AN INTERRUPTION.

THE NEWCOMER.—Say, you fellows! If there’s any cutting up to be done, I’m here for the lion’s share.
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review

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Matt Loayza is Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Professor of History at Minnesota State University, Mankato. He has published articles in *Diplomatic History* and *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, as well as contributing to *Passport*. In his current role, he has supported and contributed to a number of student success and equity initiatives, and was the 2021 recipient of MSU Mankato's Diversity Champion Award.

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1. I think that I am more than a little disappointed that the 2022 World Cup is being held in November and December rather than in June and July (especially given where it will be held, which is another issue altogether). Yes, yes, I know that the heat in Qatar makes a summer schedule unworkable and dangerous for the athletes—not to mention that the staggering/depressing number of injuries to key USMNT players—I’m especially looking at you, Weston McKennie, Tyler Adams, and Gio Reyna—make the extra months to heal and train extremely welcome...assuming that we actually qualified (still pending as of today). But I have great memories of watching World Cup and European championship matches at past SHAFFR conferences with some serious soccer fans, and I will definitely miss that. Plus, just think of all of the lectures I will have to cancel this fall to avoid conflicts with the match schedule....

2. I think that, occasionally, the diplomatic world and the academic world collide. Three years ago, Beijing Sport University Press decided to publish a Chinese language version of the book I co-edited with Heather Dichter, *Diplomatic Games: Sport, Statecraft, and International Relations since 1945*. The pandemic delayed the publication of the translated edition—not unusual, as many of us experienced and are continuing to endure issues and delays with academic presses—but it looked like things were still on track as late as last fall. But after Heather made several media appearances in which she made comments about various concerns regarding the Beijing Winter Olympics, the press suddenly backed out of the deal. Clearly, criticism of anything about the Games or China’s involvement was problematic enough for the Chinese government that retribution was required. Kudos to Heather (and other scholars and journalists) for rightly calling out the regime, both on the troubling problems with the Games and on other issues like the treatment of the Uyghurs; the lost opportunity for a translation of our book is a small price to pay to highlight these problems. I would be quite interested to hear about anyone else who has had a similar experience with Chinese presses, archives, or other institutions...maybe even in a future *Passport* article.

3. I think that Brian Etheridge will do a terrific job as SHAFFR’s inaugural Electronic Communications Editor. For those of you who do not know him, Brian has been an important part of SHAFFR for over two decades, and he has an intelligent, ecumenical, and wide-ranging perspective on the organization and the role it can and should play in both the academic and policy worlds. SHAFFR’s Twitter feed, website, public engagement, podcast (yes, that is in the works), and media strategy—among his multitude of responsibilities in this role—are in excellent hands.

4. I think that both academic freedom and freedom of speech are under direct assault across the United States and on university/college campuses from a variety of authoritarian forces—on both the left and the right. Whether it is “cancel culture,” or the increasing number of cases of book censorship, or the various laws against teaching certain topics that are being passed or considered in state legislatures, or the attacks on university tenure systems, or the efforts to enforce ideological and lexiconic orthodoxy on campuses, the environment in which we live, work, publish, and comment has become increasingly toxic, unpredictable, perilous, and uncertain. This is especially true for academics—like me—who do not have the protection provided by tenure...but all of us face these challenges. We need to do all we can individually and collectively to hold the line against these trends and maintain the guardrails that allow us to explore ideas, assert opinions, and publish research without fear of retribution or being silenced—even if they are unpopular, heterodox, or lack ideological purity...regardless of where that ideology might fall on the political spectrum. This is neither a left vs. right nor a woke vs. MAGA issue; this is effectively an existential crisis for the academy.

5. I think that it would be great to have a photo spread in a future issue of *Passport* that included positive things that came out of the past two years with COVID. Pandemic pets, tattoos, babies, hairstyles, beards, hobbies...anything that may not have happened without the travails we have endured since March 2020 but that would be uplifting to our community.
6. I think that, by the time that you are reading this column in early April 2022, there will be about ten weeks until the SHAFR conference kicks off in New Orleans. I may or may not have purchased my plane tickets last December. I definitely have a countdown on my phone. I will be at the Westin all weekend (don’t let that deter you from going to the conference)–eating beignets and jambalaya, listening to live music, and engaging in a few (OK, maybe more than a few) casino-based activities. If that weren’t enough, the program put together by Emily Conroy-Krutz and Daniel Immerwahr looks terrific–especially since there will be actual panels with actual three-dimensional people with actual personal interaction in actual rooms; a social event at the World War II Museum, which, if you have never been there, is excellent; and Laura Belmonte’s presidential address. I cannot be the only one who has three years of pent-up socializing ready to be released in and around the French Quarter...along with three years of comments posing as questions waiting to be unleashed on panelists at Tulane in June. Laissez les bons temps rouler.

7. I think that U.S. diplomacy over the past two decades has become more reactive and less innovative than at any point since the 19th century. It will be fascinating to see the scholarship on the early 21st century as it develops as scholars grapple with this era, try to understand how and why this has occurred, and figure out what the short- and long-term ramifications will be for the country and the world.

8. I think that I am thrilled that SHAFR decided to create a Council seat specifically to represent the interests of members of the organization who are employed at teaching-centered institutions. While research is a major component of SHAFR’s mission, teaching is the other half of that equation—and an aspect of the profession that has not been well represented in SHAFR’s leadership over the years. IMHO, Molly Wood is the perfect person to serve as the inaugural Council member in this seat. If you have concerns or issues relating to teaching the history of U.S. foreign relations that you believe the organization should consider, let Molly know.

9. I think that I am also thrilled that SHAFR decided to make the Peter L. Hahn Distinguished Service Award an annual prize. There are so many members of the organization who deserved to be recognized for their extensive—and frequently unacknowledged—service that we could probably give this award out on a monthly basis. Thanks to everyone who gives generously of their limited time and energy; without that commitment, SHAFR could not function.

10. I think that the Biden administration’s failure to keep faith with U.S. citizens and Afghani allies during the U.S. withdrawal in the summer of 2021 and in the months that have followed was a monumental and despicable failure of leadership. Full stop. Of course, that does not mitigate the problematic decisions of the previous two decades or excuse what the resurgent Taliban have done since assuming control over the country. But as one U.S. colonel angrily commented as Afghans seeking to escape clung desperately to the outside of U.S. transports as they flew away, “Where is the moral courage?”

11. I think that the importance of viewpoint diversity cannot be overstated. Let’s not be so arrogant (or delusional) as to believe that we have all of the right answers on every political, social, intellectual, or historiographical question and that anyone who disagrees with us is evil, uninformed, or misguided. Embrace Mill’s Trident.

12. I think that we should all be aware of the fact that we have scores of SHAFR members who have faced a plethora of challenges over the past couple of years—and not all of them due to the pandemic. Serious physical and mental health concerns (both individual and family), employment issues, and existential crises of all stripes seem to have proliferated since we all last met in person at the Renaissance in June 2019. I know we all have our own concerns and that the pandemic has limited our bandwidth for a lot of extraneous things, but we should try to be sensitive to our friends and colleagues, and do what we can to support them in whatever they are dealing with. Most of the time, these problems are far more significant and carry far more weight than they will let on. Just listening and showing some empathy can sometimes make all the difference in the world.

13. I think that the perennial problem of access to historical documents should be of deep concern to all of us. The stories about Trump-era documents being destroyed, thrown away, or flushed down the toilet at the White House (not to mention being spirited out of the West Wing to Mar-a-Lago) are only the latest obstacles to scholars seeking to understand the history of U.S. foreign relations. The on-going changes to the presidential library system and document storage, the inexplicable desire of agencies to destroy documents after a mere seven years, and the evergreen problems relating to classification issues only exacerbate these concerns. Huge props to Richard Immerman for his yeoman efforts over the years with the Historical Advisory Committee; to SHAFR for joining CREW in its efforts at document preservation; to SHAFR’s Committee on Historical Documentation for its work on these matters; and to everyone who has filed a FOIA request or worked to ensure government transparency and the continued access to documents that so many of us need for our work—and that we all need to keep the U.S. government accountable. I am deeply reluctant to support advocacy by SHAFR on many, if not most, issues, but the organization is absolutely right to take a leading role in confronting these problems.

14. I think that, as of this writing in late February 2022, that almost any comment on the Russian invasion of the Ukraine would be premature. But a couple of things do stand out: the willingness of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Sweden to forego the 2022 World Cup by refusing to play Russia in a qualifying playoff, which led to FIFA banning Russia from the competition; the Ukrainian Interior Ministry not only taking down road signs to confuse Russian troops but
also changing the ones that are still up to essentially read “F*** you;” the Tik Tok videos explaining how to drive captured Russian tanks; and former heavyweight boxing champions Wladimir and Vitali Klitschko—along with thousands of regular civilians from all walks of life—voluntarily joining the Ukrainian military to fight for their country’s freedom. The invasion will have profound international implications including significant global diplomatic, military, and economic consequences, the extent of which may not be apparent for years or even decades. Let’s hope that international leaders continue to rise to this challenge, avoid further escalation, and figure out a quick and lasting path to peace.

15. I think (following up on the previous two thoughts) that SHAFR—and all professional organizations—need to stop passing resolutions on everything. The impulse to weigh in on current events, opine on political/social/cultural issues, or express love or hatred for a particular idea or person has become ubiquitous in academia. Hardly a week goes by without a resolution advocating for or against... something. With the proliferation of websites, social media, and other outlets for expressing opinion, individuals have the ability to speak out on any issue about which they feel strongly. Advocacy in which an organization purports to speak for all of its members should be narrowly defined, restricted to issues of direct concern to the organization and its mission, and these statements should be relatively rare to underscore their significance. For SHAFR, the CREW lawsuits and access to documents fall into that category; announcing support for a political position or country—whether related to contemporary U.S. foreign relations or not—does not. The recent decision to sign on to the AHA resolution on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a perfect example of misplaced advocacy. The invasion and Putin certainly deserve scorn, but disapproval and censure should not come from SHAFR collectively.

16. I think that, despite the fact that my university will not let me break up my course on the history of U.S. foreign relations into two (or three) parts—trying to squeeze material from 1776 to the present into one semester is basically impossible—I love teaching about early U.S. foreign relations. So many interesting events, ideas, and people with so much connective tissue to contemporary issues.

17. I think that you are stuck with me for another five years since Council decided in early March 2022 to reappointment me to another five-year term as editor.

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**Call for Nominations**

SHAFR’s Nominating Committee is soliciting nominations for elected positions.

The 2022 elections will fill the following positions:

- **Vice President/President-Elect** (1 vacancy, 1-year term, followed by a 1-year term as president and then a 2-year term on Council)
- **Council members** (3 vacancies, 3-year term)
- **Nominating Committee** (1 vacancy, 3-year term)

Please submit nominations (including self-nominations) to the members of the Nominating Committee by email no later than **June 30, 2022**. Nominations must include the nominee’s name, email address, institution (if applicable), and a statement of the nominee’s qualifications. The committee particularly seeks nominations that offer specific details about the nominee’s service to SHAFR and commitment to the field. It is helpful to indicate whether you have contacted the nominee about his or her willingness to serve.

Nominating Committee members:

- **Kathy Rasmussen, Chair**
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Justin Hart, Matt Loayza, Caryn E. Neumann, Cameron D. McCoy, Lori Clune, and Paul S. Hirsch

Introduction to Roundtable on Paul Hirsch, *Pulp Empire*

**Justin Hart**

Over the last quarter century, two of the most vibrant subfields in the historiography of U.S. foreign relations have been the literatures on public/cultural diplomacy and the relationship of race and racism to U.S. foreign policy. In *Pulp Empire*, Paul Hirsch is not focused on engaging the major debates in either of those fields, but he nevertheless makes an extremely compelling case for the centrality of comic books in telling each of those stories. The following reviewers do an excellent job summarizing the structure and major arguments of *Pulp Empire*, so I will not duplicate their work and will instead concentrate on synthesizing their assessments of the book.

The reviewers are unanimous in praising Hirsch’s book as “compelling,” “enormously enjoyable,” filled with “telling quotes and interesting anecdotes,” and “composed with an enviable clarity of expression.” Caryn Neumann closes her review with the simple statement that “the book is recommended,” and based on what they write here I think the other three reviewers would certainly agree. In addition to commending Hirsch’s prose, his eye for detail, and his cogent summaries of particularly revealing individual comic book issues—“he read so we don’t have to,” as Lori Clune puts it—reviewers also appreciated the beautiful presentation of the book, which includes numerous full-color reproductions of images (printed on high quality paper) from the comics being discussed. In order to fund such an expensive publication with a university press, rather than a commercial press, Hirsch applied for and received a subvention from the Robert B. Silvers Foundation. We are all beneficiaries of his entrepreneurial impulse here, because the book simply would not have been as effective without these images.

The reviewers do, of course, also have their “quibbles,” some more than others. Clune argues that “the narrative threads tend to tangle. The chronology here may jump around a bit for some readers.” Cameron McCoy notes the lack of an attempt to resolve the paradox of arguing, on the one hand, that the comic book industry was a refuge for various minoritized peoples, while on the other hand indicting the publications as a whole for their absolutely vile misogyny and racism. Why, in other words, did these people not have more of an impact on the final product?

Matt Loayza asks for “a more precise definition of the pulp empire”—a concept that would seem central to the argument, but really only appears in the introduction and conclusion and is not contextualized within the large literature on the United States as empire. Two reviewers question why the story stops in 1965. Finally, Neumann offers a critique that is a constant weakness of almost all studies of U.S. public and cultural diplomacy—the lack of data or evidence about the impact of the media in question upon foreign populations: “The book is strongly focused on consumption inside American borders,” Neumann points out.

Hirsch offers a thorough and generous response to the reviews. He concedes most of the reviewers’ critiques, while attempting to clarify the concept of the “pulp empire” and why the narrative stops in 1965, as well as restating the book’s major arguments. He also acknowledges the ways that “the realities of time, funding, and my physical disability” (not to mention CIA intransigence on FOIA requests) prevented him from tracking down the answer to every question raised by his story. The same is true for all of us, of course. No book can do everything, so readers should use these reviews as an inspiration to pick up a copy and judge for themselves. Enjoy this thoughtful discussion of the Pulp Empire!

Note:

1. Perhaps because he is targeting a crossover audience, Hirsch is largely silent on historiography, even in the introduction. Many of the staples of the literature on U.S. public/cultural diplomacy appear in the endnotes to chapters 5 and 6, but more for contributing factual information to his narrative rather than to engage their arguments or the field as a whole. In terms of the very large number of books on race/racism and U.S. foreign relations, the only titles to appear in Hirsch’s references are Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Harvard University Press, 2001); and Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Harvard University Press, 2006). That said, I think many of the authors in both of these fields will immediately recognize how many of Hirsch’s arguments about comic books fit into their own arguments about the role of image in U.S. foreign relations.
Review of Paul S. Hirsch, Pulp Empire: The Secret History of Comic Book Imperialism

Matt Longza

In Pulp Empire: The Secret History of Comic Book Imperialism, Paul S. Hirsch examines the convoluted relationship between the U.S. government and the comic book industry from the Second World War to the mid-1960s. U.S. officials, captivated by the potential of comic books to disseminate ideas, joined forces with the comic book industry during both the Second World War and the Cold War as part of their propaganda campaigns, which were designed to showcase American values and discredit totalitarianism. The government’s support for and partnership with commercial comic book publishers helped to legitimate the industry and expand its markets, which complicated subsequent efforts to devise coherent and comprehensive propaganda strategies.

The resultant “pulp empire” was a contested space in which policymakers in Washington vied with comic book producers, officials of other nations, cultural critics, and a growing body of international readers over control of the visual and narrative content within comic books. Over the life of the pulp empire, U.S. propaganda officials sought to curb the perceived excesses of the industry while simultaneously appropriating the medium to realize their policy goals. Hirsch argues that the most essential and enduring facet of the pulp empire was race, and that policymaking decisions related to comic book content were “driven by the matter of race and its role in US foreign policy” (31). In the long run, he believes, efforts to portray America as an enlightened, tolerant society were undermined by racist depictions of people of color and whiteness narratives.

Pulp Empire’s seven chapters can be divided roughly in half. The first three chapters examine how the government came to view the comic book as a potent propaganda weapon in the war against fascism. Comic books, dismissed by Americans as lowbrow entertainment since the birth of the medium in the early 1930s, nevertheless attracted a growing number of young and adult readers by the end of the decade. U.S. officials quickly grasped that comic books were a cheap means of conveying powerful visual images (and, accordingly, ideas) to wide audiences of varying literacy levels. Uncle Sam subsequently partnered with comic book publishers and appropriated the medium by developing its own products to educate their readers on the need for domestic unity and the perils of fascist totalitarianism.

Following the defeat of the Axis powers, Washington ended its partnership with and oversight of the industry, whereupon commercial publishers proceeded to sate the appetite of their American and international audiences for sex, violence, and the macabre with a number of lurid crime, horror, and romance titles.

Hirsch draws upon numerous examples to support his points, and he has a keen eye for telling quotes and interesting anecdotes that will provide scholars with an abundance of materials that are certain to engage students. Notable highlights include textual and visual analysis (the text is accompanied by illustrations) of a 1947 tale in which Donald Duck builds an atom bomb. It detonates and irradiates the good citizens of Duckberg, whom Donald proceeds to swindle (138–39). These charges resonated with an increasing number of critics overseas, and the growing outcry prompted the government to pressure the industry into accepting self-regulation in 1954. The government subsequently re-appropriated the medium (via collaborations with select publishers and the creation of its own comic books) as a means of alerting the developing world to the threat of Soviet communism.

Meanwhile, the commercial comic industry struggled through the 1950s because of the chilling effect of the 1954 Comic Book Code. Its revival began shortly after the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, when the Timely Comics Company rebranded itself as Marvel comics and introduced a new stable of superhero titles that featured more complex character development and relationships that readers found more realistic and relatable. Hirsch observes that despite these innovations, Marvel’s characters operated in a sphere that was strikingly similar to that of World War II comics: a bifurcated, simplistic world where white heroes led the forces of good against non-white villains.

From the outset of his book, Hirsch emphasizes that propagandists regarded the cheap, portable, and malleable nature of comics as prime virtues. The fact that comics were not taken seriously as literature or art was originally viewed as an asset rather than a disadvantage, since their modest reputation made them unlikely objects of scrutiny and could thus help them fly under the radar. By the early postwar period, U.S. officials had come to disdain the “violent, racist, and imperial” (212) nature of commercial comic books.

However, officials remained convinced of the medium’s power to persuade and were still aware that comics were highly popular across the globe. As the 1950s progressed, growing concerns that the developing world was increasingly susceptible to Soviet influence prompted them to appropriate comic books, eschewing the unreliable commercial comics in favor of their own titles, which they produced and disseminated for audiences in Latin America and other parts of the developing world.

Hirsch shows a more “chipper attitude toward atomic energy” (129). Later chapters include a concise and engaging summary of the anticomunist narrative formulas featured in the Marvel superhero titles during the first half of the 1960s. Although Bradford Wright has already established Iron Man’s Cold War credentials, labeling him as “the most political of Marvel’s superheroes,” Hirsch reveals that Iron Man had a kindred spirit in Thor. Although the Norse God of Thunder may appear to be an unlikely disciple of
George Kennan and Paul Nitze, Thor needed little urging to align himself with the United States in the Cold War, going as far as to battle the Vietcong in a 1965 story that concludes with the expected repudiation of the communist way of life (254).

Hirsch describes the “pulp empire” as the result of a “complex and fluid network of interactions” in which a wide variety of policymakers and commercial comic book publishers contributed to and often contested the creative content of these increasingly popular cultural forms. He establishes that U.S. policymakers would attack or appropriate the medium depending on their policy objectives at any given time and that this approach lent itself to numerous inconsistencies and contradictions.

That said, the book would benefit from a more precise definition of the pulp empire. The empire was clearly amorphous, but turns of phrase stating that “sticky” comics “were everywhere, and yet they were nowhere” (16) often tend to obscure rather than enlighten. The development and maturation of the networks that Hirsch references merit further scrutiny; the book ably describes several of these relationships, but it is not clear when the networks actually began to function as a pulp empire. Finally, given the importance of race to the pulp empire, I am curious about Hirsch’s thoughts on the long-term repercussions of the pulp empire’s narratives to Washington D.C.’s efforts to cultivate improved ties with the developing world.

Although *Pulp Empire* persuasively defines comic books as both a popular form of entertainment and an important, valuable propaganda vehicle, the claim that comics were a “uniquely powerful” (6) form of “revolutionary media” is somewhat overstated (12). In discussing the Eisenhower administration’s use of cultural diplomacy, the author notes the importance U.S. officials attributed to showcasing American culture (notably, through jazz exhibitions) to show the world that the United States was a refined, sophisticated nation. He goes on to argue that French and British anti-comic book campaigns of the late 1940s and early 1950s indicate that “low” cultural forms possessed as much power as their elite counterparts, but he does not really test this assertion by examining how high and low culture impacted French and British opinion.

Moreover, while U.S. officials clearly viewed comics as important in their own right, the author does not devote extensive analysis to how policymakers viewed comics relative to the other media at their disposal. Although some attributes of the comic book were not easily duplicated by magazines, radio, film and, later, television, it would be interesting to discover how American propagandists thought the comic book stacked up against the other options at their disposal.

To his credit, Hirsch pulls no punches in identifying racism as one of the linchpins of the pulp empire. He contends that “race was inseparable from the evolution of the comic book and its relationship to policy” (273). Indeed, one of the most important contributions of his book is its revelation that racist assumptions prompted white policymakers and commercial publishers to make faulty and contradictory decisions time and time again. Both before and during the Second World War, comic book depictions of non-white peoples drew from a wide variety of existing racist stereotypes. Although U.S. officials urged comic publishers to portray the United States as a nation that valued both its own diverse citizens and its global allies, it simultaneously promoted narratives that often reduced the global conflict (particularly the Pacific Theater) to a conflict between white America and a violent, devious, and racially inferior enemy.

Unfortunately, America’s Latin American, Filipino, and Chinese allies fared little or no better. In a painful but telling example from a 1941 comic, Hirsch shows that the Chinese member of the Blackhawk squadron, “Chop-Chop,” was created for comic relief and depicted in demeaning, racially stereotyped ways. He was a team member in name only. Hirsch’s findings lend further credence to Brad Wright’s observation that while comics often paid “lip service” to national unity, few bothered to explore the role of racial tolerance and inclusivity in a definition of national unity.4

Although the postwar crime, horror, and romance comics earned notoriety for their salacious and violent content, Hirsch again directs our attention to how these titles dealt with race. Whereas wartime comics generally portrayed non-whites as sidekicks, people of color virtually disappeared from the comic book landscape, resulting in “a construct within which being American is synonymous with being White” (112). Jungle comics, one of the few genres that regularly featured people of color, adhered to white supremacy narratives. Here, Africans invariably appeared as primitive peoples who were easily subdued and then led by white heroes such as Sheena and Tiger-Girl. Since these stories ran counter to America’s efforts to be regarded as an inclusive society fit to lead the free world, the authors of the Comic Books Code of 1954 took steps to eliminate them, specifying that “ridicule or attack on any religious or racial group is never permissible.”5

Alas, comic book editors responded by writing African-Americans out of the comics entirely; thus avoiding the issue of race altogether. After 1954, the consistent feature of comic narratives, regardless of publisher, genre, or hero, was whiteness. Even Marvel, hailed for breaking new ground in several ways, was “hardly radical” in its approach to race and U.S. foreign relations. The early Marvel Universe cast the Fantastic Four, Iron Man, and even Thor as unapologetic anti-communists in a binary conflict in which white heroes defended democracy against non-white, totalitarian villains (264).

Although the author acknowledges that the pulp empire endures in modified form to the present day, he concludes his analysis in the mid-1960s, which he views as the peak of the U.S. government’s efforts to create and disseminate comic book propaganda. By this point, the ability of comics to shape opinion, particularly opinion in the developing world, had been eroded by the ongoing U.S. aggression toward Cuba, the failure of the Alliance for Progress to live up to its initial hype, and most of all, the “optics of America’s war in Vietnam” (240). Although this theory is plausible, it remains to be seen whether international readers were sufficiently aware of events in Vietnam prior to 1965 to consciously reject pro-American comic book propaganda, or whether international audiences became more skeptical of these narratives later in the decade as the war escalated.

Readers who have a passing familiarity with comic book history will likely be frustrated by Hirsch’s 1965 endpoint, for the story only becomes more interesting at this point. As Brad Wright has noted, Marvel started to address its egregious whitewashing of the Marvel universe in 1965, when illustrations of African Americans as average citizens first appeared in background street scenes. Marvel introduced its first black superhero, *Black Panther*, a year later, and in the second half of the decade Marvel, however timidly, began to introduce social issues such as Black Power, feminism, and the Vietnam War in its storylines.

Although it is fair to say that comic publishers such as Marvel were dragged rather than pushed into the “relevance movement,”6 the introduction of social issues nevertheless marked an important turning point for the genre. The impact of these new twists to the narrative
formulas of the pulp empire remains to be explored, and one hopes that Hirsch is open to writing a sequel. That said, this volume is an ambitious work that suggests fascinating questions for future research. It also opens up the potential for historians to further their engagement with interdisciplinary scholarship in various fields, among them mass media studies and critical race theory.

Notes:

Review of Paul S. Hirsch, Pulp Empire: The Secret History of Comic Book Imperialism
Caryn E. Neumann

Trash is fun. The U.S. government shipped thousands of works of great literature around the world during the Cold War, but it also sent millions of comic books. Readers loved comics. Passed from person to person and often left in waiting rooms, comics would be read until the pages fell apart. Unfortunately for American plans to win the hearts and minds of other peoples, the comic books portrayed the United States as a horrific place, filled with extreme violence, virulent misogyny, and ugly racism. Paul S. Hirsch discusses these trashy works in his enormously enjoyable Pulp Empire: The Secret History of Comic Book Imperialism. Visually arresting and easy to read, the comics of the 1940s and 1950s were not today’s graphic novels. With titles such as Crimes by Women (1949), Fight Against Crime (1951), and Underworld Crime (1953), these books had no pretensions. The cover of Underworld Crime, reproduced in Hirsh’s book, shows two simian-looking thugs about to assault a terrified woman with a red-hot phallic-looking tool while her horrified husband/boyfriend, tied up with rope, looks on. The cover of Thun’da (1952) features a half-naked Tarzan look-alike saving a barely dressed woman by attacking stereotyped Africans, primitively attired, with large lips and claw-like hands. As Hirsch persuasively demonstrates, these images were common and informed a global readership that the United States remained a deeply racist and violent country despite government pronouncements to the contrary.

The ubiquity of comic books in the late 1930s, 40s and ’50s made them powerful. As Hirsh reports, early comic books sold between 200,000 and 400,000 copies per issue. Nearly all American boys and girls in the 1940s and 1950s read them, and the federal government’s support for the industry during the war ensured that millions of American adults did too. Hirsh cites a study that claims half of urban families read comics. He does not cite studies of readership outside the United States, as the book is strongly focused on consumption inside American borders.

Adult readership grew during World War II, as half of all soldiers and sailors relaxed with comics. The Navy even classified comics as essential supplies for the Marines stationed on Midway. However, the little books were never reputable. Much of American society regarded them as slightly above pornography.

Popular, with plain text that was easy to read and comprehend and storylines that emphasized raw emotion, comic books looked to the Writers’ War Board (WWB) like the perfect medium for their purposes. A quasi-governmental agency, the WBB used funding from the federal government during World War II to attack fascism, encourage racial tolerance, and promote international cooperation. As lowbrow entertainment, comics seemed to be an unlikely vehicle for government propaganda, but through the WWB, comics became political media. Even the advertisements, which would never be found in explicit propaganda, were geared toward helping comics to promote government aims. The agency never tested the effectiveness of comic-based propaganda, though, and Hirsh provides anecdotal evidence that the comics did not change racist beliefs among Americans. This anecdotal evidence also undermines his argument that comics subsequently had a powerful influence on overseas consumers of American comics.

Despite the WBB’s efforts, comic creators continued to employ the ugly words and images that had always made comics sell well. Derogatory racial tropes appeared on the same pages as patriotic, inclusive imagery. Hirsch cites the example of a 1943 issue of Young Allies. The allies, a group of children, are fighting Japanese soldiers. Both the Japanese and the only Black member of the allies, Whitewash Jones, are depicted in the crude, racist visual language of the era. Jones has thick purple lips and wears garish clothing. The Japanese have piglike noses and enormous buckteeth. While the WBB helped shape some positive stories, these stories competed on newsstands with a hundred other titles with vicious stereotypes. Hirsch notes that the WBB had no tangible evidence that audiences absorbed the correct messages, but he doesn’t present any proof that audiences absorbed the wrong ones, either, though the circumstantial evidence is strong.

Superheroes dominated comic books during World War II, but funny animal comics sold well, and crime stories also appeared at this time. After the war, the public preferred crime, horror, and romance. Hirsh provides a superb history of mid-century comics. He notes that the true-crime genre, which tried to portray real events in as shocking a manner as possible, first appeared in 1942, when the first issue of Crime Does Not Pay came out. That issue was so different from other comics that newsstand workers were unsure how to display it. On the cover, gunmen are shown shooting at each other across a saloon, while a dead body falls to the floor and a wounded man slumps on the bar. Another gunman chances a buxom woman while pointing a machine gun at his opponent. On an inside page, a man is shown bending a woman over a stove and setting her on fire. As Hirsh notes, major characters who were not white rarely appeared in postwar comics, so the increasingly graphic violence the comics showed was directed at whites.

While Crime Does Not Pay sold poorly during the war, circulation leaped after the soldiers came home, and in no time, copycat comics from other publishers appeared on the newsstands to take advantage of the desire from readers for extreme violence in realistic settings.

American publishers sold their products, both in English and in translation, in dozens of countries. By the early 1950s, over four hundred comic book titles could be found...
on newsstands in the United States and abroad. American tourists, soldiers, and diplomats also brought these comics overseas and then left them in various places to be read by others. Few people thought twice about abandoning them, as they were cheap and only about sixty pages long. New readers would pick them up in barbershops, hotels, and doctors’ offices to amuse themselves and kill time.

Hirsch fills his book with a wealth of examples of the imagery found in the comic books of this era. A popular anthology, Wings Comics, which was distributed internationally in both English and Spanish, typically featured images of bondage in which women were both the victims and perpetrators of sexualized violence. Black characters, who rarely appeared in these pages, adhered to stereotypes. Chinese men were uniformly portrayed as communist troublemakers, while Chinese women alternated between being hypersexualized or fetishized as helpless pro-American dolls. These images, Hirsch argues, undermined the state-sanctioned presentation of America as a culturally advanced and politically inclusive society.

America’s international military commitments expanded at the same time the comic book industry became a major cultural and economic force. The strategy of containment, coupled with federal support for American companies involved in global trade and a growing emphasis on international tourism, guaranteed the steady circulation of uncensored comic books on every continent. Working independently or under the auspices of the Marshall Plan, private American companies shipped comics to merchants in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin American.

Hirsch notes that one publishing company received a contract from the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) for sending comics to Germany that was about five times larger than the ECA orders for Reader’s Digest, Time, Bantam Books, and Pocket books combined. The Pan American International Agency sent 50,000 to 90,000 copies per month of the crime comic Accion policiaca to all Spanish-language countries in Latin America. It is not clear why Argentina was spared. The International Comics Group sent Spanish-language horror and romance titles to every Spanish-speaking country. Ziff-Davis shipped G.I. Joe to thirty-five countries.

The U.S. government bought and distributed violent, racist comic books as weapons against totalitarianism. Apparently, no one considered that it might be self-defeating to present the nation as a cesspool of hate and brutality. Hirsch does not present a government defense, if one exists, and this is certainly a shame, as the reader is left to wonder what officials could possibly have been thinking. He does suggest that they may simply have not paid close attention to the contents of comics because they were never intended to promote American culture.

Until psychiatrist Fredric Wertham raised the alarm in 1954, no one attempted to censor the violence in comic books. Films had been subjected to varying degrees of censorship nearly from the start, while works of literature also faced bans for deviating too greatly from community standards. Comic books, however, occupied a different rung in popular culture. Since they were low art, most people may have simply dismissed them as having no value and no impact anyway. Army intelligence and the FBI had begun covert investigations of the industry once they realized that crime and horror comics promoted skepticism about the Korean Conflict, cynicism about government, vicious misogyny, and both racist and pro-civil rights imagery. J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, suspected that a Communist published Crime Does Not Pay because of the disrespect for authority in its pages and its celebration of violence and chaos. The combination of covert investigations, Wertham’s call to arms, and the U.S. Senate’s desire for a juicy public investigation led to a public reckoning.

Wertham succeeded in neutering comic books by linking deviant behavior in children to violent images in the medium. Testifying before a Senate subcommittee on juvenile delinquency, he observed that comics were always found near any children or young adults committing acts of violence or cruelty. The hearings horrified the American public, or at least the ones who did not enjoy comics. The committee discovered that Communists in Asia and Africa cited comic books as evidence of the depravity and racism in American life. Since American soldiers spread comic books, communist propagandists capitalized on the image of soldiers littering the world with violent and racist narratives. Comics also provided ammunition for anti-colonial movements that stressed the racial history of the United States. Propaganda from Romania, Iran, and Czechoslovakia used comics books as source material. Hirsch does not share this propaganda with readers.

In 1954, the Comics Code Authority, an initiative by comic publishers to fend off government censorship by censoring themselves, prohibited graphic images of violence and gore as well as salacious images of women. The Comics Code killed off crime and horror comics, leaving only the superhero and romance ones. Most adult readers subsequently found other amusement, and comics became frozen in the public imagination as infantilized entertainment of little worth.

In summary, Hirsch effectively explains why the comics should have horrified Americans who were trying to promote a positive image of the United States. But he is much less effective in demonstrating the actual impact of the comics. The book opens with the Pakistani ambassador to the United States relating in 1952 that his young sons loved American comics book, acquired them in Pakistan, and left stacks of them behind in every hotel. After that, foreigners disappear. There are no accounts from Europeans, Asians, Africans, or Latin Americans about how they perceived the United States as the result of reading comics. In a book devoted to imperialism, hearing the voices of the colonized would have added considerable value.

Hirsch does include—unnecessarily, I think—a discussion of a graphic illustration created by the CIA to instruct assassins on how to kill. While the graphic has sequential artwork and uses images and text, it is a stretch to call it a comic. It is violent and offensive, but it was not commercially produced for sale to a general audience. It is just a few drawings. The reader gets the sense that Hirsch found a juicy tidbit in the archives and was determined to squeeze it in somehow.

Lastly, it is perhaps unfair to complain that a researcher who explored eight archives should have visited one more, but Hirsch appears not to have checked the Billy Ireland Cartoon Library at The Ohio State University. This is the largest archive devoted to comics in the world, and a visit is a must for comics researchers.

Despite these quibbles, Pulp Empire is a fascinating and delightful book. While it focuses on government policy, its treatment of comics has considerable depth, and the many images of trashy comic book covers it includes add to the fun of reading it. Hirsch’s work will appeal to all readers and should prompt vigorous discussions on the Cold War and the impact of cultural works upon foreign policy. I recommend it.
Paul S. Hirsch begins *Pulp Empire* with the observation that “the comic book is uniquely powerful. Relatively uncensored, enormously popular around the world, and characterized by the remarkable diversity of its creators and consumers, the American commercial comic book can show us aspects of US policy making during the mid-twentieth century that no other object can” (6).

It is quite clear that Hirsch’s *Pulp Empire* has taken its lead from Bradford W. Wright’s *Comic Book Nation: The Transformation of Youth Culture in America* (2001), but only in one respect: both recognize the American foundations of the comic book. Hirsch even acknowledges Wright—as he should. But apart from this obvious link, and his study of the effects of the comic book on American culture, Hirsch has set himself apart from other scholars of this genre, like Mark D. White, Robin S. Rosenberg, and William Irwin.

Comic book specialists will be delighted with Hirsch’s ability to show how cultural constructions of identity within societies and political institutions can be significantly altered by “pulp.” His work also reveals how matters of global consequence and transitions involving winning and losing hearts and minds—specifically in the decolonizing world—were often influenced by commercial and propaganda comic books. *Pulp Empire* is thus a history that assumes two ideas: “diploacy and culture are connected,” and the U.S. government “deliberately used popular culture” during World War II and the Cold War to achieve victory (10).

In seven chapters, framed by an introduction and conclusion and divided into two parts, *Pulp Empire* covers the creation of the American comic book and the beginning stages of its legitimization through government agencies, industry officials, and public intellectuals. It then focuses on the effects of the “pulp empire” and how it transformed the comic book industry’s content and global distribution. It convincingly introduces cultural, political, and diplomatic issues such as racism, capitalism, communism, and consumerism in ways that highlight American cultural authority and imperialism. According to Hirsch, “the American comic book was bound up with matters of race and capitalism” throughout World War II and the Cold War, and “[e]very decision made by federal agencies was, at its core, shaped by these two issues . . .” At every point, political demands and policy priorities shaped the comic book industry and the medium’s contents, both commercial and propaganda titles, and thus “transformed the comic book into a political object and a weapon deployed around the world” (21–22).

Too often, traditional comic book scholars and those studying the effects of the American comic book on culture tend to gravitate towards researching the entertainment and media psychology that suggests that comic book characters may influence how we think about ourselves and others. While Hirsch allows himself to feel the pull of this force, it is only to draw closer attention to four historical elements that describe the story of the American comic book: visual culture, commerce, race, and policy. He points out that “these four fields are analogous to the four colors used to print comic books: cyan, magenta, yellow, and black. They lie atop one another, smearing, blending, and bleeding to create a complete image. To separate them is to disassemble a coherent whole and to shatter a picture that in its entirety shows us how culture and diplomacy were entangled during the mid-twentieth century” (22). Each element built on the next in uneven ways while providing detailed contours to the forces that affected these fields.

Within these four fields, Hirsch tackles themes of sexuality, violence, crime, jingoism, decolonization, femininity, and masculinity to show how the global distribution of comics both informed and frustrated American efforts to project a more sophisticated and inclusive democracy—a democracy that would serve as a suitable alternative to Soviet communism. The comic book industry expanded greatly, as the government used visual culture to fashion covert and overt propaganda that would shape and disseminate perceptions of America’s enemies, allies, and non-white citizenry.

During World War II, for instance, the Writers’ War Board (WWB)—a private domestic propaganda organization—helped define America’s enemies by promoting dehumanizing images of the Germans and the Japanese. The WWB depicted these Axis powers as “racially and culturally defective yet also eminently beatable opponents.” This portrayal was critical for shaping domestic wartime narratives that increasingly imagined the Germans and Japanese not just as “the other,” but as “fundamentally, irredeemably evil and violent” (38). The WWB’s intent was to ensure that all America viewed them as “racially defective, incurably violent, and responsible for their own destruction” (46).

In this respect, the visual medium of pulp accomplished several goals. It showed that undemocratic nations were aggressive, “innately bigoted, and cruel”; it encouraged hatred and intolerance, which allowed the United States to engage in “justifiable discrimination” to eliminate global fascism and bring about greater postwar peace; and it convinced Americans that non-white allies would always remain different, “human yet not quite White.”

Because of the war, the United States prioritized victory over fascism and asked its citizens to pursue unity en route to military dominance and not to try to incorporate civil rights along with global democracy. As a result, black characters in comics were treated as footnotes, portrayed as tertiary characters and condemned by their black skin to being one-dimensional buffoons. This portrayal also influenced how white audiences interpreted and absorbed messages of tolerance and cooperation among non-white/non-American nations.

As uncensored comics continued to find larger international audiences through formal and informal networks of American distributors, visual depictions of crime stories showing violence and sex came to dominate the pulp empire, captivating millions. However, this crime, horror, and romance genre created certain problems. “By their very nature,” Hirsch writes, “these comic books posed a challenge to the growing domestic consensus that the survival of American-style democracy required a long-term confrontation with international communism. In a society that imagined itself as a more inclusive alternative to Soviet-style dictatorships, [they] raised uncomfortable questions about the true state of race relations, gender roles, and economic inequality” (85). Despite their primitive and aggressive storylines, crime-themed comics like *Crime Does Not Pay*, *Underworld Crime*, *Fight against Crime*, and *Crimes by Women* were wildly popular and appeared to present images of a postwar America that was at odds with
womanhood. These images also conflicted with the more wholesome messages of a sophisticated society promoted by propagandists and policymakers.

In 1954 Dr. Fredric Wertham, a German American psychiatrist, author, and anti-comic book crusader, published a critique of the effects comic books had on the minds and behavior of children who come in contact with them. In Seduction of the Innocent he argued that comics were instruction manuals (“maps of crime”) for criminal activity, juvenile delinquency, and violence. Wertham would be the leading exponent of the effort to undermine comic books along social and cultural lines, but the pulp empire would remain strong. His warnings about the long-term threat of the comic to moral authority, about delinquency, iniquity, and perversion, could not compete with consumer culture. He and others underestimated the comic book's advance in the twentieth century. Comics were more than a silly diversion, primarily for kids. Across the entire entertainment spectrum, comic books filled a vacancy in a lucrative space at the bottom of the cultural hierarchy that united adults and children.

In any event, the pulp empire's economic engine was nearly unstoppable by 1944. The attraction of characters like Steve Rogers (a.k.a. Captain America), Superman, Wonder Woman, and Captain Marvel very quickly made comics a pop culture mainstay. By early 1942, reports by Business Week and Publishers Weekly revealed that monthly sales for comic books had climbed, in a matter of four years, to fifteen million. This sales rate would nearly double by the end of December 1943. Moreover, publishers generously assumed that there was a “pass-along value” of five readers per comic book (18–22). With almost 125 different comic book titles hitting newsstands each month, retail sales neared $30 million.

During the war years, U.S. commerce and industries experienced a boom, and the comic book industry was no exception. In 1944, the New York Times had reported that 25 percent of magazines shipped overseas were comics, which quickly landed in the hands of U.S. troops. At least 35,000 copies of Superman alone were read by troops each month, making comics a huge part of military culture. Thus, with the military serving as a viable microcosm of society, comic books, specifically the dominant genre of superhero comics, proved to be fertile ground for introducing stereotyped representations of cultural and ethnic relations.

Because comics relied so heavily on visually codified depictions of characters that were routinely reduced to their appearances, race became a central feature of the pulp empire. Reductionism gained a great deal of momentum in the industry, especially in superhero, crime, horror, and romance narratives. However, non-white characters found little room in the predominantly white pulp institution as mainstream figures. For African Americans, there would be no masks and capes to disguise any sort of alias. No such costume could conceal their appearance and enable them to assimilate in any meaningful way into the white culture of the pulp empire.

For many black artists and writers, the only way to disguise themselves was to appear invisible, which is what many did. Hirsch contends that “[despite] the relative freedom accorded comic book creators, one topic remained taboo in romance stories: interracial relationships. As with crime and horror comic books, the world within romance titles was virtually all White” (110). I found this to be the most paradoxical aspect of power within the pulp empire during this era. The pulp empire employed black and Jewish artists, writers, and illustrators, but failed to acknowledge their presence prominently and positively on comic book panels.

Hirsch also argues that the most remarkable aspect of the race and diversity issue is that “[the] legacy of the pulp empire was, ironically, created by some of the least influential people” in America, yet what they created “significantly shaped global perceptions of the United States” (10). While he makes this assertion primarily in response to global decolonization and the rejection of comics as “grotesque products of American cultural imperialism” and the “embodiment of American cultural authority,” the depictions of race, violence, and sexuality in comics did influence “domestic and international federal policies toward the comic book” (10).

These depictions in fact generated significant issues for policymakers. In order to bolster the effort to extinguish communism and fascism in a decolonizing world, they were determined that everyone should view the United States as the global mainspring of cultural, political, and military power. The atom bomb, itself a symbol of technological progress and military power, provided policymakers with another tool to demonstrate to the world the racial and intellectual superiority of the United States over non-white nations, but its depiction in comics was problematic too, because it raised the specter of nuclear holocaust and made America appear even more elitist. Hirsch thus calls attention once again to the comic book's global reach and its influence on domestic and foreign policies, highlighting not only racism, violence, horror, crime, fascism, and delinquency, but also how everyday men and women dealt with some of the greatest issues of the day—including nuclear war.

Hirsch remains intent on showing how Dr. Wertham continued his crusade to delegitimize the comic book and demonstrate its adverse effects during the Cold War, first at home and then abroad. For Wertham and the members of the 1954 Senate Subcommittee Hearings into Juvenile Delinquency, with the special focus on Comic Books (i.e., Estes Kefauver, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., Olin D. Johnston, William Langer, and Alexander Wiley), the comic book posed several challenges as it made its way to non-white nations. The subcommittee highlighted four concerns in this new age of decolonization and a freer global community. First, they were troubled by the increasing popularity of crime and horror comics. Second, because of the violence in comic books, they felt foreigners were being exposed only to a primitive and undesirable version of American life. Third, uncensored American comic books were creating “particular problems” among non-whites. And finally, Soviet propagandists were using comics as prime examples of the depravity of American culture (193). These concerns would highlight America's myopic and bigoted views of racial tolerance and egalitarianism—all characteristic of an actual empire.

The content of comic books also complicated U.S. efforts to prove that it was a “modern sophisticated society that cherished the contributions of contemporary artists, designers, and composers” (213). However, despite a perceived setback in nations like France and Great Britain, the pulp empire was able to achieve some success in winning hearts and minds and rolling back communism. Marvel characters such as Thor, the Fantastic Four, Nick Fury, Tony Stark, Captain America, and Spider-Man all fed American myths of democracy and U.S. military might, as...
represented by the military-industrial complex. According to Hirsch, the “Marvel method” found incredible success as the United States became more comfortable with the atomic age. The new generation of comic book heroes actively supported U.S. military intervention. As a result, “American policymakers benefited from the success of Marvel; by this time, comics had embraced the Cold War consensus and ceased to pose any meaningful challenge to domestic or diplomatic policies” (266). Yet comic books still eschewed almost anything non-white, essentially “whitewashing” the comic book universe.

That failure notwithstanding, Marvel had introduced a brighter universe of American comics to the world. “This new America was no longer a cruel and vicious place. It was a bright, technologically advanced society where superpowered men and women lived among average Americans and shared some of the same problems” (267). *Pulp Empire* captures this imagery in extraordinary ways.

Hirsch’s scholarship is both readable and densely packed with information, completely free of jargon, and composed with an enviable clarity of expression. He ends *Pulp Empire* with the migration of pulp to film, with fresh interpretations of old characters, and with thoughts on how the study of comics remains relevant today and will still be relevant in the future. Although pulp is “powerful, compelling trash that attracts, repels, and fascinates us” all at once (275), he notes, it is also a history of visual culture, commerce, race, and policy that furnishes a window into the hopes, fears, and frustrations that connect us all.


Lori Clune

I didn’t think I was a comic book fan — until, that is, I opened a box of childhood mementos during a COVID/-Marie Kondo phase and discovered three *Archie* comics, looking much the worse for wear. Memories flooded back to the Bronze Age of comic books: the musty store, the stuffed boxes, the excitement of a new *Archie*-Betty Veronica-Jughead adventure. Like Paul Hirsch, I stepped away from comic books by my mid-teens, but I still can picture *Richie Rich, Casper*, and *Archie* comics digest covers many years later.

What a thrill then, to delve into Hirsch’s compelling read and discover a fascinating connection between comic books and U.S. foreign policy. In “grappling with comic books’ political and cultural significance, at home and abroad” he provides “a new interpretation of American diplomacy during World War II and the high Cold War” (6, 10). What Mary Dudziak and Thomas Borstelmann did for civil rights, Hirsch has done for comic books.

Hirsch investigates the place that comic books have occupied in American culture and concludes that “just as the American government shaped the form and content of the comic book, so, too, did the comic book shape U.S. foreign policy. In this fluid relationship between policy and culture, between race and imperialism, was a fresh understanding of the most significant and costly struggles of the twentieth century: the battle against totalitarianism (35). He labels this relationship a “pulp empire.” Whether investigating and attempting to regulate the independent comic book industry or using these “disposable” cultural products for their own “state-sanctioned propaganda” purposes, a range of U.S. government officials and agencies were notable players in the comic book industry (19, 6).

The influence of these millions of comic books — “wonderful, terrible, ephemeral, important trash” — is impossible to ignore (14). Comics are popular, portable, and cheap, with accessible text, clear artwork, and a lingering ability, which Hirsch calls “stickiness,” to educate and entertain (16). It is not surprising that government officials would want to leverage this cultural product to combat “serious anti-American sentiments around the world” (173). Hirsch explains that while “commercial comic books could damage US policy goals…propaganda comic books could shore them up” (10). For example, Nelson Rockefeller led an effort to use comic books to fight the “rise in fascist influence” in Latin America in the late 1930s (40). During World War II, federal officials pushed a view of the United States that was “racially and ethnically tolerant” in its effort to defeat fascism (61). The Manhattan Project’s General Leslie R. Groves even urged a comic book depiction of the discovery of nuclear energy, complete with *Blondie*’s hapless husband, Dagwood Bumstead splitting an atom in 1949 (129). Despite the criticism that violent crime comic books garnered in the 1950s, most notably from psychiatrist Fredric Wertham, the CIA decided to create one of their own. The classified nineteen-page comic book provided a “step-by-step guide for assassinations, complete with cartoon images of how to conduct a political killing” (77).

Swaths of Hirsch’s book include comic book summaries that intrigue and often horrify. Many readers will likely be grateful that Hirsch has provided summaries; he read so we don’t have to. Growing up on the adventures of Betty and Veronica does not prepare someone for the decapitations and mutilations that were alarmingly prevalent in these crime comic books. Little wonder that these inspired the CIA.

Hirsch uses Dr. Wertham’s writings, particularly his book, *Seduction of the Innocent*, to examine how comic books were responsible for juvenile delinquency in the late 1940s and 1950s. Downplaying “child abuse, sexual assault, bullying, and economic inequality,” Wertham condemned “any comic book, no matter how benign it seemed” as “dangerous” and “the marijuana of the nursery” (171). According to Hirsch, comic books were attacked by a wide range of political actors, from Daily Worker writers to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. As a result, publishers banded together to form the Comics Magazine Association of America (CMAA) and censored themselves, imposing a code on content and advertising in 1954 (185). But the industry adapted to work within the constraints of the code and continued to thrive.

In chapter seven, Hirsch describes WWII-era superheroes and the powerhouse of Marvel Comics. With complex characters, adult themes, patriotism, bright colors, Marvel “totally reshaped the popular understanding of American commercial comic books, both at home and abroad” (246). Most of us have seen the classic comic book cover from late 1940 showing Captain America punching Hitler.

The continuing popularity of WWII superheroes brings to mind Elizabeth D. Samet’s scholarship in *Looking for the Good War: American Amnesia and the Violent Pursuit of Happiness* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2021). Samet explores the nostalgic memory of the “good war” and the sentimentalizing and mythologizing of the U.S. triumph over Nazism. She questions whether “the prevailing memory of the ‘Good War,’ shaped as it has been by nostalgia, sentimentality and jingoism, [has] done more harm than good to Americans’ sense of themselves and their country’s place in the world” (p 5). It seems likely that this appeal of WWII nostalgia, especially during the Vietnam War and the post-9/11 wars, invaded comic books as well.

I am particularly eager to add *Tales of Suspense* 39 (which introduced Iron Man in late 1962) and *Thor Battles the Vietcong* (1965) to my upper division course on the United States and Vietnam. Tony Stark’s genius and “technological hubris” in building the “American military-industrial complex, in the form of Iron Man” to fight
Vietcong guerrillas is audacious and enlightening (253). And exploring with students why Thor, the Norse god of thunder, has become an aggressively anticommunistcold warrior will be fascinating. As Hirsch explains, through these 1960’s comic books, readers were exposed once again to “an image of the United States as unambiguously good and its communist enemies as perfectly evil” in spite of the increasingly dour news coming out of Southeast Asia (263).

Hirsch is to be commended for this significant contribution to U.S. cultural history, which overlaps, as such history often does, with U.S. politics, diplomacy, and foreign policy. One hopes government agencies, particularly CIA officials, will reward future FOIA efforts to shine more light on these operations. With more access, historians will be able to further flesh out the Cold War story of comic books in the decolonizing world and the Soviet bloc. We are grateful to Hirsch for blazing this trail. (Personally, I also appreciate Hirsch’s candor in admitted to having had a panic attack upon his first visit to the National Archives; I thought I was the only one.)

The author and the University of Chicago Press made good use of a Robert B. Silvers Foundation grant. They understood that the history of a visual medium benefits greatly from high-quality images and paper that is up to the task. Images that appear every few pages and a beautiful layout give the book a terrific aesthetic that brings the story to life. (A history monograph with plentiful images? When do we ever say that? Let’s hope more and more often.)

I recommend that survey course professors and high school teachers borrow Hirsch’s lens to teach civil rights, diplomacy, propaganda, and the Cold War. While some textbooks and state standards bifurcate these stories, history, of course, does not. Hirsch confirms that “Cold War diplomacy, culture, and race...were all intertwined and blended together, not artificially separated” (9). Comic books can serve as compelling threads to weave these stories together. I have assigned the book as one of fourteen monographs in my spring 2022 graduate seminar on Cold War culture. I am confident it will broaden my students’ perspectives.

As is often the case with history, the narrative threads in Pulp Empire tend to tangle. The chronology here may jump around too much for some readers. There is also an odd bridge at the end of chapter 1 that alludes to nuclear warfare, but readers are first taken on a detour to early Cold War global anti-communism in chapter 2. It’s not until chapter 3 that Hirsch explores Federal Civil Defense Administration efforts to use comic books to “soothe Americans’ fear of atomic war,” shows how The H-Bomb and You enlisted American children as “combatants in the Cold War,” and introduces Donald Duck’s Atomic Bomb (119, 126). But these rarities do not take away from this fascinating and well-told story.

Hirsch admits that “there is no clean ending to this narrative, because it isn’t over” (277). He is correct. In addition to many documents not yet public (who doesn’t want to know the full story of CIA comic books and the 1984 invasion of Grenada?), the story itself is unfinished history. Historians would be wise to continue this astonishing tale up through the 1970s and to the present day. While television images overshadow comic book propaganda, the print story continues (240). There is much more to tell beyond Captain America punching Hitler. The public will be interested; our students already are.

**The Secret History of Pulp Empire: The Secret History of Comic Book Imperialism**

Paul S. Hirsch

I was enormously excited to learn that Passport was organizing a roundtable on Pulp Empire. Because my book straddles multiple historical disciplines, I was also curious about the backgrounds of the reviewers. It was good to see that they are a diverse, wonderfully accomplished collection of scholars, and I am grateful to them for their thoughtful and thorough responses to Pulp Empire. I would also like to thank Andrew Johns, who arranged this panel.

I was both relieved and gratified that all the reviewers accepted Pulp Empire’s central argument: comic books are not a juvenile jumble, of wild images and silly text but uniquely powerful, political media. Uncensored, enormously popular, co-opted by government agencies as diverse as the CIA, State Department, and the Federal Civil Defense Agency, comic books swept across the globe during the mid-twentieth century. What resulted was a pulp empire—a complex and fluid network of interactions among comic books, America’s imperial project, and its crusades at home and abroad against fascism and communism. Within this pulp empire, the power of comic books is real and quantifiable.

I am particularly moved by Lori Clune’s conclusion that “what Mary Dudziak and Thomas Borstelmann did for civil rights, Hirsch has done for comic books.” To be mentioned alongside these pathbreaking scholars is at once humbling and energizing. It is also delightful that the reviewers did not challenge my claim that comic books provide significant and unique insights into the policies and perceptions of the United States. When I first began tracing the connections among comic books, diplomacy, and race, I encountered a certain hesitancy among historians, some of whom seemed reluctant to accept the comic book as a legitimate and unique optic on American diplomacy. It was only encouragement from my much-loved and recently departed mentor, Marty Sherwin, that kept me on my path. I dearly wish he was here to discuss these reviews with me.

At the start of this project I went, impeccably unprepared, to the National Archives compound in College Park, Maryland. I somehow imagined it contained vast quantities of boxes helpfully labeled “propaganda agencies and comic books,” or “the relationship between the State Department and comic book publishers.” Of course, this was delusional; the relationships among government agencies and the comic book medium ran across the records of many agencies both overt and covert, hidden in hundreds of boxes boasting labels totally unrelated to comic books. Once I realized this, I promptly had a panic attack and scurried out of the archive.

Always aware of this morale-splintering beginning, I am so gratified that the reviewers largely approve of my research, writing style, and conclusions. It is wonderful to learn that some already use comic books to teach, with Lori Clune noting that “The public will be interested in Pulp Empire; our students already are.” Even so, they identified topics and sources I should have made addressed. Before tackling them, I want to explain the book’s structure, style, and flow, and show how I chose what to include in Pulp Empire and what to omit.

At the core of Pulp Empire is the idea that comic books were inseparable from the politics and physical machinery of World War II and the Cold War. Hundreds of millions,
perhaps billions, traveled abroad with soldiers, diplomats, and tourists. Government agencies including the CIA, the State Department, and the Writer’s War Board also created their own non-commercial propaganda comic books for distribution across the Global South. Federal policymakers emphasized comic books in this region because they refused to believe that non-white peoples were sophisticated enough to absorb messages embedded in more traditional propaganda.

It was a particular pleasure to discover a cultural form that not only reached millions of people of color in the Global South but also gave voice to so many marginalized groups of Americans. The industry, described by one artist as “a creative sewer,” provided employment to (and exploited) talented illustrators, writers, and editors unable to find work in more mainstream industries because of their race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation. Comic books, particularly those published between the mid-1930s and the mid-1950s, offer artwork and text created by Black Americans, women, Jewish Americans, Asian Americans, and other people pushed to the perimeters of American society. Their work was bold, creative, and dangerous, and there was a great deal of it. For scholars, these comic books, which were uncensored, provide a window into the frustrations, fears, and hopes of men and women whose opinions were not valued by contemporary society.

Comic books of all types respected neither borders nor local tastes and, to their numerous and vocal critics, proved quite capable of infecting children and adults wherever American power—political, cultural, and financial—left its mark. To examine history through comic books is to see clear and undeniable connections between the medium and diplomacy, between race and propaganda, and between an uncensored, uncontrolled strain of American media and global perceptions of American society at mid-twentieth century.

I wrote Pulp Empire as a crossover history, in two senses of the term. First, I designed it to be relevant to multiple scholarly disciplines, including American history, art history, communication studies, race studies, and gender studies. Second, given the unprecedented global popularity of movies based on comic books and the increasing acceptance of comics or “graphic novels” as highbrow culture instead of entertainment crafted by and for the mentally dim, a political history of the comic book had to appeal to a wide audience for maximum effect. A chapter on the uncensored comic book’s unique ability to describe the horror of atomic warfare begins with the story of two people—a child and a Black American man—killed by secret, intentional exposure to plutonium as part of the Atomic Energy Commission’s grotesquely misnamed Project Sunshine. I hope that these intensely personal histories refocus the reader, offer essential context, and explain, with a minimum of jargon, that the United States government sanctioned experiments on human subjects far more horrifying than the contents of the crime and horror comic books discussed in the chapter.

I am heartened by Cameron McCoy’s observation that the federal government cut off nearly all cooperation with criminals, gore, and violence directed at women global audience with images of a United States obsessed with plutonium as part of the Atomic Energy Commission’s race-based battle for the United States at mid-twentieth century. Still, I’ll have a go at explaining the book’s endpoint. Beginning in late 1954 the previously unfettered comic book industry had to follow a very strict censorship code. Although billions of uncensored comics produced before the code still traveled across the globe, the code made it clear that the federal government would no longer tolerate the violent, sexual, and deeply racist narratives woven into countless commercial comic books. The domestic comic book industry virtually collapsed. Vastly fewer commercial comics reached consumers in other countries and those that did were neutered.

Government agencies continued creating and distributing their own propaganda comics throughout the decolonizing world for another decade. But the conflict between hugely popular, uncensored commercial comic books and much tamer propaganda titles was over. The state-sanctioned version had won. Additionally, as best I could tell, the trail of propaganda comic-book and documentary evidence goes cold in the mid-1960s.

Matt Loyaza writes that my definition of the pulp empire deserves further explanation. He is right. I’ll take a stab at clarifying the term. The pulp empire took shape in 1943, when the federal Writers’ War Board identified comic books as perhaps the perfect propaganda medium. The board began editing and even creating narratives camouflaged in commercial comic books. They aimed to maximize hatred of Japanese and Germans and to convince Americans that the war against fascism was, despite the nation’s stated belief in human rights, a race-based battle of annihilation. At the same time, various armed services began sending many millions of patriotic, uncensored comic books (some containing stories created by the WWB) to servicemembers fighting all over the globe. During World War II, publishers and federal agencies enjoyed a symbiotic relationship, each benefiting from enormous sales of pro-American comic books.

It was not until the late 1940s that the pulp empire took its final form. By that time, popular superhero comic book titles had declined rapidly. In their place came a wave of vicious, sexual, and racist comic books. These uncensored crime, horror, and “jungle” titles presented a global audience with images of a United States obsessed with criminals, gore, and violence directed at women and children. Lawmakers from France to Indonesia recoiled at these hateful depictions, triggering numerous diplomatic crises for the United States. It was at this point that the federal government cut off nearly all cooperation
with commercial publishers and began creating its own propaganda comic books to minimize the negative effects of titles like *The Killers*, *Murder, Inc.*, and *Crimes by Women*.

It is this ultimate politicization, the global interplay between billions of uncensored commercial titles and state-sanctioned, anti-communist comic books that really captures the meaning of “pulp empire.” The federal government, no longer working in cooperation with commercial comic book publishers, deployed positive images of race and femininity in American society to mitigate the brutality on display in commercial titles. Its goal was to win hearts and minds in the Global South, while keeping all comic books—both commercial and state-sanctioned—away from America’s white allies in Western Europe, where they made a mockery of American claims to cultural sophistication. The comic book was popular from the outset, but it took government intervention and reaction to make the pulp empire.

As embarrassing as both commercial and propaganda comic books were to the United States, they offered one unambiguously positive trait: they were fun. Yes, commercial comics proved a nightmare to federal agencies and provided endless material for anti-American propagandists. But there is an unarguable joy to flipping the pages of a comic book and savoring its contents. And because of America’s vast numbers of military bases, diplomats, and tourists, it was an indulgence available to a Colombian child or a Ghanaian engineer. Soviet-style propaganda was often quite serious, and American comic books operated as a constant reminder of that joylessness. Winning hearts and minds could not always be about ballet, classical music, or chess. Comic books made this project a happy obligation from beginning to end.

We are all of us living in the pulp empire. Twentieth-century comic books exist as ghosts among us. The excitement, dread, and joy generated by the avalanche of uncensored American comic books are not dead. Contemporary understandings of the United States are a jumble of old and new; they emerge from memory as much as experience. And the cultural impressions formed by billions of comic books still perform cultural work domestically and around the world. Characters created to fight World War II and the Cold War dominate American and global culture. Now, as in the past, they operate with the implied consent of the federal government. These are the phantoms swirling around us still, shaping our popular culture and policies in ways we cannot always single out because their prevalence makes them so familiar. Within the pulp empire, the presence of comic book narratives is almost oppressive.

Caryn Neumann notes that *Pulp Empire* could be improved by the inclusion of market research and demographic studies of comic book readership in the various countries referenced in the book. These include, but are not limited to, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other nations across the Global South. The realities of my serious physical disability, along with financial constraints and my inability to learn perhaps ten new languages made this impossible, although I used as many French-language sources as I could. But her point is a valid one: a transnational study of cultural co-optation and transmission can only benefit from more global sources. I would like to collaborate with one or several scholars to produce such a book.

Many countries including the Soviet Union, China, and Iran turned the uncensored contents of commercial comic books back against the United States. They used the torrent of violent, sexual, and nihilistic narratives—about a billion every year during World War II and the first decade of the Cold War—as powerful evidence of the cruelty inherent to American-style capitalism. Caryn Neumann flags my limited discussion of these anti-American propaganda programs, as well as the absence of related images. I searched for these records in the files of senate subcommittees, the United States Information Agency and its parent organization, and the State Department. I submitted FOIA requests—inevitably rejected without explanation—to the CIA. In this case, as in others, the simple unavailability of materials made it impossible to include relevant examples in the book. Again, this is a legitimate criticism and a helpful reminder that a thorough understanding of the FOIA system is essential to writing history.

Caryn Neumann also highlights the absence of evidence from a significant comic book archive—the Billy Ireland collection at Ohio State University. I did consult the Billy Ireland collection, but it does not include information or comic books relevant to *Pulp Empire*. I prioritized the largest government and personal collections of comic books, documents, and personal papers, in particular the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the personal papers of Malcolm Ater, and collections at Georgetown University and Michigan State University. I spent so much time in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., for example, that the security guards at the building’s entrance learned about my research and referred to me as “Captain Marvel.” Again, the realities of time, funding, and my physical disability stopped me from exploring every comic book collection in the United States. Still, her objection is perfectly fair. It is important that scholars embrace comic books as a unique means of exploring the past; the more evidence we assemble in support, the better.

All the reviewers note the fifty-odd full-color pictures peppered throughout *Pulp Empire*. Both I and my editor believed that a book arguing for the importance of comic books and visual culture demanded supporting images. *Pulp Empire* would have significantly less power without them. Unfortunately, most academic presses are unable to pay for dozens of full-page illustrations. I would encourage cultural scholars to plan accordingly: applying for grants took up a substantial amount of my time across many years. Financial awards from at least half a dozen organizations enabled me to fund the images in *Pulp Empire*. Without them, the book would be bare.

Writing on visual media, then, requires scholars to walk two paths simultaneously: that of a traditional academic, and of an enthusiastic self-promoter. It is very difficult to fill both roles at the same time, and I am so glad that the reviewers found much of value in the final product. Now I can reassure my younger self, the terrified grad student that ran right out of the National Archives, that the results were worth the effort.
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A Roundtable on Andrew Priest,
Designs on Empire: America’s Rise to Power

Paul Kramer, Richard S. Fogarty, Andrew M. Johnston, Michael E. Donoghue, Jeannette Eileen Jones, and Andrew Priest

Introduction
Paul Kramer

The historical study of connections, encounters and exchanges between the U.S. and other imperial states is now entering its third decade, and only picking up steam. Admittedly, the earliest call for inquiries into the ways that U.S. empire was entangled—and unexceptional—in a larger, globalizing world of competing and interacting empires arrived much, much earlier. Writing in 1900, Alfred Thayer Mahan warned that the study of U.S. “expansion” would be “very imperfect if it failed clearly to recognize...that it is but one phase of a sentiment that has swept over the whole civilized European world within the last few decades.” Writing in 1906, W. E. B. DuBois recast Jim Crow as the United States’ unexceptional segment of a worldwide “belt” of racist, colonial-imperial regimes. In words strikingly similar to Mahan’s—and radically at odds with them politically—DuBois reframed what white Americans called the “Negro problem” as “but a local phase of a world problem.” For DuBois, the “color line” was not narrowly American, but inter-imperial; it “enters into European imperial politics and floods our continents from Alaska to Patagonia.” But for a long time, historians mostly failed to heed Mahan’s caution or DuBois’s cartography. There were two main culprits here. The first was the durable, defining power of methodological nationalism in the writing of U.S. history, which largely ascribed the United States’ development to “internal” factors and the writ of “national character.” Artificially cropping U.S. history in the wrong places, methodological nationalism effectively erased historical worlds of inter-imperial commonality and exchange, including ones in which Mahan and DuBois were deeply enmeshed.

A second perpetrator—a co-conspirator with the first—was U.S. national exceptionalism. A fully realized inter-imperial history of the United States was stymied for decades by an exceptionalist insistence that the United States was not or did not have an “empire”; or if it had one, it had been minimal, accidental, and short-lived. To be sure, there were numerous studies of the United States’ relationships with European imperial states, especially in diplomatic, military and intellectual histories that took place across transatlantic space. But these were not and could not be inter-imperial histories, because they only involved one imperial state; the term “empire” cleaved exclusively to great powers elsewhere. In the context of the nationalist mobilizations of World War II and the Cold War, with their profound and durable effects on historical thought and scholarship, the United States was cast as exceptionally different, typologically separate from a homogenized world of “real” empires. Sometimes this exceptionalism employed apologetic adjectives: U.S. empire as “reluctant,” “ambivalent,” “democratic,” “informal,” “invited” or “non-territorial,” for example. Sometimes it used euphemistic nouns: the U.S. as “world leader” or “superpower.” Both exceptionalist modes effectively misaligned the United States and other imperial states in ways that made their commonalities and interactions as empires difficult if not impossible to see, and non-exceptionalist comparisons between their histories hard to realize.

Thankfully, by the end of the 20th century, both these structures were beginning to give way to fresh, new, illuminating perspectives. First, there was the slow, uneven and contested, but ultimately successful renewal of “empire” as applied to U.S. history, beginning in many respects with Amy Kaplan’s resonant call to study the imperial dimensions of U.S. culture, the cultural dimensions of U.S. empire, and U.S. empire in the larger, global context of empires. This last summons in some ways resembled earlier calls to see U.S. empire as “but one phase” of a broader set of global, imperial processes, advanced here with a powerful, DuBoisian spirit and a critical, non-Mahanian edge. Second, there were various announcements, between the early and late 1990s, of a “transnational” or “internationalized” U.S. history which called on scholars to study the United States’ similarities, interactions and exchanges with other nations. Scholarship written in this vein reconstructed cross-border migrations, commodity chains, transportation systems, information linkages, activist networks, and cultural and institutional transfers in ways that mapped the United States’ multidirectional engagements with wider worlds, in ways that self-consciously challenged national exceptionalism.

By the early 2000s, these two developments—each a complex work-in-progress, each facing serious headwinds, and each largely disconnected from the other—began to converge, as historians began to frame the United States’ transnational past as the history of an empire among empires. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given both the depth of Anglo-American historical connections and the strong foundation of existing scholarship on British-U. S. ties, Americans’ perceptions of and interactions with British imperial power came into view earliest, drawing strength from a revitalized, post-colonial historiography of the British empire. My 2002 essay in the Journal of American History, “Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons,” called for the historical study of interconnected empires, and reconstructed U.S. visions of the British empire and British imaginaries of U. S. empire between the 1880s and early
crossing Empires: Taking U. S. History Transimperial Terrain

In many ways this early period’s most fully-realized monograph crafted in an explicitly inter-imperial mode was Dirk Bönker’s magisterial 2012 Militarism in a Global Age, which carefully reconstructed German and U. S. navalists’ transatlantic dialogues, mutual perceptions and institutional and ideological borrowings on matters of military-imperial power, capitalist political economy, expert rule and moral-political order. In doing so, the book provided new periodizations and geographies of the U. S. warfare state, even as it demolished persistent accounts of an exceptionalist German “militarism” from which U. S. institutions and political culture had somehow been immune. Most recently, A. G. Hopkins’ monumental American Empire reinterpreted U. S. imperial history by emphasizing the endurance of British influence and parallels between British and U. S. approaches to empire-building. And consolidating this development, and poised to inspire its next generation, Kristin Hoganson’s and Jay Sexton’s recent edited volume, Crossing Empires: Taking U. S. History Transimperial Terrain gathers together compelling works by leading scholars that explore histories of U. S. empire as similar to, interacting with, and borrowing from other imperial states.

In this context, Andrew Priest’s Designs on Empire represents a valuable contribution. The book explores a still under-studied era in U. S. foreign relations history, between the early 1860s and the mid-1880s, revealing the many ways that Americans’ understandings of the meanings of empire, the United States’ actual and aspirational place in the world, and the United States’ similarities and differences with respect to other imperial states were shaped by their engagements with other empires. Specifically, Priest shows that ‘Americans’ interactions with European colonial projects—the Spanish suppression of Cuban rebellion, British indirect rule in Egypt, the short-lived French imposition of a monarchical regime in Mexico, and the Berlin Conference on the colonial division of Africa—had significant impacts on Americans’ self-understandings as nation and empire. In doing so, he demonstrates the interpretive value of an imperial history framework. Traditional approaches would likely have partitioned each of these case studies into its own conventionally regionalized bin, rather than bringing them together in a single volume. By contrast, Priest is able to see them as participating in a common history of U. S. inter-imperial interaction and engagement, similarity and contrast across geographies, even as he keeps their regionally distinctive dynamics in view.

Priest’s historical cases of inter-imperial encounter are varied and well-chosen: two involve zones of primary U. S. geopolitical interest in the Western Hemisphere and two are based in Africa, where U. S. involvement in this period was more limited. He begins before the Civil War, with influential Americans’ rejection of European imperialism as monarchical, tyrannical, backward-looking and antithetical to the United States’ virtuous “empire of liberty” across North America. These reflections built the supposed otherness of European empire into the formative meanings of the settler-colonial project that was at the heart of U. S. national and imperial identity. The book then turns to four distinct episodes in the history of U. S. involvements with European imperialism. It first looks at France’s invasion of Mexico and installation of Maximilian as ruler in the 1860s; here U. S. policymakers balanced wariness about a European power’s violation of the Monroe Doctrine, fear of French intervention against the Union in the Civil War, and perceptions of Mexicans as racially unfit for republican self-government. The book then explores U. S. policy during Cuba’s revolt against Spanish colonialism in the Ten Years’ War between 1868-78.

U. S. officials had long hoped to annex the island or prevent its transfer to another power. Despite concerns about the Monroe Doctrine, and some sympathy for the Cuban struggle—especially among Black leaders allied with Afro-Cuban struggles for freedom and independence—racist anxiety about the possibility of self-liberated Cuba as “another Haiti,” and Spain’s promises of emancipation encouraged American policymakers to limit U. S. involvement. The book then shifts to Egypt and, specifically, to emerging forms of indirect British rule. In the wake of an uprising against the influence of an Anglo-French consortium, Britain invaded and installed a protectorate anchored in its military and naval presence, control of the Suez Canal, and loan agreements with local elites. Americans, entranced with the region for Biblical and Orientalist reasons, varied in their stances towards British rule: some sympathized with Egyptians’ struggles, while others embraced British control as a stabilizing and white-racializing counter to European decadence and decline. Importantly, these developments provided some Americans inspiring models of imperial power defined in terms of capitalist exploitation and trade, without the costs and risks of direct military conquest and colonial administration. Finally, the book takes up the United States’ involvements in the 1884-5 Berlin Conference on Africa, in which a dozen imperial powers convened to discuss European control over the continent and prospects for an “orderly” colonization without chaotic, disruptive, inter-European warfare. Here as elsewhere, U. S. policymakers embraced racist European discourses of a “civilizing mission” in Africa as they sought to secure open commercial access and prevent the carving up of Africa into economic spheres from which Americans might be excluded. Meanwhile, African-American commentators hoped to protect Liberia from European colonization, even as many advanced their own versions of a “civilizing mission.” In this context, as in Priest’s other cases, Americans developed their changing attitudes towards empire, and the United States’ role in the world, in the thick of conflicts over European colonialism, its varieties and its alternatives.

In the insightful exchange that follows, the respondents—experts on the wide-ranging histories
that Priest’s book engages with—emphasize its many strengths. As they point out, Priest’s account of Americans’ involvements in and reflections on European colonialism reveals the complex ways that Americans observed and learned from other imperial states, projected onto them, and distinguished themselves from them. While it is easy to take for granted that Americans would cast themselves as an exceptionalist non-empire or anti-empire (given the polity’s origins in anti-imperial revolt and its more general propensities for exceptionalist self-understanding), Priest shows these forms of imperial exceptionalism emerging, and reinforces how important American imaginaries of European empire were to this process. While Americans’ exceptionalist impulses stretched further in time, and developed in myriad contexts—from debates about the viability of republican forms of government to questions about whether all industrial-capitalist societies would ultimately give rise to socialism—each of these discursive fields had their own particular dynamics. Priest convincingly shows that Americans’ understandings of self and world were not worked out in the abstract, but in the context of specific inter-imperial interactions as they unfolded. Importantly, he demonstrates that there was no necessary contradiction between Americans’ acceptance of Eurocentric, imperial discourses, their adoption of features of European colonial rule, and their insistence that Americans ways of being in the world were exceptionally and virtually different. Across the contexts he studies, racialized visions of the naturalized and necessary geopolitical domination of Euro-American states—already present in U. S. ideologies of Manifest Destiny—played a defining role in Americans’ evolving understandings of their right and duty to conquer others. Shaped in the crucible of U. S. involvements with European colonialism, these visions would be reforged in ways that informed (even as they did not determine) the United States’ extra-continental colonial-imperial projects in the 20th century.10

While emphasizing the book’s strengths, the respondents also register some criticisms. Fogarty suggests that the book, which mostly uses diplomatic archives, Congressional debates, and elite opinion published in influential journals, might have benefited from more varied primary sources, especially popular-cultural sources through which Americans came to imagine and depict European colonialism. He also wishes the book had taken its discussion of U. S. attitudes towards French colonialism forward in time, into France’s era of self-consciously assimilationist, republican imperialism, a project that had historical linkages to and resonances with the United States’ own, racialized, imperial-republican project. Donoghue similarly would have liked the book to embed its central cases in deeper chronological contexts, and notes that the conclusion could have gone into greater depth in tracing the implications of these European-American encounters for the United States’ extra-continental imperial projections in the 1890s and beyond. Johnston observes that the book’s discussions of imperial interactions in the post-Civil War decades make only limited reference to larger contexts of white-supremacist, North/South reconciliation, and rising immigration restriction that unfolded at the same time. Jones would have wanted to see the book, which includes a number of prominent Black commentators, discuss the points of view of a wider range of observers, especially Black women, who had their own diverse approaches to European colonialism, especially in African contexts.

The respondents nevertheless agree that Designs on Empire is a significant and well-executed book that makes a key contribution to histories of U. S. empire, inter-imperial interaction and Americans’ evolving understandings of the United States’ place in the world. And like many useful scholarly works, it raises compelling questions that go beyond its immediate scope, including questions about our own time. Americans’ attitudes towards the actions of other imperial states continue to reshape their visions in ways that enlighten and obfuscate. The United States has continuously triangulated its geopolitical identity with reference to both positive and negative models of empire; in the context of the brutal invasion of Ukraine, Russia clearly plays the latter role. Here some commentators have stressed the uncomplicated moral necessity of American power and insisted that discussion of the United States’ own recent and ongoing histories of imperial projection must be set aside in the interests of rallying Americans and “the West” for a unified response to Russian aggression. Remarkably, such comments predicate a responsible, clear-eyed response to Putin’s imperialist war on the erasure of U. S. imperial pasts and presents.

But it is far from clear why supporting Ukrainians’ aspirations for self-determination and freedom, and safeguarding Ukrainian refugees, requires U. S. imperial forgetting, especially given that such forgetting has in many cases had its own horrific consequences. It will always be a geopolitical rationale available for why defining aspects of the U. S. past and present are inconvenient; by a set of remarkably versatile, ever-shifting criteria, and in light of the reality and specter of other empires’ actions, the right moment for reckoning may never arrive. The question is whether empires get the histories they want and need, or whether historians insist on creating something else. Designs for Empire explores very different moments and situations, but it shows these dynamics at work. When it comes to the longstanding project of exceptionalizing U. S. power in the world and sanitizing, effacing and forgetting its imperial dimensions, the violence and ruthlessness of other empires remains a sinister gift that keeps on giving.

Notes:
3. The turn of the 20th century saw a burst of scholarly and popular publications and university courses that placed the United States new, overseas colonizing thrust in an inter-imperial context, in hopes that that the United States might learn the “white man’s burden” from seasoned experts, and take away cautionary lessons. But the trend faded relatively quickly, including among historians. See Frank Ng, “Knowledge for Empire: Academics and Universities in the Service of Imperialism,” in Robert David John- son, ed., On Cultural Ground: Essays in International History (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1994), pp. ___.


Not in It for the Real Estate

Richard S. Fogarty

Born of a protest movement and a war of decolonization, the United States has since its inception imagined itself as anti-imperial and anti-colonial. This notion is as influential at the beginning of the twenty-first century, when viewing the United States as an empire may be more strongly justified than it has ever been, as it was during the nation’s first two centuries of existence.

In October 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld articulated this repudiation of empire with distinctive bluntness when he discussed U.S. policy in Afghanistan and the Middle East. He claimed that the United States had “no aspiration to occupy or maintain any real estate in that region.” Eight months later he would repeat the formulation, this time asserting that the Western nations united in NATO, following in the foreign policy tradition of the United States, were “countries that have no interest in taking over other peoples’ real estate.”

Gathering the allies of NATO under the umbrella of America’s selfless magnanimity in this way was interesting and significant. Historically, Americans who thought about imperialism and colonialism most often compared U.S. policies and behavior with those of the great European empires, particularly the British, French, and Spanish. Most American observers were keen to contrast the imperial restraint of the democratic, altruistic United States with traditional European acquisitiveness, highhandedness, and oppression.

Indeed, though he had a different purpose in mind, Rumsfeld drew on this familiar trope contrasting progressive American attitudes with retrograde European behavior when he referred to Western European nations, even NATO allies, as “old Europe,” which could not understand or support U.S. policy like the “new” European nations of the eastern region of the Continent. That the secretary of defense seemed to muse somewhat contradictorily with respect to the qualities of his NATO allies is less important than his channeling of powerful currents of official and often popular thinking about the United States in relation to both empire and Europe.

Andrew Priest, in his insightful new book Designs on Empire: America’s Rise to Power in the Age of European Imperialism, demonstrates the enduring resonance of these sentiments in official rhetoric about empire by beginning his study with a statement by a figure very different from Donald Rumsfeld: President Barack Obama. Speaking at Fort Bragg in December 2011, Obama said, “Unlike the old empires, we don’t make . . . sacrifices for territory or for resources. We do it because it is right” (1). The vocabulary and phrasing are, characteristically, more elevated and eloquent, but the nearly exact correspondence between the sentiments expressed by the two men is striking.

Priest’s work makes it clear that this is no accident, for both men, in their official capacities as formulators of and spokesmen for U.S. policy and as (admittedly very different) products of American political culture, were inheritors of a long and powerful tradition of thinking about the United States as “essentially unimperial” (4). This idea has been an important part of the broader sense of American exceptionalism that animates so much of political life in the United States. What Priest demonstrates so clearly and in such detail is not only the long-term consequences of this way of thinking about the nation and empire, but also just how important encountering and thinking about European empires has been to America’s development.

Critically, Designs on Empire locates key moments in this development before the late 1890s, when the United States erupted into the global pursuit of imperial power through its war with Spain. A great deal of scholarship, with good reason, focuses on this period, but Priest shows that Americans were having robust conversations about imperialism and colonialism earlier, during the period between the 1860s and the 1880s. And the actions of European imperial powers fueled these conversations, which would powerfully shape American self-understandings with respect to empire well before the USS Maine exploded in Havana Harbor.

Priest is primarily interested in American ideologies of empire as articulated through political discourse. He notes that ideology is often not a central focus in scholarship on U.S. foreign policy, but he argues that domestic conversations about the imperial and colonial ventures of European powers, both those aired publicly and those carried on internally among government officials, were important in shaping American approaches to its own empire-building.

In this the author is in harmony with the historiographies of European imperialism, which have long focused on...
ideology and culture more broadly as keys to understanding the empires of the “new imperialism” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In fact, it is not too much to say that the study of ideology and culture have come to dominate these historiographies. To be sure, these studies often, though certainly not always, examine attitudes about empire among people across the social spectrum and on both sides of the colonial divide, while Priest is primarily concerned with the words and thoughts of elite political actors and opinion makers. He argues that the focus on elites is more or less inescapable, because they “left the clearest imprint on the documentary record” (3), but it is important to note that historians of European imperialism have explored popular attitudes as well by surveying the artifacts of popular culture—such as advertisements, music and songs, literature, memoirs and adventure stories, games, imagery, films, expositions, and more—that are often surprisingly full of revealing references to empire. Nonetheless, the author here seeks to uncover the thinking of influential figures who were in a position to shape U.S. policy with respect to empire, and through deep research and insightful analysis he paints a clear picture of earlier developments that led to later and better-known assertions of U.S. imperial power at the very end of the nineteenth century.

Priest begins his book by surveying attitudes toward the great European imperial powers during the early years of the American republic, finding sentiments that would become more pronounced during the period he is primarily interested in, the 1860s through the 1880s. Before the Civil War, influential Americans regarded European empires with feelings ranging from skepticism to distaste. They believed that the young republic’s form of government and its commitment to non-intervention in the affairs of other nations (a foreign policy stance famously inaugurated by George Washington during the founding years of the country) set it apart and above the corruptions of empire.

At the same time, however, the United States was embarking on a policy of colonial expansion, which Americans could separate from the empire-building of others by ignoring the despoliation of Native Americans, characterizing new lands absorbed as “empty” or “unproductive,” viewing the incorporation of new contiguous territories as different from the conquest of faraway lands overseas, and arguing that the United States eventually welcomed these new territories (or at least the white males in them) into the republican family on an equal footing and with political representation. This hypocrisy and double-talk about empire would endure through more overt assertions of imperial power, such as those that resulted from the Spanish-American War, and beyond (they would even crop up much later in the words and actions of U.S. government officials such as Donald Rumsfeld and Barack Obama). In short, this early period saw Americans “assuming a separation from European imperialism but incorporating many of its prejudices and practices” (41). Crucially, there was very little difference between Europeans and Americans when it came to racist views of non-white peoples as unfit to direct their own affairs and live outside the control of Western imperial control. In this, Americans were already very close to embracing the European rhetoric of a colonial “civilizing mission” long before they sought to carry out this mission far from the continental United States.

This sort of sneaking admiration for and emulation of European imperial prejudices and practices, combined with an ideological and rhetorical repudiation of these same prejudices and practices, informed the responses of Americans to four critical episodes between 1861 and 1885. Watching France’s Napoleon III intervene militarily in Mexico during the U.S. Civil War, Secretary of State William Seward drew a clear distinction between French tyrannizing over a foreign people and the United States’ own expansion, which was, he wrote, “domestic and republican” (67).

It is clear, however, that Seward and other Americans could not bring themselves to oppose French policy too forcefully, even when it involved overthrowing a republican form of government in the Western Hemisphere. Their reluctance was due not only to the exigencies of civil war, but also to their views of Mexicans as a people unfit for republican self-rule. Even Frederick Douglass, himself a victim of condescending, paternalistic racism, agreed. He wrote that there was “perhaps a deficiency inherent in the Latin races” that prevented Mexicans from a “full comprehension of the principles of republicanism” (70).

Such views also informed U.S. policy toward Cuba during the Ten Years’ War, which began in 1868, and discouraged the United States from intervening on behalf of Cuban insurgents against Spanish rule (an intervention that would have been in line with America’s general distaste for Spanish colonialism and its interest in gaining greater influence over the island). In addition, they gave further impetus to the tendency of white Americans to identify with European colonial powers as they sought to rule over “inferior” races. As the editor of the New York Evening Post put it in a letter to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, “We do not want Cuba with her ignorant population of Negroes, mulattos . . . alien to our population” (113). Even in a Western Hemisphere supposedly covered by the Monroe Doctrine, which repudiated European interference, American racism significantly tempered the rhetoric of anticolonialism.

Events in Egypt in 1882 further pushed American elites toward identifying with European imperialists rather than those who rebelled against the influence of the very imperial power against which Americans had fought in their own war of decolonization. To many Americans, British control over Egypt seemed justified—and certainly preferable to the chaos that would supposedly reign if non-white Egyptians managed their own affairs. What was more, Britain’s model of indirect rule rather than outright colonial conquest and direct rule was attractive to Americans, who regarded such arrangements as models that would enable the United States to develop international economic power without the burdens of formal empire. The “civilizing” process of indirect rule would safely keep racial inferiors at arm’s length while preserving the economic benefits of free trade in a world of Western empires that often closed off their colonial markets to competition.

This world of empires was significantly consolidated at the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference, where more than a dozen imperial powers met to regulate European control over Africa—in effect, to divide up the continent among themselves. The United States sent a delegation to the conference, not to obtain for itself what Leopold II of Belgium called “a slice of this magnificent African cake,” but to preserve American economic interests by advocating for international free trade, a stance formalized a decade and a half later as the Open Door Policy.

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Europeans’ “civilizing mission” in Africa, predicated as it was on the essential savagery and primitiveness of black Africans.

This mission sat easily with the predominant racist views of white Americans, of course. The American presence in Berlin “further embedded” the United States “in concepts of race and rule . . . that would be . . . ultimately acted upon in multiple arenas” (157). More similar to European colonialists than they often wanted to admit, American elites were not only ready to engage in an imperial project by the mid-1880s, they were in fact already engaging in the broader Western imperial project and had more or less fully developed the particular blend of “civilization” and “commercialization” that would characterize U.S. imperialism well before the conflict with Spain at the end of the century that would decisively propel the nation onto the world stage as an empire (188).

Examining four discrete episodes in chapters that mostly focus on American views of a particular European empire (first France’s, then Spain’s, Great Britain’s, and Germany’s) at a particular point in time enables Priest to develop fully and in detail particular aspects of the evolution of the United States’ own complex relationship to the idea and fact of empire. Yet although the chapter on the Berlin Conference does allow for a wider focus and some sense of how American policy- and opinion-makers viewed and compared European empires, there is at least one disadvantage to the author’s approach.

For instance, as instructive as the U.S. response to the French intervention in Mexico is, moving away from a sustained discussion of French imperialism after the French left Mexico in 1867 leaves important and potentially very interesting aspects of the French colonial empire unexamined. Napoleon III fell from power three years after withdrawing from Mexico, and France inaugurated its Third Republic, a regime that decisively consolidated the republican form of government in the country and remains to this day the longest lasting in French history since the Revolution of 1789. While building the republic at home, the Third Republic also built a globe-spanning colonial empire in the decades after 1870, second in size only to the British Empire.

If Americans were temperamentally suspicious not only of French intervention in North America, just across their southern border, but also of Napoleon III’s status as an emperor and his efforts to put another European emperor on the throne of Mexico, there was every reason they might view the actions of a sister republic in a different light. Just five months after the end of the Berlin conference, Prime Minister Jules Ferry, one of the most important early architects of the Third Republic and of its colonial empire, defended his government’s colonial policies in the French parliament. France, he argued, needed to participate in the European scramble for empire heating up in the 1880s for three reasons. First, in an international economic environment of rising competition and protectionism, France needed to capture additional export markets. Second, there was a “humanitarian and civilizing side of the question.” “Superior races,” he claimed, “have a right vis-à-vis inferior races . . . a right because superior races have a duty . . . the duty to civilize inferior races.”

The third justification for building the French colonial empire was a matter of “politics and patriotism.” Strategic considerations in a competitive and dangerous world dictated that France seek—through enhanced wealth, naval coaling stations, and much else—to put itself in a geostategic position of strength in relation to the other great powers. Ferry articulated a case for what might be called “French exceptionalism”: France’s republican leaders had a “sense of the grandeur of France” and had shown that unlike the limited horizons of smaller, lesser nations, “something else is needed for France . . . she cannot be merely a free country . . . she must also be a great country, exercising all the influence over the destiny of Europe that is rightfully hers . . . [S]he ought to spread this influence throughout the world and carry everywhere that she can her language, her customs, her flag, her arms, and her genius.” As Priest’s book demonstrates, many Americans were thinking along these same lines about their own exceptional nation, also a republic, also with long experience dividing humanity into “superior” and “inferior” races.

If American observers in the 1860s could lament the French incapacity for self-government, as evidenced by their imperial regime headed by a Napoleonic emperor, and compare French foreign adventures unflatteringly to the successes of the British Empire (57), it would be interesting to know how views might have changed later, during a period when a republican regime in France, far more democratic than the government in Britain, was building a colonial empire that by the early twentieth century covered over 6.5 million square miles and ruled 44 million people outside of France.

To be sure, an affinity with Great Britain and its empire—reinforced through linguistic, historical, and cultural ties that have for most American elites been stronger than links to any continental European nation—was in strong evidence from the beginning of the American republic, and would continue down to the present day’s “special relationship.” The remarkable statement from an editorialist in 1889 that Britain was “nearly as much entitled to be called a republic as she will ever be” demonstrated the power of these ties (though the idea of Britain as a republic would shock most Britons, then and now, and demonstrates the author’s odd confusion between that nation’s increasing, if grudging, expansion of democracy and a truly republican form of government).

Priest quotes this British editorialist’s statement, but what his readers might not know is that it appeared in an article entitled, “Republicanism in France,” published in the centenary year of the French Revolution of 1789. The writer denied the title of republic to France, despite the formal nature of its constitution, for various alleged political failings. Prejudices and stereotypes die hard. Yet Francophilia has been as powerful a current in U.S. history as Francophobia, and from their origins in twin late-eighteenth-century revolutions shaped in part by a common Enlightenment heritage, through various alliances (including the young U.S. republic’s first alliance in 1778, which helped ensure its survival) and disagreements, the two nations’ histories and self-images have intertwined.

Much would change in the United States and the world of empires by 1914, and in any case, Priest is concerned with an earlier period. But it may be significant that when the Great War broke out in Europe many Americans were drawn to risk and even sacrifice their lives to fight for the imperiled republic of France (and its empire) well before the United States entered the conflict in 1917. During the war Americans also expressed their affinity for the French cause on official occasions: witness the famous declaration, delivered in a speech at Lafayette’s tomb, by one of General Pershing’s staff officers, Colonel Charles E. Stanton: “Lafayette, we are here!” Such sentiments attested to the long history of friendship between the two nations and the many debts of gratitude incurred over the years.

American attitudes toward their British allies in this
war were often notably cooler, at all levels of the government and military. In other words, we cannot always take for granted the closeness of the United States and Great Britain over the last two centuries, despite the very real influence and even admiration of Americans for Britain’s ways of ruling its empire during the nineteenth century.

What Americans made of the republican empire France was building from 1870 onward is at least worth investigating. In particular, it would be interesting to know what Americans thought about the French version of the colonial civilizing mission, which laid heavy stress on the supposed assimilation of colonial subjects into French culture and, theoretically, the body politic of the nation. This sometimes caused the French to appear far more racially tolerant than either the British or the Americans, who were more likely to balk at the notion of absorbing allegedly inferior peoples, even if they were “civilized” through colonization.

To be sure, race-consciousness did exist in France, as the possession of a colonial empire predicated on white superiority and a “right” and “duty” to rule clearly indicated. Understandings of race merely differed in certain respects between France and the United States, and the race-consciousness of white Americans often aligned more closely with predominant views in Britain. But the republican form of government and a formal adherence to republican principles of freedom, equality, and universal humanity suggest some consonance between attitudes toward empire in France and the United States.

If Americans have often been uncomfortable with the idea that they rule over an empire on the model of European imperial constructs, if colonialism was, in the words of William Appelman Williams, an “embarrassment” for Americans, it was and is at least in part because colonialism clashes so glaringly with the republican principles by which Americans like to think they live. As the great historian of French colonialism Henri Brunschwig recognized, this sort of hypocrisy was likely to give professing republicans a bad conscience.

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White Americans have always lived with the glaring reproach to their republican ideals embodied first in the institution of slavery, then in vicious racism and oppression. But attempts to resolve these contradictions through an ideology of “civilization” and a supposedly selfless and altruistic foreign policy that seeks to “free” and “lift up” other peoples without coveting their “real estate,” to make “sacrifices” because “it is right” rather than for “territory or resources” like the “old empires” of “old Europe,” were and are critical justifications and rationalizations of U.S. foreign policy and empire-making. In short, like republican France, the republican United States must appear “fundamentally unimperial” (201) to clear its guilty imperial conscience.

These ruminations on the instructiveness of a comparison between the republican imperialisms of France and the United States are not criticisms of Andrew Priest’s excellent work, but a measure of how thought-provoking and intriguing his work really is. Readers will come away from it thinking harder about aspects of U.S. and European history they thought they knew well, and having learned much that is new. At the very least, no one will be able to deny the importance of thinking about imperialism and colonialism during the formative first century of the American republic’s existence. By the time Rudyard Kipling famously beckoned to Americans to join in the Western scramble for empire and “take up the White Man’s burden” in 1899, he was in many respects preaching to the choir.

Notes:
4. For a particularly influential articulation of this approach in the historiography of European imperialism, see Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley, CA, 1997).
8. See Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War (Lawrence, KS, 2007).

Review of Andrew Priest, Designs on Empire: America’s Rise to Power in the Age of European Imperialism

Andrew M. Johnston

There is a scene early in Michael Mann’s 1992 film The Last of the Mohicans where colonial frontiersmen are being recruited by a British officer to fight the French. Hawkeye (Daniel Day-Lewis) stands aloof, muttering that the French are Britain’s enemy, not the colonists. The war was started, he argues, by the territorial greed of the Crown. Hawkeye’s adoptive Mohican father, Chingachgook, had similarly complained that the “Fathers of England and France both take more land, furs, than they need. They’re cold and full of greed.”

In 1992, one could still credibly claim (at least with a popular audience) that the French and Indian Wars had
nothing to do with the colonists’ territorial restlessness or the settlers that the French and British were trying to restrain. Mann’s film affirms that Americans were, from the outset, different from their European masters and wanted nothing to do with imperial skullduggery. They just wanted to be left alone to raise their families... on native land.

Andrew Priest’s terrific new book tackles America’s always paradoxical and often self-delusional disposition toward empire, but this time he focuses on the tensile period between the Civil War and the Cleveland administration. It was there that we find the dress-rehearsals for the great imperialist-anti-imperialist debates after the War of 1898.

Priest picks four examples where U.S. politicians and leaders of opinion debated the question of European imperialism, two from North America (France’s intervention in Mexico during the Civil War and Spain’s repression of a ten-year insurrection in Cuba between 1868 and 1878) and two from Africa (Britain’s occupation of Egypt after 1882 and the Berlin Conference over the Congo in the winter of 1884-85).

In each example, he draws on a rich mixture of diplomatic archives, congressional debates, and elite discussion in influential journals to uncover how the United States defined good and bad empires while trying to understand its own interests in a shrinking world. These discussions created the ideological vocabulary for America’s own overseas expansion once it had acquired a capability for self-assertion. Priest’s analysis is nuanced, carefully reasoned, and, most importantly, shifts our attention away from seeing 1898 as a sudden, unexpected watershed.

The book emphasizes the play of ideas rather than the economics of imperialism, although (and some readers might want something a bit more explicit here) the two are frequently connected in Priest’s own analysis. American critics of European empires routinely emphasized economic issues, expressing concern that imperialism threatened to close the United States off from commercial opportunities at an especially critical (and violently unstable) time in American capitalism. The sequencing is crucial here insofar as America’s colonial empire wasn’t completed until after the Civil War, when the Europeans had already accelerated their partition of the rest of the world. Consequently, when the United States came to assert its belief in “free trade” (the Open Door), it was a gesture born of a certain futility that was then turned into an ideological virtue, albeit a selective one, given Washington’s own dogged protectionism.

But the inheritance of the Revolution and the Monroe Doctrine meant, above all, that Americans continued to see themselves as fundamentally different, even as they looked on in wonder at Europe’s global reach. Priest’s pundits focused on three basic contrasts. First, Americans believed that the aggressive colonialism of the Europeans was an “outdated feature of the international system,” as America’s own existence seemed to prove. Republican thought bent toward the teleological view that European imperialism was a dying, if still dangerous, feature of the ancien régime.

Second, America’s continental expansion was perforce different: it was “natural,” sometimes underscored by providentialism, but always starting from the (racial) different: it was “natural,” sometimes underscored by scientism. Some of the new theorists of “liberal imperialism” in London elaborated upon these ideas. They had begun to see the white settler colonies (which the United States once was) of the world as the best way to reconcile freedom and tyranny. Race is the constant presence in such ideas—in contradictory ways, as we know, because it could point toward both paternalistic absorption and racial quarantine, although never full human equality. Because of his focus on elite American opinion, Priest pays less direct attention to the role played by the emergence of Jim Crow, white reconciliation, immigration restrictionism, and other domestic contexts that increasingly informed American views of empire; but it is, to the book’s credit, always present.

These diverse impulses—assertiveness, righteousness, and fears of racial contamination—ended up producing a series of dualisms in American thinking, which could pivot from imperialist to anti-imperialist depending on the speaker and the geographical direction he or she faced. It reminds me of Michael Kammen’s People of Paradox, which contends that over time, the transplanting of British institutions and values into North America sharpened comparison of these processes, including interactions between cultures and environments, in the New World colonialisms of Britain, France, and Spain. The point here is in showing precisely how American anti-imperialism and imperialism have danced, not as opposites, but as contradictory impulses stemming from the same ideology.

Priest’s examples bring such impulses into dramatic focus. The strange story of France’s efforts to install an Austrian monarchy in Mexico during the Civil War serves as the backdrop to William Seward’s embattled efforts to reconcile his vision of a modernizing, expansive America with defending republicanism abroad. Seward knew the United States was powerless to enforce the Monroe Doctrine against France, but he was able to define America’s opposition not as self-interest but as a defense of republicanism, meaning that the United States framed its growing power in the region in terms of its defense of the Mexican “people.”

The second test of American non-intervention in the hemisphere—and the one which most clearly foretold 1898—was Spain’s Ten Years’ War against the Cuban insurrection. The end of slavery in the United States took away the fear that expansion into the Caribbean (or elsewhere) might benefit American slavery at home. With it gone, the United States could more logically maintain its benevolent interest in the island’s people. That thought, though, was increasingly displaced by the racism the Civil War never fully expunged, a racism that doubted whether the anticolonial rebels, especially those whose faces
reflected the racial composition of Cuba, could either be self-governed or incorporated into the United States. The United States could not decide what it wanted out of the situation. It saw advantages in maintaining good relations with Spain (a decaying Catholic monarchy, but a white one) while keeping disparate voices for annexation or recognition of the rebels at bay.

It might be worth taking a step back here to consider the picture so far. What the three late eighteenth-century revolutions in the United States, France, and Haiti introduced was, in the words of Perry Anderson, a normative concept of internationalism that juxtaposed “the people” against the tyranny of the ancien régime. In this sense, the “nation” was the will of this newly emancipated mass (however limited its franchise), and “patriotism” was the universal connection between all who struggled for society and against superstition and despotism. American hostility toward French liberalizm and Haitian racial equality already gave us a sense of just what it was that limited early America’s commitment to such universal solidarity (class and race).

After the old order in Europe was temporarily reinstalled (after, in other words, Napoleon had damaged the image of cosmopolitan patriotism), the propertied classes in societies slightly behind England in the Industrial Revolution wanted to create strong states from which to catch up. Their form was less political than cultural and linguistic, but still promoted what Anderson calls “differentially universalism,” a cultural pluralism that was still valuable in the revolutions of 1848, which were both political and ethno-particularist. When these failed, the nationalist model was captured by any conservative or bourgeois liberal sect that had an interest in consolidating its political power, as the tempest of industrialization created a large and disenfranchised working class to be absorbed.

This was when “chauvinism proper” emerged across the industrial world, as capitalism moved toward larger enterprises that sought to control national markets and to press for overseas annexations when those markets became saturated. Capitalism used biology to describe nations and races, now pitted against each other. For the first time since the eighteenth-century revolutions, in other words, the “people” were no longer theoretical on the same side. The sorting process was a double-edged one: the people were now mobilized behind imperial rivalry (racial chauvinism fed the imperial discourse of superiority and special “mission”), and that happened at the very moment suffrage was giving the lower orders access to the political process. Consent of the (property-owning) governed finally gave way to genuine democracy, but it was now organized around axes of ethno-racial identity. This long view of how the international solidarity of 18th-century liberalism (for want of a better word) devolved from international patriotism to national xenophobia seems to me a useful way to think about all the paradoxes of the 19th century. The universal connection between all who struggled against superstition and despotism. American hostility toward French liberalizm and Haitian racial equality already gave us a sense of just what it was that limited early America’s commitment to such universal solidarity (class and race).

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the trail of causation when so many disparate elements clearly come together at the same time: racial science, the expansion of global economies, great power rivalry in Europe that was generating centrifugal social forces, and self-conscious efforts to build a sense of nationalism in which empire played a key role. The mechanisms of the impulse toward U.S. assertiveness remain a little unspecified: was it a necessity inherent in the acquisition of economic power? Or internal to the possession of a republican ideology surrounded by potential ideological foes? How, in other words, do the ideational and the material interact?

Priest steps back a little from that challenge. While he incorporates new approaches to empire, he resists being overtly theoretical. That will please some readers more than others, but his remains an immensely valuable book that shows how much America's imperial future owed to its engagement with the heyday of European imperialism.

Notes:

Review of Andrew Priest, Designs on Empire: America’s Rise to Power in the Age of European Imperialism

Michael E. Donoghue

f for most historians of U.S. foreign relations, the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War of 1898 propelled America firmly on the road to overseas empire from which it never departed although we have seen various claims as to why it followed this path and engaged in continuous denial about the motives behind and character of the expansion that followed. Andrew Priest has written a fascinating account of how U.S. statesmen and opinion-makers wrestled in the several decades that preceded the 1890s with the idea of empire both continental and overseas. Key events examined in this volume spurred arguments about whether the burgeoning power of post-Civil War America should lead the nation to adopt, reject, or even transcend the models and actions of contemporaneous imperious. Even before independence, Britain’s North American colonists yearned for expansion into lands held by the indigenous as well as England’s French and Spanish rivals. A hunger for ever more territory marked the United States’ early years, beginning with the vast holdings west of the Appalachians gained in the 1783 Peace of Paris, and continuing with the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, the 1819 Florida Annexation, the 1845–6 acquisitions of Texas and Oregon, culminating in the huge 1848 Mexican Cession.

Continental empire appeared an almost natural goal laid out in the ideology of Manifest Destiny. It was widely accepted, and never even considered imperial since the territories acquired were contiguous, “sparsely populated,” and eventually incorporated into the Union as equal states. Even expansion to the North attempted during the War of 1812 would only have united the Anglo-Saxons of the continent (along with the Quebeccois) and saved them from supposed British oppression. The nation thus would have escaped the opprobrium of tyrannical empire—empire that it once derided, having gained its sovereignty in an anti-colonial war for independence. How, therefore, could such a people ever really be imperial?

This thinking, of course, ignored the violent crushing of other peoples’ aspirations for sovereignty: the indigenous, French, Spanish, and Mexicans who formerly held the lands Americans avidly seized. Perhaps just as important as Priest shows, such reasoning overlooks the many endorsements the Founding Fathers accorded to empire, provided it promoted liberty and land for white Anglo-Saxons and created a “Greater United States.” U.S. empire was admirable, while foreign dominion over others as practiced by Europeans and Ottomans was immoral, repressive, tyrannical.

The mental gymnastics required to square such a circle were considerable and provoked many a crisis, including an especially existential one in 1861 in which an Empire of Slavery confronted an Empire (presumably) of Liberty. A difficult reconstruction followed this destructive civil war during which the U.S. emerged as one of the world’s leading industrial powers. Yet it also faced the threat of powerful European empires in areas deemed vital to U.S. security, commerce, and/or ideology.

An early peril unfolded right along the U.S. southern border when Napoleon III attempted to expand his empire into Mexico by making an Austrian prince Maximilian the puppet ruler of that state. This alarming provocation occurred at the height of the Civil War when the Lincoln administration, consumed with winning that fearsome conflict, strove to prevent British and French intervention as the Confederacy sought it. Spain also took advantage of U.S. preoccupation with its civil war by reoccupying the Dominican Republic.

Many Americans decried these actions as clear violations of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine which Priest correctly analyzes as a complicated document both anti and pro-imperial depending on one’s perspectives and the future U.S. interventions undertaken in its name. After Appomattox, Washington applied its considerable diplomatic weight to force a French withdrawal. Previously Lincoln had provided Mexican resistance fighters with modest clandestine aid, fearing French intervention in the Civil War if he or his Secretary of State William Seward acted too aggressively. Under a combination of U.S. pressure, criticism of this adventure back home, and fears over growing Prussian power, Napoleon III withdrew in early 1867, leaving Maximilian to his fate before a Mexican firing squad.

As the author ably demonstrates no sooner had the Mexican crisis been resolved, when a more complicated and bloody conflict erupted on the island of Cuba upon which Washington had long held annexationist designs. Creole insurgents launched the Ten Years War (1868–1878) to win independence from Spain. Various U.S. administrations had either supported or tolerated filibuster expeditions against the island in the antebellum era and even its outright purchase from Spain. But Grant’s government dithered and later recoiled from the intervention option.

Race proved a key factor. Slavery still existed on the
island and sowed divisions between the rebels who wanted independence and abolition versus those who desired independence alone. How could the U.S. which had just fought a bloody war for abolition intervene to support forces that opposed it? Americans in this Reconstruction era also grappled with the consequences of expanding full citizenship rights to blacks. The attitude of many conservative - and even liberal - Americans was that the nation did not need more inferior citizens of color by annexing an island whose population was one third African and mulatto with additional mestizos and others of “dubious” racial stock. For Southerners, a liberated Cuba provoked fears of another Haiti with a race war that could spread to their heavily black region. Better to back Spanish rule (a relatively weak empire and not a threat like France or Britain) despite the primacy of the Monroe Doctrine.

In the end regardless of some private U.S. citizens’ participation in the war and half-hearted mediation attempts, the U.S. stayed on the sidelines assuaged by Spain’s emancipation promises in the final peace accords. All this would change in 1898 but in its response to the Ten Years War, the U.S. revealed its deep internal divisions over race and empire. Many Americans had concluded that people of color lacked the capacity for self-governance which would serve as a springboard for future U.S. overseas interventions in the late 19th and throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries (see Latin America, the Philippines, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan).

Grant’s last ditch hopes for an imperial outpost in the Dominican Republic died on the Senate floor when a coalition of still powerful former abolitionists refused to support a racial colony. Former Southern Confederates in the chamber also wanted no part of one. Some African American leaders, actually called for U.S. intervention in Cuba out of sympathy for the struggling Afro-Cubans who fought for both racial and national freedom. And even Frederick Douglass initially supported Grant’s proposed annexation of the D.R. for the cause of black Pan-Americanism and uplift. But their voices failed to overcome Congress’s rejection.

Priest next examines the 1882 outbreak of anti-foreigner riots in Egypt that stimulated growing U.S. interests in and fears about European imperialism in Africa. Indeed, many historians view this event as the start of the infamous “Scramble for Africa” which colonized the entire continent within three decades. Given that Americans preferred commercial penetration overseas and opposed formal color schemes, the location of huge areas from U.S. trade worried American statesmen. Egypt in particular fascinated them with its exotic attachment to the Ancient World and the Holy Land, sites of earlier imperial aggrandizement that prominent U.S. tourists visited and were now coveted by the vibrant British and French empires—and even the declining Ottoman empire. American policymakers debated the lessons to be gleaned from Europe’s renewed imperialism in Africa.

While Egypt took a back seat to the more essential U.S. interests in Central America, the Caribbean, and even distant Hawaii and China, U.S. diplomats in Egypt and some observers back home disliked British arrogance and entitlement. They often sympathized with Egyptians chafing under British power as their own ancestors had before 1776. To U.S. Anglophiles, it appeared that John Bull wanted the whole world while Americans preferred a more open arena for international trade and influence.

Egypt also provided a ready example of informal colonialism. London dominated the nation through its control of the Suez Canal, limited naval and military assets, and growing political influence that stemmed in part from loans to local khedives who ruled under Europe and Constantinople’s watchful eye. British earlier experience with using the East India Company as a tool of empire also proved instructive, demonstrating how domination could be achieved through a variety of instruments that fell short of outright military occupation.

That methodology appealed to nascent U.S. imperialists obsessed with expanding their power even as they denied wanting to do so. Civilizational justification for foreign rule also obtained here since despite Egypt’s former glory, Westerners now saw her in deep decline like most Ottoman regions and viewed it as easy pickings given the West’s technological and military advantages. During a visit to Egypt, retired General George B. McClellan fell into the Western proclivity for stigmatizing Egyptians as wayward children and ignored the growing numbers of grog houses and brothels that marked the baleful effects of Western – not “Oriental”- influence in Egyptian cities.

An examination of the Berlin West Africa Conference serves as the final chapter of the book. In many ways, that concave proved the most complex U.S. encounter with European imperialism since it comprised such a byzantine collection of competing interests. Empires, nations, and personalities vied for their share of Africa’s resources. Foremost among the dueling personalities was the Machiavellian King Leopold II of Belgium determined to wrest control of the Congo Free State for his own gain under the guise of Christian benevolence.

Americans opposed a European carving-up of Africa (and soon had to argue against a similar arrangement in China in the 1890s). They essentially wanted an Open Door for trade with the “Dark Continent,” without the costs of military occupation. Europeans had other ideas and were accused of avarice by Americans who claimed a virtuous exceptionalism. Chancellor Bismarck hoping to head off disruptive wars over the riches in play, called for a meeting in his capital to organize an orderly colonization process that would dampen imperial rivalries. As they nobly stole land and resources from weaker Africans, he and the other participants claimed their actions were aimed only at ending the blight of slavery and disease – and the promotion of Christianity and “civilization.” No African leaders were invited to the conference just as no Latin Americans were ever consulted in the drawing up of the Monroe Doctrine.

Lacking any knights of the Round Table, the Arthur administration sent two diplomats John Kasson and Henry Sanford to assert America’s right to get in on the spoils. Belgium and Britain deployed a better point man here in Henry Stanley an adventurer, promoter, and confidence man whose talents would have put P.T. Barnum to shame. Sanford initially supported the announced purpose of the conference, African American leaders such as W.E.B. Dubois were soon disillusioned, as were the U.S. diplomats. There was little potential in Africa for a start-up imperial nation such as the U.S. Without a foothold there, bidding for a share of the wealth proved impractical. And as previously noted, no one in the U.S. was enthusiastic for black colonies. Americans ended up being crowded out by the more experienced European colonizers and the U.S. government bowed out of Africa. Washington declined to accept the conclusions of the conference, contenting itself with its semi-colony Liberia until the World War II era.

In his short but persuasive conclusion, Priest demonstrates convincingly how America took the lessons learned from close observances of and interactions with European imperialism during reconstruction and the Gilded Age and put them to “good use” in expanding its already strong presence in the circum-Caribbean region and Hawaii, even venturing further afield into the Philippines and China. Clearly, U.S. connections and conflicts with other empires helped refine its own future approaches to overseas expansion.

While imperial enthusiasts like TR decried Americans for sitting on the sidelines during this dramatic period, the U.S. was significantly engaged. And for those of us who are
sports fans can attest, one can learn a lot sitting in the cheap seats as various U.S. administrations undoubtedly did. All throughout this work, Priest portrays Washington as more willing to exert its power when operating closer to home— with a few exceptions. He believes that distant overseas engagement became part of its “long game” that came to fruition after 1898. U.S. doubts about overseas empire certainly provoked pauses in its policy deliberations but intervention in the affairs of other peoples continued on a persistent (if stop-and-go) manner from the founding of the nation to our own era. Ancient Rome actually operated in a very similar manner.

Now comes the part in my review where I have to find something wrong with this excellent and perceptive work that beautifully blends all the key and recent historiography of U.S. empire with new findings and insights, as well as choice quotes from statesmen and opinion-makers. The book also covers a neglected period in U.S. foreign relations history that badly needs its expert analysis. Raised Catholic I have long been indoctrinated with the belief that it is wrong to criticize a priest, but alas, I must proceed.

First, the book could have used a few more paragraphs in each chapter explaining in more detail how things worked out after these revealing episodes and a bit more context on them for the non-specialist reader. Some background on Mexican conservatives’ long-held desires for a monarch, the liberal-conservative civil war in Mexico, and how Maximilian’s regime so quickly collapsed come to mind. Priest sharply analyzes the complexities of Napoleon III’s misadventure, even touching on, for example, the role that U.S. mercenaries played, but he misses one key racial component while otherwise doing a masterful job of including race in all aspects of early U.S. policy. One reason Mexican conservatives and certainly some Americans held the elected President Benito Juarez in such contempt and supported or tolerated a foreign prince to replace him was that he was a “full-blooded” Zapotec Indian. The horror light-competenced Mexican elites felt towards Juarez could be likened in this regard to U.S. conservatives’ disgust with a black man in the White House that sparked their backing a white authoritarian to succeed him in 2016.

Similarly on Cuba, a few more paragraphs on the background and origins of the Ten Years War would be in order though Priest’s main emphasis is understandably in the diplomatic field. The same could be said for the two African-focused chapters. The book could benefit a bit more on what happened in Egypt and equatorial Africa after the incidents/crises that are addressed. The epithet “wog” was curiously absent in Priest’s nuanced discussion of British views on race in Egypt.

The book’s conclusion could have worked better as an entire chapter that showed in greater depth how during the 1890s and after, the U.S. used many of the lessons and strategies it learned from European imperialism. To my mind that merited an entire chapter and would nicely conclude the work, though to be fair these matters are sketched out in the conclusion, and I realize that publishers put spatial limits on books to keep them in the 200-page range for university classes. Still, U.S. banana enclaves, railroad building (including the 1851-55 Panama Railroad), mercenaries, and investments before and after the Civil War illustrate nicely U.S. empire-building in its own Caribbean sphere, copying from while condemning Britain and France for doing the same in other locales. As Panama is my specialty, I would have liked more on U.S. fears over the French canal effort. Some American diplomats viewed De Lesseps’ corporation as a dangerous East India Company-style wedge for French imperialism in the Western Hemisphere.

The term “civilization” is used quite a bit in quotes from key players in the book. Perhaps a couple of paragraphs early on defining the term’s relationship with imperialist thinking would clarify matters, as individuals seem to describe different or very general concepts when using it. But these are small quibbles about an otherwise superb work that illuminates earlier U.S. overseas encounters and that nation’s “love-hate” relationship with imperialism which seriously challenges continued claims to exceptionalism. I thoroughly enjoyed the book, recommend it to all my friends and colleagues, and applaud its author for his first-rate work on such an important topic.

A favorite Western of mine, Vera Cruz (1954), starring Burt Lancaster and Gary Cooper, looks at the role of U.S. mercenaries fighting for both sides with great flair and historical inaccuracies.

Andrew Priest. Designs on Empire: America’s Rise to Power in the Age of European Imperialism

Jeannette Eileen Jones

In Designs on Empire, Andrew Priest analyzes the rise of American power that coincided with four episodes of European imperialism during the nineteenth century: the installation and rule of Maximilian I as the Emperor of Mexico (1864–67), Spain’s ten-year war with Cuba (1868–78), the British occupation of Egypt (also known as the Anglo-Egyptian War) in 1882, and the Berlin Conference on Africa (Kongokonferenz) of 1884/5. He argues that these events influenced American ideas and political thought about the morality of imperialism as a vehicle for nation states to establish their place in the world.

Focusing on the period from the Civil War to the 1890s, Priest explores how some elite Americans came to accept “British models of empire,” particularly regarding commercial expansion, rather than Spanish and French imperialist projects. These same American elites also viewed imperial intervention in “unstable” foreign regions as “a necessary evil in the contemporary world” (10). However, Priest makes it clear that there existed no American consensus on empire or imperialism as modes for expanding U.S. power. Rather, there was “a range of possibilities” for executing American foreign policy and extending American power abroad (14).

Whichever path American policymakers decided to take, the United States was operating in transimperial terrain, “enmeshed in imperial networks” (14), long before the Spanish-American War. As Priest reminds the reader, American imperialism began at the inception of the nation, as “logical” American westward expansion and settler colonialism came at “the expense of indigenous populations” (19). Despite avowals to the contrary, the United States was already an empire operating among other empires.

Before delving into the four case studies that make up this study, Priest surveys American attitudes about European empires from the Early Republic period to the eve of the Civil War. Citing Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Henry Clay, and John Quincy Adams, among other elite American politicians, he dissects various contemporaneous arguments championing both territorial expansion and nonintervention as policies that distinguished the United States from European empires in the Atlantic system. For example, he explains that defenders of contiguous expansion, whether through nonviolent (annexation or purchase) or violent (war or forced removal) means, reasoned that such American actions differed from those of European empires in the Americas, as the United States intended these territories to become states in the Union and wanted the people to enjoy citizenship.

Of course, as Priest notes, this justification erased African Americans and Indigenous peoples. Hamilton declared the latter “our natural enemies” because they supposedly owed fealty to Great Britain and Spain (36). For
him, the “Western frontier” and the Spanish territories to the south were battlegrounds for expelling Europeans from the North American continent. However, such convictions did not translate into U.S. support for hemispheric independence movements. Priest cites Adams’s warning against involvement in “imperial intrigues” or “other nations’ affairs” as a “danger to the body politic” (44). Adams was not alone in this stance; other elites echoed his sentiments, basing their arguments primarily on racialized views of legitimate nation-building. The United States simply could not trust non-white peoples to establish functioning American republics in its image. Read in this context, the Monroe Doctrine was not only “ambiguous” but also flexible, allowing “politicians to adapt and manipulate it for numerous different purposes in the decades that followed” (45).

Priest demonstrates how French interference in Mexico, which occurred after the Benito Juárez government defaulted on its loans from France, Britain, and Spain, tested the boundaries of the Monroe Doctrine. Napoleon III’s decision to send Maximilian I of Austria to Mexico with French military support came at an inopportune time for the United States, as it was embroiled in its own civil war. Secretary of State William H. Seward’s policy of “nonintervention and hemispheric unity” mollified those Americans who understood that the Monroe Doctrine had no standing in international law, as well as those who feared that upsetting Napoleon would lead to French diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy (74).

In contrast, other Americans begged the U.S. government to save its republican neighbor, Mexico, from French domination. Priest deftly explains the convergence of racist views of Mexicans, non-interventionism, anti-imperialism, and anti-slavery sentiment that ultimately led to Seward’s decision to reassure the French that the United States would not intervene in the Mexican crisis. He did not want to “antagonize Paris more than he felt was necessary” (74).

The Ten Years War, which commenced a year after the execution of Maximilian in 1867, further strained American adherence to the Monroe Doctrine. Like the Mexican crisis, the war between Cuba and Spain appeared to many American elites as a direct challenge to America’s commitment to hemispheric independence from the intrigues of European empires. However, Priest argues that the Cuban crisis differed significantly, as Cuba, unlike Mexico, remained a colony of Spain. Thus, “the Grant administration did very little to pursue an overtly anti-colonial agenda and at times even supported” continued Spanish rule over Cuba to advance the “material interests” of the United States in the island (87).

Priest also points out that Secretary of State Hamilton Fish and elite politicians like Charles Sumner decried intervention in the war—particularly if it led to annexation of Cuba—on racial grounds, believing that Cuba’s “ethnic makeup” precluded any successful integration of its people into the American body politic (88). Moreover, Fish viewed Cubans as “incapable of good self-government” (93). In contrast, those favorable to intervention, including filibusters calling for annexation of the island, often characterized Cuba as “contiguous” territory and thought it best administered by Americans. Frederick Douglass, who once supported annexation of Santo Domingo, believed that all the Caribbean islands with Black populations (including Cuba) would fare better in a republic than as European colonial subjects.

Again, Priest connects racial ideology to foreign policy, analyzing the racial stereotypes about Cubans that supported both nonintervention and annexation policies to solve the Cuban problem, with Douglass as the outlier who argued for Black self-determination (102–3). Despite strong sentiment among Americans for supporting the Cuban rebels, Fish refused to support Cuban independence.

Priest’s treatment of the American responses to European imperialism in Africa (Egypt and the Congo Basin) as part of the broader “Scramble for Africa” during the late nineteenth century exposes the tension between adherents of the Monroe Doctrine and political elites who feared that the United States might be excluded from global shifts of power and sidelined politically and economically. In addition, Priest attends to the actions of nonstate actors and consular servants whose interest in Africa often shaped or influenced U.S. policy with European imperial powers. In chapters 4 (“Britain and the Occupation of Egypt”) and 5 (“Germany and the Berlin West Africa Conference”), he dissects the strains between “popular Anglophobia” (123) and the acceptance (and favoring) of British modes of imperialism based on an increasing belief in “Anglo-American brotherhood” (122). In addition, many elite white Americans began to embrace the “Anglo-Saxon civilizing mission” (126), which led them to favor Britain’s role in the so-called opening of Africa in the wake of the Berlin Conference, often while simultaneously decrying British imperial policy in India.

Priest explains that Americans’ “reactions to the British intervention in Egypt were . . . mixed” because they saw the Egyptian government as a “failing state” and were skeptical of British imperial methods for governing Egypt (151). As he notes, the American presence in Egypt before and after the 1882 intervention included missionaries, tourists, merchants, businessmen, and consuls. Among the latter was, most notably, Simon Wolf, who served during the outbreak of hostilities. It was the diversity of these Americans (primarily residing in Cairo and Alexandria and reporting back to the United States about their experiences) that prevented a uniform view of Egypt from prevailing at home.

Nevertheless, there were points of agreement among some of those observers. Many were disturbed by “European encroachment on the people” (138) and by Egyptian attempts to reform their nation as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire because they felt those shifts left Egypt vulnerable to the British, who made no secret of their desire to declare it a protectorate. Others, however, believed British rule over Egypt would free it from the clutches of the Ottoman Empire.

Priest elucidates the warring positions between the Americans who felt “sympathy for the Egyptian plight” (142) and those who feared “burgeoning Egyptian nationalism” (143). He details the “racialized language and attitudes” (148) that underlay some Americans’ beliefs that British rule was necessary for modernizing and civilizing Egypt. He also touches briefly on American views of Muslims, but he could have delved more deeply into American Islamophobia and Orientalism in his discussion. In the end, secretaries of state Frederick Frelinghuysen and Thomas Bayard maintained American impartiality during the early years of Britain’s “veiled protectorate” over Egypt.

Priest’s assessment of U.S. involvement in and American sentiments about the Berlin Conference on West Africa draws from a myriad of Black and White state and non-state actors. Somewhat expectedly, White consuls and commercial agents stationed in Africa and U.S. envos
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiaries assigned to major European metropoles took an interest in the conference. John A. Kasson, head of the U.S. legation in Berlin, emerged as a major participant in the conference proceedings, along with Henry Sanford, former ambassador to Belgium.

As Priest notes, “American interests in Liberia also encouraged some broader attention to West Africa” (159). African Americans who promoted emigration to Liberia, along with their White supporters, believed that the United States had a vested interest in safeguarding the African republic from European encroachment. Pan-Africanists, many of whom were opposed to or ambivalent about Liberian emigration, argued that Blacks in the diaspora had a duty to protect Africa from the greed of European imperialists. Still, many elite African Americans approved of the “Europeans’ proclaimed civilizing mission in Africa” (176).

Priest uses the voluminous correspondence between Kasson, Frelinghuysen, Bayard, and Willard Parker Tisdel (a commissioner to the Berlin conference) to illustrate the complexities of the foreign policy implications of American involvement in Africa. Kasson believed that Africans would benefit from the imposition of “European-styled ‘civilization’ on them” (181), whereas Tisdel rejected any suggestion that Africans could be induced to work, convert to Christianity, or engage in modern trade relations with the West. While Frelinghuysen supported U.S. participation in the Berlin Conference despite the cynicism of Tisdel and others about the outcome of Kasson’s and Sanford’s contributions to it, Priest argues that “the U.S. delegation’s presence in Berlin was also part of a pattern of experimentation with, assertion, and retraction of American power” characteristic of the period. Moreover, although the incoming administration rejected the Berlin Act, America’s “association . . . with internationalism” could not be ignored (187).

Priest concludes his study with a brief discussion of American imperialism and foreign policy in the wake of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars, highlighting elite Americans’ continued discomfort with acknowledging the United States as an empire. Despite evidence that U.S. continental and overseas expansion mirrored that of the European empires that Americans looked askance at, many political elites continued to reinforce an American exceptionalism narrative. Priest recounts how presidents Cleveland, Harrison, McKinley, and Roosevelt regarded their foreign policies towards the Western Hemisphere, the Pacific, and Asia as fundamentally “unimperial” (201). Moreover, the majority of Americans concurred with these political leaders in viewing U.S. expansion as benevolent, serving to modernize and civilize peoples around the world. Priest concludes that the United States “was not at the vanguard of empire during the final decades of the nineteenth century,” but “its intellectual development was still deeply embedded in and influenced by” the “new imperialism” (203).

Priest shines in his close reading of the rhetoric used by U.S. statesmen during these key moments in European imperialist expansion and intervention. He reveals a dynamic dialogue among American elites concerned about the implications of British, Spanish, and French imperial power in the Western Hemisphere as well as in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Germany’s rise as an imperial power added to their angst. As Priest notes, even with these concerns, many prominent Americans viewed Russia as the exemplar of proper expansion most akin to “Manifest Destiny.” From Jefferson to Thomas Knox, these men espoused pro-Russia sentiments, and during the British occupation of Egypt they “continued to see Russia as a progressive force” (136). In contrast, other elites echoed the position of the Young American Movement that in the 1840s and ‘50s warned against the “expansionist and oppressive” Russian Empire (31).

Priest’s attention to such fissures in American attitudes toward European imperialism is emblematic of Designs on Empire’s venture into American diplomatic historiography, and it broadens scholarship on Gilded Age political thought. Arguably, his book is as much a diplomatic history as an intellectual one. He builds his argument on a judicious use of archival sources not simply to paint a coherent historical narrative of America’s rise to power from the end of the Civil War to the turn of the twentieth century, but also to demonstrate how a range of elite Americans contributed to the history of ideas about empire.

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That said, Priest could have included more Black elites and activists in his study. Rightfully, he often quotes or references Frederick Douglass, since Douglass had a national and international reputation as an abolitionist and advocate for Black equality and was minister to Haiti between 1889 and 1891. Priest also cites Martin Delany, D. Augustus Straker, and W. E. B. DuBois, who, among other Black men, expressed their thoughts on imperialism, empire, and territorial expansion.

However, there were other Black thinkers, particularly Black women, who were assessing imperialism in this era. For example, Anna Julia Cooper, in her book A Voice from the South (1892), criticizes imperialism and “manifest destiny” as “Barbarian brag.” Other Black women, including missionaries in Africa, decried the Scramble for Africa and its potential threat to the sovereignty of Liberia and to the freedom of African peoples. Still others supported the outcome of the partition of Africa, as it allowed them to pursue what they saw as their duty to “uplift” and Christianize Africans as part of their racial destiny, as Michele Mitchell argues. In her studies of Black women missionaries who traveled to the Congo during the 1890s, Kimberly D. Hill calls this phenomenon “African American Christian internationalism.” Including such voices would have strengthened Priest’s analysis of elite and popular American responses to European imperialism.

Designs on Empire is a much-needed addition to the scholarly study of the “new imperialism” and American empire. Grounded in the historiographies of imperialism and the United States in the World, as well as deep archival and primary source research, the book makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of American diplomacy during the late nineteenth century. It is attentive to the inextricable links between racial ideology, internationalism, and imperialist expansion during the late nineteenth century, and it provides readers with a nuanced interpretation of America’s quest to established itself as a power to be reckoned with in global politics.

Notes:
Author's Response

Andrew Priest

Sending a book out into the world is both an exciting and daunting prospect. This is especially the case when that book is about a topic like empire on which so many brilliant scholars have already written so many brilliant things. I am delighted, therefore, that the reviewers think Designs on Empire makes a contribution, and, perhaps more important, that the contribution is worth making. I am very grateful to Michael E. Donoghue, Richard S. Fogarty, Andrew M. Johnston, and Jeannette Jones for engaging with the book so fully and for their thoughtful and generous reviews. Thanks also to Andy Johns for organizing this roundtable.

I am pleased all the reviewers agree with me about the need for new work on this topic, especially an intervention that draws us away from the allure of 1898 and war with Spain as the turning point for the United States on the international stage. Since I began research on this book, I have become more and more convinced that understanding the United States as a nation engaged with empire whose policymakers always had imperial aspirations is crucial if we are to comprehend the dynamics of modern American power. In the book, I intended to show that those aspirations were significantly influenced and shaped by the imperial powers of the day and that leaders in the United States were in constant conversation with those powers—learning from and being shaped by them. Designs on Empire is obviously far from the first book to explore tensions in the course of the history of the United States, which was an expansionist power that broadly considered itself to be anti-colonial. A vital element of this belief was that U.S. territorial expansion was in some way different from that of the European colonial powers’ carving up of territories that were often far from the metropolitan center. Yet in adopting a set of beliefs that broadly aligned with the European worldview, American leaders often agreed that there were circumstances in which advanced “civilizations” (as they saw them) should be exported and perhaps even imposed on others. As Donoghue notes, there is more that could be done to explain what American leaders meant by the term “civilization.” In this context, I take it to mean forms of politics, culture, and economics that Americans and Europeans took to be acceptable ways to live and prosper.

This concept of civilization was also highly racialized, and questions of race certainly dominated much elite thinking. One way to answer these omissions, as Fogarty notes, might be broadening my source base. Indeed, expressions of ideology in diverse media have become increasingly important to historians. They appear in many different forms, such as nonfiction books, magazines, novels, poems, and travel writing in many mediums. I have touched on this in a previous publication, specifically referencing U.S. author-travelers like Jack London and Mark Twain, but Fogarty is right that I am primarily concerned here with policymakers and those figures who were at least close to power, if not at the center of it. Jones makes a similar point about my concern with writing on diplomacy as well as ideology, and I thank her for her generous comments about my close reading of the sources. I did try to balance this with some focus on literary culture as expressed in leading middle-brow journals, especially regarding views of the British Empire, but my concern was, I suppose, always driven by the archival material I thought revealed so much about political and diplomatic mindsets.

I am intrigued by Fogarty’s comments on my treatment of the British and French empires. He begins by querying whether my focus on France as a monarchical and imperial power in the 1850s and 1860s led me to overstate American skepticism about French forms of colonial control. He notes the longevity of the French Third Republic, its rush for overseas colonies in the 1870s and 1880s, and the fact that it incorporated colonial subjects into metropolitan France in a way that might seem to have been more akin to U.S. territorial expansion.

There is much I could say about this, but I will limit myself to a few observations. Firstly, I agree that additional work is needed on the United States and the French Empire during the first decades of the Third Republic. It would, for example, be fascinating to know more about American reactions to the French takeover of Indochina a century before the crisis of American Empire there.

Secondly, I think that attitudes toward republics and monarchies were complex and challenging to categorize. In chapter 3, which deals with the Cuban Ten Years’ War, I note that Spain was both a republic and a monarchy during the 1860s and 1870s, but that fact apparently did little to alter American perceptions of its unfitness as a colonial ruler. Perhaps this was because these Spanish regimes were short-lived, unlike the more stable Third Republic, but I do wonder whether shorthand ways of understanding national empires of the day dominated regardless of what was happening in those metropolitan centers. Thirdly, and this idea is related to the previous point, I have increasingly come to think of empires as multifarious—rather than singular—forms of rule. Indeed, Daniel Immendorf rejects the notion of one American Empire in favor of a “Greater United States” with various types of governance.

Finally, Fogarty rightly argues that we cannot take for granted the diplomatic closeness of Britain and the United States, especially compared to France—famously the United States’ first ally. Certainly, relations between powers wax and wane, but it is noteworthy that American empire-builders after 1898 remained largely wedded to the idea of Britain as the preeminent imperial power on the planet. They observed more closely than ever the British Empire’s overseas enterprises as models for their own empire-building and even provided rhetorical support for British colonial violence in places like southern Africa.

Finally, the reviewers highlight two of the tensions that have accompanied me throughout the research and writing of this book: the question of temporal specificity and the
role of the domestic. Donoghue suggests that a chapter on the 1890s and the consequences of each episode covered would expand the book's relevance. Indeed, I struggled early on with how to deal with a vast and complex topic like empire, so dominant in the diplomatic landscape of the nineteenth century, while maintaining analytical focus on American elite responses to particular contexts at particular times. My solution was to examine specific moments of imperial crisis and change as part of broader commentaries on particular empires, leaving the 1890s for the conclusion to maintain focus on those key moments.

Likewise, Johnston, while generously noting that the domestic is “always present” in the book, would like it to feature more heavily in both the book’s focus and its theoretical framing. These debates were, after all, taking place during a time of pivotal changes in the United States—changes that included the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, which were followed by decades in which they were not enforced in many parts of the country. Similarly, the nation’s economic situation, with its growing extremes of poverty and prosperity, animated much of American life in the Gilded Age.

Here, as Johnston puts it so well, the interplay of imperialist and anti-imperialist forces was honed by the paradoxes of democracy at home (and heavily influenced by race and class). American economic power thus also shaped emerging ideas, just as it was itself predicated on hierarchies of race and civilization, a factor that was particularly obvious in the debates about the Berlin conference on the status of West Africa. Here I was pleased that several of the reviewers welcomed my discussions about nascent Open Door rhetoric among American officials—rhetoric that sometimes seems to be so geographically and temporally specific. Given its significance in China and Latin America in the following decades, I thought examining it was important.

Both these questions about temporal specificity and the domestic reflect choices made in course of carving out the book’s scope and potential contribution. While there are compelling arguments to do things differently, I believe there are equally compelling reasons to proceed as I have. I leave it to readers to decide whether the right balance has been achieved.

I will end this response where the book begins; with a reference to the contemporary United States. When I first began thinking about this project, the so-called War on Terror was still very much part of the political lexicon. U.S. participation in Iraq was coming to an end, but President Barack Obama had made the decision to expand the American military presence in Afghanistan. That it was Obama—a figure who is popularly understood to be a progressive and even a dove—who took this decision is especially important for the book, as Fogarty notes.

Obama’s protestations about America’s supposedly benign uses of power around the world, in contrast to empires past, highlight the fraught place of empire and imperialism in the American political imaginary. Today, as Obama’s former vice president, Joe Biden, continues to grapple with the end of twenty years’ engagement in Afghanistan and at the same time must deal with the Russian threat in Ukraine, rapid and expanding competition from China, and the continuing global pandemic, questions about America’s place in the world and how it should wield its still-considerable economic and diplomatic power seem bound to endure.

Notes:
2022 ANNUAL CONFERENCE

ONLINE JUNE 10 - 11, 2022
IN PERSON JUNE 16 - 18, 2022
NEW ORLEANS

TULANE UNIVERSITY
ACCOMMODATIONS ON CAMPUS AND WESTIN CANAL PLACE
FRIDAY SOCIAL EVENT AT THE NATIONAL WWII MUSEUM
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Retaliation against a complainant of sexual harassment or other forms of sexual misconduct a person who reports harassment, sexual misconduct, or other behavior that violates these policies is also a violation of these policies.

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This policy will be clearly and prominently displayed on the SHA FR website. All participants in the annual meeting and anyone obtaining or renewing a SHA FR membership will be required during the registration process formally to acknowledge the policy and their responsibility to abide by it.
Complaints

SHAFR will designate a complaints team that will be available to receive complaints from, describe reporting procedures to, provide advice on resources to, and discuss issues with participants in any SHAFR-sanctioned activity who have experienced or witnessed violations of this policy. The team’s contact information will be made available on the SHAFR website and in annual meeting registration materials. Neither the team nor any other SHAFR official can provide legal advice to those who make reports under this policy.

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Annual Report

The Executive Director will prepare an annual report of complaints or other evidence of policy violations (with no names used). The report will be circulated to the full Council at the January meeting and made available to the membership on request. The report may also identify how many reports were received, the forms of discrimination and misconduct alleged, how long the matter took to be resolved, and the outcome.

Some text in this policy is adapted from documents produced by the American Historical Association, the Shakespeare Association of America, the Society of Biblical Literature, and the University of Iowa.
A View from Overseas: The Wild West of Scotland

Oli Charbonneau

Tucked amidst the iconic red and beige sandstone tenements of Glasgow’s East End is a bronze statue of William “Buffalo Bill” Cody, stoic and braced atop his bucking horse. The piece sits in a private courtyard and, walking north on Whitehill Street, you can see it peeking over the manicured hedgerows bordering two sides of the property. When I moved to Scotland, I did not expect to be reminded of the American settler West on Saturday morning trips to the coffee shop. Asking around about the statue, I invariably received either a vague reference to the West of Scotland’s long romance with American country and western culture, or a shrug that said, “The city’s full of peculiar stuff—why do I need to explain this?”

Glasgow is littered with monuments to empire. They dot the city’s public parks and squares, immobile and constant reminders of how overseas power shaped Britain’s “second city of empire.” A 144-foot obelisk to Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson, naval hero and vociferous defender of the transatlantic trade in enslaved peoples, towers above visitors on the Glasgow Green. In the city center, a grander equestrian statue of the Duke of Wellington, whose storied career included a long stint in the Raj, sits becapped with an orange and white traffic cone—a now-long-standing tradition that fuses Glaswegian humour and the West of Scotland’s casual contempt for the pieties of British nationalist mythology.

Traveling west, General Lord Frederick Roberts, famed for his leading role in British colonial wars in Asia and Africa, gazes across Kelvingrove Park upon the University of Glasgow. The university itself is something of a monument to empire, too; it is the beneficiary of gifts and bequests from imperial powerbrokers whose fortunes derived from the slave trade. Back at the Green, the five-tier Doulton Fountain is worthy of its own dedicated study. Built for the 1888 International Exhibition, it features terracotta figures representing Canada, South Africa, Australia, and India—a celebration of the empire’s global reach.

Next to these grand tributes, Buffalo Bill in Dennistoun feels quaint: a discreet and anachronistic statue on a quiet residential street, well removed from the city’s major public thoroughfares. More unusual yet is its provenance. The statue was not erected during the showman’s lifetime (1846–1917) or even shortly thereafter, but in 2006, by a property developer called Regency Homes. A near facsimile (1846–1917) or even shortly thereafter, but in 2006, by a property developer called Regency Homes. A near facsimile of Frederic Remington’s iconic 1906 work “The Outlaw,” it was unveiled by a member of Scottish Parliament to mark the 115th anniversary of the opening of Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show in Glasgow, which ran for over three months on nearby Duke Street in a massive purpose-built amphitheatre.

Scottish links to the American interior predate Cody’s visits here by well over a century. Scots migrated to North America in increasingly significant numbers between 1700 and 1900 and played vital roles in shaping settler-indigenous contact zones, first on pre-1776 trading frontiers and later, as Euro-American settler rule hardened, as ranchers, land speculators, and industrialists. Metropolitan elites on both sides of the Atlantic romanticized the peoples and spaces of the Scottish Highlands and the American West, folding them into reductionist frameworks that sentimentalized tribal lifeways, commodified the ecologies of the colonial remote, and alternately celebrated and lamented the arrival of historical “progress” in the hinterlands.

These fantasies found traction among the urban masses in the works of popular artists and authors like George Catlin and James Fenimore Cooper. The comparative blurring of heterogeneous societies in Scotland and the growing United States obscured tangible material and structural interdependencies between the British North and the American West. “America’s borders attracted displaced peoples from the north of Britain,” historian Colin Calloway writes, “while resources extracted from American lands fueled developments in Scotland and England.”

In the final decades of the nineteenth century, amidst ebbing warfare in the Trans-Mississippi West and Turnervian laments about the “closing” frontier, interest in readily digestible—if not factually or ethically reliable—cultural representations of the settler story grew in the transatlantic public commons. Cody’s show, Buffalo Bill’s Wild West, capitalized on this demand, crisscrossing the United States and touring Europe eight times between 1887 and 1906. His retinue ultimately performed before millions in cities like London, Rome, Paris, and Antwerp.

This massive moving community and its extensive logistical requirements had only become possible through the rapidly expanding “transportation and communication facilities” of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. By 1891, it was a finely tuned operation with hundreds of people and animals acting in service of a set of didactic vignettes that purported to tell the “The Drama of Civilization”—or, in other words, the settler conquest of the continental interior. Cody tapped into an already emergent “European fantasy of the American West” and amplified it by giving audiences more of what they wanted: encounters with the exoticized “wildness” of frontier life. In doing so, The Drama of Civilization spoke to metropolitan audiences in Britain, Germany, France, and the Netherlands already primed to understand the domestication of non-European peoples and spaces through the prism of the high imperial civilizing mission.

Buffalo Bill’s Wild West would have been among the most lavish spectacles Glaswegians had even seen. Local architects hired by the touring company overhauled the long, narrow buildings of the previous year’s East End Industrial Exhibition, bringing them under one massive roof. The result was a seven-thousand-seat amphitheatre that featured a range of modern amenities, including gas lighting, spotlights, ventilation fans, and a raised stage with a shifting set of massive panoramic paintings depicting frontier nature. Glasgow audiences attending The Drama of Civilization were provided a supposedly “authentic” chronological telling of the history of the American West that, in the eyes of designer Steele MacKaye, revealed how intrepid (white) pioneers faced down myriad human
and environmental challenges. The production’s six acts jumped across centuries, from an imagined indigenous “pre-history” to an “immigrant train” crossing the plains; from the idyll of the pioneer ranch to the Battle of Little Bighorn. In between the mounted battles and pyrotechnics were segments featuring trick shooting and “cowboy” music.10

Unlike later tours in Europe, the show’s 1891 cast included Lakota prisoners of war, most prominent of whom were the Miniconjou band chief Kicking Horse and Short Bull, a Brulé member of the Ghost Dance religious movement. The movement had, in the final weeks of December 1890, provided a pretext for the U.S. Army to enact a crackdown on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota that culminated in the 7th Cavalry massacring 150 to 300 Lakota and afterwards dumping their bodies into mass graves.11 Ever the opportunist, Cody coordinated with authorities at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, to offer a deal to their wards: take the indefinitive imprisonment.12

Many chose the former, and thus found themselves in the strange role of enacting fictional versions of the colonial violence they themselves had experienced. The tragic dimensions of this were largely lost on members of the Glasgow press, who spent their time chasing local anecdotes about the Lakota. As Tom Cunningham relates in his meticulous reconstruction of Cody’s visits, stories appeared in newspapers of tipi encampments and Lakota men so smitten with Glasgow that they decided to remain here permanently.13

In repackaging the “Old West” as an epic of struggle and heroism, shows like Buffalo Bill’s Wild West helped create a set of fables about American history—and the idea of progress—with seemingly endless commercial viability. A second wildly successful tour of Scotland in 1904 included nearly thirty stops and heralded the beginnings of a fascination with “country and western” culture that lingers today. In repackaging the “Old West” as an epic of struggle and heroism, shows like Buffalo Bill’s Wild West helped create a set of fables about American history—and the idea of progress—with seemingly endless commercial viability. A second wildly successful tour of Scotland in 1904 included nearly thirty stops and heralded the beginnings of a fascination with “country and western” culture that lingers today.

The Buffalo Bill statue in Dennistoun has escaped scrutiny in Britain’s current memory wars, which center on the public legacies of the British empire: statues to enslavers; museum collections pillered from colonized Asian and African states; buildings named for empire builders; universities, including the one I work for, funded through systemized immiseration; and publics wrestling with how empire’s long shadow inflects contemporary inequalities.17

In Scotland, the complex diasporic connections to the settler West proved less resilient than this readily apprehensible version of the past, an “inspired by true events” title card that permitted the foregrounding of entertainment and aesthetics. It anticipated the many ways that the United States’ twentieth-century consumer empire obscured itself, exporting goods, services, and ideas that increasingly trumpeted their adaptive localizations rather than their American roots.19 In this sense, the Buffalo Bill statue became an unusual avatar for a particular sort of local history—a story about a vanished moment from Glasgow’s industrial past, when its foundries could rapidly produce the steel girders necessary to build the amphitheatre that housed the Cody spectacle; and about how a consumable American West held lasting appeal for working-class Glaswegians, who laminated its stories of triumph, tragedy, and grit onto their own.

My present office is on the top floor of an old Victorian rowhouse, a former private residence gifted to the university by a shipping magnate in the 1920s and eventually transformed into a research and teaching space. On the walls of its broad stairwells are faded decorations housed the Cody spectacle; and about how a consumable American West held lasting appeal for working-class Glaswegians, who laminated its stories of triumph, tragedy, and grit onto their own.

Notes:
13. Ibid., 71–79.
17. Memory Wars in the UK.

In the next issue of Passport:

- A roundtable on Heather Dichter, Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games;
- 2022 SHAFR election information
- A roundtable on Tizoc Chavez, The Diplomatic Presidency

and much more.
Seven Questions on...

Human Rights

Editor’s note: “Seven Questions On...” is a new regular feature in Passport that will ask scholars in a particular field to respond to seven questions about their field’s historiography, key publications, influences, etc. It is designed to introduce the broader SHAFR community to a variety of perspectives for a given field, as well as serving as a primer for graduate students and non-specialists. AJ

1. What drew you to this field and inspired you to focus on your specific area of the history of human rights?

Carl Bon Tempo: In the early 2000s, I was writing my dissertation on American refugee policies during the Cold War, and specifically working on a chapter about the 1970s. Again and again, in the primary documents, “human rights” came up in relation to refugees. I figured I ought to know something about the history of human rights if I was going to understand what I was seeing in the documents—so I started reading the secondary literature. And what struck me, almost immediately, was how little deep historical scholarship had been conducted about the human rights moment that occurred in the 1970s. I filed away this historiographic gap—I had to finish the dissertation. And then I had to turn the dissertation into a book. But in about 2007, I returned to that field of human rights history, just as it was beginning to take off.

I think my interests fit in well with those scholars in 2007, but I also was interested in something a little different. Many of the works of human rights history that appeared in the first decade of the 2000s can be broadly situated in what we were then calling “The U.S. and the World” scholarship. I wanted to change the focus a bit with my work, examining how human rights ideas and language shaped politics (in its broadest definition) in the United States, during the 1980s. This reflected how I defined myself as a scholar: a historian of twentiethcentury American politics who was interested in the United States’ relations with the world. All of this helps explains (what I hope is) the pithy title of my project: “human rights at home.”

Theresa Keeley: As long as I can remember, I’ve been interested in human rights, although I would not have used that term. As a kindergartner, I heard about the hunger strikers at our local Irish Center, I was taught anticomunist songs at my Catholic Ukrainian school, and I listened as my dad explained César Chávez and the United Farm Workers as we passed by the grapes while grocery shopping. In the days before DVR, I watched what my dad picked. When it wasn’t a Philly sports team losing, it was lots of civil rights and Kennedy documentaries. I remember what must have been the first airing of Eyes on the Prize. As a teen, I became active in environmental issues. In college, I gravitated toward research papers about state violence. (I am clearly not making a case for myself as someone who is fun at parties.) After college, I won a fellowship to spend a year abroad exploring the relationship between the Catholic Church, human rights, and the state in Poland and in Northern Ireland. In Kraków, I spoke to people and their families involved in the Solidarity movement. As a human rights worker in Derry, I advocated for those whose loved ones were killed by the British security forces. I also spent time speaking to men jailed for IRA activities. Upon my return to the United States, I helped coordinate a civil disobedience campaign that highlighted the humanitarian impact of the U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iraqis after the First Gulf War. Then, as a public interest lawyer, I pushed for housing as a human right, equal treatment for the LGBTQ+ community, and equal educational opportunities for women and girls. I applied to grad school in history after I realized that I enjoyed teaching, as I often taught clients how to represent themselves in court and lawyers new ways to represent their clients. At night, I was spending my free time reading books like King Leopold’s Ghost, The Burning Tigris, and I’ve Got The Light of Freedom. Once in grad school, human rights were a natural fit, but I do not remember if I framed my application in that way.

Michael Cotey Morgan: I was drawn to contemporary history because I wanted to understand why the world is the way that it is. The idea and practice of human rights have been central to global politics since the end of the Cold War, so it seemed essential to figure out where they came from, how they acquired such influence, and why so many governments continued to abuse them. The history of human rights also offered a way to get at some of the biggest questions of international history, including why wars break out, how countries can build lasting peace, and the relationship between legitimacy and power.

Rasmus Søndergaard: I came to human rights history through a longstanding interest in the role of ideas in U.S. foreign relations. For my MA degree, I had written a thesis on Bill Clinton’s foreign policy strategy of Democratic Enlargement, focusing on the influence of Wilsonianism and Democratic Peace Theory. As a graduate student looking for a dissertation topic for my Ph.D. back in 2013, I was pulled toward the field of human rights by the cascade of fascinating new books on human rights history emerging at the time.

Two factors—one practical and one historiographical—led me to focus on my specific area: how relations between the Reagan administration and members of Congress shaped U.S. human rights policy in the 1980s. First, a congressional fellowship in the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 2012 spurred my interest in how individual members of Congress can shape foreign policy. Second, an influential body of scholarship, highlighting the breakthrough or rediscovery of human rights in the 1970s, made me curious about what...
happened to human rights as the Cold War flared up in the following decade before coming to a sudden end.

2. Which scholars do you see as having laid the groundwork for the study of the history of human rights?

CBT: Maybe it is useful here to think in terms of generations. I tend to think of the founding generation of the current scholarship as including Paul Lauren's The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (1998), Lynn Hunt's Inventing Human Rights (2007), and the seminal articles from the late Kenneth Cmiel in the Journal of American History (“The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States” from 1999) and the American Historical Review (“The Recent History of Human Right” from 2004). These works crafted and crystallized some important narratives about the history of human rights and displayed vividly how the field could sustain multiple approaches—and indicated some of the work still to be done.

The next generation appeared shortly thereafter, highlighted by three works: Elizabeth Borgwardt's A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (2007), Samuel Moyn's The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (2012), and Barbara Keys' Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s. Borgwardt and Keys both asked fundamental questions about how and why human rights came to shape U.S. foreign relations, but used very different chronologies and stories to do so. Moyn's stunning and provocative account historicized the political project inherent in the very idea of human rights, ultimately revealing a wellfounded skepticism about that project. Moyn did that rare thing: produce a short readable book with which everyone has to grapple.

RS: With historians as relative latecomers to the field of human rights, several nonhistorians have helped lay the groundwork on which historians have since built. For my own research, I have found the work of David Forsythe and Kathryn Sikkink particularly useful. Turning to historians, it is difficult to overlook Samuel Moyn whose influence on the field of human rights history has been immense. Narrowing the scope to historians working specifically on human rights in U.S. foreign relations, I would highlight scholars like Elizabeth Borgwardt, Sarah B. Snyder, Barbara J. Keys, and Mark Philip Bradley. Yet, this is by no means a comprehensive list.

3. Discuss how the field has evolved to include different approaches to analyzing the history of human rights.

CBT: If we continue with my generations scheme, then I think we see today in the current crop of scholarship how many different approaches have found purchase in the field. There are too many scholars to mention, so the names I offer here are by no means complete, but they also are representative. Vanessa Walker's Principles in Power explores U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America in the 1970s and early 1980s, easily mixing U.S. foreign relations, American politics, and NGO-based activism. Jana Lipman's In Camps looks at the human rights activism coming out of refugee camps across Southeast Asia from the 1970s through the 1990s. In her story, Vietnamese refugees, and the larger Vietnamese diaspora, emerge as activists shaped human rights principles and ideas to their own ends. Finally, Jessica Whyte's fascinating The Morals of the Market: Human Rights and the Rise of Neoliberalism smartly shows how a group of economic thinkers in the 1940s and 1950s crafted a definition of human rights consonant with, and in fact integral to, their faith in neoliberalism. Whyte argues that this marriage between human rights and neoliberalism persists to this day, though she wisely notes that other definitions of human rights of course also remain in play.

What stands out to me in these three works are the ways human rights history intersects with other vibrant subfields. Walker’s book is maybe the most “traditional” if one thinks about it as a study of foreign relations even in the capacious way that most define that field today. Lipman’s work also finds homes in the historiography of immigration and in critical refugee studies. Whyte’s book joins the effort of many historians over the last two decades to understand the rise of freemarket thinking and neoliberalism. In my view, these connections are all a sign of the health of human rights history and the variety of approaches our colleagues are taking.
I see some big questions that many works have addressed. These include when did human rights become an important or influential force in international relations? When and where were there human rights campaigns? What counts as “human rights?” What is the difference between civil rights and human rights? How did individuals or groups advocate for human rights? In analyzing these questions, scholars have taken different approaches, and what I am listing here is by no means exhaustive. Some scholars have focused on the relationship between civil rights and human rights in the United States and how and why U.S. discourse often separates the two (Carol Anderson, Mary Duziak); the relationship between women’s rights and human rights (Emily Rosenberg, Kelly Shannon, Katherine Marino); human rights, international institutions, and law (Elizabeth Borgwardt); religious actors as human rights advocates (Lauren F. Turek, Michael J. Cangemi) or as working against others’ human rights (Melanie McAlister in her most recent book); human rights as intellectual history (Samuel Moyn); how U.S. government actors engaged in human rights activism or responded to human rights abuses (Simon Stevens, Sarah B. Snyder, Rasmus Sinding Søndergaard); LGBTQ+ rights and human rights advocacy (Laura Belmonte); musicians as human rights advocates or as music as a way to promote human rights (Alan McPherson, William Michael Schmidli); sports and human rights (Eric J. Morgan, Barbara Keys); how Americans understand human rights and how that shapes their response to abuses abroad (Mark Bradley); how Americans’ understanding of what their nation should be influences human rights activism (Barbara Keys); advocating for human rights as they concern economics or through economic measures, such as boycotts (Tehila Sasson, Paul Adler); transnational activism (James N. Green, Roger Peace, William Michael Schmidli); organizations’ efforts regarding human rights (Brian S. Mueller); the Helsinki effect and human rights in the former Soviet Union (Sarah B. Snyder, Robert Brier); human rights and self-determination (Bradley R. Simpson); the language of human rights (Patrick William Kelly); responses to human rights violations by the military (Brian Drohan); and transnational justice (Debbie Sharnak).

The field has also expanded to include a wider range of countries and actors. Older scholarship tends to focus on the transatlantic liberal tradition, usually starting in the Enlightenment (sometimes with a nod to older ideas of natural law) and culminating in the development of the United Nations, European Union, and their associated institutions, with a particular focus on the politicians, diplomats, and lawyers who negotiated the treaties and drafted the statutes. Of course, this story is essential to any understanding of global human rights, but historians have started to look beyond it. Their efforts have yielded important insights into the influence of civil society and nonstate actors; the ways that anticolonial activists and activists in the communist world and global south. For excellent examples of these new approaches, see the work of Jennifer Amos, Roland Burke, Cindy Ewing, Adom Getachew, Bonny Ibhawoh, Steven Jensen, Elizabeth Kerley, Ned RichardsonLittle, and Sarah Snyder—to name just a few.

RS: From an initial concern with determining the origins of human rights, the field has broadened considerably in its focus and approaches. This evolution has enriched the field by encompassing a wider set of actors, geographical regions, time periods, and a broader range of specific human rights to name but a few of the most obvious. Historians have also expanded the archival foundation of the field by, among other things, introducing non-U.S. archives that have helped improve our understanding of how U.S. human rights policy has been perceived from the outside.

4. What are some of the challenges faced by scholars working in the field?

CLOT: I’m going to come at this question from my own perspective, as someone thinking about human rights in the context of domestic politics and political culture. And here one of the challenges I face is the prevalence of “rights talk” among Americans throughout history. Think of the African American quest for “civil rights,” or the movement for “gay rights,” or President Roosevelt’s 1944 “economic bill of rights,” or the activism at the heart of the battle for women’s rights.” Or even just the term “political rights,” which is almost ubiquitous in U.S. history. The challenge is figuring out how—or if—these formulations of rights relate to, or are a part of, “human rights.” In other words, what is the overlap between rights talk generally and human rights specifically in U.S. history? The answer, of course, lies in deeply contextualizing the individuals and organizations who use these terms and trying to understand the meaning of “human rights” in that same historical context. As we all know, all of this harder to do in practice than it sounds in theory!

TK: I see many challenges, but I will focus on two. First, for the historian studying human rights, it can be emotionally draining and fraught. Human rights history is often depressing. Even when advocates are successful in exposing harm and pushing for change, they are reacting to something horrible. I’ve had sleepless nights processing things I’ve read and I did not even live through the experience! Truthfully, for me, the work has become harder in the midst of COVID on an emotional level.

Second, I see challenges concerning resources and voice. More privileged scholars may have resources to travel to archives in other countries. Another issue is how scholars can be compassionate and mindful as they research other people’s hardships. How might scholars have conversations about this and how might graduate students feel better prepared before they confront situations like this? In my research, there were situations in which people were willing to speak to me, but only off the record. They worried about potential repercussions, including their safety. Some
were Central Americans, while others were U.S. and Irish citizens. I preserved their desire for anonymity. But I wonder, how much does the story become about the storyteller and not the person who lived it? Is it just replicating power dynamics that these human rights advocates fought against in the first place?

MCM: Human rights is a powerful but slippery concept, and it's connected to almost every field of inquiry. The first challenge is therefore conceptual: to pin down exactly what people meant when they talked about “human rights,” and to illuminate their unspoken assumptions. In thinking about foreign relations, there's the additional challenge of distinguishing between the rhetoric of rights, the underlying concept, and specific policies. In many cases, decisionmakers used the same vocabulary to refer to different things, or they took refuge in ambiguity in order to paper over their disagreements. At the height of the Cold War, for instance, Soviet and American leaders could both insist that they remained committed to human rights, but they understood that term very differently.

The second challenge is disciplinary. The best books in the field bring together a range of different subjects, including diplomacy, law, and philosophy, and draw on insights from political history, intellectual history, cultural history, and social history. Finally, there's a geographic and linguistic challenge. The modern history of human rights—like modern international history in general—transcends national frontiers, so it's difficult to write about it from the perspective of a single country, even one as powerful as the United States. RS: I would argue, that a key challenge is to determine what to include and what to leave out of the field of human rights history. Historians have done a remarkable job of unearthing the different vernaculars of human rights across time and space. However, there is always a risk of applying the human rights concept anachronistically when examining history through the prism of human rights from the vantage point of the present. While human rights language is ubiquitous today, this was not always the case, and some policy issues that are framed in human rights terms today were not necessarily so in the past. As the field continues to expand, it is worth considering what belongs under the human rights umbrella and what might better be examined through other frameworks or concepts.

Another crucial challenge is how to parse the motivations behind the adoption of human rights language by policymakers and other political actors. In other words, when are human rights invoked purely for political gain, when is the commitment sincere, and when might it be a mixture of both? A general challenge for any historian, the issue of motivations seems particularly challenging for historians of human rights because of the concept's malleability, which has seen it stretched and distorted in innumerable ways. Finally, on a more practical level, archival access remains a challenge for scholars working on human rights beyond the Cold War.

5. What are some of the significant questions in the field that you feel need to be addressed in greater detail or, alternatively, which questions need to be reconsidered by contemporary scholars?

CBT: In general, I'm very happy with the state of the literature; my colleagues have taught me so much in recent years and on topics and events that I had not considered. I'm especially pleased with work that is taking the human rights history of Africa seriously, with work that is moving beyond the human rights “breakthrough” of the 1970s, as one edited collection described it, and with work that is connecting various aspects of life in the U.S. to human rights history. One area/period that I suspect will be very fertile ground for historians of human rights in the coming years is the early 2000s. My sense is that two defining phenomena of that era—the War on Terror and the surging antinewcomer sentiment in American society (and accompanying government policies)—are related and, in fact, grew as they drew energy from each other. Human rights historians are especially wellplaced and trained to explore the links between these two important episodes.

TK: I wonder about so many questions. How did activists overlap in their campaigns and when were campaigns internally divided? (I am reminded of Robert Surbrug's Beyond Vietnam.) How did politicians attempt to divide advocates? How did race, class, and gender influence campaigns, as Judy TzuChun Wu analyzes in Radicals on the Road? When and how did movements for human rights outside the United States or movements to address U.S. violations of human rights abroad connect with movements to push for greater human rights inside the United States? What happens if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is decentered as the focus of activism or understanding of human rights? Do only those who used the term “human rights” qualify as human rights advocates in the eyes of scholars? Where is the line between humanitarianism and human rights? Ever since I read Petra Goedde's The Politics of Peace: A Global Cold War History, I often think about how peace interacts with human rights. Where do antiwar advocates fit with human rights advocates, as Van E. Gossé's work always prompts me to consider? (With this barrage of questions, it is probably no surprise that my research tends to move in ten different directions simultaneously.)

MCM: The idea of human rights doesn't exist in a vacuum, and its relationship to other fundamental concepts—such as sovereignty, self-determination, and national security—has enormous consequences. When we talk about the rise of human rights in the late 20th century, we need to think about how they fit with the constellation of principles that define the global order. Since strengthening one of these principles sometimes requires sacrificing another, we should also consider which ideas lost ground as human rights advanced, and why. This approach would move beyond linear narratives of rise and fall, and instead give us a richer understanding of the shifting terrain of the whole international system, with human rights as just one component.

Historians could also move from the macro to the micro. Rather than charting the long trajectory of human rights over several decades, there's a need for a closer examination of the concept at specific moments in time. One could, for example, apply the methods of the Cambridge school to particular thinkers or documents, and situate them in their wider intellectual context. Which sources inspired them? What were they reacting against? How exactly did they understand the concept of a right, and where did it come from?

Finally, just as Isaiah Berlin emphasized the importance of the counterEnlightenment, historians could also think about the opponents and skeptics of human rights, including those who doubted the idea, and those who questioned its application in international affairs. Investigating these rival approaches (whether positivist, realist, fascist, or other) can give us a richer understanding of the concept itself.

RS: Despite a gradual expansion to examine a wider range of human rights, the cluster of economic, social, and cultural rights has received significantly less attention than civil and
political rights. As I have argued elsewhere, the deliberate downgrade of economic and social rights in U.S. foreign policy since the 1980s is a largely untold story that is worthy of further research. Relatedly, the link between human rights and neoliberalism has recently been the subject of growing scholarly attention but how this relationship has shaped U.S. foreign policy merits further consideration. Finally, more could be done to examine American attention to human rights through an ‘intermestic approach’ that acknowledges the interconnectedness of domestic politics and foreign policy. I sense that addressing these areas in greater detail would help us better understand the limitations and failures of U.S. human rights policy from the late Cold War to the present.

6. For someone wanting to start out in the history of human rights, what 5-8 books do you consider to be of seminal importance—either the “best” or the most influential titles?

**CBT:** The works I’ve mentioned already all fall into the “best” or influential categories. If someone was starting to read in the field I would encourage them to pair some of these works together: Moyn and Hunt; Borgwardt and Keys; Lipman and Walker. Such pairings reveal a more panoramic view of human rights history, but also—and this is more important, I think—the points of tension in the narratives that historians have crafted.

**TK:** There are so many great books. Instead, I’ll mention different kinds of work that have helped me think about human rights. For someone new to human rights, I recommend starting with two edited volumes: The Human Rights Revolution: An International History and The Routledge History of Human Rights. Both will introduce the novice reader to different ways of doing human rights as well as to different scholars. The reader can then branch out from there.

One book I return to as a model for human rights scholarship and as a resource for teaching is Carol Anderson’s Eyes Off the Prize. She explains how and why the NAACP narrowed its campaign from human rights to civil rights. The book underscores not only why civil rights and human rights are often separate conversations in the United States, but also how this division is often reflected in scholarship as well. Anderson highlights the need to consider how advocates fashion campaigns within a specific context and how these will not all be stories of triumph. You can never go wrong with a wellwritten book, and Anderson’s unique writing style can be a great way for grad students to think about how to find their own voice in writing.

I also encourage someone new to human rights to consult primary sources. The Digital National Security Archives (DNSA) site, located at www.nsarchive.gwu.edu, contains many declassified documents that have human rights implications. SHAFRite Bradley Simpson, for example, was part of the National Security Archive’s Indonesia/East Timor documentation project, which worked to declassify U.S. government documents concerning Indonesia and East Timor. The project aimed to foster efforts for greater transparency and accountability, especially regarding human rights abuses during Indonesian President Suharto’s reign. Finally, I recommend reading firsthand accounts by survivors of human rights abuse and/or advocates for human rights.

**MCM:** Lauren’s Evolution of International Human Rights and Moyn’s Last Utopia make a useful pair, because they epitomize two compelling but divergent approaches to the subject. Jan Eckel’s The Ambivalence of Good offers an upodate synthesis of the global history of rights during the Cold War. Michael Barnett’s Empire of Humanity provides an excellent overview of the related but distinct idea of humanitarianism. Elizabeth Borgwardt’s A New Deal for the World and Francine Hirsch’s Soviet Judgment at Nuremberg examine American and Soviet ideas of human rights and crimes against humanity against the backdrop of the Second World War and its aftermath. Daniel J. Sargent’s A Superpower Transformed analyzes the politics of human rights as one part of the broader challenge of globalization during the 1970s. Barbara J. Keys’s Reclaiming American Virtue shows how human rights gained currency in American domestic politics during the same decade.

**RS:** This is a tough question because there are so many worthy candidates, as I am sure the responses by my fellow scholars will reveal. Having said that, I would highlight the following for the reasons listed in parentheses:

Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia (An impressive and provocative book and certainly among the most influential in the field. A natural starting point.)

Jan Eckel, The Ambivalence of Good (For a comprehensive survey of human rights politics in the second half of the twentieth century and a synthesis of the existing scholarship.)

Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue (For the American rediscovery of human rights in the 1970s in the aftermath of Vietnam.)

Steven L.B. Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights (For an account of the Global South’s role in shaping human rights during decolonization in the 1960s.)

Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War (For the role of human rights in ending the Cold War and the importance of transnational human rights activism.)

Lauren F. Turek, To Bring the Good News to All Nations (For the relationship between human rights and religion in American foreign relations.)

7. For someone wanting to teach a course on the history of human rights or add human rights to an existing course on U.S. foreign relations, what core readings and/or media would you suggest?

**CBT:** My strategy for adding elements to a preexisting course, at least for the first time, is to use standalone articles or chapters so that I can mix in the new theme within the existing structure of the course and its narrative. With that strategy, I’d rely on two collections of essays that feature some of the best scholars working in this subfield: The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s (2015) and The Human Rights Revolution: An International History (2012). Another approach that demonstrates the stakes in both human rights history and contemporary human rights thinking is to pair Sam Moyn’s latest work, Human: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War, with some of thoughtful and critically engaging reviews of the book that have come not only from historians but also journalists, lawyers, and human rights activists. The point is not to focus so much on the book, but on the lively conversation that ensued after its publication.

**TK:** There are a few approaches that have helped me to illustrate how activism works, how activists have engaged with Congress, and how U.S. foreign policy has impacted individuals. Because many of my students are savvy social media users, it can be difficult for them to understand and appreciate activism preinternet. Two articles that have sparked lively debates are Kenneth Cmiel’s “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States” and Barbara...
Keys’s “The Telephone and Its Uses in 1980s U.S. Activism.” I’ve even drawn phone trees on the board! In terms of seeing activism in action, however, nothing has generated more conversation than Have You Heard from Johannesburg: From Selma to Soweto. Many of my students know a fair amount about the U.S. civil rights movement but are unfamiliar with the antiapartheid movement. They enjoy watching college students’ activism, seeing the connections between the antiapartheid and civil rights movements in the United States, and as students in Kentucky, they always comment on Mitch McConnell’s stance regarding apartheid.

Many of my students don’t understand the process of lobbying and how congressional hearings can play a role in highlighting human rights abuses. I have successfully used hearings to examine how members of Congress talked about human rights violations in Northern Ireland and in Central America in the 1970s. I assign students different parts of a hearing with guided reading questions. Every time I do so, I hold my breath, waiting for complaints. Each time, to my surprise, it has not happened. Because my students are not generally familiar with congressional hearings, they appreciate something new. I use the opportunity to discuss how congressional committees work, how someone becomes a witness, and the theatrical aspect of hearings. We also talk about hearings as a resource for scholars. I complement the discussion by sharing my experiences working with NGOs to lobby Congress, write witness testimony, and collaborate with members of Congress.

Finally, for some of my students, it can be difficult even painful to consider the negative impacts of U.S. actions. To invite these conversations, I assign first-person accounts. Two pieces that have most successfully opened up discussions are Ariel Dorman’s “The Other 911” and Andrew Lam’s “Letter from a Vietnamese to an Iraqi Refugee.”

MCM: There are plenty of vivid primary sources that would grab almost any undergraduate’s attention. Henry Kissinger’s 1975 “Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy” speech and Jimmy Carter’s 1977 Notre Dame commencement address, for example, highlight different ideas about the place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy, and could set up a classroom debate about the meaning of détente and the role of human rights in the end of the Cold War.

Alternatively, one could assign a vivid work of narrative history. Philippe Sands’s EastWest Street, about the Nuremberg trials, and Gary Bass’s The Blood Telegram, about the Bangladesh War of Independence, turn abstract concepts into gripping stories. By turns tragic and inspiring, they demonstrate that the history of human rights involves the highest possible stakes for individuals and entire countries alike.

RS: I should start by noting that my teaching experience is exclusively from teaching human rights history and U.S. foreign relations to non-Americans at Danish and Swedish universities. Moreover, I no longer have teaching obligations in my current position. That being said, I found Clair Apodaca’s Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy: A Paradoxical Legacy to be a good, concise intro level book to U.S. human rights policy for undergraduates. Another good survey, more suitable for graduate students, is Joe Renouard’s Human Rights in American Foreign Policy: From the 1960s to the Soviet Collapse. For those looking to include the UN perspective in their course, I highly recommend Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi’s Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice as the best comprehensive option available. For the broader international historiography of the field, Stefan Ludwig Hoffmann’s take on the genealogies of human rights in his introduction to the edited volume Human Rights in the Twentieth Century remains a good starting point. For the historiography on human rights in U.S. foreign relations, Sarah Snyder’s “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review,” published in Passport, offers a succinct overview. Finally, any of the books mentioned under question 6 would be excellent choices for relevant graduate level courses.
I am a professor of American Studies and International Affairs at George Washington University. I grew up in small town North Carolina, where I loved two things: college basketball and the fact that there were worlds-upon-worlds different from my own. This second love led me both to science fiction fandom and (eventually) to grad school in American Studies at Brown University, where I focused on what would eventually become known as the study of the US in the World. My most recent monograph is The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals (2018), and I’m also co-editor (with David Engerman and Max Friedman) of Cambridge History of America and The World, vol. 4 (CUP, 2021), and Global Faith/Worldly Power: Evangelicals Internationalism and US Empire (UNC Press, 2022). I’m on the boards of Diplomatic History and Modern American History, and I live in Silver Spring with my life partner and three spoiled cats.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

- a. Bladerunner (final cut, 1982)
- e. Raised by Wolves (2020-)

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

There have been so many! But the one I remember most is when I was at one of my first job interviews, and I was asked about what interdisciplinarity meant to me. I made some snarky, disparaging comment about how some people think it means “studying both French history and German history.” I’d heard that recently, not thinking where. And somebody said, “Oh, are you talking about our dean? She studies those two!” Yep, I was: I had literally heard the comment that morning. But I did know enough to know that I shouldn’t diss the dean at a job interview! So I made up something entirely unconvincing about how, “no, no, it was a different school.” And quietly prayed to sink into a giant hole in the earth.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Steve Biko, Nawal el Saadawi, Franz Fanon, and Sylvia Wynter. Let’s talk empire, decolonization, liberation, and the meanings of freedom.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

There are so many things I care about, and, historically, most of my donations have gone to groups challenging US foreign policy and/or fighting global economic inequality. But, right now, I’m ready to focus on two crises that must be resolved before we can do much else, so I’d give $240 million to climate change action groups, focusing on both grassroots groups like 350.org and Grassroots International and a few big picture think tanks like Project Drawdown. And $240 million would go to voting rights projects in the US, things like Fair Vote and Black Voters Matter. And then, of course, $10 million to SHAFR, especially to hire more staff and to fund research and conference participation by international scholars, scholars of color, and contingent faculty. The last $10 million would fund people who want to drop out of PhD programs to become artists.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Excellent! I’ll invite all the people I hope to write about in my current project, which looks at how music and literature from the “Third World” circulated in the US in the 1970s and 1980s, inviting projects of solidarity. So, a giant concert with Abdullah Ibrahim, Inti Illimani, Fela Kuti, Marcel Khalife, Los Van Van, Miriam Makeba, Bob Marley, and, for good measure, Americans Carlos Santana, Nina Simone, and Holly Near (who promoted a great deal of Latin American music on her record label).

What are five things on your bucket list?

- Six months of living on Mediterranean beaches, including 4 solid weeks of an eating tour of Turkey
- Quit messing around and really learn Spanish
- A month-long yoga retreat
- Carbon-neutral world tour doing wildlife photography
- Fewer lists

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I always wanted to be an architect, but I have zero capacity to understand architectural drawings – even cross-sections are confusing. So, that dream was smashed early on (though I still engage in architectural house porn via Dwell’s website). Eventually I went to grad school. From there, my original PhD-backup plan was to run a laundry mat/coffee shop. But, in truth, if I weren’t an academic, I think I’d be working at a foundation or nonprofit, hopefully one of the ones I fund with my Powerball winnings.
Dustin Walcher is Sarah’s husband; Dani, Cara, Leila, and Georgia’s parent; a youth soccer coach; a lover of mountains, oceans, and cities; and a historian. He lives in Ashland, Oregon, with his wife and kids, and with their menagerie of dogs, cats, bunnies, guinea pigs, and fish. He is Professor of History & Political Science at Southern Oregon University, and, with Jeffrey F. Taffet, the author of The United States and Latin America: A History with Documents (Routledge, 2017). Additionally, he has published a variety of articles on U.S.-Latin American relations. Dustin is also a host and the co-editor-in-chief of the Historias podcast from the Southeastern Council of Latin American Studies (SECOLAS, https://historiaspodcast.com/).

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

I love movies. Casablanca has to lead my list. Classic film noir is great; Double Indemnity is my favorite from that genre. I’ve been a Quentin Tarantino fan since high school; nobody writes dialog like him. The first two Godfather films are as close as I’ve seen to movie-making perfection.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

My first year on the job market, I had a disastrous interview at the AHA. I joined two interviewers in one of the hotel suites. They both seemed like pleasant people who would have made fine colleagues. But we could not get on the same wavelength. One of them would ask a question, I would provide an answer that clearly sounded reasonable (in my mind at least!), and then they would follow-up in a way that made clear I had missed the point. “Is that all,” is not what you want to hear from your interviewer. It was … painful. Cringy, even. The half hour could not end fast enough for any of us, I’m sure. No, they did not call back.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Only three!! Okay, Jackie Robinson to talk about politics, the state of race relations, society, how southern California has changed over the decades, and, of course, sports. Eva Perón, for her towering presence and charisma, and her political instincts. I’m tempted to include John Quincy Adams because I remain in awe of the way his mind worked, but I’m afraid that his personality might be less than ideally suited for a dinner party. So, let’s bring Ernest Hemingway instead.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Winning a $500 million Powerball equates to freedom. Certainly, I would take care of my extended family, buy a comfortable house, and carefully scrutinize impactful charities to which to contribute. But really the win would mean that I could fill my days with the activities that bring me the most fulfillment. It would mean that my bucket list could quickly become my reality. It would mean more time for reading, writing, and adventures with my wife and kids.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Much like films, I love music. One of my favorite memories that I share with my wife came while we were planning the music for our wedding reception. We sat down for what turned out to be the better part of the night and prepared an extensive email to the phenomenal DJ who ultimately worked the party. My festival will be eclectic. Pearl Jam, Bob Dylan, Tom Waits, and Louis Armstrong are required. After that, I imagine a good deal of ‘90s music generally, as well as a healthy dose of classic rock. The mood of the day would dictate what else went in.

What are five things on your bucket list?

Travel much more extensively, to as many places as possible; learn to sail expertly; watch soccer matches at the Camp Nou and la Bombonera; significantly expand and improve my cooking skills; learn to ski, at least basically.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I don’t think professional athlete was ever especially realistic, though it would have been nice. The real answer is I’d probably be an attorney. I seriously considered law school as I finished my undergraduate degree. It would have been incredible to have tried my hand at some kind of filmmaking. I can imagine an alternate universe where I worked in politics and policy as a practitioner. However, most days I’m grateful that I get to do what I do for a living.
I grew up in 1980s Tel Aviv. I, too, wore a fanny pack. Majoring in film in high school gave me an appetite for old movies—which were my entry point to U.S. history. At 18 I was drafted and spent my mandatory three years in a non-combat film unit. This is where my biography diverges from that of most Americans I met. With hindsight I realize that historicizing that difference and the significance Americans and Israelis attributed to it, was part of what drove me to write my first book, *Israel in the American Mind* (2018). I’m currently writing a cultural history examining the rise and fall of the citizen-soldier order in the U.S., and I guess you can trace this one back too. But at 19 I was mostly hanging on to Kurt Vonnegut and William Saroyan and trying to get to discharge day. Academia was so much more pleasant than the army and studying history in Tel Aviv university was a treat. I met my wife Anna during a semester abroad in Venice; the first thing we did together was a presentation on fascist intellectuals. In 2007 I started graduate school at the University of Chicago. I enjoyed that adventure tremendously. I spent two years on a postdoc at Northwestern University, and since 2015 I’ve been working at the University of York, UK. We have two children (Ben, 9, and Ella, 6), and my main ambition is to make them laugh.

**What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?**

Films in rough chronology; Howard Hawks’ *His Girl Friday*, Federico Fellini’s *8 ½*, Ephraim Kishon’s *Blaumlich Canal*, Roman Polanski’s *Chinatown*, Robert Altman’s *The Long Goodbye*, Elaine May’s *Mikey and Nicky*, Pedro Almodovar’s *Volver*, and Emad Burnat’s *Five Broken Cameras*. TV: Tina Fey is a genius. Larry David is also a genius. The first *Twin Peaks* series was unique.

**What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?**

I do not get embarrassed very easily which is useful for a long-time foreigner who keeps making basic grammatical errors in English. My tendency to sing in professional settings is probably unusual. I sang a full minute of a Randy Newman during my orals (seemed like an effective way to run the clock). Students in my classes are often subjected to a man with a thick Hebrew accent giving spontaneous renditions of Beastie Boys or Loretta Lynn.

**If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?**

Dinner should be had with friends! But for our purposes I’ll mention two admirable people followed by the writer who made me laugh the most. The Polish Dr Janusz Korczak (teacher, paediatrician, author) ran an orphanage for Jewish children in Warsaw in the 1930s. When the Germans sent the children to the Treblinka extermination camp Korczak was offered, repeatedly, to be spared due to his celebrity status. Korczak insisted to lead the children to Treblinka, where he died. Aida Toma-Saliman (a current Palestinian Knesset member for the Joint list) is a fierce fighter for equality and freedom in Israel-Palestine, as well as for women’s and workers’ rights. The sharpness and integrity of Toma-Saliman and her allies should inspire hope and activism. Lastly, I’d invite Czech novelist Jaroslav Hašek. The Good Soldier Svejk is my favourite book for its hilariously grotesque (and apt) depiction of the military condition. Micro-dosing three pages a day got me through the early pandemic. It still ended abruptly because Hašek died before finishing it. So he should come back and tell me more.

**What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?**

Contributions to embattled human rights organizations and Palestinian civil society organizations would make a difference in people’s lives. I’ll spend what’s left on setting my kids up for life, getting an apartment with a terrace in Rome, and eating all the pasta. People do not appreciate the difficulty of not living in Italy after you already lived there for a bit.

**You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?**

In 1973 Joni Mitchell and Israeli legend Arik Einstein would have cooked up quite the set together. For the off (off) chance anyone is reading this for Hebrew music recommendations; Mati Caspi, Shalom Hanoch, and Yoni Rechter. But for the festival the people I really want to see are the giants of Brazilian music: Dorival Caymmi, Caetano Veloso, Maria Bethânia, Novos Baianos, Jorge Ben Jor, Astrud Gilberto, Milton Nascimento, Djavan, Cartola, Chico Buarque and Antônio Carlos Jobim. I have no clue what they’re singing about but I spend most of my evenings listening to them.

**What are five things on your bucket list?**

A lot of travel plans! I’d like to visit Brazil (I’ll need to get there for that festival anyway), and Japan. I want to wander around Istanbul and Lisbon. I want to learn Arabic and visit Cairo. But get me to that apartment in Rome and we’ll take it from there.

**What would you be doing if you were not an academic?**

I like to try to hold the attention of an audience to something I think is worthwhile. Right now, as a historian, I get to do that on a salary, which is rare. But if the jig is up, and I could afford it, I’d try writing a graphic novel. This first career was just the build-up!
I grew up in a small town in Germany close to the Dutch border. In retrospect it was a good place to grow up, but as a teenager I couldn’t wait to get out. My desire to travel took me first to London and eventually to the United States, where a one-year fellowship at Northwestern University turned into a PhD and eventually an academic career in the U.S. From the Midwest I ventured to the Pacific Northwest, New England, and New Jersey and eventually landed in Philadelphia. Along the way I raised three kids, published two monographs (GIs and Germans, 2003; The Politics of Peace, 2019); co-edited two volumes; and, together with Akira Iriye wrote a book, International History: A Cultural Approach (2022). And for the past two years I have greatly enjoyed co-editing Diplomatic History. My professional interests converge around studying cross-cultural encounters, the Cold War, and cultural globalization. Curiosity about foreign cultures has also informed my personal life as well with frequent travels back and forth across the Atlantic (including two sabbaticals), always with kids in tow. I regard as my proudest achievement that they feel as much at home in Germany as in the United States.

**What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?**

I don’t really have favorites, or rather my favorites change over time. But over the years, I do return to certain movies again and again, among them Dr. Strangelove is one of them. I liked it so much that I designed a class around it. Another favorite is The Grand Budapest Hotel. It’s fun to watch and so clever. And an “ancient” favorite of mine has been Out of Africa, which today would probably not inspire me nearly as much as it did in the mid 1980s. But it stuck with me through the decades.

**What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?**

I think my most anxiety-producing professional moment was the first time I ever had to give a lecture. I was completely over-prepared and probably made every rookie mistake there is in giving a lecture: too many dates, names, and other random facts; rapid fire delivery; with a voice that maybe carried through to the third row… you name it. Despite having prepared 6-8 single-spaced pages (at least I think there were that many), my delivery was so fast that I had several minutes to spare at the end. I do not remember all the details, but I do still recall the feeling of panic that gripped me at the beginning and at the end.

**If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?**

Norman Cousins, Hannah Arendt, Leo Tolstoy. Norman Cousins, because of his politics and because he seemed like a genuinely nice guy; Hannah Arendt, because I want to ask her so many questions; and Leo Tolstoy, because of the stories he could tell, and because I want to talk to him about his ideas about the writing of history in War and Peace.

**What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?**

I’d go to sleep and would try to forget about the whole thing.

**You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?**

I am going to dodge this one, because, if I had an unlimited budget and a time machine, organizing a music festival would be the last thing I’d want to do, that’s for sure.

**What are five things on your bucket list?**

Take a hot air balloon ride; visit Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Namibia; fly in an air glider over the fjords of Norway; get on my bicycle in my driveway and ride it all the way to Monterrey, California; retire.

**What would you be doing if you were not an academic?**

I would be working as a journalist, which had actually been my original career goal. Even as I was finishing my PhD, I was sure I’d return to journalism. Becoming an academic was really Plan B. All in all, I am pretty happy with Plan B, though.
I grew up in a historically minded household and made at best modest efforts to resist the appeal of studying it seriously. The study of foreign relations appealed to me because of its versatility. A project encompassing much of the decolonizing world in the early 1960s ticked all the right boxes, while Mel Leffler offered steadfast support and sage advice throughout.

I submitted my dissertation a few days before Lehman Brothers imploded and spent the next few years moving about: to an Ohio State postdoc, visiting positions at Old Dominion University and Colgate, and – most exotically – another postdoc in Sydney, Australia. My wandering days came to an end in 2012, when I accepted my current position at Stanford.

Perhaps pandemic conditions will force me to rethink this, but I’m happiest with deep archival projects. I’m presently revising a manuscript on the U.S.-Afghan relationship up to 1979; I was lucky to have completed essential research for it before March 2020, but still pine for another trip or two.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

I should use this space to laud Boardwalk Empire, which I still find highly underrated. For me, it was this unbelievably rich, nuanced, often hilarious depiction of the Prohibition era. Early exposure to Mystery Science Theater 3000 influenced my sense of humor.

The Killing Fields had a big impact on me when I was young and is still, arguably, the best film about the U.S. wars in Indochina. Character is a quirky, oddly moving Dutch film about the benefits and costs of persistence. 12:08 East of Bucharest is an absolute treasure – it seems to get funnier with each viewing. Fletch was psychic balm across the last few years.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

My first SHA FR followed a flight across the Pacific, and then another across the continent. The first would have left me jet-lagged, but the second was the true calamity, as mass delays and a run on Dulles-area rental cars and hotels forced me to attempt sleep in the airport. Days later, as SHA FR convened (ironically not that far away, in Chantilly), I was still exhausted and kept conking out at random moments, during other people’s panels. “Where have you been, Rob?” Mel asked at one point.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

After my first book, I think I’m contractually or at least ethically obligated to give Bob Komer a slot. Otherwise – separate event! – I’d book Franklin Roosevelt and Mikhail Gorbachev and quietly take notes.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Thinks: With that kind of money, one could actually fund NARA decently for a year or two . . .

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Who am I to interfere with Bill and Ted? Well, maybe I’d reunite Tom Petty and the Heartbreakers and give them free reign.

What are five things on your bucket list?

1. The Police in concert √√
2. Cubs World Series title √
3. The Trans-Siberian Railroad (TBD?)
5. Proficiency in one Slavic language

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I probably would have had a go at writing novels? At this point, it’s hard to imagine another path.
On January 8, 2022, SHAFR announced a number of awards at its luncheon at the American Historical Association conference in New Orleans. These awards recognize some of the best emerging scholars in our field. We are now happy to share those announcements with the rest of our community.

The Graduate Student Grants & Fellowships Committee—Sam Lebovic (chair), Kate Burlingham, and Hiroshi Kitamura—made the following awards to more than a dozen graduate students:

**The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant**

**Ayelet Marron** is a Ph.D. student at Rutgers University-New Brunswick, working under the direction of Jennifer Mittelstadt. Her dissertation is entitled “Bargaining Under Fire: The Laws of the Market in American-occupied WWII North Africa.” Drawing on economic anthropology, legal studies, and gender analysis, Marron’s work explores how American, French, and Maghrebi actors negotiated power and reshaped ideas of economic sovereignty and citizenship through everyday acts of exchange.

**The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship**

**Graeme Mack** is a Ph.D. student at the University of California, San Diego, working under the direction of Mark Hanna. His dissertation is entitled “Seaborne Sovereignties: Pacific Maritime Trade and the Origins of American Imperial Expansion, 1787-1848.” His project considers trade routes and ports far beyond North America to argue that American imperial expansion was tethered to Pacific commodities, trade networks, markets, and forms of labor.

**The Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport-Walter LaFeber Dissertation Fellowship**

**Eri Kitada** is a Ph.D. student at Rutgers University-New Brunswick, working under the supervision of Jennifer Mittelstadt. Her dissertation, entitled “Intimate and Intertwined Settler Colonialisms: Filipino Women in the U.S.-Japanese Imperial Formations, 1903-1956,” explores the nexus of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms through study of a Japanese settler community in the Philippines under U.S. rule. Kitada’s multilingual research will highlight the interplay of race, gender, and land in relation to overlapping empires and settler colonialisms across the Pacific.

**Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants**

**Kimberly Beaudreau** is a Ph.D. student at the University of Illinois at Chicago, working under the direction of Adam Goodman. Her dissertation is entitled “Refuge in Name Only: The Specter of the Economic Migrant and the Decline of the American Refugee and Asylum System, 1975-2000.” Her project investigates how the executive and legislatives branches of the U.S. government use the economic migrant category to prevent border crossers from reaching the United States, denying these migrants from claiming refuge and asylum. She explores how the categories of “refugee” and “economic migrant” are continuously produced and contested through foreign relations, domestic politics, state practice, and daily lives.

**Amy Fallas** is a Ph.D. student at the University of California, Santa Barbara, working under the direction of Sherene Seikaly. Her dissertation is entitled “The Gospel of Wealth: Charity and the Making of Modern Egypt, 1879-1939.” Tracing the intellectual, economic, media, and political networks of charity work across multiple empires and nation-states, Fallas’ dissertation will provide a new account of the relationship between international charity and the remaking of social life.

**Dexter Fergie** is a Ph.D. student at Northwestern University, working under the supervision of Daniel Immerwahr. His dissertation is entitled “Headquartering the World: American Power and the Space of Global Governance, 1944-1980.” Building on the “spatial turn” in the study of the U.S. in the world, Fergie studies the political, diplomatic, social, and cultural influence that emerged from the siting of the United Nations in New York City, as the U.S. pursued global governance at the height of the “American Century.”
Christopher Hulshof is a Ph.D. student at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, working under the direction of Alfred W. McCoy. His dissertation is entitled “The Central Java Connection: The Alliance that Ushered in the Suharto Regime, 1960-66.” Relying on ethnography and archival research, this project offers a fresh look at U.S.-Indonesian relations by examining a group of entrepreneurs, scholars, and military figures in Central Java and the politics behind their alliance with the United States on the eve of Suharto’s seizure of power.

Muhammed Cihad Kubat is a Ph.D. student affiliated with Bilkent University and Inonu University, working under the direction of Kenneth Welsbrode. His dissertation is entitled “Turkey’s Participation in the Korean War and the Making of a NATO Ally.” An international history drawing on archival sources in Britain, Korea, Turkey, and the United States, Kubat’s study will provide a new account of Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. during the Cold War.

Miriam Pensack is a Ph.D. student at New York University, working under the supervision of Ada Ferrer. Her dissertation, entitled “Registers of Sovereignty: The Struggle for State and Self in Cold War Latin America,” is a study of the divergent histories of U.S. military bases in Cuba and the Panama Canal Zone in the late twentieth century. Combining the methods of diplomatic and social history, Pensack’s study will provide new insight into the malleability of U.S. empire as well as the meaning and limits of sovereignty and self-determination in Latin America.

Emily Sneff is a Ph.D. student at the College of William and Mary, working under the supervision of Karin Wulf. Her dissertation, entitled “When Independence Was Declared,” explores the transnational circulation of the Declaration of Independence as a text and a news item. Combining the methods of book history with a microhistorical analysis of diplomatic relations, Sneff’s project will provide new insight into the histories of independence, identity, and sovereignty across the Atlantic World.

Joshua Stern is a Ph.D. student at Temple University, working under the direction of Alan McPherson. His dissertation, entitled “U.S. Labor Intervention in Latin America: The Politics of Class Harmony and the American Institute for Free Labor Development,” is a relational history of U.S. labor institutions and the Chilean labor movement. In analyzing how the principles of free trade unionism were promoted to Chilean workers and students, this bilingual study will reveal the active involvement of labor in the U.S. modernization program and the nodes of hegemonic politics that shaped the Global South.

Adam Stone is a Ph.D. student at Rutgers University-New Brunswick, working under the direction of David Foglesong. His dissertation is entitled “Women Citizen Activists and the End of the Cold War: Soviet and Western Transnational Connections, 1980-1989.” His project looks at the work of peace activists and citizen diplomats, their political rhetoric, and their drive to end the deployment of new nuclear missiles. It provides a new perspective on these movements by centering women instead of the Cold War’s traditional “great men.”

Shang Yasuda is a Ph.D. student at the University of Pennsylvania, working under the direction of Eiichiro Azuma. Her dissertation is entitled, “Soldiering through Time and Space: Han Taiwanese and Indigenous Servicemen under the Japanese and U.S. Empires, 1930s-1970s.” Her project looks at Taiwanese servicemen who moved through two different empires to show the persistence of imperial systems and lingering power dynamics that continued to dictate the lives of Taiwanese veterans well after the Second World War.

The Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship

This year’s Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship Committee—Heather Dichter, Katherine Marino, and Lorenz Lüthi—announced that Nora Lessersohn of University College, London, is this year’s winner. The committee lauded her exciting and ambitious nineteenth-century project that demands the knowledge of Western Armenian, a language infrequently taught and learned by scholars.
William Appleman Williams Emerging Scholar Research Grants

This year’s Williams Emerging Scholar committee—Joe Eaton (chair), Karin Miller, and Jay Sarkar—recognize two emerging scholars in the field this year:

Kyle Romero’s book manuscript, entitled “Moving People: Refugee Politics, Foreign Aid, and the Emergence of American Humanitarianism in the Twentieth Century,” represents a major contribution to the growing fields of U.S. and international refugee history as well as histories of humanitarian politics and governance. Based on impressive archival research, his work reconstructs the decisive involvement of American actors and U.S.-based institutions, especially Near East Relief and the American Relief Administration, in key refugee relief and transportation projects in the interwar period.

Kuan-Jen Chen’s book manuscript, entitled “The Establishment of a Maritime Order in Cold War East Asia amongst China, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, 1945-79,” examines the rise of the Cold War order in East Asia and the Pacific from the late 1940s to the 1970s. He tells this story not simply from an American perspective (which dominates the usual narrative), but from Asian perspectives as well (specifically Japanese but also Chinese and Taiwanese).

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lecture Prize

After careful consideration of a fiercely competitive field, this year’s Bernath Lecture Prize committee (Brooke L. Blower (chair), Naoko Shibusawa, and Adriane Lentz-Smith) have selected Professor Oli Charbonneau of the University of Glasgow to receive the 2022 Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize. Praised by nominators as an innovative, creative, and highly productive scholar and teacher, Charbonneau (Ph.D. University of Western Ontario, 2016) is the author of numerous essays and articles as well as Civilizational Imperatives: Americans, Moros, and the Colonial World (Cornell University Press, 2020, Philippine edition forthcoming). By focusing on the mechanics of inter-imperial exchanges and the everyday administration of Mindanao-Sulu—and tacking impressively between local, regional, and global scales—Charbonneau’s research sets new conceptual standards and new analytical trajectories for the study of U.S. Empire.
SHAFR Council Meeting Minutes  
January 5, 2022 via Zoom

Present: Laura Belmonte (chair), Shaun Armstead, Emily Conroy-Krutz, Ann Heiss, Kristin Hoganson, Daniel Immerwahr, Kyle Longley, Sarah Miller-Davenport, Andrew Preston, Lauren Turek, Vanessa Walker, Karine Walther, Molly Wood, Kelsey Zavelo, and Amy Sayward (ex officio).

Attending: Faith Bagley, Petra Goedde, Anne Foster, and Trish Thomas.

The meeting started at 9:32am ET.

Introductory matters

Laura Belmonte initiated introductions of everyone present.

Amy Sayward reviewed motions that were passed since the last meeting:

- Approval of June 2021 minutes
- Approval of having the “Joint Statement on Legislative Efforts to Restrict Education about Racism and American History” sent to membership for a vote (13-1), which was approved
- Appointment of Brian Etheridge as Electronic Communications Editor (14-0)
- Appointment of Roham Alvandi to Passport Editorial Board (13-0-1)

Belmonte passed a motion of thanks to those rotating off of Council, committee, and task force assignments:

- Sarah Snyder, chair of the Nominating Committee
- Kristin Hoganson, chair of the Ways & Means Committee
- Max Paul Friedman, member of the Diplomatic History Board of Editors
- Erez Manela, member of the Diplomatic History Board of Editors
- Joy Schulz, member of the Diplomatic History Board of Editors
- Kelly McFarland, member of the Passport Editorial Advisory Board
- Douglas Selvage, member of the Committee on Historical Documentation
- Ronald Williams, chair of the Committee on Minority Historians
- Augusta Dell’Omo, member of the Public Engagement Committee
- Kaeten Mistry, member of the Public Engagement Committee
- Luke Nichter, member of the Public Engagement Committee
- Maurice Jr. M. Labelle, member of the Committee on Women in SHAFR
- Meredith Oyen, member of the Committee on Women in SHAFR
- Nicole Phelps, member of the Committee on Women in SHAFR
- Mary Ann Heiss, chair of the Conference Committee
- Elisabeth Leake, member of the Conference Committee
- Ilaria Scaglia, member of the Membership Committee
- Shaul Mitelpunkt, co-chair of the Teaching Committee
- Aaron O’Connell, co-chair of the Teaching Committee
- Brooke Blower, chair of the Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize Committee
- Sam Lebovic, chair of the Graduate Student Grants & Fellowships Committee
- Roham Alvandi, chair of the Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship Committee
- Heather Dichter, interim member of the Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship Committee
- Joseph Eaton, chair of the William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants Committee
- Melanie McAlister, chair of the Development Committee

Financial matters

Sayward reviewed the end-of-fiscal-year financial reports. The fiscal year runs from November 1 to October 31. SHAFR had a healthy surplus at the end of this year, one that may or may not persist, due to a payment over and above scheduled royalties from Oxford University Press and lower expenses for the on-line conference. As a result, no money was withdrawn from the endowment this past fiscal year.

Andrew Preston reviewed recommendations from the Ways and Means Committee. Future expenditures on the long-term projections report were projected based on a 2% inflation rate, which may not be accurate. The committee also recommended to raise the cost of a life membership to $1500, which is higher than the $1400 rate suggested by the Membership Committee, a “round” number, and equal to 25 years at the current regular rate of $60. The motion from the Ways & Means Committee was approved unanimously.

Council reviewed the Development Committee’s report. Sayward responded that she was trying to figure out how to streamline the donation process as part of renewal, which is currently a two-step process. Donations will also be solicited during the conference registration process. Kristin Hoganson recommended that SHAFR continue to reach out to life members for donations, especially since they do not receive the same renewal communications.
Conference matters

Emily Conroy-Krutz and Daniel Immerwahr presented their report as Program Committee co-chairs. The 2022 SHAFR Conference will have both virtual and in-person components, and following the conference, Council will likely need to have a larger discussion about the role of virtual components in future meetings, which seem important to the membership. Both components are separated in terms of both time and format, with the goal of encouraging more engagement and less attrition. Sayward added that having the virtual platform, Pheedloop, in place allows for a lot of flexibility in case the in-person conference needs to be canceled due to pandemic or hurricane. That flexibility is also increased by having a campus conference rather than a hotel conference, which includes far easier cancelation terms.

Sayward reviewed the proposal for registration rates that she had drafted, which was based primarily on the income figure in the budget. The in-person rate includes registration for the virtual component and was the higher rate. However, the Ways & Means Committee suggested a significantly higher rate for the virtual component, which would reflect the value of the virtual conference, would better reflect the degree to which Council is subsidizing this portion of the conference, and would reduce the possibility that virtual components could erode hotel-room-nights in the future. Additionally, a higher rate would bring SHAFR closer to the rates of similarly situated organizations. As a result, the Ways & Means Committee had suggested that the early-bird virtual conference rate could start at $30 or perhaps even a higher rate and still be accessible to members. Council discussion emphasized that there needed to be a discounted rate for lower-income categories either way. Additionally, some argued that the virtual conference potentially has less to offer to graduate students, as there are some things they are just not getting in this format. Having a low or free registration rate allows others an easy way to see what SHAFR is like. Immerwahr clarified that there will be significant parts of the program delivered in the virtual format, including plenaries, state-of-the-field roundtables, and lightning rounds for presenting in-process research.

Kyle Longley made a motion for a $50 regular virtual rate with $10 rate for grad students. Belmonte suggested adding first time attendees and contingent faculty to the $10 rate and Longley agreed. Molly Wood seconded the motion, which passed 11-3-0. Karine Walther then made a motion to add a $30 early-bird virtual registration fee, Conroy Krutz seconded, and the motion passed unanimously.

Sayward discussed the hotel bloc for the 2022 Conference in New Orleans. We will have half of the typical room block, using the same hotel that we had previously booked for the 2020 conference (where we still have a $14,000 deposit on account). SHAFR will also have a space in a hotel with continental breakfast as people to wait for the shuttle busses to the Tulane campus. We will also have dormitory rooms available on the Tulane campus. She and Belmonte will be visiting the campus during the AHA meeting, accompanied by Lindsey Harris, our on-site conference assistant.

Sayward discussed the current Conference Coordinator search. Amanda Bundy has stepped down due to other professional responsibilities, but have established a search committee and have distributed the post. The deadline for applications is the end of January with the hope of having the person start March 1. Bundy will work through that date, and Paige Mitchell will continue to manage the online portion of the conference.

Hoganson raised the question about where we were in the process of transitioning the Toronto conference to a campus model, and Sayward stated that this is still an on-going discussion without firm plans at this point.

Membership matters

Walther highlighted the CCRT (Code of Conduct Reporting Team) report, thanking the Ways & Means Committee for its positive recommendation on providing the graduate student members of the team with a per diem and reimbursement of travel expenses. She suggested that the CCRT have staggered terms like the other committees for continuity sake. There was some discussion about when those terms should end, with January emerging as the preference so that established members will be available for SHAFR's AHA events, new members can be trained before the June conference, and the team will have sufficient time to write its report and wind up its business after the June meeting. Walther asked about updates for the Sanctions and Appeals Committee; there being none, Sayward said that she would follow up on those before the next meeting.

The motion from the Ways & Means Committee to provide CCRT graduate students with financial support to attend the conference was approved unanimously (14-0-0).

Publication matters

Anne Foster and Petra Goedde, editors of Diplomatic History, joined the meeting to discuss their report. The pandemic has not so far slowed things down. Submissions are good for now, but they will keep an eye on the long term. There has been an increase in the number of submissions from men and senior scholars, but they were concerned to see a decline in submissions from junior scholars. They elaborated on their work on their concept series, which will have a mix of junior and senior scholars. They also expressed some concern that the typesetting done in India experienced initial disruption from COVID, but this situation has evolved and deepened, with new errors being introduced throughout the type-setting process. Not necessarily an OUP or DH issue, but with the production company.

Trish Thomas, Oxford University Press editor emeritus, joined meeting, reviewing the report provided to SHAFR. In relation to the production company issues mentioned by the editors, she stated that other journals are having similar
difficulties, that Oxford should do better, and that this is not something that should happen. Thomas highlighted that usage of Diplomatic History was higher than last year, with an average of 6,900 reads per month. She contrasted the list of “Top 10 articles” with the impact factor to highlight that the factor does not account well for the long shelf-life of historical journals. JSTOR is another route for DH content, but it has a five-year moving pay-wall; EBSCO has a one-year moving pay-wall. Thomas highlighted the good promotion of special virtual issue. She concluded by stating that Brian Giblin will be the new short-term contact for editorial issues related to DH until a permanent appointment can be made.

Sayward asked a question about missing issues of Diplomatic History and securing back issues for those who have not received those issues. Thomas suggested the best route for resolving such issues. In further discussion around production challenges, it was suggested that OUP should perhaps consider qualitative measures such as this—in addition to the quantitative measure of meeting deadlines, since these errors have resulted in more time-consuming review of type-set materials by both authors and the editorial staff. The discussion ended with a quick review of the UKRI open-access update provided by Thomas and with Longley stating that his task force is keeping an eye on these issues. After this, Thomas, Foster, and Goedde left the meeting.

Council then reviewed the report from Alan McPherson, editor of The SHAFR Guide. The updated version of the Guide will be completed before the June conference, and with that, SHAFR has met all of its contractual obligations to Brill. Sayward stated that Council members will need to think about whether they want to continue with Brill and whether there will be a fourth edition of the Guide.

Sayward stated that she is urging the Web Committee to put together a call for proposals for the new website platform, which needs to be in place by November. The committee chair has promised a report shortly after the meeting, which would be distributed via email.

Membership matters (continued)

Council returned to the membership matters listed on the agenda. In June, Council had talked about revising the Williams award, recognizing that members within six years of the Ph.D. may not be faculty. As a result, Council had suggested broadening the language, and the William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Award Committee had suggested the language be simplified to “members within six years of the Ph.D.” It was also suggested that title be shifted to “Emerging Scholars” rather than “Junior Faculty.” The motion from the Williams Award Committee was approved unanimously (14-0-0).

Council then turned to the report of the Task Force on Internationalisation. Council discussion highlighted that there may be some need to create accommodation for members from countries experiencing extreme financial hardship. In terms of the suggestion of surveying all “international” members of SHAFR, Preston suggested that it be based on non-U.S. scholars, as other criteria is not readily available in the information that SHAFR collects.

The Task Force on Internationalisation motion that the Program Committee should include at least one international scholar was approved unanimously (14-0-0). The recommendation from the task force that all future SHAFR conferences should include virtual components raised a number of questions. It was suggested that Council might want to have the task force draft a more specific proposal, but there was also the indication that some vagueness might better allow flexibility for the future. Finally, since this decision has financial implications, it was decided that Council was not ready to vote on this motion.

The committee formerly known as the Committee on Minority Historians requested a change of name to the Committee on Access, Representation, and Equity, using the acronym CARE. Council voted unanimously in favor of this motion from the committee (14-0-0). There was a short discussion about the possibility of having some type of “town hall” that would be hosted by CARE, the Committee on Women in SHAFR, the CCRT, and the Task Force on the Jobs Crisis.

Shaun Armstead provided an oral report from Graduate Student Committee that focused on its on-going efforts related to the mentorship program.

Personnel matters

Council discussed the recommendations from the new Electronic Communications Editor, Brian Etheridge, for his editorial board appointments. Sayward stated that the first two recommendations were meant to focus on two SHAFR members who have played a sustained role in promoting SHAFR’s public engagement efforts, Kimber Quinney and Kelly McFarland. These appointments are not meant to establish a two-person board but to establish a foundation for future growth, especially with the Web Committee’s membership all expiring with the completion of the website transition later this year. Council voted unanimously in favor of these two recommendations for appointments to the Electronic Communications Editorial Board (14-0-0).

Council then discussed a pay increase for SHAFR’s IT Director, George Fujii. The Ways & Means Committee moved for a $1,000 addition to his base pay as a recognition of increasing inflation as well as the excellent job that Fujii does in serving the SHAFR community. This motion was approved unanimously (13-0-0).

Council then discussed the renewal of the Passport editor’s term, which was requested by Andrew Johns, who was selected on the basis of a national search just over four years ago. Sayward noted that this would follow the pattern
established for the editors of *Diplomatic History* and for the executive director. Preston made a motion to reappoint Johns for an additional five-year term, but in subsequent discussion it was suggested that in these other two cases that there was a formal review process that preceded the renewal and that this was practice that should also be followed. Molly Wood asked what would be involved in such an evaluation, and Preston suggested modeling it on the immediately past process for recommending renewal of the executive director—the current president would chair a performance review committee along with the other past presidents serving on Council, and Johns would be asked to draft a 1-2 page self-evaluation and would meet with the committee. Then, the committee would make a recommendation to Council on renewing the contract. Council requested a draft of this procedure be circulated to Council and that Council members could also forward their input to the committee. The motion to renew was therefore tabled for further clarification of the process.

There followed a general discussion about the practice of having a review in the fourth year, a renewal without an open search, and then retirement at the end of the second term. Some suggested that an additional term might be preferable for the editorial positions, but likely not for the executive director position.

*There being no new business, the meeting adjourned at 12:48pm ET.*
Professional Notes

Christopher Nichols has been appointed as the Wayne Woodrow Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Professor of History at The Ohio State University.

Kaete O’Connell has been appointed as SHAFR’s Conference Coordinator.

Dustin Walcher has been appointed as Director of the Division of Social Sciences at Southern Oregon University.

SHAFR Renewal Policy
Approved by Council, March 2, 2022

SHAFR Council expressed its desire at its January 2022 to establish a written policy on the renewal process of its editors of Diplomatic History and Passport and of its Executive Director—positions that especially benefit from a long-term tenure and a cordial transition of responsibilities.

So in line with past practices, Council policy moving forward will be that for each of these positions,

• The initial term of service will be five years;

• Council will undertake a review of the job performance of that position in the third year of the term; this review will include
  • a self-evaluation,
  • a committee evaluation, which can include input from those that this position interacts with regularly, and
  • an affirmation from the supporting institution(s) – if applicable -- that they are willing to continue the arrangement for an additional term, if offered.

• The results of that job performance review will be shared with Council and with the position (so that improvements can be made as needed and affirmation can be provided as appropriate);

• Council will then decide whether to extend the position for an additional five-year term or to open a search to fill the position. In line with past practice, Council can also choose to renew for a shorter period and then extend to the additional five-year term contingent upon further study and/or requested improvement in job performance.

• In the ninth year of a position’s tenure, Council should conduct a national search to fill this position; leaving the tenth year to ensure a smooth transition of responsibilities, records, and other materials essential to proper operation. Council may, however, choose to offer anyone in one of these positions the opportunity to compete in a national search to fill this position.

• These provisions will be incorporated into any contract or Memorandum of Agreement signed between these positions and SHAFR.

Council considered the advantages and disadvantages of amending the by-laws to reflect this policy, but a majority believed that publication of the policy in the Council minutes and in Passport was sufficient.

Recent Books of Interest

Allinson, Jamie. The Age of Counter-Revolution: States and Revolutions in the Middle East. (Cambridge, 2022).
Békés, Csaba. Hungary’s Cold War: International Relations from the End of World War II to the Fall of the Soviet Union.


Cunningham, Benjamin. *The Lian: How a Double Agent in the CIA Became the Cold War's Last Honest Man*. (PublicAffairs, 2022).


Hardy, Alfredo Toro. *America's Two Cold Wars: From Hegemony to Decline*. (Palgrave, 2022).


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Lawrence Gelfand-Armand Rappaport-Walter LaFeber Dissertation Fellowship Report
Rifling through manila folders in reading rooms around the world this year was not only a delightful manifestation of my
most romantic notions of archival research, but also provided clarity to my dissertation research in a way that secondhand
literature has been unable to match.
The Lawrence Gelfand-Armand Rappaport-Walter LaFeber Fellowship from SHAfR supported travel from my home in
Berlin, Germany, to visit archives that had remained off-limits in the early stages of my project. During the research trips,
I was able to collect hundreds of pages of crucial source material from Palo Alto and Oakland, California, as well as
Washington, DC and Lisbon, Portugal, in both English and Portuguese.
My research examines the period during Portugal’s colonial wars from 1961 to 1974 and how both the Estado Novo regime
and Lusophone-African anticolonialists mounted campaigns to win American public favor for their visions of a political
future. It explores how different social groups in the United States – a superpower and close NATO ally of the Lisbon
dictatorship – used ideas from the Portuguese Empire about race relations and theories of social organization to support
varying agendas in local contexts. In particular, my work looks at how Black power movements, white leftist civil rights
campaigners, and far-right groups employed ideas seeded by the Portuguese dictatorship or well-travelled and charismatic revolutionary intellectuals including Amilcar Cabral of Portuguese Guinea, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique, and Agostinho Neto of Angola.

At the Hoover Institution archives, I consulted the Richard V. Allen papers, which provided insight into his work with Potomac International, a public relations firm that worked in the United States on behalf of Portugal from 1973 to 1975. I also consulted the Radical Right and New Left collections at Hoover. The former included insights into how various conservative groups were thinking about Southern Africa. The latter held extensive materials on the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), a U.S. organization which worked to legitimize African liberation movements, as well as the Black Panther Party’s encounters and exchanges with Lusophone-African nationalists. In the African and Angola subject collections I found additional information on the ACOA’s engagement with Portugal, as well as information on the Gulf Oil Boycott organized to undercut Portuguese colonialism and Agostinho Neto’s international travels and communication with American groups. The Guinea-Bissau Subject Collection included information on Amilcar Cabral’s travels and how his ideas were picked up in Black academia, as well as PAIGC propaganda and outreach efforts. At the African American Museum in Oakland’s non-circulating reference library, the Ronald V. Dellums Congressional Papers provided background on the Black caucus and its engagement with foreign affairs in the early 1970s.

In Washington, DC’s Library of Congress Manuscript Division, the A. Philip Randolph papers included materials related to Black Americans’ relationship to Africa generally. More importantly, the collection included details on the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa – one of the key case studies in my research – when a group of leading civil rights figures came together in 1962 in an effort to assert a united Black foreign policy, including demanding justice for Africans living under Portuguese dominion. The Edward W. Brooke collection included insight into Nixon’s views on racial matters and how the only Black senator at the time supported his Republican campaign. In DC I was also able to visit the African American Museum, which gave an extensive overview of the civil rights movement. In Lisbon, the Torre do Tombo national archives supplied files on the Overseas Ministry’s views of Lusophone-African anticolonialists activities in the United States, as well as connections between SNCC and visiting revolutionaries from Mozambique and Angola, to name just a few.

In addition to enabling the tracing of specific connections between U.S. groups and both Portuguese propagandists and enemies of empire, the extensive research made possible by this SHAFR fellowship has deepened and enriched my understanding of broader trends within the civil rights movement, Third World solidarity organizing, U.S.-Portuguese relations, the role of the press, and other transnational linkages during the period under review. I was saddened this year to hear of the passing of one of the namesakes of this fellowship and a master of U.S. foreign relations, Walter LaFeber. His commitment to international scholarship and holding the powerful to account will serve as an inspiration to me throughout my career. In the coming winter months, as I write chapters based on the archival treasures unearthed during this year’s travel, I will remain profoundly thankful to SHAFR for its generous support.

Clare Richardson
PhD Candidate, Freie Universität Berlin
The Last Word: Beyond the War on Drugs

Anne L. Foster

During the twelve months ending in April 2021, the latest date for which there are reliable figures, more than 100,000 Americans are known to have died of a drug overdose. The number is alarmingly high, and represents an increase of nearly a third from the previous year, and up about 75% over five years. It does pale in comparison to covid-19 deaths in the United States during the same time period, which totaled nearly 575,000. For this period, covid-19 was the third leading cause of death in the United States. If overdoses were recorded separately as a cause of death, they would be the sixth leading cause, about tied with diabetes.1 Opioids, especially those laced with fentanyl, are responsible for most overdose deaths and most of the increase in overdoses, but the number of overdoses caused by cocaine and methamphetamine also has increased in the last five years. Whether you believe the solution is stricter prohibition, harm reduction, or legalization, about what is clear is that the United States has a drug problem. The massive number of and increase in overdoses tells only part of that story, but enough to make it a compelling one.

Historians of U.S. foreign relations have written some of the best scholarship on the implications for both U.S. foreign policy and the experiences of countries around the world of the U.S. choice to pursue a War on Drugs strategy for dealing with drugs.2 These works have helped us understand how U.S. drugs policy, focused on eradicating drugs elsewhere and preventing them from entering the United States, promoted destruction, hypocrisy, dangerous levels of secrecy, and worked primarily to enhance the power of those involved in drug trafficking while failing to reduce use of drugs in the United States. These works almost without exception focus on the Cold War years. A few, such as James Bradford's terrific exploration of how drugs policy has shaped the U.S.-Afghan relationship, do continue the analysis into the post-Cold War era.3 The War on Drugs has always been fought "at home" and "out there." This scholarship made those connections for us, their careful research producing powerful indictments of U.S. policy.

Our current drugs crisis, often called an opioid crisis but also featuring dramatic increases in use of various prescription and street amphetamines, seems more home grown. Both opioids and amphetamines now can be imported or made in the United States. This is in contrast to the past, when heroin and cocaine always came from outside U.S. borders. Historians of U.S. foreign relations history, with some exceptions, have not embraced study of these post-1990 changes. And only some have connected drugs history to the broader conceptualizations of foreign relations we have seen in the field in the last twenty years. Both history and policy would be well served if more scholars of U.S. foreign relations history took up topics that include drugs history.

The vibrancy of the "new drugs history" may be one reason people in our field have been less visible on this topic. Historians of drugs have their own must-read journal, Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, a wonderful conference usually (sadly) scheduled very close to SHAFR (making attendance at both difficult), and jobs in history of medicine and pharmacy, medical humanities, and a range of other places in and outside the academy. Many drugs historians write about foreign relations as part of their broader studies, but they usually are interested in a society or a drug, and their interaction, more than the effects of U.S. foreign policy.

For example, Lina Britto’s recent book on Colombia explores how the global war on drugs influenced Colombia’s marijuana market, and the transition in that country to cocaine. Matthew Lassiter is exploring the important, neglected topic of how politics of suburbia in the United States intersected with particular approaches to the drug problem.4 These are merely two among many examples of the deeply researched, politically motivated scholarship helping us better understand the full implications of how both U.S. and global drugs policies have shaped so many disparate histories in so many places.

I think another reason for the decreased interest by scholars of U.S. foreign relations is that media attention in the United States to the drugs crisis has focused on its domestic implications more than its foreign relations ones. Perhaps the focus is justified: in 2019 (the latest year for which we have global statistics), Americans accounted for more than half of total worldwide deaths from drug overdoses, with 65,717. China, the country having the next highest number, had 11,445 in that year, not only absolutely lower but when considered per capita, substantially lower. The next two countries, India (8,465) and Russia (5,877), also have large populations, indicating that although the drug overdose problem, like the problem of illicit drugs consumption generally, is global, it is much more significant for the United States than anywhere else.5 The statistics are so stark that comparative study of the kind historians of foreign relations are well primed to do, seems all the more important.

The United Nations 2021 World Drugs Report includes a global map early in the first volume representing what they call “Common Problem, Local Dynamics.” Over the United States, the phrases “high level of opioid-related overdoses/increasing use of methamphetamine/cocaine use” hover. Moving south in the Americas, the phrases over Mexico are “manufacture of methamphetamine and opioids” and then over southern Mexico and Central America we find “cocaine trafficking.” The northern part of South America has “cocaine production and trafficking,” while the southern part of the continent has “cocaine use disorders/cocaine trafficking.”6 The map makes it clear: the drug problem in Central and South America stems largely from the fact that those regions are producing drugs to serve the high levels of demand for all kinds of drugs in the United States.

The other page of the map features Europe, Asia, Africa, and Oceania. The patterns are more complex in this section. Central Asia is listed as producing and consuming both opioids and amphetamine, while mainland Southeast Asia is listed as only producing these drugs. Elsewhere throughout these four continents, the wealthier areas (Australia, Japan, western Europe) are listed as users of drugs, while the less wealthy areas mix trafficking and use. This report identifies what UN officials perceive to be the most significant drug issues in these regions, but we can see in these broad outlines that the illicit drugs market replicates, not surprisingly, how production and consumption work generally under capitalism: less wealthy countries produce the raw materials and endure the dangerous working conditions; wealthy countries consume the products. Not surprisingly, illicit drug production often increases in places where governments are...
not fully in control of their territory (Afghanistan) or in process of imposing authoritarian and isolationist rule (Myanmar). From 2015-2020, Afghanistan accounted for more than 80% of the world's opiates production. Mexico, primary supplier to the United States, accounted for 6% in those same years.

What do these statistics mean for historians of U.S. foreign relations? They certainly confirm what all historians of the War on Drugs and foreign relations have argued: the War on Drugs effort to use increasingly militarized, sometimes secret tactics to support drug prohibition by controlling (eradicating) supply has failed. But I think that they suggest to us that we should be integrating study of illicit drugs production, trafficking and sale into the broad range of foreign relations topics. Let me give a few examples of topics that are under-studied.

Until recently, there has been remarkably little written about marijuana and U.S. foreign relations. This is beginning to change. Isaac Campos and Lina Britto, historians of Mexico and Colombia, explore effects of the War on Drugs in must read books for scholars of U.S. foreign relations. William McAllister recently explored the national security implications of the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act. Marijuana use in the United States grew most dramatically in the years after 1945, when the United States was best able to promote the supply control, prohibitionist model. It is surprising that more scholars of U.S. foreign relations have not been interested in the reasons for and implications of that increase. In more recent years, the legal status of marijuana has shifted so that several U.S. states and a handful of countries have legalized recreational consumption of marijuana and even more have decriminalized it or permit medical use of the drug. This diversity of legal status may have important foreign relations implications going forward.

Scholars of U.S. foreign relations have produced excellent scholarship on the history of development and economic aid, but rarely does this scholarship integrate consideration of the illicit economy in the places targeted for development. Nineteenth century imperialism prompted crop substitution away from food and subsistence crops to those useful for export, including opium. More recently, though, growing the raw materials for drugs, whether coca leaves, poppies or marijuana plants, has appeal to people who can sell that crop more predictably at a more stable price than for other crops, even though there are dangers to growing an illicit substance. In Afghanistan, for instance, the value of the illicit trade is estimated, for the last several years, to have been larger than the total licit international trade of the country. Drugs historians often pay attention to the effects on development, but development historians are less likely to pay attention to the effects of drugs on the international political economy of processing, packaging, and transporting drugs to market receives only modest attention from political scientists and economists, and nearly none from historians. It is very difficult to study the history of illicit activities, but without attention to the alternatives for labor and capital, as well as the influences of the illicit economy on the functioning of the state, assessments of successes, failures and choices fall short.

This observation applies in some measure to wealthier, more developed countries as well, and more attention to illicit and informal economies in all places would be revealing. One group of scholars found that the illicit drug market in the European Union during 2017 was worth approximately 30 million euros. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that the total of all transactions in the illicit drug trade in the United States is in the “tens of billions” each year. The EU statistic represents the value of drugs sold to consumers, while the DEA estimate adds up the value of each transaction at each stage from arrival or production through processing, transportation and finally to the consumer. The difficulty of finding reliable, comparable statistics is one of the challenges of doing this kind of work. Collaborating with economists has potential to produce important scholarship.

The small but growing attention to environmental history in the field of U.S. foreign relations history offers another important opportunity to include the widespread effects of U.S. global efforts to eradicate drugs. Daniel Weimer's article on the international politics of herbicide use in Mexico offers an example of the important insights from this approach. The environmental effects of production and eradication of coca and poppies are concentrated in a few countries, but that means that those effects are all the greater in those places. Marijuana production, meanwhile, is widespread, and herbicide use for eradication has been common worldwide. The production and eradication of methamphetamines also has had significant environmental effects. Even the (semi) licit production of marijuana to meet significant demand growth has environmental consequences, since indoor growing can require massive inputs of water and electricity. Recent reports about the presence of pharmaceuticals in rivers suggests that there is wide scope for exploring the relationship between drugs, the environment, and foreign relations.

One of the most dramatic shifts in global illicit drug trafficking is the rise of purely synthetic drugs. Sometimes these are diverted Pharmaceuticals, but there is an increasing tendency for illicit producers to set up clandestine labs to manufacture opioids, hallucinogens, and especially amphetamines. The United Nations reports that these labs frequently are in geographical locations over which the international community has little oversight, such as parts of Myanmar and Afghanistan (and the border regions of neighboring countries). Histories of sovereignty, global capitalism, international trade, and the role and power of international organizations would benefit from thinking about the issues, surely not new, raised by the presence of such important manufacturers, of illicit commodities, in areas with only light ties to licit international political and trade organizations.

Some of my thinking on drug trafficking is shaped by Eric Tagliazoccatta’s Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier. Tagliazzo reminds us that illicit trade and illicit commodities are not synonymous. Illicit commodities are always traded illicitly, but licit commodities also can be traded illicitly. David Herzberg’s recent book White Market Drugs: Big Pharma and the Hidden History of Addiction in America approaches this topic from a different perspective, exploring the long history of the ambiguous line dividing licit from illicit drugs. Heroin (licit, commonly prescribed) have nearly the same molecular structure, for instance, but their legal status is very different. Since failures to prescribe opioids in a healthy way has fueled the current drugs crisis to at least some extent, many of us would readily accept Herzberg’s argument. But if we couple his with Tagliazzo’s, we are prompted to think much more carefully about the nature of trade in general and to be more precise as well as more expansive in our conceptions and language.

For instance, we spend time in my Long War on Drugs class talking about whether it is smuggling to go from Canada to the United States to buy alcohol, and not declare it on re-crossing the border. Or, a more complicated situation: when friends in graduate school went to the Saint Regis Mohawk Reservation to buy cigarettes, was that smuggling? Is it smuggling if it is only for your own use? If you are picking up cigarettes for friends and will be reimbursed? If you plan to re-sell the cigarettes? My students, nearly all from Indiana, usually have no personal experience of these activities the way my former students in New York and Massachusetts did. But the exercise of thinking about how one’s personal economic actions can be licit or illicit for a variety of reasons prompts them to consider how the broader economy also is shaped by both licit and illicit activities. I wonder how we might conceptualize trade, investment, development, and the foreign relations structuring them differently if we put illicit and licit economic activities in the same frame.

As I was finishing up this essay, the New York Times published another article on the overdose crisis in the United States. The story blamed lack of effective, reasonably-priced treatment options, over-prescribing, stronger drugs, and urged prevention, harm reduction, and more research into why people use drugs. Only a couple of sentences suggested that the problem had any connection to foreign relations, mostly noting that heroin
and fentanyl producers overseas had rushed to supply a perceived demand in the United States. The drugs problem is a particularly American one in many ways. But the U.S. drugs problem has shaped economics, politics, and options in other countries in ways we do not fully understand. U.S. foreign relations scholars could help us understand a lot better. I hope you will.

Notes: