topics.” For example, at the start of the Venezuela crisis of 1902-03, Roosevelt did not believe that the Monroe Doctrine protected that country against Anglo-German chastisement for its misconduct; but public opinion was growing increasingly intolerant of European inference. Then, in the instance of Panama, majority opinion stayed on course with Roosevelt, in part owing to the inability of the anti-imperialists to overcome the popular embrace of the idea of a trans-isthmian canal, while southern Democrats had a clear economic interest in expediting the venture. And so, as the Dominican imbroglio unfolded in 1904, the Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine met with negligible criticism because TR showed comparative restraint in his actions to forestall another European intrusion and delayed his interposition until after the presidential election. Johnson views all these retellings as “quite original,” “most intriguing,” and laden with “fresh insights.”

Nicole Phelps likewise admires Great Power Rising for its explication of (in the author’s words) Roosevelt’s “sophisticated grasp of how domestic politics, public opinion, and international affairs were connected.” She especially appreciates Thompson’s broad geographical selection of newspapers, including America’s most prominent German language publication of the era. TR read German, she notes, and, among the study’s many benefits, “we can more clearly see the impact of German-American voters on the calculations of national politicians” during the years before 1914-18. She also welcomes the chapters on China and Japan as illustrations of the interaction of domestic politics and foreign policy that inhered in Roosevelt’s endeavors, particularly to calm the antipathy of Samuel L. Gompers and the American Federation of Labor. (Johnson, too, underscores this timely perspective on immigration, xenophobia, and trade and tariff policy.)

None of the reviewers is more admiring of the book (or of TR) than Jeremi Suri. Like Johnson and Phelps, he lauds how the author crafts his brief for Roosevelt’s use of the press as a vital part of his “bully pulpit.” Thompson, he states, “is tireless in his reading of contemporary newspapers and encyclopedic in his knowledge of congressional and other political personalities.” Among other things, Suri singles out as “particularly enlightening” the account of the impact of Gompers and the AFL on diplomacy towards China and Japan. Invoking Tip O’Neill, he thus observes that the book “documents beautifully how . . . all strategy is local.” At the same time, though, Suri suggests that Thompson errs in downplaying important geopolitical pressures that also left their mark on Roosevelt’s policies and in not adequately acknowledging the “spread of the English speaking peoples over the world’s waste spaces.”
integrating the sense of vision that guided his decisions concerning the Panamanian crisis and the voyage of the Great White Fleet.

Ellen Tillman implicitly differs with Suri regarding “vision.” From Thompson’s argument—that, unlike most studies, TR saw the public, not as a problem, but as “a crucial part of the solution”—she infers that the president felt duty-bound actively to educate public opinion and that, indeed, “this stemmed from his sense of the U.S. role in the world.” Otherwise her chapter-by-chapter appraisal agrees with most of what the others have to say. For example, she remarks on Roosevelt’s skill in keeping German-Americans on his side during his Latin American gambits; and she sees the chapters on China and Japan as “probably the most compelling” for their current timeliness. Moreover, she echoes Johnson’s verdict that the final chapter, on the post-presidency, could be stronger than it is. During World War I Roosevelt became the country’s most obstreperous pro-Allied extremist and Woodrow Wilson’s and Robert LaFollette’s most wrathful critic. The manner and proportions of his antagonism were inappropriate and unbecoming of Roosevelt, and Thompson duly reproaches him. But the author then claims that, had he lived to run for president in 1920, he would have “transcend[ed] the personal feuding and lack of discipline that plagued him after 1909.”

Johnson considers this assertion “too optimistic” while Tillman describes it as an unjustified “desire to vindicate Roosevelt.” (The conjecture is hard to discern in his major addresses during his last few months of life. “We are not internationalists. We are American nationalists,” he ranted to thousands of admirers. “To substitute internationalism for nationalism means to do away with patriotism.” The professional pacifist and professional internationalist are equally undesirable citizens."

The only other significant shortcoming, referred to by Phelps alone, is that the work does not discuss “the importance of racial hierarchy to Roosevelt’s worldview,” nor “seriously engage with gender” (or “manliness”). The criticism has some merit. At a time when the United States was consolidating apartheid at home, Roosevelt’s sense of mission in international relations, his vision of the future for which he hoped to gain the support of the American people, was intertwined with concepts of race, masculinity, and civilization. As Phelps points out, Thompson uses many quotations that raise such issues, but he declines to explain them or weigh their implication. For example, she cites a letter to Henry Cabot Lodge in which TR likened China’s apathy to the Japanese to “foolishness conceived by the mind of a Hottentot.” Also in dealing with Colombia, he complained to Rudyard Kipling about the “corrupt pithecoid [apelike] community in Bogota.” Numerous references to manliness on TR’s part go unremarked upon, too. “No nation can achieve greatness if its people are not . . . essentially manly,” he declared during the Venezuela crisis. The basis of “sound morality,” he wrote in an editorial in November 1914, was “the virile strength of manliness.” He tended as well to impugn the masculinity of his detractors. Opponents of intervention in Panama were “shriill eunuchs,” and he worried that anti-imperialists would not “stand up manfully” in quarrels with other powers. Thompson notes in passing that Roosevelt’s colleagues in Albany dubbed him “Oscar Wilde” early in his career ostensibly because they wondered if he was up to coping with New York’s roughhewn politics. In fact, they called him that (and far worse) because, as TR well knew, they thought he was effeminate. Roosevelt was already keenly aware of the importance to public opinion of not having one’s manliness questioned; initially looking westward, he set about correcting his image.1

In any event, the Roundtable membership is unanimous. By any fair measure, John M. Thompson’s Great Power Rising is an impressive achievement. As Jeremi Suri puts it, “This is a compelling portrait of Roosevelt the strategist and politician—the ultimate Clausewitz.”

Note:
1. Interestingly, he witnessed close-hand how William McKinley’s reluctance to avenge the Maine in 1898 subjected the president to ridicule as an unmanly leader, including cartoons depicting him as a befuddled old woman wearing an apron and bonnet. See the pioneering works of Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917 (1995) and Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Provoked the Spanish American and the Philippine American Wars (2000).

### Review of John M. Thompson, Great Power Rising: Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy

Nicole M. Phelps

One of the major methodological conundrums for historians of the United States in the long nineteenth century is how to make a causal argument that ultimately rests on the relationship among politicians, newspapers, and “public opinion.” Do newspapers shape public opinion, or do they reflect it? Do politicians influence the newspapers, or are they just influenced by the papers? Who exactly is “the public” anyway?

In Great Power Rising, John M. Thompson wades into this quagmire and produces some solid evidence for the way the relationship worked during Theodore Roosevelt’s political career. Roosevelt emerges as a talented politician who had an excellent sense of what voters and members of Congress would support and tailored the content and timing of his foreign policy actions accordingly. For Thompson, Roosevelt’s “achievements” were a product of “a sophisticated grasp of how domestic politics, public opinion, and international affairs were connected,” and he developed that grasp very early in his political career, long before he held the presidency (9).

To measure public opinion, Thompson relies on the same sources that Roosevelt and his contemporaries used “with confidence”: newspaper and journal editorials from around the country and especially from New York City; letters from the public, especially the elite; letters from lobbyists and ethnic organizations; and from members of Congress, whose opinions, it was often assumed, reflected the views of their constituents (6–7). Thompson has retracted these materials for several specific foreign policy actions, including the 1902–3 Venezuela crisis with Germany and Britain, the efforts to secure rights to the canal route in Panama, the articulation of the Roosevelt Corollary, (failed) attempts to liberalize some elements of the Chinese Exclusion Act, and efforts to maintain positive U.S.-Japanese relations in the face of anti-Japanese fervor on the West Coast.

Importantly, Thompson takes us beyond what this measure of public opinion tells us. He uses Roosevelt’s voluminous correspondence to show how the president cultivated relationships with journalists to influence what they wrote and how he adjusted elements of his policies and the timing of their announcement based on feedback from the public and the press and with a careful eye on his electoral prospects. That voluminous correspondence was often quite frank, allowing for a clear picture of what was going on. It also provides ample evidence of Roosevelt’s skilled politicking, as he offered enthusiastic encouragement in some quarters and attempted to soothe ruffled feathers by downplaying his enthusiasm in others.

Thompson’s primary source research is extensive and impressive. His selection of newspapers is particularly
good, with wide geographic coverage and a range of political viewpoints represented. I was particularly pleased to see the use of the *Neo-Yerker Staats-Zeitung*, the most prominent of the German-language papers at the time. It is the only foreign-language title on Thompson’s list, and the author does not clarify for us that Roosevelt read German (he did), but to include any foreign-language press in a study like this is a great step forward. (There is also some German-language historiography in the bibliography, which is also welcome.) One of the resulting benefits is that we can more clearly see the impact of German-American voters on the calculations of national politicians in a time period other than 1914–18.

Thompson also uses the president’s mailbag—letters received at the White House from the general public—to good effect. He argues that “public sentiment was not nearly as inclined toward isolationism as many accounts of this period claim” (5). One of the ways he supports that claim is by noting the absence of complaints about foreign policy issues in the mailbag; other subjects could generate a great deal of protest.

Another strength of the book is the way in which Thompson talks about Roosevelt’s political opponents. They are not just Democrats. Indeed, Thompson frequently refers to “Democrats and anti-imperialists” as Roosevelt’s primary political antagonists. He goes further at times, pointing to mugwumps, who are best described as independents in this study, and Northeastern business elites, who constituted a powerful conservative Republican group. Thompson maintains that Roosevelt was usually successful in getting support for his foreign policies despite opposition from the leaders of all these groups; with proper “leadership” and education from Roosevelt and his administration, the broad voting public supported his policies (4). He also argues that Roosevelt was “cautiously optimistic” about public sentiment, despite historiography that points to his pessimism. That pessimism seems to have been reserved for Congress (4).

The book’s three chapters on the Caribbean Basin and the Monroe Doctrine remind us of the importance of a nuanced chain of events—a chain that, in this case, definitely included the 1904 election. Thompson presents a public that was out ahead of Roosevelt in their interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in the 1902–3 Venezuelan debt crisis; they had already expanded their definition of the doctrine to oppose virtually all European military presence in the region. Roosevelt was not there yet, believing that “civilized” countries like Germany, Britain, and the United States should cooperate to maintain order (35). The crisis taught him that the Monroe Doctrine needed to be updated to align with public sentiment, but the process of doing that was complicated and slowed by his handling of the treaty crisis with Colombia and subsequent Panamanian independence.

Although Roosevelt faced plenty of criticism for his actions regarding Panama, his political opponents were largely neutralized by the broader public, which favored the canal, regardless of the means used to deliver it. As the Dominican debt crisis emerged in the wake of the Venezuelan and Panamanian episodes, Roosevelt tried a variety of unconventional policies to deal with the situation before adopting the strong language of “international police power” in the Roosevelt Corollary after he had secured his re-election in 1904.

In addition to the chapters focused on the Monroe Doctrine, Thompson’s book also features a chapter on Roosevelt’s political career before the presidency. There are two chapters on Asian exclusion, with one focused on China and the other on Japan. The chapter on China is especially welcome, as it reminds us that the Chinese Exclusion Act was not made permanent until 1902. (It was ended in 1943, not 1965, as the author claims in passing on page 119.) According to Thompson, Roosevelt favored the continued exclusion of laborers but argued for access for non-laborers and for fair treatment for all Chinese after they arrived in the United States. In this chapter and the subsequent chapter on Japan, Roosevelt’s interactions with Samuel Gompers, the leader of the American Federation of Labor, loom large, as Roosevelt tried to curb the anti-Asian rhetoric and actions coming from the AFL and its affiliates in the interest of better U.S. relationships with the Chinese and Japanese governments.

The book concludes with a chapter on Roosevelt’s post-presidency years that deals with his 1912 presidential campaign; his efforts to help prepare the country for war, and the possibility of a 1920 presidential run, which was, of course, cut short by his death in 1919. Thompson is most critical of Roosevelt in this chapter, finding particular fault with his advocacy of a plan to tie suffrage to military service and his attacks on antiwar advocates like Wisconsin senator Robert La Follette.

For all of the study’s strengths with primary sources, there are some problems when it comes to secondary sources. The book is very centered on mid-twentieth-century scholarship on Roosevelt and on public opinion. Those are certainly key literatures to engage. What is missing is more of an engagement with more recent literature on the time period, much of which prominently features Roosevelt, even if he is not in the title. There are many quotations from Roosevelt in the book that explicitly reference manliness, and still more that reflect the importance of racial hierarchy to Roosevelt’s worldview, such as when he described West Coast anti-Japanese sentiment to his close friend Henry Cabot Lodge as being “as foolish as if conceived by the mind of a Hottentot” (121). Thompson does not seriously engage with gender or race, however. Studies like Kevin Murphy’s *Political Manhood: Red Bloods, Mollycoddles, and the Politics of Progressive Era Reform* (Columbia University Press, 2008) and Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds’s *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge University Press, 2008) would only strengthen Thompson’s analysis, as they deal, respectively, with Roosevelt’s electability and his correspondence with foreign politicians engaged in shaping exclusionary Asian immigration laws in their own countries. Incorporating this more recent literature would raise the historiographical stakes of *Great Power Rising* and add more elements to Roosevelt’s foreign policy calculus.


Jeremi Suri

Scholars still define the evolution of American foreign policy by the personalities of presidents. Historians use common labels such as “Wilsonianism,” the “Nixon Doctrine,” and the “Reagan Revolution” and associate these labels with substantive policy preferences for democratization, multilateralism, or regime change. The presumption behind all of these descriptions is that the president and his closest advisers make American foreign policy, and the other institutions of government follow. Public debates matter for elections, but scholars generally assume that they have limited effect on the projection of American power overseas, particularly in the decades since the Second World War. Politics seem to end at the water’s edge.

John M. Thompson’s deeply researched book begins with the proposition that this common adage is in fact a myth. He explains that although presidents are “widely seen as wielding a degree of power unmatched in human
history,” they “face many potential constraints,” including frequent elections, congressional opposition, partisanship, and, of course, intensive critical scrutiny from the media. For all the talk of grand strategy and national interests, presidents concentrate their attention on managing public opinion. Otherwise, the best-laid policies are doomed to failure in America’s terribly messy democracy.1

Thompson focuses intensely on President Theodore Roosevelt as a case study. His book adds to a rich body of scholarship that examines the first president elected in the twentieth century as both a pioneer of new executive powers and a representative of broader shifts in American politics.2 Like his scholarly predecessors, Thompson immerses himself deeply in Roosevelt’s almost endless writings—letters, books, articles, speeches, and conversations. He mines these voluminous materials to craft a careful reconstruction of how the president adjusted his policies on various foreign policy issues, including the building of the Panama Canal, intervention in the Dominican Republic, and relations with Japan and China. Thompson excavates Roosevelt’s original thinking and narrates how it shifted with his political circumstances. This is a compelling portrait of Roosevelt as strategist and politician—the ultimate American Clausewitz.3

Thompson focuses on the press, and newspapers in particular. He examines how major publications in New York, and local publications around the country, pervaded the politics of the early twentieth century. During the years between 1880 and 1909, he notes, newspaper circulation in the country tripled. “Americans of this era, especially policymakers, considered newspapers to be among the best, if still crude, measures of public opinion” (6).

Roosevelt surely agreed. He was an avid consumer of daily newsprint, and his words often filled the pages. The president used the press as an essential part of his “bully pulpit” to promote his message across the country and abroad. At the same time, Thompson shows, Roosevelt relied on newspapers to keep up with the pulse of the public, and he adjusted his discourse accordingly.

The former Rough Rider had a consistent and articulate set of foreign policy beliefs. He promoted an expansive, often aggressive vision of American power. He also pursued a sophisticated set of economic and cultural interests across the globe—a mix of markets and prestige for Americans seeking gains abroad. For Latin America, this meant American domination; for Asia and Europe, it meant a seat at the table among the great powers. With this thinking, and backed by a growing economy and navy, Roosevelt made the United States into a major international diplomatic and military actor. Not surprisingly, Henry Kissinger and others have remembered Roosevelt as one of America’s great practitioners of realpolitik.4

Although Thompson does not reject this portrait, he adds important qualifications. In doing so, he challenges many of the assumptions about realpolitik, at least in a democracy. Thompson shows that behind the cocksure public rhetoric, Roosevelt was actually more skilled politician than grand strategist. He focused little on geopolitical analysis and much more on newspapers, rallies, and other mechanisms for assessing and shaping public opinion. Unlike politicians who patronized the public, such as Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt “believed that the public’s often pivotal role was appropriate,” and he “criticized politicians and members of the eastern elite who disdained the masses or sought to diminish their influence” (184). Roosevelt was elitist, but he did not trust elites to make policy.

That attitude frightened Roosevelt’s blue-blooded detractors. He appealed to the masses and drew on their energy to shape his policies. He was cerebral, but also populist; sophisticated, but rarely refined. His energies and interests reflected the street more than high society. “It is difficult,” Thompson aptly observes, “to imagine Rooseveltian statecraft outside the context of domestic politics” (185).

Thompson’s book departs from the large body of literature on Roosevelt as international strategist to reexamine this formative president as domestic politician. His policies, in the author’s recounting, were shaped, timed, and implemented with a close eye to public opinion at home. Public opinion mattered more to Roosevelt than anything else, including the national interest.

Acquiring the land to build an isthmian canal through Central America was one of the cardinal achievements of Roosevelt’s foreign policy, and it is appropriately described as an expression of his emerging global strategy for American expansion. Thompson, however, chronicles the stubborn opposition Roosevelt confronted from Democrats and advocates of alternative routes. He shows how the president’s ideas shifted and adjusted to take account of those objections, and how Roosevelt worked to manipulate public opinion wherever he could. By fomenting a revolution against Columbian rule in Panama and negotiating for American access, Roosevelt turned a divisive issue into a popular cause for liberty and trade.

Thompson is at his best when he digs into the details of domestic politics, chronicling how Roosevelt maneuvered with members of Congress and appealed carefully to different voting blocs, especially German Americans, at the turn of the century. Thompson is tireless in his reading of contemporary newspapers, and he is encyclopedic in his knowledge of congressional and other political personalities. His account of Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labor’s influence on Roosevelt’s foreign policies, which shows how ethnic and labor politics came together to shape Roosevelt’s worldview, is particularly enlightening.

In his chapter on the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which was announced by the president in December 1904, Thompson describes how Roosevelt maneuvered between numerous complex positions. Most Americans did not want a war over Venezuela, a country that had defaulted on its debts and faced intervention from Britain and Germany. Americans did not, however, wish to see other foreign influences grow in the region. The Roosevelt Corollary was a rhetorical measure designed to display American toughness but still keep the country out of war, even as it became more deeply involved in Latin America. A similar dynamic applied to China and Japan, where Roosevelt increased America’s reach while continuing to cater to isolationist and racist sentiments at home. Peeking behind the intrepid rhetoric of the president, we can see that his policies in all these areas contained more political compromise at home than clear-eyed strategy abroad.

Great Power Rising documents beautifully how, to paraphrase former House Speaker Tip O’Neill, all strategy is local. Roosevelt was a political animal, a newspaper junkie, and a dealmaker. His rhetoric was more absolutist than his policies, and that is why he accomplished so much. He lost his bearings after leaving the presidency, when he became shriller and more militant than before, and perhaps too focused on recovering his power. Getting back to the presidency became Roosevelt’s final political obsession.5

Thompson’s book offers an insightful and compelling analysis of the domestic roots of American foreign policy. Theodore Roosevelt is a revealing case, because he appears focused on international realpolitik until you look closely, as Thompson has done. Too many writers have allowed Roosevelt’s rhetoric to distort their image of a man who was shittier and more complicated than his stalwart words would indicate.

Although Great Power Rising is a compelling book, it overreaches at times in its efforts to correct previous accounts. Concentrating on domestic politics, Thompson
sometimes diminishes the geopolitical pressures that pushed Roosevelt, and continued to push his successors. The growth of German and British power in the Caribbean, and their renewed efforts at expansion, motivated serious policymakers in both parties—including Woodrow Wilson and William Howard Taft, as well as Roosevelt—to pursue more interventionist activities in the region. There is a striking continuity across administrations in the pursuit of hemispheric expansion, despite serious domestic political divergences.8

More significant, the American presidents in this period appeared to have enormous power in shaping public opinion. Thompson makes this point, but he places greater emphasis on how public opinion influenced the president, not the reverse. Roosevelt was committed to an isthmian canal, a world-class navy, and “great power” status for America before his presidency began, and he re-defined American policy and politics in accord with that personal vision. He was particularly skillful in persuading and manipulating domestic society, as Thompson shows, but the president’s vision still seems paramount in understanding the building of the Panama Canal, the circumnavigation of the “Great White Fleet,” and the Portsmouth Conference. None of these initiatives would have emerged, at that time, without Roosevelt. Historians will debate whether he was a man of peace, but the efficacy of Roosevelt’s forceful international leadership explains why he was the first American to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906.

Perhaps Edmund Morris is therefore correct when he writes of the “Rise of Theodore Roosevelt” as a personal phenomenon that in some ways transcended the political limits on his predecessors. Roosevelt’s magnetism, energy, and intellect seemed to alternatively attract and pulverize potential opponents. His rhetoric mobilized supporters. Roosevelt did not merely play the game; he changed it. Morris quotes a contemporary British diplomat and member of Parliament who had met the president. “Do you know the two most wonderful things I have seen in your country?” he asked. “Niagara Falls and the President of the United States, both great wonders of nature!”9

Thompson is of course correct that even the most powerful leaders are constrained by the politics of their time. Great Power Rising offers a bold and persuasive account of why Roosevelt’s awareness of his political context, and his skillful ability to exploit it, was crucial for the success of his presidency. The man in the Executive Mansion (renamed the “White House” by Roosevelt) cannot accomplish anything worthwhile without the cooperation of countless political actors at home and abroad. That said, the ideas, energy, and charisma of the leader matter enormously. Presidents have the ability to define what their presidencies are about, even if they cannot always deliver on preferred outcomes.

Theodore Roosevelt set the model for future presidents because he created new sources of power in his person, and he drew politics to himself. That personal dynamic made Franklin Roosevelt and every Cold War president possible. It also brought us to the current era, when the person in the White House is holding the politics of his own party hostage. Theodore Roosevelt led the Republican Party by force of his personality; Donald Trump has hijacked the party to feed his narcissism.

Notes:
2. Among many others, see John Morton Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1954); Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, MD, 1956); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA, 1985); Frank Ninkovich, The Global Republic: America’s Indeliberate Rise to World Power (Chi-

5. For a more flattering focus on Theodore Roosevelt’s progressive positions in the 1912 election, see Sidney M. Milikin, Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party, and the Transformation of American Democracy (Lawrence, KS, 2009).

Review of John M. Thompson, Great Power Rising: Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy

Robert David Johnson

John Thompson’s book is particularly timely, as the United States has retreated of late from a more robust international role, first under Barack Obama and now under Donald Trump. This study of the U.S. emergence on the international stage most stands out, however, for its decision to approach Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy through the lens of domestic politics and public opinion. Thompson’s goal, in which he largely succeeds, is to examine the “complex nature of the political context in which presidents govern and the key role that plays in foreign policy” (2).

Roosevelt, Thompson contends, embodied a “paradox” of U.S. foreign policy. He recognized the growing strength of the United States and the positive strategic position the nation enjoyed, but he also understood the challenges the situation posed. Growing influence internationally could threaten the U.S. system of government. Moreover, the constitutional system generated a tendency in favor of the status quo. In the context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, that tendency represented the rather unimaginative anti-imperialism of the Cleveland administration.

The book offers three principal arguments. First, Thompson contends that Roosevelt needed to rally public support to overcome the opposition of anti-imperialists, who—although not a majority—enjoyed disproportionate cultural and economic influence. Second, because Roosevelt had to make his case for a more robust U.S. international role to the public, understanding the political landscape of the era was particularly important. Finally, Roosevelt’s general foreign policy triumphs reflected not just his political skill but also the public opinion of the era. In this respect, Roosevelt succeeded not merely because he had vision and considerable political skill, but because his political leadership rarely got too far ahead of the public. The result was a figure who “globalized the presidency, leading to an unprecedented spread of influence for the executive branch and for the United States” (180–1).

Determining the precise nature of public opinion in the pre-polling era, of course, is no easy task. (In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. and 2019 Australian elections, perhaps the process is impossible even in a time of numerous polls.) Thompson, however, relies on the strategy pioneered by Ernest May in American Imperialism, suggesting that the May model—closely examining newspapers, in particular—provides a way for scholars to reconstruct early twentieth-
that the controversy did not hurt his standing with German relations with Germany did not further deteriorate, but reckless policy (40). Ironically, British reluctance, rather hostile fashion, even among the three blockading powers, affairs.

the continued health of the doctrine, since arbitration worried about the intersection between arbitration and the Doctrine did not need strengthening. He especially persisted, he began to reconsider his sense that the Monroe Venezuelan navy—in the Caribbean Basin. As the crisis intervention—which culminated in the sinking of the were no longer willing to tolerate overt European military itself" (35).

Roosevelt once remarked that Grover Cleveland had "done as well as his party would let him . . . His numerous shortcomings and failures simply show that under the most favorable circumstances the Democratic Party . . . is not fit to be entrusted with the care of the National Government" (23). Democrats were not the only figures that Roosevelt viewed as enemies. He blasted the "perversion lunatics" who embraced the Mugwump view and expressed his trust in the perspective of the "plain people" as he portrayed himself as defending the nation's honor (28).

Roosevelt, of course, became president by accident. Though soon the most popular politician in the country, he never had a firm grasp of the congressional GOP caucus. He also faced something of a political conundrum. Committed to partisanship, he led a party supported by most German Americans, while at the same time he saw Germany emerging as a problem in Latin America. How to address this tension, according to Thompson, provided the "first significant foreign policy question Theodore Roosevelt faced as president" (33).

In the end, Roosevelt largely (and not for the first time in his career) got lucky. His initial approach to the crisis in Venezuela, where three European countries threatened military intervention after the country refused to service its foreign loans, tried to thread the needle between defending the Monroe Doctrine and not committing to U.S. military intervention. He twice informed Congress that the doctrine was the "cardinal feature" of U.S. foreign policy, but he also maintained that the policy did not guarantee a Latin American nation against "punishment if it misconducts itself” (35).

Roosevelt quickly discovered, however, that public understanding of the doctrine had evolved. Americans were no longer willing to tolerate overt European military intervention—which culminated in the sinking of the Venezuelan navy—in the Caribbean Basin. As the crisis persisted, he began to reconsider his sense that the Monroe Doctrine did not need strengthening. He especially worried about the intersection between arbitration and the continued health of the doctrine, since arbitration threatened to involve the Hague Court in hemispheric affairs.

Confronting a press that portrayed Germany in a hostile fashion, even among the three blockading powers, Roosevelt started pressuring the Europeans to end the blockade.

In this respect, Thompson portrays Roosevelt as mostly reactive. He worried that public opinion might become, in the author's words, "too passionate” and thus force a reckless policy (40). Ironically, British reluctance, rather than anything Roosevelt did, helped to terminate the crisis. In the aftermath, Roosevelt needed not only to ensure that relations with Germany did not further deteriorate, but that the controversy did not hurt his standing with German American voters. In this task, the German ambassador and the Roosevelt administration served as de facto allies, combating the efforts of British public diplomacy to turn U.S. opinion in a more pro-London direction.

This is, in short, a quite original retelling of the Venezuelan crisis, one that stresses the tension between Roosevelt's long-term international goals and his short-term political needs as the shaky head of a party for which German American voters were a critical constituency. It would be difficult, by contrast, to provide much that is new about the story of the Panama Canal, though even here, the domestic lens offers fresh insights. Thompson notes that the president feared “losing control of the debate” as he tangled with Congress over whether the canal might go into Nicaragua rather than Panama (61).

The book focuses almost entirely on the domestic side of the debate. Thompson correctly observes that despite the flagrantly imperialistic nature of Roosevelt's actions, Democrats and their allies in the anti-imperialist movement struggled to articulate a positive alternative to the president's policy. They particularly divided over whether to support the Panama Treaty, while Senate Democrats worried that the public could conclude that Roosevelt backed the idea of a canal more passionately than they did. Nonetheless, the administration had to aggressively lobby Southern opinion—especially Southern business interests—to ensure that Southern senators did not vote en masse against the resulting treaty. Thompson argues that Roosevelt defanged the Democrats with business pressure and outmaneuvered surviving northeastern anti-imperialists, such as Massachusetts senator George Hoar, by ensuring that the Panamanian government was nominally independent before negotiating any treaty.

Roosevelt's foreign policy accomplishments helped him enter the 1904 election as a strong favorite. Nonetheless, the president struggled to use the campaign to increase support for more aggressive policies in his second term. He took from the Venezuelan affair, Thompson argues, a belief that the Monroe Doctrine needed to more closely mirror the public consensus against any European military intervention in the hemisphere, for any reason. He first articulated his new vision through a letter read at a 1904 banquet celebrating the U.S. intervention in Cuba.

Strong Democratic criticism of the address, however, coupled with lukewarm GOP support, led Roosevelt to shelve the idea of additional action on the question until after the election. Democrats, meanwhile, futilely tried to make foreign policy an issue of their own, portraying Theodore Roosevelt as a would-be monarch and suggesting that he wanted the United States to play a role as “continental policeman” (83). This approach failed in the short term, as Roosevelt swept to victory. Ironically, however, it might have encouraged him to prematurely announce he would not run for re-election, which weakened his support among congressional Republicans between 1905 and 1908.

Perhaps the most intriguing section of the book is Thompson's portrayal of the Roosevelt Corollary. He portrays the move as largely defensive, an attempt to translate evolving public opinion into public policy. Nonetheless, the move encountered significant opposition both in the Senate and among elite public opinion, which understood how much the policy veered from the anti-imperialist consensus that had shown considerable strength in the 1880s and 1890s. The debate, Thompson contends, crystallized Roosevelt's distrust of the Senate's role in foreign policy—leading him "to conclude that the Senate was 'wholly incompetent' to be an equal partner in the conduct of foreign policy" (90). This contempt for the Senate also prompted Roosevelt to try and rally the public to support his policy, a task that proved more difficult than he anticipated. Thompson quotes Roosevelt remarking that he maintained public support "only by minimizing my interference and showing the clearest necessity for it" (91).
While most of the book features episodes widely covered in the literature (albeit often presented here in a fresh fashion), Thompson also explores other areas of inquiry. The chapter discussing Roosevelt’s policy toward China touches on themes that resonate in our current environment—xenophobia, business concerns with boycotts and economic pressure, the limitations of presidential power. Ultimately, however, Roosevelt failed to ameliorate the exclusion policy that had predated his presidency and could not generate enough public support for a military intervention to break the boycott of U.S. goods in China. A more significant defeat was avoided only by the emergence of tensions with Japan. While Thompson is, perhaps, too generous in his appraisal of Roosevelt’s China policy, he sharply criticizes the president’s handling of relations with Japan. He labels Roosevelt’s approach “foothardly,” and seems unsympathetic to Roosevelt’s blaming the public for his difficulties (121).

The book’s concluding (and weakest) chapter extends beyond Roosevelt’s presidency to examine his approach to the European tensions that culminated in World War I. Thompson (not entirely convincingly) notes that Roosevelt’s distaste for Taft’s 1911 arbitration treaties helped to drive the former president out of retirement. Once war began, however, Roosevelt struggled with how to approach the conflict as a private citizen, torn between his outrage over Germany’s treatment of Belgium and his public commitments to avoid partisanship. He bitterly lamented his lack of influence over U.S. public opinion; Wilson’s more pacific approach, he claimed in 1915, spoke “for the country” (155). But his personal and ideological enmity toward Wilson led Roosevelt to take an increasingly public role nonetheless. His bid for the GOP presidential nomination in 1916 took on aggressively nationalist tones, which carried over once war was declared. His willingness to cast doubt on the loyalty of Wisconsin senator Robert La Follette, Thompson contends with some understatement, assumed an “ominous” tone and “left a stain on TR’s legacy” (169).

As Roosevelt distanced himself from many progressives, who increasingly embraced an antiwar approach, he moved closer to the northeastern cultural and financial elite that he had often battled as president. The reconciliation was not enough to give him the nomination in 1916, which instead went to Charles Evans Hughes, but it paved the way for a type of ideological transformation at the tail end of his life, a theme the book could have done more to explore. Roosevelt blamed the Republicans’ 1916 loss on the party’s decision not to nominate him. Disappointed by Wilson’s sideling him during the war, he played an inconsistent role in the early debates about the postwar peace, seeming more interested in furthering his crusade against Wilson and keeping the Republican Party together than offering positive, concrete proposals.

Thompson speculates, however, that if Roosevelt had lived and prevailed in the 1920 election, he would have “been able to transcend the personal feuding and lack of discipline that plagued him after 1909,” allowing him to focus on “ideas and objectives” and provide a capstone to his career (179). We will, of course, never know, but this seems like a too optimistic reading of events. And while Thompson is probably correct in his claim that only John Quincy Adams had a comparable postpresidential career, that situation more reflects the scant examples.

Those who have championed redefining the field as international history and downplaying or ignoring the myriad ways in which both U.S. political culture and the constitutional structure have shaped U.S. foreign policy probably will find little of use in this book. If so, that’s unfortunate, because it provides several fresh ways to examine long-explored topics. Thompson’s TR is the man memorialized by Henry White, who observed that Roosevelt was the only person he had ever met who “combined the qualities of an able politician at home with those of an equally good diplomat abroad” (185).

**Review of John M. Thompson, Great Power Rising: Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy**

Ellen D. Tillman

John M. Thompson’s insightful and well-written monograph seeks to shed new light on our understanding of Teddy Roosevelt as statesman. It analyzes the ways Roosevelt used the press in governing, from befriending editors and influencing publications to interpreting the public’s mood in part through what came out in the press across the country. Thompson argues, often convincingly, that historians should reconsider TR’s relationship to the press and to public sentiment. He states that his book’s goal is to “provide an in-depth study of the politics of an individual president’s foreign policy decision-making, while offering the first comprehensive study of this aspect of TR’s career” (3).

Thompson organizes his book around three central arguments and in the process takes on some of the older interpretations and truisms about TR’s administration. First, he contends that Roosevelt was much more optimistic about the public’s character and role in government than has generally been held. Second, he maintains that, rather than public opinion simply limiting TR’s ability to maneuver after foreign policy actions had been enacted, domestic politics shaped and “influenced his decision-making at all points of the process” (5). Finally, he argues that “public sentiment was not nearly as inclined toward isolationism as many accounts of this period claim” and that TR’s active foreign policy actually found wide support among the public (5).

Thompson’s work is well researched and a welcome addition to our understanding of some of the nuances in Roosevelt’s evolving relationship with the press and his attitude toward public sentiment. Combining analysis of the press, press releases, and private and inter-governmental correspondence, the work shows clearly the ways TR struggled to maintain a balance that was indeed influenced by shifts in public sentiment. This close analysis of TR’s own words and arguments does show that he often maintained an optimism about public sentiment and its role and importance in democratic government. While at times he was clearly frustrated with a reticent public and occasionally he even believed that some circumstances might call for circumventing public opinion, he emphasized the need to interpret broad public sentiment throughout the largest major foreign policy challenges of his career, particularly in regions and with groups that would help maintain the supremacy of his own Republican Party. He also believed it was necessary to rally public support for what he and his closest advisers considered the best courses of action.

In sum, this is one of the strongest cases Thompson’s work makes and one of its most important contributions to the historiography: during his presidency, Roosevelt genuinely seems to have believed, more often than not, that it was his administration’s duty to educate and rally the public, rather than simply to manipulate or “work around” it. This belief stemmed from his sense of the role the United States should play in the world.

Chapter 1, “The Education of TR: Politics and Foreign Policy, 1882–1903,” argues that from the earliest days of his career, Roosevelt began to hone the statecraft that would serve him well through his presidency. He cultivated rhetorical skills and was committed to “public participation in politics” in ways that not only shaped his own career but also changed multiple aspects of what the presidency meant...
and how presidents related to the public. Especially upon ascending to the presidency (although certainly before that as well), Roosevelt kept an eye upon the global and moral obligations of the United States as he turned increasingly to foreign policy.

Chapter 2 deals with an episode from the early years of his career. It focuses on how domestic politics affected the way TR dealt with the 1902–3 Venezuelan crisis and influenced his deep conviction about the need for U.S. naval expansion. Thompson shows how Roosevelt worked to strike a balance throughout the crisis. For the president as for the public, the extent to which the United States should intervene in European disputes with Latin America was central. Thompson also notes that “some historians have suggested that the frequent allusions to public opinion on the part of Roosevelt, Hay, and White during the European blockade of Venezuela “did not represent primarily expressions of concern about an emerging political problem for the administration, but were rather part of a coordinated strategy to force an end to the blockade” (41). Here as elsewhere, however, Thompson calls for more nuance. He shows how carefully attentive TR was to the public’s reaction to the European blockade and to other events, and he examines the ways in which the president sought to balance general reactions and maintain the goodwill of German American voters as he sought to gain political support for the upcoming presidential election.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with two more major episodes in U.S.-Latin American relations: the U.S. role in Panama’s independence and the development of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in relation to the Dominican interventions between 1902 and 1904. Both chapters clearly show how TR’s concerns about public opinion and the 1904 election influenced his decision-making and how his policies developed incrementally over time as he felt out public opinion, yet the episodic nature of the chapters makes it difficult at times to see the greater nuances in the progression of Roosevelt’s approaches. Most convincing and helpful here is Thompson’s in-depth analysis of the care the president took to maintain the impression that his administration had done nothing to directly encourage Panama’s independence declaration.

Through the progression of Thompson’s work on Roosevelt’s efforts to revise policy, the president’s views emerge. In this instance, Thompson addressed the Monroe Doctrine, for which Thompson shows that TR skillfully gained acceptance by emphasizing that it was a revision of long-held doctrine rather than a radical change. Although the “prevailing interpretation” is that “TR had an essentially realist understanding of public opinion and viewed his countrymen as uninformed and mainly a hindrance to sound policymaking,” Thompson writes, “the Dominican episode demonstrates that Roosevelt believed the public, rather than being the main problem, was a crucial part of the solution” (91).

Probably the most compelling chapters within Thompson’s generally episodic approach are actually those that follow related foreign policy issues over time, particularly the chapters dealing with the Roosevelt administration’s relations with China and Japan from 1904 to 1909. The overlap between these chapters enables the reader to see a great deal more of the evolution-of-policy approach. One of the points that Thompson makes strongly throughout the work, and that comes out most clearly in this set of chapters, is his challenge to the somewhat common notion in the historiography that TR generally bullied, ignored, or simply sought to manipulate the public to get his way. In the often-frustrating back-and-forth that the TR administration conducted over these years with organized labor (particularly the AFL) and groups such as the Exclusion League, Thompson powerfully underscores his point that the president saw public relations as a keystone of democratic government.

While his administration certainly made decisions about what they believed ought to be done, Roosevelt continued to lobby and work with the public in an attempt to get agreement and support for his views. Frequently, his own language emphasized the need to educate a sometimes-reticent public so that the government could make the “right” (and, importantly, moral) foreign policy decisions. This was often a delicate task, and Roosevelt did not take it lightly, as Thompson shows clearly throughout. Likewise, when some among the public brought up the possibility of war with China or Japan, the administration worked tirelessly through press and rhetoric to calm their fears while still seeking sufficient public support for naval expansion and for TR’s policy that sometimes led to extensive negative press (see chapter 3 in particular). He points out that TR’s administration did, including opposition from within the Republican Party that sometimes led to extensive negative press.

Although much of the historiography against which Thompson is working is now much older, he is correct in arguing that there is still a great need for a close analysis of TR’s relationship to the press, particularly where foreign policy issues are concerned. The ways that TR saw domestic politics as necessarily intertwined with foreign policy are clear throughout the work, as is the way that these elements of statecraft were, as TR himself often said, part of the national character and special role of the United States in the development of international relations globally.

The final chapter, “The Stern, Unflinching Performance of Duty: TR and World War I, 1909–1919,” uses many of the same approaches the early chapters do but is necessarily very different. Here the reader sees—again, often in TR’s own words—the president’s growing frustration with public sentiment. He first broke with Taft and the Republican Party, and then he criticized Woodrow Wilson, calling for more attention to war preparedness as the European conflict raged. Thompson speculates throughout on why TR may have apparently broken with so many of his former ideals and political approaches, and he does show TR’s continued courting of and attention to the press and public opinion after his presidency, but one of the major points of the chapter seems to be the argument that this period of his political life may have led to most of the negative aspects of his legacy.

I am sure that much of the change in Roosevelt’s approach in this period left “black marks” on his legacy, but overall, I was less convinced by Thompson’s argument here. Throughout the book, he clearly details strong (if not overwhelming) opposition to some of what TR and his administration did, including opposition from within the Republican Party that sometimes led to extensive negative press (see chapter 3 in particular). He points out that TR’s administration did in fact engender quite a lot of suspicion at times because of his “unprecedented expansion of the powers of the presidency” (180). Examples of this can be seen throughout, although perhaps most clearly in the chapter about Panama, and, in my reading, seem to hint at a desire on the part of the author to vindicate Roosevelt. Some statements, especially in the introduction and conclusion, also seem somewhat out of place in a historical monograph: Thompson maintains that TR was “one of the most adept statesmen in U.S. history” (9), for example, and “the most gifted politician of his era” (10).

Those objections aside, this nuanced interpretation is highly welcome and promises to open significant and useful discussions about how we understand Teddy Roosevelt’s historical legacy and the ways that he went about changing the presidency. What Thompson does show clearly about Roosevelt throughout the entire work is that “the ample evidence of his faith in the people—which bent at times but never broke—and his conviction that they would almost always support a sensible foreign policy, so long as the president provided leadership, should put to rest the idea that he maintained a negative or
condescending view of public opinion” (183). While there is certain to be some fruitful discussion and disagreement about how accurate this assertion is, it becomes abundantly clear through Thompson’s work that it was more accurate than the historiography generally suggests.

Author’s Response

Jack (John M.) Thompson

One of the most daunting aspects of writing an academic monograph is anticipating how it will be received by fellow scholars. Will they uniformly disparage it? Or, even worse, will they ignore it? Thankfully, neither fate has befallen Great Power Rising. For that, I am grateful to Andy Johns, who organized this roundtable, and to the lineup of distinguished historians he assembled, all of whom read the book with care and in good faith. Robert David Johnson, Nicole Phelps, Jeremi Suri, and Ellen Tillman offered praise for Great Power Rising, even as they raised thought-provoking questions about some potential shortcomings.

I will turn to their comments in a moment, but first some background. My goal in writing Great Power Rising was two-fold. I wanted to provide the first comprehensive account of the roles played by domestic politics and public opinion in Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy. The influence of domestic factors is a recurring theme in studies of TR’s career, but it has never been fully explored. This oversight has led to some problems in the historiography. Perhaps the most notable misapprehension, as Suri observes, is that Roosevelt was essentially a practitioner of realpolitik whose main concern with domestic politics and public opinion was the extent to which they constrained his ambitious agenda. 

Great Power Rising seeks to provide a more complex portrait of the twenty-sixth president. I argue that TR was often frustrated by the nature of the U.S. system but that he also revered it. He often complained about the challenges of dealing with a partisan and myopic Congress, yet he tirelessly engaged with senators and representatives in both parties, frequently—though by no means always—to good effect. He worried about the tendency of the press toward sensationalism, but he skillfully influenced coverage of his policies and treasured his friendships with journalists.

Most importantly, Roosevelt was anything but disdainful of the American people, whom he did not seek to manipulate, but to lead. Certainly, he considered the attitudes of many members of the cultural, economic, and political elite to be pernicious. As Phelps writes, although TR was a fierce partisan, it was not only Democrats with whom he clashed. He loathed anti-imperialists and mugwumps (essentially political independents) for what he viewed as their misguided ideas and their disproportionate influence in public debates. Meanwhile, he harbored a striking faith in the essential decency and common sense of the average voter, and though this conviction occasionally wavered, it never shattered. As Tillman notes, this belief was the fuel for his indefatigable efforts to convince the voters to back his policies.

My other principal objective in writing this book was to use TR as a case study for exploring how presidents navigate the challenges posed by the U.S. political system, which, as Robert David Johnson observes, sometimes presented TR with seemingly intractable conflicts between his geostrategic and domestic political goals. Though there is a sizeable body of scholarship on this subject, to the best of my knowledge there are no career-length studies of individual presidents. I hoped that scrutiny of the gifted (albeit flawed) Roosevelt would provide insight into the ways in which U.S. structures and political culture compel presidents to formulate policy with at least one eye on the domestic context. To a considerable extent, “all strategy is local,” as Suri neatly puts it.

One of my conclusions is that this conception of strategy was a cornerstone of Roosevelt’s mostly successful foreign policy. By providing a compelling vision for national greatness, maintaining faith in the people and in the design of the U.S. system, emphasizing principled leadership, and exercising impressive political dexterity, TR largely mastered the art of the politics of foreign policy. When he stumbled, it was often because he had become impatient with aspects of democracy or the rule of law, or because he (often unfairly) dismissed his opponents as ignorant, cowardly, unscrupulous, or unpatriotic. All presidents face such challenges, but some handle them better than others.

I was very pleased to see that in the main the reviewers agree with my basic argument. However, each takes issue with secondary aspects of my approach. Broadly speaking, the critiques fall into three categories. Suri and Johnson wish I had explored themes raised in the book more fully. Suri contends that I pay insufficient attention to the geopolitical pressures that influenced Roosevelt, such as the growth of German power in the Caribbean region. In my (partial) defense, I would note that such pressures are mentioned throughout the book, and that it was never my intention to attribute TR’s actions solely to domestic factors. However, I readily acknowledge that my focus on the domestic side of the equation may have at times overshadowed the crucial role of the international context.

Suri also writes that I downplay the extent to which TR shaped public opinion. I don’t think that we really differ on this issue, as the book is filled with examples of TR swaying journalists or other opinion-shapers, setting the terms of public debate, and getting most or even all of what he wanted during fights over key policies.

Johnson argues that Great Power Rising does not sufficiently explore what he calls “a type of ideological transformation at the tail end of his life,” when TR found common cause with members of the cultural and financial elite on the most pressing issue of the era, World War I. Though I do not fully agree with Johnson’s point—I think TR cooperated with these men because they mostly agreed about the war, not because he abandoned his progressive worldview—there is a case to be made that after 1914, TR de-emphasized his domestic political priorities in order to focus on trying to persuade Americans to see the issues at stake in the European war as he did. Put differently, his will to power, along with his conviction that the importance of the war transcended all other issues, was the most important influence on him during his final years, one that led him back to the Republican Party for another shot at the presidency.

Tillman adopts a different approach by raising the issue of whether it is appropriate for academic historians to assess the performance of policymakers positively. She questions what she views as my “desire to vindicate Roosevelt” and argues that laudatory statements about TR’s historical legacy are “somewhat out of place in a historical monograph.” In this instance, I am less willing to cede ground. Though my assessment of TR is often favorable, it is hardly hagiographic: it includes frequent criticisms of his decisions and his motives. Perhaps more importantly, I do not understand the hesitancy to make assessments of a political actor, or to try to place his or her performance into a broader historical context. Given the widespread concerns about the disconnect between the academy and the rest of society, this is, to my mind, precisely the sort of debate that professional historians should engage in more often.

Finally, Phelps’s criticism of my use of secondary sources recalls, at least to my mind, the debate about high politics versus culture in the historiography. She questions my engagement with “mid-twentieth-century scholarship on Roosevelt and public opinion” and argues that I should
have engaged more with the recent literature on gender and race. Doing so, she writes, would have “raise[d] the historiographical stakes” of the project. I have no quarrel with scholarship that assesses TR’s foreign policy through a cultural lens, and in fact, where relevant, such studies are cited in the book. However, this literature has little to say about the nexus between domestic politics, public opinion, and foreign policy. That is why Great Power Rising pays more attention to the large body of work focusing on this debate—work that is not, by the way, limited to mid-twentieth scholarship. It would have been unproductive to proceed otherwise.

More importantly—and I think the other reviews bear this out—more intensive engagement with the high politics side of the literature does not lower the historiographical stakes. On the contrary, rethinking the roles of public opinion and domestic politics in TR’s statecraft leads to insights about crucial subjects of enduring relevance. These include not only the nature of TR’s foreign policy, but also the process by which the United States emerged as a great power and, more broadly, the ways in which presidents navigate the complexities of the U.S. system.

Given the sobering state of affairs in Washington and the continued salience of public opinion and domestic politics in the making of U.S. foreign policy, I believe that the issues raised in this roundtable deserve the continued attention of historians. It has been a privilege to debate them with Johnson, Phelps, Suri, and Tillman, and to contribute, if only in a small way, to a fuller understanding of the subject.

Thanks to a partnership between SHAFR and Middle Tennessee State University (MTSU), all back issues of Passport (formerly known as the SHAFR Newsletter) are now available electronically. Issues published since April 2009 are available on the SHAFR website: https://shafr.org/publications/review, while older issues are available through the MTSU Institutional Repository: https://jewlscholar.mtsu.edu/handle/mtsu/4769. This initiative both preserves the history of our organization and field and makes it more widely available.

Many thanks to those who helped make this possible, especially the staff at the MTSU Walker Library; David Anderson provided issues that were missing from the SHAFR archive; and Drs. Hasan Karayam and Marquita Reed did all of the scanning while they were graduate students at MTSU.
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Michael H. Hunt Prize in International History

Following the passing of Michael H. Hunt, former SHAFR President and a trailblazing diplomatic historian, in 2017, two of his graduate students—Chris Endy and Alan McPherson—began an effort to create a lasting legacy in Michael’s honor. As a result of the generosity of the donors listed below, the Michael H. Hunt Prize in International History will be presented for the first time in 2020.

The Hunt Prize for International History will be awarded annually to a historian of any nationality for a first book that produces fresh perspectives on international or global history since the mid-19th century. The book must make substantial use of historical records in more than one language.

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The request came out of the blue. An email from an Indonesian official whom I had never met—Bambang Eryudhawan, the historic preservation adviser to the governor of Jakarta—asked if I would be interested in visiting Jakarta for the purpose of giving several lectures on the topic of my dissertation and first book: the role of the United States in the struggle for Indonesian independence. If I were interested, “Yuhda” (who was actually familiar with my book!) said he would pitch the idea to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and to the U.S. Embassy. I didn’t hesitate to respond in the affirmative, and with great enthusiasm. I had longed to visit Indonesia for decades and had come tantalizingly close on a few occasions, only to have my hopes dashed. Several years ago, a conference to which I had been invited to give a paper fell through. A subsequent application to teach at Yogyakarta’s Gadjah Mada University as a Fulbright scholar passed muster with the Washington-based review board but failed at the Indonesia review stage; and a separate invitation to teach at that university on a short-term basis, from the head of the American Studies Department, led to a proposed set of specific lecture and workshop topics only to be derailed again, at least temporarily, because of a funding shortfall.

I have been lucky enough to travel to the Asia-Pacific region with some regularity of late, having made more than a dozen separate trips over the years. Except for one particularly memorable trip to Vietnam five years ago with my oldest son, which was pure tourism, all have been for professional purposes. But I had never been to Indonesia. Singapore was the closest I ever got. As with most budget-conscious academics, I tended to go to those places where I was invited and where my hosts generously offered to cover airfare and accommodations. Until Yudha emailed me, no one in Indonesia, unfortunately, had made such an offer.

In a welcome follow-up nearly a year after that initial inquiry, I received a formal invitation in December 2018 from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta. Would I be willing to offer advice about how to stage a historical exhibit on the role of the United States in Indonesian independence, an exhibit being contemplated by the cultural affairs staff for a historic building on the grounds of the embassy complex? And would I be willing to give several lectures on the same subject during a short visit? Absolutely, I quickly replied. My visit would coincide with embassy planning for commemorations to mark the seventieth anniversary of Indonesian independence and the formal commencement of U.S.-Indonesian diplomatic relations. Although the government shutdown at the end of the year put my visit in jeopardy yet again, as most embassy personnel were furloughed for a couple of weeks, the fourth time proved the charm.

In the early morning hours of February 18, I arrived at Jakarta’s main airport and rode through the famously congested streets of the capital to my hotel. My excitement mingled with emotional reminiscences about my 1977 dissertation and 1981 book, the gist of which I would now be expected to share with diverse audiences. The connections between present-day Indonesia and the heroic years of the independence struggle proved ubiquitous, making such reflections unavoidable. The Sukarno-Hatta airport is, of course, named after the two singular heroes of the Indonesian nationalist movement and the joint authors of the formal declaration of independence from the Netherlands of August 17, 1945, a date celebrated as a national holiday—the Indonesian equivalent of our fourth of July. My hotel was located on Sudirman Street, named for the legendary general who commanded Indonesia’s nascent armed forces in the military struggle against the Dutch colonizers.

Merdeka (Freedom) Square, the physical and spiritual heart of Jakarta, sits just north of the U.S. Embassy. It was where the ceremony took place that marked the formal transfer of sovereignty to an independent Republic of Indonesia on December 27, 1949. It was also where, on the very next day, Sukarno returned to the city the Dutch had called Batavia—the city they had expelled him from several years earlier—to take up residence in the former palace of the Dutch governors as the first president of an independent Indonesia. The charismatic leader who had come to personify the independence movement gave a rousing speech that day to an ecstatic crowd of two hundred thousand; the boisterous celebrations lasted long into the night.

I began my book with a highly descriptive account of...
those events, drawn from observations penned at the time by journalists and diplomats. It was thrilling to see the actual site in its contemporary incarnation. Never having actually lectured on the subject of U.S.-Indonesian relations in the 1940s, though, I found myself in the awkward position of needing to reread my own book. Not only did I have to refamiliarize myself with the basic story and its various twists, turns, and complexities, but I needed to boil it all down for a succinct presentation suitable for audiences likely to be unfamiliar with Indonesia's road to independence—and almost certainly unlikely to have much knowledge about the role played by Washington. It had been some time, after all, since I had given serious thought to the Hoge Veluwe talks, the duBois-Critchley proposals, the Dutch federalism scheme, or the reasons for the fall of the Amir Sjarifuddin government, among many other particulars. All of a sudden they were relevant once again.

Entering the U.S. Embassy for the first time, on February 19, proved to be a compelling experience in and of itself. For all that I have written about embassies, the only time I had actually set foot in one was in Berlin, and that was for a very short time. The Jakarta embassy, newly rebuilt, is huge, consisting of several buildings; it ranks as the seventh largest U.S. embassy in the world and employs some 1,700 people.

In my initial conversations with a handful of foreign service officers there, I quickly grasped that the planned historical exhibit on the United States and Indonesian independence was little more than an idea; no actual planning had yet occurred. In response to a series of questions, I outlined the instrumental role played by the United States in the decolonization of the Netherlands East Indies, emphasizing that while U.S. support for the Indonesian independence and the direct pressure it applied on the Netherlands were, in the end, of critical importance, those moves came only after several years of a pronounced tilt toward the Dutch and a virtual abandonment of FDR's public embrace of the anticolonial cause during World War II. U.S. policy toward Indonesia, I said, was never driven by idealism or an unswerving commitment to self-determination, but instead by a careful effort to balance European and Asian priorities at a time of deepening Cold War conflict. Any attempt to use U.S. support for Indonesian independence in a contemporary, feel-good public diplomacy campaign would founder. Any contributions I made would have to remain faithful to and be tempered by the actual, warts-and-all historical record.

To my surprise, I learned that on the very next day I would be expected to attend an embassy meeting with no fewer than seventeen Indonesian government officials. They would each be interested in having some input into how the United States government would mount a public exhibit covering an epochal period in their country's history. Could I identify a series of discrete themes that would encompass the core events of the mid- and late-1940s? And could I present those themes to our Indonesian counterparts at the meeting? That was my assignment.

On February 20, before a large group that included officials from Indonesia's Foreign Ministry and Tourism Ministry, my new historian friend Yudha, embassy officers, and others, I suggested a basic template for how such an exhibit could be assembled. I recommended a mix of photographs, short video clips, photocopies of key documents, and brief textual signposts, while proposing the chief themes that might be highlighted. Among other suggestions, I advised that one of the six or seven themes that I proposed should focus on the broad-based support for the cause of Indonesian independence that came from liberal, non-governmental groups within American society, including the labor movement, African-American civil rights organizations, and progressively oriented media outlets.

I also insisted that the role of pro-self-determination elements within the U.S. Congress should be stressed. My reasoning was that it would broaden the exhibit, while remaining faithful to the historical record, if we eschewed an exclusive focus on state-to-state relations. Although the subsequent discussion proved a bit desultory—not a few tangents were propounded by participants in a manner familiar to anyone with experience in large faculty meetings—a consensus seemed to develop around the saliency of the themes I proposed and the utility of a standard, museum-style template for capturing them. After I finished writing up my proposals for capturing them, circulated to the meeting's participants and other stakeholders, that part of my visit seemed to reach satisfactory closure. I promised to respond promptly to any issues that might emerge as the planning for the exhibition, targeted for unveiling at the end of 2019, progressed.

The lecturing dimension of my trip proved equally exciting and equally challenging. My first public talk, at Jakarta's UPN Veterans University, gave me my initial opportunity to offer an Indonesian audience a perspective on their nation's founding and struggle for independence that, I knew, was going to clash with what they had been taught in school from an early age. Typically, Indonesians learn that their nation's independence was won at the barrel of a gun; guerrilla fighters valiantly fought the Dutch to a standstill, compelling the archipelago's longtime imperial rulers to bow reluctantly to the inevitability of native self-rule.

The actual story I intended to present was more complex. Strong military resistance against a modern, highly-trained European army that had mechanized columns and close air support was, to be sure, essential to the final outcome of the struggle for Indonesia. In the absence of effective native resistance, the Dutch might have been able to get away with presenting the world with a fait accompli in 1947 or 1949. Their preferred narrative of a tiny, unrepresentative resistance movement, led by Japanese collaborators no less, easily squelched by the beneficent colonizers, would then have had more credibility. An easy victory could have set the stage for the Dutch version of Indonesian self-rule: sharply limited sovereignty to be conferred on a group of carefully selected local leaders beholden to and responsive
to the Netherlands, ensconced within the constraining web of a Dutch-controlled federal structure.

But the heroic military resistance narrative was seriously flawed. Indonesia's military commanders had always, in fact, subordinated themselves to the republic's civilian leadership. Even before the surrender of the Japanese occupiers and the audacious proclamation of an independent Indonesian state a mere three days later, prominent nationalists calculated that the goal of eventual independence could most fruitfully be attained by pursuing a diplomatic strategy. That strategy hinged on actively courting Western—and especially American—support by emphasizing the moderate, decidedly anti-communist, and firmly pro-Western proclivities of the fledging Indonesian Republic.

My predominantly young student audience at UPN Veterans University and at other venues confirmed my suspicion that this perspective on the Indonesian independence struggle would differ from the general outlines of the history they had absorbed. Yet they proved remarkably receptive to my “revisionist” views, with most seeming to accept that the civilian leaders of the young republic may have been shrewder, more farsighted, and considerably less feckless and weak than they had been led to believe. They even seemed to accept the idea that the strategy of diplomasi had some advantages over the alternative—and ultimately rejected—strategy of perjuangan (struggle). I asked them to contemplate the appalling cost in lives and physical destruction that nearby Vietnam had paid in its decolonization fight and to compare that toll with the relatively small number of human casualties that lined the path to full Indonesian independence. Did that not suggest a degree of wisdom and prudence among their forebears worth commending, I asked?

U.S. pressure on the Dutch in the spring of 1949, I insisted to my listeners (as I had in my book), proved indispensable to the final-stage Round Table Conference at The Hague that led to the formal transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949. The United States possessed enormous economic leverage over the Dutch and chose to use it once Secretary of State Dean Acheson decided that the Dutch military misadventure in the Indonesian islands was a potential obstacle to congressional support for the Marshall Plan and NATO and that the Indonesian nationalists were moderate anti-communists worth taking a chance on. “Money talked,” as one former U.S. ambassador has recalled. Yet I had to tread carefully. I certainly did not want to imply to my audiences of youthful Indonesians that their nation’s independence constituted a gift conferred on them by the American superpower.

A more appropriate way to frame the issue, I suggested, was that the Truman administration’s decisive (if belated) move to pressure the Dutch to grant unfettered independence to Indonesia represented the fruition of a conscious diplomatic strategy pursued, from the first, by nationalist policymakers themselves. Besides, I emphasized to each of my audiences, reaching for an apt historical analogy, all American students learn in school at tender ages that France played an instrumental role in the American drive for independence. Historians are agreed on this essential point; without French support, George Washington and his colleagues could not have achieved success and the thirteen colonies would not have become independent—at least not at the same time or in the same manner. But the French alliance, I stressed, was not some fortuitous bolt from the blue; rather, it served as the culmination of a roughly comparable search on the part of American patriots for an external partner who could help them attain the goal of independence. France thus established a “foundational bond” with the infant United States, I said; and I added that I would like to think that in 1949, the United States established a “foundational bond” with the Indonesian Republic.

But gratitude in international relations is fleeting, I reminded them. One need only consider how the pro-French vs. pro-British factions of the early American republic nearly tore the Washington administration apart, as the current Broadway sensation “Hamilton” so powerfully emphasizes. The latter point, about how quickly gratitude and loyalty to France gave way to suspicion and enmity, helped me address the inevitable questions I received about covert U.S. intervention in Indonesia’s Permesta rebellion of 1957–1958, the souring relations with Sukarno during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and the callous U.S. disregard for epic human rights atrocities in the bloody aftermath of the failed communist coup of 1965. Foundational bonds, I observed, mean little when perceived national interests clash. Look at the wild vicissitudes in the long history of Franco-American relations.

By the time I delivered my final lecture, at General Ahmed Yani University in Cimahi, a city in West Java, I had refined some of those comparative perspectives—both on the United States and France as historical midwives in decolonization struggles and on the different routes to independence followed by Indonesia and Vietnam. The latter contrast led me to reflect once more, as I had in my dissertation and in subsequent writings, on the dramatic divergence between the decolonization processes in Indonesia and Vietnam and the dramatically different roles that the United States played in each. My initial puzzlement about the latter, way back in 1974, led me to my dissertation subject in the first place. My fixation on Vietnam, and the continuing Vietnam War, had of course played a central role in my decision to study the history of American foreign relations in graduate school. For someone who graduated from high school in 1967 and college in 1971, it would have been difficult not to have been preoccupied with that conflict.

At the University of Connecticut, I had the great good fortune to have Thomas G. Paterson as a dissertation adviser. Not only was he young, dynamic, charismatic, and on the cutting edge of Cold War revisionist scholarship, but he shared my intense opposition to the Vietnam War. Indeed, just a few years before I arrived in Storrs, he bravely ran the risk of being fired by angry university administrators after joining a student-led demonstration against Dow Chemical recruiters in defiance of firm UConn strictures.
During my graduate studies, I found myself much less interested in the early Cold War in Europe—the focus of Tom's scholarship—than in the clash between the United States and Asian nationalism. Indonesia, as appeared clear from the handful of secondary sources and memoirs that I was reading, seemed to be the exception to the common pattern in postwar Asia: a place where the United States actually supported decolonization rather than opposed it. And so my proposed dissertation topic sprang, as so many do, from a simple question: what was so different about the Indonesian case? Why pursue a policy of support for national independence there while underwriting a French effort to suppress a comparable movement in Vietnam at the very same time? U.S. documents on Indonesia policy during the immediate post-World War II years had recently been declassified; more seemed likely to be forthcoming soon. When I excitedly pitched this idea to Tom, he could not have been more encouraging. An absolutely superb mentor and guide, he also mentioned as a caveat that he knew nothing about the topic, and he reminded me that I had had no formal training in Indonesian history. But in almost same breath, he said that we could learn together. And we did.

My Indonesia lectures brought me back to those dissertation-writing years, leading me to recall how that project took shape. With far less generous funding than is often available for today's graduate students, I planned my research trips on a financial shoestring. A close friend from childhood was in graduate school at Cornell University. I could stay with him during my trips to Ithaca to work with the incomparable holdings of Cornell's Modern Indonesia Project. He would also allow me to use his library card to borrow hard-to-find books. Trips to the National Archives and Library of Congress were facilitated by the free lodging generously provided by another old friend. An amazingly cheap plane ticket to Edinburgh, made possible by my future brother-in-law's connections to a Connecticut bagpipe band's charter flight, allowed me to get to Great Britain—and to research the just-opened records pertaining to the British role in the reoccupation of the Dutch East Indies at the old Public Record Office on London's Chancery Lane. When I conducted research at the UN Library, in New York, I could stay with my parents in Queens, commuting to “the city” via train and subway, just as I had as a kid. I even recollected how I cut costs during a trip to the University of North Carolina to view the important private papers of Frank Porter Graham, a key U.S. negotiator on my sleeping in my car one night. I visited Hyde Park to undertake research at the FDR Library. I did so in style, having secured a modest grant from the Eleanor Roosevelt Foundation that enabled me to luxuriate in my budget motel.

A trip to Indonesia seemed out of the question; not only were no documents available there, I had no funding. Having encouraged my own Ph.D. students to conduct research forays in countries as varied as Germany, Jamaica, Israel, South Africa, Syria, Cuba, Brazil, and Chile, it saddened me to remember how much more limited such foreign travel opportunities were to my generation of dissertation writers in the 1970s. Fortunately, many hundreds of Indonesian tracts, speeches, and public documents from the 1940s were accessible at Cornell University's magnificent collection, and the rich records of the UN mediation commission, which I had to receive special permission to view, contained a treasure trove of contemporaneous Indonesian and Dutch reports, letters, proposals, memoranda, and records of conversations. Although Dutch archival sources pertaining to Indonesia's decolonization struggle were not yet available to scholars, the Dutch government had begun publishing key documents in a special multi-volume series similar to the Foreign Relations of the United States. I could tap those volumes, in conjunction with the sources opened to me at the UN Library, to help better appreciate evolving Dutch attitudes and policies and thereby more effectively contextualize U.S. decision-making.

Interviews with close to a dozen former State Department officials who had been intimately involved in the making of U.S. policy toward Indonesia during the 1940s formed another significant part of my dissertation research. While in Indonesia, I couldn't help but recall some of the more memorable of those conversations, many of which I tape-recorded. I remember in particular the retired diplomat who, in response to my query as to whether racial attitudes played any role in U.S. decision-making, said he would relate a telling vignette if I agreed not to use it in my dissertation. He then proceeded to recall the tear-filled remarks of the long-serving U.S. consul general in Batavia as he bade farewell to his staff in 1947. It saddened him, the consul said, to think that we were leaving such beautiful islands to “niggers.” That vignette spoke volumes to me about underlying racial prejudices, in a way that documents rarely do.

I also recall the long-retired Abbott Low Moffat, who proudly noted in my interview with him in Princeton that he was the last U.S. official to actually speak with Ho Chi Minh. And I recollect my lively conversation with Charlton Ogburn, perhaps the most liberal and in many respects most far-sighted of State Department officers of the 1940s, who had been driven to retire from the department prematurely by John Foster Dulles's blackballing of those who had proved overly sympathetic to the cause of Third World nationalism. He fondly showed me the old pick-up truck sitting in his northern Virginia backyard, which he and his wife had shipped over from Indonesia decades before.

Frederick Nolting, JFK's ambassador to South Vietnam, helped illuminate the personal tensions that marked the fight between Europeanists and Asianists in the State Department over the issue of colonial independence—while reflecting on the differences between the policy dilemmas posed by Indonesia, on the one hand, and Vietnam, on the other. Dean Rusk, whom I interviewed at the University of Georgia, had stepped down as secretary of state six years before I spoke with him. He proved less amenable than I had hoped in drawing comparisons between Indonesia and Vietnam, but his repeated insistence that he saw the challenge of U.S. policy toward Indonesia in the 1940s as helping the Dutch "bow to the inevitable" proved usefully illuminating.

The vagaries of time proved a constant companion in my travels throughout Indonesia. I was lecturing about and discussing the 1940s while reflecting on how the intellectual climate of the 1970s, in which I came of age, influenced my original exploration of the topic. Approaching age seventy, I was thrust back into my twenties when I first began investigating the U.S. role in Indonesian independence. And I was speaking, in 2019, to audiences of Indonesian millennials about how their nation's freedom came about and I was speaking, in 2019, to audiences of Indonesian millennials about how their nation's freedom came about and I was speaking, in 2019, to audiences of Indonesian millennials about how their nation's freedom came about and I was speaking, in 2019, to audiences of Indonesian millennials about how their nation's freedom came about and I was speaking, in 2019, to audiences of Indonesian millennials about how their nation's freedom came about. It was a very long time ago for them—and for me. But it also happened to be the year I was born. Many things will long stick with me from my recent trip to Indonesia. The motorcycle-clogged streets of Jakarta and Bandung; the haunting, sing-song calls to prayer from local mosques; and the spectacular ruins of Prambanan, the remarkably well-preserved ninth-century Hindu temple complex. The building that housed the landmark Asian-African Conference at Bandung in 1955; the present-day museum housed there; the wide-eyed school children whose visit to the museum coincided with mine; and the unparalleled warmth and graciousness of my hosts. (continued on page 46)
Photos from the 2019 SHAFR Annual Conference
Washington D.C.
6.20.19 - 6.22.19
The singing of the Indonesian national anthem—once banned under penalty of jail under the Dutch—before one of my university lectures; the lively interviews with several dozen Indonesian journalists; and the thirty-something Indonesian I met at a local coffee house who proudly showed me a photo on his phone of his deceased grandfather, a top military officer during the fight against the Dutch.

But what will probably stay with me the longest is the memory of the toothless, eighty-six-year-old man who was my guide to the sultan’s palace in Yogyakarta. When I asked him if he remembered the Japanese occupation of Java, he responded by holding aloft an imaginary bamboo pole and proudly declaring: “I was the resistance!”

Note:

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association is pleased to announce that Aaron Sheehan-Dean, the Fred C. Frey Professor and Department Chair in History at Louisiana State University, is the inaugural recipient of the Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award for his book, The Calculus of Violence: How Americans Fought the Civil War (Harvard University Press, 2018).

The Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award recognizes the outstanding book (monograph or edited volume) in the history of U.S. foreign relations, immigration history, or military history by a scholar residing in the PCB-AHA region.
**Passport Question and Answer:**

“**I signed up for what?**”

Christopher McKnight Nichols & Danielle Holz

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**Editor’s note:** The following is a conversation about designing, writing, and delivering a TED Talk with Christopher McKnight Nichols (CN), interviewed by Danielle Holtz (DH), recorded at and after the SHAFR Annual Meeting in Arlington, VA, in June 2019; the conversation has been lightly edited and revised.  

**INTERVIEW/CONVERSATION**

DH: Most of us have seen, heard, or at least know about TED talks, or think we do, but we have not been through the process of conceiving, writing, and delivering one. So that is the inspiration for this conversation about the process with Chris Nichols, who delivered a TEDx Portland TED Talk in April 2018 to over three thousand people in the audience and tens of thousands more streaming live online. Nichols’s TED Talk at TEDxPortland, “The untold story of American Isolationism,” is located at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ehlaox_bx4

So, let’s begin at the beginning. How were you invited to deliver the talk?

CN: In January 2018 I received a slightly cryptic email asking for conversation to explore possibly giving a talk and providing a link. When I clicked the URL it opened to reveal a highly-produced video invitation to give a TED Talk, which featured journalist Tom Brokaw, the musicians Macklemore and Common, and others.

Not long before getting this email my mother had died after a long illness and my father was very sick. Suffice it to say that I didn’t do my usual due diligence. I figured I’d be ready to do a talk in the spring and I wasn’t very focused on the details. I assumed it was like many other TEDx events that I had seen on YouTube or heard of elsewhere. I envisioned a small crowd, limited commitment, good opportunity but nothing too special, at least in the landscape of doing public talks. I said yes.

This turned out to be an amazing and unexpected experience. You may be surprised to learn, as I was, that TEDxPortland is one of the five biggest TEDx events in the world. It is amazing, inspiring, and uplifting. Held in Portland’s Keller Auditorium, it is an all-day event, with roughly fifteen speakers and performing artists or groups, in front of 3,000+ live audience members and live-streamed to somewhere in the tens-to-hundreds-of-thousands of people. It involves high production and high design, with a lot of talented design and technology folks on the leadership team, almost 100 volunteers, and swag like you would not believe—Nike custom shoes, branded TEDxPortland backpack, picnic blanket, hand towel, mug, beer, wine, tea, chocolate, syrup, board games, t-shirts, hats … the TEDxPortland team covers the city in around twenty enormous billboards, emblazoned with the faces and key phrases of the speakers and performers (including mine!).

But that was too abstract to organize a talk around. We went in a lot of directions and eventually we agreed to rip a headline from the news and contextualize that as an example of how history matters today in light of my own expertise. “Go with what you know,” they suggested. So, the unofficial title of the talk was “why history matters today” and the official line was “the untold story of isolationism.”

DH: Why did you choose isolationism? What struck you about isolationism that made it the right story to tell about why history is important today.

CN: At first, I pitched a bunch of ideas. If you watch the longer version of the talk at the end the emcee jokes that I wrote many books worth of text and numerous versions of the talk. That is true. In fact, on the TEDxPortland Team one impressive designer I worked with liked to say that every meeting with me was a history lesson and that nobody had done more TED talks, for a guy doing his first, than me. In terms of pitching, the scope and focus of my proposals for the talk varied but my initial core idea animated everything else: I wanted to talk about why history is important today.

**Why did you choose isolationism? What struck you about isolationism that made it the right story to tell about why history is important today.**

Second, I wanted to tackle America First and the much-maligned and misunderstood concept of “isolationism” because the media tends to cover foreign policy in a dangerously oversimplified way, in my view. Much mainstream coverage focuses on how does the U.S. intervene in X or Y; whereas for most other countries and groups that’s not their first question. There’s an incomplete analysis on the ground, usually, and very spotty understanding of the ideas and timing at stake at higher levels in terms of media coverage and popular discussion—if there is any
at all. So, talking about isolationism and contextualizing isolationism helps adjust our expectations about what the United States should not do but also about our entire relationships with this foreign U.S. policy yet essentially always on intervention.

And, while isolationism receives short-shrift from historian and political scientists, the term pervades popular discourse. Regular folks as well as politicians and pundits throw around the epithet form of isolationism all the time and it does bad political work in our society. And it has historically.

For this reason, I firmly believe that it’s incumbent on us to historicize isolationism as a concept and “America First” as a particularly extreme, or polarized, iteration of a long-standing and ideologically mobile foreign-policy tradition in U.S. history. Otherwise it will only be used erroneously and a-historically.

DH: Please expand more on what that bad political work is.

CN: Well, some of the bad political work that it does is as an unanalyzed caricature of isolationism, one that casts anti-imperialism and pacifism or any skepticism about intervention or collective security and binding treaties and alliances as kinds of inherently unpatriotic anti-or non-interventionism. As if good “internationalists” always stand in stark contrast to atavistic, naive, or idealistic “isolationists.”

But that isn’t right. It will come as no surprise to SHAFR folks but tends to shock public audiences and students that if and when you historicize the term and attendant concepts and debates, you find that isolationist arguments that involve some international engagement come from both the right and the left historically. They haven’t revolved around walling-and-bounding the U.S., but rather, were fundamentally about debating and exposing the limits of U.S. power in the service of national interest—often variously interpreted and hotly debated. Indeed, even the purportedly arch-isolationist America First Committee of 1940-41 wanted international exchange as they pursued a singular position in opposition to U.S. entry to the war and all policies that might further entangle the U.S. in what they saw as a European conflict.

When I became a scholar of the subject of isolationist and internationalist thought, I shocked myself to find that over intervention or collective security and binding treaties and alliances as kinds of inherently unpatriotic anti-or non-interventionism. As if good “internationalists” always stand in stark contrast to atavistic, naive, or idealistic “isolationists.”

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When I became a scholar of the subject of isolationist and internationalist thought, I shocked myself to find that over time I really came to believe in the importance of those ideas in broadening American political debates, even if they have tended to have repugnant traveling companions such as xenophobia and racism. Isolationist conceptions of the limits of U.S. power, being circumspect about the possibilities of U.S.-led transformations—regional, national, and international -- military, economic, social, and religious—are perhaps the most potent and longstanding countervailing force against rash interventionism we see in the U.S. politico-diplomatic record. I really wanted to show the TED audience in person and online the complicated development of ideas about isolation. I aimed to make accessible the ways in which we Americans who opposed a range of restrictions on national sovereignty imposed by entering into global agreements, permanent alliances, and interventions in foreign conflicts advocated for forms of political isolationism, however the historical record reveals that they did not seek to wall off the nation from the world.

Indeed, one reason that I increasingly go back earlier and earlier in the history of isolationism in my accounts, recent articles and book chapters and one of my Andrew Carnegie projects, and in the TED talk, where I emphasize Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe, is because when you go back to when the U.S. was not a major military or economic power, you find the traction of these ideas is much more obvious. It also taps into foundational logics for U.S. foreign policy ... and literally the founders, which helps persuade public audiences. That is, an array of ideas about the benefits of relative isolation—as I put it in the talk, never complete, always engaged with the world, and generally recognizing the “sandcastle-like” quality of building borders when ideas, peoples, and commodities flow so easily across them—are crucial to the primordial soup of American foreign policy.

So how do we get to the point where the debate is reduced to one where interventionism is the only viable response to any foreign policy question? Why do we reflexively respond to the question of intervention with “when and where to intervene” and not “why or how.” Or if. This is what I hope the talk helps to illuminate for audiences.

DH: Let’s talk a little bit more about the drafting process. You’ve decided with them that you’re going to work on America First and you’re going to explore isolationism. Did you send them a full draft of the talk first? How was the beginning of the process?

CN: There was a series of meetings. It was at this point when I started having these meetings that I realized that I was in it now. On my team was a design specialist, who helped sketch images and story-board ideas, along two main organizers, the visionary leader of TEDxPortland, David Rae, a former Nike marketing executive who founded and runs a media and design firm, and a current Nike marketing leader who was a former British Parliament speechwriter, and in the end I also had an award-winning graphic artist on the team.

At times it felt like there were a lot of chefs in the kitchen. And it was nothing like working with a book editor or journal editor, or even co-writing. Of course, as a historian and somebody who has done a fair amount of public speaking inside and outside classrooms, they weren’t very worried about my presentation—which they were for some other less experienced speakers going—but we all were concerned about how to get some complicated history distilled to really reach the TED audiences.

So, in all these meetings, I was always bringing more and more text and that probably wasn’t going to be there in the end anyway. They were a little surprised by that. “Oh well if you think I should talk about you know 20th century or mostly the America First Committee,” I would say, “give me a couple days.” Then I’d return and say “here’s five pages.” These talks have to be under twenty minutes and preferably closer to twelve, or around two thousand words total. So the process began with storyboarding and cutting and revising my abandant text. Writing a TED talk with a team like this is intense, time-consuming, and in the end I found it to be a really good lesson for how to do any public talk. Because you have to really think hard about every line, about outcomes, about accessibility. One takeaway for me was that the team emphasized that you absolutely need to hit the audience hard with a great opening line.

Each segment of the talk needs to be mapped out very specifically. So, what you do in your first two minutes as an introduction must then transition to your next two minutes. That’s point one. Your next two minutes are body text, point two, then no more than three total body sections of two-to-three minutes. And then the narrative arc must be clear all the way, where you’re going to “land the plane” as they repeatedly said, has to be in mind from the start and is vital.
to any good TED talk.

In drafting we stressed finding and refining key lines. The idea was to design a handful of lines to perform emphatically, with a pause, to get the in-person audience to say “wow” or “whoa, really?” and “I’ve never thought of it that way.”

But how do you achieve that? I usually don’t think of such things in my teaching or public engagement, or at least not too much. However, for this talk paring things down and word-smithing lines and phrases that might bring a shiver to the audience, when combined with images and in culminating previous points, had to be the goal.

Central to that was scripting and thinking about when to pause and deliver lines that the audience is really going to feel, that will resonate, and then leave them to sit with the line for a few beats, and when you are going speed up your cadence. I don’t know that I performed all those things as well as I’d hoped but deliberating about them a great deal in advance was maybe the most important part of crafting the talk. Then, with a teleprompter – which I had never used – I was able to put bullet points for those “land lines” after testing them out on the team, to be sure I slowed and really hit them. That was useful and another aspect I took away from the experience that I highly recommend. That is, if you have a great line, using it to start with emphasis, then including some other similar phrases at strategic points in the talk that evoke that opening line or claim, to touch on slowly, will enhance any talk, it seems to me.

But it wasn’t until about the last bit of drafting that that the that a line that I had just buried in the middle became like the main line of the talk and the core of the first captivating image. I continue to use it for other public talks and it works very well -- history is a vaccine against superficiality.

DH: Was there anything they didn’t want you to talk about as you suggested or includes that they advised you away from or against?

CN: The big thing that we went back and forth on was Donald Trump. In the opening, when I’m trying to contextualize America First, we grappled with whether or not I would talk about Trump. How to do this without seeming like I’m just there on the stump making a political case or being overly political or just dating the talk too much was an enormous challenge. It is also kind of verboten in the TED-talk universe to “do” politics or pitch products.

So, we went back and forth on the Trump thing and ultimately just decide to explain it in terms of the remarkable return of America First as a campaign motto and policy platform and then move totally beyond Trump and the present moment to go back to the eighteenth century and march up through time, thus actually solidifying the significance of this moment in history in conversation with the past.

The team in Portland and I weren’t too worried about Trump or the present until it got to be about four days before the talk. And we’re still working on the text and still working on images which is something we should talk about. And at that point they told me, “You’ve got to start practicing. You know we have to. And you have to like it has to come in under 20 minutes. It absolutely can’t be over 20 minutes and the target was 14.” And then they told me I would be in the last group of speakers for the day, that I would likely go right before journalist Ann Curry who would close the whole event with a rousing cri de coeur for truth in journalism.

Knowing I was to go before the closer for the whole day pushed me to redouble my effort and cut a ton. In fact, the cut words file is definitely in the nearly twenty-thousand word range. There were some versions of the talk that were great. That would’ve been great. Like 40 minute lectures for a four hour class. And so we had to strip out all the quotes and streamlined everything. We landed on a structure that began and ended powerfully by via the vaccine line but in making the case that words and phrases can be -- and are -- wielded as weapons, and the only guard against succumbing to powerful but vacuous symbols and terms, what William James termed specious abstractions, is to understand the history and deeper context.

DH: Let’s talk about that. As you edited and edited, how did you prioritize what you wanted to leave in? How did you make sure that you were clear on agency? We’ve talked a lot about rupture and continuity in ideologies, how do you keep those elements in the text? And also keep that text incredibly short?

CN: I thought it was a hard balance to strike. I think that what you focus on in a TED talk is a little different from other ways that you or I would be very particular and careful about trying to keep the agents in. I think in a TED talk you’re not as worried about the agents you’re worried about the clarity and the kind of language that will generate in the audience the ability to then look into the who’s and what’s of the history, or to or to question what you’re saying and say OK wait, and push back.

But the other piece of it was imagery. For me the really interesting thing about the highly-produced sort of TED talk and process I participated in was that unlike all almost all the other kinds of talks I have done or do, the images were commissioned and designed to directly enhance the flow and deepen the content.

Right in the middle of the drafting process the TEDxPortland lead organizers realized we were on to something with my talk and they decided to amp up the images, to make it really memorable in person, for posterity, and to be usable in classrooms. So that’s something they were thinking about for my talk that it would be something that high school teachers or college professors could assign and it has now begun to be on syllabi, as Google Alerts tells me. They said okay we need we need great images for this. And so they reached out to the guy who did all the TEDxPortland billboards a few years earlier, none other than an Eisner Award-winning graphic artist named Jonathan Case.

And this this was perhaps the biggest takeaway biggest lesson for me of the whole process was -- now I want to write a graphic novel. Working with this amazing talented artist, Case, and thinking about the potential for images to convey so much more than words really was a pleasure and has opened new vistas on to how to communicate historical concepts to wider publics.

We worked together and the design team had lots of great ideas; we did story boards; we debated if anyone knew or cared who any given person in the talk was, or if or how they should be represented to make the most visual and intellectual impact; we pondered core images to carry throughout the slides and when, where, and why to use color -- something that, frankly, had never occurred to me. Case read a late draft of the script, we selected images and embedded historical ideas, some more overt some more subtle ... in the end Case did six great commissioned original design slides, pieces of art, for the talk and that I now have permission to use for other talks and events.
DH: So, did the images inform where you were going to draft? Knowing you would have the designer making these images did that change what you wanted to include?

CN: That’s a great question. You know it did. I did not think that it would at the time but have an exceptional graphic artist doing the art work for the talk and knowing this was not just a talk but a performance with images really did shape how I thought about the talk. In particular, working with speaker coach and design team plus artist it was very clear how the talk needed to be blocked out, which is not something we usually do with invited talks much less lectures or discussions. What I mean is that each segment had to have a slide. Each segment was two-to-three minutes. But would the image precede, coincide with a strong line of emphasis, or come in the middle? Why? To what effect?

We went with color images to open and close the talk, and shifted black-and-white for all the past sections, with a blending of color and black-and-white for the 1940-41 America First Committee transitional moment at which I argue the term “isolationism” was “tarred” forever. The initial image is my favorite and it visually represents and adds complexity to my favorite line “history is vaccine against superficiality.” But then where do you go from there? We ended up leaving that slide up for a full two minutes— and you can take a look at the Twitter birds and get a sense of the theme of birds to come, and you can wonder whether I am arguing history is a drug or an inoculation or a mixture of each? Then we worried about how to move from the eighteenth century to the present while keeping the audience engaged but not pushing superfluous facts. So, the next image is of the U.S. as a fledgling bird and Europe envisioned as fighting vultures or you know, predatory birds, eying the New World. I was trying to tease out for the audience the early U.S. as a weak nation and why isolationist ideas such as unilateralism, neutrality, and non-intervention—which I emphasized a lot in the talk—were bulwarks of an older era; that they might have made good sense then and at times later under nearly constant pressure being updated to meet the nation’s needs in light of new geopolitical conditions.

At the intersection of images and text was performance. You have a big clock with red numbers glaring at you, counting down, there is an enormous boom crane with video setup and camera people swirling around, not to mention three thousand people in person and so many more online. And there’s a teleprompter—I went back and forth and eventually put some text and some bullet points on it, as I wanted something to fall back on to help with the land lines but didn’t want to overly focus on and distract me from the talk as a whole.

All of this comes with no time to unpack images as we usually do for students and audiences. So, for a talk like this, the slides had to have their own impact and explanatory and analytical power to complement what I was saying and how lines were performed. Thinking about images and their use, if you look at some TED talks the speaker has a PPT clicker, but after some back-and-forth the team and I decided timing and images needed to be so in synch for my talk that the main story-board designer for my talk was backstage hitting the mark on dropping each image at a set moment, a key word, phrase, or concept, even when I was ad-libbing, to have maximum impact. The problem, I think, was that this felt like it worked very effectively for the in-person audience. The huge images behind me took up the entire stage, with side screens flanking the stage showing close-ups of me talking, seemed to keep the audience rapt, or relatively so. You can see this and hear it a bit to get a sense watching the talk, but as it stands online the power of the images and the timing that we worked so hard on strikes me as lost. So, this is another oddity of the TED talk: it is both an in-person performance and a canned performance to live on online afterwards. For me, the delivery was contingent on the images and the audience, but not on the filming process. I didn’t take the dual outcomes into account as fully as I might and I am not sure what else I could have done to be more effective in both ways, but if I had it to do over again I think I might have focused a bit more on the video element of the performance and less on the live audience.

DH: Has the process of putting together the TED Talk and giving it had any kind of sat on your presentation and writing as a historian, or how you approach history classes in any way?

CN: Well, I didn’t consider that much to this point. It’s definitely changed things. I’ve been dedicated to doing public history for a while, so that’s not quite new. But one of the things that has changed is that I was really inspired - to be part of it. Or, think of it this way -- if you haven’t ever been to one of these major TED events it’s easy to criticize them. They’re kind of these neoliberal tech-entertainment-design promotional machines. There’s a lot marketing, slogans, branding, tons of swag, as I said … but when you go and there’s three thousand plus people and it’s online and there’s a buzz in the auditorium, people stay all day from 9am to 5pm. There’s a happy hour after the talks and people linger and want to talk to the speakers, they’ve taken notes, they want autographs even. It is clear the audience is deeply inspired by all the ideas they’re hearing and almost everyone stays ALL DAY. The performers and speakers are often amazing, and inspired by each other; when I went, for example, the closer right after me was Ann Curry talking about truth and journalism. Wow, she was fantastic. But maybe most appealing and heart-wrenching on my day there was a guy, Tyrone Poole, who had been homeless and developed a new app to help people find
available apartments and save them time and precious money in the applications process for housing. There were speakers on transgender rights and parenting, on women’s empowerment, on the importance of the arts to human flourishing. Just amazing people there, inspiring human stories as well as powerful ideas. It was just moving and an honor to be part of a speaking and performing group aiming to change their societies in profound ways.

As a whole, what I took away was that these TEDx talks around the world in small communities and large cities, and the TED phenomenon as a whole, gives me hope. It is like a modern day, world-wide Chautauqua. For our world in which we are beset by the omnipresent crush of facts and social media, that seems ever-more superficial, my experience, my talk, and the TED system overall gives me hope that we can work together developing and sharing ideas to generate a better, deeper, richer future. And that, in fact, akin to a turn of the twentieth century Chautauqua vision or mission, was how I ended my talk: with an image of a family outside the Smithsonian suggesting that history, and knowledge, can be our bridge to link questions we face today with echoes from the past. That we can turn the information age to our advantage; that we can and should dig deeper into context and ideas, to take time to unearth the full story, understand it, and gain new depth of insight, about who we were yesterday, who we are today, and how, together, we can create a better tomorrow.
For scholars looking to do archival research in South Korea (the ROK), there is little information out there on how to go about it. This piece is meant to be a helpful primer on doing research in South Korea and an attempt to get the conversation started on the nature and limits of archival access there. It is not a comprehensive survey or a blueprint of all South Korean archives or research facilities.

Since my dissertation investigates the ties between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Global South during the Cold War era, my area of research focuses on postcolonial Korea. Thus, this primer is mostly limited to that time frame. I will be focusing on the ROK Foreign Ministry archives, the National Assembly Library, the North Korea Information Center at the National Library, the University of North Korean Studies Library, the National Institute of Korean History, the National Archives (Seongnam branch), the Syngman Rhee Papers, the Presidential Archives in Sejong City, and the South Korean Film Archive in Sangam. Scholars should note that the rules and procedures of these research institutions change constantly, and what I outline here may not apply to every situation. Suggestions for further research opportunities in South Korea are welcome.

Before heading off to a South Korean archive or research facility, you should take a look at their indexes and catalogues online. South Korean research institutions also digitize a number of materials. Naver, the popular South Korean search engine, has also made an archive of Korean newspapers available online. These online resources are a huge timesaver. In addition, most South Korean archives and research facilities put their detailed indexes and catalogues online. In fact, some institutions do not even make paper copies available on site. Researchers are expected to arrive with an understanding of what they are looking for.

An affiliation with a South Korean university is recommended. Affiliations for foreign researchers in South Korea are extremely helpful and will give you access to that school’s library. The best way to set up an affiliation is to contact a South Korean professor, preferably through your own advisor’s contacts. Also, the National Archives of Korea requires a student card from a South Korean University, and your affiliated university may be able to provide that document.

National Assembly Library

The National Assembly Library (NAL) is an excellent site for writing and secondary source research. It contains master’s theses and PhD dissertations from several Korean universities, which can be difficult to find elsewhere, and they also have a plethora of unique secondary sources. For example, I found a fascinating book at the NAL detailing the involvement of North Korean students in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. I most likely would not have found this book, which was published by a South Korean press, in the United States.

The NAL also has high-quality microfilm machines and a complete collection of ROK Foreign Ministry reports from the Cold War era. You can read historical Korean and Japanese newspapers on these machines. In order to use the library on a regular basis, you have to register at the entrance with your passport or alien registration card. You will then receive a library card. If you are just visiting for a day or two and need quick access, the staff may give you a temporary guest pass, so you may not need to go through the formal application process.

The NAL is located next to the National Assembly in Seoul. You can get to it easily by subway, and it is a five-minute walk from the National Assembly subway station (line 9) or a twenty-minute walk from Yeouido (line 9, line 5). The cafeteria, located in the basement, is quite affordable (forty-five hundred won) and has very good lunches and dinners.

The ROK Foreign Ministry Archives

The ROK Foreign Ministry Archives, which is not a typical physical archive but rather a collection of microfilm and DVDs, contains thousands of documents related to the foreign affairs of the ROK and the DPRK from the end of the Korean War to the mid-1980s. The reports are primarily written in Hangeul but there are some documents written in mixed script or completely in Hanja (Chinese characters). Microfilm from before 1979 has not yet been copied onto DVD, so those documents can be quite hard to read, as the quality of the microfilm is poor. I have heard that there are plans to digitize the whole collection. However, in the meantime, prepare for the occasional document that is completely illegible. It might be wise to invest in a magnifying glass.

Seoul National University’s (SNU) library, the National Assembly Library, and the Diplomatic Archives of Korea possess this collection, as does Harvard’s Yenching Library in Cambridge. For the post-1979 materials, I recommend using the SNU library, as they do not charge for downloads. In order to use the SNU library, guests simply need to give the front desk staff at the entrance either their passport or alien registration card. In return they receive a temporary pass. For the pre-1979 materials, I recommend using the collection at the National Assembly Library. They have two high-quality microfilm machines and charge fifty won per printed page. However, you cannot download from those machines onto a USB drive. There is a librarian seated next to the microfilm machines who is very helpful. The Diplomatic Archives of Korea, which should be the hub of ROK Foreign Ministry-related research, charges an extortionate amount for microfilm and DVD downloads (a hundred won per MB), so unless that policy changes, I do not recommend going to that site.
The National Library (NL) of South Korea is a huge library and a very valuable resource for historians of colonial Korea, as the Governor-General Library recently moved its records here. For my own research, I have primarily used the North Korean Information Center, which is located on the fifth floor of the NL. This center contains a large amount of North Korean propaganda, from children's books to obscure Korean Workers' Party magazines. You can also view North Korean films and television programs on the center's computers. I have even looked through rare promotional booklets from Mansudae Art Studio, the national art institute of the DPRK. The center's website is very detailed, and the holdings of the center are easily searchable.

However, because of the National Security Law of South Korea, the center's rules and procedures are quite strict. You cannot take pictures here, and you can only photocopy sensitive materials (labeled 특수) with permission from the center's staff. You will need a letter of introduction in either English or Korean from your advisor/department chair, printed on official university letterhead, in order to get permission to photocopy sensitive materials. Make sure to bring some five-thousand-won notes with you, as that is the only currency the photocopy card dispenser accepts. On the website, it says that you can borrow North Korean books from the center, but that is not totally accurate. You can take them to different parts of the NL but not out of the building itself. The NL is located ten minutes away from the Seocho subway station in Seoul (line 2). You will need your passport or alien registration card in order to enter the library.

The University of North Korean Studies Library

The University of North Korean Studies (UNKS) is located near Gwanghwamun in Seoul. This graduate school has a small library that is a hidden gem. It houses both secondary sources related to North Korea and North Korean propaganda materials. The North Korean propaganda materials are located in a side room of the library. You can find a wide range of propaganda here, from recent architectural magazines to novels. The library also has a few bound volumes of the U.S. National Archives' Record Group 242, the captured North Korean documents from the Korean War. It is not a complete collection of RG 242, but the volumes held at the UNKS library would be extremely helpful for scholars unable to travel to College Park, Maryland.

The greatest asset of this library is the searchable archive of the Rodong Sinmun, the main newspaper in North Korea, on two of its computers. Using these two computers, you can search dates and keywords within the system to find and locate articles in the Rodong Sinmun. The archive goes back to the early 1960s. Printing old Rodong Sinmun articles from this computer is permitted and costs a reasonable fifty won per page. You can photocopy certain North Korean materials, but you have to sign out the documents. The National Security Law is also strictly enforced here.

In order to access the library, you need to briefly explain to the head librarian what your research is and who you have an affiliation with. A letter of introduction from your advisor helps. The UNKS is located near the Anguk station (line 3). You should head towards exit 2 and then walk ten meters to the bus stop. Take bus number 2 to Gamsawon. Walk straight three hundred meters to the very small UNKS/Kyungnam Institute of Far Eastern Studies campus, which consists of two buildings. The campus will be on your left. The library will be located in the building on your right.

The National Institute of Korean History

The National Institute of Korean History (NIKH) is another hidden treasure in modern Korean studies. Located an hour away from downtown Seoul, it is well worth the trip. This institute is collecting archival materials from all around the world related to North and South Korea. Truly a one-stop shop for researching international histories of postcolonial Korea, it has copies of archival documents from Germany, France, the U.S, the U.K, Canada, Russia, India, Canada, Japan, China, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. It also has some North Korean propaganda materials, such as Rodong Sinmun and Choson Yosong. A large number of U.S documents from the National Archives are available on their website. However, you will have to go to the NIH to access most of the other documents. It seems to have a nearly complete collection of reports from the East German embassy in the DPRK and the French Foreign Ministry, along with Russian materials related to the pre-Korean War occupation of North Korea.

The NIH is a twenty-minute walk away from the Gwacheon government complex subway station (line 4). You will need to hand over your passport or alien registration card to a guard at the entrance gate. The staff at NIH is extremely helpful and knowledgeable, so feel free to ask them questions. There is a beautiful pond next to the building; take time to appreciate that spot on your lunch break. There is no wifi, however, and the building can be quite chilly during the winter months, so bring a jacket. Also, make sure to have a one-hundred-won coin for the lockers and some small bills for printing expenses.

The National Archives (Seongnam branch)

The National Archives of Korea is split into three different sites. The main branch is located in Daejeon; the other three branches are in Seongnam (a city about twelve miles south of Seoul), Gwangju, and Busan. Each branch contains different materials, and there seems to be little rhyme or reason for the way they are organized. For example, many documents from the colonial era are located at the Daejeon branch. However, for this section, I am referring specifically to the Seongnam branch.

The National Archives seems to be used primarily by South Korean lawyers looking at land deeds and property rights. It contains a wealth of municipal and national documents related to the postwar period of South Korea. While foreign researchers are permitted to research at the National Archives of Korea, they are not a common sight, and it may be necessary to explain your project in order to be granted access. Before you head to the National Archives, I highly recommend looking at their website and writing down a list of the documents you would like to see, as there is no wifi in the building, and it can take up to an hour for documents to be pulled from the stacks. If you request a large number of documents, you will have to make a return trip to the branch to pick up the copies. Make sure to bring small bills to pay for copies.

In order to request documents, a South Korean university card is required. A foreign university card will be of no use, but a passport or alien registration card is still required. In order to get to the Seongnam branch, take a bus from Gangnam subway station (line 2, Shinbundang line). Very few people get off at the National Archives site, so it is best to alert the bus– driver or he may skip the stop.
Syngman Rhee Papers

This section would not have been possible without the assistance of Dr. David Fields.

The Syngman Rhee Papers (SRP), which are primarily in English, can be accessed at Yonsei University’s library in Seoul. Although not comprehensive, the SRP at Yonsei contains 1,034 folders and consists primarily of Rhee’s private and official correspondence as well as instructions and reports from South Korean embassies abroad. A rough catalogue of the SRP at Yonsei can be found in Young Ick Lew’s *The Syngman Rhee Presidential Papers: A Catalogue*. Although Yonsei has a large collection of the SRP, it is not comprehensive, as it lacks materials from the pre-1948 period. The Syngman Rhee Institute, which is part of Yonsei University but located in Buam-Dong, has an overlapping collection of the SRP, including an extensive collection of his pre-1948 papers. The pre-1948 collection is generally not open to researchers, but some scholars have been given limited access to these papers. The Syngman Rhee Institute is difficult to find, and its website is currently unavailable. This is its contact information:

Jahamun-ro 37-gil 11 (Buam-dong), Jongno-gu, Seoul, Korea  
Telephone: (82-2) 3216-7742  
Email: smrhee@yonsei.ac.kr

Presidential Archives

This section would not have been possible without the assistance of Professor Carter Eckert.

The Presidential Archives, located in Sejong City, about seventy-five miles from Seoul, contains formal documents related to each South Korean presidential administration. The South Korean government quickly declassifies materials related to each presidential administration. For example, documents from Park Geun-hye’s administration are now being moved to the Presidential Archives. Nearly twelve million items are in that collection, while nearly eleven million are in the Lee Myung-bak collection, so for those researching the recent history of the ROK, this is a great resource. However, there are no personal papers—diaries, journals, or personal correspondence—at the Presidential Archives. Also, until recently, there was no law for the declassification of presidential records, so the Presidential Archives previously depended on the generosity of each former president’s family to provide relevant materials. It is not surprising that there are far more documents available for those presidents who were democratically elected. Nonetheless, this is a valuable site for those researching South Korea’s political history.

South Korean Film Archive

This section would not have been possible without the assistance of Professor Joseph Jeon.

For those studying the history of Korean cinema, the South Korean Film Archive in Sangam, which is a neighborhood in the Mapo-gu district of Seoul, is a valuable resource. The archive contains over thirty thousand films, some of which date back to the colonial period. It is free, and you can watch a movie in your own personal booth. Many South Korean parents take their children there to watch movies on hot summer days. The archive also has regular screenings of international films in its main theater, and it has uploaded many films onto its YouTube channel. There is a museum at the archive as well; it details the history of Korean cinema. Finally, there is a café on site, but since the archive is in the middle of the media district, there are many dining options nearby.

Another film archive is located in Paju, just south of Panmunjeom, but neither Professor Jeon nor I have visited the Paju site.

Observations

South Korean research institutions have done a tremendous job of compiling a large collection of North Korean propaganda materials and archival documents from around the world related to the two Koreas. They have also made a real effort to digitize many materials. However, South Korean research institutions are extremely bureaucratic, so researchers will need to navigate unique rules and policies at each institution that may initially be troublesome or confusing.

Establishing connections and getting to know archivists and librarians is important. If you are extremely patient and polite, they will be far more willing to help you. Some may even bend the rules for you. It is also helpful to know the directors of these institutions. Advisors or colleagues can help establish these connections. South Korea is a network-based society, so connections like this can sometimes be vital to the success of your project. In this respect, the research environment in South Korea could be improved if policies and procedures were more transparent.

Note:

1. During a visit to the U.S National Archives in College Park, I just happened to meet the South Korean worker who is photocopying these documents for the NIKH.
The 2020 SHAFR Summer Institute will focus on the dynamic study of “Women in the World,” featuring these exciting scholars:

**Allida Black**—her research has focused on the role of Eleanor Roosevelt, especially during her years of work on the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights; on Hillary Rodham Clinton’s work as First Lady at the 1995 U.N. World Women’s Conference in Beijing and as Secretary of State working to promote human rights issues; and on the challenges of constructing Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s history when the Liberian civil war violence destroyed essential records.

**Katherine Marino**—her research has focused on Latin American women’s efforts to promote a human rights agenda across borders in the 1920s-1940s. Indeed, her new book—*Feminism for the Americas: The Making of an International Human Rights Movement*—argues that women from Latin America and the Caribbean were central to crafting a feminist human rights agenda.

**Brandy Thomas Wells**—her research has focused on African-American women’s anti-colonial and anti-racist activism both at home and abroad from the 1890s through the 1960s through the National Association of Colored Women Clubs (NACWC) and the National Council of Negro Women (NCNW).

**Julie Laut**—her research has focused on the role of women in the Indian National movement. Her dissertation centered Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who was the first female leader of a U.N. delegation in 1946 and one of the most prominent female diplomats in the post-WWII era. Her research analyzes the ways in which gender helped structure emotional discourses over the issue of racial oppression, as she argues for a cultural approach to understanding the early U.N., its diplomacy, and its early focus on decolonization.

The Summer Institute will be held in New Orleans in the days leading up to the 2020 SHAFR Conference, so participants are encouraged to consider also proposing papers and panels for that conference meeting in conjunction with their institute participation, as there are additional travel grants available through conference participation. Both graduate students and junior faculty members are invited to participate in the institute. Institute participants will receive housing and most meals as well as some level of travel assistance.

In addition to scholarly conversations about the history of women in the world led by the scholars listed above, the institute will also include discussions on

- gender dynamics in the classroom and workplace
- career options (traditional and alternative) for history professionals
- resources on women in the world for research and teaching
- professional networking, mentoring, and opportunities
- publishing strategies
- managing work and life

If you are interested in further information, please email Amy.Sayward@shafr.org. The deadline for expressing interest in the Summer Institute is **December 1, 2019**; final decisions about participation and funding will be made concurrently with the Program Committee’s announcements in early 2020.
“Turning up in Tehran”: Differential Acceleration and the U.S. International Empire

Cyrus Schayegh

It is May 21, 1962. In the Near Eastern Studies Department at Princeton University, Professor of Iranian Studies T. Cuyler Young is “turning over in [his] mind” the possibility that he might “come out to Tehran” in early June for meetings about the role U.S. academics might play in the celebration (eventually postponed) of the 2,500-year anniversary of Iran’s monarchy and in order to “get caught up to date” on political developments. On May 29, he is still undecided, but writes in a letter to an Iranian friend in Tehran that he will “be turning up in Tehran on June 10 if my present plans go through.” He has been asked to attend “a committee meeting at Unesco (sic) in Paris on June 7 and 8” and also has “university business at Rome, and having got that far, it is too much of a temptation not to go on to Tehran.... I want to get caught up on things ... [and] naturally want to get as wide a sampling of opinion as possible within a short time.” In the final instance, he succumbs to the temptation and books his ticket a week before his departure. He returns stateside two weeks later, on June 25.1

This trip was unexceptional. From the early 1960s, Young started visiting Iran for quicker spells and taking trips on shorter notice than before. In the summer of 1961 he spent a couple of weeks with his wife, Helen, in Tehran and various provinces, which they knew from their time as Presbyterian missionaries in the northern Iranian town of Rasht between 1927 and 1936. After a quick trip to Afghanistan, they flew eastwards across the Pacific “almost directly back to the United States, except for three days in Hongkong.” And in November 1964 Young flew from New York to Tehran for two weeks, stopping over in London and Istanbul for short business meetings.

Simultaneously, as the head of his department at Princeton University, Young increased his invitations to Middle Eastern scholars and policymakers. Their visits formed part of an expansion, under his chairmanship, of the department’s involvement with Washington. He himself was contributing to Iran policy, and had served at the Office of Strategic Services in World War II and as the first U.S. public affairs officer in Tehran, from 1944 to 1946.3 The foreigners he invited came for “short visit[s],” as he told the Princeton-trained Khodadad Farmanfarmaian, who had been an official with the Iran Plan Organization. Some stayed for a semester; many for shorter periods. He organized their travel accordingly. On May 31, 1962, he informed a professor of Islamic Studies in Cairo, Mustafa Ziade, that he had received a visiting professorship for the fall. Young expected his acceptance note to arrive in Princeton a mere two weeks later, by June 15; and he assured Ziade that Princeton would cover his “round-trip air passage (tourist-economy) between Cairo and New York.” In late January 1964, days before Tehran University’s Muhammad Mo’in was to board a plane to New York to take up a one-semester visiting professorship in Princeton, Young wrote him to recommend he take a helicopter from Kennedy International Airport to Newark Airport, where Young would pick him up by car.4

Young’s pace showed in his language, in the self-confident matter-of-factness with which he talked about crossing oceans and continents, “coming out to” and “turning up in” Tehran, “get caught up to date” on the go. The contrast between his language and that of Farzaneh ‘Elmi, who was from the northeastern Iranian city of Mashad and had written to him to offer her assistance while he was in Iran, is striking. “I know that you are surprised to receive this letter,” she wrote, in Persian, “and I guess you will be all the more surprised finding out that somebody is writing you a letter az farsangha rah.” Translatable as “from very far away,” this phrase literally means “from the road of (many) farsangs,” a measure of distance that, while officially replaced by the kilometer early on in the Pahlavi period (1925–1979), remained in use informally.5

With his Middle Eastern airline connections and his list of far-flung acquaintances, Young illustrates what one may call “differential acceleration.” Consider, first, acceleration. While German airlines had intermittently flown from Tehran to Europe before World War II (Junkers Airlines, partnering with the Soviet Ukrovozdukhput in 1927–1932, via Baku and Moscow; Deutsche Luft Hansa, via Baghdad, Damascus, Rhodes, Athens, and Vienna to Frankfurt in 1938–1939), Iran’s air linkage to other countries really took off after the war. Now, however, U.S. actors became involved.

Iranian Airways, which, beginning in 1947, flew from Tehran to Paris via Beirut and Athens,
entertained from its establishment in 1944 until 1949 a technical assistance agreement with the American TWA, which owned ten percent of its shares. The other leading U.S. airline company, Pan Am, began serving Tehran in 1955, first as a side branch of its round-the-world route, connecting at Beirut, and then, from 1956 on, as an integral part of that route. Inaugurated in 1947, the round-the-world route was, beginning in 1958, served by the first U.S. civilian jet, the brand-new Boeing B-707 (see image 1). Lufthansa, which in 1959 launched the first non-stop flight from Tehran to a European city, Munich, took to the air in the postwar era when in 1955 Washington, with London and Paris, gave the green light. And Iran Air, established in 1962, flew Boeing jets.8

The U.S. interest in Iran’s air sector and the relation between that interest and Iran’s accelerated connectivity with the outside world formed part of a larger development. As Jennifer Van Vleck has argued, following World War II, air travel, with its accompanying technical and legal agreements, helped to infrastructurally underpin and discursively project U.S. “nationalist globalization,” to use John Fousek’s term: the idea that the United States was essential to the globe, the guarantor of an expanding liberal capitalist world in the Cold War. Pan Am and TWA entertained close ties to the U.S. government and were among the world’s biggest airlines route-wise; in 1950 they officially changed their names, TWA from Transcontinental & Western Air to Trans World Airlines, and Pan Am from Pan American Airways to Pan American World Airways, which had been its unofficial name since 1943.9

More pointedly, one can think of Pan Am’s, TWA’s, and Boeing’s presence in Iran as part of what Paul A. Kramer has called the “international” U.S. empire: one that does not seek to replace nation-states but, rather, works through them.9 The United States’s worldwide imperial posture created and maintained power inequalities. But simultaneously, some citizens and governments of those (sometimes nominally, sometimes substantially) sovereign nation-states could affect and/or try to benefit from U.S. imperial structures.

It is this combination that the adjective “differential” in the title of this text addresses. It builds on the argument of scholars like Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank that empires operate by creating differences.10 But it is not identical with that argument. The political relationship between the postwar U.S. imperial metropolis and its allies, clients, and dependencies, however different in nature, unfolded within, and indeed helped structure, a world of nation-states rather than of colonies.

Consider time—or timing, to be precise. Pan Am integrated Tehran into its round-the-world services route shortly after the United States helped engineer a coup d’état against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953 and Iran became an American client state. Indeed, it is clear that different destinations became part of Pan Am’s network at different times. As Pan Am coordinated its business with Washington, Washington influenced these different points in time. Pan Am’s actions reflected evolving U.S. political interests as much as commercial benefits. But they also implied the agreement of local powerholders, in this case the Iranian government.

Next, consider space. Although Iran principally looked westwards, it had some air connections eastwards and northwards, too, to the Soviet Union. Also, its principal prewar westward connection, to Germany, remained critical after World War II, although it now, it is true, was under the aegis of the United States. And while the trans-Atlantic route—to Washington’s closest allies, in Western Europe, especially Britain—enjoyed the highest number of intercontinental jet flights, Pan Am used the B-707 jet on its round-the-world route beginning in 1958, which was this airplane’s inaugural year.

Finally, think of actors. Domestically, Iran’s ballooning educated urban middle class, which helped trigger a “politics of promise” after the 1953 coup, was much better positioned to enjoy the benefits of accelerated air connectivity than its poorer co-citizens, especially in rural areas.11 It was not by chance that ‘Elmi lived in a large city, Mashhad, was working at her university’s literature department, and used a Persian typewriter and an aerogram to contact Young (see images 2 and 3).

The concept of differential acceleration helps us analyze the relationship between Iranian and American actors, too. Young’s swifter access to Iran beginning around 1960 and his self-assured tone—“come out to” Tehran—reflected an imperial metropolis’s hub-and-spokes view of the world. What is more, expressions such as “get caught up to date,” quite literally on the fly, corroborate Van Vleck’s point that the U.S. “Empire of the Air” often beheld other countries from far away and from high up, as it were. Whereas Young and his wife had spent nine years almost uninterruptedly in interwar Iran, by the early 1960s his stays had shrunk to a couple of weeks. Then again, airplanes in general, and jets in particular, enabled him to be quasi-simultaneously in two places, through visits and by getting air editions of Iranian newspapers.12 He was able to gather information and nurture contacts in Iran regularly while processing and using that information politically and remaining present at home. This ability differentiated him, a professor at a rich, well-connected Ivy League university, from any academic or political Iranian counterpart.

But the middle-class Iranians in our vignette are not like Valeska Huber’s nomads, whose movement between the Sinai and Egypt was slowed by the world-transport-accelerating Suez Canal.13 Iranians participated in Iran’s U.S.-led air transport acceleration. Such participation could be direct. More interestingly, it sometimes took the form of bandwagoning. ‘Elmi was a case in point: she sought to benefit from Young’s high-speed movement between Iran and the United States. Another example was Fakhri Garakani, a resident of Tehran. She knew Young from her birthplace, the north Iranian city of Rasht, so in March 1962 she had an American Presbyterian missionary there ask him to make an inquiry in Washington about an intricately embroidered portrait of Pope John XXIII that she had sent to John F. Kennedy, the whereabouts of which were unknown. Young agreed to help. What answer he obtained...
from the White House, and why Garakani sent a gift across the Atlantic to a U.S. president in the first place, is a story I tell elsewhere.14

Notes:
1. T. Cuyler Young to Theodore Wertime [U.S. Information Services, Tehran], May 21, 1962, folder 25, box 11, AC164, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (hereafter SMML/PU); and Young to Hussein Mahdavy, May 29, 1962, folder 2, box 4, AC164, SMML/PU. See also Young to Pryor, June 1, 1962, folder 3, box 4, AC164, SMML/PU.
2. Young to Morteza Madany, October 30, 1961, folder 10, box 3, AC164, SMML/PU. See also Young to Mahdavi, July 23, 1964, folder 6, box 6, AC164, SMML/PU; and “Young, Theodore C.,” RG360, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
4. Young to Khodadad Farmanfarmaian, September 17, 1962, folder 6, box 6, AC164, SMML/PU; and Young to Mustafa Ziade, May 31, 1962, folder 2, box 4, AC164, SMML/PU. See also Young to Mo’in, January 27, 1964, folder 1, box 6, AC164, SMML/PU.
5. ‘Elmi to Young, April 22, 1961, folder F, box 8, AC164, SMML/PU.
6. See http://www.timetableimages.com/ttimages/dlh.htm (timetables issued October 2, 1938, and January 15, 1940, dropping Tehran); Deutsche Luft Hansa timetables (April 1928), 102 (I thank Björn Larsson for this item). See also http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/history_iranian_air_transportation_industry.php; http://merrick.library.miami.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/asmo341/id/3425/rec/1; http://www.timetableimages.com/ttimages/pa/pa56/pa56-03.jpg; and http://www.timetableimages.com/ttimages/lh/lh5905/lh5905-2.jpg. The British Comet 4 jet was launched in 1958, too; first was the Soviet Tupolev 104, in 1956.
12. For Young’s reliance on air editions to stay up to date, see Young to Mahdavy, January 26, 1962, folder 14, box 13, AC164, SMML/PU.
Confronting Sexual Harassment and Misconduct in SHAFR and the Profession

Kristin Hoganson


All conference registrants and new and renewing members must affirmatively agree to abide by this policy.

As part of the rollout of this policy, SHAFR President Barbara Keys consulted widely with other organizations about their experiences in enforcing codes of conduct, as a result of which she recommended, and Council approved, three actions for the 2019 conference. First, academia’s leading conference code consultant, Sherry Marts of S*Marts Consulting, was hired to advise on the handling of any reports that might come in during the conference. Second, a three person Conference Code of Conduct Task Force was established. Council member Kelly J. Shannon chaired the Task Force, which also consisted of Conference Committee member Aaron O’Connell and Graduate Student Committee member Ryan Musto. Varsha Venkatasubramaniam participated on the Task Force as a trainee, in preparation for serving on the Task Force as a Graduate Student Committee representative at the 2020 SHAFR conference in New Orleans. During the conference, Task Force members made themselves available to answer questions about the policy; receive and, if warranted, investigate complaints; describe reporting procedures and provide advice on resources; and discuss related issues. They also committed to checking the SHAFRConduct@gmail.com account once weekly for three months following the conference. As of the July Passport submission deadline, no complaints were received.

Third, SHAFR hired Sherry Marts to run a three-hour workshop for the Task Force and Council members before the conference. In addition to addressing response and reporting practices and procedures, Marts provided a briefing on harassment—defined as unwanted, unsolicited, and unwelcome behaviors—and some of its manifestations, ranging from sexual comments and pressure for sex to assault and rape. SHAFR is following her recommendations for organizational best practice: adopting a code of conduct, developing staff and member awareness of the issue, and devising reporting and enforcement mechanisms.

SHAFR members may wish to take note of Marts’ advice on “harassment resistance.” Without suggesting that the burden should be on the target—ideally, we want to stop harassment before it occurs—it can be useful to know how experts suggest that harassment can best be stopped in the moment. Mart recommends that the targeted person adopt a calm demeanor, serious face, and neutral body language. Holding eye contact, being polite (but not nice), and with no apologies, the target can tell the harasser: “You did /said this [summarize offense]. I don’t like it. Stop right now.” Mart recommends that the target continue to maintain eye contact and to repeat the statements “I don’t like it” and “Stop right now” if the harasser responds in a way that indicates that he/she did not get the message.

The bystander interventions recommended by Marts are situation dependent. They include addressing the harasser, offering assistance to the targeted person, and distracting the harasser or target (this may be especially effective in cases of inebriation). Bystanders may wish to speak out on how a remark or action affected them (rather than the target), as in: “that bothers me.” Bystanders may also wish to delegate the intervention to a bartender, manager, or other staff member.

To provide a forum for members to discuss the new policy and related issues and to follow through on the recommendation to develop awareness of sexual harassment and misconduct in professional settings, Barbara Keys commissioned me to organize and chair a conference panel on Confronting Sexual Misconduct in SHAFR and the Profession at the 2019 conference.

This panel was well attended, with roughly forty people present. Brian DeLay, the Co-Chair (with Julia Irwin) of the SHAFR Task Force on Conference Conduct that recommended the policy that was adopted, spoke on how the Task Force arrived at the policy. Laura Belmonte, who has served as an Associate Dean at Oklahoma State University, spoke on Title IX considerations. Barbara Molony, co-president of the Coordinating Council for Women in History, spoke on #MeToo in the historical profession, highlighting the damage done by sexual harassment and complicity and the intersectional nature of harassment. Christina Franzino, the Assistant Director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office at George Washington University, spoke on bystander interventions and responses. One of her main points—consistent with Marts’s counsel—was that an important form of bystander intervention is to create a positive organizational culture. This means speaking out against discriminatory, harassing, and other harmful statements even if there is no target present.

In the ensuing discussion, audience members asked for clarification on SHAFR policy. SHAFR will evaluate complaints with assistance from external experts and conduct investigations when warranted. The President, Vice President, Executive Director, and Conference Conduct Task Force members will have sole access to the unredacted report. If warranted, the harasser will be asked to leave the conference with no refund and will be excluded from other SHAFR activities such as workshops and committees.

Before this policy was formalized, SHAFR addressed one incident, as noted in then-president Peter Hahn’s Passport September 2019
October 6, 2018 email statement to members, subsequently printed in the January 2019 issue of Passport. This statement reported that SHAFR had concluded an independent, external investigation of events that occurred during its annual meeting in Philadelphia in 2018 and was treating the findings as confidential.

In keeping with the new policy, the SHAFR leadership would like to provide further clarification. The incident in question came to SHAFR's attention via a third party, not the alleged target, who did not bring forward a complaint. SHAFR hired an attorney who is trained in sexual harassment investigations to conduct a thorough investigation that included interviews with witnesses. This exhaustively and meticulously researched report concluded that SHAFR did not need to take further action in this case to uphold its commitment to providing a non-abusive and non-discriminatory professional space.

Members should be assured that the SHAFR leadership takes complaints seriously. SHAFR will take meaningful action if warranted. The Executive Director will provide an annual report to the membership on the number of complaints filed and outcomes. If any situation arises that warrants wider disclosure of investigation findings for health and safety reasons, the SHAFR officers and Conference Conduct Task Force members who have read the investigatory report will make that decision on a case-by-case basis. SHAFR may also choose on a case-by-case basis to share investigation findings with the home institution of the accused, whether to report misconduct or to provide clarification if an individual has reported on a SHAFR member to that member's institution, thereby prompting a Title IX or similar investigation. SHAFR did share the conclusions of the 2018 outside investigation with a Title IX officer.

As noted by Franzino in the panel on confronting sexual harassment and misconduct, outside of the official SHAFR response, targeted people and witnesses can register complaints by contacting the Title IX office of harassers employed in U.S. academic institutions. (Some other countries, among them Canada and the United Kingdom, also have institutional reporting channels). The topic of an appeals and reinstatement process arose in the course of the discussion, and Council will follow up on this.

Audience members expressed appreciation for the panel, with several urging SHAFR to hold follow-up anti-bias events. As planning begins for the 2020 SHAFR conference in New Orleans, we welcome these and other suggestions. Please email me, SHAFR President Barbara Keys, Task Force Chair Kelly Shannon, or SHAFR Executive Director Amy Sayward if you have questions or concerns.

SHAFR is happy to welcome the new editorial team for *Diplomatic History*:

**Anne Foster** of Indiana State University, Editor;

**Petra Goedde** of Temple University, Editor;

and

**Alan McPherson** of Temple University, Associate Editor
The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize Committee -- Jonathan Nashel (presenting), April Merleaux, and Erez Manela -- has awarded the 2019 prize to Jessica Levy for her dissertation “Black Power, Inc.: Global American Business and the Post-Apartheid City,” which she completed at Johns Hopkins University in 2018 under the direction of Professors Nathan Connolly and Angus Burgin. It is a path-breaking study that brings together international history, business history, and African-American history. Levy weaves these different historical methods into a dissertation on how the United States, and African-Americans, worked to abolish South Africa’s apartheid system. To an impressive extent, she links local histories with larger global struggles and does this all with unusual clarity and rigor. Her research in both U.S. and South African archives is comprehensive, especially her use of the records of NGOs in South Africa. By bringing the history of capitalism together with scholarship on the global black freedom movement, Levy is opening up new ways to conceive of U.S. foreign relations. Her dissertation focuses on Leon Sullivan, a prominent Philadelphia minister, and how his ideas on black entrepreneurship and on the “self-help” movement within the African-American community led to the adoption of the “Sullivan Principles” to guide multinational corporations in the fight against apartheid. Sullivan’s efforts were in turn adopted by Sam Motsuenyane’s National African Federated Chamber of Commerce to challenge the economic underpinnings of apartheid. Levy’s dissertation therefore internationalizes neo-liberal politics and history, while linking individuals with larger global histories. The committee was impressed with the way Levy developed this multi-faceted history into a sharply written piece of scholarship.

The Committee has also awarded honorable mention to Amanda Demmer’s “The Last Chapter of the Vietnam War: Normalization, Nongovernmental Actors, and the Politics of Human Rights, 1975-1995,” completed at the University of New Hampshire in 2017 under the direction of Kurk Dorsey. Demmer looks at how the Vietnam War, far from ending in April 1975, continued to influence U.S. politics and culture well into the 1990s. She deftly weaves foreign policy, immigration history, and non-state actors in ways that show the full complexity of this history. She argues that, at its core, the end of the Vietnam War was traumatic, but this history also involves recent Vietnamese immigrants coming to the U.S. and learning how to use the levers of power to achieve their political goals of recognition by both countries. Demmer carefully details how the issue of human rights linked in unexpected ways within this history as well. Her study challenges the reader to rethink how the Vietnam War continued to reverberate in U.S. politics and culture decades after its official end point. This study is a welcome addition to the literature on the Vietnam War and will serve as a new way for historians to think about the war and its aftermath.

The winner of the Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship is Ida Yalzadeh of Brown University (receiving the award from SHAFR President Barbara Keys to the left). Yalzadeh examines U.S. foreign relations through the lens of immigration history. Yalzadeh’s dissertation, “Solidarities and Solitude: Tracing the Racial Boundaries of the Iranian Diaspora,” explores the increasingly contentious relationship between the United States and Iran over six decades through its impact on Iranian-Americans. Beginning with the 1953 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh, Yalzadeh reveals how racial formation within the United States and Iranian strategies of belonging reflected the changing political relations between Washington and Tehran. From Cold War propaganda to Third World solidarity activism and domestic lobbying today, Yalzadeh interrogates notions of U.S. and Iranian exceptionalism, whiteness and brownness, and the implications of foreign policy on the lived experiences of Iranian-Americans. Her transnational study benefits from rich multilingual, multi-archival sources that intersect with and contribute to the historiography of U.S. foreign relations, immigration, and ethnic studies. This important and innovative study is a timely intervention that promises to enhance our understanding of the fraught relations between the United States and Iran as well as the contested nature of race, ethnicity, and identity.
The **Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize** Committee—Stephen Macekura, Tehila Sasson, and Daniel Bessner—is pleased to announce that **Alex (formerly Betsy) Beasley** (University of Texas, Austin) is this year’s recipient of the Bernath Article Prize. Their article, entitled “Service Learning: Oil, International Education, and Texas’s Corporate Cold War,” appeared in the April 2018 issue of *Diplomatic History*. In the article, Beasley argues the U.S. oil industry, led by a cohort of Houston-based companies, responded to decolonization and oilfield nationalization by restructuring its economic model. By shifting from oil extraction and production to the provision of expertise and services, Beasley shows how U.S.-based companies retained their powerful position in the industry even as the geopolitical context for their activities changed dramatically. Focusing on oil companies’ international education programs, Beasley blends a careful and nuanced study of cultural diplomacy, economic history, and political power to highlight how U.S. corporations evolved to suit the post-colonial era. The article contributes to the history of cultural diplomacy, business history, and twentieth-century global capitalism, demonstrating that an emphasis on local centers of global power—such as Cold War-era Houston—can offer fruitful insights into the broader history of the United States in the world.

**Megan Black** of the London School of Economics is this year’s recipient of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize for the best first book in the field, presented here by Emily Conroy-Krutz (chair) on behalf of the committee (which also includes Madeline Hsu and Ryan Irwin). In *The Global Interior: Mineral Frontiers and American Power* (Harvard University Press, 2018), Black draws connections between the continental expansion of the United State and the transition to projections of power and capitalism overseas. As she reveals, the competition for international mineral resources has been a major aspect of international relations. The Global Interior is a fascinating examination of how the U.S. Department of the Interior evolved as a bureaucracy from its origins in the nineteenth century. As the Department interpreted the scope and nature of its operations in a new century, Black reveals the many ways that its interests were not nearly so domestically-bound as its name suggested. Instead, the paired projects of conservation and the extraction of mineral resources brought the Department of the Interior out into the world and even into space. As Black explains, Interior became an important component of U.S. empire while also helping to obfuscate the very existence of that imperial presence. Black’s study is eye-opening on many fronts, directing attention to new aspects of U.S. ambitions and interventions overseas. Beautifully written and carefully argued, it is a book that scholars of American foreign relations will be reading for many years to come.

The **Robert H. Ferrell Prize** rewards distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined, for a book beyond the author’s first monograph. This year’s prize committee (David Painter (presenting the award below), Susan Carruthers, and James Goode) announced this year’s winner is **Sarah B. Snyder** for *From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy* (Columbia University Press, 2018). In this creatively conceptualized, deeply researched, carefully argued, and clearly written study, Snyder illuminates the impact of human rights activists on U.S. foreign policy from John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in 1961 to Jimmy Carter’s in 1977, a period she labels the “long 1960s.” Focusing on policy toward the Soviet Union, Southern Rhodesia, Greece, South Korea, and Chile, Snyder traces the growing impact of human rights concerns over time and over a diverse group of countries to demonstrate that human rights had become an important issue in U.S. foreign policy well before Carter arrived in Washington. Snyder carefully examines the motivations that led individual Americans to become concerned about human rights, reasons often connected to their struggles in the civil rights movement and/or service abroad, such as Peace Corps volunteers and missionaries. Viewing the United States from abroad provided a new perspective, which led them to conclude that in many cases U.S. foreign policy had lost its moral bearing. Unlike the 1980s when the Reagan administration sought to use human rights as a Cold War weapon, activists in the long 1960s looked at violations by U.S. allies as well as by adversaries. Snyder also makes clear the strengths and the limits of Congressional influence on foreign policy, a very important, but often neglected, issue. The results of her research should inspire historians to consult the widely dispersed but very valuable papers of members of Congress. In addition, her extensive notes demonstrate her mastery of the primary and secondary sources. In short, *From Selma to Moscow* provides a model of how to address a complex but vitaly important topic.
The Robert H. Ferrell Prize Committee also awarded Honorable Mention to David C. Engerman for his book The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union sought to utilize development aid as a tool to advance their interests in what was then called the Third World. India was at the center of this economic Cold War. Some scholars argue that India and other developing countries benefitted from this Cold War competition, because it allowed them to gain more aid by playing the superpowers against each other. In his sweeping study of the political economy of U.S. and Soviet aid to India from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, Engerman shows that the reality was much more complicated. Drawing on research in archives in seven countries—including extensive research in U.S., Soviet, and Indian records—and mastery of a wide range of secondary sources, Engerman examines how different factions in the Indian government sought external aid to further their own development priorities. Planners who favored state-led industrialization and a strong public sector looked to the Soviet Union for assistance; officials who wanted to promote the private sector and free markets favored integration into the global economy and looked to the United States. Rather than benefiting India, the Cold War reinforced rivalries within the government, distorted national development by leading officials to focus on projects and plans that would appeal to foreign donors, and left India burdened with a huge foreign debt. A path-breaking study, The Price of Aid illuminates a neglected aspect of the international history of the postwar world.

The Peter L. Hahn SHAFR Distinguished Service Award recognizes a senior historian who, over a career, has shown a deep commitment to the growth and development of our organization. The award committee (Thomas Zeller [chair], Mary Dudziak [presenting], and Lloyd Gardner) selected Professor Emeritus Richard Immerman of Temple University as the 2019 recipient. While all of the nominees were, in the words of committee member Mary Dudziak, “amazingly impressive,” one of Richard’s nominators convincingly summed up his contributions by stating that “few people have done more to support SHAFR in about every way possible over the course of the organization’s existence.” Over his four decades as a SHAFR member, Richard equaled his prominence in research and teaching with his devotion to service. Richard has served in nearly every governing role in SHAFR – the Program Committee, the Diplomatic History editorial board, book and article prize committees, Council, and as the organization’s 40th president. He built SHAFR into a top-tier influence in scholarship, teaching, and service across our own our field, making us the envy of the historical profession itself. As president, he helped expand and diversify our membership by race, gender, geography, and methodology, including the creation of what has now become the standing Committee on Women in SHAFR. As president, director of the endowment, and a strategic planner on the Ways and Means Committee, Richard also orchestrated funding arrangements that enriched SHAFR on a permanent basis. He was instrumental in negotiating contracts for the journal, Diplomatic History, that provided the financial foundation for many of SHAFR’s activities today. These accomplishments arose in an era when the profession and our field were transforming, and when academia felt the pinch of funding reductions. That Richard saw us through these changes, and SHAFR actually grew, is a major feat.

But even from this top echelon, Richard continued to give advice to every SHAFR member—young and veteran, student and faculty—and he still does from retirement! He was, and is, a tireless advocate for us, a leader who builds bridges to SHAFR members in myriad ways. Such informal advice speaks to his wisdom and generosity. Younger scholars note how Richard encouraged them to participate in SHAFR; he has mentored many of them into key positions. The entire field is also indebted to Richard for his work on declassification, as Award Committee member Lloyd Gardner notes, whether as head of the SHAFR Historical Documentation Committee or as the esteemed, long-serving chair (since 2010) of the Historical Advisory Committee at the Department of State. It should be noted that he still serves as Chair, even though he retired a few years ago.

Richard has helped make SHAFR the vibrant and important organization it is today. As one nominator declared, everything he touched turned to gold—and he touched everything! He’s been the face of the organization and “remains its heart and soul.” It is an honor to name Richard Immerman the recipient of the Peter L. Hahn SHAFR Distinguished Service Award for his lifetime of commitment and leadership to our organization.
The 2018 Norman and Laura Graebner Award for Lifetime Achievement, (presented here by committee chair Edward Miller on behalf of the committee that also included Kristin Hoganson and Lien-Hang Nguyen), goes to Emily S. Rosenberg, Professor Emerita of the University of California at Irvine (and formerly of Macalester College). By any measure, Professor Rosenberg’s career as a scholar and leader in the field of U.S. foreign relations is extraordinary. She is the author, co-author, or editor of more than a dozen books; she has also published more than seventy articles, essays, and scholarly introductions/prefaces. Yet even more remarkable than the quantity of the scholarship she has produced is the deep and enduring impact of the arguments and interventions presented in her work. Indeed, Professor Rosenberg’s scholarly work is notable not merely because it has been widely read and acclaimed by her peers, but because it has sparked and shaped some of the most consequential intellectual developments in the study of U.S. foreign relations over the past forty years. As several of Professor Rosenberg’s nominators observed, her path-breaking 1982 book, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945, was one of the first to apply cultural theory and cultural studies to the study of U.S. foreign relations. The nominators also highlighted her 1990 essay on gender in the Journal of American History and her “Walking the Borders” article in Diplomatic History the same year; these are now widely viewed as foundational texts that both anticipated and inspired the “cultural turn” that has defined and informed so much of the work in our field since the 1990s. More generally, Professor Rosenberg has frequently borrowed and applied theoretical and methodological tools from anthropology, literary studies, and gender and sexuality studies; by leveraging these tools from other disciplines, her work has opened new interpretive approaches to the study of race, masculinity, biopower, religion, and consumer culture in the study of U.S. foreign relations. At the same time, Professor Rosenberg’s work has consistently offered refreshingly new perspectives on some traditional diplomatic history topics, such as U.S. economic diplomacy. Indeed, her sustained attention to economics, trade, and the ideology of “liberal-developmentalism” as a feature of twentieth-century capitalism shows that she was one of the first scholars to explore the history of globalization—and indeed, that she was doing so even before that term was coined.

In addition to her scholarly achievements, Professor Rosenberg is also a remarkably accomplished teacher and mentor. At Macalester College, where she taught for more than three decades, she won the Burlington Northern Foundation’s Award for outstanding teaching; the Thomas Jefferson Award for outstanding teaching, scholarship and service; and the Outstanding Faculty Award from Macalester’s Alumni of Color. She continued this pattern after moving to the University of California, Irvine, where she was named Professor of the Year in 2010. Yet her contributions in the area of teaching have stretched far beyond her classrooms at her home institutions. Professor Rosenberg is the co-author of several highly-regarded U.S. history textbooks that have won praise for their contributions to the internationalization of U.S. history curricula. Her monograph A Date which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory has been adopted in undergraduate and graduate courses across the United States and elsewhere. She is also a leading participant in the Teaching American History workshop series at UC Irvine that collaborates with K-12 teachers in Southern California. Perhaps her greatest achievements as a teacher stem from her mentorship of graduate students and junior scholars, a practice she began at Macalester but expanded after moving to UC Irvine in 2006. The letters the committee received are filled with testimony about the invaluable guidance and encouragement that Professor Rosenberg has supplied over the years to her younger colleagues, both men and women, as they have forged their own careers.

In the area of service to the profession, Professor Rosenberg’s contributions are aptly described as “heroic” and “extensive.” She has served on boards and committees for the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians as well as serving as a member of the U.S. State Department’s Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation. She joined the editorial boards of some of the best-known journals in the field, including The American Historical Review, Diplomatic History, The Journal of American History, and Reviews in American History. She is a co-editor of the much-lauded Duke University Press series “American Encounters/Global Interactions,” which she has used to promote the work of other scholars who have followed her with their own contributions to the “cultural turn.” Last and most important, she has been a tireless leader and advocate for SHAFR, having served as its president in 1997 (when she became just the second woman to head the organization) and headed countless committees, councils, boards, conference panels, and roundtables on behalf of our organization and its work.

In recognition of this extraordinary career of leadership in scholarship, teaching, and service, our committee is pleased and honored to name Professor Emily S. Rosenberg as the winner of the 2018 Norman and Laura Graebner Award for lifetime achievement. We note that Professor Rosenberg is the first woman to receive this award—a fitting distinction for a scholar who has mentored and inspired many of the other women who have built successful careers in our field in recent decades.
I am currently assistant professor of History at the George Washington University in the nation’s capital. I was born and raised in Chicago, just a block away from my grandfather, Frank Brady. Grandpa taught me two things that have shaped my life. One is a love for the Chicago Cubs, and the other is a fascination with history. A veteran of the Great War, he regaled me with stories of his experiences in France. In college at Roosevelt University, I washed out as a music student, and chose to major in philosophy. But I took a diplomatic history course with Daniel Headrick, due to my desire to figure out why there was a First World War in the first place. I still haven’t answered that question to my satisfaction. But I was hooked on the field after that. In graduate school at the University of Notre Dame, I knew that I wanted to do something that combined US and European diplomatic history, and my advisor, Wilson D. (Bill) Miscamble directed my dissertation on US-West German relations in the 1950s.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum often)?
My favorite TV shows are, in no particular order: Game of Thrones, Curb Your Enthusiasm, and the Venture Brothers.
The movies that I keep coming back to: Apocalypse Now, Seven Samurai, Dr. Strangelove (of course), Das Boot, and The Lives of Others.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?
My most nerve-wracking moment wasn’t actually a moment, but a full day: My first job interview. I recall walking to the building in which the History Department was located and asking myself: “What am I doing?”

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
Three historical figures? The first would be Toussaint Louverture. Ever since researching his life for my current book, I have become borderline obsessed with this amazing character.
I’d like to actually meet someone about whom I research and write, so either Konrad Adenauer or Jack Pershing should be at the table.
I’d round off my company with one of my two favorite composers: Either Beethoven or Stravinsky would provide me with some culture.

Although I wasn’t asked, there are some living figures with whom I’d like to break bread. Leading off that list would be Angela Merkel and Pope Francis.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
Let me begin by making this perfectly clear: I would like to win $500 million. I would certainly set things up so that my three children--Will, Matt, and Lydia--would be able to continue their educations. I would also give a chunk of it to my undergraduate institution, Roosevelt University in Chicago, which gave me the full ride that allowed a wallpaper salesman’s son to go to college. Finally, I would buy a small apartment in Paris for my partner, Monica. It is her favorite place on earth.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
Oddly enough, if I had a time machine and an unlimited budget, that is precisely what I would do with it. My ideal concert would begin with The Clash—for my money, the best punk band ever. We would then move on to Nirvana, the most important of the post-punk bands, and icons of my generation. Confusing the audience, The Mahavishnu Orchestra would then bring on their high-energy Fusion, with the lineup that recorded the first three of their albums. I’d then introduce Miles Davis with the “Jack Johnson”-era band. I’d round out the show with a performance by The Pixies.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?
I will some day have a pet monitor lizard. I plan on learning some of the more challenging pieces by Bach on the guitar, as well as taking lessons on the Renaissance lute. (So I’ll need a lute.) I very much want to visit Dakar. And, finally, I have four more books that I want to write.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
My dream “job” would be composing Classical music. But, as I said, I washed out of music my first year of college. Only slightly more realistically, I would have liked to be a paleozoologist. I never outgrew my childhood fascination with prehistoric animals, fossils, and evolution.

Steve Brady
When I started university at age seventeen, I thought I knew what it meant to be successful: become a doctor or a lawyer. Starting down that path, I felt uninspired in large biology lectures, and labs that replicated things that had been done a million times before. Luckily, I was enrolled in History courses to fill gaps in my schedule. Initially, I had a sense that history was something to be learned rather than created, that even as an undergrad I could do original research was incredibly empowering. My academic research examines how moments of crisis and war impact global geopolitics and security, and the ways in which these crises are communicated to and experienced by local populations – particularly on the periphery of empires. My current book project, Star Spangled Ice: FDR, Global Security, and the Polar Regions, explores how, when, and why the United States became a Super Power, through the lens of the Arctic and Antarctic. For the past five years I have been supporting the identification efforts of the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA). As the DPRK disinterment expert, I co-authored a plan to disinter more than 650 Korean War Unknowns from the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, so that they can be identified and returned to their families. Currently, I am assisting with the development of the DPAA’s Research Partnership Program. Far from the Polar Regions, I now reside on the island of Oahu with my (slightly insane) 98lb chocolate lab.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum often)?
I love BBC documentaries. A highlight of my professional career was working as an associate producer on one of these programs. I also love a well-crafted detective mystery, but I don’t like violence, horror, or action movies. I am more interested in people and how they think and interact, which is probably why I enjoy Survivor and The Amazing Race. My favourite movies tend to be nostalgic and somewhat camp: Romy and Michele’s High School Reunion, Labyrinth, Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, The Princess Bride, Drop Dead Gorgeous, and The Wedding Singer, to name a few.

2. What is your most embarrassing/nervewracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?
My most anxiety-producing professional moments center around decisions regarding my career trajectory. I had an extremely hard time deciding where to pursue a doctorate. I was lucky enough to get a scholarship from the Canadian government that would have made it much more financially sound to stay in my home country. When I was accepted to Oxford, my dream school with my dream advisor, I was paralyzed by indecision. Up to that point, I had paid for the majority of my education on my own by working multiple concurrent jobs. The idea of being able to dedicate myself to research without having to worry about money had a huge appeal, but diplomatic/military history was extremely out of fashion in Canada at the time. I felt I would have more freedom at Oxford to do the kind of research I wanted to do, even if going there meant greater financial insecurity. Similarly, when I completed my doctorate I was offered a fellowship at the DPAA. I was given advice that accepting the position would be career ending, and I was conflicted about leaving a place I loved for a non-traditional post. Working on a military base was a bit of culture shock, but the historical research I conducted at DPAA has been uniquely rewarding. My research has directly led to the disinterment and identification of the remains of a number of Unknown service members from WWII and the Korean War.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
The historical figures I am most interested in, like Franklin D. Roosevelt, are notoriously enigmatic, and would not likely be candid conversationalists in a group of strangers at a dinner. Rather than invite historical figures, I would prefer to invite historians to dinner. I have been extremely lucky to have had some wonderful mentors and friends throughout my career, but given my research interests and educational history, none of them attend the same conferences, or even live in the same country. It would be wonderful to have the opportunity to have dinner with three of them together, to thank them for all of their personal and professional encouragement over the years.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
There has been a steep decline in history majors since the financial crisis. While I was doing my post-doc at Cornell, a number of students told me their parents wouldn’t let them study history (one was studying finance with the hope he would eventually make enough money to go back to school to study history or philosophy). In the United States, there is a common refrain that you can’t get a job with a history degree. There are very few places in American media where trained historians are visible/represented, and historical programming is non-existent or limited (The History Channel needs more actual history – and don’t get me started on Ancient Aliens). In general, there is just a basic misunderstanding of what the study of history entails and how important it is to all aspects of society. With these concerns in mind, I would use the money to establish a foundation for the promotion of history. It would include a scholarship branch that would offer students the opportunity to study history without concern for funding; an internship program that would place historians in businesses; and a media production branch that would produce excellent, well-informed historical programming for the general public. If someone gets around to that plan before I win the Powerball, my alternative plan relates to health care affordability and access. I was born with a bilateral cleft lip and palate, and have a number of serious health issues. As a result, I had many surgeries, and I was hospitalized numerous times during my undergraduate and graduate degrees. I will be eternally grateful to the Canadian Health Care System and the NHS for the care I was provided. I find discussions around health care in the U.S. extremely challenging; I have friends who have more than $100,000 in medical bills alone; and have personally made decisions in my career based on the availability of health insurance. Anything I could do to mitigate that pressure for other people would be a great way to spend the Powerball.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
Music festivals are my nightmare – too many people, in direct sun, with porta-potties, but an imaginary festival with indoor plumbing featuring Simon and Garfunkel, Cat Stevens, the Cranberries, Tori Amos, Death Cab For Cutie, Erasure, and a young Kate Bush would be amazing, or a Euro-Dance party headlined by Alzacar from the early 2000s.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?
See responses 3 & 4, finish my book, make a movie about it, and visit Antarctica.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
Working in health care policy, documentary production, or in politics (there’s still time).

Dawn Berry
1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

Heathers, Varsity Blues, Grand Budapest Hotel, MI-5 (Spooks in the UK), Downtown Abbey, any Agatha Christie

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

I practiced my very first conference paper during my PhD several times, and every time it clocked 19.5 minutes -- spot on for a 20-minute presentation slot. When I actually gave the paper, it only took me 14.5 minutes. I’m a bit of a fast talker in general, and especially when I’m nervous.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Queen Elizabeth I, Princess Grace of Monaco, and Arnold Lunn

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Travel around the world and have amazing seats for the entirety of the Olympics every two years and for other sporting events

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Tori Amos, Joss Stone, Matt Nathanson, Matt Wertz, Madonna (1980s through early 2000s), G. Love and Special Sauce, Mika, James Taylor, Billy Joel

6. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

Working in the sport industry
I’m an Associate Professor of American History at the University of Leicester where I have worked since 2005. My last book was Against Immediate Evil (Cornell, 2014) and my last edited book (with Andrew Priest) was US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Candidates, Campaigns, and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton (Kentucky, 2017).

I liked history at school and decided to do a History degree after doing an in-depth final year project on Watergate, which sparked an interest in American history that has never gone away. The fact I lived in the US as a child meant I already had a connection to all things American. I did as much American history as I could as an undergraduate at Liverpool before going on to postgraduate study at Birmingham. I first joined SHAFR in 2001 as a PhD student, when I came over for my first conference at American University. Aside from history, I love music (little of it cool – see below) and play the drums to a mediocre level. I also play rugby union, and intend to do so for as long as my body allows. I live in Leicester with my wife, Zoe, and our cat, Chocolate.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?
   Where to start? For TV, I’ll go with five comedies from both sides of the Atlantic: 30 Rock, I’m Alan Partridge, Blackadder, The Thick of It, and Veep. For films, I have a soft spot for 70s conspiracy thrillers including All the President’s Men, The Parallax View, Three Days of the Condor, and The Conversation. And Blazing Saddles, obviously.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?
   Aside from job interviews, the first conference paper I gave at SHAFR in 2001 has to be one of the most nerve-wracking. I think I got one simple question, and my initial response was relief that no one decided to tear my paper to shreds. Yet looking back, the paper was so narrow and detailed that no one really cared. I quickly realised that it is better to get tough questions than none at all.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
   I have to say Franklin Roosevelt, even though I fear he would be hugely disappointing – Eleanor would probably be less evasive and far more revealing. I would have to ask American Association for the United Nations director Clark Eichelberger, mainly so he could tell me how much I have written about him is wrong. And finally Edward Bernays, so he can help me with my next project.

4. What would you do if you won the 500 million Powerball?
   I would start with the practical stuff—pay off my mortgage and ensure my family and friends do not need to worry too much about money ever again. I would give a large sum to my old school, which has struggled in recent years to the point there was a TV documentary about its troubles. Then maybe I would create a foundation to support research in the arts and humanities. I might even win a grant from myself.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
   This line-up reflects the fact that my musical taste was fixed as a kid in early 1980s Colorado. All acts have been picked up in the time machine from 1982 unless otherwise stated. Day One: Daryl Hall and John Oates/Prince/Michael McDonald/Todd Rundgren. Day Two: Kiss (1978)/Journey/Toto/Foreigner. Day Three: Bruce Springsteen/Fleetwood Mac (1979)/Steely Dan (1977)/Chicago (1972).

6. What are five things on your bucket list?
   I don’t really have one, not one with vaguely realistic ambitions anyway. I was thinking about this recently and struggled to come up with much, and I’m not doing much better now. This is probably a combination of my relative happiness and a disturbing lack of adventure.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
   I would probably be a school teacher. I have a huge amount of respect for them. I am extremely lucky to be able to teach aspects of history that I am interested in to students who want to learn about it. Maybe I would still work for the bank where I worked in the year before going on to postgraduate study. Alternatively, a number of people have suggested I should go into broadcasting because I have a voice for radio. Or maybe they said a face for radio.
I am a doctoral candidate at Indiana University studying twentieth century United States history. My research focuses on American psychological warfare during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. I am particularly interested in the way both civilian and military ideas influenced psychological operations, from advertising executives offering to work on psychological strategy to the PSYOP unit newsletters created by soldiers for soldiers. My undergraduate work was in journalism at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. After a stint as an editor for a trade publisher and then a medical journal, I started my graduate work in history. Rather than editing others’ research, I wanted to pursue research myself and explore the questions that most intrigued me. When I’m not working on my dissertation, I’m often walking my dog on one of the many trails around Bloomington or herding my cat away from my knitting.

1. Favorite movies and TV shows?
I probably watch too much TV, so I have favorites in different genres. I love a good mystery and one of my favorites is Miss Fisher’s Murder Mysteries. Perhaps this is biased as I now live in Indiana, but Parks and Recreation is one of my favorite comedies. For movies, I return to some of the same movies all the time and my go-to movie when I need a pick me up is The Princess Bride. I also have a special love for low-budget sci-fi movies and grew up watching SyFy originals with my mom.

2. Embarrassing/anxiety producing moment
I presented a paper at IU as part of a graduate conference when I was in my second year. I was extremely nervous and when I got up to speak, I pulled up my PowerPoint and began. My PowerPoint only had material for the second half of my talk, so I just left the title screen up for the first 5 to 7 minutes of the talk before advancing to material I referenced late in my paper. My friends told me they thought I had panicked and just forgotten about my PowerPoint. Now I know to always have slides for the whole presentation or to go without a PowerPoint!

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
For personal scholastic knowledge, I would love to sit down with some of the figures I write about to learn more about them and their decision making. For pure curiosity, I would want to meet figures from earlier periods than I study. And I would want to invite a figure who had a major fascination for me when I was first learning local history in middle school. It might make an odd dinner table, but I would invite people like Lyndon Johnson, Queen Elizabeth I, and Huey Long.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
I can’t really imagine what that amount of money means and allows but I would use a portion to provide for my family, a portion to support the many local public libraries I’ve used throughout my life, and a portion to fund student scholarships. I have benefitted from scholarship funds at every level of higher education and I want to make those same opportunities open to more people. And I cannot calculate the amount I have benefitted from local libraries throughout my life.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
This is difficult to decide and I am most definitely biased to music from the 1960s and 1970s because of how much I use it when I teach about the Vietnam War. I would try to get some of the major acts I would like to experience live, so I would invite groups like the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Creedence Clearwater Revival, and the Jimi Hendrix Experience.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?
I do not have a real bucket list, so I don’t have a quick five-item answer. Some of my hopes for the future include touring the national parks in the US southwest, visiting Vietnam, and gaining true fluency in several languages.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
Hopefully, I would be working in a bakery. I love baking and almost always have something freshly baked in the house from bread to cookies. More likely I would be editing, but baking is a major passion.

Katy Doll
Far fewer historians of U.S. foreign relations than should will read Keren Yarhi-Milo’s Who Fights for Reputation: The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict. To begin with, political scientists and international relations theorists remain at the periphery of SHAFR, our guild, and Yarhi-Milo fits squarely into that category. Her previous book, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations, drew on prodigious research, including archival research, to address one of our most fundamental questions: How do states infer another state’s goals and estimate its behavior? It was a superb book, and it won multiple prizes. Nevertheless, it is the rare SHAFR member who has read it.

I fear that the title of Yarhi-Milo’s new book will be even more off-putting. Bob McMahon in 1991 presented an enthusiastically received Bernath Lecture on credibility or “fighting for face” (2). Further, I know first-hand how skeptical historians are of scholarly efforts to penetrate the psychology of leaders.  

I can only hope, therefore, that this review will encourage some among Passport’s audience to read something that differs from their normal fare. As she did in Knowing the Adversary, Yarhi-Milo devotes the early chapters of her new book to articulating her theoretical contribution, which is standard operating procedure for political scientists. She situates that contribution within a framework of complementary and competing theories and walks the reader through her methodologies. This discourse is dense and can seem overwhelming (a problem exacerbated by the typeface’s small font). But Yarhi-Milo’s exposition is succinct and clear, her notes are thorough and exceptionally informative, and even her graphics and quantitative analyses are intelligible. The results of the cross-national survey experiments that she conducted with Joshua Kertzer in the United States and Israel, countries with dramatically different security environments, are so similar that they instill in the reader confidence in her theory. Her selection of case studies—one on Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton—is illuminating: they offer grist for any good historian’s mill.

Yarhi-Milo identifies “self-monitoring” as the attribute of a leader that is most influential in governing the impulse to resort to military force in order defend his or her reputation, above all the reputation for resolve in crisis situations. She claims that because self-monitoring is a personality trait that emerges in childhood (whether it is genetically or environmentally dependent seems an open question), and because it is manifested in ways that are observable, it is a valuable tool for assessing candidates for political leadership. It is also valuable for a leader’s opponents, who must decide whether or not to initiate a challenge.

These predictive dimensions to Yarhi-Milo’s theory are problematic. For example, she draws on data produced by a survey of sixty-eight “presidential historians” to measure where to place Presidents Truman through Bush ‘43 on the self-monitoring spectrum. But we historians know how unreliable such surveys are, particularly when assessing a president whose archives, including pre-presidential archives, remain only partially accessible. And even if the survey results are compelling (Clinton edges out Johnson as the highest self-monitor; Carter edges out Ford as the lowest), they are retrospective, reflecting the president’s history. Most candidates lack such a history, and many opponents are insufficiently expert in their adversaries’ histories. One can only speculate what the American public or Iraq’s Saddam Hussein would have predicted about George W. Bush up until fall 2001. Even now Yarhi can only classify ‘43 “in an intermediary category between high and low” (74).

Yet Yarhi-Milo’s argument that in decisions about war and peace individual leaders matter and that a leader’s personality can be decisive in the choices she or he makes is to me incontestable. And the evidence that she presents on the causal relationship between self-monitoring level and international behavior, especially during a crisis, is persuasive. Concern for one’s reputation for resolve can, and perhaps always will, shape that behavior. The trick is to determine how, and how much. I find unconvincing the claim, and Yarhi-Milo cites only Thomas Schelling for support, that reputation is, in a normative sense, of greater strategic value than territory in international relations, and that during the Cold War the United States defended Berlin and committed military forces to Korea primarily to save face.

But criticizing Schelling (and by extension Yarhi-Milo) for minimizing threat perception, security concerns, economic interests, and more (in her case studies Yarhi-Milo does compare the explanatory power of reputation with other considerations) does not mean that we historians should not take close account of a leader’s effort to project, or, in IR jargon, signal, his or her willingness to accept the risks—and costs—of holding firm in the decision-making calculus. The question is why certain leaders are willing to accept greater risks and pay greater costs to build, reinforce, or confirm their reputations than others, and what explains the distinctions. Thus psychology is vital to Yarhi-Milo’s project. After all, one leader’s beliefs about another’s (or several others’) are as integral to the outcomes of his or her choices as are his or her own personality and beliefs.

Most of us, regardless of how well-read we are in psychology, will highlight familiar personal attributes to explain differences in the priority leaders place on their reputations: how comfortable they are in their skin, their insecurities, the success and reputation they brought with them to office, their emotional intelligence, etc. The contrast between Eisenhower and Nixon, or even Eisenhower and Truman, comes immediately to my mind. Yarhi-Milo appreciates such variables in a leader’s personal equation, but she moves a step beyond them. She focuses on leaders’ inclinations to modify their behavior for the purpose of projecting an image intended to enhance their reputations,
which she ties to status. These leaders are “high” self-monitors, and she argues that they, as opposed to low self-monitors, are particularly attentive to cultivating a reputation for resolve among both allies and adversaries in the context of international relations. That is because in international relations, status increases commensurately with a reputation for holding firm as opposed to compromising. To resurrect an old cigarette commercial, these leaders, doves as well as hawks, would rather fight than switch. And to do so they will employ military instruments. The implications of her theory are significant: a high self-monitor dove is more prone to resort to force in an international crisis than a low-self-monitor hawk, although the high self-monitor dove will also probably try another coercive measure first, such as the imposition of economic sanctions. As for the high self-monitor hawk (while reading this book I tried not to think about Donald Trump but failed)—beware.

Like all good political scientists, Yarhi-Milo methodically defines self-monitoring, explains how she evaluates the trait, and, warning that her “theory should be taken as probabilistic rather than deterministic,” theorizes about the causal links between self-monitoring dispositions and reputations for resolve (269). Also as is common among political scientists, she develops a typology for leaders’ propensity to employ military instruments to bolster their reputations: crusaders, believers, skeptics, and critics. Many historians will slog through this discussion. Once Yarhi-Milo starts to test her hypotheses empirically and qualitatively, however, the subject matter becomes more recognizable and, frankly, more absorbing. Who Fights for Reputation devotes a chapter each to Carter, Reagan, and Clinton. Yarhi-Milo selected these three post-World War II presidents because not only do they represent virtually the entire spectrum of self-monitoring dispositions, but they also vary significantly in levels of hawkishness (the correlation between self-monitoring disposition and beliefs about the utility of military force is pivotal to the theory). Carter is virtually an ideal low-monitor dove (a reputation critic); Reagan nearly an ideal high-monitor hawk (reputation crusader), and Clinton nearly an ideal high-monitor dove (reputation believer). Absent from these exemplars is a low-monitor hawk (reputation skeptic), but the only president who seems to fit that category was Gerald Ford. And Ford’s tenure in office was too brief and too accidental to serve adequately as a case. (Yarhi-Milo does factor another reputation skeptic, Caspar Weinberger, into her chapter on Reagan.)

Suffice it to say, all three of the presidents whom Yarhi-Milo explores in depth confronted the severe international crises required to test her theory. For Carter, she uses Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia (supported by the Soviets and Cubans), the “discovery” of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan is also featured in the chapter on Reagan, along with the intervention in Lebanon, the invasion of Grenada, and the bombing of Libya. The illustrative crises in the Clinton chapter are the Black Hawk Down episode in Somalia, the “Uphold Democracy” military operation in Haiti that followed the retreat of the USS Harlan County, and the deployment of the USS Independence and USS Nimitz battle groups to the Taiwan Strait, described as “one of the clearest examples of military signaling in modern American history” (258).

I need not retell the stories of these crises. Most Passport readers will be familiar with at least their outlines, and if not, there’s no reason to spoil the fun. I must make explicit, though, that without exception the cases provide robust support for the theory. Why Yarhi-Milo omitted the Iran hostage crisis and the Balkans remains unclear. The reason can’t be the lack of sources. In large part because few volumes from the Foreign Relations of the United States Reagan subseries have been published, and none from the Clinton subseries, the sources for the Reagan and Clinton chapters are relatively thin for all the crises. For this reason she concedes that some of her judgments are “tentative” (230). She likewise concedes, notwithstanding her acknowledgment of how Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski pulled Carter in different directions and George Schultz and Weinberger did the same for Reagan, that more work incorporating advisors is essential. Still, I doubt that dissecting Iran and the Balkans, the release of new archives, and diving deeper into the decision-making apparatus will substantially undermine the evidence Yarhi-Milo presents and the arguments she draws from it.

Further, even if the reader is skeptical about the boxes into which Yarhi-Milo fits these presidents, or for that matter about the history she presents, her theory has inherent value. This is particularly true during an age when historians have increasingly come to distinguish between “wars of choice” and “wars of necessity.” Systemic and societal forces certainly play a role in these decisions. Ultimately, nevertheless, the individual, to borrow a word from George W. Bush, is the decider.

Notes:
1. Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions (Princeton, NJ, 2014).


W. Taylor Fain

In Persian Gulf Command, Ashley Jackson presents an evocative, ambitious, and thorough account of the Second World War in the heart of the Middle East. It is his intention, Jackson writes, to employ “numerous different disciplines and fields of expertise, including international politics, the national and local politics of Iran and Iraq, diplomatic, imperial and military history, and more general history, social and economic” (ix). It is a tall order and, to a large degree, Jackson is successful in his task.

This is, perhaps, surprising, as Jackson, a leading historian of the British Empire in World War II, practices military and diplomatic history of a very traditional kind. The reader will not find in these pages analyses of the Middle Eastern “other” in the eye of Western policymakers. Nor does Jackson contemplate the gendered nature of Western perceptions of Middle Eastern peoples and cultures. Women are few and far between in his account, although the English travel writer Freya Stark, employed in the Public Relations Section of the Baghdad embassy, and Hermione, Countess of Ranfurly, attached to the staff of Britain’s Persia and Iraq Command, appear from time to time to offer perceptive observations of life and work in the region. It is in the details of imperial defense and logistics that Jackson excels. In Persian Gulf Command he undertakes to explain how “prosaic matters such as railway rolling stock and desert supply dumps were crucial cogs that kept the wheels of imperial [and Allied] defence turning. Often overlooked, logistical preparations and advanced planning for the movement of military resources around the world and the sustenance of forces in distant theaters were the indispensable handmaidens of successful strategy” (29–30). With his meticulous descriptions of what it takes to run a
war, Jackson affirms the maxim that amateurs talk strategy, while professionals study logistics.

As Jackson explains in his even more recent study of Africa and the Indian Ocean during the conflict, he is concerned principally with the “global deployments, the humdrum tasks, and the infrastructural developments in little-known places that comprised the war experiences of thousands of men and women, occurring in theaters of conflict . . . that are less trodden in the histories of the Second World War.” One is tempted to label these backwaters of conflict . . . that are less trodden in the histories of the Second of thousands of men and women, occurring in theaters of little-known places that comprised the war experiences humdrum tasks, and the infrastructural developments in concerned principally with the “global deployments, the communication through the region. He adeptly assesses the war’s initial phases, when it was uncertain whether Germany or the Soviet Union posed the more immediate threat to Iraq and Iran. Building on the work of Daniel Silverfarb, Jackson neatly captures the 1941 coup in Baghdad by German sympathizer Rashid Ali-Gailani, the Iraqi siege of the RAF base at Habbaniya, and the subsequent British military campaign to re-establish apliant government in Iraq. He adroitly limns the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran later that summer, the ouster of Reza Shah, and the Allied occupation of the country—events of great consequence for postwar U.S. and British policies in the country.

A particular strength of Jackson’s study is his treatment of the propaganda and intelligence wars in wartime Iraq and Iran. We learn, for example, the extent to which Nazi Germany actively courted nationalist sentiment in both countries, deploying agents to coordinate fifth columnist activities, incite anti-British fervor, and encourage sympathy for Germany and its regional goals. Jackson writes that Germany’s central message was that “it was the friend of all those opposing colonialism and imperialism, and the scourge of the Jews” (7). We learn how Germany made use of Rashid Ali, now in exile, and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem to amplify their propaganda. We see German agents working in Iran to incite the volatile Qashqai and Bakhtiari tribes against the British-sponsored government. Likewise, Jackson describes in fascinating detail the activities of British intelligence to counter Axis propaganda, win local support, and roll up German spy networks in both Iraq and Iran.

Persian Gulf Command also gives us a sensitive treatment of life during wartime for Iraqi and Iranian civilians, who endured the privations, inconveniences, and indignities of the Allied occupation. Jackson explains that the war brought cash and jobs, but it also resulted in shortages, inflation, and a generally deteriorating quality of life for locals. Iranians and Iraqis resented the presence of U.S. and British troops on their soil, and tensions between them were common. For their part, U.S. and British personnel endured the extremes of the Middle East’s climate and the tedium of deployment to a remote theater of the conflict. U.S. troops serving in the Army’s Persian Gulf Command joked that their command’s initials stood for “People Going Crazy” and referred to themselves as the “FBI, the Forgotten Bastards of Iran.

Historians of American foreign relations will find Jackson’s later chapters of particular value. He is adroit in his depiction of U.S. and British efforts to make Iran a hub of Allied supply efforts. With the Axis threat to the region receding, U.S. and British officials set about the task of making Iran the principal conduit for U.S. Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union. Establishing the “Persian Corridor” was a daunting task logistically and physically. Jackson reminds us that Iran was larger than Britain, France, Germany, and Spain combined, while Iraq was almost as large as Germany. In Iran, U.S. personnel encountered “rain, snowdrifts, dust storms, and temperatures ranging from -25 to 120 degrees Fahrenheit” (300). Despite these conditions, Jackson writes, the British Persia and Iraq Command and the U.S. Persian Gulf Command “achieved extraordinary feats of construction, transport and delivery” (296).

Jackson is also quite good at describing the mounting inter-Allied tensions in the Middle East during 1944 and 1945. He notes that “while the region became a unique arena of Allied cooperation, it simultaneously became a debut stage for the Cold War and a point of contention between competing Anglo-American visions of the post-war world” (3). The Americans, he writes, “looked askance at British policy, particularly what they considered to be its old-fashioned imperialist taint, and resolved to oppose the Soviet Union’s regional ambitions and instead to develop Iran as a model of American-sponsored nation building” (318). His conclusions place him in the camp of historians who note the many sources of friction within the Anglo-American alliance and the sharply limited nature of the “special relationship” that London worked hard to establish during the war.

The strengths of Persian Gulf Command are readily apparent. Jackson’s prodigious research in the British archival record, his close reading of the voluminous secondary literature on his subject, and the judicious and persuasive judgments he renders concerning the region’s centrality to the Allied war effort enrich our understanding of this often-neglected theater of the conflict. Moreover, his eye for the telling anecdote and appreciation for the role of individual personalities bring his analysis to life.

The book’s strengths leave the reader wanting more. Still, on some counts Jackson fails to deliver. His research in the U.S. archives, for example, is perfunctory. More importantly, in narrating his political and social history of Iraq and Iran during the war, he has managed to exclude almost completely the voices of the people in those countries. The fact that he does not consult sources in Arabic or Farsi limits the contribution he is able to make on these subjects.

These criticisms aside, Jackson has made a formidable case that Iraq and Iran merit further attention from scholars of the Second World War. Far from a backwater arena of Allied cooperation, it simultaneously became a debut stage for the Cold War and a point of contention between competing Anglo-American visions of the post-war world” (3). The Americans, he writes, “looked askance at British policy, particularly what they considered to be its old-fashioned imperialist taint, and resolved to oppose the Soviet Union’s regional ambitions and instead to develop Iran as a model of American-sponsored nation building” (318). His conclusions place him in the camp of historians who note the many sources of friction within the Anglo-American alliance and the sharply limited nature of the “special relationship” that London worked hard to establish during the war.

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These criticisms aside, Jackson has made a formidable case that Iraq and Iran merit further attention from scholars of the Second World War. Far from a backwater arena of Allied cooperation, these two nations were central to the Allies’ military and political strategies in the Middle East and to their global effort to defeat the Axis.

Note:
In comparison to North Africa, the Persian Gulf has failed to register the depth of historical study one would expect from a legitimate theater of operations during World War II. In Persian Gulf Command: A History of the Second World War in Iran and Iraq, Ashley Jackson, professor of imperial and military history and visiting fellow at Kellogg College, Oxford, digs into this particular “periphery” of the far-flung conflict and reveals that it served as a significant battleground throughout the course of the war for Axis and Allied powers alike. He contends that Allied forces invaded because of the Persian Gulf’s abundant oil supply and accessibility to critical Soviet-German conflict areas, and he asks a simple question concerning the Big Three: was the towering effort to repel the Axis powers worth it?

According to Jackson, this view of the periphery finds its origins in the early 1930s. For Britain and the Soviet Union, the area—and in particular Iran—was then “a borderland to their respective Asian empires, the gateway to India, and a bone of contention at the heart of their geostrategic aspirations” (9). Jackson illustrates how the relationship between the British, Americans, Soviets, Iraqis, and Iranians began taking shape. Because of the region’s proximity to the great powers and “the presence of oil” it would simply be a matter of time until key global actors converged on the Gulf.

As they had at the close of the Great War, political and diplomatic rivalries would now create a new arena of competition in Central Asia. Anglo-American visions of a postwar world would vie with the disparate motivations and methods of imperialism and nationalism. The emergence of these political rivalries in the Gulf also explains the connections between imperial powers and their colonies and sets up the context for international relations between the Anglo-American powers and the Muslim states. For instance, Jackson asserts that the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty gave Britain unfettered access to oil in exchange for Royal Air Force protection. He also maintains, while adhering to his central tropes, that the British and Soviets intervened in the Persian Gulf before Iran and Iraq ever communicated. As they had at the close of the Great War, political and diplomatic rivalries would now create a new arena of competition in Central Asia. Anglo-American visions of a postwar world would vie with the disparate motivations and methods of imperialism and nationalism. The emergence of these political rivalries in the Gulf also explains the connections between imperial powers and their colonies and sets up the context for international relations between the Anglo-American powers and the Muslim states. For instance, Jackson asserts that the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty gave Britain unfettered access to oil in exchange for Royal Air Force protection. He also maintains, while adhering to his central tropes, that the British and Soviets intervened in the Persian Gulf before Iran and Iraq ever communicated with Nazi Germany, an excuse both countries used to justify invading the region. Furthermore, it was not until after the Anglo-Soviet invasion that U.S. influence emerged in the Gulf region. According to Jackson, the British and Soviets intervened for oil and proximity, but the United States entered the region to lay “the foundations of its puissant post-war presence” (2).

Much of Persian Gulf Command is dedicated to describing how the Great Powers wrestled for supremacy over the Gulf region and how the turbulent Allied power relationship saddled the citizens of the region with inflation and famine and drove them to riot. Jackson concludes that much of the region’s suffering can be contributed to a distracted Britain. For example, in 1942, because of a 30 percent decline in regional production, Iran estimated that it needed to import 160,000 tons of wheat. Britain, which regulated Iranian imports, gave the Iranian government 30,000 tons of wheat. After receiving one-fifth of that amount, Iran sold the wheat at a price 555 percent above the previous year’s. Poor Iran’s starving, and there were bread riots in provincial areas.

Persian Gulf Command focuses keenly on conflict between occupier and occupied and illustrates the mutual resentment that ran deep in the region. Jackson brings this part of the narrative to life and shows the palpable tension within the region by highlighting the voices of those who were there. For example, he clearly demonstrates the paternalism the Allies felt towards the Iranians and Iraqis by quoting British leaders who referred to both groups as children.

Although, Jackson, who is British, excels in setting forth the events of World War II in Iran and Iraq from the British perspective, he does not focus exclusively on his countrymen. Readers will not feel cheated by his opening remarks, wherein he explains that he is “a British historian, focusing on the British war effort, using primary British sources” (xi). His narrative still examines the contours of history and provides the strategic context of each significant event during the war. He sharpens his historical focus on the occupation of Iran and Iraq, for example, and explores the lives of the people on both sides who lived through it. He describes the results of food shortages and the political instability—most notably the coup d’état of Rashid Ali—that increased internal and external pressure in the region.

Using journals, diaries, military documents, and recollections, Jackson paints a new picture of what occurred in Iran and Iraq during the Second World War, how it was perceived, what was said, and even what some were thinking. Persian Gulf Command is not simply a look at military strategy and tactics executed in Iran and Iraq during the early 1940s. It also examines the economic, political, and social ramifications of taking the war to the Middle East. Jackson describes, for example, how Muslim leaders called for a jihad against occupiers, turning the political conflict into a struggle over religion. He also shows that World War II is appropriately named, as his book describes, in great detail, events that occurred outside the popularized theaters of operation in Europe and the Pacific.

Persian Gulf Command is a well-researched and welcome contribution to the literature of World War II. It is ambitious not only that it covers a subject and region that has been traditionally marginalized in Western classrooms, but also because it adds significantly to our knowledge of what it was like to live on the peripheries of one of the most terrible global crises in human history. Jackson does not shy away from detailed descriptions of the lives of men, women, and children in Iran and Iraq during the Second World War. He calls attention to nearly every aspect of life during the Allied occupation in a balanced and thorough manner.

For anyone studying the Second World War or the Middle East, Persian Gulf Command is not supplemental, it is essential. But it is also a must-read for anyone interested in the origins of modern disputes and tensions in Iran, Iraq, and Southwest Asia, for in addition to providing valuable insights into the Persian Gulf during World War II, it also points the way to the global conflict of the future by describing how the seeds of hostility were sown in the region from 1939 to 1945.

Peter D. Eicher, Raising the Flag: America’s First Envoys in Faraway Lands (Lincoln, NE.: Potomac Books, 2018)

Maureen Connors Santelli
can bring into focus the broader significance of the United States’ presence within the global community of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Peter D. Eicher’s Raising the Flag: America’s First Envoys in Faraway Lands contributes to this body of work through specific attention to some of the first American diplomats and their exploits in foreign lands.

Eicher, a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer who served in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific, provides an engaging overview of nine regions in which the United States had diplomatic and commercial interests from the American Revolution to the Civil War. The stories of foreign ministers such as Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson are familiar, but those of the dozens of foreign agents who served abroad during the first eighty years of American history are less well-known. These individual experiences, Eicher argues, illustrate “the development of foreign policy and the growth of American influence around the world” (xii).

Eicher’s volume presents a cast of colorful characters who provide insight into the attitudes that drove early American interests in different regions of the world and highlights “their uniquely American reactions to the oddities they found in distant lands” (xii). Instead of living an elegant existence within foreign royal courts, most American diplomats had the daunting task of representing the United States and “its strange new form of government—democracy—to foreign leaders who had never heard of the country and could not conceive of such a political system” (x–xii). In addition, before the use of transoceanic steamers it could take a year or longer to send home for instructions and receive a reply. In the midst of potential riots, revolution, and intrigue, American envoys were frequently left to their own devices in their foreign outposts awaiting replies to their correspondence from home.

Raising the Flag is divided into nine chapters; each focuses on a different region of the world that attracted early American interest. Covering places such as Asia, the Ottoman Empire, South America, and Mexico, Eicher provides the groundwork for American interest in each region and notes whether Americans faced local resistance as well as potential hostilities from European powers. Each chapter addresses a specific diplomatic outpost and fleshes out the efforts made by early American envoys. As Eicher demonstrates in these chapters, early diplomatic affairs were frequently driven by an interest in expanding commercial trade.

Eicher links the chapters together through his cast of characters, though each chapter could stand alone as a separate vignette on early American foreign affairs. Chapter 1, for example, focuses on Samuel Shaw, the first American consul in China. The chapter outlines American interest in the tea trade and the complications of engaging in trade with China because of the better organized and financed British. Shaw, a veteran of the American Revolution who had not yet traveled extensively, was selected to lead the first commercial venture to China.

Eicher provides biographical information on Shaw and links his experiences in the Revolution to his journey to China from Boston on a small merchant ship, the Empress of China. Long before Shaw was named to an official diplomatic position (in 1786), he corresponded with the U.S. secretary for foreign affairs and kept the U.S. government informed of his commercial efforts with China as well as conflict with England. American merchants began to develop what would become a profitable trade with China, bringing back goods such as tea, spices, silk, lacquerware, and porcelain. Eicher concludes the chapter by observing that, ironically, the tea trade with China brought Boston out of the “economic doldrums it had suffered ever since the Boston Tea Party a quarter of a century earlier” (33).

In addition to the development of American trade, Eicher also focuses on the expanding borders of the United States. Chapter 8, for example, traces the commercial and diplomatic efforts of Thomas Larkin in California in the years that led up to the Mexican-American War and the discovery of gold in 1848. Larkin left Massachusetts for Monterey, California, in 1831 to assist his brother in his trading business with Mexico. He built a successful business in California and learned to speak fluent Spanish but did not renounce his American citizenship. Those qualifications ultimately won him the appointment as American consul in Monterey in 1843.

Larkin was consul at an uncertain time. There was a string of revolts in California against Mexican rule in the 1840s, and Mexico struggled to maintain control of the region because of its distance from Mexico City. Larkin became convinced that it was only a matter of time before California separated from Mexico. When the separation finally took place, Larkin was certain that California would “inevitably come into the U.S. orbit, provided the British or French did not intervene first” (256).

Chapter 8 also weaves in the exploits of other actors, including John Frémont, who travelled through California on a mapping expedition. Frémont’s movements alarmed locals and caused Larkin much stress, as Frémont held no official post but was accompanied by sixty armed men. Ultimately, Eicher characterizes Larkin as a capable man who prospered in the midst of a politically chaotic landscape. After his death he was recognized as “foremost among the men who won for us California” (292).

Eicher’s knowledge of the foreign service and how it changed over the course of the nineteenth century provides readers with a useful foundation for some of the challenges these early diplomats faced. For example, Eicher explains that the United States had no career foreign service until the twentieth century. Most envoys in the early part of the nineteenth century came to their posts as a result of pre-existing business interests in the region rather than through previous diplomatic experience. By the 1830s, these official appointments were often determined through Andrew Jackson’s spoils system. Although these appointees had provided political support, their qualifications for serving as diplomatic envoys were questionable at best. Many of them continued to conduct private business while serving as diplomats.

Eicher’s knowledge of early diplomatic ranks and titles provides further insight into the challenges American envoys faced. He notes that Americans of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries considered the title of ambassador “too pretentious for representatives of a democracy” and that the United States did not confer this title until 1893. Instead, American envoys were given the rank of “minister,” which was “one tier below ambassador in general international practice” (xiii). In addition to minister, there were several other lower-level diplomatic titles that were conferred by the United States. As a result of these reduced ranks, American envoys did not have the same prestige their foreign counterparts with the title of ambassador did, a detail that limited their access to foreign officials.

Raising the Flag promises to illustrate how the lives of early American diplomats “believe the popular image of diplomacy” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and to highlight consistent themes in America’s growth as a world power. Eicher’s work certainly delivers on this promise. His selected characters help to reveal the link between early American diplomacy and commerce and military expansion as well as their common interest in advocating for American democracy in the world. In addition, all the characters featured in Raising the Flag reveal, through the personal accounts they left behind, the sense of adventure and curiosity early Americans had in
their foreign posts.

Eicher tries to connect the experiences of his large cast of characters into a cohesive study on early American diplomacy, but the shared themes he highlights are sometimes lost as he focuses on the individual stories of each diplomat. However, he does present an array of experiences and goals shared by early American diplomats, and I think additional research, as Eicher himself suggests, would help place these fascinating stories within the expanding scholarship on early American contact with foreign lands.

The sources Eicher draws from are primarily from the Library of Congress and the National Archives, especially records from the State Department. Although he presents an intricate and complicated story of early American diplomacy, scholars may find themselves wishing for additional notes. Perhaps some notes were omitted for the sake of space, but Eicher makes some interesting points concerning the personal lives and experiences of his various characters, and more substantial references would have been useful.

The brevity of the references aside, Raising the Flag offers an interesting contribution to early American diplomacy. This book will be of interest primarily to graduate and undergraduate students of American diplomatic history. However, the individual stories found in Raising the Flag may prove to aid experts in thinking about how the personal experiences of early American diplomats helped to cultivate American influence in a larger world.

Susan Dunn, A Blueprint for War: FDR and the Hundred Days that Mobilized America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018)

Stephen Ortiz

In A Blueprint for War, Susan Dunn continues her impressive run of books centered on the important but somewhat less highlighted stage of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency: the years between 1938 and 1941, when the transformative New Deal period had ended but the United States had not yet formally entered World War II. Dunn has taken a serial approach to these “in-between” years, with this fine book coming on the heels of Roosevelt’s Purge: How FDR Fought to Change the Democratic Party, and 1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh, Hitler—the Election amid the Storm.1 While the 1938–1941 period may not have been featured as prominently in previous studies of FDR’s presidency, Dunn’s book joins recent scholarly and popular history on the era, with authors again drawn to the epic battles of interventionists and isolationists and to the Sphinx-like leadership of FDR in that historical moment.2

A Blueprint for War picks up roughly where 1940 left off, with Roosevelt re-elected to an unprecedented third term, and it keeps a sharp focus on the four-month period ending with the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941. To Dunn, though, the four-month phase is not merely a significant transition. She argues that it constituted a “Third Hundred Days” in the annals of FDR’s presidency, made lasting contributions to the understanding of the United States’s role in the world, and was every bit as enduring as the “first” and “second” hundred days of Roosevelt’s New Deal transformations. Dunn contends that “it was ultimately the most vital and consequential period of his presidency: during those hundred days, the president would initiate the pivotal programs and approve the strategic plans for America’s successful leadership in World War II—leadership on which hinged the survival of the civilized world” (3).

Dunn’s narrative is divided into ten chapters and supports her overall argument by assessing three major developments that began to take shape in December 1940. She sets the stage with the post-election hangover of uncertainty and near despair over the German blitz of Britain. Over the course of the remaining chapters she explains how FDR began a steady reassertion of presidential leadership in three key areas: military planning and mobilization, the shaping of public opinion, and the congressional passage of Lend-Lease. Dunn is quick to point out how, in each of these areas, Roosevelt moved from indecision and implicit support for American involvement in the war on the side of the British to consistent messaging and explicit material support and ideological affirmation.

Dunn explains the Lend-Lease idea’s launch thus: “If the president’s plan was approved by Congress, the Roosevelt administration, after months of indecision, halfway measures, and confusing signals, would finally assume leadership of the democratic forces in the war of two worlds” (63). Chapters on the United States and Anglo-American war planning (first in Plan Dog and then in the ABC agreements, respectively) lay out military discussions and FDR’s support of them. The most pivotal chapter seems to be the one titled “Arsenal of Ideas.” Instead of just going through the list of impressive speeches FDR made in the winter of 1940–41, Dunn weaves the famous “garden hose” fireside chat, the Four Freedoms speech, and FDR’s less well-known third inaugural address into a fabric of “democratic aspiration” from which the war was defined from then on for the American people (98). Only a chapter on labor relations in war production feels extraneous. The rest of the structure builds the argument quite effectively.

A Blueprint for War is written in an engaging and convincing narrative style. This will surprise no one who has read any of Dunn’s previous books. She is a master storyteller, digging deep into the period for quotations and perspectives that are not merely a rehashing of shopworn lines from the many earlier narratives. And like any master storyteller, Dunn uses dramatic tension in marvelous ways. Her writing makes the uncertainty of historical actors visible as they face crises in their respective worlds. She is especially good at moving along the British/American fault lines, with great archival material deployed from both sides in the fraught pas de deux of 1940–41. She is also seriously committed to grounding her discussions of international relations in the gritty-gritty of domestic politics—and they are all the more convincing as a result of that commitment. I have, for all these reasons, used Dunn’s book for undergraduate classes with great effect and can see now how A Blueprint for War would be equally effective at capturing the attention of newcomers to the period.

Dunn’s most innovative historiographical contribution—the naming of the period the “Third Hundred Days”—makes the book more than just a stellar retelling of a story for a new generation. She makes a very strong claim about the significance of the period not just to interpretations of FDR’s presidency, but also to the larger sweep of modern American history. Dunn writes that “Franklin Roosevelt’s third hundred days were one of the most fertile periods of his long presidency: three months during which his administration rejected isolationism, made a commitment to victory, and put in motion the means necessary to achieve it . . . . In these winter months, the United States took its first strides toward becoming the world’s superpower, with all of the benefits and costs that status entailed” (176–7).

Yet Dunn’s interpretive position does not persuade entirely. The first two hundred days, with their flurry of legislative activity and the remaking of the American state, often but not always directed by FDR, do not immediately spring to mind when the reader is immersed in the 1940–41 material. The comparison between these periods, therefore, can seem strained, except that the “hundred day” phrasing now denotes a commonly accepted period of presidential
accomplishment. And Dunn’s book leaves little doubt about the importance of FDR’s accomplishments.

Beyond these reservations about the “hundred days,” there are a few issues to critique in Dunn’s handling of the isolationists, who are perhaps better described as anti-interventionists. Dunn nods perfunctorily to the breadth of sentiment and the variety of rationales that fell under the anti-intervention umbrella, along with the requisite scholars who have researched them most thoroughly. Yet she ultimately treats this group quite flatly, as antagonists to FDR and to intervention (and by extension, to liberal democracy) only, and not as a range of people, some of whom had clear-headed objections to FDR’s approach, goals, and deliberate obfuscation. They come across in her rendering as villains who needed to be vanquished—and were subsequently defeated in this third hundred days. For example, she writes that “their aim was to defeat not Hitler but Franklin Roosevelt, with isolationism as their cudgel” (19). Dunn also fails to address their persistence. They persisted after Lend-Lease until Pearl Harbor; and they persisted in American politics during and after World War II. As current American life makes all too painfully clear, understanding these perspectives is a more pressing task than ever.

In sum, Susan Dunn’s A Blueprint for War is a terrific read, filled with drama and new morsels that even the best-read FDR or World War II scholar will take in with delight. At a brisk 182 pages of text, it is also a book easily adopted into course assignments. And even if the “third hundred days” designation does not entirely convince, it provides a serious provocation to its readers to think about the “Arsenal of Ideas” that Dunn describes so well as studies both in leadership and in American public opinion and ideological commitment. It is recommended highly.

Notes:
3. Wayne S. Cole’s Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–1945 (Lincoln, NE, 1983) and Justus D. Doenecke’s Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941 (Lanham, MD, 2000) are cited by Dunn, but the complexity of these studies is lost in the narrative.
This meeting was held in accordance with SHAFR By Laws.

Council Members Present: Barbara Keys (presiding), Vivien Chang, Matthew Connelly, Mary Dudziak, Peter Hahn, Kristin Hoganson, Julia Irwin, Andrew Johns, Adriane Lentz-Smith, Brian McNamara, Lien-Hang Nguyen, Amy Sayward (ex officio), and Kelly Shannon.

Council Members Absent: David Engerman and Kathryn Statler
Others Present: Anne L. Foster, Petra Goedde, Antonia Javier, Savitri Maya Kunze, Julie Laut, and Patricia Thomas

General Business

SHAFR President Barbara Keys called the meeting to order at 8:00 am. Keys welcomed the Council and thanked outgoing Council members Matthew Connelly, David Engerman, and Julia Irwin; Amy Sayward, George Fujii, and conference organizers Julie Laut and Amanda Bundy for their hard work organizing the 2019 Annual Meeting, along with Program Committee Co-Chairs Kaeten Mistry and Jay Sexton; and Passport editor Andrew Johns and outgoing Diplomatic History editorial team Anne Foster and Nick Cullather for their contributions and service to these publications and to the Society.

Julie Laut, Conference Coordinator, joined Council to present a brief oral report on the annual SHAFR conference.

Executive Director Amy Sayward noted that since the January 2019 meeting, Council had approved the following motions via correspondence: the minutes of the January 2019 meeting; SHAFR participation in action to promote the creation and preservation of historical diplomatic records; and the implementation of training regarding, and arrangements for, the sexual harassment/misconduct policy at the 2019 SHAFR Conference. With regard to the latter issue, Council had discussed and voted to approve three measures proposed by Keys: (1) hiring consultant Sherry Marts to advise on the handling of any complaints during the conference; (2) formation of a Conference Code of Conduct Task Force; and (3) provision of sexual harassment training to Council and Task Force members before the conference. Council votes were: for (1), unanimously in favor (14-0-0); for (2) 12 for, 1 against, and 1 abstaining; and for (3) 12 for, 1 against, and 1 abstaining.

Financial Matters

Sayward presented financial reports for the first six months of the current fiscal year and the proposed FY2019-20 budget with input from Peter Hahn as chair of the Ways & Means Committee, which had met the previous evening. Both Sayward and Hahn noted the expected deficit in this and in future fiscal years that would create budget constraints in upcoming years. Hahn suggested that Council will need to consider efforts to trim expenses and increase revenues, including possible membership fee increases, conference registration fee increases, reduced spending on communications, and enhanced development initiatives. Hahn proposed that no call for proposals for a Summer Institute after 2020 be made and instead that the Summer Institutes be placed on indefinite suspension. After careful deliberation, Hahn motioned to approve the FY2019-20 budget, Brian McNamara seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously (12-0-0).

Council took up the proposal for a Second Book Workshop and Writing Retreat from the Women in SHAFR Committee. The Council voted unanimously in favor of the proposal (12-0-0).

Keys proposed the creation of a task force to develop criteria to help frame decisions on which activities and external groups SHAFR sponsors, endorses, or funds.

Personnel Matters

Sayward introduced a recommendation for a new Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Conference Consultant Amanda Bundy for 2019-2020, including bonuses for the Conference Consultant and Conference Coordinator following the conference. Mary Dudziak offered a friendly amendment to allow the Executive Director and President to negotiate the MOA for up to three years, which Sayward approved. Council indicated its support of these recommendations.

Keys introduced her proposal for annual performance reviews of salaried non-editorial staff. McNamara suggested that the procedure be added to relevant MOAs. Dudziak asked whether the evaluation should be completed annually or every other year. In response, Sayward explained, and Hahn concurred, that because Council is asked annually to approve renewals and stipend amounts, it makes sense to complete annual evaluations.

Keys introduced for discussion the Executive Director evaluation, during which Sayward recused herself. Council discussed the important, demanding, and multifaceted role the Executive Director plays and offered recognition and great appreciation for the work that Sayward has done and continues to do in the position. Council noted that previously there had been an assistant to the Executive Director and that the extent of the job seemed to warrant continuing use of the new assistant Sayward has recently retained. Dudziak suggested that a task force could investigate how the work of Executive Director might be restructured in the future to make the position more sustainable, a suggestion with which Council
concluded. Hahn made a motion to approve the three recommendations put forward in the Executive Director evaluation with slight revisions: first, that SHAFR carry out a review of the position no later than June 2022; second, that Sayward's contract as Executive Director be extended for two years to August 30, 2022; and third, that Sayward receive a bonus of $3,000 in 2020 and in 2021. Connelly seconded Hahn's motion, and Council voted unanimously in favor (12-0-0).

Information Technology (IT) and Web-Related Matters

Council reviewed the Web Committee Report and expressed support for the Committee's proposal to create a LinkedIn community page for SHAFR.

Council reviewed IT Director George Fujii's Report. Council noted the timeline for the required website overhaul. Kristin Hoganson suggested that Council create a task force on communications generally that would situate the web-redesign process in a larger context, which received general support from Council.

Publications-Related Matters

Anne Foster, current co-editor of Diplomatic History, and Petra Goedde, incoming co-editor as of July 1, joined the meeting to discuss their report on the previous year and the transition as the journal moved to joint administration between Temple University and Indiana State University. Foster highlighted the draft MOUs with Temple, Indiana State, and the editorial staff. She noted that future e-mail correspondence to the journal will be sent to diplomat@SHAFR.org. Foster also emphasized the role her current co-editor, Nick Cullather, has played in ensuring that the journal has run smoothly during the five years he served as editor for Diplomatic History while also holding a demanding administrative position that prevented him from using the teaching relief and other funding budgeted for the journal. Dudziak suggested passing a resolution to thank Cullather for his role as editor of Diplomatic History and for his service to SHAFR. Council members agreed that such a thanks would be in order. Hoganson asked about whether the incoming editors had plans to publish closer to their page budget, and Foster explained that the team has ideas about publishing more state-of-the-field and invited contributions. Council asked whether the editors favored inclusion of a Gold Open Access option. Foster and Goedde recommended that Council make a decision in consultation with Oxford University Press.

Patricia Thomas and Antonia Javier of Oxford University Press Journals joined the meeting for a discussion of their report. Thomas noted that Diplomatic History could have an online-only subscription option for 2020. She also suggested that Oxford would be able to send a follow-up e-mail to members who did not renew by a certain point in the year. Keys raised the issue of Gold Open Access. Thomas noted that Gold Open Access has been an option for some Oxford Journals for several years, because some research funding has become contingent on publishing funded research in fully open-access format. Thomas noted there were different types of licenses under which a journal article can offer Gold Open Access and recommended CC BY-NC-ND (Creative Commons: attribution, non-commercial, no derivatives) as a potentially good option for Diplomatic History. She noted that most comparable journals charged $3,000 per article for Gold Open Access and that price did not seem to influence uptake. Council members queried whether offering this option would lead to inequities; Keys responded that because the open access requirement came from funding agencies, only scholars with research grants needed to take up this option, though she noted that it was possible the UK's Research Excellence Framework might impose an open access requirement uniformly. Adriane Lentz-Smith moved that SHAFR proceed with the Gold Open Access under the CC BY-NC-ND license for a fee of $3,000. Hoganson seconded the motion, which passed with eleven votes in favor and one abstention (11-0-1).

Council discussed the Passport report, submitted by its editor, Andrew Johns; supplemental information from Keys that noted that 36 of the last 37 stand-alone book reviews were of books by men, a trend that had become more pronounced since Council first expressed concern over the gender proportion in January 2018; and a response from Johns discussing the challenges around stand-alone book reviews. Dudziak emphasized the importance of actively reorienting priorities to successfully move toward gender equity. Johns noted that the stand-alone book reviews started five years ago as a means of reviewing more books than Diplomatic History was able to review but that in the five years since beginning the stand-alone book reviews, publishers have stopped sending as many books to the journal. Johns emphasized that it would be prohibitively time-consuming to seek out books to review, considering the many other kinds of articles Passport publishes. Julia Irwin suggested that perhaps books could be selected for review by coordinating with SHAFR's book prize committees. A number of Council members echoed support for the idea that book reviews might best be spread among a team of people or delegated to a book review editor. Dudziak suggested that the issue be taken up by the upcoming communications taskforce, an idea Council members supported. Council members also expressed recognition that Johns had greatly expanded the scope of Passport during his tenure as editor and commended his contributions to the publication. Keys reiterated the importance of taking pro-active steps to ensure that the books reviewed reflect SHAFR's membership, noting that the substantial amount of work to solicit book reviews might be alleviated by hiring a book review editor.

Conference-Related Matters

Keys and Irwin presented a preliminary report on plans for the SHAFR 2022 conference. Irwin stated that a task force was in the process of looking into hosting the annual SHAFR meeting outside the continental United States in 2022, including reviewing a bid to host it in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Council discussed the possibility of formalizing a call for proposals that would go out annually in June, with a clause for SHAFR 2022 noting that areas outside the continental United States would be encouraged to apply. Council generally agreed that asking the Conference Committee to help formalize the requirements for bids might improve the bidding process.
Hoganson presented a preliminary report on SHAFR 2020 in New Orleans. She noted that the conference would be at the Westin Canal Place Hotel, the opening reception would take place at the National World War II Museum, and the theme of the conference would be “Gulfs, Seas, Oceans, and Empires.”

**Membership Matters**

Keys presented her proposal to establish a committee on the job crisis in academia. Council agreed about the need for such a committee considering the state of the present academic job market.

Keys opened discussion of the Membership Committee’s report on By Law changes by explaining that she had tasked the Committee with looking into membership ramifications of the new conference code of conduct. The Committee’s report reviewed possible changes to the membership section of the By Laws, including the addition of a new section articulating the grounds, procedure, and implications of exclusion or suspension from SHAFR as well as a definition of the meaning of “good standing.” The Membership Committee report noted that the by-laws provision detailing the duties of Council would also require amendment if suspension and expulsion are contingent upon a Council vote. Council agreed that a task force should carefully consider the alternatives and present proposals to Council in the future.

Council then considered Keys’s proposals for three by-law changes: (1) to change the term “Vice President” to “Vice President/President-Elect,” for greater accuracy and for clarity in external communications; (2) to have the presidency begin on November 1 rather than January 1 in order to allow the new president more time to prepare for the annual January Council meeting; and (3) to remove the outdated requirement that Program Committees have only five members. Kelly Shannon moved to approve these proposals. Lentz-Smith seconded, and the motion received unanimous support (12-0-0).

Council reviewed the Graduate Student Committee report. Keys commended Cindy Ewing, chair of the Graduate Student Committee, for her leadership and thanked the committee for its contribution to SHAFR, noting that the value of this new Committee was being demonstrated by several new initiatives at the conference, including a happy hour and staffing at a welcome table.

**Other Reports**

Sayward presented the Executive Director report, particularly highlighting that the digitization of past issues of Passport was almost complete.

Lien-Hang Nguyen and Lentz-Smith provided a report on the work of the Committee on Minority Historians. They noted that Christopher Fisher and Perin Gurel will co-chair the Committee next year. They also noted the Committee had organized a conference panel this year on “Decolonizing SHAFR.”

Council reviewed Richard Immerman’s report on the Historical Documentation Committee. Council expressed deep concern about the ongoing state of affairs at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), noting among other issues the cessation of systematic declassification at presidential libraries, which means that only Mandatory Declassification Review requests will result in declassification of documents at those archives. Council agreed that SHAFR should collaborate with other historical organizations with an interest in protecting NARA to help lobby for, among other things, increased funding.

Lentz-Smith motioned to end the meeting, seconded by Irwin; Council unanimously approved the motion. Minutes were taken by Savitri Maya Kunze.
Professional Notes

Laura Belmonte has been appointed as Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences at Virginia Tech University beginning August 1, 2019.

Amanda Bundy (Ph.D., The Ohio State University) has been appointed as SHAFR conference coordinator.

Errata

Barbara Keys’ name was incorrectly listed as ‘Barbara L. Keys” in the January 2019 issue of Passport. The editors regret this error.

Recent Books of Interest


Bhagavan, Manu, ed. Indian and the Cold War. (UNC, 2019).


Byrd, Brandon R. The Black Republic: African Americans and the Fate of Haiti. (Penn, 2019).


Edelman, Robert and Christopher Young. The Whole World Was Watching: Sport in the Cold War. (Stanford, 2019).


Fischbach, Michael R. The Movement and the Middle East: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict Divided the American Left. (Stanford, 2019).


Gualtieri, Sarah M. A. Arab Routes: Pathways to Syrian California. (Stanford, 2019).


Kim, Jessica M. Imperial Metropolis: Los Angeles, Mexico, and the Borderlands of American Empire, 1865-1941. (UNC, 2019).
King, David P. God’s Internationalists: World Vision and the Age of Evangelical Humanitarianism. (Penn, 2019).
Kuzmarov, Jeremy. Obama’s Unending Wars: Fronting the Foreign Policy of the Permanent Warfare State. (Clarity, 2019).
Lamoreaux, Naomi, and Ian Shapiro, eds. The Bretton Woods Agreements: Together with Scholarly Commentaries and Essential Historical Documents. (Yale, 2019).
Lynch, Timothy J. In the Shadow of the Cold War: American Foreign Policy from George Bush Sr. to Donald Trump. (Cambridge, 2020).
Paisley Fiona and Pamela Scully. Writing Transnational History. (Bloomsbury, 2019).
Robb, Thomas K. and David James Gill. Divided Allies: Strategic Cooperation against the Communist Threat in the Pacific during the Early Cold War. (Cornell, 2019).
After receiving the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant, I was able to use the funding to return to the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland in order to go through collections that I had only been granted access to after putting in FOIA requests. The funds were thus spent on transport, lodging and meals for the week that I spent at the archives. Most all of these folders were in the Department of Justice Record Group and had to do with the ways in which Iranian students in the United States were located and managed after the Iran Hostage Crisis under Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti. One interesting folder, for instance, held letters written to Civiletti by U.S. private citizens in which they expressed exasperation at the lack of government action in deporting Iranian students after Iranian students took the U.S. embassy in Tehran. As such, it provided one reason of many that the Department of Justice went through with interviewing every Iranian student in the United States and checking as to whether or not they were out of status. The letters themselves showed a particular brand of racism that likened Iranians to Vietnamese refugees, which also proved to create a layered analysis to the ways in which U.S. foreign policy towards the two nations—and U.S. public perception of such diplomacy—had significant overlaps.

Ida Yalzadeh
Ph.D. candidate
Brown University
In Memoriam:  
Martin J. Manning  
(1950-2019)

The field of U.S. diplomatic history lost a great friend, mentor, and scholar when Martin J. Manning passed away on February 28, 2019. As anyone who had the unforgettable pleasure of speaking with Martin would know, he was born in Boston and attended Boston College. He later earned his MLS from Catholic University. During a career that spanned forty-four years, he served as a research librarian and archivist for numerous federal agencies and offices, most notably with the United States Information Agency and the Department of State, where he was employed at the time of his passing.

Martin was an accomplished researcher with an eclectic range of interests. His publications included Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda (2004), Encyclopedia of Media and Propaganda in Wartime America (2010), “Globalization of Baseball in Popular Culture,” in Baseball and American Culture (2012), Herbal Medicine and Botanical Medical Fads (2002), and many other articles, edited volumes, and reviews. He also served as one of the senior editors for the Contemporary Sports Issues series published by the Haworth Press. Martin was a member of the Popular Culture Association and served as the Area Chair for World’s Fairs and Expositions and New England Studies for the PCA’s annual conferences. He served as a judge for National History Day both locally in Massachusetts and nationally in Washington, DC.

Many of us will also remember him for his selfless efforts helping us with our own research projects. We would like to take a moment to share some of our fondest memories of working with our colleague and friend, Martin J. Manning.

Laura Belmonte (Virginia Tech University): Martin was essential to my successfully completing my dissertation and the research that became my first book, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War. For over a year, he endured my almost-daily siege on the USIA Archives, then housed in the basement of the agency’s southeast DC headquarters. Once he trusted me, he allowed me to rummage through the entire collection, a collection that he accrued singlehandedly and guarded fiercely. He took as much joy as I did in finding documents that advanced my core arguments and generously shared both his great institutional memory and the occasional cup of terrible institutional coffee. Without Martin’s diligence and stewardship, I am certain we would have permanently lost huge parts of USIA’s history and its vital role in U.S. cultural diplomacy.

Kenneth Osgood (Colorado School of Mines): I was sad to learn of Martin Manning’s passing, and I write to just share a little bit about how gracious he was to me. I didn’t know him especially well, but like many scholars who have crossed Martin’s path, I do remember and appreciate how extraordinarily helpful he was. He made a difference in my life, and, in the dissemination of knowledge and understanding more broadly.

I’m a historian who writes about Cold War public diplomacy. Many moons ago, when I was a young graduate student in the 1990s, I came across a reference to a “USIA Archive” in a paper presented at SHAFR by Laura Belmonte. It was referring, of course, to the U.S. Information Agency, where Martin worked for many years. I eventually made by way to Washington to conduct my research. Somehow, I tracked down Martin’s contact info, and then, in those early days at the dawn of e-mail (no Internet as we know it), I reached out to Martin. He was so welcoming! He invited me to come to the archive, which, if memory serves, was in a dark and dingy corner of the Department of Education building. As an interesting aside: recently a colleague and friend of mine, Brian Etheridge, was researching at the National Archives in USIA records, when he came across a folder with my name on it. He opened it and discovered a printed copy of my e-mails to Martin. I guess his little kindness to me is preserved for all time in the records of our country.

Martin was an excellent steward of these resources, and he took great pleasure in showing me his archive of USIA history. For several days we worked together. I remember an enormous file card collection containing all manner of sources, and I regretted not having the time I needed to investigate them all. (I hope that collection is preserved somewhere!) Martin let me use the photo copier, free of charge, a tiny act of kindness for an impoverished graduate student that I’ll never forget.

At some point we had an amusing conversation about another archival depository in Suitland. I had never heard of “Soot-lin,” as he pronounced it, nor of Suitland, however it is supposed to be pronounced. I didn’t know that it was a town in Maryland, nor that it housed an archive. It took us a few minutes of very confused chatter to figure out what on Earth he was talking about. But when it finally became clear that it was a place that held records that ordinary researchers don’t use or gain ready access to, he went out
of his way to help me find it, and to find the invaluable materials there I needed. You don’t often find such helpful service like this in any business!

Over the years, I periodically contacted Martin with queries, and he often responded helpfully. I wonder if those communications are now archived somewhere... the archiving of the archivist!

From what I could gather, Martin was one-of-a-kind, a man from another time, and a fine, fine human being. He will be missed. The small “thanks” I wrote to him in the acknowledgments to Total Cold War probably don’t do justice to all he did for me, and certainly not to all he did for history itself.

Nicholas Cull (University of Southern California): Martin Manning was—in the fullest sense of the phrase—a good friend to both diplomatic historians and to diplomatic history. He was personally kind and supportive to the researchers who came his way; he was generous with his own ideas and insights in his formal academic practice and publications on the history of expos and propaganda and he gathered and sustained a collection of material that made research into the United States’ forgotten Cold War agency, USIA, viable.

I first met Martin Manning back in 1994 when starting research on the history of USIA. That was a novel idea back then. It was only in the George H.W. Bush administration that rules had changed to allow public access to USIA archives. Previously they had been assumed to be covered by the Smith-Mundt Act’s ban on domestic access to ‘propaganda’ materials created for external consumption. Writing on USIA was largely the province of the recent retired practitioners themselves like Hans Tuch or Wilson Dizard. Martin was eager to bring in more voices. My own project eventually became two single-author volumes on the history of USIA, one edited collection and multiple chapters and articles on agency-related issues, but this did not happen overnight. As a historian then located in the UK my research promised to be logistically challenging, but from the get-go he encouraged me. He promised desk space and access to a phone line and a photocopier in a basement at USIA head-quarters. When I turned up in DC in the autumn of 1995 for a prolonged stint in DC with a small British Academy grant and an affiliation with University of Maryland, he proved true to his word. Challenges that fall and winter included the National Archives decision to close RG 306 as part of the relocation from the old archive building to the new, and the Clinton/Gingrich federal shut-down. In all the muddle Martin shone through. He got me started, not for history itself.

I visited Martin at the USIA Historical Collection soon after I spoke with him. Very soon I was referring to it as simply “The Manning Collection.” He had shelves full of books and journals and file cabinets bursting with documents and photos. Almost immediately, he directed me to his files on the “Unfinished Business” exhibit at the 1958 World’s Fair. I had never even heard of it, but Martin—as usual—was right: this was an incredibly important attempt by the U.S. government to deal with the propaganda blowback from the recent racial violence in Little Rock. Martin just kept pulling materials from files and shelves. When I told him I couldn’t possibly afford to photocopy all of these documents, he pointed me toward the photocopier and told me to copy everything I wanted—for free! From that came an article, the first of many publications in which I thanked Martin for his help. He assisted me in finishing up the book on African American diplomacy, then provided even more guidance when I decided to do a study of U.S. art exhibits sent abroad during the Cold War. There was no topic, no exhibit, no individual that Martin didn’t know—and not simply know, but also have a massive amount of records about! By the time I completed my study of U.S. cultural diplomacy in 2017, Martin was one of those people that I wrote about at some length in my acknowledgments in recognition of his more than two decades of assisting me with my work.

Of course, Martin was himself an accomplished historian, with numerous publications to his credit. But I always felt that the real joy of his life was taking scholars such as myself under his wings and helping us to bring our projects and ideas to fruition. And his help didn’t stop there. He was the chair of the World’s Fairs and Expositions section of the Popular Culture Association’s annual conferences and he graciously invited me to participate. When I asked whether my proposal would be accepted, I can still hear Martin’s Boston twang telling me, “Michael—if you submit a proposal, you’re giving a paper!” In return, Martin served on a panel for the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations that I set up. And, of course, my visits to see him in DC. were inevitably accompanied by his buying me breakfast at one of his favorite haunts, Old Ebbitt Grill. He was more than simply a helpful archivist, or a reliable source—he was a colleague, a fine historian, and a friend, in every sense of those words.

Michael L. Krenn

Passport September 2019
The Last Word:
Making History Together with the National Archives

Maarja Krusten

Editor's note: This column responds directly to Bob Clark's essay, "The Last Word: The National Archives Has Lost its Archival Way," which appeared in this space in the April 2019 issue of Passport.

When historian Eric Foner spoke in 2015 at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) about the U.S. Civil War and Reconstruction, he observed that a historical narrative may seem inevitable to readers after it is written, but as events unfold, participants often must act decisively and quickly on partial information or in an environment filled with unknowns. Throughout my career as a federal archivist, a government historian, and a middle-manager participant in and observer of senior-level decision-making, I have seen officials act in just that way. People do the best they can based on what they know.

Foner is right to say that history doesn't feel like history while we are living through it and that retrospective analyses of past events may reflect many different interpretations. Even the meaning of a phrase or a sentence may be disputed among researchers. In my opening paragraph, for example, does my use of "participant in" refer to my being the decisionmaker about an operational issue within the government? Or someone who provided analysis and historical summaries that others used in making a decision? Or someone who has played both roles, with additional context needed to show which applied? If this were oral history rather than an essay, an interviewer would have the chance to ask me that. Unlike in the past, social media now gives us opportunities to explore what others mean when they speak or write.

As scholars who do archival research know, piecing together what happened and why during past events depends on how individual researchers interpret what is on the page or screen. New information can change how we look at issues. In 2018, David S. Ferriero, archivist of the United States (AOTUS), made these observations in an interview about NARA's Remembering Vietnam exhibit:

Eric Foner, in his book Who Owns History, writes, "History always has been and always will be regularly rewritten, in response to new questions, new information, new methodologies, and new political, social, and cultural imperatives." Our job at the National Archives is to ensure that the public has access to the information they need to do that job of rewriting history. As classified information is declassified, as presidential papers are reviewed and released, as records that have never been researched before are used, that story will continue to be rewritten.

Foner does answer the question, "Who owns history? Everyone and no one—which is why the study of the past is a constantly evolving never-ending journey of discovery." As a librarian and as the archivist of the United States, my job has always been to support that journey.1

In the April 2019 issue of Passport, archivist Bob Clark shared his perspective on his former employer in “The National Archives Has Lost its Archival Way.”2 In that essay, he raises questions about digitization efforts and expresses concerns about former president Barack Obama's decision to forgo a traditional NARA-administered presidential library and museum. While the Obama Foundation will build and administer a privately run museum, NARA will hold the born-digital and paper records of the Obama White House in one of its archival facilities. Access will largely be digital.

NARA still is working out if, when, and how researchers might have access to paper records in special cases where that is necessary and how to take in related records from former administration officials.

Actions taken by the National Archives in 2011 and 2012 provide context for why Clark and I view some of the questions he raised in his essay differently. On October 27, 2011, the Berlin Crisis 1961 conference at the National Archives opened with welcoming remarks by AOTUS David Ferriero. A keynote address by a Georgetown University professor, the late William R. Smyser, preceded panels on the building of the Berlin Wall. Smyser served in Berlin in 1961 as an assistant to Gen. Lucius Clay, then a special advisor to President John F. Kennedy. He set the scene by drawing on his perspective as an academic and a former foreign service officer who witnessed construction of parts of the Berlin Wall. He described driving through the Potsdamer Platz as a representative of Gen. Clay—the last official able to travel freely between sectors during the Cold War—just as the barriers between West and East Berlin went up.

The former foreign service officer described the impact on those on the ground who watched events unfold and decision-makers in Washington. Both were uncertain of the outcome but were determined to serve the United States well, and both debated how best to do that. Smyser's remarks added texture and context to the newly declassified Kennedy administration records that were made available electronically in 2011.

Officials of NARA's National Declassification Center who worked with equity holders on the records releases also served as event coordinators and helped host the conference. Attendees received CDs with electronic versions of the newly declassified records along with their programs for the conference.

A month after the NARA Berlin Crisis 1961 symposium, on November 28, 2011, President Barack Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum on Managing Government Records that pointed to the present and future use of records administered under the Federal Records Act (FRA).
The memorandum declared that records transferred to the National Archives under the FRA would “provide the prism through which future generations will understand and learn from our actions and decisions.” It also stressed that efficient management and retrieval methods were essential while records are active:

When records are well managed, agencies can use them to assess the impact of programs, to reduce redundant efforts, to save money, and to share knowledge within and across their organizations. In these ways, proper records management is the backbone of open Government.

Decades of technological advances have transformed agency operations, creating challenges and opportunities for agency records management. Greater reliance on electronic communication and systems has radically increased the volume and diversity of information that agencies must manage. With proper planning, technology can make these records less burdensome to manage and easier to use and share.3

President Obama directed the archivist of the United States and the head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue a Records Management Directive focused on efficiency, accountability, openness, and “transitioning from paper-based records management to electronic records management where feasible.” In August 2012, AOTOS Ferriero and the acting OMB director, Jeffrey Zients, issued the Managing Government Records Directive (M-18-12) to the heads of federal agencies and departments. This directive created a much-needed process to modernize technologically and conceptually the handling of temporary and permanently valuable information and records, including email, under the Federal Records Act. Obama’s own official records, as well as those of designated White House Executive Office of the President components, would come into the National Archives under the Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978 as he left office.

The first use of email within a White House organizational unit dates to the IBM Professional Office System in the 1980s. In some government offices, punch cards or cassette tapes enabled some forms of technologically assisted typing in the 1970s. Microcomputer use came later. The use of Local Area Networks and email became widespread within the federal government in the 1990s.

At the same time, the White House records managers, whom many historians know through White House Central Files subject classification markings on carbon copies and original correspondence, explored using technology to enhance filing and retrieval. By 1990, they were using optical scanning and CTRACK, an electronic correspondence management system. Since then, electronic records management applications have replaced some government filing cabinets filled with paper files. As changes occurred in records creation, presidential staff and officials in federal agencies depended on records managers and information technology staff to provide ways to retrieve information and records for ongoing government business.

On December 6, 2012, the National Archives posted on its website a November 2012 report to the president by the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) on “Transforming the Security Classification System.” Recommendations included using technology to aid in the review of national security classified materials and making changes to the culture of security classification.

The White House and NARA actions between 2011 and 2012 that I have described here have a through line: the use of technology and revision of traditional practices to expand access, reduce costs, and increase efficiency. I attended several briefings at the National Archives on all these initiatives as they began. What stayed with me from the December 2012 PIDB meeting at NARA was the concept of “safe harbor” in cultural change. The PIDB’s Recommendation 6 on decisions by officials with authority to classify material for national security (or not) stated that “agencies should recognize in policy and practice a ‘safe harbor’ protection for classifiers who adhere to rigorous risk management practices and determine in good faith to classify information at a lower level or not at all.”

When Barack Obama left office in January 2017, news reports pointed to the establishment of a traditional NARA-administered presidential library and museum. NARA prepared for that kind of library during a transition that included the preservation of electronic records for future access as well as the transfer of paper records of the type I helped move out of the White House as a National Archives employee in previous decades. But in May 2017, NARA announced a new model for presidential libraries with the Obama Presidential Library, which would provide digital access to PRA-administered records. The former president had decided not to build a traditional library to house the small percentage of White House records that weren’t born-digital. However, the private Obama Foundation would administer a museum outside the NARA framework and provide funds for digitization of paper records held by NARA.

Since then, the National Archives and the Obama Foundation have issued information sheets that address some of the questions raised in 2018 and 2019 by stakeholders, including historians and other researchers. On social media, I have explained that NARA took legal custody of the Obama records as he left office. I have emphasized that Obama’s archival materials will be processed under the same statute and regulations used for the records of his predecessors, starting with Ronald Reagan. Some readers of news reports about digitization took “unclassified” to mean “uncategorized” rather than not requiring national security restriction. However, the electronic filing and retrieval methodologies that served officials while the president was in office will form part of the basis for researcher access to NARA’s digital Obama Presidential Library.

In April 2019, Dan Cohen, who is vice provost for information collaboration, dean of the libraries, and professor of history at Northeastern University, wrote about how the Obama Presidential Library unit within the National Archives is already digital. His essay opens with links to a February New York Times article (“The Obama Presidential Library That Isn’t”) and reactions from historians (Robert Caro) and a Washington Examiner columnist (Phillip Terzian).4

Cohen, who is also the founding director of the Digital Public Library of America, observes that “the debate about the Obama library exhibits a fundamental confusion. Given its origins and composition, the Obama library is already largely digital. The vast majority of the record his presidency left behind consists not of evocative handwritten notes, printed cable transmissions, and black-and-white photographs, but email, Word documents, and JPEGs. The question now is how to leverage its digital nature to make it maximally useful and used.”5

It is important to consider context for the virtual federal Obama Presidential Library. As Cohen points out, the NARA-administered physical Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library and Museum holds some 45 million pages of archival records.

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The White House and NARA actions between 2011 and 2012 that I have described here have a through line: the use of technology and revision of traditional practices to expand access, reduce costs, and increase efficiency. I attended several briefings at the National Archives on all these initiatives as they began. What stayed with me from the December 2012 PIDB meeting at NARA was the concept of “safe harbor” in cultural change. The PIDB’s Recommendation 6 on decisions by officials with authority to classify material for national security (or not) stated that “agencies should recognize in policy and practice a ‘safe harbor’ protection for classifiers who adhere to rigorous risk management practices and determine in good faith to classify information at a lower level or not at all.”

When Barack Obama left office in January 2017, news reports pointed to the establishment of a traditional NARA-administered presidential library and museum. NARA prepared for that kind of library during a transition that included the preservation of electronic records for future access as well as the transfer of paper records of the type I helped move out of the White House as a National Archives employee in previous decades. But in May 2017, NARA announced a new model for presidential libraries with the Obama Presidential Library, which would provide digital access to PRA-administered records. The former president had decided not to build a traditional library to house the small percentage of White House records that weren’t born-digital. However, the private Obama Foundation would administer a museum outside the NARA framework and provide funds for digitization of paper records held by NARA.

Since then, the National Archives and the Obama Foundation have issued information sheets that address some of the questions raised in 2018 and 2019 by stakeholders, including historians and other researchers. On social media, I have explained that NARA took legal custody of the Obama records as he left office. I have emphasized that Obama’s archival materials will be processed under the same statute and regulations used for the records of his predecessors, starting with Ronald Reagan. Some readers of news reports about digitization took “unclassified” to mean “uncategorized” rather than not requiring national security restriction. However, the electronic filing and retrieval methodologies that served officials while the president was in office will form part of the basis for researcher access to NARA’s digital Obama Presidential Library.

In April 2019, Dan Cohen, who is vice provost for information collaboration, dean of the libraries, and professor of history at Northeastern University, wrote about how the Obama Presidential Library unit within the National Archives is already digital. His essay opens with links to a February New York Times article (“The Obama Presidential Library That Isn’t”) and reactions from historians (Robert Caro) and a Washington Examiner columnist (Phillip Terzian).4

Cohen, who is also the founding director of the Digital Public Library of America, observes that “the debate about the Obama library exhibits a fundamental confusion. Given its origins and composition, the Obama library is already largely digital. The vast majority of the record his presidency left behind consists not of evocative handwritten notes, printed cable transmissions, and black-and-white photographs, but email, Word documents, and JPEGs. The question now is how to leverage its digital nature to make it maximally useful and used.”5

It is important to consider context for the virtual federal Obama Presidential Library. As Cohen points out, the NARA-administered physical Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library and Museum holds some 45 million pages of archival records.
But that scale pales in comparison with the record of President Obama’s White House: 1.5 billion “pages” in the initial collection, already more than 33 times the size of President Johnson’s library. I use “pages” because the Obama Foundation has noted that “95 percent of the Obama Presidential Records were created digitally and have no paper equivalents.” The email record alone for these eight years is 300 million messages, which NARA estimates amounts to more than a billion printed pages. In addition, millions of other “pages” associated with the Obama administration are word-processing documents, spreadsheets, or PDFs, or were posted on websites, apps, and social media. Much of the photographic and video record is also born-digital. There are also 30 million actual pages on paper, which are currently stored in a suburb near Chicago. Given the likelihood that a decent portion of this paper record actually came from digital files—think about all of the printouts of PDFs, for instance—only a miniscule portion of what we have from Obama’s White House is paper-only.6

Presidential and federal records aren’t maintained without structure under the control of the creating workplaces for four or eight or thirty years, then turned over to the National Archives to be transformed into an artificial collection-after-the-fact for researchers to use. They are used for business purposes within a logical structure while still in the custody of the White House and the executive agencies and departments. While researchers won’t see ribbon or carbon copies with the handwritten White House Central Files category markings used on twentieth-century records, the visible parts of the Obama White House recordkeeping structure may provide context and connections for researchers to use and explore.

The National Archives that I know has not “lost its way.” The archivist, David Ferriero, and the employees in his care are continuing the same journey their predecessors began in 1934. The officials I know in person up and down the ranks remain dedicated to sharing historical knowledge. And they are committed to doing so as effectively and efficiently as they can in a period of limited budgets and rapid technological and cultural change.

NARA officials are creating new paths for carrying out the archive’s mission not because of changes in values or goals, which remain the same, but because the creators of records have embraced new tools for business communications in recent decades, just as they have in the corporate and academic worlds.

As Dan Cohen notes, it is worth considering how best to make born-digital and digitized materials “useful and used.” NARA is exploring various options for doing so within this new model for presidential libraries, just as it has since 2010, when it began its efforts to improve its web presence and online catalog, to modernize and increase transparency in the records management process, and to use technology to aid in archival processing and declassification efforts.

We are not facing the crisis that Fred Kaplan foresaw when he wrote, in a 2003 essay for Slate, about “The End of History.” Kaplan predicted recordkeeping chaos and voiced his fears about what would happen if there no longer were pages to turn in paper file folders. NARA’s ongoing efforts to preserve and make knowledge available provide all of us who care about archives the opportunity to make history together by gathering in “safe harbors” to talk through our perspectives on the issues with goodwill, inside and outside NARA. NARA has also given us the opportunity to draw on our individual experiences and skills as we embrace exciting chances to face present and future challenges together.

Notes:
6. Ibid.