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Hal Brands is Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis. In 2015-2016, he served as the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning.

Michael Donoghue is Associate Professor of History at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He earned his Ph.D. in History at the University of Connecticut at Storrs. His book, Borderland on the Isthmus: Race, Culture, and the Struggle for the Canal Zone, was published by Duke University Press in 2014. He has also co-authored—along with Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Robert Brigham—American Foreign Relations: A History, Volumes I and II (8th ed, 2014). He is currently working on a monograph on U.S. military-Cuban relations from 1939 to 1964.

Michaela Hoenicke-Moore is Associate Professor of History and Director of Graduate Studies at the University of Iowa. She is the author of Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945 (2010), which received SHAFR's Myrna F. Bernath Book Award in 2010. She is currently working on a project on nationalism and U.S. foreign policy.

Adam Howard is the General Editor of the Foreign Relations of the United States series at the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian. He is also Adjunct Professor of History and International Affairs at The George Washington University.

Ryan Irwin is Associate Professor of History at the University at Albany, SUNY. His book, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (2012), explored the fight against apartheid after African decolonization. He is currently writing a book about liberal internationalism.

Andrew L. Johns is Associate Professor of History at Brigham Young University and the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies. He is the author of Vietnam’s Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War (2010), and editor of four books including A Companion to Ronald Reagan (2015). He is the editor of Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review and general editor of the Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace book series published by the University Press of Kentucky. He was elected as President-elect of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association in 2017, and will serve as President of the PCB-AHA in 2018-2019.

Osamah Khalil is Associate Professor of History at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, and is the author of America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National Security State (2016).

Matt Loayza is Professor of History and Department Chair at Minnesota State University, Mankato. He teaches courses on the history of U.S. foreign relations, the Cold War, and various topics in modern U.S. history. He has published articles on inter-American relations during the Eisenhower presidency in Diplomacy and Statecraft and Diplomatic History. His current research focuses on cultural exchange programs during the 1950s.


Victor McFarland is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Missouri. His research interests center on oil and the energy industry, along with related topics including the environment, political economy, and U.S. relations with the Middle East. He is currently working on a book manuscript that examines the oil crisis of the 1970s.
Andrew C. McKevitt is Assistant Professor of History at Louisiana Tech University, where he has taught since 2012. After receiving his Ph.D. from Temple University in 2009, he taught at Philadelphia University and was a Hollybush Fellow in Cold War History at Rowan University. He received SHAFR's Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize in 2011, and his first book, *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of America*, will be published by the University of North Carolina Press in October 2017.

Simon Miles is Assistant Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. His current book project explores the causes of the end of the Cold War using recently declassified archival materials from both sides of the Iron Curtain. He completed his Ph.D. in History at the University of Texas at Austin.


Nicole M. Phelps is Associate Professor of History at the University of Vermont. She is the author of *U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference* (2013). Her current research project is a history of the U.S. Consular Service in the long nineteenth century.

Mark A. Stoler is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Vermont. He is the editor of *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, with the 7th and final volume published in 2016, and the author of numerous books and articles about U.S. strategy and diplomacy in World War II, as well as a biography of Marshall. He is also a past president of SHAFR.

Megan Threlkeld is Associate Professor of History at Denison University. Her first book was *Pan American Women: U.S. Internationalists and Revolutionary Mexico* (2014). Her current research explores the idea of world citizenship among U.S. women from the 1890s to the 1950s.

Lauren F. Turek is Assistant Professor of History at Trinity College in San Antonio, Texas, where she teaches courses on modern United States history, U.S. foreign relations, and public history. Her articles on religion in American politics and foreign policy have appeared in *Diplomatic History*, *Journal of American Studies*, and *Religions*. She is currently finishing her book project, *To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelicals, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Relations*, which will be published by Cornell University Press.

Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt is Assistant Professor of U.S. and Middle East History at California State University, Stanislaus. He received his B.A. from the University of California, Santa Cruz and his Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is currently working on a book titled, *Oil and the Limits of American Power in Iraq: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company, 1958-1975*.

Salim Yaqub is Professor of History at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and Director of UCSB’s Center for Cold War Studies and International History. He is the author of *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (2004) and *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S. Middle East Relations in the 1970s* (2016), as well as several articles and book chapters on the history of U.S. foreign relations, the international politics of the Middle East, and Arab American political activism.

Jason Zeledon received his Ph.D. in History from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 2016. He is the author of “As Proud as Lucifer: A Tunisian Diplomat in Thomas Jefferson's America,” which appeared in *Diplomatic History* in January 2017. His research explores how America's conflict with the Barbary pirates from 1784-1815 influenced the development of political parties, nationalism, and ideas about gender and race within the United States.

Silke Zoller is a Ph.D. candidate in History at Temple University. Her dissertation focuses on the development of international anti-terrorism policies during the 1970s. She earned her M.A. in Early Modern and Modern History at Eberhard Karls University in Tuebingen, Germany. Her research has been funded by SHAFR, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library Foundation, the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, and the Center for the Humanities at Temple, among others.
From the Chancery: Times Like These

Andrew L. Johns

Steph Curry and I both had excellent summers. The two-time NBA MVP won his second NBA championship in June and signed a $201 million, five-year contract in July. I was reappointed as editor of Passport for a five-year term (for slightly less money than Curry’s contract) and became a grandfather. Curry celebrated with a parade and by taking a well-deserved (and likely quite expensive) vacation. I celebrated by looking the other way while my wife predictably spoiled our granddaughter (both in utero and on an on-going basis) and by creating a new column in Passport. Really, whose life would you rather have?

SHAFR had an excellent summer as well. During our latest trip to the Renaissance in Arlington, we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the organization’s founding, had an excellent conference with terrific attendance (you can see some of the pictural evidence in the center of this issue), and witnessed Peter Hahn receive the first SHAFR Distinguished Service Award—has there ever been anyone more deserving of such an award? Exceptional scholarship continues to be published by members of SHAFR—certainly much faster than I can keep up with—and the organization continues to grow and diversify without losing its close-knit character and welcoming ethos. And as the chair of the Nominating Committee this year, I can assure you that we have another stellar group of candidates to help lead us into SHAFR’s next 50 years (PSA: the election information follows this essay).

Unfortunately, all of these positives stand in stark contrast to other things occurring in the worlds in which we live and work. Jacobin-esque forces continue to do everything they can to suppress heterodox views on college campuses. Violence or the threat of violence at Berkeley, Middlebury, and elsewhere endanger the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and academic freedom. Fear, anger, and outrage over issues ranging from the profoundly significant to the utterly trivial proliferate and make nearly impossible the civil discourse and compromise which should be the hallmarks of democracy.

These problems go beyond consternation about the 2016 presidential election results, although that certainly has played a role despite the obvious resiliency of the U.S. constitutional system. More disturbingly, the increasing polarization and Balkanization of our body politic and the ubiquitous demonization of our political “enemies” threatens to rend the fabric of our society to the point where it is almost unrecognizable and perhaps even unredeemable. During a Seattle City Council meeting earlier this year, for example, council member Kshama Sawant felt the need to assure everyone that she had no Republican friends. As Andrew Cline has written, “It is hard to form friendships with people we believe to be morally corrupt.” But, he continued, “If we cannot talk to each other, we cannot govern together. In a republic, governing requires conversation. How do we start that conversation if we view the person on the other side as an enemy rather than a fellow citizen with whom we have at least some shared interests and goals?”

The international environment is no more settled than the domestic one. Instability and conflict—whether political, military, economic, or social—dominate the world stage. We worry about the flood of refugees from war-torn areas of the globe. We wonder what our allies think of our political foibles while witnessing many of them grapple with their own internal confusion and dysfunction. We watch as a repressive regime that cannot feed its people tries desperately to become a nuclear power and develop the missile technology that will allow it to project that power. We witness carnage, depredations, and horror in conflicts that seemingly have no end in sight, while clashes of religion, resources, and ideology around the world threaten to erupt into even more widespread death and destruction. We see humanitarian crises, ethnic and sectarian strife, and lawlessness undermine civil society across the globe. And we wonder when, where, and on whom the next terrorist atrocity will leave a lasting mark.

Is this the kind of world that I want my granddaughter to inherit? Absolutely not. So what, then, can we do?

There are no easy answers, of course. And as historians we know that the world has always faced upheaval, war, and discontent in every era. But we, as members of SHAFR, are uniquely situated today to have a positive and significant influence on the communities—both academic and beyond—in which we live and work. In keeping with the themes of the pre-conference workshop co-sponsored by SHAFR and the Miller Center, many of our colleagues have taken the initiative in using their knowledge and wisdom to inform their commentaries on historical and contemporary issues at a time when that expertise and perspective is sorely needed—facts (actual, not alternative), as it turns out, do matter. If you have not checked out the new “Made by History” feature at the Washington Post that Nicole Hemmer has created and to which Mitch Lerner, Sarah Snyder, Jeff Engel, and other SHAFR members have contributed essays, it is well worth your time. We should take the lead on our campuses and in our classrooms in championing free speech—even (and especially) those ideas with which we do not agree—and encouraging open, honest, and thoughtful debate about actual ideas and solutions rather than parroting talking points, joining in with the shrill and ultimately pointless noise that makes up so much of our political discourse, or being sidetracked by banalities posing as existential crises. And we should realize that our differences should not overwhelm what we have in common...and that should be the starting point for addressing the challenges and recognizing the opportunities we have before us.

Steph Curry came into the NBA with questions about his durability, athleticism, and potential. After years of hard work and sacrifice, that skepticism has evaporated. We face challenges on our campuses, in our country, and in the world that can seem overwhelming, but that does not mean that we should not confront them and give our full measure of devotion to solving them. In times like these, we can and should do no less.
ATTENTION SHAFR MEMBERS

The 2017 SHAFR elections are upon us. Once again, Passport is publishing copies of the candidates’ biographies and statements by the candidates for president and vice-president as a way to encourage members of the organization to familiarize themselves with the candidates and vote in this year’s elections. Additional information, including brief CVs for each candidate, will be available on the electronic ballot.

“Elections belong to the people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their backs, then they will just have to sit on their blisters.” Abraham Lincoln

Passport would like to remind the members of SHAFR that voting for the 2017 SHAFR elections will begin in early August and will close on October 31. Ballots will be sent electronically to all current members of SHAFR. If you are a member of SHAFR and do not receive a ballot by the beginning of September, please contact the chair of the SHAFR Nominating Committee, Andrew Johns (andrew_johns@byu.edu) as soon as possible to ensure that you are able to participate in the election.

“The exercise of the elective franchise is a social duty of as solemn a nature as [a person] can be called to perform.” Daniel Webster

Last year in the 2016 SHAFR election, 599 members of SHAFR voted. Passport would like to encourage the membership of SHAFR to take the time to participate in our organization’s self-governance once again this year. As we have seen over the past year, elections have consequences.

“Every election is determined by the people who show up.” Larry J. Sabato

2017 SHAFR Election Candidates

President
Peter Hahn, Ohio State University

Vice President
Elizabeth Cobbs, Texas A&M University
Barbara Keys, University of Melbourne

Council
Scott Kaufman, Francis Marion University
Adriane Lentz-Smith, Duke University

Council
Melani McAlister, George Washington University
Hang Nguyen, Columbia University

Council (Graduate Student)
Alvita Akiboh, Northwestern University
Brian McNamara, Temple University

Nominating Committee
Gretchen Heefner, Northeastern University
Mitchell Lerner, Ohio State University
**Candidate for PRESIDENT (Choose 1)**

**Peter Hahn, The Ohio State University**

**Biographical Statement**

I am a specialist in U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. Having earned my doctorate in 1987 at Vanderbilt under the direction of Melvyn P. Leffler, I joined the History faculty at Ohio State in 1991, earned promotion to professor in 2004, served as department chair in 2006-15, and became dean of Arts & Humanities in 2015.

I have published seven books and dozens of articles, essays, and reviews. Based on extensive research in U.S., British, Israeli, and French archives (involving sources in English, Hebrew, and French), these publications have advanced the internationalization of our field. I have delivered scores of papers and lectures, speaking in ten countries. I have advised or co-advised 35 completed doctoral dissertations, taught thousands of undergraduates in formal courses, and led student and alumni education abroad programs in Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Italy, and Japan.

I have dedicated a good portion of my career to SHAFR. After joining the society as a graduate student and becoming a life member in 1989, I served as associate editor of *Diplomatic History* in 1991-2001. As executive director in 2002-15, I managed SHAFR at a time of substantial growth in its missions and impact. Under my direction, SHAFR’s annual operating budget grew six-fold and its endowment more than doubled. I launched *Passport* and the Summer Institute; established the Divine, Bemis, Williams, Hogan, and Young fellowships and the two dissertation prizes; professionalized and expanded the annual conference; and collaborated with presidents and council members on numerous other initiatives.

**Candidate Statement**

As president, I would strive to advance the many goals of SHAFR. I would build on the initiatives I supported and launched during my time as executive director. In particular, I would work hard to develop more financial support for graduate students and young scholars—financial support to foster the study of foreign languages, expand research opportunities, and nurture intellectual dialogue in summer colloquia and seminars. I would strive to build upon the progress SHAFR has made attracting women, under-represented minorities, and foreign scholars into our ranks. This diversity has significantly enriched our organization in recent years.

In practical terms, I would promote initiatives and managerial practices that facilitate research, scholarship, teaching, and public education. I would favor maintaining the broad range of methodological approaches that have developed in the field over recent decades, from the more traditional approaches focusing on security and formal diplomacy to the newer approaches embracing gender, ethnicity, culture, and other thematic concerns. I would seek to contextualize the society’s foundational focus on the U.S. experience in a sweeping international perspective. I would ensure that the journal, newsletter, website, and guide to the literature remain top-tier publications. I would explore the possibilities of joint conferences or other endeavors with other professional and learned societies. I would support initiatives to advance excellence in teaching.

I would demand efficient administrative practices including fiscal stability, clear and timely communications, proper governance, and robust opportunities for individual success.

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**Candidates for VICE PRESIDENT (Choose 1)**

**Elizabeth Cobbs, Texas A&M University**

**Biographical Statement**

My father grew up picking fruit in San Joaquin Valley and my mother selling corn at county fairs. They began a family in high school. I was a fortunate beneficiary of the feminist and civil rights movements that opened new career paths to many Americans, including the path of scholarship. This led me to Stanford, where I earned my Ph.D. in 1988, and to my first SHAFR conference that same summer.

SHAFR has been my intellectual home base for 30 years. I have served on Council, the Ferrell and Bernath Prize Committees, and as a mentor to students entering the job market.

Candidate Statement

A welcoming esprit de corps has long been SHAFR's greatest strength. As vice-president, I would build upon the far-sighted leadership that has made our congenial community ever more inclusive, especially with regard to foreign scholars and women. My goal would be to continue this trend by developing funds that help us involve historians from state colleges and universities, independent writers, and scholars of diverse backgrounds.

Before joining academia, I was an administrator in the non-profit world, which gave me extensive experience in chairing meetings, organizing events, managing budgets, and foundation fundraising. I would bring these skills to the vice-presidency along with a passion for SHAFR's mission. I am especially keen to encourage scholarship that reaches the general public. Our field makes a difference in how people around the world understand one another. At a time of resurgent nationalism, historians offer welcome perspective on age-old problems of war and diplomacy, chauvinism and cooperation. My vice-presidency would emphasize opportunities for sharing our research with audiences anxious to comprehend U.S. foreign relations. This might include initiatives to heighten the visibility of SHAFR members, engage policymakers, mentor scholars interested in writing op-eds, develop conference panels that explore documentary filmmaking, and educate members about digital opportunities—in addition to traditional scholarship.

I am also excited to build upon our commitment to intellectual diversity. Lively, respectful debates about controversial interpretations enhance scholarly rigor. If elected vice-president, I will seek every opportunity to involve members in nurturing our important, vibrant organization in these and other ways.

Barbara Keys, University of Melbourne

Biographical Statement

I received my Ph.D. from Harvard with Akira Iriye. In 2006 I moved to the University of Melbourne, where I am Associate Professor (Level D, comparable to U.S. full professor). I have been a visiting scholar at the Kennan Institute (Washington), Center for the Study of Law and Society (Berkeley), Center for European Studies (Harvard), and Institut für Europäische Geschichte (Mainz).

I have written two prizewinning books, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s (Harvard) and Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (Harvard), and over 20 journal articles and chapters on topics ranging from personal diplomacy to financial crises. My current work focuses on transnational efforts to create a more just world. I am editing a volume on moral claims in international sport for Penn Press and completing a book on anti-torture campaigns, based on research in eight countries and four languages. My research has been supported by the Social Science Research Council and Australian Research Council, among others. I serve on the editorial boards of Human Rights Quarterly and Modern American History, have given invited lectures in ten countries, and comment regularly in Australian media. I received the Bernath Lecture Prize.

I have been a committed SHA FR member for 25 years, one indication of which is my participation at ten of the last eleven conferences despite the distance from Australia. My SHA FR service includes the Nominating Committee, Membership Committee, Bernath Article Prize Committee, Status of Women Committee, and Diplomatic History Editorial Board.

Candidate Statement

If elected Vice President, I would pursue three broad aims. First, I would work hard to continue SHA FR's growth and to promote diversity, including developing new ways to welcome, integrate, and mentor newcomers. I advocate maintaining SHA FR's core focus while also embracing scholars whose international scholarship may not center on the United States. As an American-Australian dual national working outside the United States, I would work to expand SHA FR's international links, including with U.S. studies centers around the world, and would explore holding an annual conference abroad.

Second, I would focus on meeting new challenges. After years of increasing income, SHA FR is facing a tighter budget. I would seek to maintain progress in supporting graduate students, junior faculty, and non-U.S.-based scholars while spending more efficiently and raising income, especially through development. I would appoint a committee to examine how SHA FR could assist graduate students in a bleak job market. We must also defend historical inquiry as a vital component of a free society. Today our mission as educators is more urgent than ever. Building on current development efforts, I would inaugurate a fund to support teaching initiatives and innovative public outreach.

Finally, SHA FR has an enviable tradition of being well governed. I have honed administrative skills in a variety of positions at Melbourne (undergraduate chair, research chair, convenor of two conferences) and would use these skills to further transparency, fiscal prudence, and efficient and stable governance.
Candidates for COUNCIL: RACE #1 (Choose 1)

Scott Kaufman, Francis Marion University

I am a professor of History and chair of the Department of History at Francis Marion University in Florence, South Carolina. I have authored, co-authored, or edited nearly a dozen books, many of them with a focus on Cold War-era U.S. diplomacy, and the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. My latest monograph, *Ambition, Pragmatism, and Party: A Political Biography of Gerald Ford*, is forthcoming from the University Press of Kansas. At present, I am completing a study of the environment and international diplomacy from the turn of the twentieth century to the present, which will be published by Continuum. In 2007, I was named a Board of Trustees Research Scholar at Francis Marion University, and the following year I received a Fulbright Scholarship to serve as the Mary Ball Washington Professor of American History at University College Dublin in Ireland. From 2009-12, I was a member of SHAFR's Nominating Committee, serving as its chair during 2011-12. I have attended nearly every SHAFR conference since 1998 and look forward to the opportunity once again to serve the organization.

Adriane Lentz-Smith, Duke University

Adriane Lentz-Smith is Associate Professor of History at Duke University, where she holds secondary appointments in African & African-American Studies and Gender, Sexuality & Feminist Studies. Her interests lie in histories of the United States in the World, African Americans and the world, and placing local spaces in global currents. Lentz-Smith is the author of *Freedom Struggles: African Americans and World War I* (Harvard, 2009) and has written about the intersection of black freedom struggles and the American security project in articles and edited volumes. She is currently working on a new book project on African Americans, state violence, and late-Cold-War San Diego.

In SHAFR, Lentz-Smith served as Program Committee co-chair for the 2017 annual meeting and is currently co-chair of the Committee on Minority Historians. In the broader profession, she serves on the editorial boards of *Modern American History* as well as *Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism* and on the faculty advisory board of Duke University Press. She holds a B.A. in History from Harvard-Radcliffe and a Ph.D. in History from Yale University.

Candidates for COUNCIL: RACE #2 (Choose 1)

Melani McAlister, George Washington University

Melani McAlister is Associate Professor of American Studies and International Affairs at George Washington University in Washington, DC. She is the author of *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and US Interests in the Middle East* (2005, o. 2001), and co-editor of *Religion and Politics in the Contemporary United States* (2008). She recently completed *Our God in the World: The Global Visions of American Evangelicals*, forthcoming in 2018 from Oxford University Press. She is also co-editor of volume 4 of the forthcoming *Cambridge History of America and the World*. McAlister was the co-director of the program committee for the 2016 SHAFR conference, and a member of the 2015 program committee. She has served on the board of *Diplomatic History* and on the Hogan Fellowship Foreign Language prize committee. She recently chaired the hiring committee for a new SHAFR conference consultant. McAlister has received fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities and Princeton University's Davis Center for Historical Studies, among others. She currently serves on the editorial board of *Modern American History* and as a Distinguished Lecturer for OAH. She is beginning work on a project examining global responses to the Nigeria-Biafra war, 1967-70.

Lien-Hang Nguyen, Columbia University

Hi, I'm Hang Nguyen, the Dorothy Borg Associate Professor in the History of the United States and East Asia at Columbia University. My first book, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace*, was published by the University of North Carolina Press in 2012. Currently, I am working on a history of the Tet Offensive with Random House and serve as the general editor of the forthcoming three-volume *Cambridge History of the Vietnam War*. I am also the co-editor of *Cambridge Studies in U.S. Foreign Relations* series with Cambridge University Press. SHAFR has been my home since 1998 and I presented at my first annual meeting in 2003. Since then, I have been elected to the Nominating Committee, serve on multiple prize and service committees, and am currently co-chair of the Committee on Minority Historians. I have also served as cochair of program committee (2013) and helped bring the annual meeting to Lexington, KY (2014). Some highlights of my career involve giving the 2014 Bernath Lecture, participating in the 2012 Library of Congress National Book Festival, appearing in the forthcoming CNN 1968 documentary series, and commenting on a UFO sighting for a National Geographic and Discovery Science documentary.
Candidates for COUNCIL: GRADUATE STUDENT REPRESENTATIVE (Choose 1)

Alvita Akiboh, Northwestern University

Alvita Akiboh is a doctoral candidate in history at Northwestern University. Her research focuses on material culture and national identity in the U.S. colonial empire. Akiboh's recent Diplomatic History article, “Pocket-Sized Imperialism: U.S. Designs on Colonial Currency,” examines how U.S. officials used money to introduce American iconography to colonial subjects in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Akiboh first attended SHAFR in 2012, and returned as presenter in 2016, having organized a panel on material culture and U.S. empire. In 2017, she presented on the wartime experiences of people living in the U.S. Pacific colonies. Akiboh received SHAFR's Stuart L. Bernath Research Grant in 2017, which she used to conduct archival research in Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawai’i, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Her research has also been supported by the Smithsonian Institute, the Buffett Institute for International Studies, and the Bentley Historical Library.

Brian McNamara, Temple University

Brian McNamara is a third-year Ph.D. student in history at Temple University. Working under Dr. Petra Goedde's supervision, Brian researches U.S. foreign relations with Angola during the Cold War. Brian has served on his department's Graduate History Student Association executive board, and was recently named his department's outstanding graduate student in U.S. history.

Brian worked with Dr. Richard Immerman as the Davis Fellow at Temple’s Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, where he coordinated CENFAD's everyday activities, collaborated with graduate students to produce numerous book reviews and student profiles, and expanded CENFAD's intellectual boundaries by initiating a series of interviews with leading scholars in the field about their research and methodology. The author of a forthcoming review in Passport, Brian has long appreciated his association with SHAFR, and desires to contribute his collaborative spirit to council to advance SHAFR's institutional goals and to represent the society's graduate students.

Candidates for NOMINATING COMMITTEE (Choose 1)

Gretchen Heefner, Northeastern University

Gretchen Heefner is associate professor of history at Northeastern University. Her work explores the surprisingly intimate relations between national security regimes and the everyday by combining military, environmental, and social histories. Gretchen is the author of The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the America Heartland (Harvard University Press, 2012), as well as recent articles in Diplomatic History, Environmental History, and Endeavour. She is currently working on a book about the environmental history of sand and international ideas about aridity and deserts. In 2015, she co-organized a conference on U.S. military bases at Temple's Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy. Gretchen serves on SHAFR's Committee on Historical Documentation (term ending 2018), and the SHAFR program committee (for 2017 and 2018). She recently joined Diplomatic History’ editorial board.

Mitchell Lerner, Ohio State University

Mitchell Lerner is associate professor of history and director of the Institute for Korean Studies at The Ohio State University. He is the author of The Pueblo Incident (Kansas), which won the John Lyman Book Prize, and editor of Looking Back at LBJ (Kansas); A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson (Blackwell); and co-editor of The “Tocqueville Oscillation”: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1945 (Kentucky, forthcoming). He is the founding editor of Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review, and was an original member of the SHAFR Teaching Committee. He served on SHAFR council from 2008-2011, on the local arrangements committee for the 2008 SHAFR conference, and co-directed the SHAFR summer institute in 2015. He has held the Mary Ball Washington Distinguished Fulbright Chair at UC Dublin, and has won Ohio State’s highest teaching honor, the Alumni Association Distinguished Teaching Award.
Salim Yaqub, *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.–Middle East Relations in the 1970s*

Victor McFarland

American politics have never stopped at the water’s edge. Even when it comes to U.S. relations with the Middle East, a region that can seem particularly distant and unfamiliar to many Americans, the boundary between foreign and domestic affairs has always been porous.

Two recent examples illustrate this point. First, a central theme of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign was the alleged security threat that Muslim immigrants pose to the United States. Trump pointed to events both at home and abroad, including the San Bernardino and Orlando shootings, the rise of ISIS, the war in Syria, and even street crime in countries like Germany and Sweden, to justify his proposed ban on Muslims entering the country. Second, Trump’s May 2017 visit to Saudi Arabia included not only the usual affirmations of a close U.S.-Saudi partnership, but also the announcement of business arrangements worth billions of dollars, including U.S. arms sales to the kingdom and Saudi investments in the United States. Trump promised that the deals would benefit the domestic U.S. economy and create new jobs for struggling American workers.

Most historical scholarship, however, focuses on either foreign policy or domestic affairs rather than on their intersection. Salim Yaqub’s new book *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.–Middle East Relations in the 1970s* is an impressive exception to that rule – and one that should be required reading for anyone seeking to understand the roots of the current U.S. relationship with the Arab world. Among the many important points in this book, Yaqub shows that both phenomena discussed above – American fears of Arab terrorism and the conflicted American attitude toward the Gulf nations and their “petrodollars” – were deeply shaped by the events of the 1970s.

The 1970s were a pivotal period for the U.S.-Arab relationship because of critical episodes like the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War, and a series of dramatic increases in oil prices. The dominant thread in Yaqub’s story is the Arab-Israeli peace process, which Yaqub argues was deliberately designed by Henry Kissinger to produce never-ending negotiations. Those talks prevented full-scale war, but they also prevented any comprehensive peace settlement that might have forced a complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967.

*Imperfect Strangers* looks beyond diplomatic history to include other, more neglected aspects of the U.S.-Arab relationship. Yaqub’s narrative incorporates cultural history, like portrayals of Arabs in political thriller novels from the 1970s involving petro-intrigue, terrorism, and war in the Middle East. Yaqub also describes the broader experiences of Arab Americans during the 1970s, as their community dealt with hostile stereotypes shaped by other Americans’ views on terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as heightened surveillance and travel restrictions by the U.S. government. Despite those challenges, however, the status of Arab Americans improved over the course of the decade, at least in some respects – partly because of changing demographics as Arab immigration to the United States increased after the mid-1960s, partly because of the community’s heightened visibility during a time when U.S.-Arab relations were often in the news, and partly because of Arab Americans’ own efforts to organize themselves politically. Proponents of that effort, like U.S. senator James Abourezk (D-SD), activist Muhammad Mehdi, and Columbia University scholar Edward Said, are some of the most fascinating characters in Yaqub’s story.

The reviewers in this roundtable are unanimous in their praise of Yaqub’s integration of diplomatic, cultural, and diasporic history. Adam Howard commends Yaqub for “moving beyond a strict political and economic analysis of the U.S.-Arab relationship to include a broader context of culture and domestic politics.” Osamah Khalil praises Yaqub’s “rich and engaging narrative,” which is strengthened by its attention to Arab American history and popular culture. Melani McAlister writes that *Imperfect Strangers* is “beautifully written” as well as “nuanced” and “careful,” noting that it offers “an enormously valuable corrective to studies that have all but ignored the role of the Arab diaspora in US-Middle East relations.” And Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt highlights Yaqub’s “innovative methodological approach,” which incorporates “transnational Arab perspectives and experiences.”

Howard, Khalil, and Wolfe-Hunnicutt raise a few questions about Yaqub’s work. Howard writes that Israeli primary sources (some now available online) could have enriched Yaqub’s discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Khalil argues that Yaqub should have added films like *Three Days of the Condor* and television shows like *M*A*S*H* to his discussion of the popular media. He also suggests that Yaqub’s portrayal of Arab Americans is too optimistic,
and that any improvements in their status during the 1970s were outweighed by continued discrimination, stereotyping, and ignorance on the part of other Americans. Finally, Wolfe-Hunnicutt argues that Yaqub could have been more critical in his account of Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy. Wolfe-Hunnicutt points to longstanding allegations that Carter and his national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, deliberately provoked the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. In his response, Yaqub pushes back against several of these critiques, particularly Khalil’s.

One other aspect of Imperfect Strangers worth mentioning is that, as a history of the U.S.-Arab relationship, it does not cover events in non-Arab nations. It will be an invaluable addition to courses on U.S. relations with the Middle East. Instructors planning their teaching units on the 1970s, however, may want to supplement Imperfect Strangers with shorter readings on episodes like the 1979 revolution in Iran.

Yaqub’s work is an enormously valuable addition to several fields of scholarship. It contributes to the growing literature on the global 1970s, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the Arab American diaspora, and the history of the late twentieth-century United States. It also provides a model for scholarship that seamlessly combines domestic and international affairs, one that should be emulated by other historians in the future.

Review of Salim Yaqub, Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s

Adam Howard

All views expressed in this essay are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government.

Salim Yaqub’s ambitious Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s provides a sweeping overview of a pivotal decade in the history of the U.S. relationship with the Arab world. The Arab-Israeli dispute and oil dominated this relationship during the 1970s, and Yaqub explores them in all of their gradations, from their impact on politics and economics to their effect on Arab Americans and even U.S. popular culture. Through a combination of research in the U.S. and British National Archives and the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidential libraries as well as memoirs, interviews, and a voluminous secondary literature, Yaqub’s study offers a deep understanding of these issues and contextualizes them within the domestic politics both in the United States and the Middle East.

Yaqub’s most significant contribution to our understanding of this period is his inclusion of the Arab-American experience within the context of this tumultuous era, which was dominated by war, oil shocks, terrorism, and high-stakes negotiations. As much as he utilizes textual research, Yaqub draws heavily from interviews for this portion of the book, featuring various figures who played a vital role in what he argues was a turning point in the American view of Arabs living both in the Middle East and the United States. In particular, he focuses on the origins of the Association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG) and the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA). Leading Arab American voices arose from these organizations, which were inspired by the activist movements during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

This display shows the humanity among these voices, introducing the reader to people like Abdeen Jabara, a lawyer who was one of the founding fathers of the AAUG. This seemingly indefatigable activist threw himself into the anti-Vietnam War, civil rights, and Third World solidarity movements while working tirelessly to rectify what he perceived as an imbalanced U.S. policy favoring Israel over the Arabs. Yaqub also highlights dramatic (and sometimes amusing) episodes involving these Arab-American leaders. In one episode, he describes how a contingent of Arab-Israelis attempted to engage AAUG members at its annual convention in 1970, leading to a dramatic showdown where the AAUG president, law professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, got between the two groups in the convention hotel while Edward Said, a founding member of the AAUG and an up-and-coming academic, yelled “provocateurs” at the Israelis (68). Ultimately, the Israelis turned back, but anecdotes such as these bring to life the personalities that helped raise Arab-American consciousness during this decade.

Yaqub also sheds light on the challenges facing Arab Americans, especially from international events that impacted them at home. After the 1972 Munich Olympics, when eight Black September Organization operatives killed eleven Israeli athletes, many Arab Americans felt they became targets in the United States. A Lebanese American from Cleveland lamented that the Munich tragedy burdened her with “guilt by ethnic association” and made her a “hyphenated” American.

Yet just one year later, Arab Americans would find their collective spirits lifted as they united in support of the Arab cause during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. After the collective sense of humiliation that followed the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, they celebrated the initial success of the Egyptian and Syrian armies during the first days of the October War. Thousands marched in the streets of American cities, either “to back Arab claims or criticize their own government’s support for Israel” (112). Although the war ended in a military defeat for Egypt and Syria, Arab Americans embraced a newfound pride as a result of the initial Egyptian and Syrian military successes as well as the Arab oil producers’ effective use of an oil embargo and price increases to compel the world to heed their agenda and take them seriously.

This Arab-American “awakening” had its limitations, however. Throughout Yaqub’s narrative, it is clear that for each effort by Arab Americans to promote the Arab cause, there was a counterforce in the United States of much greater size and influence. During the October War, Arab Americans organized pro-Arab demonstrations in major cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Washington, and San Diego that attracted, in total, a few thousand people. In New York City alone, 75,000 people attended a pro-Israel rally in a single day. Yet just after the October War ended and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger launched his “shuttle diplomacy” between Israel and Arab states, there was an evolution of the Arab image in the West. As Kissinger wryly remarked to Syrian foreign minister...
‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam in 1974, “I’m transforming your leadership from being abstract devils into real leaders with real concerns” (157). Although Kissinger took the credit for this transformation through his diplomacy, it was really part of a process shaped by many actors. As Yaqub notes, by the mid-1970s, many Americans came to view Arabs as more “pragmatic than fanatical, methodical rather than reckless, constructive and broad-minded rather than bitter and vindictive” (157).

Within Yaqub’s more traditional analysis of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East, two presidents and a secretary of state dominate the story—Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Henry Kissinger (Gerald Ford operates mostly in Kissinger’s shadow). Yaqub presents Nixon as well attuned to the dangers of the status quo in the Arab-Israeli dispute, but ultimately unable (or unwilling) to risk a confrontation with the domestic forces that sought to protect Israel from vacating the occupied territories. Yaqub covers the familiar discussion of Nixon’s Machiavellian maneuvering as commander-in-chief, but he shows the president in a somewhat sympathetic light: in his view, Nixon recognized the dangers of a U.S. policy that favored Israel, but tragically failed to tackle the issue head on for fear of expending too much political capital. And once the Watergate investigation accelerated, Nixon focused on political survival over foreign policy.

With Nixon’s precipitous political decline, Kissinger’s star ascended. Yaqub reveals Kissinger’s initial apathy toward the region while serving as the national security adviser, leaving Middle East policy primarily to Secretary of State William Rogers. However, the October 1973 War forced Kissinger’s hand, only a month after he had become the Secretary of State. With Nixon sidelined by the Watergate investigation, Kissinger became the de facto leader of U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. Yaqub credits him with elevating the stature of Arabs during his various “shuttle diplomacy” missions between 1973 and 1975. In the end, however, Yaqub contends that Kissinger’s diplomacy aligned with the Israelis on borders and the Palestinian issue primarily because of his personal history. Although some people have argued that Kissinger experienced a stormy relationship with the Israelis during shuttle diplomacy, Yaqub quotes from Kissinger’s memoir to show that he viewed Israel as an ally “closely linked with my family’s fate in the Holocaust” (149). It is not surprising, Yaqub argues, that a Jewish refugee from 1930s Germany would observe Israel “through the prism of the Nazi light: in his view, Nixon recognized the real concerns” (157). Although Kissinger took the credit for these sweeping movements from topic to topic may seem jarring, but as Yaqub notes in the introduction, his general approach is “to engage with individual historiographic issues as they arise in the narrative, rather than making overarching claims at the outset” (12).

Ultimately, a nimble reader is rewarded with intriguing narratives that move from a chapter detailing the drama of the October 1973 War to one that features an engaging analysis of former Vice President Spiro Agnew’s 1976 novel, The Canfield Decision, a fictional story that appeared to reflect Agnew’s views on the U.S. relationship with Israel.

One issue that stands out in this study is Israel’s role in the narrative. Although this is a study of the American relationship with the Arab world during the 1970s, the Israelis are a significant part of that dynamic. Yet apart from Moshe Dayan’s memoir, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations, the Israeli story is drawn from the secondary literature or from newspaper accounts. Yaqub works well with these sources, but it is surprising to see no use of Israeli archival material, especially the Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel series, which is available online. It would have enriched the story to see more of the Israeli perspective through their own documents. Overall, however, Yaqub’s research casts a wide net and includes the most recent secondary literature covering the region during the 1970s.

Because the material from this decade is so rich, it is impossible for Yaqub to do justice to it all. Several of the stories he recounts are worthy of their own books. For example, when discussing Andrew Young’s role as the U.S. ambassador to the UN and his resignation after meeting with the PLO’s UN representative (in violation of a 1975 U.S. agreement not to negotiate with the PLO), Yaqub touches on the black community’s anger toward organized American Jewry. Seeing a hero of the civil rights movement forced to resign from a high-level position in the U.S. government, apparently because of pressure from Israel and its U.S. supporters, struck a nerve and revived long-standing grievances between the black and Jewish communities over issues such as busing and affirmative action. This story alone is worth a monograph, but of course, it would be too much to ask Yaqub to go beyond the limited coverage he provides on this issue when he has so much to discuss.

But this episode, among others, speaks to the rich and dynamic material of the 1970s as it relates, even tangentially, to the U.S. relationship with the Arab world. It also speaks to Yaqub’s contribution to the scholarly literature on this
Review of Salim Yaqub’s Imperfect Strangers

Melani McAllister

Salim Yaqub’s beautifully written cultural and political history of relations between the United States and the Arab world explores diplomacy and geopolitics in the context of cultural discourse about the Middle East. Yaqub attends to the work of grassroots political activists, particularly Arab Americans, and offers an enormously valuable corrective to studies that have all but ignored the role of the Arab diaspora in U.S.-Middle East relations. This nuanced, careful book will be valuable for scholars and teachers, and useful in courses on U.S. foreign policy, U.S.-Middle East relations, ethnicity in the United States, and transnational American studies.

Yaqub makes four important contributions. First, he adds to a burgeoning scholarship in international affairs that highlights the importance of the 1970s, focusing on how new actors and networks shaped the U.S. role in the world. In this, Yaqub joins scholars who focus on grassroots activity such as support for human rights (Bradley, Keys, Moyn and Ecke1), humanitarianism (Burnett, Davey2), and Third World solidarity (Lubin, Young3).

For Yaqub, the 1970s are important not only in terms of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war or the Iran hostage crisis, but also because of the ways in which longer-term changes began to push U.S. policymakers, and parts of the U.S. public, to become more involved in the region. He examines carefully U.S. responses to the changing politics of oil—the embargo of 1973, price increases, and the sense of insecurity expressed by policymakers and the public alike.

His second contribution is methodological. Yaqub moves nicely between traditional diplomatic history, with a focus on key players like Kissinger and Nixon, and an approach that highlights non-state actors, including Arab Americans, journalists, and, sometimes, novelists. In one of the book’s most unusual chapters, Yaqub analyzes the spate of speculative writing about the Arab threat in the middle 1970s, looking at both fiction—the ubiquitous novel of Arab terrorism—and political commentary in mainstream news media. The analysis does more than prove that Arabs were represented poorly, although that was undoubtedly the case; it also highlights how much these American texts represented a vision of the United States in decline, with American failure paired with the supposed rise of the Arab oil weapon. Israelis also featured frequently in these stories, their prowess serving as counterpoint to American weakness and lack of will.

Yaqub’s reading of the novels and other popular writing is part of the project throughout, as he weaves together a range of sources for understanding popular discourse and official policy. He describes anti-Arab jokes that circulated in the United States and jokes about the peace process that made the rounds in Egypt or Israel. These give a texture to the book that I found very valuable, offering readers, including students, a sense of the “look and feel” of a cultural moment. (Perin Gürel’s new book on Turkish images of the West does similarly rich work.4)

Third, Yaqub’s attention to Arab Americans as political actors is remarkably thorough and compelling. We have had some excellent work in recent years that brings Arab Americans more fully into the transnational histories of U.S.-Middle East relations (Abdulhadi, Alsultany, and Naber; Feldman; Pennock5), but nothing else has traced the activist history in this period with such depth and nuance. Yaqub offers the best history yet of the Association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG), an organization with a clear left-liberal agenda and a highly intellectual cohort, including, early on, Edward Said. The AAUG was never a particularly large organization, but it was a significant one because of its clear and consistent analyses of U.S. policy. It provided a home for diasporic activism combined with a political critique that the group shared with other kinds of left-wing political organizations. The AAUG never changed the world—few of the organizations that Yaqub traces did—but Yaqub’s analysis shows the importance of activism even when activists are not particularly successful in advancing their agenda. As Arab Americans developed their own analyses of events in the region, their investments mattered, even if Presidents Ford or Carter or Congress remained unconvinced. The AAUG in particular played a significant role in reshaping Middle East studies, which did have a real long-term impact both inside and outside policymaking circles (see Lockman6).

Yaqub’s approach to studying Arab Americans as political actors enables him to make an argument for why religion was not particularly important in this period (except during the conflict in Lebanon, which I return to below).

Religious affiliation was not a broadly defining issue in political relations between Americans and Arabs. Most Arabs were Muslim and most Arab Americans Christian. Arabs and Arab Americans alike, however, offered critiques of U.S. policy that owed much more to pan-Arab solidarity, or to broader political values such as the right of self-determination and the sanctity of human rights, than to religious identity. Similarly, while many American Jews identified with Israel, and many more American gentiles respected this stance, relatively few Americans in the 1970s publicly portrayed the U.S.-Arab encounter as part of an age-old contest between Christendom and Islam (15).

As a scholar who writes frequently about the history of religion, I found this compelling. One of the core principles of religious history is that religious feelings, affiliations, and practices are never simply a given. They are constructed, cultivated, and cofounded in particular historical circumstances. We cannot assume that religion will always be central to any particular region or conflict. Given how deeply the idea of an inherent conflict between Christianity and Islam has much the assumptions about Christianity versus Islam have seeped into our modern-day political culture, Yaqub offers a valuable reminder it quite valuable for us to be reminded of the ways in which other sets of affiliations, including pan-Arabism, internationalism, economic interests, and ideologies of left versus right, were the fundamental shapers of conflicts in the Middle East in this period. It is worth remembering that religion was not a dominant part of how most Americans, including policymakers, understood the region.

Finally, I found one of the most important contributions of the book to be Yaqub’s discussion of the Lebanon civil war of 1975–79. The chapter on the war explains the conflict in very clear terms, accounting for but not getting lost in the shifting alliances among the Maronite Christians who made up the majority of the Right; the Sunni and Shi’a Left; the PLO; and Syria, Israel, Egypt, and the United States. Too often this war is underestimated in discussions of U.S. policy in the Middle East. (Daniel Sargent’s wonderful A
Superpower Transformed, for example, mentions Lebanon not at all.) Yaqub shows how the complex situation in Lebanon exposed weakness in the U.S. stance in the region. The religiously based confessional system in Lebanon gave disproportionate power to the Maronite Christians, with government positions and proportional representation based on the census of 1932. (That census was never officially repeated, lest recognition of the changing demographics of Lebanon upset the precarious balance of political power.)

Opposed to the generally right-wing Maronite groups was the Lebanese Left, comprising most Sunni and Shia, as well as Druze and some Christian supporters. The PLO was something of a wildcard, aligned with the Left but also the cause of some resentment from Lebanese who did not approve of the “state within a state” the PLO had established in South Lebanon. The PLO’s presence drew Israeli attention, and ultimately Israeli fire. The U.S. alliance with Israel, and Israel’s de facto alliance with the Maronites, put the United States in opposition to the PLO. For a complex set of reasons, Syria also positioned itself in opposition to both the Palestinians and the Lebanese Left, and a Syrian incursion into Lebanon in 1976 nearly destroyed the PLO. Although the United States had had remarkably little direct influence on events in Lebanon, U.S. policy benefited from the conflict. “We didn’t plan it but we have broken the Arab united front,” Kissinger marveled. “I cannot say we planned on the Syrians to grind up on the PLO.” he added later in a conversation with former White House Counsel Leonard Garment, “but it is working out well” (226).

The multiple and shifting alliances were part of what made the Lebanon conflict so difficult for Arab American groups, and Yaqub is unspARING in his analysis of their unwillingness to develop anything other than platitudes in response to the war (although they sometimes did give much-needed humanitarian aid). Most Arab Americans were of Lebanese descent, but the Lebanese community in the United States was generally divided and confused. The exception was the AAUG, which published a 1975 pamphlet written by two professors, political scientist Leila Meo and literary critic Edward Said, both of whom supported the pan-Arab vision of the Lebanese Left. Most other groups had little to say. The National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) found itself befuddled by the war that threatened their vision of Lebanon as a haven for moderation.

They had little familiarity with Lebanese politics and did not know quite what to make of the civil war. Up till now, their primary frame of reference for understanding the Middle East had been the Arab-Israeli conflict and their own “evenhanded” approach to resolving it. Pre-1975 Lebanon fit comfortably into the evenhanded vision; it could even be seen as its regional embodiment. Lebanon was pro-American and pro-Arab, an oasis of liberal entrepreneurialism and a haven for Palestinians. The country’s rapid disintegration, however, showed that each component of this formula was bitterly opposed by significant segments of Lebanese society (220).

As their natal country was being torn apart—with Syria occupying much of the country, more than 15,000 Lebanese and Palestinians had died by June 1976—Lebanese Americans were helpless to do much more than worry from afar. James Abourezk, the Arab American senator from South Dakota, did manage to get Congress to appropriate a modest $20 million in humanitarian aid.

Then, in 1978, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in response to a PLO incursion into Israel. Thousands were killed and tens of thousands became refugees. In the United States, the pro-Arab organizations rallied from their confusion to denounce Israeli actions. But Israel had its own narrative, one that found resonance in the United States: Prime Minister Menachem Begin started to overtly champion the cause of Lebanese Christians, saying they were being persecuted by Palestinian and Lebanese Muslims.

It is impossible to read Yaqub’s detailed but highly lucid account of the war, both as it was lived in Lebanon and as it was received and debated in the United States, without a sense of foreboding. Anyone who knows what the 1982 invasion of Lebanon wrought will recognize the seeds of it in the events of the 1970s. Soon, there would be the massive Israeli incursion, the ensuing murderous attacks on the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila by Maronite militias, and, ultimately, the devastating civil war that nearly destroyed Lebanon in the 1980s. It is impossible to read Yaqub’s detailed but highly lucid account of the war, both as it was lived in Lebanon and as it was received and debated in the United States, without a sense of foreboding. Anyone who knows what the 1982 invasion of Lebanon wrought will recognize the seeds of it in the events of the 1970s. Soon, there would be the massive Israeli incursion, the ensuing murderous attacks on the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila by Maronite militias, and, ultimately, the devastating civil war that nearly destroyed Lebanon in the 1980s.

Notes:
5. Rabab Abdulhadi, Evelyn Alsultany, and Nadine Naber, eds., Arab & Arab American Feminisms: Gender, Violence, & Belonging
The Tragedy of U.S.-Arab Relations in the 1970s

Review of Salim Yaqub, Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s

Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt

Salim Yaqub's Imperfect Strangers offers a valuable contribution to the study of U.S.-Middle East relations. The book begins with a description of Sirhan Sirhan's June 1968 assassination of Robert F. Kennedy. Just as was the case with the assassination of Robert's brother John five years earlier, media reports described the murder as a "senseless act" that lacked any sort of political motive whatsoever.1 Newspapers invoked the existential philosophy of Albert Camus to explain that the "only way to understand such maniacally absurd events is to see the absurd itself as all the answer there is." (3).

Yaqub employs this story to illustrate the yawning gulf between the way that many Americans understood the RFK assassination and the meaning that many Arabs in the United States and beyond took from the act. Whereas many Americans simply could not understand why anyone would want to kill the Democrats' best chance to stop peace candidate Eugene McCarthy from capturing the party's nomination in that year's primary contest, many Arabs saw the assassination as a deeply political act. Sirhan was a Palestinian refugee who had been driven from his home as a child during the 1948 War. He eventually settled in Pasadena, where he experienced a deep sense of alienation and outrage over U.S. support for Israel, especially in the aftermath of the 1967 War. He committed the assassination in the context of an election year in which Kennedy was trying to mobilize voter support by championing the transfer of U.S. Phantom warplanes to Israel. While the American press vilified Sirhan, many Arabs celebrated him as a heroic resistance fighter.

This story illustrates the deep sense of estrangement that had come to characterize U.S.-Arab relations by the late 1960s. For Yaqub, the assassination also marks the symbolic opening of a particularly turbulent decade in the history of the U.S.-Arab encounter. As Yaqub explains, it was in the 1970s that "American and Arabs became an inescapable presence in each other's lives and perceptions, and members of each society came to feel profoundly vulnerable to the political, economic, cultural, and even physical encroachments of the other." Yaqub sees these as "fundamental patterns" that established "much of the tone and substance of U.S.-Arab relations as they have unfolded in subsequent decades." (7).

To support this thesis, Yaqub mines recently declassified U.S. government records and examines published Arabic language sources to construct a truly balanced account in which American and transnational Arab perspectives and experiences are given equal analytical weight and consideration. Moreover, rather than limiting himself to an analysis of state-to-state relations on the basis of diplomatic records, Yaqub employs an innovative methodological approach that draws on demography (chaps. 2–3) and popular cultural analysis (chap. 6) to better situate American foreign policy within a domestic political context. In this regard he finds that Arab Americans experienced a curious "double movement" in the years under analysis (6–7, 344–47).

On the one hand, as a result of high-profile acts of Palestinian terrorism such as the Robert Kennedy assassination and many more that would follow in the early 1970s, Arab Americans saw their social status become increasingly precarious. The Nixon administration subjected Arab Americans to what might be thought of as an early form of "extreme vetting," particularly in the wake of the 1972 Munich massacre. "Operation Boulder," as the program came to be known, entailed "aggressive screening" of Arabs seeking to enter the United States, waiting periods for entry visas for Arab visitors, and extensive surveillance of Arab American organizations and activities (98). Yaqub sees in these measures a "‘dry run’ for the draconian measures directed at domestic Arabs and Muslims in the wake of 9/11" (89).

However, on the other side of this "double movement," Yaqub shows how increased Arab immigration made possible by the 1965 Immigration Act, which did away with the system of racial quotas established in the World War I era, opened the door to powerful social movements in support of Arab American civil rights (10, 58–9). Among the Arab Americans who achieved prominence in this era are two men who play recurring roles in Yaqub's drama: Edward Said, the pioneering scholar of Orientalism (1978) and later spokesman for the Palestinian National Council—the PLO's "parliament in exile"; and Senator James Abourezk (1973–79), the populist Democrat from South Dakota who worked tirelessly to defend Arab American civil liberties, hold oil companies accountable, and forge a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Yaqub's analysis of the efforts of these two men tells us a great deal about the possibilities and limits of Arab American social activism in the 1970s. Both figures faithfully represented Arab and Palestinian concerns on the national and world stages. It is perhaps a testament to their success that "a December [1973] Gallup poll found that only 6 percent of Americans blamed the energy crisis on the Arab countries, whereas 25 percent blamed the oil companies, which many believed were exaggerating the oil shortage to maximize profits, and 25 percent blamed the U.S. government, which stood accused of failing to plan for the contingency" (153). But ultimately both Said and Abourezk ran headlong into an array of forces and factors that militated against any change in American foreign policy with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Perhaps the most powerful of those forces was Henry Kissinger. As Yaqub notes, throughout the period under analysis, there was a broad international consensus in favor of a resolution to the conflict. Most world leaders agreed that Israel should withdraw from the territories occupied during the June 1967 War and allow a Palestinian state to emerge in the West Bank and Gaza, while the Palestinian leadership and the leaderships of the surrounding Arab states should in turn recognize Israel's right to exist (6–9, 13, 359). Even U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers (1969–72), who did not go so far as to advocate for a Palestinian state, believed that Israel's occupation of Arab lands undermined American interests elsewhere in the region (26–9). Rogers was mostly concerned with American oil interests in the Gulf and feared that Saudi Arabia or other Arab Gulf states might retaliate against the United States by nationalizing American firms.

Yaqub demonstrates in precise detail how Kissinger ignored these concerns and tried to subvert any effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by restoring the 1967...
borders and recognizing the Palestinian right to self-determination. As Yaqub makes clear, Kissinger viewed the conflict through the lens of Cold War globalism; in his view, Israel was a “friend,” and any pressure on it would undermine America’s system of global alliances and redound to the benefit of America’s “enemies” (13, 26–9, 53).

Kissinger’s vision of friends and enemies was so static that he was unwilling to acknowledge Palestinian efforts to moderate their position on Israel (57–9) and Anwar al-Sadat’s effort to reorient Egyptian foreign policy away from an alignment with the USSR and toward an alignment with the United States (chap. 4). After floating “rumors of war” for more than six months, Arab forces finally struck Israeli positions in October 1973, triggering the economic cataclysm that Rogers feared: Arab oil producers announced a production cut and shipping embargo against the United States and other states supporting Israel. The Shah of Iran, who did not join the Arab embargo and remained allied with Israel, then took advantage of the crisis atmosphere to dramatically increase the price of oil just as Americans prepared for a cold winter.2 Households and firms turned down thermostats and “scrapped Christmas light displays”; airlines cancelled flights and announced major layoffs. The national unemployment figure increased dramatically; simultaneously, a spike in the general cost of living forced firms to dramatically increase the price of goods. The national unemployment figure increased dramatically; simultaneously, a spike in the average cost of living forced economists to contend with the heretofore-unknown phenomenon of “stagflation” (153).

The economic devastation brought about by the oil crisis ultimately convinced Kissinger that “everything would have to change to remain the same.” The oil shock that rippled through the U.S. economy, occurring so soon after the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, came at a moment of acute vulnerability and insecurity and reinforced popular notions of American imperial decline. To stave off this sense of decline, Kissinger shifted the terms of the diplomatic discourse surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict away from a comprehensive settlement and toward bilateral negotiations between Egypt and Israel (153–54).

It is here that Yaqub sees Kissinger as most tragically successful. While blind to Anwar al-Sadat’s early efforts to shift Egypt’s foreign policy away from an alliance with the Soviet Union and toward alignment with the United States and the Gulf states, Kissinger eventually came to see that Egypt could be drawn off the Arab-Israeli battlefield. Egypt’s removal as a frontline state would then make a new Arab-Israeli war highly unlikely, if not altogether impossible. Moreover, Egypt’s defection from the Soviet camp would fundamentally alter the balance of forces in the region and redound to the strategic advantage of the United States (338).

Perhaps most tragic of all, Kissinger accomplished this geopolitical realignment in a way that precluded recognizing Palestinians as legitimate representatives of Palestinian interests. This much became clear after the Carter administration came into office in January 1977. Yaqub shows that Carter made a good faith effort to negotiate a comprehensive settlement to the conflict and to bring Palestinians into the negotiating process. Carter, however, faced an Israeli government steadfastly opposed to a Palestinian state and unwilling to even recognize let alone negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (243). Given Israeli intransigence, and unwilling to force the issue, Carter had no choice but to fall back on the Egyptian-Israeli bilateral negotiating framework devised by Kissinger. This process ultimately succeeded in producing the end that Kissinger had envisioned while frustrating the comprehensive settlement Carter sought. Indeed, it secured Israel’s right flank so that it could concentrate its firepower on the PLO in Lebanon (chaps. 7–8).

At the risk of oversimplifying a subtle and nuanced analysis, a sharp character contrast emerges from Yaqub’s account. Kissinger appears as a diabolical genius, and Carter a tragic hero. Yaqub’s argument is compelling in this regard. He offers ample evidence to show how Kissinger’s mastery of bureaucratic politics effectively established the acceptable perimeters of American foreign policy toward the conflict. That said, the book leaves a few questions unanswered. One pertains to where the Carter administration’s Arab-Israeli policies fit within the evolving geopolitics of the region. Scholars have long noted that the increase in geopolitical tensions (and consequent rise in military spending) associated with Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy actually began in the last years of the Carter presidency.3 As evidence they point to the arming of Islamic militants opposed to Kabul’s communist government a full six months prior to the Soviet invasion in December 1979.4 The ostensible objective of this aid was to “induce Soviet military intervention” and draw the “Russians into the Afghan trap.” National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski reportedly told the president on the day of the Soviet invasion that the United States now had the “opportunity of giving the USSR its Vietnam war.”5

However, Yaqub presents the Soviet invasion as one in a series of unexpected “jolts” that inaugurated a new era in Middle East relations (330–31). Iraq’s September 1980 invasion of Iran is also presented in these terms. But the notion that the Iraqi invasion came as a surprise contradicts the theory, “almost universally believed throughout the Middle East,” that the United States (and Brzezinski in particular) gave a “green light” to Saddam Hussein’s attack.6 Even the Reagan administration’s incoming secretary of state, Alexander Haig, believed this to be true. After visiting Saudi Arabia in April 1981, Haig reported to the president in a top-secret briefing that it was “interesting to confirm that President Carter gave the Iraqis a green light to launch the war against Iran through Pakistan.”7

Haig and the regional consensus may be wrong. But as Yaqub notes, at the very least the Carter administration was quick to recognize the ways in which the conflict could be turned to America’s strategic advantage. A State Department memo from October 1980 concluded that “if we have to hunker down with Egypt and Israel and face a hostile Middle East, a sustained, smoldering conflict in the east that keeps Iraq bogged down and the Arabs bickering among themselves may at least provide the easiest circumstance in which to face this prospect.” (333). Yaqub describes this as a “remarkably prescient forecast of Middle Eastern geopolitics in the ensuing decade” (333). However, one wonders if something more than prescience was at work.

Analyses of what was driving U.S. policy with regard to arming the Afghan mujahidin and the timing and nature of the “tilt” toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War remain highly speculative. Archival records have only recently been opened, and Yaqub is among the first scholars to examine documents from the period in any detail. He is far too careful in his scholarship to present any unsubstantiated claims. Nonetheless, both of these policies seem to bear the imprint of Brzezinski’s geostrategy, and it would be interesting to learn more about where the Arab-Israeli peace
process that Yaqub dissects so well fits within Brzezinski’s grand strategic thinking.

Notes:
2. The political economy of oil is not Yaqub’s central analytical focus, but he could nonetheless emphasize more strongly that it was Iran and not the Arab states that engineered the price hike. He could also draw on the analysis of Timothy Mitchell to show the ways that the “crisis” was contrived and manipulated for political ends. See Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (London, 2011).

Review of Salim Yaqub, Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s

Osmah F. Khalil

The 1970s are no longer a punchline. In recent years, historians have revisited the decade, often dismissed as an era of stagnation and ridiculed for its hair, fashion, and music, and have found instead a dynamic period in American and global history. Salim Yaqub’s Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s is a creative and important addition to this growing literature.

Yaqub draws on an impressive number of archival and primary sources to support a rich and engaging narrative that covers the “Long 1970s,” from the June 1968 assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy to the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan. The book’s major contribution is its discussion of Arab American activists and organizations. Diplomatic historians often view the “Middle East” as well as the broader Arab and Muslim worlds as alien and hostile terrain. Yaqub should be commended for writing the activists and their nascent organizations into a history of the period and placing them within the broader context of American foreign policy. Imperfect Strangers demonstrates that Arab Americans were not just a misunderstood and reviled “other,” but an integral part of American society.

Yaqub dutifully recounts Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and his diplomatic strategy. Readers are exposed to Kissinger’s duplicity, his inaccurate assessments of threats and opportunities, his penchant for melodrama, and, occasionally, his sardonic wit. Although the narrative tends to get bogged down in the details of the peace process, Imperfect Strangers offers a fascinating insight into how Arab American activists and organizations perceived and responded to U.S. foreign policy and events in the Middle East. Indeed, one of its more interesting discussions concerns the split between Arab American organizations over the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-79.

As with any book of this size and scope, there are some omissions and missed opportunities. Yaqub’s discussion of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat’s channels to Washington is interesting but incomplete. Arafat also met with congressional delegations and key U.S. senators, including Senator and former Democratic Presidential nominee, George McGovern. McGovern was also a mentor to Arab American Senator and fellow South Dakotan James Abourezk, a major figure in Imperfect Strangers. Arafat repeatedly indicated his willingness to compromise with Israel and make major concessions. These meetings occurred before and during the Lebanese Civil War, and Arafat’s proposals were reported to Kissinger and Israel.

Another prominent but secret channel was between the Central Intelligence Agency’s Robert Ames and Ali Hasan Salameh, a key member of the PLO’s Fatah faction and an advisor to Arafat. The details were known to Kissinger and Israel, and the channel was apparently also utilized to send messages back to Arafat from Washington. Kissinger’s antagonistic attitude toward the PLO and its implications could have been explored further, especially in relation to his negotiating strategy toward Egypt and Jordan.

Yaqub notes that the PLO was instrumental in assisting with the 1976 evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon as well as the release of some American hostages held in Iran three years later. It would also have been interesting to compare the contrasting responses of the Ford and Carter administrations. While the Ford administration was hostile to the organization, President Ford publicly acknowledged the PLO’s assistance, and Kissinger dispatched a private letter of thanks that was subsequently published by the organization. Although the Carter administration has been depicted as more amenable to relations with the PLO, it chose not to disclose the organization’s assistance in Iran to the American public (323).

The examination of popular culture in chapter 6 is one of the book’s most intriguing aspects. Yaqub discusses well-known “terror” films like Black Sunday that tapped into and amplified fears of terrorism, but he also examines the explosion of novels from the period that drew on events in the Arab world and the Middle East. The dystopian warnings of On the Brink by Ben and Herbert Stein and The Canfield Decision, former vice president Spiro Agnew’s ill-fated attempt at writing a suspenseful and erotic political thriller, were just two of the 118 titles published from 1968 to 1978 (186). Yaqub deserves credit for reading these tedious works and writing about them.

While the pulp fiction of the 1970s was unremarkable, the “New Hollywood” films and filmmakers of the era were far more influential. The movies of the period often reflected the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate zeitgeist. A discussion of Sydney Pollack’s 1975 classic, Three Days of the Condor, starring Robert Redford, would have enhanced Yaqub’s examination of the perception and fear of oil interests and an unchecked national security state.4

Representations of Arabs and the Middle East were also present, if not ubiquitous, in 1970s television. Yaqub briefly discusses the negative portrayals of Arabs in different television series. Yet there was also an opportunity to offer a more nuanced treatment that reflected the integration of Arab Americans into American society that he so deftly
describes. The TV series *M*A*S*H*, based on the influential 1970 Robert Altman film, was one of the longest-running and highest-rated programs of the 1970s and ’80s. Lebanese American actor Jamie Farr portrayed the often-ridiculed but beloved character, Corporal Maxwell Q. Klinger. Like Farr, Klinger was a Lebanese-American from the blue-collar town of Toledo, Ohio. Toledo also boasted a well-established Arab and Muslim American community. While Klinger’s character vainly attempted to obtain a dishonorable discharge through ridiculous schemes and wearing even more outrageous outfits, he eventually settled into his position as the indispensable company clerk and was even promoted to sergeant. Although the show sometimes traded in the stereotypes and ethnic slurs typical of 1970s television, Klinger also occasionally uttered Arabic phrases and insults (accompanied by the laugh track) and regaled the camp with stories about his “Uncle Abdul” and other family members.

The “Dear Uncle Abdul” episode (Season 8, Episode 12), which aired in December 1979, focused on Klinger’s character writing home about his experiences in the unit. While the timing of the episode and Klinger’s increased profile on the program may have been a coincidence, they align with Yasb’s argument that Anwar Sadat helped to make Arabs more acceptable to Americans. 

Although Yasb’s claims about improved perceptions is appealing, the evidence is insufficient. He relies in part on opinion polls, which are neither reliable nor consistent indicators of such views.7 In addition, the Gallup poll Yasb cites does not reveal a major shift in attitudes toward “Arabs” but toward the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli conflict (272–73). Even these polls only note an improvement from 10 percent in October 1977 to 15 percent in January 1979, a few months after the Camp David Accords were signed, which, Yasb adds, was the “high point for the decade.” Moreover, the poor geographic knowledge and geo-political awareness of most Americans, then and now, also raises doubts about this assertion. Could the average American in 1979 differentiate between Sadat’s “good” Egyptians and the rogues’ gallery of “bad” Arabs or between Arab and non-Arab countries?8 Could they correctly identify Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Libya on a map? How did positive and negative media coverage of Sadat or other Arab leaders, reinforced by the official statements of American policymakers, influence their perceptions? Today, after more than a quarter-century of direct interventions in the Middle East and North Africa and a massive build-up of American military bases in and around the Persian Gulf, how many college students or American voters can correctly identify the countries in the region? Furthermore, as Yasb accurately describes in the final chapter, the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis unleashed a wave of hostility against individuals perceived to be “Muslim” or “Iranian,” including Coptic clergymen, Sikhs, Latinos, and South Asians (327). Whatever improved image “Arabs” benefited from due to Sadat’s diplomacy, it was fleeting.

In spite of the latent or overt hostility, Arabs and Arab Americans continue to be successful in the United States. One important area that is not explored in *Imperfect Strangers* is the business world and its interactions with the U.S. government. Yasb notes that Najeeb Halaby, the chairman and chief executive of Pan American Airlines and father-in-law of King Hussein of Jordan, participated in a 1978 “Arab-American Dialogue” conference in Libya. Eight years earlier, Halaby graced the cover of *Time* magazine. He also served as the head of the Federal Aviation Administration under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and had other formal and informal roles in Washington, dating back to the 1940s. Although a remarkable individual, Halaby was not alone, and an examination of Arab-American businessmen during this period would have been a welcome addition.

From movies and television to corporate boardrooms to the U.S. military and the factory shop floor, Arab Americans were and are a part of the United States and have been since the nineteenth century, if not earlier. *Imperfect Strangers* tells a vital part of that story and it is sure to influence future studies not only in diplomatic history but more broadly.

Notes:
7. See Justin Lewis, Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and Why We Seem to Go Along With It (New York, 2001).
8. See also Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York, 2004).

Author's Response

Salim Yasb

Editor's note: At the author's request, the online version of this essay has been edited to respond to language in the reviews that was slightly altered in the copyediting process. AJ

I am deeply grateful to Andrew Johns for arranging this roundtable and to the four reviewers for contributing such thoughtful, sophisticated, and insightful assessments of my monograph. The latter have many kind words for the book. They also offer some incisive and fair-minded criticisms that have prodded me to reexamine my claims and thus see many of the underlying issues more clearly than I did before.

Let me start with Osamah Khalil, who tends to be more critical than the other reviewers. Given the high caliber of his own scholarship, Khalil's demurral merits close and respectful attention. Ultimately, however, they do not persuade me.

Somewhat dismissively (or so it seems to me), Khalil...
writes that my book “dutifully recounts Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and his diplomatic strategy.” He then laments that “the narrative tends to get bogged down in the details of the peace process.” I would humbly submit that my treatment of Kissinger’s Arab-Israeli diplomacy is rather more than “dutiful” and actually presents a bold challenge to the historiography of the topic. I claim in the introduction—and believe I demonstrate in the ensuing text—that Kissinger deliberately designed that process to enable Israel’s indefinite occupation of Arab land” (13, italics in original). Back in the 1980s, the journalists Alan Hart and Patrick Seale offered versions of this argument. But they did so on the basis of meager public evidence, whereas I make the case by consulting recently declassified U.S. government documents. Few if any of my fellow diplomatic historians have staked out this position. Indeed, some of them (including Adam Howard, in his contribution to this roundtable) have recently questioned my interpretation of Kissinger’s motives. Any success I may have in resisting their challenges—and, hopefully, in winning wider historiographical acceptance of my version of events—will be attributable to the fact that I did “get bogged down in the details” of this dispiriting tale. Khalil will thank me in the end. Much of the rest of Khalil’s critique falls into the “stuff you could have talked about but didn’t” category. Every item he mentions was eminently worthy of inclusion. The problem was that I had a vast and intricate story to tell and limited space in which to tell it (though I am grateful that my publisher allowed me as many pages as it did). Generally speaking, I selected material that bore most directly on a given argument I was making or that could do “double duty” by resonating with more than one theme. My discussion of fictional portrayals of the Arab world, for instance, was in the service of a larger claim about a peculiar vision of the U.S.-Arab relationship that emerged in the middle years of the decade, a vision that paired America’s perceived failings with a sense of Arab ascendancy. Generally speaking, I selected material that bore most directly on a given argument I was making or that could do “double duty” by resonating with more than one theme. My discussion of fictional portrayals of the Arab world, for instance, was in the service of a larger claim about a peculiar vision of the U.S.-Arab relationship that emerged in the middle years of the decade, a vision that paired America’s perceived failings with a sense of Arab ascendancy. A tiny handful of films from the era, such as Network and Black Sunday, illustrated this theme, but it mostly came through in the much larger number of thriller novels published from 1974 to 1978. So I dwelt at some length on the novels, wrote less about those two movies, and said nothing about some other cultural products, e.g., the film Three Days of the Condor and the television series M*A*S*H, even though they were, as Khalil notes, more prominent than the novels and revealing in other ways.

An example of “double duty” would be my treatment of secret contacts between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization. I did not discuss the full range of those contacts because they were not central to the arguments and themes of the book. But I did spend some time on the liaison activities of the Palestinian scholar Walid Khalidi and the Quaker educator Landrum Bolling. Not only were those activities significant in their own right and little known to historians (or anyone else); they allowed me to introduce two historical actors with important links to, respectively, Arab American political activism and the circulation of Arab-friendly discourse in the United States.

Khalil’s final criticism is that I am unpersuasive in claiming that the Arab image in the United States improved somewhat in the 1970s. His method of refutation is twofold: to point out the limitations of one category of my evidence, and to note the persistence of American ignorance about and hostility toward the Arab world throughout the 1970s and beyond. These observations, while valid, do not really touch my argument. Khalil is right that opinion polls are not, by themselves, definitive indicators of public sentiment, but they can be useful when combined with other sorts of evidence. And I do supplement the polling data with testimonies from journalists, pundits, U.S. officials, Arab political leaders, and Arab American activists, all of whom reported that Arab actors and their perspectives were acquiring a new, elevated status in the American public mind. I also make my own direct assessment of the content and tenor of American public discourse at the time (154, 157–8, 172, 273–5). Taken altogether, I think this evidence constitutes a powerful case—circumstantial, anecdotal, and impressionistic though it may be in places—that something was shifting in American attitudes toward the Arab world.

Khalil is also right to insist that, both in the 1970s and subsequently, many geographic knowledge and

What I am outlining, then, is a simultaneous increase in positive and negative portrayals of the Arab world in the 1970s, a consequence of the fact that the region as a whole was becoming more important to the United States and more visible in American society. I am further positing a dialectical relationship between these positive and negative modes. As I note in the epilogue, the convoluted politics of the U.S.-Arab encounter “produced a sort of double movement: contentious international events that alienated Arab Americans and made their position in American society seem more precarious were often accompanied by, and sometimes inseparable from, developments that mitigated those very processes” (344). In short, the worse things appeared to get for Arab Americans, the harder they and their allies worked to make things better, and their actions were not entirely without effect. Khalil stresses the first half of the dialectic and acts
as if it automatically negates the second half.

Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt mostly endorses my treatment and has many complimentary things to say about it. Toward the end of his review, however, he gently chides me for portraying the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War as events “in a series of unexpected ‘jolts’ that inaugurated a new era in Middle East relations.” Not to be nitpicky, but while I do use the word “jolt” to describe each of these events, I don’t believe I said they were “unexpected” in Washington. Military developments of this magnitude seldom occur completely out of the blue, and those in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf were no exception. But they were indeed jolts to the international system, in that they quickly and dramatically transformed the geopolitical landscapes in which they occurred and forced a wide array of governments to reassess their policies.

Wolfe-Hunnicutt doesn’t stop there. He urges me to speculate about the possibility that the administration of Jimmy Carter deliberately provoked the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the Iran-Iraq War (or perhaps both). He graciously allows that my “scholarship is far too careful to present any unsubstantiated claims,” but he wants me to lean in this direction. In principle, I am receptive to Wolfe-Hunnicutt’s suggestion. While I do try to be careful, especially when assigning questionable motivations to historical actors (hence my relentless documentation of Kissinger’s Arab-Israeli intrigues), I am not necessarily opposed to taking imaginative liberties with the available evidence when it is in short supply. I just don’t think that Imperfect Strangers is a suitable vehicle for attempting the sort of speculation that Wolfe-Hunnicutt has in mind. My book’s treatment of the subjects in question—U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and the escalating tensions between Iran and Iraq—is far too brief to accommodate the methodical sifting of existing evidence (and the careful explanations accompanying any departures from that evidence) that would be required to make such speculation plausible. Anything I were to offer along these lines would have a “drive-by” quality that would cast doubt on the book’s other controversial claims, even those based on much fuller documentation.

So I don’t really entertain such speculation in the book. Now that we’re on the subject, however, I will say the following, for what it’s worth: I find it hard to believe that even the most Machiavellian members of the Carter administration would purposefully foment a major war in Central Asia or the Persian Gulf. The Soviets’ Afghan adventure did ultimately prove disastrous to America’s Cold War adversary, but in late 1979 few could foresee that long-term outcome. The more immediate effect was to undermine the Carter administration’s own recent efforts at U.S.-Soviet arms control and cause the president to appear, in retrospect, to have been insufficiently attuned to the Soviet threat—not a good look for his upcoming reelection campaign.

Regarding the Iran-Iraq War, I do write in the book that Carter and his team “saw little advantage . . . in making heroic diplomatic efforts to end the hostilities” once they had erupted (332). But this was an understandable (if not particularly laudable) stance on the part of an administration that was fighting for its political life until November 4, 1980, preparing for its imminent dissolution after that date, and desperate to get the U.S. hostages out of Iran during both periods. Displaying diplomatic inertia following the onset of hostilities is not tantamount to revealing a prior hangkering for their outbreak—or so it would appear to this (perhaps Pollyannaish) observer.

Of course, I could be all wet on the topic. If I am, it will not surprise me to see Wolfe-Hunnicutt himself bringing forth the clinching evidence that exposes my error.

The first thing I need to say about Adam Howard is that I am indebted to him for editing and co-editing a number of the excellent Foreign Relations of the United States volumes on which my research relied. I should also mention how relieved I am that someone so steeped in the U.S. documentary record does not find more fault with my handling of U.S. Middle East diplomacy in the 1970s (though he does find some, as discussed below). All told, Howard is very kind to my book. He does an excellent job of conveying the wide range of topics and registers Imperfect Strangers explores; his review reminds me why I was excited to launch this project in the first place. Yet he also notes the costs exacted by my broad and eclectic approach. Because it is impossible to do justice to all of the subjects I address, some of them must receive relatively glancing treatment. Moreover, the frequent shifts from one facet of the U.S.-Arab relationship to another, and indeed among different genres of history, are bound to be a little disorienting to some readers. I wish I could say I embarked on the project fully aware of these downsides and accepted them, in advance, as the necessary price of achieving a monograph that packed so much variety into a manageable number of pages. In truth, I wrote the book I needed to write and arrived at this justification after the fact. In any case, I do think the results vindicate the costs, and I gather Howard agrees.

One pitfall, however, was avoidable. Howard is absolutely right to suggest that I could have done more with Israeli sources. As I worked on the book, and precisely because I had so many balls in the air, it seemed sensible to forgo adding an Israeli research trip to the endeavors I was trying to juggle. But of course, as Howard notes, there are means of consulting official Israeli documents that don’t require travel abroad (or, for that matter, a reading knowledge of Hebrew, which I sadly lack). I now wish I had gone beyond memoirs, news accounts, and secondary works to incorporate declassified Israeli records.

Substantively, Howard suggests that I have gone too far in attributing Kissinger’s diplomatic behavior to his “personal sentiments” about the legacy of the Nazi Holocaust, Israelis’ sense of vulnerability, and similar subjects. I admit—and this will please Wolfe-Hunnicutt—that there is, after all, an element of speculation in my handling of the issue. Ultimately, I can’t get into Kissinger’s head to observe his motivations directly. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger describes his perspective at some length and with uncharacteristic emotion, and his account is consistent with, and helps to make sense of, his diplomatic actions at the time. On this matter, at least, his testimony strikes me as credible.

Howard raises other considerations, such as U.S. domestic politics and Kissinger’s “stormy relationship with the Israelis during shuttle diplomacy.” These are indeed key parts of the story, and I have tried to combine them with an understanding of Kissinger’s personal outlook to develop a coherent and plausible interpretation of his Arab-Israeli diplomacy. I’d sum things up this way: Kissinger had deep personal sympathy for Israel’s geopolitical position and a healthy respect for the power of the pro-Israel lobby. Both views, working in tandem, inclined him to shield Israel from international pressure to relinquish all or most of the occupied territories. At the same time, Kissinger differed with Israeli leaders over how to achieve this goal. He believed that, if the Israelis were to free themselves from
pressure for wholesale withdrawal, they needed to make modest territorial concessions to their Arab neighbors; the Israelis, for various reasons, were extremely reluctant to make such concessions. The collision of those two perspectives produced the “stormy relationship” to which Howard refers.

The fact that Kissinger had personal insight into Israelis’ anxieties brought two additional elements into the mix. First, being Kissinger, he could not resist exploiting those anxieties for his own diplomatic purposes. Second, however, he was haunted by the prospect of pushing the Israelis too far and triggering what he described in his memoirs as “the psychological disintegration of an ally.” There was no telling what the Israelis might do in such a frenzy. Kissinger wondered if they would “risk everything on one throw of the dice”—a veiled reference, perhaps, to the threat or use of nuclear weapons.6

So yes, I do think that Kissinger’s personal sentiments are relevant to his Middle East diplomacy and that historians are equipped to explore that connection intelligently and persuasively.

Melani McAlister is even more generous, to the point of making me a blush a bit. It’s gratifying to receive this vote of confidence from a scholar who has so profoundly and positively influenced my own work. Two of my book’s more subtle claims—touc
CFP: 2018 Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations  
Philadelphia, PA               June 21-23, 2018

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for its annual conference, to be held in Philadelphia, June 21-23, 2018. While particularly keen to explore the theme of leadership in revolutionary times, noting the role of Philadelphia in the American Revolution and the centenary of the World War I armistice, the Program Committee welcomes papers and panels that offer traditional and fresh thinking about foreign affairs in all its varied forms. The deadline for proposals is December 1, 2017.

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Panel sessions for the 2018 meeting will run one hour and forty-five minutes. A complete panel typically includes three papers plus chair and commentator (with the possibility of one person fulfilling the latter two roles) or a roundtable discussion with a chair and three or four participants. The Program Committee is open to alternative formats, which should be described briefly in the proposal. Papers should be no longer than twenty minutes, and must be shorter in situations where there are more than three paper presentations. Proposals should list the papers in the order in which participants will present.

Individual paper proposals are also welcome, though complete panels with coherent themes will be favored over single papers. Those seeking to create or fill out a panel should consult the Panelists Seeking Panelists Forum on SHAFR.org or Tweet #SHAFR2018.

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New for 2018: Requests for AV equipment must be made at the time of application and are not guaranteed to be fulfilled. Presenters requesting AV service will be asked to provide a concise rationale and to indicate if their presentation can be made without this technology.

Any special scheduling requests (e.g., that a panel not take place on a particular day) must be made at the time of application.

Generally, an annual membership in SHAFR for 2018 will be required for those who participate as part of the program at the 2018 meeting. The president and program committee may grant a limited number of exceptions to scholars whose specializations are clearly outside the field of the history of the United States in the world, broadly conceived. Instructions on how to become a SHAFR member will be included with notification of accepted proposals.

For more details about the conference please visit the main conference page on SHAFR.org. We look forward to seeing you next June in Philadelphia!

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An Outpouring of the Spirit: A Historiography of Recent Works on Religion and U.S. Foreign Relations

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In a 2006 Diplomatic History article, Andrew Preston laments that “religion has been sorely lacking” in the study of U.S. foreign relations, particularly as “a lens through which historians examine America’s role in the world.” Although he acknowledges that a number of scholars writing prior to the 1990s had “blended religion with foreign relations without even realizing it,” Preston argues that there existed neither a defined historiographical subfield within diplomatic or religious history nor a clear and systematic methodological approach for bringing the sacred into the study of U.S. foreign relations.

In part to explain this paucity of attention, Preston references the work of Leo Ribuffo and Patricia R. Hill, both of whom have highlighted the challenges of assessing the role of religion in foreign relations and of using religion as an analytic category in U.S. diplomatic history. At first glance, religion seems perhaps too nebulous and malleable to have a causal impact on foreign policy. But Preston contends that taking religion into account would add greater depth and complexity to our understanding of the many interdependent factors that shaped American interactions abroad.

Indeed, religion provides a fruitful avenue for analyzing U.S. foreign relations. It helps shed light on the formation of ideology and national values and on how policymakers and domestic interest groups promote these values. Religious beliefs, as enduring elements of American culture and ideology, influenced the worldview of political leaders and the public, helped to steer the national discourse, and set the parameters of policymaking. Religious differences and religious conflicts materially affected war-making, alliances, and diplomatic, economic, and cultural exchanges throughout the nation’s history. Religion interacted with—indeed was and is still entangled with—categories such as race, gender, and class, not to mention domestic politics and culture more broadly. Thus it makes sense for historians to think carefully about religion wherever and whenever it intersects with foreign relations.

In the decade since Diplomatic History published Preston’s article, a great deal of new scholarship in this area has appeared both in print and in the halls of the annual SHAFR meetings. While commenting on a panel at the 2016 annual meeting, Preston noted that the year’s program included such a wealth of papers on the subject that he felt assured that “religion is now a standard topic in diplomatic history.” Though he was not the only scholar calling for greater attention to religion in the history of U.S. foreign affairs, and certainly much work on the topic existed prior to 2006, his article still provides a useful temporal starting point for assessing developments in the field over the past decade. It also identifies some of the thematic and methodological areas where scholars can address the relationship between religion and U.S. foreign relations. These approaches include biographies of key policymakers, analyses of missionary work, and discussions of how religion “informs values, norms, and ideas” about America’s role in the world.

Before moving into how the historiography reflects these and other themes, though, it is worth highlighting a couple of the synthetic works on religion in diplomatic history that have appeared since 2006. Andrew Preston again merits mention. Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy offers a magisterial survey of religious influence on America’s role in the world from the early seventeenth century through the first decade of the twenty-first century, though with greater emphasis placed on the period after 1898, when the United States became a more active global power. To illuminate the role of religion even in those aspects of foreign relations where it might be obscured, Preston examines both “the top-down perspective of policymaking elites” and “the bottom-up view of religious Americans who do not make policy themselves but influence it collectively, through political pressure and activism abroad.” He also incorporates a diverse range of American faith traditions.

Michael B. Oren provides a similarly sweeping overview of U.S.-Middle Eastern relations in Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present, with religious faith as one of three central and interrelated areas of focus. Much like Preston, Oren suggests that faith operated on multiple levels in shaping U.S. relations in the Middle East. He identifies American civil religion as a force that “propelle[d] Americans to export their concepts of patriotism and democracy abroad” at various points in U.S. history. He also argues that biblical depictions of the Middle East and specific religious interest groups—such as Christian missionaries who sought to evangelize in the region during the nineteenth century or Jewish Zionists during World War II—shaped American perceptions of the region and public opinion about U.S. policies.

Oren and Preston rightly note that the influence religion exerted on foreign relations, and the nature of that influence, varied and continues to vary. But this is still a capacious field, one that examines the individual religious beliefs of elite policymakers and the religious language in presidential rhetoric as well as the efforts religious missioneraries and grassroots political movements made to share information about events on the ground abroad or to protest American policies. Scholars in this field assess religious conflict as well as theology, the constitutional separations of church and state, secularization, and civil religion. They may examine the influence or ideas of...
individual faith traditions, denominations, or sects, or how all of the diverse traditions in the United States interact. In short, methodological approaches to this area of research vary just as much as the key players and historical forces do.

Given the crucial role of the executive in U.S. foreign policy, it is not surprising that many works seek to illuminate how the religious beliefs that individual presidents held influenced their approach to international politics and decision making, especially in times of crisis. Woodrow Wilson's presidency offers fertile ground for this approach, in part because of his foreign policy moralism and in part because of his stalwart religious identity. Malcolm Magee argues that Presbyterian theology, especially covenant theology, guided Wilson and “infused him with an ideal of what the world should look like and what America’s role should be in that world.” Magee links Wilson’s interpretation of international law, approach to foreign policy, and eventual framework for the League of Nations with his belief that “the mission and primary goal of all believers was to bring the world into liberty by means of God’s covenantal order.”

Similarly, Mark Benbow looks to covenant theology and Wilson’s sense of mission to explain U.S.-Mexican relations during the Mexican Revolution. He argues that Wilson’s “grounding in covenant theology . . . led him to believe that Christians had a duty to fulfill God’s will on earth” and that this belief “formed a template for him to use in evaluating events.” Benbow suggests that Wilson relied on this “template” or “operational code” to help him decide which Mexican leaders the United States should back at various points to attempt to promote democracy and order between 1913 and 1915. Both Magee and Benbow look to Wilson’s writings, particularly his writings as a young man, for evidence of how his theology shaped his thinking and later policy decisions.

Cara Burnidge’s excellent recent work also examines Wilson’s religious identity as a means to understand his liberal internationalism and his conception of U.S. interests, but she situates Wilson within the larger milieu of Progressive-era social Christian thinkers. She traces Wilson’s religious and intellectual development and reveals that the core foreign policy precepts that Wilson advanced, including his emphasis on promoting democratic principles, were “best understood as an expression of white middle- and upper-class social Christian notions of a proper world order.” According to Burnidge, Wilson viewed democracy as “a form of government based in a Calvinist notion of God’s order that regulated citizens according to social divisions he understood to be natural and inherently good, particularly whites’ racial superiority and patriarchy.” That view reflected not just Protestant theology, but prevailing Social Gospel beliefs.

Like Magee and Benbow, Burnidge notes that Wilson viewed democracy as part of God’s order and thus believed the United States had a mission to spread these social Christian ideals throughout the world, creating a “new framework for global order, an international system in which powerful nations cared for those who were powerless.” By expanding the story beyond the president’s personal theological views and religious background, though, she helps to explain the purchase that Wilsonian internationalism had on certain sectors of the American public during his presidency.

Of course, Wilson is not the only president whom scholars have examined to understand the relationship between religious belief and presidential leadership in foreign affairs. In Religion and American Foreign Policy 1945–1960, William Inboden studies the religious convictions of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, as well as other elite decision makers, delving into the spiritual content of their public statements, private writings and correspondence, and interior lives. Based on this analysis, he suggests that “religious ideas and values shaped the worldview of American leaders, and the lens through which they viewed the world beyond American shores,” during the Cold War.

Inboden makes it clear that although there were not “always direct connections between a particular religious belief and a particular policy pursued by American leaders,” their actions did often reflect their religious worldviews. His section on how the Truman White House developed a “diplomatic theology of containment” showcases this line of argument and is particularly interesting for students of early Cold War policy and ideology.

Elizabeth Spalding also discusses Truman’s religious faith and how his spiritual beliefs informed his embrace of containment and U.S. relations with the Soviet Union more broadly. Blake Jones and Darren McDonald look to worldview as well to help explain the development of presidential policies, illuminating how Jimmy Carter’s Baptist faith contributed to his understanding and handling of the Iran hostage crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other scholars have turned their attention to how religious beliefs molded the worldviews and foreign policy stances of Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush.

Yet presidents do not make foreign policy on their own. The religious backgrounds and worldviews of other elite policymakers can provide essential insight into how these key individuals made sense of the challenges and opportunities the country confronted in its foreign relations during their tenures. In some cases, the melding of religious belief with national identity colored how policymakers viewed national security threats. For example, Inboden notes that John Foster Dulles, much like his rival George F. Kennan, understood the Cold War in explicitly theological terms, and he makes the case that the anticomunist vision Dulles articulated for the postwar order reflected his belief that U.S. interests aligned closely with “the ideals of Christendom.”

This understanding of the Cold War led some policymakers to use religion in a tactical manner. Ahmed Khalid al-Rawi demonstrates this tendency in his study of how American anticomunist propaganda aimed at Muslim countries emphasized that they had common ground with the United States. Religion was a core value for both; it was not for the Soviet Union. In other instances, religion-based morality guided the approach some policymakers took in dealing with American allies and adversaries. Inboden explores how Senator H. Alexander Smith brought his religious worldview to bear on policymaking with China and Taiwan during the early years of the Cold War. Other scholars have examined how religious practice shaped the habits of mind or thought processes of key policymakers. Andrew Preston argues that the religious backgrounds of Dulles, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Henry Kissinger inculcated “a pattern of thought that is ideally suited to the principles of grand strategy” as well as an appreciation for the “relationship between morality and foreign policy.”

Theologians also exerted influence on foreign policy thought, both at the elite and grassroots levels. Milan Babík explores Protestant theologian George David Herron and his correspondence with Woodrow Wilson and sees a link between Herron’s eschatological interpretation of “World War I, American foreign policy, and the League idea” and Wilson’s own very similar views. Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr attracts perennial interest from scholars. Many have examined how Niebuhr’s writings on Christian realism, his personal relationships with policymakers, and his involvement with influential think tanks guided public opinion on a range of issues in U.S. foreign relations and international politics during World War II and the Cold War.
in the intellectual currents of their time, adding a great deal to our understanding of how and why this influential theological strand emerged. Jonathan P. Herzog explores how religious thinkers, including Jewish rabbis, Protestant theologians such as Niebuhr, and Catholic clerics such as Francis Cardinal Spellman, framed U.S. foreign policy, anticommunism, and indeed the Cold War itself as spiritual battles.

Meanwhile, David Zietsma looks to the religious modernism of Niebuhr, Kirby Page, Sherwood Eddy and others—as well as the legacy of Walter Rauschenbusch and the Social Gospel movement—to understand American national identity during World War II. He suggests that “Americans drew chiefly on religious modernism’s discursive regime to reaffirm their identity as God’s chosen nation,” and he argues that this identity helped Americans move from a non-interventionist stance premised on “good neighborhood” to broad support for intervention in the war “as a righteous nation opposing evil in the world” between 1937 and 1941.

Other religious leaders, ideas, and organizations also fostered activism and shaped political discourse about American involvement in wars and armed conflicts. In turn, wars influenced and sometimes changed domestic religious life, practices, and thought. Much of the recent scholarship on war and diplomacy during the colonial, revolutionary, and early republic eras draws connections between religious identity and the emergence of nationalism and national identity. Protestant beliefs provided the foundation for manifest destiny and other expansionist ideologies, providing religious justifications and key motivation for seeking new territories and markets. Looking at transnational expansion during the late nineteenth century, Jennifer Graber explores the debates that the ostensibly pacifist Quakers had over their involvement in implementing President Grant’s 1869 “Peace Policy” with the Plains Indians. A number of recent works on foreign relations during the late nineteenth century illuminate how messianic beliefs contributed to American overseas expansionism during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars.

The scholarship on Wilson’s presidency discussed earlier in this essay intersects with the literature on religion and World War I, of course, but recent work from Jonathan H. Ebel, Andrew Preston, and David Mislin expands the focus of these explorations, examining not only the spiritual rhetoric and underpinnings for fighting the war, but also the effect the war had on faith communities at home. Both Ebel and Preston have argued that, much like Wilson himself, the American public and American soldiers viewed the conflict through a theological lens. Preston also reflects on how the war reshaped Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism in the United States and suggests that the war exacerbated the modernist-fundamentalist split within Protestantism and hardened religious identities more generally.

By contrast, DavidMislin examines how the interfaith military chaplaincy fostered a temporary tri-faith (Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish) ideal during the Great War—a civil religion that promised to change the nation’s image abroad. Markku Ruotsila challenges the idea that all American Christians embraced Wilsonian internationalist ideology. He demonstrates that conservative evangelicals railed against the League of Nations not because they were isolationist (their global missionary agenda precluded isolationism), but because “they were unilateralists and sometime Christian nationalists who could not accept any diminution in American freedom of action” through

Religion was also a factor when the Cold War went hot in proxy conflicts across the globe. Religious groups played a particularly important role in protests surrounding the Vietnam War, for example. In studying that war, some historians have looked to religious conflicts between Buddhists and Catholics in South Vietnam.

Scholars have also focused considerable attention on the religious aspects of the Cold War. The ideological and spiritual dimensions of the superpower rivalry are well known and well documented; the Cold War has provided fodder for examinations of everything from religious rhetoric to interest group activism on Cold War issues to questions about how the conflict reshaped religious life in the United States. In the past decade many scholars, including Jonathan P. Herzog, Dianne Kirby, and William Inboden, have published books, articles, and edited volumes that illuminate how and why the American public and leaders conceived of the Cold War (and anticommunism more generally) in explicitly religious terms and how this understanding of the global conflict with the Soviet Union influenced U.S. foreign relations.

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These anxieties also influenced the justifications for and protests against U.S. interventions in Latin America, particularly during the Reagan era. Here in particular, U.S. domestic politics intersected with ongoing theological and denominational rifts, as politically conservative Catholics and evangelical Protestants railed against the perceived threat of liberation theology, which they linked to the
spread of communism in the region. Meanwhile, politically liberal Catholics and mainline Protestants stood in strong opposition to the Reagan administration’s penchant for supplying financial and military aid to authoritarian leaders in Latin America, who tended to commit gross human rights violations as they suppressed left-leaning political movements.46

Political and religious divides in the United States over the direction of U.S. foreign policy contributed to grassroots organizing and lobbying by religious leaders and groups. Some works that consider this dynamic focus on specific religious groups that have exercised effective political power, such as evangelical Christians and the religious right more generally, to advocate for policies as diverse as promoting Christian Zionism, preventing human trafficking, and supporting persecuted co-religionists in other countries.57 Indeed, during the Cold War, concerns about religious persecution abroad motivated numerous lobbying campaigns, including those on behalf of Soviet Jewry and underground Christian groups in the Soviet Union.48

A number of scholars have examined more recent U.S. efforts to promote international religious freedom through foreign policy. Many of these studies explore the role that domestic interest groups played in lobbying Congress for expanded protections for religious minorities.59 Some of these works, most notably Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s Beyond Religious Freedom, expose the unintended consequences of these efforts to make the promotion of global religious freedom a core U.S. policy aim.60 Several recent articles also chronicle the interest that domestic lobbies—especially those made up of Catholics and certain ethnic groups—tak in the at-times fraught relationship between the United States and the Vatican during the Cold War.51 Lastly, the link between religion and the influence of domestic public opinion on U.S. foreign relations with countries in the Middle East after 9/11 has received considerable attention from historians, political scientists, and American studies scholars.52

American foreign relations encompasses more than just policy, of course. When religious believers from the United States ventured out into the larger world to establish missions and evangelize, they brought with them their political values and ideology in addition to their faith. Unsurprisingly, a considerable number of scholars have looked to missionary work to understand the full range of U.S. interactions abroad throughout the nation’s history. In Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic, Emily Conroy-Krutz argues that in their efforts “to convert foreign people (whom they called the heathen world) to both Protestant Christianity and an Anglo-American culture they called civilization,” early missionaries served as both “representatives of American culture abroad” and as “central sources of information about the rest of the world for Americans at home.”53 There are many recent works on the role of early missionary encounters in transmitting American ideals (including American ideas about race, gender, and civilization) and informing other peoples about how U.S. citizens understood the world and the role the United States played within it. These works also examine how interactions between missionaries and foreigners influenced perceptions of the United States.54 Missionary activity often intersected with U.S. foreign policy in this period, as when American missionaries ran afoul of laws or customs against proselytism in the countries they sought to evangelize and U.S. policymakers debated whether or not to intervene.35

The link between American Christian missionary work and U.S. foreign relations is not limited to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though. George J. Hill sheds new light on the involvement of American Christian missionary groups in U.S.-Liberian relations in areas ranging from education to public health to rubber production in the 1920s through the 1940s.65 Much as in the nineteenth century, evangelistic efforts during the Cold War and beyond served to export American political values—in this case anticommunism, which became bound up with ideas about religious liberty. Interactions between U.S. missionaries and those they sought to evangelize sometimes influenced state-to-state relations, and the information that missionaries shared about events occurring beyond America’s shores sometimes contributed to domestic Christian engagement on foreign policy issues.66

Since Christian nationalism—or the belief that American and Christian principles were intertwined and mutually reinforcing—informed at least some aspects of missionary work and late nineteenth-century imperialism, historians of religion and foreign relations have delved deeply into the concept.38 A recent special issue of the journal Religions included a number of papers that considered Christian nationalism within the context of U.S. foreign relations, broadly conceived, from the early republic through the present day.69 These papers reveal how religious leaders, individuals, and in some cases political leaders viewed international interactions through the prism of Christian nationalism and sometimes operationalized Christian nationalism to achieve their broader policy objectives. Scholars of contemporary politics have also used the concept of religious nationalism to understand anti-Muslim sentiments in the United States, and their findings have at least some bearing on the relationship between broad public perceptions of the larger Muslim world and U.S. relations with majority Muslim countries.60 Ray Haberski examines civil religion—the embrace of a national creed, which is in some ways related to yet distinct from religious nationalism—to help explain the rhetoric that presidents, intellectuals, and the public use when discussing U.S. involvement in wars.61

Religious historians and political scientists writing for scholarly religious audiences have also addressed civil religion and have focused as well on the influence of specific denominations on U.S. foreign relations. Their works provide valuable insights for secular readers, even if these readers are perhaps not the primary intended audience. Recent examples of interest include John Wilsey’s in-depth intellectual and theological history American Exceptionalism and Civil Religion: Reassessing the History of an Idea and Mark R. Amstutz’s Evangelicals and American Foreign Policy, which offers a broad overview of evangelical engagement with U.S. foreign relations and a nuanced chapter on evangelicals, Christian Zionism, and U.S.-Israel policy.52

Despite the tremendous diversity of recent scholarship on religion in U.S. foreign relations history, there are many unexplored and underexplored paths for future work. As time passes and more materials from recent administrations are declassified, we will have new opportunities to look for the influence of religion in the making of post-Cold War foreign policy. From evangelism in formerly closed countries to religious interest group activism on the issue of international religious freedom to U.S. involvement in the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and other nations, future scholars will move the field forward by considering...
religion in all of its modes of influence. They will examine the role it plays in worldview and the official decision-making process, in interest group lobbying, and in civil religion and religious nationalism. Bringing religion into the study of U.S. relations with specific regions or nations, such as Latin America and Africa, will also prove fruitful. Hopefully future work will look further backward, too, to help us better understand the role that religion, religious beliefs, and religious conflicts may have played in shaping U.S. foreign relations during the early republic and the nineteenth century, before the country became a major power on the world stage.

I also hope to read more work on less-well-covered faith traditions. There is much interesting scholarship to be done on Mormons, who send out somewhere on the order of twenty thousand missionaries each year. How do the interactions that these Mormon missionaries have with converts and potential converts abroad influence perceptions of the United States or affect the interests that U.S. Mormons pursue vis-à-vis U.S. foreign relations?

Studies on Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs, Native American religions, historically African American denominations, and Pentecostals hold tremendous potential as well. To varying degrees, scholars may find that these faith traditions shaped domestic and foreign policy opinion and factored into bilateral and multilateral relations through missionary work, immigration or migration patterns, wars, refugee crises, links between ethnic identities and concerns about events unfolding abroad, philanthropic and humanitarian work, international development efforts, and economic globalization. Intersections between the fields of U.S. foreign relations, intellectual, and religious history through studies of institutions and thought leaders may also hold great promise. I am particularly excited about forthcoming and in-progress work on topics as wide-ranging as the institution of the military chaplaincy, evangelical religion in U.S.-Israelis relations, evangelical internationalism, and religion in World War II intelligence from Ronit Stahl, Daniel Hummel, Melani McAlister, and Matthew Avery Sutton, respectively.

The past ten years have proven extremely productive in terms of new scholarship on the history of religion in U.S. foreign relations. As the range of works highlighted in this essay shows, the inherent interdisciplinarity of this field brings valuable intellectual currents from religious studies, American studies, intellectual history, political science, and sociology into the study of diplomatic and international history. Given the tremendous potential that religion holds for understanding the history of the United States in the world, and the variety of future directions this area of research may take, I anticipate we will continue to see exciting work in this field as scholars continue “bridging the gap between the sacred and the secular in the history of American foreign relations.”

Notes:
2. Ibid, 794, 796.
5. For a recent historiographical overview of religion in U.S. foreign relations that includes works published beyond the ten-year time span that I have imposed on this essay, see Sandra Scanlon, “Determining Cause and Effect: Religion in the Study of United States Foreign Relations,” Journal of American Studies 51, no. 1 (February 2017): 226–34.
9. Andrew D. Magee, What the World Should Be: Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-Based Foreign Policy (Waco, TX, 2008), 35.
10. Ibid, 17.
12. Ibid, xi.
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
22. Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 230, 256.
24. Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 202.
21. See, for example, Andrew R. Murphy, “Religion, Civil Religion, and Civil War: Faith and Foreign Affairs in the Lincoln Presid


50. Hurd makes the compelling argument that by defining “religion” in particular ways and by making decisions about which groups count as “religious” or “religious minorities” for the purposes of providing protections, policymakers can lead religious groups to change their practices so they better fit the expected mold. This can inadvertently elevate or shut out religious groups and leaders and, ironically, can contribute to greater religious conflict. Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom, 23, 34, 67, 82, 113.


55. Angelo Repousis, “The Devil’s Apostle: Jonas King’s Trial Against the Greek Hierarchy in 1852 and the Pressure to Extend U.S. Protection for American Missionaries Overseas,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (2010): 225–51.


This roundtable features reviews of Hal Brands's *Making the Unipolar Moment* by three scholars—Michael Donoghue, Andrew C. McKevitt, and Michaela Hoenicke-Moore—and a response by the author. Each contributes to a discussion about a book that aims to be not simply another work focusing on the end of the Cold War, but rather a more holistic study of the interplay of international political economy, processes of democratization and political transformation in the developing world, and the rise of new global challenges such as terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. In other words, Brands attempts to bring coherence to the recent past, an era still awkwardly periodized as the late Cold War and early post-Cold War, just as future historians may face what could be the even greater task of bringing coherence to the world we live in today—a world, the author argues, that is characterized by a new wave of pessimism and malaise.

At the core of *Making the Unipolar Moment* are two fascinating questions: 1) how did the U.S. move so quickly from “malaise” in the 1970s to unipolarity in the early 1990s, and 2) what is the relationship between structure and strategy in shaping the global environment? In his response to this roundtable, Brands declares that “neither structure nor strategy was a sufficient cause of the geopolitical rejuvenation that the United States experienced after the late 1970s; it was the complex and dynamic interaction of the two that drove that change.”

Michael Donoghue argues that “Brands's analysis is most effective when he describes the changing U.S.-Soviet-European relationship of the 1980s and how it shifted so dramatically in favor of the United States.” However, he says, Brands “is on less sure ground in his analysis of the developing world. . . . [He] founders on various mischaracterizations of the crisis in Central America and the Middle East.” Andrew C. McKevitt writes that Brands “showers Reagan with superlatives that would have made the president’s contemporaneous critics—and maybe the Gipper himself—blush.” On the other hand, he sees the value in Brands's approach in this book, which, like his last book, *What Good Is Grand Strategy*, is intended “to bridge the gap between historians and policymakers.” Finally, Michaela Hoenicke-Moore sees Brands's book as a celebration of U.S. foreign policy successes. But she finds, critically, that “Brands is not as interested in analysis as in using the upward trajectory of American power and status over these decades to back up the claim that military power and the right ideology are the two decisive factors in international relations.”

Brands accepts some of the critiques of the reviewers, while taking issue—even strong issue—with others. Despite some reservations, however, all the reviewers applaud the author for taking on such a big subject. The book is a sweeping survey of post-Vietnam U.S. foreign policy from the late 1970s through the early 1990s—a period, as Brands notes, “when the country roared back from malaise and widespread pessimism” (345). As we enter another period in which isolationism and even malaise might again be on the rise, as they were in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, perhaps his book may prove most useful as a guide for how to escape the pattern before it is too late. We could end up with a new unipolar world or a multipolar one. To find out, we will have to wait for the sequel.

**Onward and Upward?: Review of Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment**

*Michaela Hoenicke-Moore*

In his sweeping survey of U.S. foreign policy after Vietnam and through the end of the Cold War, Hal Brands sets out to explain the making of the unipolar moment by answering two related questions: “What role did U.S. policy play in forming it?” and “To what extent are major changes in the international order driven by deep structural forces . . . and to what extent . . . by concrete strategy?” (3). Not to leave you too long in suspense, his conclusion is that U.S. policy was vital to the unipolar moment, and the changes in the international order were driven by both structural forces and concrete strategy.

In Brands’s words, “the rise of the unipolar moment occurred at the nexus of impersonal historical forces and conscious policy choices; good strategy allowed the United States to make the most of its good fortune” (11). The specification in the second half of the sentence is important. Throughout the book Brands finds reason to celebrate U.S. foreign policy successes as “a testament to the strategic acumen of U.S. officials, and especially . . . that shown by the Reagan administration across an array of surpassingly consequential international matters” (8). The challenges and setbacks that the country encountered, on the other hand, had little to do with American policies but could be attributed instead to those few pesky structural forces that did not align with American primacy. But in spite of
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it all, the United States “possessed multiple and mutually reinforcing dimensions of dominance” (10) and thus was in a good place.

Brands argues that “the most vibrant forces in the global arena” reinforced American efforts during this period. These were “the onset and progression of terminal Soviet decline, the onrush of democratization and a more prominent human rights consciousness, and the rise of globalization and the associated changes in the world economy.” He is careful to acknowledge that “all these trends originated from influences that were beyond the control of any U.S. policymaker” (341), but one cannot help but marvel at the perfect “synergy” or “interplay” of choice and circumstance, of strategy and structure, and, one might add, of fate and free will, that the author continually highlights. Surely such good fortune, such wisdom would indicate that we are in the presence of a chosen nation.

Not surprisingly, President Ronald Reagan emerges as one of the heroes in Brands’s account, which devotes four out of six chapters to his administration. Brands writes that “from the beginning Reagan combined a generally astute strategic sensibility with an unwavering belief in the greatness and long-term prospects of the United States” (342). This combination lies at the heart of the author’s primary thesis: U.S. foreign policymakers recognized and capitalized on the century-old nationalist belief that their country was in the vanguard of world history, which in turn is directed from on high.

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This trajectory is only temporarily broken by chapter 5, “Structure versus Strategy in the Greater Middle East,” in which Brands discusses America’s alternating support for the two sides in the Iran-Iraq war, its encounter with terrorism (Qaddafi’s Libya and Lebanon), and its support for the Afghan mujahideen. Although Brands credits Reagan’s strategic prescience and acumen with playing an active role, at least in a broad sense, in the making of the unipolar moment, he does not believe that the difficulties and challenges that the United States faced, especially in the greater Middle East, were of American making.

The final chapter, “The Dawn of the Unipolar Moment,” covers the end of the Cold War, German unification, and the Gulf War. Like most scholars before him, Brands gives high marks to Bush and Baker’s vision, careful and adept diplomacy in achieving German unification on Western terms and in navigating the potentially treacherous waters of the collapse of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union itself. In his discussion of the Gulf War, Brands does not linger on the success of American leadership in putting together an international military coalition supported by political willingness and financial subsidies (304ff.). Rather, he concludes with an ambiguous note on the war’s “catastrophic success” (313). On the one hand, he stresses that “military power was still the ultima ratio of world affairs, and that U.S. military power was the indispensable guarantor of post-Cold War security” (316). On the other hand, he finds that the “undeniably messy” ending of the “war against Saddam had not resolved the long crisis of Gulf security” (314ff.).

This ambiguity sets the stage for Brands’s positive assessment of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) document of early 1992. The DPG’s stated strategy of “precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor” (328) was, in Brands’s rendition, “hardly an outlier in official thinking about post Cold War strategy” (330) and “in fact . . . proved to be foundational in the shaping of post-Cold War strategy” (331ff.) well into the Clinton administration and beyond.

Brands claims that he offers a “more holistic” (4) account than previous studies, based on new archival material. Yet
much of what he relates has been analyzed by other scholars in depth and often within a more international framework. But Brands’s claim to originality is valid, in that he offers a profoundly revisionist account that reviews and re-examines the last quarter of the twentieth century from the perspective of American primacy exclusively: its causes, its manifestations, and, perhaps most important, its lessons. Like many revisionists, Brands reverts to an older model of the history of American foreign policy, here returning to a narrative of “the world according to Washington.”

Throughout the book, but especially in the conclusion (“Understanding the Arc of American Power”), Brands sets up straw men that he then dutifully destroys to suggest that he is looking at issues from a novel perspective. He finds that American primacy during this period “was about more than an imbalance of material capabilities and the absence of a global competitor” (338), and he goes on to cite Joseph Nye, who chastises “the realist who focuses only on the balance of hard power [and] will [thereby] miss the power of transnational ideas” (340). But most accounts of this period take “soft power” into account. Similarly, Brands claims originality for “seeing the advent of unipolarity as a multifaceted and multistage process” (341). But again, that has not escaped the attention of others before him, with the only difference being that scholars like Michael Hunt, Melvyn Leffler, Mary Elise Sarotte, and Sarah Snyder have put the process in its proper international or transnational context—and restored a historically accurate sense of contingency to it.

In a related argument, Brands posits that “America’s post-Cold War dominance was not a mere accident of history” (10). While that formulation is not surprising to historians who know most events and developments to be over-determined, Brands offers a particular explanation as to why this had to happen: (U.S.) strategy and (IR) structure aligned “synergistically” (341) throughout this period. Thus there is no need to probe more deeply into the nature of the challenges to and set-backs for U.S. interests, let alone examine unintended consequences, blowback, and failures. With respect to the end of the Cold War, Timothy Garton Ash and Mary Elise Sarotte have commented on what psychologists call “hindsight bias” and what Henri Bergson termed “the illusion of retrospective determinism”—it had to come out like this. Well, it didn’t. And while IR models are rightly praised for their efficient explanatory power, this one is so narrowly focused on the United States as to be solipsistic.

The aftermath of the Vietnam War did indeed generate a “declinist” as well as an “imperial overstretch” school, a “testament to what ambitious, forward-looking strategy can accomplish at a pivotal moment in global affairs” (343). No matter how many missteps are made or how dire the situation looks, it might still all work out in the end—at least for a while.

Notes:
1. On p. 362 Brands is more outspoken about the United States’ “historically exceptional power position and ... unique capacity to steer the course of world events.”
3. Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-first Century (New York, 1993). Published at the end of the period under examination in Brands’ study, Kennedy’s book does not count the United States among the nations well placed to confront the challenges of the new millennium. Richard Haass, Foreign Policy Begins At Home: The Case for Putting America’s House in Order (New York, 2014). Haass’s is just one among others across the political spectrum that is critical of imperial overstretch. He observes that “[t]he biggest threat to American security and prosperity comes not from abroad but from within”—previously admired standards of education, immigration, infrastructure, and economic well-being are crumbling at home.

Review of Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order

Michael Donoghue

H al Brands has written a sweeping and densely researched account of how U.S. power rebounded under the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations after the seeming decline of U.S. global hegemony in the 1970s, especially under President Jimmy Carter. Brands believes this vital power shift was due to a combination of deep-seated U.S. advantages; tectonic shifts in world trends towards democracy, globalization, and information technology; and, perhaps most important, a solid strategy on the part of conservative U.S. presidents and policymakers to take advantage of these larger transformations. He credits Reagan and Bush Sr. in particular with breaking out of the restraints of a bipolar world with their victory over the Soviet Union and with beginning to move, by the early 1990s, toward a new unipolar American age that, according to Brands, still dominates the globe today.

The United States emerged from the Second World War in 1945 as the only nation with an economy that was both undamaged and supremely powerful. It constituted almost fifty percent of world output. Despite this impressive position, Washington still faced a formidable military and political rival in the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc satellites. After 1949 the United States lost its atomic monopoly, but it still held enormous military and economic power at all levels. It had already begun fashioning alliances with Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea to “contain” the Soviets and their new ally, Mao Zedong’s Communist China. As a result of its military strength and a generally robust economy in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States held the advantage in this bipolar standoff until the early 1970s, when the quagmire of Vietnam, stagflation at home, oil shocks, and increased industrial competition from its now-recovered European and Japanese allies cut deeply into the U.S. share of production and trade, and more importantly, into Washington’s self-confidence and former sense of supremacy.

In Brands’s narrative, the nadir was reached in 1979, when the Shah of Iran and Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, both U.S. allies, were ousted; and a second oil spike, double-digit inflation, the Tehran hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan all combined to create what President Carter called in his “malaise” speech a “crisis of confidence.” The British rock band the Kinks alluded to this...
perception of America in deep decline in a song on their 1979 Low Budget album that has Captain America calling out repeatedly, “Catch Me Now I’m Falling.” But never fear, a new Captain America in the person of Ronald Reagan took the helm, righted the ship of state, and, using all the underappreciated yet pro-Western developments in play, forged a remarkable unipolar victory. Brands puts together a compelling analysis along these lines. To his credit, his work contains a lot of nuance and a number of caveats to qualify his generally triumphalist portrayal of an American revival. But his work also reveals some major problems.

Brands’s analysis is most effective when he describes the changing U.S.-Soviet-European relationship of the 1980s and how it shifted so dramatically in favor of the United States. But even here, more emphasis could have been placed on the huge problems inherent in the Soviet system that—independent of any U.S. action—put the USSR in a deep crisis by the 1970s. In retrospect, the enormous Reagan arms build-up in the first half of the 1980s now looks like a huge waste of funds, as the more moderate increases advocated by Ford and Carter would have sufficed. The United States had been putting immense military pressure on the Soviets for seven administrations, but it was the central failure of the Soviet economy and empire, not the increase in U.S. arms spending, that lay at the root of Soviet decline. Under Reagan, the United States was like a boxer who puts himself through an incredible training regimen and profligately spends resources to confront an opponent who is already at death’s door.

Brands also fails to capture fully the reckless and cavalier attitude toward nuclear war with the Soviet Union that many Reagan officials expressed in their first term. Fearful career State Department officials frequently referred to those around Reagan in the Defense Department and the National Security Council as the “war party,” and with good reason. Several of these deeply ideologically driven folks exuded an extraordinary nonchalance towards nuclear war with Moscow and the full-scale invasion or immobilization of Soviet allies. (For example, Alexander Haig exclaimed in 1982, “You just give me the word and I’ll turn that f…king country [Cuba] into a parking lot!”)

Brands is adept at describing the pathologies of the Soviet empire, but he never even mentions the concept of the American empire. Yet much of what Washington went through from the 1970s through the 1990s resembles the various declines and revivals of the Roman and British empires, albeit in greater brevity. The foundational problem of those empires and of the U.S. empire arose from their fundamental commitment to dominate large swaths of world against the wishes of the people who lived there—more than from the quality of their decision-making or their leadership.

Brands is also on shaky ground in his analysis of the developing world in this period. While he does a good job of explicating the debt crisis in Latin America and U.S. trade woes with Japan, he founders on various mischaracterizations of the crises in Central America and the Middle East. He claims that “during the late 1970s, Washington was forced to surrender ownership of the Panama Canal” (22). The United States did no such thing; it retained control until December 31, 1999, under the terms of the Carter-Torrijos treaty. That treaty was a U.S. triumph that improved relations with Panama, Latin America, and the developing world and postponed the final transfer for twenty-two years. The attached DeConcini amendments gave the U.S. the right to intervene militarily against any threat to the strategically obsolescent waterway. The idea that tiny Panama forced the United States out is ludicrous and a favorite far-right canard. In reality, the treaty was a prime example of the benefits of diplomacy over armed conflict.

The treaty was one of Carter’s great achievements, along with the 1979 Camp David Accords that, for all their shortcomings in not addressing the central Palestinian question, removed Egypt as a military threat to Israel (and Jordan as well), leaving Syria as the only contiguous nation to oppose Israel in the region. One of the key yet ignored pro-U.S. shifts was Egypt’s break with the USSR and its dismissal of Soviet advisors in 1972–73. Twice Brands states that the 1979 Soviet invasion of the Afghanistan brought the Soviets within closer striking range of Persian Gulf oil sites (28, 227). But a cursory glance at any map of the Middle East shows that Azerbaijan and Armenia, then part of the Soviet Union, were just as close to the Gulf as eastern Afghanistan. Russian bases in those areas could have struck Gulf assets throughout the whole Cold War.

In his description of the Reagan administration’s culpability in horrendous human rights offenses in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, Brands, to his credit, lists most of the crimes. But he then takes the Panglossian view that since it all turned out for the best (i.e., Marxist guerrillas were defeated) these policies simply had “costs.” Costs for whom? Certainly for the roughly 190,000 Central American civilians, large numbers of them women and children, who were exterminated by U.S.-supported-and-directed militaries and death squads. And the millions who lived in terror under this decade-long assault. Washington could have forestalled guerrilla victories with far less bloodshed, using diplomacy, reforms, regional partnerships, and U.S. economic—not military—aid, which Reagan repeatedly rejected or failed to push for with sufficient ardor.

Brands’s narrative ignores Otto Reich and his Office of Public Diplomacy (OPD), which in conjunction with Reagan’s FBI hounded U.S. citizens, churches, and human rights groups who dared to give political asylum to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. Reagan officials disingenuously claimed they were “economic refugees,” not political ones, for fleeing from the slaughterhouses their countries had become in large part because of the president’s policies. Brands writes a good deal about Reagan’s championing of human rights and democracy (though to be fair, he notes the limits of the administration’s efforts), but he fails to confront the overarching truth that democracy and human rights made advances in most places in the 1980s not because of the Reagan White House but in spite of it.

In fact, this U.S. aversion to democracy in the developing world was at the root of the problems Washington faced in the late 1970s and early 1980s. So many of the dictators that Brands presents as key players in his own narratives— repression, torture, murder—was that Moscow supported them or appeared to. In the 1980s, every political prisoner bleeding in a cell (with the key exception of those in Eastern Europe) knew that his torturers had the support of the Reagan White House. This list includes those in South Africa, most Central American nations, Brazil, Chile, Argentina (until 1983), Paraguay, Uruguay, Egypt, Pakistan, Burma, the Philippines (until 1986), and even Kampuchea, where Reagan supported the Pol Pot regime for geo-strategic reasons!

Brands gives a penetrating analysis of Middle East terrorism and the complexities and frustrations it fomented. What he fails to confront directly is that the Reagan administration itself was a state sponsor of terrorism in its Contra War, its support for Joseph Savimbi’s UNITA in Angola, its backing of the Guatemalan, Chilean, and Pakistani militaries, etc. This approach deliberately promoted instability and violence, but since it harmed
Scenes from the SHAFR Annual Meeting
perceived Soviet interests, the administration said “so be it.” Certainly such tactics were not Reagan’s sole invention. Eisenhower had done the same in Guatemala and Iran; Kennedy in Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, and Guyana; Nixon in Chile and Cambodia.

An imperial analysis of Washington’s plight in the late 1970s might produce more answers to the dilemmas U.S. policymakers faced. The consequences of U.S. empire, its costs and distortion of the U.S. economy, had finally come home to roost. On the political front, lip service in support of democracy and some genuine efforts towards liberalization could not make up for embracing so many brutal allies and ignoring so many horrendous crimes, which undercut U.S. credibility with billions in the developing world. Short-sighted policies in backing dictatorships continually failed but were continually adopted.

American neo-imperialism extended to the role of the World Bank and the IMF in punishing the Third World’s poor to get the debt of klepto-regimes and elite-mismanaged economies repaid. One cannot help but wonder whether attitudes toward race on the part of Reagan and his advisers informed much of their decision-making in the Third World. Reagan started his 1980 presidential campaign in Philadelphia, Mississippi, the site of the Schwerner, Goodman, and Chaney murders, a clear signal to the South as to where he stood on racial issues. Reagan’s intense devotion to South Africa’s apartheid regime, along with a whole litany of items on his domestic agenda, reveals his true sentiments on racial equality.

Brands chooses 1979 as his year of supreme U.S. crisis. But a better date might have been 1968 (although this would have admittedly meant a longer and less manageable book). That year saw the U.S. decision to de-escalate in Vietnam following Tet, massive anti-war protests, urban race riots, and the assassination of major U.S. political leaders. Inflation and economic slowdown had already begun. The run on gold, the decision of a standing president (who loved the exercise of power) to step down, and the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo and its entire crew by the North Koreans all signaled, at least on the surface, a shocking declension in U.S. prestige and power, or, to use Brands’s favorite phrase, a “tectonic shift” of equal significance to 1979. But recognizing this would have entailed criticizing the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations as sharply as Carter’s and would have made it more problematic to position Reagan in his stock role as savior. (By the early 1970s, Nixon saw the world as pentagonal - not bipolar - with the U.S., U.S.S.R, China, Western Europe, and Japan all vying for global influence and power.)

One of the more fascinating counterfactual debates of this period is what might have occurred had Reagan won the 1976 Republican nomination over Ford (he came close) and been elected that November. I have no doubt that Reagan would have been a one-term president had he confronted all the problems Carter did, operating in a postwar environment and a recession from day one. Had Reagan dispatched U.S. marines and paratroopers to sustain the Shah—the man on whom the whole regime was centered—in 1978, he still could not have escaped the death of the terminally ill Pahlavi a couple of years later. What could Reagan have done to prop up Somosa with military intervention? Whatever he did would have engendered another Vietnam-style quagmire in Central America. And how could Reagan have stopped the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan any more than a Soviet premier could prevent a U.S. invasion in Central America or the Caribbean?

Brands’s analysis of the George H.W. Bush presidency, which on one level simply picked up the torch of Reagan’s more creative diplomacy with Mikhail Gorbachev, is spot on. The reform-minded Soviet premier had unleashed forces he quickly discovered he could not control. Once he abandoned the use of force at the center of the Soviet Empire, the nationalist impulses of Eastern Europe and even the Soviet republics fragmented the whole shaky edifice of the deeply conflicted state. Bush, in starker terms than Reagan, was a mere witness to this rapid and startling collapse. The U.S. intelligence failure here was massive, as it was with the 9/11 attacks, and the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003.

Bush also appeared very indecisive when the Berlin Wall fell and the issue of a unified Germany arose. Thatcher’s views proved off-base, and Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s national security advisor, appeared reactive, though given the speed of the event and the element of surprise, such responses were understandable. Brands could have pointed out that Thatcher had a fortifying influence on an uncertain Bush in August 1990, during the Iraq/Kuwait crisis, and he would have done well to give a fuller explication of Ambassador April Glaspie’s mixed signals to Saddam Hussein. Bush gave a moving speech on Iraq’s Kuwaiti invasion. He decried aggression and stated that no powerful nation had the right to invade its small neighbor. Latin Americans at least grasped the supreme irony here, as Bush had ordered the very same action (in admittedly different circumstances) eight months earlier against Panama.

With the twin victories in Kuwait and the Cold War, the United States stood at the peak of unipolar power in 1991, as Brands correctly notes. The brilliant Prussian general, Helmuth Von Molkte the Elder, once remarked that “the greatest catastrophe that can befall any nation is to suffer an overwhelming military defeat. The second greatest catastrophe that can befall any nation is to win an overwhelming military victory.” The general was alluding to the sense of hubris and overconfidence that follows such triumphs. In retrospect, as Brands points out, the Gulf War victory was not as impressive as it looked on TV. Large elements of Saddam’s Republican Guard escaped destruction, and the dictator used them to crush uprisings by the Kurds and Shias in order to reestablish his power. At the same time, Bush Sr.’s reluctance to invade Baghdad now appears brilliant.

Unipolar overconfidence certainly influenced George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. That war proved a disaster of far greater consequence than Vietnam, as it destabilized the entire region and inspired terrorists around the world to launch jihad against the new Crusaders and their allies. Without the restraints of bipolarity, what is to prevent Washington from making similar blunders in the future? Brands does not say, although he must be commended for recognizing this principal dilemma of his central concept. Less emphasis on unilaterality and unipolarity and more on multilateralism and coalition-building appear to be in order. An underemphasized element of both Reagan’s and Bush Sr.’s successes is that they were all achieved with the help of powerful allies—NATO, Japan, and, to a lesser degree, an anti-Soviet Red China.

The lasting contribution of Brands’s work will be how he ties the U.S. resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s to America’s longstanding strengths and the liberal globalism with which they were so easily enmeshed. The more open U.S. society and economy greatly facilitated the telecommunications and information revolutions that the rigid, centralized Soviet economy simply could not digest. The great irony evident even in Brands’s own concluding pages is that terrorists have made great use of this cheap telecom technology and that the globalized economy so heralded as a U.S. triumph helped contribute to the worst recession in 2008-2010—indeed, depression—since the 1930s.

U.S. unipolarity today finds itself under enormous strain from debt, slow growth, and global (especially Chinese) competition. In addition, America’s great new
rival in Beijing will undoubtedly pose future military challenges. Meanwhile, the terrorist problem has metastasized tremendously since the 1980s and 1990s. And Vladimir Putin appears determined to revive some new form of the old Soviet Empire, intimidate his neighbors, and provoke the United States, perhaps igniting a new Cold War. America Triumphant has redounded to America Quo Vadis (Where are you going?), especially in light of the deep ruptures in the Republican party, thanks to the absence of the glue that held it together for so long: anticommunism. The new Republican president-elect calls for a most dangerous form of unipolarity (“World: You’re Fired!”) and asks Americans to reject NATO, old allies, international trade agreements, global institutions, and all those who support them. Absent the former Soviet threat, such isolationism reaps huge populist rewards but calls into question the viability of a new American century when 47% of the voting population has apparently rejected the U.S. international mission.

Review of Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order

Andrew C. McKevitt

Ever have I empathized more with a Soviet leader than after three hundred pages of Hal Brands’s impressive new book, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order. It is early 1991, and the George H.W. Bush administration has assembled what is arguably the most potent war coalition of the twentieth century with the intention of removing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s occupying armies from Kuwait. Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev presses Bush to pursue diplomatic solutions short of war, but with communism a ghost in Eastern Europe, and German reunification and alignment with the West now a geopolitical reality, the most transformative political figure of his generation had no cards left to play. “We just can’t let this guy off the hook,” Bush explained. Summing up this novel Soviet feeling of impotence in his diary that February, Gorbachev’s chief foreign policy advisor Anatoly Chernyaev wrote, “We are doomed to be friends with America, no matter what it does” (312).

At that moment I, like the Soviets, felt battered by a decade of U.S. diplomatic and military triumphs, the product of a “veritable strategic renaissance” crafted by the Reagan and Bush administrations (342). Reagan, Bush, and their advisors, Brands recounts in lengthy successive chapters, had engineered the Cold War’s unexpected denouement, played an active and indispensable role in promoting an unprecedented democratic revolution across the planet, and shepherded in a neoliberal global economic regime that would lead to an era of unparalleled wealth creation. (All of these successes challenge Brands’ enviable talents for finding the right superlatives.) Even Reagan’s most conspicuous foreign policy failures and troubling legacies—his administration’s exacerbation of Middle Eastern instability, its inability to deal with international terrorism, and its support for unsavory anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan—left mere “problematic residues” for future administrations (346). It’s enough to make a critic of U.S. foreign policy feel doomed to eternal sunshine.

Ostensibly, Making the Unipolar Moment is not just another book about Reagan. It considers the Carter and George H.W. Bush administrations, and even dips its toe back into the Nixon and Ford administrations and forward toward Clinton’s. But the real centerpiece is Reagan’s tenure, with two-thirds of the text consisting of one of the finer analytical narratives of his administration’s foreign policy yet published. With a minor but critical exception, Brands’s assessment is unabashedly glowing. In this regard his book is among the latest contributions to Reagan revivalism.

Indeed, for more than a decade now, the forty-first president has been the sun around which the historiography of the post-1960s United States orbits. But even before a professional historiography existed, Joan Didion had appropriately dubbed Reagan the “Fisher King,” a figure of Arthurian legend, keeper of the Holy Grail, to whom pilgrims were drawn in the hopes of healing the debilitated guardian.1 Historiographic pilgrims have aimed to resuscitate Reagan’s reputation, at least among the left and the learned classes who dismissed him in the 1980s as an airhead with little attention span and even less capacity for understanding the nuances of complex domestic and international problems. Reagan’s character had suffered grievous wounds from the slings and arrows of a thousand cynics, and Brands, along with a full generation of historians now, has come to heal.

To Brands’ credit, however, Making the Unipolar Moment successfully balances an evidence-based revival of Reagan’s reputation with a conceptual framework that mitigates against the trend toward posthumous apotheosis. On the one hand, he showers Reagan with superlatives that would have made the president’s contemporaneous critics—and maybe the Gipper himself—blush. The “veritable strategic renaissance” of the Reagan and Bush years was “historically potent and perceptive” (11). He was both an astute strategist and a persistent optimist with “an unwavering belief in the greatness and long-term prospects of the United States,” despite the setbacks of the 1970s. Reagan set the vision for a grand strategy that reasserted American strength and exploited Soviet weaknesses, and whereas contemporaneous critics believed the vacuous Reagan simply said dumb things, like calling the Soviet Union the “focus of evil in the modern world,” Brands instead finds a deliberate “campaign of ideological warfare led by Reagan himself” (81). After he “shattered Soviet confidence” that had accumulated during the 1970s (89), he carefully implemented a “Reagan recalibration” to establish a conciliatory relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev in pursuit of the end of the Cold War, if not the end of all nuclear weapons (96). When Brands accuses John Lewis Gaddis of reproducing “traces” of the triumphalism of Reagan hagiography, it is easy to miss the irony only because it is buried in an endnote (365).

On the other hand, where Making the Unipolar Moment departs from the “just another Reagan book” category is in its contribution to a growing literature smashing the myth of the 1980 election as a caesura that divided declension from ascension. Instead, for Brands the American resurgence that would culminate in the unipolarity of the early 1990s was rooted in the 1970s, in the precise moment many Americans believed to be the nation’s twilight. Whether it is the framing of democracy and human rights promotion as a strategic tool or the pursuit of a neoliberal global economic order that paved the way for contemporary globalization, it is refreshing to see the Carter administration get credit for the ideas, if not for the execution.

an alleged “Reagan Revolution,” professional historians continue to uncover the origins of a range of domestic and international transformations further back. Whereas we once thought Reagan created an age, we are now getting better at seeing how an age created Reagan.

Brands tries to find the sweet spot between these two interpretations with an argument about the interplay of structure and agency. Some scholars will see his thesis—“the emergence of the unipolar era reflected a synergistic interaction between structure, on the one hand, and deliberate and proactive strategy, on the other”—as a model for thinking about how individuals engage with unwieldy global structural changes; others may find it frustratingly reductionist. For Brands, the age created Reagan—he was “exceptionally fortunate to wield power at a time when so much was breaking Washington’s way”—as much as Reagan created the age. His administration “turned structural opportunity into successful strategy, and in doing so, it began to shape global changes to America’s decided advantage.” For a historian of the era, this balance may be too clever by half, but as an explanatory tool and a mechanism for teaching policymakers about the practice of making grand strategy, it proves effective and convincing.

To that end, Making the Unipolar Moment aims, as much of Brands’s previous work does, to bridge the gap between historians and policymakers. The extent to which you believe scholarly historical inquiry should aspire to instruct Beltway types in the construction and maintenance of “unipolarity” will determine much of your tolerance for this approach. Indeed, if you prefer words like “empire” and “imperialism” to unipolarity or “primacy,” then your patience will likely be stretched thin. I don’t blame Brands for avoiding “empire”: it means dodging a muddy debate with a deep historiography about just what an empire is and does, and that is not his goal. If you aim to educate the mandarin class on its own recent history, you tell them they’re “primacists,” not imperialists. (You definitely don’t tell them they’re “primates.”)

But the question of empire goes beyond semantics. Skeptics may find most disconcerting Brands’s lengthy analysis of deepening U.S. entanglement in the Middle East during this period, the significant exception to a decade of triumphs. There is some charm to writing of a plucky Reagan attuned to opportunities to exploit the Soviets; but such a tone translates less effectively to a region where U.S. interests, whether geopolitical or economic, were inherently imperial. When Brands writes of the Reagan administration’s showdown with Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, for instance, the stark imbalance between global empire and troubled postcolonial society is reduced to a test of individual wills. In the wake of Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks on Americans overseas, Reagan ordered the navy to conduct exercises in the Gulf of Sidra “to show the United States would not be intimidated by Qaddafi’s threats, and that it possessed its own powerful tools of deterrence and coercion” as if this were ever in doubt in Washington, Tripoli, or anywhere in between.

Empires don’t need pluck. They are global structures onto themselves, and if policymakers in Washington were challenged to translate strategic vision into effective policy in the context of rapid global structural change, how could Tehran do the same? Or San Salvador, or Managua? I’m reminded of David Foster Wallace’s story of the two young fish swimming past an older fish who was hollering, “Morning, boys. How’s the weather?” After a while one young fish turns to the other and asks, “What the hell is water?” Water is what historians and social scientists call structure, and if every state in the international system in the late twentieth century was a fish of varying size, speed, and strength, then the United States was Poseidon.

I continue to search for metaphors, alas, because despite my admiration for Brands’s achievements in this book, I simply don’t trust the metaphor he uses to organize it: unipolarity. Political science created the concept at the very moment Brands is considering, and talking heads looking to make sense of the world glommed onto it in hopes of simplifying the infinite complexities of a rapidly changing international context. Brands takes his cue from Charles Krauthammer’s 1991 observation: “Now is the unipolar moment.” But what if Krauthammer was wrong? (It would not be the first time.) It’s a question Brands never asks.

Why accept this notion of unipolarity so uncritically? Arguably it is an ideological construct formulated to justify continued U.S. global supremacy at a moment of uncertainty (and in this respect is not unlike political scientist Joseph Nye’s “soft power”). Indeed, before the United States was a unipole, political science didn’t have a word to describe it. Also, looked at from another perspective, the “unipolar moment” began in 1945, not 1991, and it merely waxed and waned across the rest of the century. Brands admits as much in his conclusion when he says that “America’s international superiority was actually less pronounced in the early 1990s than it had been at the dawn of the superpower era a half-century earlier” (336). Two pages later, he returns to unipolarist assessments, this one from Yale historian Paul Kennedy at the dawn of the Global War on Terror: “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing.” But didn’t the disparity exist in 1945? Ultimately, the concept distracts from what is otherwise the most compelling narrative of U.S. foreign policymaking during this period, and one almost wishes Brands would dispense with the IR-speak veneer and embrace the empire.

Such a wish feels like a residue of contemporary political disputes, though, not historiographic ones. Hal Brands has produced a rich book, one that combines a masterful synthesis of a dizzying array of material (there is so much to talk about, and I’m eager to see my fellow reviewers tackle what I could not) with a provocative framework that will challenge practitioners of primacy, if not occasionally frustrate historians.

Notes:

Author’s Response
Hal Brands

My thanks to Andrew Johns for organizing this roundtable, and to Andrew McKevitt, Michaela Hoenicke-Moore, and Michael Donoghue for their participation. It has been said that critical engagement is the highest compliment one academic can pay another, and it is indeed gratifying to have one’s work assessed with such spirit and vigor. That said, the reviewers are not alone in occasionally feeling “frustrated” with what they were tasked to read and critique. For although I am grateful for the reviewers’ praise where it is offered, I do find several aspects of their criticism—particularly the critiques offered by Moore and Donoghue—disappointing and, frankly, somewhat perplexing. I would respectfully suggest, in fact, that these reviews offer a misleading account of what Making the Unipolar Moment actually covers and argues, that they frequently generate more heat than light regarding the
key issues at stake in the book, and that in doing so they unintentionally highlight broader challenges confronting the historical profession today.

As a bit of background, *Making the Unipolar Moment* represents my effort to explain how the United States went from the malaise and apparent decline of the 1970s to the rivivored primacy of the early 1990s. It engages this subject by examining the interaction between structure (roughly defined, those factors that policymakers could not control, at least not on a day-to-day basis) and strategy (those factors that they could control). The book concludes that neither structure nor strategy was a sufficient cause of the geopolitical rejuvenation that the United States experienced after the late 1970s; it was the complex and dynamic interaction of the two that drove this change.

In other words, American resurgence would not have been possible without enormously favorable global trends such as Soviet decline, third-wave democratization, and the onset of modern-day globalization, but those trends would not have advanced so rapidly, spread so broadly, or benefited the United States so significantly if not for the conscious strategies pursued by U.S. policymakers, particularly in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush years. At the same time, however, the book recognizes that strategy-making could be a very messy and iterative process even when done well, that there were important Ford- and Carter-era antecedents to the successful policies of the 1980s and early 1990s, and that there were significant—in some cases, even profound—costs to the policies that the United States pursued during this period. American strategy thus left a broadly constructive legacy, but one that was hardly unambiguous or unalloyed.

The reviews at times give the impression—or flat out assert—that I obscure these costs of U.S. foreign policy, and this is a first point to which I would like to respond. For I find this assertion somewhat mystifying, and suspect that other readers of the book would as well. The book describes, for example, the ways in which U.S. policy fueled the international jihad that emerged from the Afghan war; the on-the-ground consequences of U.S. support for brutal regimes in Central America; the financial costs and high strategic risks of the Carter-Reagan military buildup; the human misery that was sometimes caused by the Third World debt crisis and neoliberal adjustment programs; and other unsavory aspects of U.S. policy. Indeed, the idea that “the reassertion of U.S. power had its darker side” (347) is one of the explicitly stated, overarching themes of the book, and it appears repeatedly—and prominently—throughout the text.

Nor do I ascribe U.S. policy failure only to “those few pesky structural forces that did not align with American primacy,” as Moore writes. To give just one example, I provide an extended discussion of the Iran arms-for-hostages debacle, an instance of U.S. policymakers compounding a difficult situation with significant unforced errors. To be clear, every strategy entails costs and features at least a few missteps, and I do contend—on the basis of abundant evidence and analysis—that in the aggregate, the good outweighed the bad. But accurately assessing the book—like accurately assessing this period—requires due attention to complexity and nuance.

Second, my book seems to have caused great discomfort to two reviewers—Moore and especially to Donoghue—who are both are disinclined even to consider the idea that Ronald Reagan might have done anything right. My book seems to have caused great discomfort to two reviewers—Moore and especially to Donoghue—who are both are disinclined even to consider the idea that Ronald Reagan might have done anything right.

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A third issue worth clarifying—one raised especially by Moore—is the claim that I ignore issues of contingency and agency in telling the story of American resurgence. This critique also misses the mark. A book that examines, in great detail, how structural forces and policy choices interacted is hardly blind to issues of contingency and agency; it puts them at the center of the story, even while recognizing the limits of their influence. A fair-minded observer can hardly read this book without appreciating the fact that things could indeed have turned out differently had George H. W. Bush reacted in another way to the breaching of the Berlin Wall or to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, for instance, or had Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts to save the Soviet Union and its empire in Eastern Europe not been so catastrophically counterproductive.

Fourth, the reviews manifest some dissatisfaction with my use of “IR-speak” (namely, the concept of unipolarity) and lament my failure to engage deeply with the concept of “empire.” This critique is not inaccurate—I don’t do much, if anything, with the idea of American empire—but it still strikes me as misguided. To be perfectly clear, I have no normative objection to the idea that the globe-spanning geopolitical project that the United States has long pursued has had some quasi-imperial aspects to it. (I do find it a bit rich, though, to call the Reagan administration’s clash with Qaddafi—a leading state sponsor of terrorism during the 1980s—“a confrontation between a global empire and a troubled postcolonial society.”) But the trouble with “empire” is that it has long been a vaguely defined concept that is often used simply as pejorative shorthand for the purported crimes and misdeeds of American globalization. And given that the concept of empire constitutes ground so well-trodden that one can hardly distinguish the historiographical footprints from one another anymore, I will stick with my belief that using a different analytical framework—even one from another discipline—can inject some new analytical energy into these debates.

Now, this might be a misstep on my part if (as McKevitt suggests) I simply accept the concept of unipolarity uncritically. But I don’t: the book provides a clear definition of unipolarity and discusses the ways in which the United States met and actually exceeded the criteria for unipolarity in the early 1990s, in areas from economic and
military power to the prevalence of America’s favored ideas and concepts. Nor does the book miss the fact that U.S. predominance was actually more pronounced immediately after World War II than it was after the Cold War; in fact, I call the immediate postwar era America’s “first unipolar moment” (15). What was different about the post-Cold War era, of course, is that the United States no longer had a global rival—a condition that magnified the geopolitical effects of unipolarity. Finally, the book most certainly does not suggest that American dominance continues unchallenged to this day. Rather, it ends more ambiguously, by noting that American primacy—while still very impressive—is more contested today than at any previous time during the post-Cold War era.

Fifth, for the sake of correcting the record, I must point out that there are a handful of assertions in the reviews that cannot pass unaddressed. The idea that the United States was forced to retreat from formal ownership of the Panama Canal is neither “absurd” nor a “right-wing canard.” As both Republican and Democratic administrations recognized during the 1970s, Panama had generated sufficient pressure—both diplomatically and through the threat of sabotage and insurgency—that Washington had no good option but to conclude the Panama Canal Treaties. Those treaties were still examples of constructive diplomacy, but diplomacy that stemmed from U.S. difficulties in preserving long-held positions.

Similarly, it is inaccurate to suggest that I label détente an unmitigated failure, for I point out several of its long-term contributions to eroding the Soviet bloc and note that Reagan’s critiques of it were sometimes unfair. I do contend (accurately) that détente did not meaningfully inhibit the Soviet arms buildup or quest for greater influence in the Third World, but any honest assessment has to grapple with these issues. Lastly, Donoghue recycles the old argument that Washington could have stopped Central American insurgencies by deemphasizing military aid in favor of economic aid. There are reasonable arguments to be had about what balance there should have been between economic and military assistance. But it is simply naive to assert that the Salvadoran government could have survived against well-armed Soviet- and Cuban-supported insurgents without receiving outside military assistance. Indeed, to make this assertion is to commit precisely the error of which historians so often accuse policymakers—placing ideology above evidence. Similar points could be made about the counterfactual assertions that Donoghue makes without offering any evidence—such as the idea that the Soviet Union would have crumbled on its own without the U.S. geopolitical offensive of the late 1980s. Counterfactuals such as these are by their nature impossible to prove or disprove, but when they are made absent any supporting evidence, they sound more like articles of faith rather than serious historical arguments.

I will close by addressing two broader issues that surface in the reviews and that, in my view, speak to broader challenges for the historical profession. The first of these is the question of how historians should relate to and engage policymakers, a point raised by McKevitt. Like virtually all professional historians, I staunchly reject any idea that historians should alter their analyses or pull their punches to curry favor with policymakers. But I also reject any suggestion that engaging with policymakers is inherently corrupting of an otherwise pure academic pursuit. Those of us who spend our professional lives immersed in how policy gets made and what its effects are presumably do so because we think we have something constructive to add to debates about U.S. foreign policy. In fact, I would suggest that people like us who live such privileged professional lives—who get paid, often with taxpayer money, to research, think, and write—actually owe it to our societies to do so. I make no apologies for the fact that I wrote this book because I thought that a nuanced analysis of this critical period in American history—one that bears so many interesting similarities to today—could speak to both the academic and policy communities. And I would suggest that today, at a time of remarkable turmoil—both internally and externally driven—in U.S. foreign policy, such engagement is as critical as ever.

The second issue concerns what I find to be a disturbing undertone in parts of this roundtable: a certain reluctance to acknowledge American diplomatic successes where they have occurred and a predisposition to allege that doing so equates to sycophancy and triumphalism. I don’t mean to tell anyone what their ideological or political predilections should be, and I don’t suggest that there is only one valid interpretation of this period. But being a historian means doing more than criticizing power and explaining why and how U.S. policy fails. It also means being willing to accept that U.S. power is sometimes used for worthy ends, that it is sometimes used quite effectively, and that recognizing and explaining policy success—even when that success is achieved by Ronald Reagan—is not a betrayal of the historian’s ethos.

Above all, being a historian means being willing to at least consider the idea that for all of America’s blunders, errors, and immoralities in foreign affairs, perhaps the creation of a world in which the United States was geopolitically dominant, in which great-power competition receded (albeit temporarily) to lower levels than at any time since before World War I, and in which free political and economic institutions advanced further than ever before was actually a good thing—not just for the United States, but for most of the world. I am open to debate on all these ideas, but if we simply dismiss them or show far more interest in the sins of American policy than the successes, we are doing ourselves, and our discipline, a disservice.

For after all, the issues raised here are bigger than any single book. They go to the heart of what we aspire to do as historians. I was originally drawn to the study of history because I so admired the work of great historians such as David Kennedy, Melvyn Leffler, Marc Trachtenberg, and John Gaddis. These scholars could be harshly critical of U.S. policy, while also showing real empathy for decision-makers confronting weighty and difficult issues. They were willing to experiment with approaches and concepts from disciplines other than history and to put aside ideological preconceptions to go where the evidence led them. They debated their colleagues (and each other) fiercely, but they learned from them in the process. That is the tradition that attracted me to our field when I first set out to get a Ph.D. in diplomatic history. It still strikes me as an example worth emulating today.
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The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize Committee—Vanessa Walker, Jim Meriwether, and Jonathan Nashel—has awarded the 2017 prize to Zach Fredman (right) for his outstanding dissertation “From Allies to Occupiers: Living with the U.S. Military in Wartime China, 1941-1945” (Boston University, 2016). The committee was impressed with the depth and breadth of his multinational archival research and attentive analysis to both Chinese and U.S. perspectives. His sophisticated analysis of the daily experiences and interactions of both Chinese and U.S. actors makes a critical contribution to our understanding of U.S.-Sino relations in the 20th century. Moreover, Fredman’s dissertation is an impressive piece of research that reveals the complicated overlap of alliance and occupation that has often been involved in the United States’ presence in foreign territories throughout the 20th century. The committee takes great pleasure in recognizing this exemplary piece of work.

The committee also cited Betsy A. Beasley’s dissertation, “At Your Service: Houston and the Preservation of U.S. Global Power, 1945-2008” (Yale University, 2016) for an honorable mention in the 2017 Unterberger Dissertation Prize. “At Your Service” is an ambitious and original study of the transformation of American internationalism through the prism of the oilfield services industry in Houston, Texas. Beasley’s work traces the development of “service globalism”—that is the export of expertise rather than products—and its implications for U.S. corporate and governmental power at home and abroad. This work exemplifies the exciting nexus between local and global forces that have defined the United States in the twentieth century and raises important questions about the relationship between capitalism, labor, race, and power for the United States today.

The newly renamed Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship committee of Mike Morgan (chair), Megan Black, and Osamah Khalil announced the two recipients for 2017:

Nguyet Nguyen (right), of American University, is bringing the Vietnamese diaspora into the history of the global movement against the Vietnam War. She examines the ways in which Vietnamese exiles built support among activists in the United States and Western Europe in an effort to persuade the American government to withdraw its forces. In this account of international diplomacy from below, state and nonstate actors collided, as migrants, university students, and transnational social movements mobilized support for the National Liberation Front. Nguyen’s research moves impressively across continents, integrating Vietnamese, American, and French sources into a single, globe-spanning story. Operating in the best tradition of the “new diplomatic history,” she offers new explanations for the failure of U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam and Washington’s inability to win over international public opinion. In this way, she sheds new light on an important and previously neglected aspect of the conflict.

It is widely accepted that the U.S. War on Drugs has left its mark on Mexico, but the history and consequences of this process have not been well understood. Aileen Teague, a doctoral candidate at Vanderbilt University, is breaking through this barrier with a dissertation that explores how U.S. drug control policies shaped Mexican domestic politics. It makes a major contribution to the history of the United States and the world by illuminating the actors, institutions, and policies that shaped patterns of drug addiction and violence in two societies. Navigating the national and local levels of this story, Teague examines the perspectives of U.S. policymakers, Mexican leaders, local drug enforcement agents, Mexican soldiers, opium producers, and insurgents. Her dissertation reveals how the United States and Mexico constructed an antidrug worldview that has provided an essential framework for more recent policies concerning immigration, manufacturing, and border enforcement. Teague’s multisited and multilingual work breaks new ground and offers important insights into present-day problems.

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize Committee—Andrew M. Johnston, Kristin Ahlberg, and Stephen Macekura—has awarded the 2017 prize for distinguished research and writing by a junior scholar to Tehila Sasson (right) of Emory University for her article “Milking the Third World? Humanitarianism, Capitalism, and the Moral Economy of the Nestlé Boycott,” published in the American Historical Review in October 2016. The committee judged the article’s impressively broad research, and its ability to combine the new histories of humanitarianism with emerging transnational consumer critiques of multinational corporations, as an exemplary demonstration of the intersection of global and international history. The article makes a persuasive argument about the emergence of a global “moral economy” in the 1970s that has continuing salience in our understanding of global governance today. The committee is delighted to be able to recognize Dr. Sasson’s exceptional contribution to the field.
Hal Brands, Andrew Preston, and Emily Conroy-Krutz awarded the 2017 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize for the best initial book in the field of U.S. foreign relations to Matthew Karp for his book, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy (Harvard University Press, 2016). Karp’s book is a path-breaking and highly original account that relates the rise of U.S. power in the decades preceding the Civil War to an unfolding global struggle over the future of slavery. It describes the intimate relationship between slaveholders and America’s increasingly ambitious foreign policy and maps the ways in which these individuals sought to fashion a broader global order and economic system based on white supremacy, human bondage, and an aggressive and empowered state. In doing so, Karp’s book provides new insights on U.S. foreign policy in the antebellum era as well as the battles between abolitionists and slaveholders that roiled the Atlantic world. This Vast Southern Empire is an impressive work of scholarship, one that is likely to shape debates for years to come.

Elizabeth Cobbs, Julia Irwin, and David Painter have awarded the 2017 Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize, which rewards distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined, for a book beyond the author’s first monograph to Nancy Mitchell for Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War. Her deeply researched and engagingly written book not only provides a detailed and nuanced account of U.S. policy towards Africa during the Carter years, it also compellingly argues that scholars (not to mention pundits and the public) have misunderstood Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy. Rather than an inexperienced and naïve liberal more interested in promoting human rights than containing Communism, Carter was an intelligent, disciplined, and convinced Cold Warrior who believed new policies were necessary to achieve victory in the Cold War. Drawing on extensive research in documentary collections of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Cuba, South Africa, and Zambia, in addition to interviews with twenty-eight key participants and a firm command of the secondary literature, Mitchell makes a stunning contribution to the history of U.S. foreign relations. In prose of literary distinction, Jimmy Carter in Africa uncovers new information and advances novel interpretations about an understudied region, period, and president.

The Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing recognizes outstanding collections of primary-source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents and set them within their historical context. In the two meticulous volumes of The Nixon Tapes, Douglas Brinkley and Luke Nichter have done the heroic work of transcribing and annotating the 3,700 hours captured by the recording devices in the Oval Office between 1971 and 1973. Less than 5 percent of those conversations had been previously transcribed and published. The prize committee—Laura Belmonte, Brad Simpson, and Nichole Phelps—is pleased to make this award.

In response to a clear demand from the organization’s membership, SHAFR’s Council has this year established an annual SHAFR Distinguished Service Award. The first recipient is Peter Hahn. Peter has been almost certainly the most important single person in the distinguished history of our organization. He served as our executive director from 2002 to 2015. One past-president has observed that Peter “in effect ran the organization, served as its institutional memory, and oversaw its enormous expansion, and as such he is largely responsible for its success.” Other former presidents who worked closely with him recall Peter’s “extraordinary administrative competence” and his “reassuring unflappability.” Various SHAFR presidents recalled hearing endless variations on the phrase, “It’s already taken care of.” Peter has for years infused SHAFR with his deep moral integrity and steadfast courtesy and concern for others. A longtime chair of the History Department and mentor to dozens of graduate students at The Ohio State University, Peter now serves as Dean of Arts and Humanities. Last fall, Peter was elected vice president of SHAFR and will take over as president next year.
The William P. Clements Department of History at Southern Methodist University, building on its established strengths in Southwest and Borderlands History, is pleased to announce new graduate student and doctoral fellowships in the broad field of American history, including the history of the presidency, politics, and foreign affairs.

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Book Reviews


Ryan Irvin

What is the next big thing? Jamie Miller begins An African Volk by tackling this question, and he suggests that the new frontier in international history is the intersection between the global Cold War and local politics. Historians need to look “not so much at geopolitics,” he writes, “but at the domestic politics, specifically at how Cold War ideologies shaped contests over different political visions within global south states” (18). This paradigm might be termed the Tip O’Neill approach to foreign relations history. All politics is local, O’Neill quipped memorably, so it follows that all diplomatic history should start at home.

An African Volk uses this approach to explain John Vorster’s fate as South Africa’s prime minister. Focusing on 1974–1976, Miller’s story turns on the conflict between Vorster and his defense minister, PW. Botha. The two men wanted the same thing: stability in Southern Africa. But that was the only thing they had in common. Vorster fancied himself an alchemist, “believing that skillful diplomacy could transform African states’ hostility to apartheid into genuine acceptance,” and Botha was a strongman who felt that “coexistence between white and black could only be secured by using force to destroy South Africa’s enemies” (7). Compromise between Vorster and Botha was not in the cards, and when the former’s approach blew up in his face in the mid-1970s—mostly because of the ill-fated Angola invasion—the latter seized power and altered the face of South African foreign policy. This story is familiar, but Miller retells it with stunning detail, recapturing the ideological differences that separated apartheid’s champions.

An African Volk is not a study of U.S. foreign relations. However, American leaders, particularly Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, appear at several junctures, and Miller’s story engages debates that are instantly recognizable to U.S. diplomatic historians. Three items jump out. First, Miller’s emphasis on the primacy of domestic politics engages one of the field’s oldest debates. What drives people? Like Fredrik Logevall and Thomas Schwartz, Miller looks to the home front for answers. Second, the book tackles a period that has vexed international historians and sheds light on the Angolan imbroglio. Miller’s approach suggests that Pretoria did not intervene in that country at Washington’s behest, and while he does not produce the smoking gun, his interpretation is very well argued. Third, Miller takes apartheid seriously and illustrates how Pretoria’s actions abroad reflected an earnest debate about separate development. This approach illuminates the way national security buttressed white supremacy in South Africa.

Miller is a splitter by nature, and the sheer detail he provides in An African Volk makes it the definitive history of Vorster’s foreign policy. It is old-fashioned in all the right ways, and corrects several misperceptions about Afrikanerdom. For instance, the book complements Piero Gleijeses’s Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom, while poking holes in Gleijeses’ depictions of Afrikaner elites. Unlike Gleijeses, Miller explains how South African policymakers perceived threats and why they pursued different objectives. Miller also elaborates upon my own Gordian Knot, specifically on its analysis of apartheid as a postcolonial discourse. He takes the story forward into the 1970s and leaves the reader with a richer portrait of Afrikaner domestic politics, proving that Vorster’s efforts went beyond mere branding. Finally, An African Volk adds depth to Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War. Although Afrikaners barely appear in that seminal text, they shaped regional politics in Southern Africa, and Miller’s story provides an important corrective to narratives that overemphasize Washington and Moscow.

Is Miller’s approach the next big thing? If An African Volk has a downside, it stems from the book’s granularity. Miller revels in bureaucratic infighting, and while political history is too often maligned for being political history, some of Miller’s more provocative claims are subsumed by the tit-for-tat of his narrative. For instance, Miller begins with interesting observations about anticommunism, borrowing Masuda Hajimu’s work to frame the concept as an ideology (18). This paradigm might be termed the Tip O’Neill approach to foreign relations history. All politics is local, O’Neill quipped memorably, so it follows that all diplomatic history should start at home.

Notes:
In his richly detailed *Brothers at Arms: American Independence and the Men of France and Spain Who Saved It*, Larrie Ferreiro stresses the American revolutionaries’ utter dependency upon France and Spain for weapons, funds, and military and naval support. His thesis appears most clearly in the conclusion: “Instead of the myth of heroic self-sufficiency, the real story is that the American nation was born as the centerpiece of an international coalition, which together worked to defeat a common adversary. America could never have won the war without France, and France could never have succeeded without Spain” (336). Although its main argument is not new (it expands upon Jonathan Dull’s classic *A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution*), *Brothers at Arms* provides a comprehensive analysis of French and Spanish motivations for supporting the United States in its war for independence. Ferreiro marshals a wide array of French, Spanish, British, and American sources, including correspondence, diaries, government reports, memoirs, and newspapers. His book also features several portraits and engravings of battles, although, regrettably, he does not discuss them in the text. His expertise in engineering often enhances the narrative; particularly good is an insightful discussion about how the development of copper sheathing (“thin plates nailed to the underwater part of the ship”) enabled ships to “sail faster, turn more quickly, and stay at sea for much longer periods” (195).

*Brothers at Arms* emphasizes the bitterness that France and Spain felt at losing the Seven Years’ War to Britain. Throughout the 1760s, French and Spanish policymakers collaborated on a revanche (revenge) strategy and plotted a combined invasion of England. France hoped to supplant Britain as the most influential power in Europe, while Spain sought to retake Gibraltar and Minorca (both lost during the Seven Years’ War) and to thwart British expansion in the Gulf of Mexico. France also wanted to avoid an escalation of tensions between Spain and Portugal over the boundaries of their South American colonies; and since Portugal hoped that Britain would intervene on its side, the French sought to help the Spanish by keeping British forces tied down in North America.

From the outset of their war for independence, American revolutionaries depended upon France, Spain, and the Netherlands for weapons. The Americans had few gunsmiths or gunpowder and cannon manufacturing facilities, and the Privy Council banned firearm exports to the colonies in 1774. European arms brokers sometimes shipped directly to the colonies, but American merchants also picked up weapons shipments in the West Indies. Altogether, the Americans obtained 90 percent of their firearms from overseas and received nearly $30 billion from France and Spain (335).

*Brothers at Arms* adroitly details how France’s and Spain’s military and naval involvement prevented Britain from winning the Revolutionary War. The French government officially entered the war in 1778 (once its navy had been sufficiently rebuilt), while Spain joined the following year. Spain did not officially ally itself with the American colonies, but instead united with France in exchange for France promising to help Spain invade England, recover Gibraltar and Minorca, and remove Britain from Florida and Central America.

The movement for American independence benefited enormously from French and Spanish self-interest. By attacking British holdings in Gibraltar, India, the West Indies, and the Louisiana and Florida territories, France and Spain forced Britain to divert troops, ships, and supplies away from the colonies. American leaders understood the importance of enlisting the mighty European powers against Britain. Writing in November 1778, George Washington observed that if France and Spain “obtain[ed] a decided superiority by Sea,” England “could give no effectual aid to oppose them” (179). Indeed, Britain eventually became overextended, and domestic support for the war eroded after the Yorktown surrender. As Ferreiro concludes, “Britain was simply overwhelmed, both militarily and politically” (304). Losing had not been inevitable, however, as “Britain could have won the war in any of a dozen ways” (303). For instance, the British government could have prevented Spain’s entry into the war by accepting its offer of neutrality in exchange for returning Gibraltar.

Despite losing the War for American Independence, Britain soon recovered and became the world’s most dominant naval power after defeating the combined French and Spanish forces at Trafalgar in 1805. France’s involvement in the Revolutionary War led to financial and political chaos: it had spent nearly a billion livres on the war (the equivalent of a half trillion dollars today). The monarchy soon collapsed under the French Revolution, and tens of thousands of citizens were killed during the Reign of Terror. Spain fared better in the immediate aftermath of the war. Although it failed to retake Gibraltar (despite dispatching 60,000 soldiers and sailors), it recovered Minorca, gained Florida, and unseated Britain from the Gulf of Mexico and most of Central America. Within a few decades, however, Spain’s colonies would be inspired by the American Revolution and would launch their own independence movements.

At times, one wishes that Ferreiro had developed some of his contentions more fully. For instance, he argues briefly that American diplomats Benjamin Franklin and John Adams had “little influence” and “could only watch powerlessly as events unfolded before them,” because French Foreign Minister Charles Gravier and Spanish Chief Minister José Moñino y Redondo controlled “the next steps in the war” (110-111). A claim this bold deserves more thorough discussion, as it challenges prominent works by Gordon Wood, Stacy Schiff, and Jonathan Dull. Additionally, Ferreiro occasionally mentions how inclement weather affected battles (218, 241, 276). A sustained reflection of weather’s overall effect on the Revolutionary War would have been welcome. Finally, titling the book *Brothers at Arms: American Independence and the Men of France and Spain Who Saved It* (the phrase “brother in arms” comes from an 1823 letter from the Marquis de Lafayette) is problematic. While some strong emotional bonds developed between American and French officers and many French soldiers and sailors sought refuge in the United States after the French Revolution, Spanish forces never fought together with American troops. Moreover, Ferreiro repeatedly emphasizes that French and Spanish policymakers supported the United States out of self-interest. Is it really accurate to call them “brothers”?

Overall, though, Ferreiro excels in highlighting the global dimensions and ramifications of the War for American Independence. *Brothers at Arms* merits a wide readership and joins the burgeoning historiography of works that situate the American Revolution and the Early Republic within the international context.

Notes:
W hat role should the United States play in the world? And what type of world is most conducive to U.S. interests? The answers to these questions, of course, depend on whom one asks. But strikingly, Joseph M. Siracusa and Aiden Warren, both of the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University, argue that U.S. leaders have been largely consistent in their answers to those questions and in their formulation of policy from the American Revolution through Barack Obama’s second term. U.S. foreign policy has been shaped by policymakers seeking to maintain a “balance of influence” in the world: being neither too engaged nor isolated, for example, and working with partners but also taking the initiative in international affairs when necessary (xiii). Throughout the history of U.S. foreign relations, they argue, top policymakers have sought a world comprised of democratic states whose citizens enjoy the right of self-determination and whose governments promote free trade. Such an international system, according to a succession of presidents, would be secure, stable, and conducive to U.S. interests.

Siracusa and Warren cover a great deal of historical ground to substantiate this thesis, even though their book is less than three hundred pages long. They begin with the Revolution and its immediate aftermath, when the Washington Doctrine emerged. George Washington knew that the nascent United States needed close ties with Europe for its economic development and survival. He also recognized (and his more anti-European advisors, such as John Adams, insisted) that becoming embroiled in European conflicts could just as easily be lethal to the new republic.

The next chapter sees that logic extended with the growing realization in Washington of the need for an “American sphere” in the Western Hemisphere (57). The Monroe Doctrine thus asserted U.S. influence (largely backed by the United Kingdom’s naval force) in the region and warned the European powers not to stand in the way of the South American states that had liberated themselves from Spain. Meanwhile, seeking security, presidents before and after James Monroe expanded U.S. territory across the continent.

Siracusa and Warren then turn their attention to the twentieth century. They trace the origins of U.S. democracy promotion and intensified engagement with the world to Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points and the unsuccessful attempt to join the League of Nations. Though the president hoped to globalize American ideas such as self-determination, the U.S. public and its representatives in Washington saw League membership as a guarantee of costly entanglement in future European wars. After World War II, however, U.S. involvement in European affairs became nearly ubiquitous.

The authors devote three chapters to the United States’s role in the Cold War, tracing the evolution of U.S. foreign policy after 1945. Harry Truman faced a new set of challenges, but he did so with an unprecedented set of foreign policy tools. In order to stem the growth of Soviet ideology, perceived as intrinsically hostile to the United States and what it stood for, Truman involved the United States not only in European conflicts but in wars around the world. The intensity and scope of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union increased over time as presidential doctrines became increasingly broad in their definitions of U.S. interests. When those definitions grew too expansive and led the United States into the Vietnam War, a sobered public became much more wary of overseas entanglements. Ronald Reagan may have reinvigorated the Cold War, but he and key members of his cabinet, such as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, nevertheless remained hesitant to use force abroad.

Two final chapters bring Siracusa and Warren’s analysis into the twenty-first century. George W. Bush’s “overzealous, extreme, and unprecedented” approach to U.S. foreign policy extended the Cold War-era willingness to engage with the world, from the containment of threats to U.S. interests and national security to the preemption thereof (184). This approach led to a single-minded rush to war in Iraq in 2003. When Barack Obama took office in 2009, the authors argue, very little “actually changed,” despite rhetoric to the contrary (205). The default position remained to use force unilaterally to defend U.S. interests around the world, however the president might choose to define them, and, increasingly, to use technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles to minimize risk to U.S. personnel.

Writing a history of U.S. foreign policy over more than two hundred years in roughly as many pages of text is no mean feat. Siracusa and Warren offer a compelling assessment of consistency and change in U.S. foreign policy, especially as conceived by the White House. Their basic argument is that these presidential doctrines have consistently sought to shape a world where free trade and self-determining, democratic states amenable to American ideology prevail—the definition of a world most conducive to U.S. pursuit of national goals. The reader comes away with a broad understanding of the history of U.S. foreign relations, to be sure, but also of the challenges facing the United States in the future.

Of course, such a synthetic treatment of the complex relationship between the United States and the world is bound to leave some things out. The War of 1812, for example, is overlooked, as is the Civil War. Both conflicts were formative to the growing United States, and their exclusion is striking in a book which comes close to being a survey text of U.S. foreign relations. Similarly, the choice to omit how presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton adapted U.S. foreign policy to the post–Cold War world is a missed opportunity. The amount of ground covered also leads to some oversimplifications. Describing U.S. foreign policy before and after World War I as “isolationism,” for example, may be a convenient shorthand, but it masks the extent to which the United States was—and has always been—deeply involved in international affairs well beyond its borders (81). Similarly, their treatment of Wilsonian “self-determination” omits the fact that the president’s doctrine really applied only to white nationalities (61).

Despite these shortcomings, Siracusa and Warren make an important contribution to the historiography of U.S. foreign relations. Their treatment balances breadth and brevity to illustrate how and why major ideas in U.S. foreign policy have emerged in response to a changing international system. As the United States and the world confront a new period of perceived unpredictability in grand strategy in Washington, one wonders, will the consistencies of the past continue into the future?

Megan Thrkelld

In the Great War and American Foreign Policy, Robert Hannigan finishes the task he began in The New World Power: American Foreign Policy, 1898–1917 (Philadelphia, PA, 2014) by carrying his reinterpretation of U.S. relations with the world through to the early 1920s. Hannigan’s central argument here is one of continuity over change. He contends that Woodrow Wilson’s approach to World War I and its aftermath, far from being a new departure in U.S. policy, must be understood as the continuation of U.S. policies begun in the 1890s. “Washington’s response to the Great War,” he writes, “is fundamentally the story of how the United States sought to protect and then put on more stable foundations an international order to which American leaders, well before 1914, had already become strongly attached” (x). That order was characterized by (relative) stability among the great powers, open door economic policies in China, and U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere.

Part I recaps one of the central claims of Hannigan’s earlier book, namely that the Wilson administration inherited and adopted as its own a foreign policy vision that had been crafted over the previous decade and a half. Wilsonian liberal internationalism was not a departure from what came before, but part of a long-term effort on the part of successive administrations to influence world events in a way that would enhance the power of the United States.

Part II analyzes Wilson’s—and, it is important to note, Edward House’s—maneuverings during the first three years of the war in light of the role they envisioned for the United States in the postwar international order. Wilson’s commitment to that vision, Hannigan argues, belied his professions of neutrality, since Wilson knew that the United States could only secure its own standing by protecting Britain’s and diminishing Germany’s. One of Hannigan’s valuable insights here arises from his decision to incorporate U.S. policies toward China and Latin America into the larger context of U.S. responses to the war. Those policies, which since 1898 had centered on quashing anti-colonial and anti-Western rebellions and on imposing order through violence and threats of force, “provide a broader track record by which to evaluate the nature of the Wilson administration’s commitment to self-determination, democracy, international cooperation, and other concepts that it was increasingly going to champion on the European and global stage from 1917” (79).

In Part III, Hannigan argues that Wilson’s conduct of the war was determined by what he wanted the peace to look like. He abandoned “peace without victory” by the fall of 1917, for instance, when it appeared that an end to the war at that point would result in Germany remaining too strong. Hannigan also convincingly shows the connections between Wilson’s Fourteen Points and pre-war U.S. policies. Several of the points, for example, were designed to forestall further disorder in Europe that would threaten U.S. trade. Point 3 ensured a continuation of the open door, while Point 5 was designed to spare the world, in Hannigan’s words, “upheaval from colonial rivalries or resentments” (129).

Part IV, the longest section of the book, focuses on the Paris Peace Conference and its aftermath, including the actual treaty negotiations, Wilson’s and House’s responses to the various crises that came up during those six months, and the ratification battle in the U.S. Senate. The League of Nations represented the cornerstone of Wilson’s plan to cement the United States as a leader, alongside Britain, of the postwar order. But here again, according to Hannigan, the president’s vision was not so much a new world order as a continuation of the old one in a different guise. His interactions with the other great powers as well as with representatives of colonial peoples demonstrated his ability to deal harshly with anyone who threatened the stability of that order.

Part V takes the story up to 1924 and shows that the foreign policy visions of the Harding and Coolidge administrations were in fact continuations of both Wilson’s vision and those of earlier Republican presidents. The settlement at the Washington Naval Conference was just one example of how the United States tried to maintain the pre-war balance of power between itself and Britain and to ensure that it would be able to continue building up its navy to support its growing international economic presence. Once again, incorporating Latin America and China is instructive, since policies like “dollar diplomacy” not only continued unabated through the first quarter of the century (and beyond), they were also prototypes for the “mechanisms of stabilization” the United States would employ in Europe through measures like the Dawes Plan.

Hannigan’s book is thorough, clear, and persuasive. His attention to the global context of U.S. policies during World War I is especially appreciated, as is his careful detailing of Edward House’s influence on Wilson’s thinking. The book’s historiographic interventions are perhaps not as novel as Hannigan claims. Studies over the past decade and more have substantially reconsidered both the limits of Wilsonianism (historians of U.S.-Latin American relations, for instance, have long understood exactly how far Wilsonian rhetoric extended) and the U.S. motivations for entering the war. Wilson may have convinced himself that he was “making the world safe for democracy,” but Hannigan is not the first historian to have questioned that seemingly disinterested rationale. Overall, however, his book is a valuable contribution to the study of U.S. foreign policies in the World War I era.


Nicole M. Phelps

In many ways, Volker Prott’s study of the World War I peace process is four books in one. Chapters 1 and 4 offer an account of the three Allied expert planning bodies—the Comité d’études, the Political Intelligence Department, and the Inquiry—and their interactions before and during the Paris Peace Conference. Chapters 2 and 5 detail the process of reestablishing French administration in Alsace-Lorraine, focusing particularly on efforts to separate “native” Alsace-Lorrainers from “immigrant” Germans. Chapters 3 and 6 explore the Greek-Turkish War of 1919–1922, which was precipitated by the Allied decision to land Greek troops at Smyrna as an occupying force. The final chapter covers the actions of the experts attached to the Minority Section of the League of Nations.

The components of these chapters work together to demonstrate the complex and drawn-out nature of the peace process, making the book a useful contribution to recent efforts to expand the temporal scope of scholarship on World War I. The first chapter in each pair looks primarily at the international level—the discussions and decisions at the Paris Peace Conference—while the second investigates conditions on the ground as the Paris decisions were implemented or, more likely, adjusted and subverted. Through this structure, Prott seeks to demonstrate the necessity of combining multiple levels of analysis to
understand what happened and why.

For scholars of American diplomacy, the most salient questions are likely to be about where Prott stands on Wilson and the definition of “self-determination.” Wilson himself gets very little attention; the focus is more on what others did with his language, rather than what Wilson’s intentions actually were. Prott argues that the popularity and strength—and fragility—of “self-determination” and “national self-determination” stemmed from the fact that it was not a well-defined concept and thus could be defined by its myriad users in ways that met their specific needs.

That is certainly what happened at the Paris Peace Conference. Because “national self-determination” was never defined and asserted as the guiding principle for the treaty-making process, participants used it as one factor among several as they made their decisions about where to draw new borders. Prott points out that “national self-determination” was open to both civic and ethnic definitions, but in most cases, participants at the time used an ethnic definition. The Wilsonianism at the heart of the Paris system was almost immediately corrupted by ethnic violence, and Prott argues that the fundamental problem with the system was “its inability to renew itself by producing viable ideals and commensurable principles capable of addressing the persistent territorial disputes” (5).

In Prott’s account, Wilson has more to answer for because he did not offer a precise definition than because he injected exclusionary nationalism or impractical idealism into international politics.

The book’s chief strengths stem from Prott’s admirable language abilities. The prose reflects sophisticated word choices add nuance and analytical power without succumbing to jargon. The book also features close readings of a variety of primary sources, as well as an engagement with a range of secondary literature; these materials are in English, French, and German. His research brought him to a variety of archives, and his uses of the Alsace-Lorraine postal censorship records and the correspondence of Rosalind Toynbee, the wife of historian Alfred Toynbee, from the Toynbees’ tour of Anatolia during the Greek-Turkish War are particularly creative. He has also made a thorough exploration of the reports of the three planning bodies and the minutes of the Paris Peace Conference—especially those of the smaller conference committees—which provide a welcome, nuanced, and empirically supported contribution to scholarship on World War I and its peace agreements.

Prott’s study is engaged with a variety of European historiographical and social science debates, including those over the relationship between comparative and transnational history, borderlands and shatter zones, and the lingering separation of a civilized Western Europe from a backward Eastern Europe. For an American reader, those debates feel constricting, especially because they enable Prott to adopt a very narrow and somewhat ahistorical definition of “ethnicity.” Most American approaches to these topics involve race. For the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, race encompasses ethnicity, with perceived differences among “white” groups such as Germans and Poles being as salient in many places as perceived differences between, for example, white Europeans and black Africans. That ethnicity was part of race suggests that Prott’s study of the application of national self-determination in Europe should engage not only with the process of line-drawing in Europe, but also with the geographically and temporally broader process of drawing the color line on a global scale—a process in which the participants at the Paris Peace Conference were certainly engaged.

In this vein, Prott does give some attention to Erez Manela’s Wilsonian Moment, but there is an absence of engagement with literature on European colonialism, exclusionary policies in the British settler colonies and the United States, and applications of American racial ideas to the Habsburg Empire at the Paris Peace Conference. To be fair, this later study came out in 2013, which was late in Prott’s writing process, though his book does contain references to even more recent literature.) These studies, which approach time and geography differently, help fill in why ethnicity was prevalent and convenient for policymakers and experts at the time. They do not necessarily contradict Prott’s findings, but they would enhance the analysis. One might conclude that the “experts” at Paris had a greater commitment to the ethno-racial order they were helping to construct than Prott suggests.

Prott’s study is definitely ambitious and thought-provoking, and it helps to further the current reevaluation of World War I, the Paris Peace Conference, and Wilsonianism. Having graduate students compare and contrast the book with Manela’s Wilsonian Moment, my U.S.-Habsburg Relations, Carole Fink’s Defending the Rights of Others, and Eric Weitz’s “From Vienna to the Paris System” would make for an excellent writing assignment. Margaret McMillan’s Paris 1919 could serve as a more traditional paradigm. Although these authors arrive at similar conclusions—especially with regard to their emphasis on World War I as a major turning point in the nature of the international system—the ways in which they do so vary considerably. Careful considerations of the texts would help students pursuing studies in international and diplomatic history make decisions about their own methodologies and historiographical positioning, and there would also be a fruitful discussion to be had about transitioning a dissertation to a book. The Politics of Self-Determination provides an example of an ambitious, creatively organized, and well-written multiarchival study that is worthy of emulation.

Notes:


Silke Zoller

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On February 21, 1969, the new presidential administration’s national security advisor paid a quiet visit to the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. Over lunch, Henry Kissinger informed the longtime ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, that the president wanted to speak secretly with him to address the fundamental issues of Soviet-American foreign relations. Kissinger left no record of this discussion with the ambassador, which was the first of a long series of meetings with Soviet officials that he and the president would refer to as “the Channel.” Fortunately, Dobrynin did (30–31).

Records of meetings such as this provide the backbone
of Richard Moss’s new diplomatic history monograph, Moss covers well-trodden ground, with a focus mainly on the period from December 1970 to May 1972. He studies in detail how the Nixon White House used clandestine meetings and telephone calls with Soviet officials, especially Dobrynin, to shape the most crucial foreign policy initiatives of Nixon’s first term. Nixon and Kissinger dominate the stage. They debated with Dobrynin and each other about such issues as the U.S. rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China, the Vietnam War, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the Four Power agreement on Berlin, the Indo-Pakistani War, and a Soviet-American summit meeting.

What sets Moss’s work apart from the rich preexisting historiography is his placement of secret negotiations, or back channels, at the center of his argument. Moss traces the evolution and role of these back channels, following the high-level policymakers who conducted them. He argues that these secret lines of communication made the achievements of détente feasible. They allowed Kissinger and Dobrynin to link issues that would otherwise have been treated separately by established foreign policy bureaucracies, and they provided outlets for policymakers to express wishes and anxieties without losing face in public.

Secrecy, and its role in foreign policy, lies at the heart of this work. Moss spends substantial time on the mechanisms of back-channel communication, describing what worked and enumerating the pitfalls the participants encountered in the course of their discussions. He thus provides a useful case study that analyzes a major and accessible recent example of clandestine diplomacy. The secret meetings at the highest levels of policymaking (even Secretary of State William Rogers was unaware of them) allowed for candid discussions and compromises not possible in public statements.

Moss also shows how clandestine back-channel negotiations can feed into policymakers’ personal preferences. Nixon turned to the back channels because they seemed leak-proof and therefore assuaged his paranoia. When the Moorer-Radford affair revealed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were deeply frustrated at being cut out of the loop, were spying on Kissinger and leaking top-secret documents, for example, Nixon clung to back-channel diplomacy determinedly instead of reevaluating the merits of his attachment to secrecy. Meanwhile, Kissinger leveraged his position as Dobrynin’s primary contact to expand his influence with Nixon, control the foreign policy process, and undermine competing bureaucrats from the Departments of State and Defense. Moss makes a compelling case that the initial successes of détente occurred specifically because of this secrecy, not despite it.

Moss provides a valuable argument that back-channel diplomacy is strongest when it augments traditional foreign policy and less successful when it is utilized as the primary means of diplomacy. Arranging secret meetings under the nose of the Washington foreign policy establishment hurt détente in the long run. Kissinger’s monopoly of the negotiation process was an issue, as resulting policies at times lacked the support or expertise of critical institutions. Not fully aware of all specifics, for example, Kissinger did not include submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the back-channel discussions about SALT. The Department of Defense promised to reject any agreement without such missiles, and the official U.S. negotiating team had to scramble to add these missiles to SALT at the last minute.

Candid face-to-face discussions also tended to reveal more than they should. Nixon and Kissinger noted that Dobrynin became highly emotional on the subject of Sino-American rapprochement, and they correctly inferred that the issue was a particularly sensitive one that could be used against the Soviet leadership. Dobrynin, for his part, quickly realized that the two Americans desperately wanted the public acclaim that a Soviet-American summit meeting would bring them, especially during the election year of 1972.

Finally, there were also major foreign policy problems that the back-channel mechanism simply could not solve. Kissinger again and again pushed the Soviets on the Vietnam War, asking them to pressure their North Vietnamese allies into negotiating with the Americans. This maneuver failed. North Vietnamese leaders simply ignored Soviet requests to work with the Nixon White House. Moss emphasizes that back channels can foster cooperation, but they do not function well in coercive situations. Such insights will be of interest to many policymakers.

The sheer level of detail in the book makes it accessible mainly to those already familiar with the Nixon presidency. Moss spends most chapters providing verbatim transcripts of conversations between Nixon, Kissinger, and Dobrynin. His approach is to step back and let the historical actors speak for themselves. Drawing back the curtain of history, he repeatedly shines light on high-stakes conversations that participants cryptically alluded to only in other memoranda or in their memoirs. While informative, this approach tends to be narrative and descriptive rather than analytical, although Moss does frame the conversations with brief analytical statements about the importance of the back channel for the foreign policy issues under discussion. Still, there is an opportunity for further analysis of the Nixon-Kissinger-Dobrynin back channel in the vast materials that Moss has showcased, especially since he focuses heavily on the most successful era of détente, from 1970 to 1972. The monograph ends with Nixon’s 1972 visit to Moscow, and leaves only tantalizing hints about what work could be done on the subsequent years.

Moss is uniquely suited to the work of opening further lines of inquiry on the much-discussed Nixon administration. As a former State Department historian, a one-time analyst at the Pentagon, and an expert on the Nixon presidential recordings, he wades through and seamlessly links thousands upon thousands of taped conversations and telephone transcripts and makes it look easy to boot. By comparing his findings with the much smaller number of Soviet sources available, Moss is able to draw compelling conclusions about how both sides operated and communicated (or miscommunicated) with each other. Unsurprisingly, few conversations actually went the way that Nixon or Kissinger wanted them to be remembered. Moss’s approach offers the reader insight into policy objectives and measures, but it can also serve as a window of opportunity for historians interested in psychology and emotion.

Overall, Moss’s monograph supports the diplomatic historiography of détente by showcasing the conversations behind Nixon and Kissinger’s carefully cultivated curtain of secrecy. It highlights the unusual mechanisms by which these men conducted foreign policy and reveals how back channels strung together the linkages of détente. At the same time, the monograph serves as a warning that back-channel diplomacy has its limitations. It breeds distrust and cannot replace institutional expertise or solve third-party conflicts. Back channels can be valuable when used to support a successful foreign policy, but they should not dominate it.
Scholars of the Vietnam War face a notoriously long historiography analyzing why the United States engaged in a prolonged ground conflict in Vietnam and how it lost the war. While the field has moved aggressively toward an embrace of transnational research in the past decade, Pat Proctor’s five-hundred-page *Containment and Credibility* re-centers the discussion in a domestic diplomatic setting. Like earlier works from scholars like Fredrick Logevall, Michael Hunt, and Andrew Johns, Proctor’s book offers a close reading of the political debates that drove presidents to act in Vietnam. Proctor alludes to the roots planted by Eisenhower and Kennedy in his work, but he focuses on the Johnson and Nixon administrations in his assessment of how the containment effort built the war effort in the United States and the decline in credibility broke it. He argues that the Vietnam War only served to reinforce the Cold War ideology of containment in the minds of mainstream Americans, while distrust of leadership led to the failure of the Johnson presidency and the war.

Proctor calls his book a mass political history of the “public struggle between supporters and opponents of the Vietnam War to influence American public opinion about the war” (xii). In this way, he sets the stage for not engaging with a specific branch of government or with international governments in his analysis. He places himself firmly into the Logevall school with his assumption that Johnson chose to engage in the Vietnam War; he also concludes that Johnson was so committed to this choice that he blatantly misled the American people into believing his pretext for engaging in the ground conflict as both a necessity for containment and a retaliation for unprovoked attacks on American vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. A considerable portion of the book is spent discussing Johnson’s manipulation of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which Proctor believes provided the key to the war’s escalation and Johnson’s fall from power. Once administration officials decided to escalate, they experimented with arguments that the United States needed to uphold its promises to back commitments to our ally. However, they found that the American public responded better to the containment thesis.

The events of 1967 provide the central turning point for Proctor’s thesis. The continued surge in ground troop numbers increased resistance to Johnson’s approach. Americans agreed that the United States should be involved in Vietnam, he argues, but they largely disagreed with Johnson’s methods. More significantly, the revelation that administration officials had withheld their doubts concerning the Gulf of Tonkin incident, along with Senator J. William Fulbright’s decision to hold Foreign Relations Committee hearings over the purported attacks, set the stage for what historians have typically seen as the pivotal events of the war in 1968.

Fulbright felt that Congress did not want to violate Johnson’s “insurance policy” against criticism by challenging the war, which they had consented to with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The hearings served to break down Johnson’s credibility and allowed Congress to attack the president without attacking the Cold War theory of containment, which proved persistently popular. Proctor argues that Johnson began to lose credibility in the eyes of the American public by late 1967, when the hearings fueled the anger that members of Congress felt about Johnson’s private assurances that he would not use the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to escalate the conflict and exacerbated the sense of betrayal that voters felt about his public assertions prior to the 1964 presidential election.

In the final portion of the book, Proctor takes on the Nixon administration’s handling of the war. Overall, Nixon had higher rates of support for his management of the conflict, despite the common narrative that the entire nation had turned away from the war by the 1970s. Proctor offers a compelling discussion of the interplay between what he calls “mainstream” Americans and “radical” protestors, or the antiwar movement. His use of “radical” throughout the book raises questions about tone and the meaning of the word. Proctor argues that protestors had less of an impact than Nixon’s own weakening credibility after he failed to find a quick peace. He points to the backlash over actions in Cambodia, the findings of the My Lai trials, and protests organized by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War as compounding factors in Nixon’s credibility problem. But he dismisses the significance of the events at My Lai as directly impacting Nixon’s standing in the eyes of the American public. While the massacre took place during the Johnson administration, I would like to hear more from Proctor on whether the cover-up impacted the perception of the office of the presidency more broadly.

Proctor’s evidence comes from three main categories of sources that formed the fundamental basis for presidential decision-making and rhetoric. Throughout the book, he circulates between statements from government officials, reactions in the press, and public opinion polling. He bases the argument that Johnson maintained mainstream support through 1967 on polling numbers showing approval for the war hovering at just over fifty percent in most cases. While Proctor is sensitive to fluctuations in these numbers, the assessment that anything over fifty qualifies as public support might create the basis for some challenges. Still, the interplay between the three types of sources reinforces Proctor’s arguments regarding Johnson’s concerns for balancing support for the war between Congress and the American public. After the initial passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the two groups rarely found themselves in agreement.

Proctor delivers a significant amount of detail on how and why the White House leadership forged its way forward in Vietnam, but his study lacks an international context. That context certainly weighed on both administrations. At points, Proctor mentions underlying cultural misunderstandings and tensions with the government in South Vietnam, which would benefit from more analysis. But he keeps the scope of the book domestic, and significant events thus fall out of focus. Most striking, perhaps, is a failure to engage with the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, which occurred just two weeks before that of President Kennedy. The coup and resulting political unrest in the nation that Johnson’s predecessors had committed to defend increased the risk of the South “falling” to communism. Proctor shows convincingly that administration officials waited for a crisis before acting on what they saw as a necessary intervention in Vietnam in 1964. The instability of South Vietnam would only strengthen this argument.

Likewise, the focus on credibility is narrow and misses several opportunities to engage with the multitude of factors that weakened support for the Johnson administration in Congress and among the American public. Other domestic issues, including the Civil Rights Movement, are barely mentioned, if at all. While the focus of the book is Vietnam, it would have been helpful to allude to other issues on the minds of Americans. Examining other questions asked in the plentiful surveys described in the book would have helped provide context. In addition, Proctor’s work could use a broader engagement with the secondary literature. He tends to rely on a small pool of monographs without
bringing in more recent works from historians like Andrew Johns and Edward Miller, whose works could expand his assessments. Finally, and this is a minor issue, the work would benefit from better copyediting. Numerous typographical errors and unnecessary repetition distract from the underlying narrative, which otherwise succeeds at engaging readers with direct and pointed arguments.

These criticisms aside, Proctor has written a work that engages a well-trodden topic in a new way. His book presents valuable statistics regarding public opinion and congressional thought throughout the war years. His broad takeaway, that the book shows “the mechanism by which a widely held foreign policy ideology resists change, even in the midst of its most unacceptable consequences,” leaves the reader with plenty to think about when looking at other circumstances in which such a pattern might prevail (423). Proctor uses his conclusion to draw parallels to the global War on Terror and the rise of ISIS, which he sees as driving forces in a potentially century-long war. In this way, the national struggle to comprehend Vietnam continues to offer lessons for and parallels with the situation the United States finds itself in today.


Matt Loraza

In his introduction to Understanding and Teaching the Cold War, Matt Masur argues that the recent developments in Cold War scholarship and the availability of previously unavailable archival sources present an opportunity for historians to reconsider how we teach the Cold War in our classes. To this end, Masur has assembled a formidable cast of scholars, all of whom share their ideas and expertise on teaching the Cold War. Individuals looking either to create new Cold War courses or to breathe life into older courses will find this book a significant asset.

The book is organized into five sections. Part One, “The Cold War and the Classroom,” features essays by Carole Fink and Warren Cohen that provide overviews of the Cold War in Europe and Asia, respectively. Part Two, “Traditional Topics, New Perspectives,” consists of five essays that show how recent historiography and newly available primary sources make it both possible and essential to teach the Cold War from varied and multinational perspectives. The five chapters in Part Three, “The Cold War and American Society,” explore how the superpower conflict shaped everyday life within the United States and suggest methods to explore these subjects in the classroom. Part Four, “The Global Cold War,” reiterates the benefits of incorporating global approaches with four chapters that explain how the Cold War impacted and was shaped by regional actors across the globe. The final section of the book, “Archival Collections for Teaching the Cold War,” includes three essays that identify and describe some of the most useful online document repositories and propose strategies for teaching with digitized documents.

Carole Fink and Warren Cohen open the work with overviews of the Cold War in Europe and Asia that emphasize the importance of imparting the multipolar nature of the Cold War to students. Fink presents a framework for teaching Cold War Europe that includes traditional Cold War reference points (such as Suez, the Berlin Wall, and détente) but replaces a bipolar narrative with a more intricate one that incorporates the roles of historical actors across Europe. In his reflections on the Cold War in Asia, Cohen likewise contends that Washington’s relations with Beijing cannot be fully understood without giving full due to other important players, such as Taiwan, Japan, and other regional actors. Both essays affirm that historians add complexity not for its own sake, but rather to develop a better grasp of history, as engaging the past is a process that requires an understanding of historical context, active inquiry, and the analysis of multiple perspectives that presented several possible outcomes rather than a single, inevitable conclusion.

Many of the contributors to the volume concur that one of the most significant challenges they face as teachers is that of student engagement. As Fink attests, it is perplexing to discover that the “personal and intellectual landscape” (14) of contemporary students is often a teenage wasteland when it comes to Cold War political history and cultural references. Yet David Bosso urges teachers to stop lamenting the chasm that separates the zeitgeist of the post-9/11 generation from their own. Instead, Bosso challenges teachers to become more cognizant of how the twenty-four-hour news cycle, heightened pace of globalization, and growth of social media affect student learning. Relentless exposure to tidbits of information, he argues, fosters habits that attach greater importance to “answers than . . . questions” (108). The resultant devaluing of context increases the likelihood and frequency of disconnect when students are forced to grapple with broader abstract concepts. To offset the problem, Bosso endorses thematic approaches that connect contemporary concerns such as globalization and human rights to their Cold War antecedents.

The perceptive observations and ideas on prompting student inquiry found in Bosso’s essay are representative of the quality of the other chapters. Although the chapters vary both in topical focus and pedagogical tools, they all reflect the work of dedicated teacher-scholars with worthwhile ideas about course organization, important scholarship, primary sources, and various assignments. The chapters are organized logically and effectively, but since the essays stand on their own merits, readers can certainly make their choices à la carte and still benefit from the work. Readers who are developing their first Cold War courses would do well to consult both Bosso and J. Simon Rofe’s “Cold War in Western Europe.” The latter is notable both for its observations about Western Europe and for its suggestions about teaching strategies, which reflect a clear grasp of the relevant pedagogical literature.

Teachers searching for new ways to engage their students in the Cold War should consider the suggestions of Molly Wood and Laura Belmonte, both of whom recommend teaching the Cold War with a combination of traditional documents, novels, Hollywood films, and other popular culture sources. As Wood observes, official memoranda and correspondence often fail to convey the anxieties and collective dread that went hand in hand with living under the shadow of the atomic bomb and the possibility that one’s next door neighbor was a communist. To better capture the general “vibe” of the Cold War, Wood suggests fusing traditional diplomatic accounts and sources with original sources (and appropriate background context) that address related issues such as consumerism, the Red Scare, and gender roles. Introducing examples from films such as The Manchurian Candidate (1962) and The Day After (1983) can vividly illustrate contemporary anxieties and prompt meaningful discussions about them.

Belmonte, while taking a similar approach, adds a wealth of comic books, popular songs, political cartoons, and propaganda films for consideration. She and Belmonte share questions and points of comparison that have resulted in productive discussions when posed to their classes. Although both of these essays are focused primarily on American popular culture, Belmonte does identify a select number of notable foreign films of interest, and Philip Pajakowski’s chapter on postwar Poland
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Ryan M. Irwin makes a logical and impassioned call for assignment complexity, and the quantity and depth of factors requiring hard decisions about topical coverage, and variations in student aptitude are among the many

Africa, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Cold Eastern Europe, Western Europe, East Asia, Latin America, and validate this approach, as Pajakowski, Rofe, Hiroshi the globe. The chapters in "The Global Cold War" exemplify teaching the Cold War from multiple perspectives across

on how to establish a learning environment conducive to race and ethnicity. To help instructors contend with makes it difficult to get students to talk about issues related by the current polarization of the public sphere, which Plummer acknowledges, the already difficult task of students to distorted or patently false conclusions. As teachers should use these films (like other documents, pop and depicted them in an unflattering light. Accordingly, Plummer provides an important cautionary note to this effect in “Civil Rights and the Cold War Era.” Plummer recognizes that contemporary films can help “visualize the ethos” (182) of a particular time, but she reminds us that throughout the Cold War, Hollywood films consistently employed negative stereotypes of African-Americans and depicted them in an unflattering light. Accordingly, teachers should use these films (like other documents, pop culture or otherwise) with caution and supply appropriate background information, lest the lack of context lead students to distorted or patently false conclusions. As Plummer acknowledges, the already difficult task of teaching critical thinking and source analysis is exacerbated by the current polarization of the public sphere, which makes it difficult to get students to talk about issues related to race and ethnicity. To help instructors contend with these daunting obstacles, she advances valuable proposals on how to establish a learning environment conducive to fruitful discussions of the intersections between race and foreign policy.

From cover to cover, the book unequivocally supports teaching the Cold War from multiple perspectives across the globe. The chapters in “The Global Cold War” exemplify and validate this approach, as Pajakowski, Rofe, Hiroshi Kitamura, Andrew J. Kirkendall, Ryan M. Irwin, and Mary Ann Heiss all make compelling arguments for including Eastern Europe, Western Europe, East Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Cold War coursework. As Kirkendall points out, time constraints and variations in student aptitude are among the many factors requiring hard decisions about topical coverage, assignment complexity, and the quantity and depth of readings. The contributors do not make such choices easy; Ryan M. Irwin makes a logical and impassioned call for including Africa in Cold War coursework, and Mary Ann Heiss makes a compelling case that teaching the NAM helps students develop a deeper understanding of the complexities of international relations.

The final section describes some of the most important digital archives and how to access their holdings. After Christian Ostermann guides readers through the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), M. Todd Bennett explains how to use the State Department’s extensive Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. Marc Selverstone then shares his thoughts on teaching with presidential recordings. Selverstone points to several online repositories of interest, including the Presidential Recordings Program (PRP) at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center.

The combined holdings of the CWIHP, FRUS, and the PRP are extensive indeed, and the essays provide important suggestions for locating documents within these collections. The chronological and topical organization of FRUS makes it the most user-friendly of the three collections for introductory student research projects, with the other repositories best left to more experienced students. Teachers looking to incorporate documents into their lesson plans can take advantage of the selections created by the CWIHP and PRP, such as the CWIHP’s “Cold War on Ice” and “Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy. Newcomers to the PRP’s online exhibits are advised to start with “LBJ Orders Some New Haggard Pants.”

Understanding and Teaching the Cold War provides rich and extensive topical and chronological coverage of the global Cold War. Although a chapter on the Cold War and the Middle East would have strengthened the already impressive collection of essays in “The Global Cold War” section, the volume still provides insights on teaching an impressive number of subjects related to the Cold War. The chapters are invariably rich in content, and all contain extensive citations to pertinent scholarly literature and primary documents. The analytical frameworks, lesson plans, and assignments are detailed and extensive, with ambitious and complex learning objectives. Accordingly, they are more suitable for upper-division and specialty courses on U.S. foreign relations or the Cold War than for broader survey courses on U.S. history.

Teachers should keep an eye out for instances in which multiple authors report on positive results using the same documents and methods. For example, Jessica Elkind, M. Todd Bennett, and Christian Ostermann all testify to the advantages of pairing either George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” or the “X” article with Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Novikov’s cable to Moscow in teaching the early Cold War. By the same token, Elkind, Anthony D’Agostino, Mario Del Pero, Kitamura, and Kirkendall explain that when they design assignments that ask their classes to reconsider the origins and end of the Cold War, students develop an improved comprehension of continuity and change throughout history.

Professors and high school teachers committed to student learning will find that Understanding and Teaching the Cold War makes the difficult task of teaching Cold War history a little easier. It is a valuable contribution to the scholarship of teaching that deserves space on the bookshelf of new teachers who are developing initial Cold War courses as well as experienced faculty who are contemplating revisions to their existing courses. Very few readers will come away from this provocative compilation without the motivation to experiment with at least some of the ideas in it. It is highly recommended.
Council members present:
Terry Anderson, Amanda Boczar, Tim Borstelmann, Matt Connelly, Amanda Demmer, Mary Dudziak (presiding), David Engerman, Petra Goedde, Amy Greenberg, Peter Hahn, Julia Irwin, Paul Kramer, Fred Logevall, Amy Sayward (ex officio), Kathryn Statler.

Others attending:
Mark Bradley, Frank Costigliola, Melani McAlister, Nick Cullather, Anne Foster, George Fujii, Alex Fulton, Ann Heiss, Andrew Johns, Adriane Lentz-Smith, Debbie Sharnak, Trish Thomas.

Business Items:

Council voting between meetings

After opening announcements, SHAFR President Dudziak discussed limits on email votes by Council. Greenberg pointed out that many Council discussions between meetings are on items that do not actually require a vote. Engerman made a motion to limit our use of email votes as we seek to better understand the issues and their solution (to be considered at January 2018 meeting). The motion was seconded by Greenberg and passed unanimously.

Financial matters

After a short introduction by Engerman to the financial issues that Council has begun to address and the ways in which the Ways & Means Committee has worked with the Executive Director to develop reports and policies (including an endowment spending rule) that will assist Council in making the best decisions for the organization, further discussion of the FY18 budget was deferred.

Partnership with National History Center

Dudziak discussed her meeting with Christian Ostermann of the Wilson Center and Dane Kennedy of the National History Center (NHC), and a proposal from Ostermann and Kennedy regarding SHAFR’s future relationship with these organizations. Council members expressed skepticism regarding maintaining this relationship. Logevall expressed his respect for the work of the Wilson Center and his hope that SHAFR would continue to maintain some kind of relationship at this point. After a full discussion, Logevall moved that SHAFR cut its funding of the National History Center to $2,000 per year. This motion was seconded by Anderson and passed unanimously with one abstaining. Dudziak concluded the conversation by pointing out that the National Coalition for History is not currently on our agenda and that there seems to be broad consensus on the value of this partnership with SHAFR.

Membership matters

At the initiative of Dudziak, Council discussed membership matters, including the idea of joint memberships as a way of increasing membership in a way that would be intellectually and financial beneficial to both sides. She suggested that we should pursue this possibility with the American Society of International Law (ASIL). Kramer said that it might be useful to explore synergies with other organizations. Engerman said that a pilot with ASIL, given current circumstances, could be helpful and inform future conversations about a larger portfolio of organizations, an idea that Borstelmann endorsed. Dudziak concluded with her commitment to move forward and provide Council with particulars in January.

Financial matters (continued)

Dudziak proposed that SHAFR begin limited advertising on our website, suggesting that it could raise $1,000 or more per year in revenue. Engerman said that the report from the Web Committee was particularly helpful and that its recommendations had his full support. Dudziak will work with the Web Committee to develop an advertising policy that would follow the model of the Organization of American Historians (OAH), allowing small ads, without videos, related to SHAFR’s mission.

Council returned to a discussion of the current fiscal year, which includes a Summer Institute and does not fall under the endowment spending rule. Most of the projected expenses are already contractually obligated, giving little room to trim. However, next year’s budget, which does not include a Summer Institute and does fall under the spending rule, should be the focus of Council’s attention. Engerman also stressed that decisions should be based on SHAFR’s mission, not simply dollars and cents.

Engerman suggested that some relatively small changes could be made to bring the FY2017-18 budget into balance thanks to changes already made in the previous Council meeting. Goedde suggested that Council work on figuring out what cuts it could make now to balance the budget for the next fiscal year. Logevall moved to approve the FY2017-18 budget as presented with the understanding that subsequent Council action could amend various budget categories. The motion was seconded by Engerman and passed unanimously.
**Summer Institute**

Mark Bradley joined the meeting to discuss the recommendations of the Summer Institute task force, which included Goedde and Demmer. Based on the previous Council discussion, they had worked to develop a model and template for a workshop tied to the conference. Goedde asserted the task force’s preference for a 2.5 day workshop that would presumably allow time to build community among the participants, an idea that Logevall underlined. The task force believed that tying the institute to the conference would result in savings, especially if the institute took place at or close by the conference hotel. Demmer talked about the idea of explicitly linking the plenary and the institute to provide even more synergies and possible savings. Bradley pointed out the long-term value of the institute based on the fact that one of the panels at this conference was the result of intellectual ties built at a previous institute.

Logevall raised the question of whether a Monday-Thursday institute in the same conference venue might also be a good scenario. Statler then raised the possibility of running a summer institute at the Miller Center much like the recently concluded workshop on public engagement, which could benefit from cost-sharing with the Miller Center. Dudziak pointed out that a longer institute could discourage participation from scholars with small children and raised the question of the compensation for the organizers and senior scholars. Goedde suggested that Council set the budget and make final decisions based on the proposals received for a 2019 Summer Institute.

The final motion was that future summer institutes would be held biannually and attached to the annual conference and that a call for proposals should go out in January 2018 for a 2019 Summer Institute with a total overall budget of $10,000, which could potentially be adjusted if needed. It should be organized along the general lines outlined in the task force report. The motion was made by Goedde, seconded by Irwin, and passed unanimously.

**Development matters**

Frank Costigliola, Chair of the Development Committee, joined the meeting. He discussed fundraising efforts, including the Leaders’ Fund. Dudziak pointed out that a fundraising policy was needed. Based on consultations with SHAFR’s attorney, she recommended accepting gifts of cash, stock, in-kind gifts, and non-real estate tangible gifts, with the latter categories evaluated by a committee that would decide whether or not to accept the donation. Based on SHAFR’s lawyer’s advice, she recommended an explicit exclusion of real estate.

Following a discussion, Connelly made a motion that SHAFR accepts “donations of cash, stock, and other liquid assets.” Irwin seconded the motion, which passed 10-2-0.

**Personnel matters**

Melani McAlister joined the meeting, having served as the chair of the search committee charged with identifying the new Conference Consultant. The search committee unanimously recommended Mark Sanchez. Dudziak recommended that he start at the salary at which Julie Laut had started and that she be authorized to make the same offer to the second-place candidate if turned down. Engerman made the motion, which was seconded by Irwin and passed unanimously.

**SHAFR publication matters**

**Diplomatic History**

Nick Cullather and Anne Foster, the editors of *Diplomatic History*, joined the meeting and discussed the status of work on the journal. Goedde prompted a discussion of the diversity of authors, noting that gender diversity of authors had remained at approximately 23% for some time. Cullather and Foster noted that they continue to work on this and other kinds of diversity, including recruiting more international authors.

Dudziak noted that it is important to recruit more readers of *Diplomatic History*. She explained that the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) had an exhibit table at the conference, with the idea that SHAFR might benefit from a relationship with CFR, including broader exposure for *DH*. Logevall heartily supported this idea. Council thanked Dudziak for her efforts in bringing CFR to the SHAFR Conference.

Borstelmann highlighted that the number of manuscript submissions had surged during their editorship, and Dudziak called for the minutes to reflect that Council thanks the editors for their excellent work. Cullather pointed out that there are now fewer forums and those tend to be ones that they have either commissioned or that cluster around a pair or set of submissions. Engerman recommended including the relatively quick “time to decision” in the submission guidelines to entice those who are uncertain about submitting. Dudziak also suggested working with the editorial board to actively recruit women and international authors and to better coordinate social media efforts between the journal office and the other communications coming from SHAFR. Foster pointed out that it would be very helpful to have students download usage figures to determine what to keep and what to jettison. Engerman suggested that a link on the course webpage could be a particularly effective strategy.

**Passport**

Based on the report of the task force on *Passport* editorship, Boczar made a motion that Council renew Andrew Johns’s term as editor. Statler seconded the motion, which passed unanimously.
Johns joined the meeting, and Council congratulated him on his reappointment. Dudziak raised issues discussed in the task force report, including the possibility of more institutional support. Dudziak promised to follow up with a letter to Brigham Young University stressing the importance of Johns’s work.

Council discussed other issues with Johns, including the kinds of contributors to Passport, and he promised to include more information in his report to Council in January.

A discussion ensued about accessing past issues of Passport on the SHAFR website. Google does not result in hits for Passport. Engerman suggested that there are things that SHAFR might be able to do to drive our content further up in Google. Logevall asked for Johns’s evaluation of the division of book reviews between Passport and Diplomatic History. Johns said that authors have been uniformly pleased when their books are reviewed in Passport.

SHAFR Guide

Dudziak asked for approval of a proposal for giving SHAFR members discounted access to the on-line SHAFR Guide, to be published by Brill. Statler moved for approval, which was seconded by Logevall and passed unanimously.

Conference matters

Ann Heiss, Chair of the Conference Committee, joined the meeting. Dudziak pointed out that the committee is preparing a call for proposals for hosting the 2020 SHAFR Conference, which will be published in the September issue of Passport. Council discussed the committee’s suggestion of charging for extra copies of the program to begin an effort to “green” the annual meeting. Logevall expressed concern about the number of concurrent sessions (twelve), which could depress attendance in some sessions. Irwin made a motion to accept the recommendation that extra copies of the program be for sale for $5 at subsequent conferences. Greenberg seconded the motion, which passed unanimously.

Goedde reported that she and Richard Immerman would be co-chairing the local arrangements committee and working with Peter Hahn on planning for the 2018 SHAFR Conference in Philadelphia.

Council discussed the current policy requiring SHAFR membership to present at the conference and the issues relative to that which had come up this year. For this year, Council decided to allow limited exceptions with the majority consent of the President and Program Committee Co-Chairs. Kramer expressed the opinion that the possibility of an exception, if not known, would be ineffective. Greenberg said that it is common for organizations to have exceptions for professionals who are not historians. Heiss recommended that any requests for exceptions be required at the time that the panel is submitted for consideration by the Program Committee. Greenberg shared the language from the Slavic Studies Association, which includes “Who does not need to be a member? Only scholars and specialists outside the field of Slavic, East European and Eurasian studies do not need to become members. They must still register for the convention as non-members.” Goedde made a motion to use a version of the Slavic Studies Association language, with the President and Program Committee Co-Chairs (by a majority decision) making final decisions on exceptions; it was seconded by Anderson and passed unanimously.

Information technology matters

George Fujii, SHAFR’s Information Technology Manager, joined the meeting. He reported that traffic to the website tends to be cyclical and correlated to deadlines for fellowships, prizes, and the conference. However, additional traffic now corresponds to SHAFR e-blasts. He also reported that the Teaching Committee is now empowered to upload its own content to the page. Council thanked Fujii for his work.

Membership and conference matters

Adriane Lentz-Smith, Chair of the Committee on Minority Historians, spoke about the committee’s activities this past year, which included recruiting a panel for the conference. To attract more graduate students of color, she suggested ensuring that the conference call for papers be listed in a variety of venues that have more diverse graduate students. Council supported the idea that the Committee on Minority Historians should have a reserved panel in much the same way that the Teaching Committee currently does.

In her role as Program Committee Co-Chair, Lentz-Smith responded to Logevall’s question about the ideal number of panels. She expressed reservations about lowering the number of concurrent sessions, which would potentially lower overall conference attendance since graduate students and many faculty can only afford conference attendance if subsidized by their institutions, which often requires inclusion on the program. This conclusion was drawn from the record high rejection rate of proposals for this year’s conference. Goedde asked if there were things that could be done to encourage more diverse presenters on panels. Greenberg suggested that language in the call for papers could mention that diverse panels have higher acceptance rates, and Lentz-Smith said that it was important for members of the Program Committee to be mindful about diversity.

Connelly raised the question of whether paying honoraria to plenary and keynote speakers was a practice that should continue. Logevall suggested that an honorarium might be necessary to attract a high-caliber speaker to a location outside a major metropolitan area. Dudziak noted that SHAFR’s practice is to leave this to the President’s discretion.

Publication matters

Diplomatic matters
Trish Thomas and Alex Fulton of Oxford University Press (OUP) joined the meeting. Thomas described the membership renewal process, and Dudziak recommended that SHAFR and OUP work together to provide more customized renewal messages as part of a larger effort to increase and retain members. Thomas suggested that a card be made available at the OUP booth at complementary organizations’ conferences providing a free trial of *Diplomatic History*, which would fit well into such a strategy.

Connelly asked about the use of year-end vs. year-to-date data and about the revenue differences of membership vs. downloads of journal content. Thomas reported that journal content is accessible from the OUP and EBSCO websites behind a one-year moving pay-wall (to maintain the value of membership) and now on JSTOR. She pointed out the long shelf life of *DH* journal articles as evidenced by the list of top ten articles. Fulton suggested that a Twitter campaign highlighting these “SHAFR classics” along the lines suggested by Connelly could be a good starting point in terms of marketing. Thomas also reported that themed virtual issues help to bring readers to the website.

Sayward commented that the renewal challenges faced last year had been completely resolved by OUP this year. Thomas also reported that production was on or ahead of schedule thanks to the diligent work of Cullather and Foster. She also reported that the journal’s impact factor had continued to rise, with a current 14/87 impact factor. Fulton then talked about efforts to get more people signed up for article alerts. She said that OUP and SHAFR’s social media efforts were very complementary and that the journal’s content was very rich for anniversaries.

**Membership matters**

Boczar reported that there were eight members of the new Graduate Student Committee, who had met to discuss what they can most effectively do. They are working with Fuji to develop a SHAFR graduate student listserv and are proposing a graduate student happy hour during one of the conference evenings. She also suggested that her committee might want to add questions to the proposed survey of the membership. Dudziak called for a round of applause to express welcome and appreciation for the committee’s work.

**Financial matters**

Dudziak reported on her survey of Council members regarding travel reimbursements to attend meetings. She said that graduate student members of Council will require reimbursement and that some members of Council will as well in order to attend two meetings per year. She noted that a lack of travel reimbursement would exclude some from standing for Council, a point that Borstelmann pointed out could hurt our diversity. Hahn expressed the opinion that graduate students should also be encouraged to pursue travel funding from their home institutions. The final consensus was that the language in the policy should be strengthened to urge Council members to try to limit their requests to one of the meetings, but that limited exceptions could be made at the discretion of the President.

Returning to consideration of ways to trim the FY2017-18 budget, Statler moved (and Boczar seconded) to further trim the Global and Diversity Scholars travel reimbursement budget. Anderson expressed the opinion that the lack of long-term membership by past recipients should play a role in deciding to cut in this area, but Goedde pointed to the benefits of having more international participation in the conference itself, regardless of long-term membership. The vote in support of this motion to reduce this budget item was unanimous.

In considering how to cut expenditures at the conference, Hahn pointed out that the Ways & Means Committee had already requested that Conference Consultant Julie Laut include in her final report her suggestions for cutting the budget 2%, 5%, and 10%, which the Council could act upon in January. Engerman thought that these recommendations were likely to include a reduction in the number of free drink tickets for the opening reception (from two to one) and reduced subsidies for social events. Goedde identified audio-visual services as an expensive area that might be usefully cut. She made a motion to cut the number of free drink tickets from two to one; the motion was seconded by Borstelmann and passed unanimously.

**Membership matters**

Dudziak thanked Irwin for her fine report for the task force on a SHAFR survey, which had been prompted by the request last year from the Committee on Women in SHAFR. Dudziak suggested that the next steps were likely to be to develop the questions and to work with SHAFR’s IT Manager. It is also important to know whether there will be costs associated with this initiative. Greenberg moved to support the on-going work of developing the survey; the motion was seconded by Goedde and passed unanimously.

**Publication matters**

Dudziak reviewed the stipend information for the *Guide* editor. Hahn suggested that future compensation should reflect the workload moving forward, especially managing the quality of work of the revisions that are contractually required. Hahn made a motion, which was seconded by Engerman, that we request a report from McPherson regarding the workload moving forward and that, based on that report, the President was empowered to determine compensation in a manner commensurate with the scope of work and in line with past stipend amounts, and that the amount could incorporate a cost-of-living adjustment. The motion passed unanimously.

In considering compensation of the editor of *Passport*, Council discussed a number of factors that go into determining the stipend amounts based on each position’s job description. A motion was made by Hahn to increase the base stipend amount by 2% (to be included in the appointment letter) with the possibility of cost-of-living adjustments in subsequent years. The motion was seconded by Anderson and passed unanimously.
Communication issues

Statler reported on the recently-concluded workshop on public engagement organized by SHAFR and the Miller Center. She said that the four key take-aways were that (1) a public relations/communications task force could work on creating a public-facing SHAFR presence that could leverage members’ existing connections with organizations and media; (2) some sort of communication group for those interested in doing this might be needed (a private Facebook page was discussed as a possibility); (3) at the next SHAFR Conference, we should consider using YouTube and Facebook Live to promote new books and conference content; and (4) the SHAFR 2018 Conference should consider including a workshop on public engagement. Statler will follow with a formal report. Dudziak thanked Statler for the report, and both agreed on the need to do more with the SHAFR Experts Directory.

Dudziak foregrounded the Advocacy Task Force report by reminding Council that this was an outgrowth of Council’s previous action on the ban on immigration from some Muslim countries, which had an effect on SHAFR members. Council approved a petition opposing the ban by a unanimous vote. (Council decided to act only if there was a 2/3 majority.) The task force (including Kramer, Greenberg, and Dirk Bonker) had surveyed different historical organizations and considered technical issues involved in polling the entire membership. Statler commented positively on the emphasis on involving the membership. Anderson was happy that the issues to be considered would only be those that directly affect SHAFR members. Dudziak noted that the process recommended by the task force would make it extremely difficult for SHAFR to take advocacy positions. Statler commented that it should be hard. Goedde added that the high threshold would also ensure that the resolution speaks with one, more powerful voice, and Connelly stated that the travel ban would have met these standards.

In regard to the recommendation that the SHAFR President could speak quickly, but not on behalf of the organization, Dudziak questioned this provision, since the president already has the ability to speak on her/his behalf as an individual with the right to free speech. Kramer commented that this was the American Historical Association’s policy for its Executive Director. Goedde pointed out that if a President spoke “as President” in a way that was contrary to the views of the majority of Council that such a situation could be remedied by a vote of Council. Greenberg moved and Anderson seconded a motion supporting the process laid out by the task force for resolutions on behalf of the membership; it passed unanimously. Next steps include a draft of language for the by-laws, which will go to Council, and a push to gather more email addresses for members so as not to unintentionally disenfranchise members.
Professional Notes

Pierre Asselin has accepted the Dwight E. Stanford Chair in History at San Diego State University.

Andrew L. Johns was elected as President-elect of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association for 2017-2018. He will serve as President of the PCB-AHA in 2018-2019.

Alan McPherson has been appointed as the new Director of the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy at Temple University, where he will also be Thomas J. Freaney, Jr., Professor of History.


Joe Parrott has accepted a tenure-track position as Assistant Professor of History at The Ohio State University beginning in Fall 2017.

Stephen Rabe has retired from the University of Texas-Dallas after 40 years. A professorship in U.S. foreign relations has been created in his name at UT-D. He will be teaching at the Honors College of the University of Oregon and will be continuing his scholarship.

Jayita Sarkar has accepted a tenure-track position as Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University beginning in Fall 2017.

Mike Schmidli has accepted a position at Leiden University beginning in Fall 2017.

Duane Tananbaum was named Teacher of the Year at Lehman College, City University of New York, for 2017.

Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, January 1-December 31, 2016

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation to the Department of State (HAC) has two principal responsibilities: overseeing the Department of State's Office of the Historian's (HO) preparation and timely publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, and monitoring the declassification and release of State Department records.


Meeting this standard is challenging. The number of vital government documents pertaining to foreign relations that are produced by a spectrum of government departments and agencies has exploded since the 1960s. Yet Congressional legislation requires the publication of “thorough, accurate, and reliable” volumes no later than 30 years after the events that they document. HO has worked diligently to meet its statutory obligations even as it provides additional services of great value. For example, in 2016 it prepared essential briefings to the Barack Obama administration and to Donald Trump's
during the transition, and it contributed constructively to the success of the presidential project to document human rights abuses during Argentina’s “dirty war” between 1975 and 1984.

The HAC is delighted to report that, notwithstanding its challenges, HO sustained its impressive progress in publishing FRUS. In this context 2016 stands out as a special year: It published the volume covering US-USSR relations from 1986-1988. This volume appeared only 28 years following the events it documented—the first time HO achieved this benchmark since 1996. Although the spike in covert actions during Reagan years will present declassification challenges that make repeating this feat more likely to be the exception than the rule, the HAC remains encouraged by HO's commitment to productivity.

The 1991 Foreign Relations act also mandates that the HAC monitor and advise on the declassification and opening of the Department of State’s records. The HAC expressed its disappointment and concern over this area of its responsibility in its previous several reports. Despite some improvement produced by a very committed staff, the HAC’s concern has not dissipated.

Section 1.5 of Executive Order 13526, issued in December 2009, requires the declassification of records over 25 years old—unless valid and compelling reasons can be specified for withholding them. State’s Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS) deserves praise for its efforts to meet that requirement, overcoming continuing and often intensifying shortages of resources and staffing and inadequate facilities. Nevertheless, because of the time needed for reviews by multiple agencies other than State with equities in its documents, the many technological problems that arise in connection with the growing number of electronic records, and the frequent delays in the transfer of the records to and their processing at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), a large percentage of State’s records may not be available to researchers for years beyond the E.O.’s declassification requirement. The HAC applauds the leadership of both IPS and NARA for addressing these issues conscientiously and aggressively. But without more staffing and resources, and the development and application of more effective technologies, the problems will not only persist but also grow worse.

**Publications of the Foreign Relations Series**

Compiling the continually increasing number of records necessary to document an administration’s foreign policies, culling from them the limited number that can be managed in one volume yet still provide a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” history, and then submitting that selection to the appropriate agencies and departments for declassification and verification, poses an exceedingly difficult and time-consuming challenge. This challenge underscores that the eight volumes HO published in 2016 is a very impressive number. These volumes are:


It warrants repeating that this list’s last volume, *Soviet Union*, October 1986-January 1989, which covers the momentous lead-up to the end of the Cold War, not only for the first time since 1996 complied with the 30-year deadline but also beat that deadline. Also on this list is FRUS’s first stand-alone volume on Public Diplomacy. Moreover, HO is now already half-way through publishing the Carter subseries, and the total of twenty-seven volumes if it has published since 2014 has established an all-time record for productivity. The volume of covert actions that characterize the latter Carter and entire Reagan years, however, will make sustaining the publication rate of the print volumes all but impossible. Nevertheless, with 73 volumes currently in the compiling/research, review/revision, declassification, or editing/publication stage, the HAC is cautiously optimistic about the future.

HO also continued its project to digitize its back catalog of Foreign Relations volumes dating back to 1861. In 2016 it published on its redesigned website 82 newly digitized volumes, all of which are completely searchable within and across volumes.

**The Challenge of the 30-Year Requirement**

The HAC was severely disappointed that the Department of State did not permit publication of the long-delayed Iran Retrospective volume because it judged the political environment too sensitive. The HAC was unsuccessful in its efforts to meet with Secretary Kerry to discuss the volume, and now there is no timetable for its release. In addition, significant cost increases necessary for funding for the Remote Archives Capture (RAC) program, which may impair the program’s mission to digitize classified documents at the Presidential Libraries so the scanned images can be accessed in Washington, DC, is also a cause for concern. It is likely that researching and compiling FRUS volumes will become more difficult and take longer.

Further, exacerbated but not driven exclusively by covert action issues, the declassification environment is discouraging. The 1991 Foreign Relations act requires agencies to review volumes submitted to them for publication in FRUS within 120 days. If the agency withholds a document from declassification and HO appeals, the agency must respond within 60 days. Within the Department of State, a division of the Office of Information Programs and Services conducts these reviews. IPS has been
commendably conscientious and professional in complying with these deadlines. So has the National Security Council’s (NSC) Office of Access Management, which both reviews documents with White House equities and provides commentary on decisions made by other declassifying agencies. The Department of Energy (DOE) has improved the pace of its reviews.

The same cannot be said for the Department of Defense (DOD). In 2016 HO submitted to its Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR) six volumes; DOPSR completed the reviews of only two, and the quality of those reviews was inadequate. The reviewers applied the classification guidelines so inconsistently as to require numerous appeals to remedy improperly withheld material. Moreover, DOPSR has not yet completed the reviews of two volumes that HO submitted in 2015, exceeding the statutorily mandated timeline by an average of 198 days. Such non-compliance delays FRUS publication. While the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) performs better than DOD, its performance declined in 2016. Owing to personnel changes, high priority special projects such as the declassification of the Nixon/Ford President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs), and the number of covert actions, it completed reviews on only four of the eleven volumes HO submitted in 2016. The effectiveness of the High Level Panel (HLP) process has also declined. In 1992 the State and CIA signed a Memorandum of Understanding that established a State-CIA-National Security Council HLP to provide guidelines for declassifying and publishing documentation relating to covert actions and to adjudicate disputes. From 2013-15 the HO-CIA HLP process resulted in CIA’s approval of an average of four HLP issues a year. In 2016 CIA did not approve any. Hence, five volumes are on hold pending resolution of HLP issues. The sluggishness of the CIA’s reviews has already caused HO to reduce its estimate of the number of FRUS volumes it will publish in 2017 by twenty percent. The HAC met with CIA’s staff and Historical Review Panel (HRP) to address these problems.

Declassification Issues and the Transfer and Processing of Department of State Records
As it did last year, the HAC commends NARA’s leadership for its efforts to mitigate the obstacles posed by underfunding and understaffing for making both paper and electronic records available to scholars and the public in a timely manner. The consequences of these shortcomings, nevertheless, have become increasingly acute as the volume of records, particularly electronic records, which require organizing, describing, and reviewing before transfer, grows. The State Department established the Electronic Records Management Working Group (ERMWG) to address NARA’s direction to manage electronic records by the end of 2016, and all permanent electronic records by the end of 2019. The emails of the secretary of state and all other Department principals, together with their staff, are now being archived in a central, searchable electronic archive that meets NARA’s success criteria. This means that the records of most consequence – those of the Department’s senior officials – are being captured and retained permanently. These initiatives will promote cost-saving efficiencies and greater search capabilities in the long-run. In the short-term, however, they are time consuming and labor intensive.

NARA’s Research Services has perforce concentrated on addressing the backlog of accessioned records produced by delays in processing. For example, it has hired additional archival technicians who perform tasks such as basic arrangement and creating box lists. But these gains in processing have come at the expense of research units. The number of staff members in NARA’s Research Services division remains below that of 2014. The HAC therefore takes pleasure reporting that NARA still managed to undertake such major initiatives as a project that will facilitate future processing and transfer by improve descriptive information for accessioned foreign affairs records, a project intended to enhance access to the records for both NARA staff and researchers by ensuring that finding aids are up-to-date and available in the research room and online, and follow-on efforts to upgrade and increase the utility of the National Archives Catalog.

The NDC and IPS likewise suffer from staff and resource shortfalls, but the effects have been less deleterious. Indeed, both performed extraordinarily in 2016. Because of its capable staff, lessons learned since established in 2010, and an innovation that facilitates coordination between NDC’s staff and agency reviewers on-site at Archives II, NDC had reduced the backlog of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) referrals by more than 25%. In addition, its Indexing-By-Demand initiative and solicitation of prioritization proposals has enabled NDC to better anticipate other Department principals, together with their staff, are now being archived in a central, searchable electronic archive that meets NARA’s success criteria. This means that the records of most consequence – those of the Department’s senior officials – are being captured and retained permanently. These initiatives will promote cost-saving efficiencies and greater search capabilities in the long-run. In the short-term, however, they are time consuming and labor intensive.

IPS’s Systematic Review Program (SRP), notwithstanding disruptions caused by the renovation of its Newington facility, succeeded in reviewing FRUS volumes at a rate that prevented delays in publication. It also completed the reviews of classified State Department records before their automatic declassification after 25 years in order to exempt still-sensitive information from declassification. The release rate for electronic records was 90%; for paper records, over 99%. An even more impressive achievement was its processing in 2016 of more than double the number of FOIA requests, MDR requests, and special requests for records over 25 years old than it did in 2015, reducing the backlog by 72%.

Richard H. Immerman, Chair  Robert McMahon  Trudy Huskamp Peterson
Laura Belmonte  James McAllister  Katherine A. S. Sibley
Mary L. Dudziak  Susan Perdue  Thomas Zeiler
STEPHEN G. RABE PROFESSORSHIP IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS

The School of Arts & Humanities of the University of Texas at Dallas will commence a search to fill the new Stephen G. Rabe Professorship in U.S. Foreign Relations. The successful candidate will have received a doctoral education at a distinguished university under the mentorship of a notable scholar in the field, substantiated by a record of highly regarded publications of articles and/or books that presage a career of progressively greater scholarship distinction. The scholarly attainments of the successful candidate will, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements for appointment as a tenured associate professor or professor of history at UT Dallas. In accordance with the wishes of the Donors, UT Dallas intends to provide the Professorship holder with support for research and professional activities commensurate with that provided to other members of the history faculty of comparable experience and distinction.

UT-Dallas is a rapidly growing university (26,800 students) of distinction. It has been designated the best young university (under 50 years) in the United States and one of the best young universities in the world. The university is located within one of the most economically dynamic regions of the United States.

Preliminary inquiries should be addressed to Dr. Daniel Wickberg, Coordinator of the Historical Studies Program.

FRANK GIBNEY AWARD IN AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS 2018

The Journal of American-East Asian Relations invites submissions for the Frank Gibney Award. The editors give the award to an essay in the field of American-East Asian Relations written by a graduate student based on coursework and submitted by his or her supervisor.

The winning author will receive a US$1,000 prize and the winning article will be published in the Journal in 2018. The award honors the life and goals of Frank Gibney (1924–2006), an early and enthusiastic supporter of the Journal. He began his study of Japan as a military intelligence officer during World War II and the Occupation of Japan, then became a correspondent and editor at Time, Life, and Newsweek magazines before joining Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1966 to develop its presence in Asia. Gibney wrote or edited more than a dozen books on Japan and Asia. In 1979, he co-founded the Pacific Basin Institute, still active at Pomona College, Claremont California.

Deadline for submissions is January 15, 2018

The supervisor or advisor should send the manuscript and a brief cover letter to Charles W. Hayford, Immediate Past Editor: Chayford@AOL.COM

For matters of scope, style, and form, see issues of the Journal and Instructions for Authors: http://www.brill.com/sites/default/files/ftp/authors_instructions/JAER.pdf

Previous Recipients:


The editors will inform the winner by March 15 and spread the news through social media and Brill’s newsletters:

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About Brill

Founded in 1683 in Leiden, the Netherlands, Brill is a leading international academic publisher with offices in Leiden and Boston. Brill publishes in 20 main subject areas, including Middle East and Islamic Studies, Asian Studies, Classical Studies, History, Biblical and Religious Studies, Language & Linguistics, Biology, and International Law, among others. Brill publishes 200 journals and some 700 books and reference works each year, available in both print and electronic form, as well as primary source research collections and databases. The company’s key customers are academic and research institutions, libraries, and scholars. Brill is a publicly traded company and is listed on Euronext Amsterdam NV. For further information please visit www.brill.com.
SHAFR Awards

Applications and nominations for the following SHAFR prizes, fellowships, and grants are due by October 15, 2017. Please see SHAFR.org for specific information on each.

- Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize
- Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant
- W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship
- Lawrence Gelfand - Armin Rappaport - Walter LaFeber Dissertation Fellowship
- Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants
- Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship
- The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship for graduate students (even years only)
- William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants

Recent Books of Interest


Barrett, David M. *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy*, (Kansas, 2017).


Li, Xiaobing. The Cold War in East Asia, (Routledge, 2018).


McKercher, B.J.C. Britain, America, and the Special Relationship since 1941, (Routledge, 2017).


In 1951, as the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) discussed the status of women in private law, a representative of the International Union of Catholic Women's Leagues brought delegates' attention to the marital status of women in colonial territories. She “requested the Commission to make specific recommendations for adoption of legal provisions protecting the institution of monogamous marriage and the rights of women in valid marriages.” Invisible in the official reports of CSW, the evidence of this statement comes from a report by Rachel Nason, consultant to the US Mission to the United Nations.1 It is one of the earliest statements that contains mention of preserving specific kinds of families in relation to women's marriage rights, and helps me to see the Christian origins of some of these ideas.

I was awarded the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Grant in 2016 to fund research in the National Archives related to women's rights in the United Nations. I intended to prioritize the papers of the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN), the Women's Bureau, and the State Department. I hoped to find documents pertaining to the activities of CSW and women's rights in the UN more broadly, particularly regarding family life and the 1962 Convention on Consent for Marriage.

This research trip proved extremely fruitful, though not in the ways I had expected. I determined that during a previous, shorter visit that I had mined the relevant documents from the USUN collection. The Women's Bureau, however, provided incredible sources that allow me to tie the work of the Bureau to much broader networks of women's international organizing. Its relationships to organizations like the YWCA and International Alliance of Women plugged the Bureau into global conversations about women's rights.

Even more exciting, for the first time I delved into the Department of State Central Decimal Files. These files contain, among many documents, telegrams reporting on the daily actions taken in the UN. Most significantly for my project, these include reports on the conversations and decisions within CSW. In an effort to present the Commission as a united front and to legitimize its efforts—members regularly had to contend with perceptions of CSW as a group of bickering ladies—official reports frequently avoid details of participants in debate. The result is an image of the Commission as a site of rational debate that ends in calm agreement, but also a lack of information for the historian about where disagreements emerged and why. Although not always a great deal more detailed than these reports (CSW was not, after all, a main priority for the USUN), the telegrams help to open these discussions to deeper analysis.

However, those telegrams that describe the sessions in 1951, like the one quoted above, are exceptionally detailed. The full document might be 12-20 pages, with as many as six of those pages devoted to full descriptions of CSW debates, the views of specific delegates, and detailed breakdowns of Soviet actions and statements. They also mention, in some cases, informal meetings for which no other written record exists at which delegates made decisions about CSW’s agenda. The 1951 telegrams therefore provide an incredible foundation on which to build my analyses of ideas about family in the United Nations.

I could not have discovered these papers anywhere else, and I am grateful to SHAFR for making my National Archives visit possible.

Jessica Malitoris
PhD Candidate
Department of History
Duke University

To the Editor:

Lubna Qureshi’s article, “Assessing Obama’s Foreign Policy,” (*Passport*, April 2017, p. 47) stated that “the Nixon administration felt justified in bombing Cambodia to destroy the non-existent Communist headquarters known as COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam).”

One has only to look at the COSVN resolutions and reports that have been published in Hanoi in recent years to know that COSVN existed, and was extremely important.

COSVN proper (the *Trung uong cuc mien Nam*, which might be translated Central Committee Southern Branch) was a committee, a small group of very powerful individuals. But it had a supporting staff, and various subordinate organizations associated with it. The U.S. government, during the war, habitually used “COSVN” as a label for the whole complex of organizations centered on the committee.

The complex of organizations centering on COSVN had moved from Tay Ninh province of South Vietnam into Cambodia by 1967, and then moved much deeper into Cambodia early in 1970. But the fact that COSVN was able to stay one step ahead of the Americans seeking to destroy it should not be taken as evidence that it did not exist.

Edwin Moise
Professor of History
Clemson University

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**Call for Proposals to Host the 2020 SHAFR Annual Conference!**

Every other year, SHAFR holds its annual meeting in a location other than the Washington, D.C. area. The SHAFR Council would like to hear from members interested in hosting the conference in their home cities in late June 2020. Council is also interested in hearing from potential hosts for 2022 and 2024.

Specifics about what hosting the annual meeting entails can be found on the SHAFR website. In an effort to provide as much lead time as possible for negotiating with hotels and other facilities, the deadline for submission of applications will be **1 December 2017**, which will allow Council to consider them at its January 2018 meeting.

Please send proposals that address the items listed in the dedicated notice on the SHAFR website to SHAFR executive director Amy Sayward (Amy.Sayward@shafr.org).
The Last Word: Fifty Years of SHAFR Memories

Mark A. Stoler

Editor’s note: This essay was written in response to a request on the 50th anniversary of SHAFR’s founding for anecdotes from members of SHAFR about their conference experiences over the years. AJ

In 1967 my graduate adviser at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, John DeNovo, informed his graduate students of the formation of SHAFR and advised all of us to join. I did so soon thereafter, but in all honesty I have no strong recollections of the organization until its first conference at Georgetown University in June of 1975. That is when my love affair with SHAFR truly began, as for the first time I found myself in the company of so many other historians who shared my interest in U.S. foreign relations—including those “elders” whose books I had read as a grad student just a few years earlier! But also attending were many of the then-young foreign relations historians of my generation, colleagues I met for the first time at Georgetown and who I continued to see at ensuing SHAFR conferences. Some of them would become close friends over the next 40+ years.

I had originally intended in this paragraph to provide names of those friends, colleagues and “elders” but have decided not to do so for fear of inadvertently omitting people who deserve mention—as well as boring all of you who read this with such a lengthy list! Instead, I will share some memories of past SHAFR conferences, especially the early ones, and ask you to excuse any factual errors caused by the impact of time on my memory. As I often warned my students, memoirs and oral histories are far from always accurate! As I often roomed in those university dorms with the late Ira De Sola, I am reminded of that terror whenever I am asked to comment, in SHAFR meetings and elsewhere, on the work of younger scholars. And hopefully it has led me to soften the language if not the content of my criticisms and suggestions for improvement of their work, thereby taking the sage advice of an old rabbi and dear friend who told me long ago to always remember (especially when grading) to “temper justice with mercy.”

Mark Gilderhus of Colorado State University and Texas Christian University—a past president of SHAFR as well as a wonderful teacher, scholar, and human being who utterly loved these conferences and the organization as a whole at least as much as I did. I met him at one of the early conferences, and he became a dear friend whose passing in 2015 I still mourn. So inseparable did we appear to be at these SHAFR conferences that George Herring years ago labeled us “the Marx Brothers.”

Ten years ago, Mark and I as well as many others shared some memories of those early years of SHAFR in a special 40th anniversary issue of Diplomatic History—memories I will try not to repeat here, save to emphasize once again the enormous impact of the Vietnam War on an entire generation of SHAFR members and leaders. Suffice it to say that I was impressed and thrilled by the presentations at the first conference in Georgetown by Seth Tillman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Ronald Steel, who was then completing his classic biography of Walter Lippmann. I believe it was a year later at the second conference in Columbus, Ohio, that I was equally if not more impressed and thrilled by a provocative debate between David Trask and Walter LaFeber over whether there should be a council of historical advisers to the president. I also had a chance to speak extensively with each of them—and each provided me then and later with enormously important insights that still affect my scholarship and teaching. I remain deeply grateful to both of them.

SHAFR was overwhelmingly male during those early years. I do remember meeting Betty Unterberger and Anna Nelson at one of those early conferences, and recall hearing the then-young Marilyn Young on a panel during the first SHAFR Conference at Georgetown. I also remember sitting with John DeNovo and other senior diplomatic historians one evening at that first conference when Dorothy Borg unexpectedly walked in—and in truly old-time “gentlemanly” fashion, they all stood up to greet her! I presented my first SHAFR paper at the third conference at the University of Virginia in 1977, as part of a panel organized by Jeffrey Safford of Montana State University. My subject was Vermont Republican Senator and Senate Foreign Relations Committee member George D. Aiken, who had recently retired and donated his papers to the University of Vermont, my home institution. I remember being terrified at that presentation when I saw John DeNovo in the audience, watching to see how his former grad student would do, sitting with Norman Graebner! I am reminded of that terror whenever I am asked to comment, in SHAFR meetings and elsewhere, on the work of younger scholars. And hopefully it has led me...
to soften the language if not the content of my criticisms and suggestions for improvement of their work, thereby taking the sage advice of an old rabbi and dear friend who told me long ago to always remember (especially when grading) to “temper justice with mercy.”

Interestingly, my own youthful terror returned many years later when I became SHAFR president in 2004. Frankly, I had little idea of my responsibilities in such a position, despite having served on Council and numerous SHAFR committees for thirty years, and I relied massively for assistance and guidance on Peter Hahn, then SHAFR’s executive director. My debt to him is enormous, and I am thrilled that he is now SHAFR’s vice president and will be its president next year. I am also thrilled by the fact that SHAFR bestowed upon him at this year’s conference a richly-deserved honor, the Distinguished Service Award. The standing ovation he received along with that honor speaks volumes. No one has given more to the organization.

Many of us who have served as SHAFR president agree that the most difficult assignment is delivering the presidential address at the annual meeting. As I looked out at that sea of faces at the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas in 2004, all expecting to hear something original from me, I had one overwhelming thought: “Oh sh...!” Other former presidents from my generation have told me of similar reactions just before they began their addresses. To make matters worse at mine, there right in front of me sat such senior notables as, once again, Walter LaFeber and Norman Graebner. This time, however, Norman was seated next to my wife Diane rather than my grad adviser as he had been in 1977, a fact I mentioned at the beginning of my presentation in an effort to calm my nervousness. I think it worked…………

Another memorable but more recent SHAFR Conference was the one that took place at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2010. To say I was looking forward to returning to my old grad institution would be an understatement, but I almost failed to get there thanks to the airline that cancelled my connecting flight from Detroit to Madison—a trip I had previously replaced the old SHAFR Newsletter—as well as numerous awards for our members, fellowships and grants for graduate students in our field, a summer institute, and a budget whose size would shock the original founders of the organization. I remember as council member, vice president, and president how that budget exploded, at least partially as a result of an unexpected bidding war between three publishers for Diplomatic History. I also remember former SHAFR president Randall Woods shocking as well as deeply impressing me with his negotiating skills and hard bargaining vis-à-vis those publishers and their staff members, abilities that I had never imagined lay beneath his southern grace and charm. Watching him, I actually felt sorry for them..........

The changes in the field of U.S. foreign relations have been as enormous as the changes in SHAFR—a fact clearly illustrated by the large differences in each edition of the historiographical volumes previously cited as well as in the seven different editions of Tom Paterson and Dennis Merril’s two-volume Major Problems in the History of American Foreign Relations. As for the Vietnam War that played so prominent a role for all of us at our now advanced age, it is almost as far removed chronologically from contemporary students as World War I was from me at their age, while the Cold War of which it was a part ended years before most of them were even born. Despite all the changes, however, SHAFR for many of us remains the same SHAFR we first fell in love with—an intellectual family and home. At the recent 50th anniversary conference in Arlington, VA, Carol Anderson beautifully captured that fact in relating her feelings while attending her first SHAFR conference—that she found in us her “intellectual partners” and that “SHAFR is my home.” Those were my feelings as well when I attended that first 1975 conference. They still are today.

Notes:
For more SHAFR information, visit us on the web at www.shafr.org