In this issue

NARA and Its Challenges
A Roundtable on Under the Starry Flag
A Guide to the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

And more...
Cover Image:
1951, July. Courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library & Museum. Shown at a conference relating to the draft tripartite treaty among the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, are left to right, in the front row: Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper, unidentified, Sen. John Sparkman, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In the back row is John Foster Dulles, to the right and slightly behind Dean Acheson. The signing of the draft tripartite treaty, which was created from discussions that occurred between 1949 and 1951, was initialed in San Francisco, California, on July 12, 1951. Accession Number 96-1183.

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Robert Pee is currently an independent scholar. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Birmingham (UK) in 2013; is the author of *Democracy Promotion, National Security and Strategy: Foreign Policy under the Reagan Administration* (2016); and is the co-editor of *The Reagan Administration, the Cold War and the Transition to Democracy Promotion* (2019). In addition, he has published research articles in *International Politics* and *The Conversation*. He researches on the interconnections between U.S. democracy promotion, national security, and non-state actors from the Cold War to the War on Terror.

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I n reading the inaugural essays in the H-Diplo series “Learning the Scholar’s Craft,” I have been struck by the authors’ recollections of the ways that associates—Army personnel officers, friendly classmates, a young editor, a vibrant teacher, a generous aunt, a gracious correspondent, a dog-shooting document keeper—affected their scholarly trajectories. My career as a historian has likewise been shaped by an array of people. The document keeper I recall most vividly let me read her mother's scrapbooks while sitting on the sofa in her living room. I have no idea how she treated the neighborhood dogs, but given that she fed me cookies, I suspect that they had nothing to fear. Looking back at the significant encounters that made me the historian I am today, a pattern emerges: many crucial encounters occurred at SHAFR conferences. On my winding trajectory from women’s and gender history to the study of imperialism, colonialism, and globalization, SHAFR associates played pivotal roles at every twist and turn. I have gone to panels keen to hear one specific paper only to have my mind set ablaze by another, and I have gotten leads on archives, books, articles, presses, teaching strategies, and departmental practices during conference coffee breaks. I am a bona fide introvert, the kind of person who would have a hard time deciding what to do if given a choice between a night on the town or one in the library, reading century-old reports on sewage dumping in the Great Lakes.

And yet I look forward to the SHAFR conference every June, for that is where I hear the papers and roundtable remarks that change the way I understand the world; where I meet the people most likely to set me off on paths that I never would have found on my own. That is where people known to me through their written words have become conversation partners, so that when I read their work I hear their voices speaking from the page. And that is where I feel like I am part of something larger. I always leave feeling inspired.

So if you have not already marked your calendar, purchased tickets, and booked accommodations for the June conference, be sure to do so soon! Thanks to the Program Committee (co-chaired by Julia Irwin and Gretchen Heefner), Local Arrangements Committee (co-chaired by Gunter Bishof and Jana Lipman), Conference Consultant Amanda Bundy, Executive Director Amy Sayward, and hundreds of paper proposers, this conference will be a memorable one. To get a sense of the exciting conversations that await in the Crescent City, consider the first five panels on the draft program: “The Geography of International Organizations”; “Empires and Intersections: Race, Religion and the Atlantic World”; “An Empire of Refugees: The United States’ Cold War Policy and Refugee Legacy, 1959-1995”; “Asia after Vietnam: Enduring Patterns and Transformations in U.S.-Asia Relations”; and “Narrating Empire from Below.” As these topics suggest, there will be something for everyone, and conference-goers will be faced with some tough choices on which sessions to attend.

The NOLA conference will make the most of its location, with an opening plenary session on World War II at the National World War II Museum and a Friday plenary on the Caribbean World prompted by the conference site. Options to sign up for a walking tour on Friday and a visit to the Whitney Plantation (notable for its focus on the lives of enslaved people) following the conference will provide opportunities to learn more about the history of this port city from its colonial origins through the catastrophic events of Hurricane Katrina.

I would also like to flag the social gathering to be hosted by the Committee on Minority Historians (CoMH) after the Friday plenary. CoMH Co-Chairs Chris Fisher and Perin Gurel are eager to hear your thoughts on advancing diversity and inclusion in SHAFR, and this event will provide a dedicated opportunity for you to connect with them and other Committee members. I very much hope that all SHAFR members will join the CoMH in its important work. Even if you cannot attend this gathering, you can draw in scholars from underrepresented groups; reach out to newcomers at SHAFR events; further diversify SHAFR leadership through self-nominations and the nominations of colleagues; and continue to spread the word on our conferences, publications, web and social media presence, prizes, fellowships, collegial community, and collective efforts on behalf of the wide expanse that is our field.

One of the luncheons at the June conference will be dedicated to archival issues. The SHAFR Committee on Historical Documentation (HDC), chaired by Richard Immerman, has long been concerned about the budgetary and other challenges facing the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) [See Richard’s essay in this issue of Passport]. In response, the HDC has been working with organizations such as the American Historical Association (AHA) and National Coalition for History (NCH) to open more lines of communication with NARA and advance our interest in government documents preservation, declassification, and access. On a parallel track, our representative to the NCH, Matt Connelly, has pressed to make NARA a greater priority. One result of these efforts is that the National Humanities Alliance will highlight NARA concerns in its annual Humanities Advocacy Day. Because many records users have at best a limited understanding of the archival developments that will affect the next generation of scholarship and, indeed, the documentary record of our time, the Friday luncheon...
will focus on archival matters past, present, and future. Conference goers will also be interested to learn that SHAFR will meet again in Arlington, Virginia (a quick metro ride away from Washington DC) in 2021 and then in Toronto in 2022. Council selected the Toronto site from a highly competitive pool of bids. I wish to express my gratitude to all those who developed and submitted proposals. The annual conference is the central event in the organizational life of SHAFR and we are indebted to the teams of scholars who are keen to partner with us to make it happen.

Avid minute-readers will notice that Council voted in January to adopt the MemberClicks membership management system. Executive Director Amy Sayward, her assistant Faith Bagley, SHAFR IT Director George Fujii, and the Web Committee (chaired by Heather Stur) are now working with the MemberClicks staff to set up our account. MemberClicks should make it easier for you to renew your SHAFR membership (up to now, Oxford University Press has handled SHAFR memberships for us, but we will handle memberships in house with this new platform). You will also be able to set up and manage your own entry in our Experts Directory once the MemberClicks system is up and running.

Two other significant developments that came out of the January Council meeting are the creation of a Public Engagement Committee and the launch of a Task Force on the Jobs Crisis in Academia.

The Public Engagement Committee had multiple origins, including the SHAFR pre-conference workshops in 2017 and 2019 and a call for the creation of such a committee during the State of SHAFR plenary session at the 2019 conference. Kelly M. McFarland and Kimber Quinney co-chaired a task force on whether and how to proceed, and Council enthusiastically approved their proposal to establish a committee focused on bridging the gap between academics and wider publics through means such as the SHAFR website, Twitter feed, and Experts Directory; the sponsorship of conference panels and workshops; Passport articles on reaching non-academic audiences; podcasts, and the cultivation of media and other partnerships. Bradley Simpson has signed on as the first chair of this committee, which is now up and running.

The Task Force on the Jobs Crisis originated with my predecessor, Ara Keys, who appointed Daniel Bessner and Michael Brenes as co-chairs. Believing that it was essential to recruit contingent faculty and precarious members of the task force should receive financial recognition for their volunteer labor, Council approved the co-chairs’ proposal to offer modest honoraria to qualifying members of the task force. As noted in the January 2020 e-blast, Daniel and Michael would welcome your ideas and comments.

As these reports on SHAFR goings-on make clear, there are structures behind collegiality and chance. The first essays in the “Scholar’s Craft” series draw attention to some of these larger forces and institutions. Along with allusions to war and religious persecution, they mention positive structures such as university departments, archives, presses, prize committees, and a State Department documentation project. Having served on several SHAFR committees over the years, I’ve had glimpses into how much hard work goes into making SHAFR a force for good in the profession. From my current perch, I am awed by SHAFR members’ willingness to put aside their own research, course preps, and other endeavors to advance our collective commitments.

So here’s to the seemingly chance encounters that you will someday herald in your memoirs and to the dedicated team that is laboring to produce these chances, for the larger good of our scholarly craft.

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**Call for Nominations**

SHAFAQ’s Nominating Committee is soliciting nominations for elected positions.

The 2020 elections will fill the following positions:

**Vice President/President-Elect** (1 vacancy, 1-year term, followed by a 1-year term as president and then a 3-year term on Council)

**Council members** (2 vacancies, 3-year term)

**Graduate Student Representative** (1 vacancy, 3-year term)

**Nominating Committee** (1 vacancy, 3 year-term)

Please submit nominations (including self-nominations) to the members of the Nominating Committee by e-mail no later than June 30, 2020. Nominations must include the nominee’s name, e-mail address, institution (if applicable), and a statement of the nominee’s qualifications. The committee particularly seeks nominations that offer specific details about the nominee’s service to SHAFR and commitment to the field. It is helpful to indicate whether you have contacted the nominee about his or her willingness to serve.

**Nominating Committee members:**

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A Roundtable on
Lucy Salyer,
Under the Starry Flag: How a Band of Irish Americans Joined the Fenian Revolt and Started a Crisis over Citizenship

Paul A. Kramer, David Brundage, Amy S. Greenberg, Daniel Margolies, Torrie Hester, and Lucy Salyer

Roundtable Introduction
Paul A. Kramer

Lucy Salyer’s highly accomplished Under the Starry Flag arrives at a exciting moment for scholars drawn to the intersections between U.S. foreign relations history and the history of U.S. immigration and naturalization regimes, and contributes to the project of interweaving these fields in fresh and decisive ways. While migration politics was never absent from the writing of U.S. diplomatic histories—it was central to the history and historiography of U.S.-Japan relations, and early scholarship of the U.S. refugee regime, for example—what might have seemed to be a natural and necessary subject for historical inquiry, with transformative potential for both historiographies of U.S. foreign relations and immigration, developed slowly. What was, for a long time, the relative marginality of immigration within the canons of U.S. diplomatic history, and the relative bracketing of inter-state negotiation and conflict within U.S. immigration history, might well have surprised the legions of migrants whose fortunes—then and now—have sparked significant inter-state tension and deliberation, even as the wranglings and clashes of states in an unequal world have profoundly shaped migrants’ prospects for mobility, safety, rights and freedom.

Thanks to works like Salyer’s, historians’ migrations between U.S. foreign relations history and immigration history are, by this point, varied and vibrant, surrounding and rendering obsolete the barriers that previously kept these fields apart. Especially over the past decade or so, the collective intellectual labor of historians of U.S. foreign relations and historians of immigration—and the many scholars who self-consciously bridge these areas—have in diverse ways interlaced these fields, revealing the immigration/foreign relations nexus as an historically consequential and intellectually generative focal point, and charting the way forward for future investigations. As the reviewers below make clear, Lucy Salyer’s excellent new book makes a pivotal contribution to this effort. Narratively compelling and analytically acute, it tells the story of transatlantic Fenian revolutionary politics in pursuit of Irish freedom from British colonial rule and, especially, controversies over its violent filibustering efforts in Canada, as a lens onto fraught, Anglo-American struggles between the incompatible citizenship regimes of assertive empire-states. In particular, Fenian militance raised the question of whether and to what degree revolutionaries who had naturalized to U.S. citizenship merited the diplomatic protection of the U.S. state, and the broader principle of the right to expatriate. As Salyer shows, the charged issue of whether naturalized immigrants had fully shed their previous allegiances, duties and rights, or remained permanently attached to “home” states, like it or not, was of vast and enduring significance for Irish-diasporic politics, U.S. citizenship, British subjecheid, and the international order.

The reviewers, gifted historians of the many subject areas Salyer’s book elegantly joins—Irish diaspora, U.S. immigration and deportation policy, U.S. international and imperial law, U.S. continental empire—rightly praise Salyer’s deep research in diplomatic archives, court records, and transatlantic newspaper sources, her meticulous practice of immigration-legal history (a field whose dynamism owes a tremendous debt to Salyer’s earlier, pathbreaking Laws Harsh as Tigers, on Chinese exclusion), and her adeptness in tracing out the implications of transnational, Fenian exile politics, and contests over the rights of naturalized migrants, for the historical development of the U.S. citizenship regime and the U.S.’s changing role in the world. David Brundage foregrounds the book’s important work on the “politics of exit” as an historical thematic and its contribution to an internationalized history of Reconstruction politics, while taking issue with aspects of her depiction of Fenian revolutionary politics. Amy Greenberg focuses on the failed Fenian invasion of Canada as an instance of 19th century filibustering, and the book’s account of transformations of U.S. citizenship and its inter-state ramifications, while asking for richer material on U.S. public support for the Fenians and links to Reconstruction. Torrie Hester emphasizes the ways Salyer’s book connects the politics of voluntary expatriation to Reconstruction politics, and situates it in the context of emerging historiographies of foreign policy legalism, and the historical crossings of immigration and foreign relations. Daniel Margolies highlights the ties between expatriation and U.S. continental empire—the settler-colonialist utility of expatriated Europeans-become-Americans—Irish participation in the Civil War, and the ways U.S. policymakers’ defenses of naturalized European immigrants brought the nation’s simultaneous rejection of African Americans’ citizenship claims into sharp relief.

Salyer’s thoughtful reply engages the reviewers’ comments and critiques; like them, she also draws
connections between the questions at the book’s heart, about the construction of citizenship through naturalization law and policy, and shifting balances of power between states and political subjects over the terms of political membership, and present-day struggles over citizenship in the United States and elsewhere as rising political forces seek to build authoritarian regimes on the basis of deliberately, sometimes violently, fissured and fractured conceptions of political belonging, strategies that include the splitting off of naturalized from native-born citizens. As she points out, expatriation—associated in her book with republican freedom and the transatlantic campaign against colonial oppression—has also been a formidable weapon of the powerful and an instrument for weakening the rights of both citizens, naturalized and native-born, and non-citizen migrants. While these deeply troubling realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its realities may shape many readers’ encounters with the book, scholars might not be unreasonable to hope that its impressive crossing of immigration history, legal history and the history of U.S. foreign relations will also inspire future border-crossing scholarship that will outlast—and

Review of Lucy E. Salyer, Under the Starry Flag: How a Band of Irish Americans Joined the Fenian Revolt and Sparked a Crisis over Citizenship

David Brundage

Lucy Salyer, a distinguished scholar of American immigration and legal history, has written a superb, study of a fascinating topic. Under the Starry Flag focuses on the high-profile British trials of several Irish-American members of the Fenian Brotherhood, a transatlantic organization that sought Irish independence from Britain by force of arms. They had been arrested in Ireland in 1867 while attempting to provide military aid to a Fenian uprising. Their defense argued that, although they had been born in Ireland, they had subsequently become naturalized U.S. citizens and therefore could not be prosecuted for treason in the British Isles.

Though the men were convicted, the international crisis that they triggered led to a major, though little-remembered, transatlantic political battle, “the great expatriation fight of 1868” (215). The result of this battle was a significant piece of congressional legislation, the 1868 Expatriation Act, and various international treaties that established—at least for a time and for Europeans—the essential right to change one’s citizenship or allegiance. Salyer savors the irony of unintended consequences. “Bent on freeing Ireland,” she writes, “the Fenians sparked a revolution in the law of citizenship instead” (6).

This brief précis of Salyer’s argument may make her book sound like a somewhat arcane policy history of a long-dead set of issues. After all, in today’s world the great battles around immigration in the United States and elsewhere revolve around the politics of entry, not exit. Think Donald Trump’s 2017 Muslim ban, the draconian family-separation policies at the U.S. southern border, or the role that concerns about immigration played in Britain’s June 2016 vote to leave the European Union. It is Salyer’s accomplishment in this work to show the relevance of this forgotten history to these contemporary issues and debates while simultaneously crafting a highly engaging story around a fascinating and diverse group of characters.

Thoroughly researched in an impressive range of primary sources (diplomatic correspondence, court proceedings, and an array of newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic), Under the Starry Flag is also elegantly structured as a three-part drama. Part I (“The Fenians and the Making of a Crisis”) consists of four chapters that set up the nature of the problem. Here Salyer describes the Great Irish Famine and assesses the “exit revolution” (24) of the years between 1815 and 1924, when 55 million Europeans and a smaller but growing number of Asians emigrated from their homelands to a variety of destinations, the most important of which was the United States. She also analyzes the origins and politics of Fenianism and then discusses the Fenians’ claim to American citizenship (“Civis Americanus Sum”).

This part of the book also introduces the reader to the two most memorable of her various dramatis personae, the Fenian John Warren and the U.S. minister to the United Kingdom, Charles Francis Adams. Part 1 also relates the long history of U.S.-British conflict on the question of naturalization, a conflict going back to the War of Independence: while political leaders in the United States had long insisted that there was an inherent right of expatriation, British authorities held fast to a doctrine of perpetual allegiance, or as they often put it, “Once a subject, always a subject” (3).

The three chapters of part 2 (“Citizenship on Trial”) constitute the dramatic heart of the work. They detail the voyage from New York to Ireland of the Jackmel, renamed Erin’s Hope by the rebel Fenians on board, and describe the frustrating series of events that led to their imprisonment in Dublin. Once in prison, Warren and the others used their letters to family and friends, reprinted in the increasingly important transatlantic press, and their defense strategy in their trials in highly dramatic ways (“All the World’s a Stage” is the title she gives to the chapter on the trials) to pressure American diplomats like Adams to take up a defense of their rights as naturalized American citizens.

Part 3 (“Reconstructing Citizenship”) consists of five chapters that complete the arc of the narrative and explain how the crisis over expatriation was resolved. Salyer analyzes the nature of the debates in Congress that led to the 1868 legislation with clarity and economy, and she introduces us to new historical figures who are nearly as compelling as Warren and Adams: Francis Lieber and his fellow “publicists” (experts in the emerging field of international law), who did much of the intellectual legwork that prepared the way for the expatriation treaties signed first with Prussia and finally Britain itself. Eschewing a triumphal ending for her book, Salyer provides an absolutely essential epilogue, demonstrating how the politics of race soon undermined the logical extension to emigrants from Asia of the newly recognized freedom to change one’s citizenship or allegiance.

In addition to its intrinsic value as a highly effective dissection of an important and little-known policy battle, Salyer’s work makes an important contribution to a fascinating recent trend in migration studies: the move away from a traditional focus on the politics of entry to what some have called the “politics of exit.” Like David Sim, whose fine study A Union Forever: The Irish Question and U.S. Foreign Relations in the Victorian Age (Cornell University Press, 2013) should be seen as part of this trend as well, she sees diasporic Irish nationalism as a useful angle of vision on this topic. Sim also examined the expatriation crisis and its resolution in legislation and treaty-making, but while A Union Forever took a long view, examining Irish nationalist activity and its impact on U.S.-British relations from the 1840s through the early twentieth century, Under the Starry Flag narrows in on a very short period in the late 1860s and early 1870s. In so doing, it makes a fundamental contribution to another emerging trend, the transnational history of the Reconstruction era.

Over the last three decades, Reconstruction historiography has featured a great deal of innovative work, much of it focused on the active role played by freed people
in shaping Reconstruction’s political, social, and economic outcomes. More recently, research by historians of gender and of childhood has kept the field at the forefront of exciting and creative work. But for all its excitement, Reconstruction historiography still hasn’t been surprising enough to one of the most important recent developments in U.S. history, what some have called the “transnational turn.” It is not entirely clear why this has been the case: perhaps, as Andrew Zimmerman has suggested, the political issues that dominated Reconstruction have simply appeared “too narrowly national to reward an international approach.”

One of the most important aspects of Reconstruction, however, was the debate it generated over a variety of profoundly important questions relating to citizenship. Who is a citizen? What rights and obligations come with citizenship? How does citizenship interact with ideas about race and gender? What Salyer does so effectively in this book is to demonstrate the international import of these questions. She connects the traditionally domestic focus on Reconstruction-era citizenship legislation (e.g., the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, etc.) to the international dimensions of citizenship. Part 3 of her work, “Reconstructing Citizenship,” draws out the connections particularly well: after an authoritative discussion of the debate over citizenship rights for African Americans and women, for example, she observes that “into this swirling debate on citizenship and rights stepped the Fenian Brotherhood” (134).

Given the centrality of the Fenians to Salyer’s story, however, it must be noted that her analysis of their movement is a weakness—the only real one—in the book. Long seen as insular, fanatical, and hopelessly romantic, the Fenian Brotherhood was in fact a profoundly transnational phenomenon. The movement was founded nearly simultaneously in Dublin and New York in 1858-59, and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (as the organization was known in Ireland) eventually established a presence on all six continents. The Fenians’ radically democratic character and their critical impact on the later development of trade unionism and land reform movements on both sides of the Atlantic are also notable features of their history. None of this would be apparent to readers of Under the Starry Flag. Despite Salyer’s generally sympathetic treatment of their efforts, Warren and his comrades appear, as in the older historiography, mainly as fanatical opponents of England, not as forward-looking transnational revolutionaries.

Even more important for the purposes of this review, in the long run the Fenians were successful. Scholars of Irish nationalism, whatever their views about the merits of the so-called physical force tradition that proponents espoused, have generally agreed that a direct line can be drawn from the Fenians to the 1916 Easter Rising, the Irish Revolution of 1918-23, and beyond. As the University College Dublin political scientist Tom Garvin, generally a sharp critic of the Fenians’ political legacy, has put it, “in so far as such things can be dated, the Irish revolution started with the founding of the IRB in 1858.”

Given, as Salyer makes clear in her epilogue, the profoundly limited and short-lived character of the “revolution in the law of citizenship” that is her focus, her framing of the Fenians’ contribution to this history may be somewhat off the mark. Their greatest impact, in other words, may have been precisely “in freeing Ireland.”

None of the comments above should be taken as disputing the important contribution that Lucy Salyer’s Under the Starry Flag makes to the transnational history of Reconstruction and to the forgotten history of expatriation. It is a volume of the utmost significance.

Notes:
2. See Catherine A. Jones, Intimate Reconstructions: Children in Postemancipation Virginia (Charlottesville, VA, 2016) for an example of the innovative work currently reshaping the field.
3. See Andrew Zimmerman, “Reconstruction: Transnational History,” in Interpreting American History: Reconstruction, ed. John David Smith (Kent, OH, 2016), 171-96. See also, however, the essays collected in David Prior, ed., Reconstruction in a Globalizing World (New York, 2018), 94-120.
5. Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland, 1858-1928, repr. (Dublin, 2005), 5.

Review of Lucy E. Salyer, Under the Starry Flag: How a Band of Irish Americans Joined the Fenian Revolt and Sparked a Crisis over Citizenship

Amy S. Greenberg

Lucy Salyer’s delightful narrative history of the ill-fated American Fenian movement runs to just 224 pages of text, yet it manages to pack two important historical arguments into a dramatic transnational tale featuring foreign invasions, “freedom fighters,” Bowery B’boys, the Burlingame Mission, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, illegal weaponry, a “crack-brained harlequin and semi-lunatic” Fenian booster, and one exceptionally irritated Civil War-era minister to the Court of St. James. But that’s not all: readers are also treated to capsule portraits of over a dozen ordinary foreign-born Americans trapped in an international order that denied the right of an individual to expatriate or exchange the citizenship of one country for another. Under the Starry Flag is at once expansive and detailed, testifying to the author’s deep knowledge of the complex history of American migration, her impressive research skills, and her ability to draw connections between seemingly disparate topics. In short, there’s a lot here, and most of it holds together.

This is narrative history, so the story must come first. It goes something like this: In June 1866, a liberty-loving band of Irish-born Civil War veterans launched three invasions of Canada in the hopes of freeing Ireland from British tyranny. The Fenians, as they were known, were not successful, and twenty-five were sentenced to death in Toronto to death by hanging. Those who escaped imprisonment regrouped, and the following year forty-five intrepid recruits, commanded by the Five Points Democrat James Kerrigan (a veteran of the U.S.-Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Canadian invasions), smuggled a small brigantine with a hold full of guns and ammunition out of U.S. waters and steered it toward Ireland. They reached Sligo a month later and hovered off the coast, waiting to join an uprising that never materialized. A few men, including Kerrigan, escaped back home; the rest were captured and charged with treason. The British, like other Europeans, espoused a doctrine of “perpetual allegiance” (63) regarding nationality. In their view, naturalized Irish Americans remained British subjects, and the United States had no say in their fates.

Americans, by contrast, insisted that national allegiance was voluntary. In the mid- nineteenth century
all a man had to do to become an American citizen was file a declaration of intent and three years later appear before a state or federal court of record to renounce any other national “allegiance or fidelity” (26), swear to uphold the constitution in front of two witnesses who could attest to his character, and vouch that he had been in the country at least five years. For a married woman the situation was even more straightforward; her citizenship and her children’s citizenship followed that of her husband.

The Irish American prisoners in Canada and Ireland demanded protection as “American citizens” from the American consulate and complained bitterly to newspaper reporters about their suffering while in custody. Although nineteenth-century citizens discussed rights in a way that sounds familiar today, their conception of citizenship was as much about duty as rights: citizenship entailed reciprocal obligations that tied the state and the citizen together. In this context, the obligation of the United States to protect Civil War veterans, both at home and abroad, was manifest, and its failure to meet that obligation was galling to the Fenians.

Although the minister to the Court of St. James, Charles Francis Adams, had done a brilliant job on behalf of the Union keeping Britain neutral during the Civil War, his final years at his post were blighted by the Fenian controversy. According to Salyer, the fate of the prisoners became an international cause célèbre that in 1868 motivated the U.S. Congress to define, for the first time, America’s responsibilities to citizens abroad. Soon thereafter, the United States began negotiating treaties with other nations in order to codify an international right of expatriation. So, although the Fenians failed to liberate Ireland, their efforts to spread liberty were not entirely in vain. As the book’s dustjacket tells us, “the small ruckus created by these impassioned Irish Americans provoked a human rights revolution that is not, even now, fully realized.” The American Fenians all went free.

And in 1870 they invaded Canada for a fourth time. Given our nation’s love affair with Irish American identity, the timeless allure of gun smuggling, and a legitimate connection to the Civil War, it’s surprising how little attention the Fenian movement has received among scholars writing trade history. But the Fenians have never quite fit into reigning historical paradigms. As the brief summary above may suggest, they don’t fit perfectly into a narrative about the international codification of nationalism either. In order to create a comprehensible story that places the Fenians in a moderately sympathetic light, Salyer deviates from strict chronology, beginning with the attempted invasion of Ireland, which she contextualizes with a brilliant thirteen-page summary of 350 years of Irish history, followed by an exploration of the nativist backlash against Irish Catholic refugees of the potato famine—a backlash that is perhaps best summed up by the sadly eternal warnings of an exasperated Protestant minister in 1855 that “there are limits to our national hospitality” (28).

From there, Salyer explores the Irish American experience in the U.S. Civil War, and the failure of military service to turn Irish Americans into “real” citizens in the eyes of the native-born. The nostalgia for Ireland among veterans who were still marginalized in their adopted country is hardly surprising, and given the series of misfortunes that afflicted them, their plan to return to Ireland as liberators, however unrealistic, makes psychological sense. It is only at this point in Salyer’s narrative that the Fenians launch the three invasions of Canada that in reality predated the trip to Ireland. Their 1870 invasion of Canada is resigned to the epilogue.

However poorly Irish Americans were treated in the United States, and however heroic the Fenians imagined themselves to be, their military adventures were neither well planned nor successful. A less-kind narrator could credibly describe the American Fenians as rabble-rousers, miscreants, or murderers. The Fenians invaded Canada in the hope of gaining “a base of operations from which we can not only emancipate Ireland, but also annihilate England” (41).

That goal made no more sense then than it does now. The first of the three 1866 invasions consisted of a few hundred disorganized men who attempted to invade New Brunswick from Maine. It was, not surprisingly, a total failure. In the second, a thousand American men crossed the Niagara River from Buffalo, where they were rebuffed by Canadian volunteers, including two companies of college students called up in the middle of their exams. The Battle of Ridgeway, as it was known, officially ended two days later, when a mass of tired and hungry Fenians retreated by canal boat back across the Niagara. Once on American soil, they were arrested and charged with violating U.S. neutrality laws. In the third 1866 Canadian invasion, a few days after the Battle of Ridgeway, a force of under a thousand Fenians crossed into Quebec from Vermont and was easily repelled by Canadian forces.

All this might have seemed comical had innocent people not died. Nine Canadians were killed and twelve more seriously wounded defending their country from American invaders in June 1866. “This Fenian filibustering was murder, not war,” declared an Irish-Canadian politician who, according to Salyer, “had fled Ireland in 1848 to escape prosecution for his participation in the Young Ireland nationalist movement.” He was, she adds, “no fan of Fenianism in 1866.” Why would he be? It is hard to imagine that any Irish-Canadian would support an Irish nationalism that expressed itself by killing Canadians. “What had Canada or Canadians done to deserve such an assault?” he asked (50). It is a good question.

One group of scholars who have written quite a bit about the Fenians are historians of filibustering. It is the four invasions of Canada that matter to the history of American territorial expansion, but here too, the Fenians have proven difficult to fit into reigning narratives. It has become a truism of territorial expansionism that Canada faded as an object of U.S. territorial lust after the implementation of British reforms passed in the wake of the Rebellions of 1837–8. In the 1840s and 1850s, it was Southern dreams of a Caribbean empire that drove filibustering, and when that impulse died during the Civil War, filibustering supposedly died as well.

One of the historiographical contributions of Salyer’s volume is to make it clear that Canada never lost its allure for Northern expansionists. Whether they wanted Canadian territory to force the British to free Ireland or simply to widen the boundaries of the United States, there is a great deal of evidence that both British diplomats and ordinary Canadians believed, through the end of the nineteenth century, that the United States posed a threat to Canadian sovereignty. Like generations of earlier filibusters, the men who invaded Canada were shocked when they were arrested back in the United States for violating U.S. neutrality laws, because they believed the nation was behind their efforts to spread “freedom” through the Americas. It is no coincidence that James Kerrigan was also a veteran of William Walker’s Nicaragua filibuster.

The other major contribution of the book is its subtle transnational argument about expatriation and citizenship. Salyer’s Fenian narrative is dramatic and grounded in impressive archival research, but the true value of this volume lies in its explication of how international law impacted the millions of immigrants who arrived in the United States in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Salyer asks “where one nation’s power began and another’s ended, not only in controlling territorial boundaries but also in policing membership in the nation-state. How far could nations reach in demanding allegiance
from subjects living beyond their borders? How far should the United States go to protect rights of citizens—especially naturalized Americans—against the claims of other states as they traveled abroad?" (53).

Although an immigrant’s path to American citizenship was remarkably straightforward in the middle of the nineteenth century, the alchemy of turning a foreigner into a citizen only worked if other nations accepted it. China threatened emigrants with the death penalty. Foreign-born Americans from France and the German states were considered by their countries of origin as deserters from compulsory military service. Some of those who returned to Europe in the 1860s were jailed; some who remained in the United States were punished for their “desertion” with seizures of property.

For many foreign-born Americans, the expatriation crisis of the Fenians “became nothing less than a referendum on the cultural and legal status of the naturalized citizen in America” (137). In our own era of policed borders, the right of expatriation seems quaint, but the conclusion to Under the Starry Sky reveals how laws about expatriation mutated into the exclusionary immigration laws of the twentieth century, with particularly draconian effects on married women, whose citizenship continued to be defined by the status of their husbands.

Salyer packs a great deal into a short book, but more evidence about the extent of public support for the Fenians would have been welcome. The citation to a claim that “angry letters and petitions poured into Congress and rallies spread throughout the United States” in support of the Fenians lists a single page in a nineteenth-century publication about Charles Francis Adams as “minister to England and a Know-Nothing” (266). Fifteen pages later, readers learn that “boisterous rallies erupted throughout the nation in the winter of 1868 as the Fenian battle cry ignited among a large swath of the foreign born” (139), but Salyer doesn’t detail where the rallies occurred or how many people attended. The idea that a significant portion of the American public cared or was even aware of the Fenians is undercut by some of Salyer’s evidence. She notes that Thomas Nast’s 1868 cartoon attacking the Democratic Party, “This is a White Man’s Government,” which shows three white men clasping hands while standing on the back of a freedman, is a critique of an “unholy alliance between the foreign-born and the violent, unreconstructed South that keeps African Americans pinned down” (141). But the cartoon reveals no awareness of the Fenian movement. The Irish character is represented exactly as he would have been in the 1850s, down to the hat that reads “5 Points.”

Nor is Salyer’s effort to link the legal struggle of the Fenians with that of freedpeople in the 1860s entirely successful. She argues that Radical Republicans made the cause of expatriation possible by “providing the vocabulary and a political climate that placed citizenship and its rights at the forefront of the nation’s agenda” (139). Some foreign-born Americans appear to have adopted the political language of the Radical Republicans in order to assert the right of expatriation, but it is also true that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is explicitly domestic in character.

These quibbles aside, it will be the rare reader who doesn’t come away from this book with a better understanding of both the international context of nineteenth-century U.S. migration law and how not to liberate Ireland from British rule.

**Review of Lucy Salyer, Under the Starry Flag**

Daniel Margolies

Few people (even generally cynical historians) would have predicted that the naturalization regime would be challenged in contemporary American politics any more than that the legitimacy of birthright citizenship (guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment) would come under assault as a feature of the contemporary politics of white nationalism and racism. But as Lucy Salyer’s new book makes clear, the struggle over naturalization regimes, the right to and permanence of expatriation, and even the Arendtian right to have citizenship rights all developed in fraught and fluid circumstances. These issues have long been interwoven with questions of national consolidation and self-definition, emerging U.S. global power, individual mobility, and the very definition and permanence of the label of “citizen” in the realms of international law and diplomatic interest.

This fascinating book turns on the development of questions of power and choice in the debate over nationality and expatriation and their meaning on a global scale. One of its key strengths is its emphasis on expatriation—not in the exclusionary way the term is sometimes used, but in its sense as a right, or “the ability to choose one’s nationality” (33). It is especially useful to read this impressively researched history with an eye to the present moment, wherein the suffering and carnage produced by war, crime, narco-vioence, and climate change has again resulted in mass migration and strains on systems of mobility and on the permanence and individual choice of expatriation. Expatriation was both a tool and a new right with a special resonance and potential for citizenship empowerment at a critical moment in the history of the United States in the world.

Questions about the extent of Fenian citizenship protections were central to the new Reconstruction-era consideration of the connections between citizenship rights and the federal government, as articulated and defended by politicians like Charles Sumner, Charles Francis Adams, and others. Salyer describes what Republicans in Congress considered to be a postwar revolution of rights. This revolution introduced new rights for African Americans and spurred agitation for extending these rights to women and the foreign-born, among others. In her telling, the expansive new readings of the right of voluntary expatriation were “intoxicating” (142).

Salyer places expatriation into the constellation of rights articulated during Reconstruction as the background for the Expatriation Act of 1868, the first statement that “individuals had the inherent right to change their political allegiance, and the government had the obligation to protect its adopted as well as native citizens when they travelled outside of the United States” (3). She observes the ways in which the contemporary political culture has allowed the transformation of the expatriation regime and membership in the state to be loosened from its origins in the Reconstruction-era revolution in individual rights, and she calls our attention to the needs and objectives of immigrants in the reunited polity during the development of new political and legal models for the state apparatus of control. One of the things lost with the general misunderstanding of the depth of the revolutionary nature of Reconstruction was this sense of the expansive potential of expatriation to empower immigrants in new ways in their new setting.

Much of the Fenian literature has emphasized the assaults on Canada by Thomas W. Sweeney, William R. Roberts, and General John O’Neil. Salyer pushes beyond the view of the Fenians as a “dismal failure militarily” (2) to present a subtle global approach to the Fenian movement.
That approach contextualizes Irish immigration within the broader impact that American sociopolitical development had on the international legal order and puts the thorny issues raised by naturalization questions at the heart of trans-Atlantic diplomacy. Fenian internationalization of the Irish independence movement on the basis of a foreign-born citizen's potentially tenuous new foothold in American sovereignty provides a useful vehicle to explore historical efforts to control citizens and migrants stretching back to the eighteenth century, when European countries tended to view exiting subjects as deserters. As the British insisted during the Fenian controversy, “once a subject, always a subject” (64).

This book provides a fresh new reading of the Fenians through the lens of expanding conceptions of expatriation as well as resistance to the “doctrine of perpetual allegiance,” which was wrapped up in imperial subjecthood (63). Salyer explores the political and diplomatic context for disrupting efforts to remove the protections of citizenship and to deny its protections and claims. She also examines the dangers produced by what she calls the “jurisdictional tangle” created by the massive migration of peoples from Europe to the various settler colonial entities (5). Although they are not a focus of this book, it is interesting to consider the numerous ways in which notions of permanence and replacement, along with eliminationist thinking, functioned in settler colonial ideologies and how these might have been underscored (if not actually catalyzed) by increased migration and the consequent jurisdictional moves to redefine solidity in expatriation.

Salyer decenters the story by starting in Ireland with a history of the Irish loss of independence as a consequence of British political and economic policies. She chronicles the declining fortunes, familial struggles, and rebellious sentiments of Clonakilty, Ireland, which was the hometown of John Warren, one of the American Fenians who found himself at the center of the international furor over expatriation after he was caught by the British trying to run guns from New York to Ireland aboard a ship rechristened the Jacmel. When the potato famine hit, Clonakilty was a “scene of sad carnage” (12). A quarter of the Irish population—Warren among them—left for new settlement abroad in just eleven years. It was a mass refugee exodus with profound implications.

In the United States, the Irish faced the usual array of immigrant challenges, but they were also confronted with the rampant nativism of the Know-Nothing movement and the strong anti-Catholicism of the American Party. At the same time, ambitious imperialists like William Henry Seward saw no political logic in making distinctions with respect to American sovereignty. To counter Fenian actions they turned to an admixture of felony and treason charges and arrested Americans alongside Irishmen. “Irish Americans produced the money, the men, the organizational structure, and the energy behind Fenianism in America; the only thing ‘Irish’ about the movement, concluded the London Times, was the craziness of the scheme” (47). The Fenians also met with harsh treatment in the United States. Those who attacked Canada in the Battle of Ridgeway were arrested by General George Meade for violating American neutrality laws. President Grant later made it explicit that any group attacking Canada in the wake of the Naturalization Treaty, place itself outside American protection.

Salyer points out that the question of absorption and assimilation had been fundamental since the early republic. The United States, it turns out, initially had a rather lax approach to the institutionalization of expatriation. In lieu of a law defining it, the nation relied on essential claims and a vague expression of an American doctrine that remained ill-defined. An emphasis on the inviolability of naturalization developed in the early nineteenth century alongside the rise of politically and economically induced migration. This fostered a strong sense of the claims of citizens—a sense that went beyond the well-known resistance to British claims over sailors as subjects that animated the War of 1812. Contradictions and flaws remained in the system which reflected the deeper logic of the American state. In the 1850s, for example, protections were granted to migrants fleeing the Hungarian revolution, but at the same time, the Dred Scott decision denied citizenship to African Americans. In this sense, the certainty with which the Civil War settled some of the questions produced by evolving and expanding definitions of national citizenship and the challenge to the atmosphere of nativist discrimination helped to encourage the Fenians to assert themselves in the struggle for Irish independence.

After the Civil War, the goal of Irish-American Fenians was the independence of Ireland. Salyer mentions the war but does not emphasize it as a causal factor or detail the experience of individuals in it beyond a mention of the martial skills they developed (and bragged about). This subject was not her focus, but it might have been interesting to explore it in more depth. While outside the thrust of her argument and peripheral to her interests—and perhaps best the subject of another book—the specific impact of the wartime experience on the worldview of the Irish Americans who became Fenians does seem as if it might have been a fruitful angle to explore. If the sources exist, it would be interesting to trace the development and transformation of insurrectionary ideas acquired in the course of military service, especially as the sources of Fenian resistance are asserted but not detailed.

The same approach could be interesting in considering those Irish Americans involved in the war who did not join the Fenians or perhaps did not even sympathize with the movement. Exploring the specific impact of the war on attitudes toward and aptitudes for combat and leadership on the part of Irish Americans on both sides seems worthwhile, as it was at least as much a revolution and a (reactionary) national liberation movement of global impact as it was a civil conflict. It could be especially useful to think about the apparent contradictions of supporting Unionism in the American conflict but national liberation in Ireland and about how such contradictions might have been reflected in Confederate immigrants like Fenian sympathizer Patrick Cleburne, among others. Considering how deftly Salyer combines diplomatic, immigrant, and legal histories in other ways, she might very well be able to bridge the persistent gap between so much inward-facing Civil War work and such compelling global connections.

In the United States, the Fenian Brotherhood was preparing for 1865 to be the “year of action” (40). The Fenians were entering a global world of resistance to British imperial order, as Salyer points out, from the 1857 Sepoy revolt to unrest among the Maoris and the Jamaicans. She also points out that the diplomatic climate was already fraught, given the memory of British support for Unionism in the American conflict but national liberation in Ireland and about how such contradictions might have been reflected in Confederate immigrants like Fenian sympathizer Patrick Cleburne, among others. Considering how deftly Salyer combines diplomatic, immigrant, and legal histories in other ways, she might very well be able to bridge the persistent gap between so much inward-facing Civil War work and such compelling global connections.
of complexities for globetrotting Americans making rights claims as well as becoming ensnared by them. International law, she notes, had not caught up with social realities.

There were other issues animating U.S. interests. “Seward, like the reading public, linked the Alabama claims with the Fenian crisis,” but he also saw them as “part of his broader mission of making the United States a more powerful player in the global arena” (99). The heart of the book is the trial of John Warren in 1867, which turned on questions about his status as an alien and his claims to state protection. Both the trial and the issue of expatriation ultimately hinged on jurisdictional aspects of citizenship. In this way, the Fenian controversy prefigured much of the coming conflict over status, mobility, and rights regimes, which came to dominate any understanding of individual connections to territorial sovereignty in the realm of global politics and political economy. Salyer’s narrative culminates, in some ways, in the move to self-determination in expatriation, widely accepted by the time of the 1868 Expatriation Act, which passed overwhelmingly. As Salyer argues, “the expatriation protests, fanned by the Fenian trials abroad, had forced the American government’s hand, pushing it to declare its dedication to the principle of expatriation and—at least on paper—to protect naturalized and native-born citizens no matter where they roamed” (174).

The expatriation issue was as impossible to separate from domestic politics as it was from at first seemingly unrelated issues of international affairs; similarly, there was no clear line between the parties that sought naturalized votes while fearing that “the naturalization process left [immigrants] personally unchanged” (148). The issue was further complicated by the fact that foreign-born naturalized Americans not uncommonly adopted the racial and gender prejudices of native-born Americans. “Whiteness critically shaped what it meant to be a citizen in the United States” (150), Salyer writes gracefully, and “race remained threaded throughout the claims for the rights of the foreign-born” (151). The book ends with an important and chilling broadening and transformation of the story of expatriation from the Fenian example, with political philosopher and jurist Francis Lieber and others advocating policies to protect the dominance of the “Cis-Caucasian race” (219) through exclusion, first of Chinese and then of Europeans deemed insufficiently white and Protestant.

This final section of the book, which deals with the complexities produced by the issue of expatriation as a part of a “new international order,” is perhaps the most effective and relevant in terms of broader lessons and historical significance. Salyer explores the implications and slippages of the expatriation issue in the German and Chinese contexts, as the United States negotiated treaties and sought to internationalize its understanding of expatriation while also changing the terms of the equation. The relationship with China foregrounded expatriation in ways often overlooked. Of course, tragically, the expatriation issue did not overcome what Salyer describes as “a critical limit to the right of expatriation: the right to leave did not guarantee the right to enter. . . Race continued to be one ‘filter’ for citizenship” (203). Expatriation became a “tool of the state, used by totalitarian and democratic governments alike (although not to the same degree) to prune and manage their citizenship” (222).

By the beginning of the twentieth century, state attention turned to the process of deterrioralization, reversing naturalization and stripping citizenship for a variety of domestic political reasons as well as state objectives. As Salyer notes wryly, “controlling entry rather than exit became the key focus of the modern nation-states, their inherent sovereign power to police their territorial borders viewed as essential to what it meant to be a modern state” (219). Modern state-building adopted the logic of white supremacy and exclusion, and expatriation itself became almost moot.

Ironically, expatriation was less critical with the jurisdictional recapitulation of the state outside its borders, which was a feature of twentieth-century U.S. empire. Alongside the trajectory created by the federal state’s expansion of its interests in the regulation of citizenship and broadening of its powers to strip citizens of their status and rights was a congruent trajectory representing the state’s expansion of constitutional protections to citizens abroad as the presumption against extraterritoriality was reshaped in service to burgeoning imperial hegemony. Salyer’s well-written and clearly argued book fits well into the recent scholarly writing on deportation as foreign policy, immigration control, and restriction, and on the shaping of citizenship regimes as a function of the expansive spatiality of modern states in the world system.

**Review of Lucy Salyer’s Under the Starry Flag: How a Band of Irish Americans Joined the Fenian Revolt and Sparked a Crisis over Citizenship**

**Torrie Hester**

Lucy Salyer’s *Under the Starry Flag: How a Band of Irish Americans Joined the Fenian Revolt and Sparked a Crisis over Citizenship* takes up the understudied history of expatriation. The narrative opens with the story of forty-one men boarding a ship called *Erin’s Hope* in New York City on their way across the Atlantic to Ireland in 1867. Their mission, kept secret from the U.S. and British governments, was to join a larger Fenian movement fighting for Irish independence. They failed miserably, but they ignited an international controversy over expatriation and naturalization.

*Under the Starry Flag* is a stunning accomplishment by a historian whose work on Chinese exclusion has long been a mainstay in the study of race, migration, and U.S. immigration policy. Salyer knits together the journey of the men of *Erin’s Hope* with the story of the diplomats who navigated the subsequent escalating diplomatic tensions over expatriation. She captures the responses to the crisis from international legal scholars and politicians—a crisis that redrew boundaries of national membership, resolved diplomatic disagreements that had lasted for almost a century, and changed international law. As the Trump administration works to expatriate naturalized U.S. citizens, understanding the history of individual rights and state power at the heart of *Under the Starry Flag* could not be more important.

In the twenty-first century we associate expatriation with expulsion and the forced loss of citizenship, but Salyer examines an era when expatriation was controversial for very different reasons. During the nineteenth century, expatriation was tied into nation- and empire-building and, for some migrants, the radical-for-the-time process of choosing one’s citizenship. When the *Erin’s Hope* set sail in 1867, expatriation had long been viewed as central to the U.S. nation-building project. The government recognized it as a first step to building the larger population that the nation required to grow and flourish. Citizens were a critical resource, and expatriation would create more of them.

The United States was an outlier among nation-states and empires when it came to expatriation. Great Britain, for example, had viewed the expatriation policy of the United States as predatory since 1776. Expatriation for British officials translated into a loss of citizens and was viewed as costing Great Britain imperial labor resources. Most centralized states and empires in Europe viewed
expatriation similarly and, like Great Britain, enforced “perpetual allegiance,” which denied a person’s right to renounce citizenship.

Newly naturalized Irish Americans took advantage of U.S. policy. They viewed expatriation as a means to respond to British imperialism. Salyer writes that expatriation spoke “to their [Irish emigrants’] sense of loss—of being involuntarily thrust from their homeland by the cruel English. But the right of expatriation—the ability to choose one’s nationality” was “made all the more powerful by the experience of exile” (33). For some, like the crew of Erin’s Hope, expatriation also provided space to advocate for changes in their country of birth.

Salyer identifies the aftermath of the Erin’s Hope voyage as a key—if little known—event that shaped the history of U.S. citizenship. The Fenian Brotherhood organized in the United States to fight for Irish independence, and it motivated the crew of Erin’s Hope to sail to Ireland and join the larger independence movement. But British officials arrested the men who went ashore in Ireland, including key leaders John Warren, a naturalized U.S. citizen, and William Nagle, a U.S. citizen by birth and son of noted Irish rebel David Nagle.

After their arrest, Nagle and Warren talked to reporters and drummed up public sentiment in the United States to help secure their release. The crew of Erin’s Hope quickly refashioned themselves from a liberating force into political prisoners. Advocates in the United States held rallies and published newspapers articles describing the plight of Warren, Nagel, and the rest of the Fenians from the Erin’s Hope. They mobilized supporters across naturalized populations, including people of German, French, Austrian, and Polish heritage. They hoped the large public campaign would convince the U.S. government to demand that the British authorities recognize the Fenians’ U.S. citizenship, which would shield them from the charges the British leveled against them.

Their efforts worked. With tight elections around the corner, congressmen introduced several laws to protect the foreign-born and gain their votes in the process (157, 159). Nathaniel P. Banks proposed the first U.S. law to codify the nation’s practice of expatriation, which became the Expatriation Act of 1868. The international ethnic nationalism of the Fenians, Salyer documents, pushed Congress to formalize the U.S. nation’s expatriation policy. It also forced the State Department to negotiate with officials from Great Britain to obtain the release of the imprisoned crew of the Erin’s Hope.

Under the Starry Flag places the Fenian crisis in the context of Radical Reconstruction and here is where Salyer connects the Fenian crisis to the larger history of U.S. citizenship. That the foreign-born, like African Americans, saw expanded rights of citizenship during the years of Reconstruction was not a coincidence. Salyer argues that Radical Republicans “may not have claimed the cause of expatriation as their own, but they helped make it possible” by providing “the vocabulary and a political climate that placed citizenship and its rights at the forefront of the nation’s agenda” (139). After officials arrested and imprisoned the crew of Erin’s Hope, for example, “the Fenians demanded reconstruction rights for naturalized citizens” (139).

Race was also central to the Fenians’ and their supporters’ ability to put the rights of the foreign-born on the congressional agenda during Radical Reconstruction. The Fenians’ whiteness, Salyer argues, was central to their ability to leverage capital in the United States. Whiteness was also central to their success in Congress. Congress responded to their advocacy because the men of Irish, German, French, Austrian, and Polish heritage could vote. They did not face racist restrictions that denied them that right.

Salyer’s work encourages further examination of immigration in Reconstruction. Congress passed the Expatriation Act of 1868 within days of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment (3). What is also true, and beyond the scope of Salyer’s book, is that lawmakers wrote the Civil Rights Act of 1870 to apply to immigrants as well as African Americans. The research of legal scholar Thomas Joo shows that fifteen years later, the Supreme Court turned to that Civil Rights Act to protect the property rights of Chinese immigrants in one of the era’s major civil rights cases. Future scholarship can deepen our understanding of why and how lawmakers included immigrant rights in some of the key legislation passed by the Radical Republicans.

The Reconstruction-era rights of naturalized citizens soon contracted. Domestic lawmakers did not do this, nor did the courts or vigilantes inflicting violence, as was the case for African American rights. Instead, as Salyer documents, diplomats constrained the newly articulated rights of naturalized citizens by limiting the protections they could claim abroad. State Department officials did so to contain disputes and prioritize the interests of businesses and the foreign policy elite (214–15). Salyer’s work on this issue should inspire more research into the interplay between diplomacy and the end of Reconstruction.

Methodologically, Salyer’s book is the outcome of a concerted effort to bring together immigration and diplomatic histories. SHAFR has encouraged this approach over the last several years. An increasing number of panels at SHAFR’s annual conferences focus on immigration and diplomacy, and one of its plenary sessions at the 2015 session was entitled “Immigration and Foreign Relations: 50 Years since the Hart-Cellar Act.” Under the Starry Flag is an important addition to a growing body of work at the intersection of these two disciplines—a body of work that includes books by Donna Gabaccia, Hidetaka Hirota, Meredith Oyen, Paul Kramer, Arrissa Ho, Kelly Lytle Hernández, and María Cristina García.

Salyer draws on an impressive set of sources that combine immigration and diplomatic history and includes, among other items, immigrant newspapers and U.S. and British diplomatic records. Her analysis moves seamlessly from the level of the nation-state to international relations. This approach enables her to illustrate, for example, that the 1868 expatriation law passed by the U.S. Congress did little to deal with overseas jurisdiction, but it set up the incentive for diplomats, both U.S. and foreign, to solve the crisis.

Under the Starry Flag also fits in with the exciting scholarship examining foreign policy liberalism. International law had for decades failed to provide a way through disagreements between the United States, with its policy on expatriation, and other countries, with their policies of perpetual allegiance. Tensions and conflicts worsened, wrought by massive expansions in global capitalism and migration throughout the nineteenth century (60). An entire chapter explores the work of international lawyers, like American Francis Lieber, who changed “the debate about expatriation.” This part of Salyer’s research complements work done by scholars like Benjamin Coates and Martti Koskenniemi, who examine the role of legal scholars in shaping international law in the nineteenth century. Salyer shows that international lawyers like Lieber helped convince policymakers in nations still practicing perpetual allegiance to change their policies and allow most of their citizens the right to expatriate.

The conflict over expatriation led directly to the dramatic expansion of international law. The number of diplomatic treaties increased sevenfold over the nineteenth century (189). Treaties resolving disagreements over expatriation and naturalization and the Fenian crisis drove most of the additions to international law. Between 1868 and 1872, the U.S. government signed one naturalization treaty after another with countries around the world.
These treaties resolved the Fenian crisis and ensured that conflicts over expatriation as a step toward naturalization would not continue.

Salyer’s many contributions to the field also include the revelation of how diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflicts over expatriation led to the expansion of international law into trade agreements, dispute resolution, and migrant protections. The Anglo-American Treaty that diplomats negotiated to end the Fenian crisis included provisions that also resolved the Alabama claims and remaining territorial and fisheries disputes in North America (214–15). Many of the treaties that secured the right of people to expatriate also included protections for migrants. The Burlingame Treaty with China, for example, “provided one of the few legal shields for Chinese immigrants in the United States against discriminatory laws, entitling them to the same ‘privileges, immunities and exemptions’ extended to other foreign nationals” (200).

Within Salyer’s treatment of international law is a small but critical contribution to women’s history. This contribution does not come from a focus on the social history of women. In fact, most of the people in Salyer’s book are men—the Fenians on Erin’s Hope and those who invaded Canada were all men; the diplomats and lawmakers from the United Kingdom and the United States were all men.5 However, near the end of the monograph, Salyer examines a particular issue that would be of great importance for women’s history.

Britain, like the United States, writes Salyer, “joined what was becoming a worldwide trend of marital denationalization,” stripping women who married foreigners of their nationality in order to achieve uniform international rules” (208). Historians such as Candice Bredbenner and Linda Kerber have written about this issue, but Salyer illuminates the role that the expatriation crisis played in the trend.6 At the end of the Fenian crisis, she notes, the British parliament ended perpetual allegiance. To do so, they expanded the individual rights of immigrants in British law—except for married women. British lawmakers introduced marital denationalization into domestic law, and diplomats subsequently included it in the new Anglo-American treaty.

Salyer argues that domestic and international law granted men and single women the choice to expatriate but at the same time “strip[ped] married women of any choice whatsoever when it came to nationality” (210). Lawmakers’ and diplomats’ resolution of the crisis over expatriation, therefore, made gender into “a filter” for new individual rights (203). Salyer’s ability to make this argument derives from her skill at using the national and international scales of analysis and from her strength as a historian of both U.S. and British law. Her argument is a model for scholars who write about history driven by men and are using gender as a category of analysis to understand the impact of the history on women’s lives and power.

In the book’s epilogue, Salyer writes that expatriation, “once praised as a natural right wielded by the individual,” had become the “tool of the state” by the twentieth century, “used by totalitarian and democratic governments alike (though not to the same degree) to prune and manage their citizenship” (220). In 2019, the Trump administration is turning to expatriation once again to “prune” citizens, creating nativist and racially motivated policies that constitute an “invisible” wall. Salyer’s work on expatriation recalls a different time, when the U.S. government worked hard to protect and reinforce the rights of immigrants in the United States and those that became U.S. citizens.

Notes:
1. They argued, writes Salyer, “that they had done nothing wrong.” They had not actually done any fighting. They also told people back in the United States that “what happened to them could happen to any American. And American honor and national status hung in the balance” (93).
5. Salyer does include some social history of Warren’s wife and some social history about women generally, but it is secondary to the main thrust of the book and the people at the heart of it.

Author’s Response
Lucy Salyer

Years ago, I set out to write a big history of American citizenship policies, tentatively entitled “Pledging Allegiance: The Troubled History of American Citizenship.” Originally Under the Starry Flag was to be chapter 1 of “Pledging Allegiance,” analyzing the transformation of U.S. citizenship law during Reconstruction, with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the “chapter” soon grew into its own book. As I began to investigate the little-known Expatriation Act of 1868, which came to legal life at the same time as the Fourteenth Amendment and sparked tremendous public interest, I became hooked by a story full of fascinating characters that was more international in scope and profound in its significance. Americans at the time heralded the Expatriation Act, and the numerous treaties secured to protect that right, as “one of the greatest and most important triumphs of American diplomacy” (3), yet “the right of expatriation” rings few bells of recognition today. Why the right of expatriation (that is, the right to migrate and change one’s citizenship) mattered so much in the nineteenth century and why it is largely forgotten—yet still vital—today is the central puzzle I sought to solve.

The project posed challenges as I cast my net wider to place American developments in citizenship policy in a global context. I traveled on unfamiliar terrain, moving from domestic to international law, from domestic to foreign policy, and from American to foreign archives. I sought to write an engaging narrative history which would be analytically rich, a task that proved much more difficult than expected. It was daunting to step into new fields of history, several of which are represented by the scholars here who have reviewed Under the Starry Flag with such depth and gracious attention. I appreciate the opportunity to respond to their various queries and observations.

One set of questions raised by the reviewers focuses on the Fenians, the transnational organization of freedom fighters formed in 1858 to free Ireland from British control. As the reviewers’ excellent synopses of the basic storyline reveal, the Fenians served as the catalyst that resulted in fundamental changes in national and international policies
on citizenship, leading Britain and other European countries to abandon theories of “perpetual allegiance.” Just who the Fenians were, what made them tick, and how significant their movement was in the long run are questions that have long sparked scholarly controversy.

Dan Margolies suggests I might have paid more attention to how the Civil War shaped their “worldview” and “insurrectionary ideas,” and to “think about the apparent contradictions of supporting Unionism in the American conflict but national liberation in Ireland.” How, in other words, could the Fenians oppose the secession of the Confederate South which claimed the right to govern itself, much like the Irish demanded an independent republic? The Civil War was transformative for many Irish American Fenians, as Christian Samito details in his excellent book, Becoming American Under Fire: Irish Americans, African Americans and the Politics of Citizenship during the Civil War Era (Cornell University Press, 2009). But, in Samito’s analysis (with which I agree), Fenians did not see Unionism and Irish national liberation as contradictory. They revered the Union as a republican refuge and “included the exportation of American values abroad as part of their mission.” The Civil War and the fight to liberate Ireland from England’s grasp were both part of the “global struggle for republicanism.” To be sure, Fenians such as Patrick Cleburne could be found in the Confederate ranks, and Fenian ardor for the Union cause waned as Irish American casualties rose and President Lincoln declared emancipation as a central objective of the war. But historian David Gleeson calls Irish American Confederates “reluctant secessionists,” and the majority of Irish nationalists continued to see their fight to preserve the Union and their battle for an independent Ireland as vitally linked.

But how should we characterize the Fenians and their legacy? Here, two of the reviewers sharply differ. David Brundage arguing that I shortchange the Fenians in depicting them as “fanatical opponents of England,” not as forward-looking transnational revolutionaries,” while Amy Greenberg says “a less kind narrator could credibly describe the American Fenians as rabble-rousers, miscreants, or murderers.” Greenberg also questions “the idea that a significant portion of the American public cared or was even aware of the Fenians,” finding the evidence provided in particular footnotes as too thin to make those claims.

That most Americans (at least those who read the papers and followed politics) knew about the Fenians is undeniable, that claim built not on a single footnote but on the accumulation of evidence throughout the book. To add to that evidence, a quick search on the New York Times database for articles on “Fenian” and “Fenians” between 1865 to 1869 yields 1,976 hits, an impressive number for a newspaper that was not particularly fond of the Fenians. What newspaper could resist covering the exploits of the filibustering Fenians – invading Canada on numerous occasions, for example – in an era when editors competed to sell papers? But Greenberg raises a second, crucial question: Did Americans really care about the Fenians? Where’s the proof that Americans rallied to their cause?

Newspapers, congressional documents, diplomatic correspondence and presidential speeches—indeed, the passage of the Expatriation Act—all attest to growing concern about the American Fenians’ treatment by Britain, prompted by the rising pressure of foreign-born Americans to act. The Boston Pilot reported that “the feeling throughout the land is very generally awakened” by the treatment of Irish American prisoners abroad, recording meetings popping up in the East—in such cities as Portland, Maine; Manchester, New Hampshire; Norwich, Connecticut; Elmira, New York; Washington, D.C.—but also in Midwestern cities, home to large numbers of German as well as Irish immigrants: Cleveland, Toledo, Cincinnati, Terra Haute, and Milwaukee. “One of the largest and most enthusiastic” meetings ever held at the State House in Springfield, Illinois, drew a crowd of American citizens, anxious to speak, on December 23, 1867, and “men of all nationalities” crowded a meeting at St. Louis to protest against “perpetual allegiance” as “an odious and barbarous relic of feudalism and a standing menace and insult to the Republic.” Even on the “frontier of Civilization,” in Mankato, Minnesota, the “utmost excitement prevailed.” Exact numbers of those in attendance (an important question raised by Green) are difficult to ascertain, but the meetings were packed, if the news accounts are to be trusted. “Every crook and cranny” of Mechanic Hall in Salem, Massachusetts, “was filled to suffocation” in late December 1867, reported the Pilot, while other major newspapers reported crowds of 7,000 at a Coopers Union rally in New York, “one of the largest meetings ever convened at Fanueil Hall,” and an “immense mass meeting” in Buffalo, New York.

Each meeting ended with an adoption of resolutions, reprinted in the newspapers and forwarded to Congress, denouncing British treatment of Irish American Fenians, declaring that “each man has the unqualified right to transfer his allegiance,” and demanding that Congress and the President take action. Secretary of State William Seward referred to these rallies in his diplomatic correspondence with Charles Francis Adams and the British government, saying “the people are appealing to this government throughout the whole country, Portland to San Francisco and from St. Paul to Pensacola” as a result of the trial of American Fenian John Warren (p. 157). Congress and the President did take action (detailed in Chapter 6) as did diplomats in the U.S., Great Britain, and German states, the subject of chapters 7 and 8.

Perhaps the question is not whether Americans cared about the Fenians, but why they cared. Many Americans held a skeptical view of the Fenians, similar to Green’s, the New York Times condemning the crimes of “thoughtless, misguided Irishmen” and “lawless ruffians” who violated American neutrality by invading Canada. But even critics of the Fenians worried a great deal about U.S. power in the world and the threat that competing emigration policies and citizenship regimes posed to the nation’s growth. As Margolies points out, while the Fenians are interesting in themselves as a potent transnational movement, they are central in my book as “a useful vehicle to explore historical and foreign politics over what Margolies refers to as “power
and choice” and “their meaning on a global scale.”

The phrase *civis Americanus sum* (“I am an American citizen”), used as a rallying cry by Fenians and the title of chapter 4, neatly captures how state power and individual choice became conflated. The phrase came from Roman law (*civis Romanus sum*), referring to the claim that Roman citizenship protected the individual as he traveled throughout the Roman Empire, and had been updated by the British government (*civis Britannicus sum*) as a tool of empire in the 19th century, used to shield British subjects from other powers’ interference. In the Fenians’ hands, “I am an American citizen!” simultaneously declared the power of the individual to choose citizenship (a claim directed both at the British and fellow Americans at home) and the power of the state to have their citizens recognized as such by other countries. State and individual empowerment became entwined and the interests of the state and immigrants aligned. That is one reason critics of the Fenians cared about their cause. The British stance—the “monstrous monarchical assumption” of “once a subject always a subject”—threatened the U.S. government’s power to define its citizenry, an essential aspect of national sovereignty and the country’s future growth which depended on immigration. Strategically, as the “centre of immigration in the world, . . .it has become indispensable for us, as a great nation, to have this right recognized,” concluded a typical editorial (157).

Others, particularly the growing international community of international law experts, saw the Fenians as a side story, just one more reason that new nation states should come together to form a modern international law to remove barriers to free trade and free migration. The simultaneous campaign to modernize international law, and its connection to the expatriation battles, was one of the most exciting and unexpected aspects of the research project. As Torrie Hester observes, the naturalization treaties became an entering wedge for future international agreements of all sorts, the Anglo-American Naturalization Treaty of 1870 opening the door for the Treaty of Washington of 1871. I share Torrie Hester’s call for more research on “foreign policy legalism” as well as the roles diplomats play in immigration policy.

Still, no matter how much individual proponents and congressional acts declared expatriation to be an inalienable and natural right, not everyone could declare “I am an American citizen!” nor expect that the government would rush to defend her. Expatriation turned out to be a right of expatriation—denied to “non-white” immigrants (particularly Asians) and white man’s right, the right to choose American citizenship would rush to defend her. Expatriation turned out to be a right that to strip Americans of their citizenship. “In our country the people are sovereign,” Black concluded (223). If, in the Trump era, the *Afroyim* doctrine is under attack, it’s all the more important to recall that the U.S. has not always been about building walls and to revive the now-forgotten “American doctrine” of the right of individuals to choose their homes.9

Notes:
3. See, especially, chapter 5, notes 75 and 76, and chapter 6 in Under the Starry Flag.
4. See note 76, p. 265-66; notes 61, 62, 63 at p 270 in Under the Starry Flag.
In May 2019, SHAFR signed on to a lawsuit brought by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) and the National Security Archive at George Washington University over President Trump’s failure to keep records of his meetings with foreign leaders as required by the Presidential Records Act and Federal Records Act. Among the examples cited by the suit are the President’s undocumented meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The suit asked the Court to ensure that records be created and properly preserved and archived, as required by law.

In February 2020, U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson interpreted Circuit precedent to mean that the Court lacks authority to “oversee the President’s day-to-day compliance with the statutory provisions involved in this case.” Jackson pointedly commented that Congress has the power to “revisit its decision to accord the executive such unfettered control or to clarify its intentions.” Jackson also made a point of noting that her opinion “will not address, and should not be interpreted to endorse, the challenged practices, nor does it include any finding that the Executive Office is in compliance with its obligations.”

Having lost in the District court, SHAFR is now a party to the appeal. The likelihood of success remains remote. Nevertheless, because Judge Jackson cited the lawsuit’s complaints in her decision and highlighted Congress’ authority to address the issues raised by the complaint, if SHAFR and its co-defendants lose the appeal, the suit will challenge Congress to legislate a remedy.

SHAFR is also party to an ongoing case against Michael R. Pompeo, et al., that emerged from the case against the White House. The Pompeo case charges that Secretary of State Pompeo and the Department of State have refused to create records of essential agency transactions as the Federal Records Act requires. The brief cites testimony from the impeachment hearings on off-the-books shadow diplomacy as part of its case that the defendants have not acted in good faith to comply with the Federal Records Act.

In response to another unfolding historical documentation case, flagged by the Historical Documentation Committee, SHAFR President Kristin Hoganson has sent letters of concern to three French officials: President Emmanuel Macron, Franck Riester (Minister of Culture), and Florence Parly (Minister for the Armed Forces). These letters express alarm over a recent change in declassification policy established by the Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN). The new rules, regarding the declassification of documents from 1940 to present, are hindering access to government documents, including ones that have previously been open and accessible to scholars, students, and the general public.

Attention SHAFR Members:

On March 6, 2020, SHAFR President Kristin Hoganson appointed a Conference Contingency Task Force to monitor the quickly evolving COVID-19 situation with regard to the 2020 SHAFR conference, 2020 SHAFR Summer Institute, and Second Book Workshop in New Orleans. Updates and announcements regarding the status of these events will be forthcoming via e-mail and on SHAFR.org
NARA’s Deepening Crisis

Richard Immerman

In my capacities as chair of SHAFR’s Historical Documentation Committee (HDC), the AHA’s National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Review Committee, and the Department of State’s Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), for more than a decade I have closely observed NARA’s deepening crisis. In my judgment, we are approaching a point from which there can be no return.

By now most SHAFR members are aware of the serious problems that are eroding NARA’s ability to fulfill its mission. Many of us have experienced one of these problems first hand. Some researchers have been unpleasantly surprised by the transition to the “one pull” policy at National Archives II, for example, or when they learned that the computer terminal for the Remote Archives Capture (RAC) program at the Carter Library was no longer operable and would not be repaired. Those SHAFR members whose scholarship depends on successful FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) and MDR (Mandatory Declassification Review) requests expect waiting lengthy periods of time to receive any results, even if the request is denied in full. Yet over the past several years those waits have become intolerable. NARA fell so far behind appraising and describing the documents it accessioned from the spectrum of agencies that President Obama established the National Declassification Center. This NDC has helped, both by reducing the backlog and developing initiatives such as “indexing by demand” to serve the needs of individual researchers. Nevertheless, NARA remains overwhelmed.

The explosion of records over the past decades, many of which are born digital, has exacerbated the problem by stretching NARA to the breaking point. And its capabilities are almost sure to be stretched even further point by the recently approved mandate to accept only digitized records after December 2022. Presidential libraries as well as agencies such as the CIA have already had to abandon systematic review to keep up with the increased number of FOIA and MDR requests, a spike driven in large part by the inadequacies of systematic review. The combination of FOIA and MDR requests expect waiting lengthy periods of time to receive any results, even if the request is denied in full. Yet over the past several years those waits have become intolerable. NARA fell so far behind appraising and describing the documents it accessioned from the spectrum of agencies that President Obama established the National Declassification Center. This NDC has helped, both by reducing the backlog and developing initiatives such as “indexing by demand” to serve the needs of individual researchers. Nevertheless, NARA remains overwhelmed.

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At both presidential libraries and National Archives II, moreover, we now must work from finding guides that are only a shell of what they once were. I’m not even going to touch the question of the number and subject expertise of those archivists from whom we seek guidance, or how the perceived need of short-staffed agencies and NARA itself to rely heavily on artificial intelligence and attendant technologies to manage electronic records poses a grave risk to the permanent retention of thousands of valuable ones. The list of difficulties we face is interminable.

At long last the historical community has begun to address this crisis, and SHAFR has been at the forefront of the effort. Indeed, it was the survey of historians’ attitudes toward and assessments of NARA that our HDC conducted in 2014 that first garnered the attention of NARA’s leadership and many of our colleagues. (https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/april-2014/a-national-treasure-at-the-brink). That should come as no surprise. No subfield of history is more archive-dependent than ours. And as international historians, our experiences in multinational archives provide us with unparalleled insights. SHAFR historians have played an outsized role on the HAC and we are well represented in the National Coalition for History (NCH) and the NARA Review Committee, which the current crisis prompted the AHA recently to establish.

Largely because of these organizations’ expressions of concern with the state of NARA, which include the HAC’s annual reports over the past several years that are read by congressional committees in addition to the public (the HAC reports are available on the SHAFR research page at https://shafr.org/research), NARA’s leadership arranged a meeting this past fall with principal stakeholders. Attendees included representatives from SHAFR, the AHA, the NCH, the Organization of American Historians, and the American Association for Political Science. I participated, along with Matt Connelly and Kristin Hoganson. The discussion covered a spectrum of issues, many of which we’ll revisit at a luncheon plenary scheduled for the SHAFR meeting in New Orleans. But what in certain respects was the meeting’s most valuable outcome, at least in the short term, was what we learned about NARA’s current situation, which borders on untenable. Kristin, Matt, and I decided that this knowledge warrants dissemination throughout the membership so we can be informed and we can work together to seek solutions.

For this purpose, I am transmitting the briefing document produced by NARA’s leadership subsequent to our meeting and distributed by Meg Phillips, NARA’s external affairs liaison. I reproduce it exactly as Meg sent it so that it portrays unvarnished NARA’s point of view. I do need to add some context, however. The central theme of the presentation by Jay Bosanko, NARA’s chief operating officer, was that “we are doing the best with what we have.” How one defines “best” is highly subjective, and the intent of SHAFR and the other organizations that attended the meeting is to sustain a mutually beneficial dialogue with NARA. In this regard we can all agree that what NARA has is not nearly enough. This shortfall is dramatically illustrated by its appropriations for FY2020. That budget provides for an almost $15 million reduction in operating expenses from FY2019. NARA proposed this reduction, it warrants stressing, justifying it primarily with savings from spending on facilities and the workforce. ($22 million is earmarked for digitizing records that NARA has accessioned in paper; agencies are required by December 2022 to produce a million pages of records a month. By comparison, NARA digitizes only 2,500,000 pages a month.)
2022 to digitize all their records before transferring them to NARA, but this is an unfunded mandate). After some adding, subtracting, and negotiating, Congress approved NARA’s proposal.

Keep that in mind as you read below. The HSC will continue to monitor developments closely, and it will make every effort to update the membership. But should anyone decide it valuable to share an experience with us, or to make a suggestion, don’t hesitate to let us know. You can contact me, the NCH through Matt Connelly, and/or Kristin Hoganson or any SHAFR officer or Council member. NARA’s crisis is a crisis for us all, and an effective response requires a collective effort.

NARA Challenges Regarding Staffing and Responsibilities

• When NARA became independent of GSA in 1985, it had a total of 3,096 employees who were responsible for 1.6 million cu. ft. of archival holdings and 14.4 million cu. ft. of agency records at NARA’s federal records centers.

• Today, NARA has fewer than 3,000 employees (2,875) who are responsible for 5.3 million cu. ft. of archival holdings and 27 million cu. ft. of records centers holdings.

• In the past 35 years, the volume of NARA’s holdings has increased more than threefold, while the number of staff has stayed relatively constant.

• NARA’s mission has expanded significantly since 1985 as well. 7 additional Presidential Libraries

• Nixon, and Carter through Bush 44

• Obama (new model – records and artifact responsibilities remain)

• Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO)

• Oversight of classification, safeguarding, and declassification, etc.

• Office of Government Information Services (OGIS)

• FOIA Oversight and Ombudsman roles

• National Declassification Center (NDC)

• Expanded responsibility for declassification

• Business needs have changed dramatically since 1985

• IT hardware, software, etc. and staff have increased

• Handful of IT staff in 1985; 70 today

• Safety and security requirements (post-9/11)

• Heightened archival storage standards

• Expectations of our customers have changed dramatically since 1985

• Extensive web and social media presence

• Records available online

• 0 in 1985, 30,000 in 2009, 97 million today

• Support to veterans and their families at NPRC and beyond

• Increased use of FOIA and other access mechanisms

• The need to manage large volumes of textual records is not diminishing.

• 2-3 million cubic feet of permanent Federal records will be eligible for transfer to NARA in the next 15 years.

• Another 3 million cubic feet of permanent Federal records are eligible for transfer beyond 2035.

• Our infrastructure and facilities are aging and are in need of significant investment.

• Repairs and Restorations appropriation of about $7.5M for 40+ facilities

• Declined from over $9M in FY 2014, despite a backlog of needs

• The challenges all become more acute when considering what we face with electronic records. Today, we have accessioned about 963TB of data or 21.5 billion logical data records

• In 1991, our earliest estimate, our total electronic records holdings represented only 13 million logical data records. Today we are accessioning an average of 2 billion logical data records annually.

• The challenges with the scope and scale of electronic records is daunting. Consider this:

• The volume of electronic records in the FOIA backlog just at the George W. Bush Library is the equivalent of approximately 158 million pages. The current staff at the Library can review approximately 650,000 pages per year, which means that it would take nearly 250 years to eliminate this one backlog.

• The Obama Presidential Library has approximately 300 million emails; since each email averages (with attachments) the equivalent of five pages, the Obama Library alone has the equivalent of 1.5 billion pages of emails, in addition to 12,000 cubic feet of analog records.

• Meanwhile, we are attempting to work through these challenges in an environment that includes reduced budgets across the Executive Branch that have resulted in reduced staff, outdated information technology, and records management resource deficiencies.
A Roundtable on Jennifer M. Miller, *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan*

Aaron Skabelund, Hiromi Mizuno, Andrew C. McKevitt, Marc Gallicchio, and Jennifer M. Miller

Review of Jennifer M. Miller, *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan*

Aaron Skabelund

Over twenty-five years ago, in an edited volume entitled *Postwar Japan as History* (1993), Andrew Gordon called on fellow historians to begin viewing postwar Japan through the lens of history. John Dower’s Pulitzer Prize-winning study of the occupation, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (1999), was one of the first books to answer this call. Since then, historians have produced an accelerating number of studies of the country’s ever-lengthening postwar period. They have explored a variety of topics besides the occupation, from the postwar monarchy and politics of war memory to the idea of growth and the impact of the massive 1960 protests.

Diplomatic historian Jennifer M. Miller’s *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan* makes a stellar contribution to this growing scholarship. The chief focus of her study is the 1950s. Though she says less about culture than Dower does, Miller essentially picks up the story of U.S.-Japan relations where he leaves off, as his coverage of the last two years of the occupation is sparse. Because the transpacific relationship and the early postwar decades were so central in shaping Japanese politics, society, and culture, Miller’s book, like Dower’s, will long be required reading for anyone who wants to understand Japan then and today.

By “Cold War democracy,” Miller means the multiple views of democracy that contended for dominance in Japan during the decades of geopolitical tension between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its satellite states. In this instance, “democracy” is best understood as plural rather than singular. U.S. policymakers wielded the most dominant interpretation of democracy, though it was contested and challenged. American political and military leaders believed that equality and representative government would bring Japan peace and stability. But during and after the occupation they became so concerned that communist power would put democracy in peril that they enacted “almost antidemocratic democracy” (3), which was marked by contradictory impulses—authoritarian paternalism and continued support for the establishment of democratic institutions in Japan.

After the Cold War began in 1947, most Japanese conservatives aligned themselves with the Americans. They shared the U.S. “obsession with communist deviance,” which they, like American officials, believed “could only be combatted through a commitment to political stability and the development of a ‘healthy’ national spirit that would channel the masses into following state authority” (5). Other Japanese, especially those on the Left, embraced very different ideas about democracy. Suspicious of state power because of the war, “they argued that the public’s role in a democratic society was not to mobilize behind stability and state power,” but rather for “the people . . . to mentally separate themselves from the demands of the state and vigilantly hold its leaders accountable to popular desires for peace and democratic representation” (6). Though Miller acknowledges that the situation was more complicated than a simple binary, she argues that these two views formed a dialectical process that contended to define democracy and played a constitutive role in shaping the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Miller’s approach to Japan’s postwar history is characterized by connectivity—emphasizing links across space (transnational) and time (transwar) that are emblematic of recent historiography and that sharpen her analysis. One would hope for equal attention to both sides of an international relationship in diplomatic history, and Miller delivers. Thanks to intensive language study followed by thorough archival research in Japan, she gives each side its due. This is evident in every chapter. Throughout the book, Miller mines sources, primary and secondary, in both English and Japanese. She uses those sources to explore how competing notions of democracy shaped policy even as one side has the upper hand, as the Americans do until the occupation comes to an end (along with her first three chapters), after which the Japanese, conservative and liberal (but especially liberal), seized the initiative.

Chapter 1 analyzes visions of democracy in the context of American wartime planning and first five years of the occupation. Chapter 2 examines discussions of democracy and “spirit” (seishin) as the United States military reestablished a Japanese military after the outbreak of war in Korea forced General Douglas MacArthur to rush American troops in Japan to the peninsula. The third chapter explores how Americans and Japanese sought to use the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which ended the occupation, to mobilize Japan to join the “so-called free world” in the struggle against global communism (115).

Chapters 4 and 5 assess the protests opposing the expansion of the Tachikawa Air Force Base in the mid-1950s and the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, during which many Japanese—not just activists and intellectuals—used their visions of democracy to resist American Cold War policies and the U.S.-Japan alliance.
The sixth and final chapter, “Producing Democracy,” investigates how Americans and Japanese used U.S. technical assistance to craft new visions of democracy that were based on economic productivity and growth. Miller argues that by the early 1960s, these developments brought about a shared rationale for the alliance that pervaded the rest of the Cold War and endures to this today.

The value of Miller’s transnational approach, which at times becomes multinational as she explores how Japan was held up as a model for other Asian countries, is that it allows for a more nuanced interpretation than one that privileges one side of a relationship. Repeatedly, Miller challenges existing historiographical conclusions using evidence based on this approach. Historians of Japan, for example, have traditionally explained the 1960 protests by pointing to the domestic evolution of democracy. Miller argues that because the U.S.-Japan alliance had long impacted the development of democracy, international as well as national factors must be part of any explanation (210). Just as democratic ideas shaped the alliance, the alliance shaped notions of democracy, in Japan and elsewhere in Asia.

I wish Miller had gone further, though. She lays out a persuasive argument for “Cold War democracy” in Japan and the United States, but is this concept applicable elsewhere? Miller rules out other Asian allies of the United States, such as Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam, where American policymakers supported authoritarian leaders, but how about in Europe, Africa, and Latin America? Are the dynamics she describes applicable only to the U.S.-Japan alliance? I wish she had at least speculated on this question.

The transwar nature of Miller’s study also allows for new contributions. Like the work of historians of Japan that has highlighted continuities between wartime and postwar thinking, her study dips back into the pre-1945 years to highlight both Japanese and American ideas that kept animating the relationship during and after the occupation. One of her most interesting assertions is that “understandings of democracy” in the United States and Japan came to be based “not simply on the existence of democratic institutions and individual rights and liberties,” but on the “mentality and mindset of the people” (8). She identifies wartime-era expressions that informed the postwar position that a defense of democracy required “a psychological—even spiritual—commitment to national unity and stability” (10). This requirement was used to justify the suppression of supposedly antidemocratic voices in both countries.

This transwar—and again, transnational—approach enables Miller to offer a more complete explanation for what historians have called the “reverse course”: the sudden shift from progressive policies to an anticommunist crusade in the late 1940s. Because American policymakers believed both during and after the war that democracy was a “mental and spiritual project, which could only be sustained through constant vigilance and psychological strength,” the shift in policies exhibited continuity rather than simply a rupture. This emphasis on psychology, combined with a racialized sense of superiority, led occupation officials to interccept democratic voices, including Japanese ones (51–52). Miller shows that the notion that Americans were dealing with an irrational “Japanese mind,” as Frank Capra’s wartime propaganda film “Know Your Enemy: Japan” memorably and disturbingly stressed, shaped U.S. policy long after the end of the occupation. Strikingly, an embassy official used the exact same phrase to explain the anti-U.S.-Japan security treaty demonstrations in 1960 (221). The past, and its ideas, lived on in Cold War Japan.

Cold War Democracy is a model of historical scholarship. It makes contributions well outside diplomatic history. It is superbly written and organized. Miller has also selected striking and original photographs to illustrate the narrative. One of my few complaints is that all the references for a paragraph are grouped into single-mention endnotes, but that was surely a decision made by Harvard University Press. As this criticism suggests, I strained to find flaws in this book. Instead, I found myself wishing that Miller had continued her examination of the alliance further into the 1960s and beyond. Perhaps we can look forward to a sequel that will shed more light on postwar Japan as history.

Review of Jennifer M. Miller, Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan

Hiromi Mizuno

This is a well-researched and ambitious book that examines the process of U.S.-Japan alliance-making and U.S. hegemony-building in Asia from 1945 through the 1960s. Author Jennifer Miller does a wonderful job of portraying the dynamism of this process, which was propelled by the common interests of the two governments but also intercepted by domestic politics in both countries. As a historian of modern Japan, I especially appreciate chapter 4 on the Sunagawa anti-air base expansion movement and chapter 5 on the anti-security treaty movement, two pivotal developments in postwar Japan that have received little attention from American scholars of the Cold War. Miller shows that, while the United States undoubtedly maintained the upper hand, the Japanese protest movements against U.S. hegemony did impact American policies.

The strength of the book lies in its sophisticated weaving of rich details from archival research into a highly readable narrative that captures an overarching picture of how U.S. hegemony was achieved and maintained. Miller’s mastery of the secondary literature, ranging widely across U.S. and Japanese history in both English and Japanese, is remarkable. This is very mature scholarship, and it is especially impressive for a first monograph.

The basic narrative of the book does not diverge from the narrative established by Japan scholars. Cold War imperatives reversed American goals in the military occupation of Japan from demilitarization to re-militarization and from political reform to economic recovery and development. Faced with the return of vibrant socialist and Communist movements in Japan, the victory of the Communist Party in mainland China, and the Soviet Union’s successful nuclear bomb testing, Douglas MacArthur released Japanese wartime leaders and elite bureaucrats from prison while purging the labor unionists and leftists he had released from their wartime imprisonment only a few years earlier.

The postwar U.S.-Japan alliance—and Japan’s economic prosperity—was based on the congruence between American Cold War warriors and conservative Japanese wartime leaders. Japan scholars have examined this congruence as manifested and maintained in the so-called San Francisco System (international relations defined by the San Francisco Peace Treaties and the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty, both signed on September 8, 1951) and the 1955 system (the domestic political structure in which the conservative Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] reigned, albeit with significant opposition from the Socialist Party). As John Dower has put it, the “San Francisco System’ and ‘1955 System’ vividly symbolize the intense political conflicts over issues of peace and democracy” that “pitted liberal and left-wing critics against the dominant conservative elites,” especially in the most volatile period of the 1950s and 1960s. According to Dower, “Peace became the magnetic pole for both legitimization and criticism of external policy; democracy served the same function for highly contested domestic issues.” For Japan, this resulted in a “separate peace” from a diplomatic point of view and a shaky democracy at home under the dominance of the LDP. Both results were legitimized by what would become by the mid-1970s the Japanese “miracle economy.” By the mid-1970s, the Japanese “miracle economy” legitimized peace.

Miller’s chapter organization follows this narrative line: chapter 1 focuses on the Occupation and its reverse course, chapter 2 on the Korean War and militarization of Japan, chapter 3 on the 1951 peace and security treaties, chapters 4 and 5 on the most intense Japanese protests against the U.S.-Japan military alliance, and chapter 6 on Japan’s economic growth and the productivity movement. Where Miller differs from other scholars is in her central focus on democracy in the arena of diplomacy. She argues that that American leaders and delegates conceived of democracy not simply as a system of government but as a “state of mind”; the Japanese people, and by extension the Asian peoples, needed to believe deeply in American values and its capitalist system in order to be effective allies in the Cold War. What good would it do if the United States gave universal suffrage to the Japanese, but they voted for a socialist leader? (In fact, the very first general election in postwar Japan produced a socialist prime minister!)

The idea of what Miller calls “psychological democracy” runs through all the chapters, illuminating American policymakers’ deep—and sometimes remarkably naive—faith in molding the minds of the Japanese while also mitigating their sense of insecurity when faced with Japanese liberal, leftist, and/or pacifist movements that promoted non-American democracy. A rich array of quotations from archived memos, classified security notes, and recorded interviews and memoirs of numerous American policymakers and Cold War warriors documents the broad American consensus in democracy as “a process of mental and psychological transformation” (29). Miller argues that congruence between the American Cold War warriors and Japanese wartime elites was based on “the shared goal of not only preventing communist infiltration but also building Cold War democracy” (23).

I am not sure if one can separate the two aspects of this shared goal. In fact, as I was reading the book, I could not stop myself from putting scare quotes around the word “democracy” and substituting “Pro-Americanism” or “anti-communism” for it. Take a sentence on page 126, for example: “Yet for Dulles and others, for Japan to become a model for all of Asia—a key treaty objective—the United States would have to continue to mold Japanese minds in the shape of democracy.” According to Miller, American policymakers demanded from Japan not only economic and military vigor but also the psychological strength to resist communism globally and to achieve stability and consensus at home. I do not disagree with this, but Miller’s emphasis on the “spiritual” dimension and her attempt to re-read anti-communist politics through it creates an unintended effect: the more the author takes American policymakers’ advocacy of democracy seriously and highlights their spiritual and psychological approach to it, the more the book reads like a story of brainwashing and psychological warfare.

Or perhaps she did intend the book to be read as such. Perhaps that is why the book ends with Prime Minister Abe. I appreciate Miller’s attempt to illuminate the “ideological continuities in democratic visions and ideologies between the Cold War and the so-called war on terror” (275), but how absurd it is to have Mr. Abe as a concluding example of democracy—unless one is mocking Cold War “democracy.” Miller, in her conclusion, discusses the phrase “common interests and shared values,” which was used in the title of a 2014 report by a congressional study group on Japan. The use of the term “shared values” in reference to the U.S.-Japan alliance, she notes, “is now commonplace” (274). It seems to me, however, that it is “common interests” that continue to keep the U.S.-Japan alliance strong and that define the two countries’ shared values. In 2015, Abe achieved what American policymakers and his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke could not do in the 1950s—that is, a militarization of Japan—by passing new laws that allowed the Self-Defense Forces to be deployed overseas for the United States, against strong domestic public opposition. Photo images of citizens’ protests in front of the Diet building show a remarkably cunning similarity to those from the failed anti-Anpo protest demonstration of 1960. To most Japanese, the passing of the 2015 legislation yet again cast doubt on the saliency of democracy in Japan. It would make more sense, thus, to see the relationship between Abe and American leaders through the lens of “common interests” rather than the “shared values” of democracy (274–78).

I do not disagree that democracy, the definitions and visions of which once contested violently in Japan and Asia, has come to be equated with capitalism. But in fact, that equation is quite remarkable, because Marxism, socialism, and communism also have democracy as an ideal. The history of prewar Japan—not covered in Miller’s book—is rich with leftist and liberal intellectuals and unionists who struggled to reconcile democracy with the absolute power endowed upon the emperor (Andrew Gordon has called this “imperial democracy”). Miller’s work helps us understand how the erasure of democracies happened, but it is also clear that it was not because democracy became a shared value, but because the democracy that was defined as anti-communist carried such political and diplomatic weight in dealing with Cold War America.

In other words, it is not necessarily “ideological continuities in democratic visions” that characterize the U.S.-Japan alliance from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period as Millar concludes. Miller makes it clear at the beginning of the book that the aim of her project is to highlight the role of ideological rationales over that of security and economic rationales (8). I would argue, however, that one cannot and should not separate ideology from security and economic concerns. Let me explain.

One place I disagree with Miller is in chapter 6, where there is an otherwise very informative discussion of the industrial productivity program. Led by the United States and embraced by Japanese leaders, the program brought Japan unprecedented economic growth, calmed political unrest, and enabled Japan’s return to Asia as the model of a “Cold War democracy.” Miller concludes the chapter by arguing that economic development became the most attractive field of U.S.-Japan cooperation, especially after the Anpo crisis, because it “promised to provide the mental transformation necessary to combat communism in Japan and Asia and revitalize Japan with a new sense of purpose” while maintaining Japanese and American regional and global dominance: “Development, after all, did not require economic redistribution, colonial redress, or apologies for Japan’s wartime aggression” (272).

I maintain that it did require those things. As is well known, Japanese postwar development aid began as reparations for Japan’s wartime aggression. Japan
concluded bilateral reparations treaties with Asian countries in the 1950s: with Burma in 1954 (and 1963) for US$ 200 million, with the Philippines for US$ 550 million, with South Vietnam for US$ 39 million, and so forth. These treaties—as well as so-called quasi-reparations treaties with South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand—stipulated that the amount be paid not in cash but in technical aid, using Japanese capital goods and services. Dams, roads, and factories were built by the Japanese throughout Asia as reparations payments. The development aid programs that Miller discusses—such as Third Country Training—functioned alongside these much bigger projects, as well as numerous Colombo Plan projects. As reparations were paid off in the 1960s, those projects turned into development aid and commercial contracts, enabling and propelling the high growth of Japan’s export-oriented economy. (I would add that the rise of the 1960s development aid that Miller points out occurred also because of this timing.)

Through this developmentalist network of technology, Asian nationalist leaders established military regimes in their newly independent countries, Japan re-entered Asia both diplomatically and economically, and the United States built its Cold War Asia. Meanwhile, individual victims of Japanese war aggressions, such as former comfort women and forced laborers throughout Asia, were ignored, forgotten, and silenced by these governments. I have called this “the kula ring for the flying geese” to articulate the simultaneously symbolic, diplomatic, and economic nature of the developmental network in Cold War Asia. Japan’s postwar economic prosperity was possible not because the US provided efficiency technologies to Japan and Japan perfected it. Daniel Immerwahr has criticized such US-centered “hub-and-spoke” approach of Cold War studies in this journal. I agree with Immerwahr. In order to recover and grow, Japanese capitalism required access to the market and resources in Asia, not just capital and technologies from the US.

Postcolonial dynamics in postwar Asia make Cold War ideological concerns less central than scholars of Cold War Studies assume. It may be a surprise to Americanists that Japanese aid projects and trade agreements with Asian countries were surprisingly free of Cold War constraints and language. Japan semi-formally traded with Communist China throughout the 1950s and 1960s and continued reparations/aid projects when Southeast Asian leaders such as Sukarno did not seem fully committed to the “free world.” Asia Kyokai, a quasi-government organization whose English publication Miller used for chapter 6, was absolutely essential in this process. However, in my analysis of its Japanese-language publications, Cold War concerns and rhetoric were expressed much less frequently by Japanese leaders and businessmen than their far bigger concerns with the lingering negative effects of Japan’s colonial and wartime occupation in the minds of Asians. To Asian dictators whose aspiration was to achieve economic independence from their former European colonizers and to solidify their legitimacy domestically, Japanese political and business leaders emphasized the language of “cooperation,” replacing the wartime language of co-prosperity. They did not, to my knowledge, use the language of “democracy” to promote this developmentalist network with Asian leaders. This is not to refute Miller’s work in any way. Instead, as a future direction, I want to suggest looking at the U.S.-Japan alliance-making together with Japan-Asia relationships and the US-Southeast Asia relationships. It would illuminate much nuanced and layered processes of the making of Cold War Asia and should generate stimulating discussions in graduate seminars.

In his 2019 book Anti-Japan, Leo T. S. Ching, who is concerned with the dead-end crash of neo-nationalism in post-Cold War East Asia, calls for “the decolonization of democracy.” Especially in Japan, Ching maintains, anti-militarization movements should be “questioning and challenging the complicity of democracy in suppressing the colonial question in the postwar capitalist order” if they want to effectively create transnational alliances beyond Japan. I agree. Miller’s work is extremely helpful here as it demonstrates how hard the United States pushed to perpetuate the colonial condition of democracy in postwar Japan. American Cold War policy still deeply matters to post-Cold War Asia, where the separate peace arrangement of the Cold War—two Koreas and two Chinas—continues to shape international and domestic politics. This troubling legacy of the “Cold War peace” has been examined and critiqued by many scholars, but Millar and Ching remind me that doing so should also mean paying attention to the troubling legacy of “Cold War democracy.”

There is one question that I would like to ask Miller to address in her response to the reviews in this roundtable. Why is there no discussion in her book of the tension within the Occupation authorities between left-learning New Dealers and conservative Cold warriors? Charles Kades, Harry Kelly, David Conde, and some other New Dealers who conventionally appear in studies of the Occupation do not make any appearance in Cold War Democracy, and their dismissal as part of the reverse course is not mentioned.

Notes:
3. Hiromi Mizuno, “Introduction: The Kula Ring for the Flying Geese: Japan’s Technology Aid and Postwar Asia,” in Engineering Asia: Technology, Colonial Development, and the Cold War Order, eds. Hiromi Mizuno, John S. Moore, and John DiMoia (London, 2018), 1–41. The Kula Ring refers to the gift exchange system in Papua New Guinea, made famous by anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski in the 1920s. My critical use of this analogy is to highlight the simultaneously symbolic and economic function of international aid in modern capitalist economy. The flying geese refers to the Flying Geese Model, which was originally conceived by Kaname Akamatsu in the 1930s but became internationally popular in the 1980s to explain the “catching-up” process of industrialization of latecomer economies.

Review of Jennifer M. Miller, Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan.
Andrew C. McKevitt

I worry that readers will see the subtitle of this book—“The United States and Japan”—and skip these roundtable reviews, mistakenly believing that a book about a bilateral relationship is primarily for specialists in that relationship, whereas monographs about U.S.-[pick a country] relations speak to an earlier era of scholarship and public concern. We live in a transnational era, after all, both in terms of our research subjects and our material lives. Many graduate students are trained to think transnationally rather than bilaterally. And beyond that, the U.S.-Japan relationship today just seems so pedestrian.

It is a point Jennifer Miller makes in the conclusion of Cold War Democracy. Nobody batted an eye in the twenty-first century, she writes, when George W. Bush or Barack Obama spoke of the “shared values” between the United States and Japan. Viewed from the perspective of the book’s subject, however—roughly, the first two postwar decades of this relationship—such an outcome would have seemed extraordinary. Would anyone in 1945, or even 1960, have predicted that two enemies that had waged a war of mutual
extermination could have established a partnership that, in 2019, stands as modern history’s longest bilateral military alliance? Somehow, as Miller notes, that extraordinary development became ordinary in the last several decades, to the point where we don’t consider its regular, ritualized renewal newsworthy.

I begin, then, with more of a plea than an argument: read this book, please, because it is probably for you even if you’re among the readers who think the U.S.-Japan relationship is pedestrian. That I have to begin with such a plea speaks to the state of the field on U.S.-Japan relations. Works on the subject have carved out their own cubbyhole in U.S. foreign relations history and have persisted even in an era when bilateral studies have gone out of fashion. The historians who write these books, however, have long believed that buried in the postwar history of U.S.-Japan relations lies a bigger story than simply a bilateral one. We’ve seen more “there” there than the grand historical narratives of the postwar era suggest.

Miller’s *Cold War Democracy* reads like such a victory to me, then, because it finally actualizes that feeling, so difficult to nail down, that the U.S.-Japan relationship could tell us something more about the Cold War than just the alliance’s place in it or the value of its mammoth trade flows. Despite Ambassador Mike Mansfield’s claim that the “U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none,” or Chalmers Johnson’s description of it as “the most valuable transoceanic relationship that has ever existed,” or Singapore’s founding prime minister Lee Kuan Yew’s characterization of the partnership as “without parallel in history,” foreign relations historians still need to be convinced of Japan’s greater significance to the Cold War narrative. Miller has, as the kids might say, brought the receipts.²

For Miller, the bilateral relationship is a vehicle for exploring the larger issue of the U.S. construction of a democratic ideology during the Cold War. U.S.-Japan relations were, in that sense, a laboratory in which U.S. policymakers could experiment with ideas about democracy, ideas that would evolve into “modernization theory” and shape U.S. government thinking about the nonwhite world. Certainly Miller is not the first historian to prioritize the concept of democracy in the Cold War. Arguably, the idea of democracy during the Cold War as an idea that predated the end of the Second World War; it was freedom to prosper. This is as much a historical argument as a historiographic project that elevated ‘democracy’ as the rationale for this relationship over just a couple of decades.³ Like other works in this tradition, her book takes ideology seriously as an explanation rather than simply a cover for material interests. “While both security and economic rationales were crucial to the construction of this alliance,” she writes, “this relationship also arose from a larger American ideological project that elevated ‘democracy’ as the rationale for this alliance’s existence.” (8)

Writing of democratic ideology as a specific *project* of U.S. Cold War liberals opens it up to nuanced interrogation. It was easy for Americans to neglect the way democracy in the abstract was contested during the Cold War, to forget that the Soviets and Chinese Communists also laid claim to it, let alone that popular Japanese visions clashed with those of U.S. policymakers. Indeed, it was the importance of democracy to everyone—and the consequent clashing of these visions of democracy—that made it so important to the Cold War. Miller argues that in this sense democracy was as important a rationale for the alliance as security or economics. Indeed, democracy *was* security and prosperity, in the way policymakers framed it at the time. Democracy was strength against totalitarianism, an idea that predated the end of the Second World War; it was freedom to prosper. This is as much a historical argument as a historiographic one: to understand the Cold War, we can’t separate ideology from national security or economic considerations. For Miller, they are mutually constitutive.

Taking ideology seriously in practice means taking Americans seriously when they used phrases that historians of the past easily dismissed as rhetorical flourish: James Byrnes speaking of the “spiritual disarmament” and “spiritual liberation” of the Japanese people (27); George Kennan famously cabling from Moscow in 1946 about the “self-discipline, confidence, morale, and community spirit” needed to win political victories over the Soviets (10); Paul Nitze calling for “vitality” and “confidence” alongside a massive military buildup in NSC 68 (53). These are squishy words, difficult to pin to any category of analysis, but Miller’s exploration of the ever-present language of psychology, mental health and fortitude, and the democratic “spirit” separates the book from previous analyses of ideology and the Cold War.

These were not throwaway words to the people who used them; they really did believe that the battle between Japanese militarism and democracy, or Soviet communism and democracy, was rooted in a struggle over individual and collective mentalities. Alien ideologies could not pervert “healthy” minds. Democracy was not just synonymous with institutions of representative government but also with a cultivated and bolstered democratic “spirit.” As Miller writes, “democracy required a psychologically strong citizenry that was capable of remaining vigilant about protecting democratic values while distinguishing between healthy and harmful ideas” (2). Policymakers who articulated these ideas worked in a professional world in which psychological sciences held great sway. Fears of communist “brainwashing” were not metaphorical. Vigilance against such threats sometimes required sacrificing rights and freedoms. Out of such obsessions, then, a clash of democratic visions was born.

U.S. policymakers’ obsession with “healthy” minds explains their responses to the clash of democratic visions that occurred on the ground in Japan, from the occupation era through resistance to the U.S. military presence in the 1950s and in the 1960 Anpo protests, when millions of Japanese turned out on the streets to object to the renegotiation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. This clash, between U.S. officials and Japanese conservative leaders, on the one hand, and Japanese activists, intellectuals, and
protestors, on the other, was a product of characteristic American paternalism mixed with anxieties about deviations from a narrow vision of democratic practice, one directed by elites toward a liberal consensus.

But the clash also produced unexpected U.S. concessions to Japanese resistance. Eventually, in the wake of the Anpo protests, U.S. policymakers reconfigured their approach to Japan, and no one figure better symbolized that reconfiguration than new U.S. ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer. Reischauer, who was born in Japan to educational missionaries, was a Harvard historian who came to the attention of the new Kennedy administration in early 1961 for his pointed criticism of the U.S. response to the Anpo protests. He quickly became a popular figure in post-Anpo Japan.

Miller digs up a real archival gem from Reischauer, however. In 1962, he wrote a letter from his ambassadorial post to William Lederer, author of The Ugly American (1958) and a novelist who himself had something to say about American international ignorance. “The most important thing in Japan-American relations,” Reischauer told Lederer, “is to help more of the Japanese public see how absolutely wrong their ideas are” (224). Surely this remark was tongue-in-cheek, but the line nevertheless succinctly conveys the American liberal elite consensus toward Japan that Miller develops throughout the book: democracy is what we say it is and claims to the contrary stand outside the narrow confines of acceptable political debate.

While staking out important ground in the literature of the Cold War, Miller also intervenes in the specific historiography of U.S.-Japan relations by challenging inherited interpretations, including the influential “reverse course” thesis. At some point in the first year or two of the occupation, the reverse-course school contended, U.S. policymakers retreated from their initial progressive goals of demilitarization and democratization, broadly conceived, and instead, as the Soviet Union appeared more menacing to postwar U.S. plans for Asia, prioritized building anticommunist political and social institutions, even if it meant collaborating with former leaders of the militarist regime.

Cold War Democracy offers a significant interpretive breakthrough on a half-century of reverse-course scholarship. The reverse-course interpretation offered a narrative of betrayal carried out by New Dealers who initially sought to rein in the excesses of militarism and capitalism but failed to resist the tide of anticommunist rhetoric and the promises of hegemony that a cowed, compliant, conservative Japan offered to an emerging, ambitious superpower. In Dower’s magisterial Embracing Defeat (1999), for instance, the reverse course serves a tragic narrative purpose. Scholars writing during the Cold War couldn’t help but buy into the struggle’s grand narratives of liberation, either of the American liberal variety or the Soviet social justice kind. Inescapable Cold War ideology demanded its interpreters judge its developments by the extent to which they were democratic or antidemocratic. To Cold War liberals, the reverse course built Japanese democracy. To revisionist critics, it reversed a democratic process.

Miller’s writing is free of any such ideological baggage, and consequently, she does not seek to blame anyone for the loss of a postwar Japan that could have been. In her framing, if there was a reverse course, it was a tactical rather than a strategic one. To be sure, U.S. policymakers abandoned progressive goals early in the occupation, but, crucially, those policymakers saw it not as a betrayal but as a recalibration. They remained unusually consistent in their belief that they were always building democracy in Japan, a democracy that had to be strong enough to resist, both institutionally and psychologically, the threats of authoritarianism and militarism. Communism was not a new threat, in that sense, then, but one that looked uncomfortably like the fascist ones just vanquished. And it was democratic ideology that was malleable, not necessarily anticomunism. The latter was simply a tactical shift within the former.

The Anpo protests serve as both the climax of the book and the turning point for postwar U.S.-Japan relations. Again here the author manages to make clear connections between developments that historians have often fumbled, tied as they have been to national security or economic analyses. The Anpo protests rooked the streets of Japan and rattled U.S. policymakers but otherwise had no substantive impact on the security treaty, which the Japanese government ratified on schedule in 1960. It did teach the Americans, however, about “the broader failure of consensus-focused and militarized democracy, as well as the United States’ ability to foster democratic transformation in nonwhite states” (225). We might think of it as one of the “teachable moments” in the development of modernization theory in the United States. U.S. policymakers interpreted Anpo as a failure of democratic ideology and in their recalibration of the U.S.-Japan relationship replaced their focus on “psychology, democracy, and anticomunism” with greater attention to “productivity, development, and political stability” (230). In demonstrating the evolution of democratic thinking on both sides of the Pacific at this moment, Miller ably explains the transition to a very different U.S.-Japan relationship in the 1970s and beyond.

Using the framework of democratic ideology to tie together what have often felt like loose ends in the historiography of U.S.-Japan relations is a valuable service. But more importantly, Miller’s sensitive treatment of that ideology in the context of the early Cold War should have a significant impact on how historians understand and continue to study the United States in the world in the twentieth century.

Notes:

Review of Jennifer Miller, Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan

Marc Gallicchio

In December 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles complained to Dean Rusk, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, about Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s unwillingness to support a major increase in Japan’s new military establishment. Dulles told Rusk that he was “terribly disappointed in the way things have
been going in Japan” and that he felt there had not been “any rebirth of moral strength as in the case of Germany.” That statement, equating military rearmament of America’s recent enemies with moral strength, has always struck me as peculiarly Dulles-like. However, it turns out that, as Jennifer Miller shows in Cold War Democracy, Dulles was not alone in his thinking. A great many American officials, and some Japanese leaders as well, believed that the sustainability of democracy in Japan required the mobilization of the moral and spiritual strength of the Japanese people.

Miller begins by showing that Americans’ understanding of democracy in the mid-twentieth century was the product of specific historical circumstances. Looking inward, American intellectuals and policymakers praised America’s “supposed” political pragmatism as evidence of a healthy state of mind sustained by individualism, rationality (as opposed to emotionalism), and a vigilant defense of democratic ideals. They worried, however, that America’s openness, one of the hallmarks of its democracy, might leave the public susceptible to Communist misinformation and propaganda. To head off such a possibility, Congress created the notorious House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) before World War II, and the executive branch followed by establishing an expansive internal security bureaucracy during the early days of the Cold War. The result was a series of purges of suspected Communists, arrests, and crackdowns on Communist influence in labor unions. The so-called Red Scare, otherwise known as McCarthyism, carried over to Japan, where the same security measures were employed as part of the reverse course.

It is one of the strengths of this book that Miller shows how Cold War practices in the United States were applied to Japan. In Japan, as in the United States, the defense of democracy perversely resulted in the suppression of freedom. Cold War Democracy also succeeds in showing continuities in American approaches to Japan that cause us to rethink the standard periodization used by historians. For example, chapter 1 shows that concern for creating a healthy democratic mindset was a common thread running through American planning for postwar Japan, the liberal phase of the occupation, and the reverse course.

More generally, Miller offers new and persuasive interpretations of familiar subjects such as Japanese rearmament and protests against American military bases in Japan. Throughout, she shows that many Japanese citizens developed and defended their own definition of democracy, one that emphasized the people's responsibility to hold the state to account. This was a form of spirit and vigilance that neither American policymakers nor Japanese leaders welcomed, especially when it led to protests over rearmament, military bases, and the security treaty with the United States.

Cold War Democracy consists of an introduction, six substantive chapters organized around specific moments in the U.S.-Japan relationship up to the early 1960s, and a provocative conclusion that demonstrates the continuing influence of Cold War policies on the relationship today. Miller draws on a wide range of Japanese and American sources and highlights the importance of non-state actors in the bilateral relationship. She establishes her thesis regarding the origins of American ideas about democracy in an introduction that nicely summarizes the views of social scientists and public intellectuals. The first three chapters look at U.S. efforts to institutionalize the required rationality and spiritual strength in Japan during the occupation. The next two focus on the Japanese response to those efforts, and the sixth looks at how U.S. and Japanese officials addressed the furor created by their previous policies.

Chapter 2 deserves singling out because of its originality. It covers the controversial effort to rearm Japan, beginning with the development of a National Police Reserve (NPR). Miller gives this familiar story a new twist: she shows that American officials justified rearmament by touting military service as a nursery of the civic virtues that were necessary for the defense of democracy. As Miller shows, American officials did not conjure that rationale out of thin air. They made the same argument in defense of the failed proposal for Universal Military Training and the subsequent implementation of a peacetime draft in the United States. Americans were also willing to see Japan rearm, because they believed they had successfully eliminated the danger of resurgent militarism in Japan by disbanding the Imperial Army and reducing the emperor to a symbol of the state with no government function.

Nevertheless, as Miller shows, Americans ended up tying themselves in rhetorical knots once they realized they needed to recruit former Imperial Army officers to staff the NPR. The creation of the NPR provoked criticism and protest from Japanese civic groups committed to a vision of the unarmed Japanese democracy established in the Japanese Constitution. It also placed the Japanese government in a delicate position as it hedged its compliance with American proposals in response to the public. No one was satisfied with the outcome, except perhaps the formerly purged officers who found themselves back in uniform again.

As the Truman administration pushed Japan to begin rearming, it was also working on a peace treaty and a security treaty to anchor Japan in an anti-communist alliance in Asia, as Miller shows in chapter 3. Japan “reformed and redeemed” through the occupation would stand at the center of an anticommunist system in Asia (153). Hopes for a broader regional pact in which Japan would serve as a model for other Asian nations had to be scrapped in favor of a bilateral security treaty between the United States and Japan.

The idea that other countries might wish to emulate Japan had some foundation in history. In the early twentieth century many Asian nationalists were inspired by Japan’s modernization. But close encounters with Japan during World War II had nationalists looking elsewhere after the war. Even when they turned to the United States for support, they were unwilling to have their interests subsumed in a pact that included Japan. As Miller shows, while planning for the security treaty and the peace treaty moved ahead, Americans sought to strengthen the Japanese public’s commitment to proper democratic values. Occupation officials were particularly concerned by Japanese intellectuals’ fondness for theoretical Marxism. They hoped that a strong dose of empirically based social sciences, facilitated by educational exchange programs, would cure them of that infatuation. Much of this work was turned over to private foundations (hence Dulles’s lament to Dean Rusk, quoted above), but they coordinated with the State Department.

Japan emerged from the occupation anchored to the United States through the security treaty and isolated from China and the Soviet Union as a result of an otherwise generous peace treaty. Japanese intellectuals rejected their government’s acceptance of this subordinate independence and sought to make officials in Tokyo responsive to the Japanese people. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the mobilization of a large segment of that public against the presence of American bases in Japan and ultimately against renewal of the treaty. Chapter 4 offers a case study of the protests against expansion of the airfields at Tachikawa Air Base outside Tokyo. The opposition to runway extensions at Tachikawa is usually viewed as a localized dispute, a case of farmers resisting the expropriation of their land. Miller shows, however, that the movement expanded into a broader indictment of the Japanese military relationship with Japan. Other incidents, like the dousing of the tuna trawler Lucky Dragon with radiation during nuclear weapons tests and...
the murder of a Japanese woman on a firing range by a GI, vividly demonstrated to many Japanese that they were not made more secure by the security treaty. Opposition to the treaty and to Tokyo’s neglect of Japanese opinion regarding the Cold War alliance with the United States came to a head in the massive protests against renewal of the security treaty in 1960. Although the revised treaty addressed some of the obvious inequalities in the original, it still tied Japan’s fortunes to American Cold War policies. The authoritarian methods of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke inflamed the Left and led to nearly two months of protests.

The U.S. embassy chalked these violent demonstrations up to a small pro-Communist minority, but Miller shows that opponents were far more varied than that. In the postmortem that followed the passage of the treaty, the embassy compiled a lengthy report that harkened back to wartime characterizations of the Japanese as immature, emotionally unstable, and easily led. A more astute analysis by Japan expert and soon-to-be-ambassador Edwin Reischauer fixed the blame on the Americans’ failure to interact with the opposition. In that respect, American diplomacy operated much like it did in the prewar era, when American representatives spent most of their time with the cosmopolitan elite of Japanese society. There were, however, limits to Reischauer’s insights. As Miller notes, the ambassador still thought it was his job to explain rather than to listen to and take seriously the criticisms made by the opponents of the treaty.

As Miller notes, the attempts by American officials to understand their failures showed that they remained committed to building public support for the alliance. The relationship, as defined by the United States, depended on active Japanese support, as opposed to a sullen acquiescence imposed by the government. The agreed remedy was to focus on economic expansion through development of “productivity consciousness.” Once again, the emphasis was on psychological mobilization, only this time in pursuit of “capitalist dreams.” An economically expanding Japan would also take the lead in development aid in Asia, in effect substituting economic assistance for the military role Americans had hoped Japan would play. The Japanese government willingly embraced these plans, welcomed managerial and engineering consultants to Japan, and announced a goal of income doubling.

As Miller notes, this emphasis on realizing capitalist dreams ignored thorny issues like economic equality in favor of expansion and the promotion of consensus between labor and capital. Once again, the United States was applying homemade remedies to Japan. The promotion of productivity consciousness as the technocratic antidote to extremist ideologies was not very different from the American way of life being peddled by a new form of spiritual leader in the United States, the managerial guru.2

A year after the treaty protests, Maxwell Taylor, President Kennedy’s military adviser, downgraded the military value of the alliance. Restrictions on the storage of nuclear weapons, the constant pressure to reduce the military footprint in the home islands, and the unwillingness of the Japanese government to meet American expectations for rearming lessened Japan’s value as an active ally and raised the value of Okinawa, where the Americans still exercised dominion over the Japanese. Minimal American security interests were met by keeping Japan out of the communist camp. In Taylor’s view, “military considerations need not shape U.S. relations with Japan.”3 This lowering of expectations probably had as much to do with calming U.S.-Japan relations as the new emphasis on economic growth.

One of the themes running through Cold War Democracy is that Americans viewed their Japanese allies in racialized and gendered terms that made it easy to dismiss the genuine causes of Japanese discontent. That point is well supported by the evidence. It remains an open question, however, as to how distinctive American views toward the Japanese were and how important they were in shaping policy toward Japan. It is probably not too much of an exaggeration to say that American officials viewed opposition to their policies at home and almost anywhere abroad as irrational. And American officials often viewed the French in gendered terms.4 Would a more culturally sensitive approach have resulted in different policies in Japan? The evidence presented by Miller suggests not. The Americans wanted one kind of democracy and their Japanese opponents wanted another. What the majority of Japanese wanted is less clear. The Japanese and Americans regularly surveyed Japanese opinion through the 1950s. Some discussion of that information would have helped place the Left-opposition in context and shown how pervasive their view of democracy was.

That may be a subject for future discussion. All books leave the reader with questions. This one is no different. That does not lessen the value of this impressive book. Miller’s original thesis, her prodigious research, and her ability to connect her topic to the broader international setting and move its focus from grass roots organizing to high policy will make Cold War Democracy the standard treatment on this important but relatively neglected period in the U.S.-Japan relationship. For those reasons, it is also an ideal text for graduate classes on the Cold War and U.S. Foreign Relations.

Notes:
1. Dulles to Rusk, December 29, 1953, folder #1, Chronological File, John Foster Dulles Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

Reflecting on the Complicity of Democracy: Author’s Response for Passport Roundtable on Cold War Democracy

Jennifer M. Miller

I want to open by thanking the reviewers for taking the time to read my work and for writing such engaged and thoughtful reviews. It is an honor to see this book discussed so seriously by such accomplished scholars, especially since they so generously and effectively captured my arguments, intellectual agenda, and scholarly interventions. I deeply appreciate the opportunity to take part in this conversation.

While the reviewers raise a plethora of important questions, I want to focus on three issues that run through their comments. First, how should we judge the centrality of “democracy” to both American and Japanese discourse in the postwar era? For example, when American policymakers, after writing a constitution that explicitly banned postwar military forces, invoked democracy to herald the necessity of Japanese rearmament, should we criticize their ideas as a betrayal of “true” democracy? As Hiromi Mizuno aptly puts it, should we put democracy in scare quotes, something that I considered doing while writing?5

As Andrew C. McKevitt highlights, Cold War Democracy was my attempt to go beyond debates about American policy as an either/or: either genuinely concerned with democracy as an either/or: either genuinely concerned with democracy
promotion or guided by raw power calculations. Instead, I wanted to think critically about democracy as an ideological project. The meaning and goals of democracy, after all, are neither stable nor timeless; my goal was to explore the different ways that historical actors understood the roots and consequences of democracy and to trace how these understandings emerged and foreclosed a wide variety of political, military, and economic arrangements.

In particular, I was struck by how often American policymakers talked about democracy as not simply institutional or procedural, but psychological and even spiritual, a “state of mind” that was seriously threatened by the propaganda and misinformation propagated by militarists, fascists, and communists alike. It is a conception that I believe my actors took seriously; it stretched across time (the 1930s, World War II, and the Cold War) and space (the Pacific), and they consistently invoked it—both intentionally and offhandedly, publicly and privately—to argue for and explain policy choices. For example, explaining democracy in psychological terms facilitated both early occupation policies like the writing of a postwar Japanese constitution that emphasized citizens’ rights and later occupation policies such as anti-Communist purges and anti-subversive laws that many observers believed were anti-democratic. My goal, then, was to separate “democracy” from its immediate positive normative meaning and explore its specific meanings in the early Cold War, with all their limits and consequences.

In investigating the meanings assigned to democracy, I also wanted to bring the Japanese into the story. One of the book’s goals was to examine the political clashes of postwar Japan as not just a fight between a democratic camp and its authoritarian enemies, but also as a contest over different visions of psychological politics. On the one hand, there was shared terrain across the Japanese political spectrum. Both those who opposed the alliance with the United States and those who supported it believed that Japan’s future depended on its citizens forging the “right” psychological disposition. Moreover, they all believed that Japan’s place in the Cold War—and its relationship with the United States—was a key factor in building this proper “state of mind.”

On the other hand, the major figures shaping Japanese political discourses (whether they were politicians, military leaders, intellectuals, or activists) believed that the proper “state of mind” would lead to very different outcomes. Many (especially on the left) claimed democracy required a psychological capacity to separate one’s mind from the exigencies of the state, to question authority, to oppose militarism, and thus reject cooperation with the United States. Others (especially on the right) believed that Japan could build democratic stability only by mobilizing the “national will” behind state power and in particular by building national confidence and military strength. In this regard, by including Kishi Nobusuke or Abe Shinzō in my book I did not mean to mock the concept of Cold War democracy (as Mizuno wonders) or to “reclaim” them as democratic figures in the way we might understand it, but rather to show the harsh and problematic nature of this language and mode of thinking. I wanted to ask how and why such actors used the language of democracy to make their own policy goals possible.

The second question raised by the reviewers concerns the role of ideology and its relationship to interests. Does Cold War Democracy prioritize ideology above interests, or does it emphasize that ideologies and interests are mutually constituted? Throughout the book, I do examine the important role that language played in shaping policy outcomes and in directing attention to specific dimensions of security. Still, I ultimately believe that ideology and interests are mutually constituted. As noted by Marc Gallicchio, this was a key point of my second chapter, which examined the creation of Japan’s postwar defense forces. Drawing parallels between the United States postwar debate over Universal Military Training and the process of Japanese rearmament, this chapter argues that Japan’s rearmament was not simply the product of concern over security. Rather, it was made possible by a growing belief that military experience and training would produce the mental vigilance and commitment necessary for “open” societies to resist Communist propaganda and infiltration. Security, essentially, had a mental, psychological, and ideological dimension. Such thinking made the U.S. occupation authorities open to using members of the former Japanese imperial military purged in the early years of the occupation—people whom U.S. military advisors valued for their leadership and “spirit” more than their tactical capabilities—as a way to strengthen Japan’s postwar defense forces.

As I make clear in my conclusion, I think this entanglement of interests and ideology, the latter of which is now expressed as “shared values,” has largely continued to the present. The language of “shared values” has done important work to continue to legitimate U.S.-Japan security goals and military ties under a broader claim that the U.S.-Japan alliance operates in moral service to peace and humanity. I was not seeking to deny the importance of geopolitical or economic interests in shaping the U.S.-Japan alliance or sustaining its longevity, but rather to interrogate how certain ideological constructions were vital to shaping and legitimating policy outcomes.

Third, the reviewers make important points about Cold War Democracy’s examination of U.S.-Japan cooperation in the field of development. The book is part of an effort to correct Japan’s absence from the recent wave of literature on postwar development and aid, which I find startling, given the country’s economic importance in this field (it had, for example, some of the largest foreign aid budgets in the world by the end of the 1980s).1 For this purpose, I included my sixth chapter to examine the role that the U.S.-Japan relationship played (whether as a model for other Asian nations, a facilitator of training, or a source of money) in development efforts elsewhere.

Mizuno notes that my assertion that Japanese development efforts did not require redress or regional redistribution is not accurate. Japan’s largest development efforts, she reminds us, came in the form of reparations for World War II. This is an important point, and I could have been more precise in my language, because her own work on how such programs turned into commercial contracts is crucial. In this sense, when I noted a lack of redress or redistribution, I was thinking explicitly about how such efforts also had goals that were openly commercial, like reentering former colonial spaces, and about the ways these efforts helped Japan achieve unprecedented growth. Due to length concerns, I prioritized the areas in which the United States and Japan cooperated, such as productivity programming in Japan, the creation of the Japan-led Asian Productivity Organization, and Third Country Training, rather than Japan’s own reparations efforts. Still, reparations programs are a crucial part of the story of Japanese foreign aid and development.

Similarly, Mizuno wonders how accurate I was in linking visions of development to earlier visions of democracy. The language of democracy, after all, does not play a large part in the publications of the Japan Productivity Center (funded largely by the United States in the 1950s) and is almost totally absent from those of Asia Productivity Corporation. This is significant, but it does not undermine the case that facilitated programs like Third Country Training in Japan. But my claim was not that these development efforts were explicitly designed to achieve political
democracy. Rather, I wanted to explore how language about mindsets and consciousness that was once used to describe democracy instead became central to discussions of economic growth, productivity, and development, both inside and outside Japan.

Just as policymakers and commentators in the early 1950s claimed that democracy required the right mindset (rather than egalitarian policies), they now argued that economic growth stemmed from the proper psychology (rather than empowering labor or economic equality). Equally important, with U.S. assistance and support, this language and mode of thinking resurrected imperial and wartime tropes. As I argue in chapter 6, Japanese development efforts reproduced the language of “cooperation” and friendship, which clearly echoed Japanese World War II propaganda while seeking to replace a history of Japanese aggression and imperial violence with claims of technological benevolence. 2 Mizuno’s assertion that the United States built Cold War Asia in part on the back of Japanese reparations and development programming—while silencing the voices of those who suffered under Japanese imperialism—is a very crucial (and underappreciated) point, one that I completely agree with. Indeed, it is the argument that I was seeking to make, and I only regret that this point did not come through as clearly as I had hoped it would. Her comment on the productive prospects of thinking about the U.S.-Japanese alliance in dialogue with Japan’s relations with other Asian states is an indispensable observation and one that I hope scholars will take up more fully in the future.

I want to close by answering some specific queries and addressing some omissions noted by the reviewers. Gallichio asked for more survey data and more reflection about how widely the thinking of the Japanese left was shared by the Japanese public. Along with the Japanese government, the United States did keep track of public opinion, and I used some of this data in chapter 2 to show public confusion about the nature of the postwar defense forces. I did not do this for every event I discuss in the book, but the largescale nature of some postwar movements shows that at least some core ideas of the left, specifically anti-militarism and Japanese independence from the United States, had significant public support. The antinuclear movement, which I do not discuss at length, similarly enjoyed a mass following, as did the anti-base movement, which ultimately led to the United States pulling some forces out of Japan, and the 1960 protests against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which caused the fall of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke.

More broadly, some of these ideas crossed political lines. For example, some conservative politicians supported rearmament because they believed it would allow Japan to operate independently of the United States. Indeed, one of my regrets about the book is that I sometimes drew the lines between Japan’s left and right too sharply, rather than showing fully the diverse, multifaceted, and cacophonous nature of Japanese politics and the Japanese public sphere in the 1950s. Mizuno also wonders about the omission of New Dealers in my treatment of the occupation. In part, I felt that I could leave them out to make room for other topics, since their story has been eloquently treated elsewhere. 3 But I also wanted to show how the conception of democratization as mental transformation stretched across political and military-civilian lines and how occupation functionaries with a wide range of backgrounds and government experience took this idea seriously. I thus often prioritized continuities and shared ways of thinking over political differences.

Finally, Aaron Skabelund and Gallichio wonder about the applicability of my framework outside Japan. I do think that the U.S. policymakers thought far more seriously about the question of democracy vis à vis Japan than they did in many other states—especially non-white states—in the Cold War era. In part, this was because many of them had accepted the early twentieth-century hierarchical notion that Japan was an “advanced” civilization, more “developed” than other non-white societies. U.S. policymakers and military leaders also felt that the stakes in Japan were very high after four years of extraordinarily bloody warfare. The Cold War perpetuated these high anxieties, especially as American leaders like General Douglas MacArthur made a direct connection between the threat of Japanese militarism and the threat of Communism, arguing that both drew their power from seizing and manipulating the minds of the people.

However, I think that the discourse of U.S. leaders and their way of thinking about Japan, with its emphasis on “healthy” politics, maturity, and rationality, was common during the Cold War, applied to a wide range of states, and helped justify military interventions and coups across the globe. Similarly, the belief that only conservative and even authoritarian and military leaders could provide the mental stability and “spirit” necessary to building democracy was common throughout the Cold War. More broadly, as I explore in my third chapter on the peace treaty that ended the U.S. occupation (an underappreciated Cold War moment), a “free” Japan was important to U.S. policymakers precisely because they believed it gave them bona fides. It was proof, they claimed, of American forgiveness, benevolence, and goodwill; of the inherent goodness of American hegemony; and of the United States’ ability to spiritually and politically liberate foreign and nonwhite peoples. Put another way, the language of democracy in the U.S.-Japan alliance (expressed today as “shared values”) was the flipside and enabler of imperial aggression and violent intervention elsewhere.

As a post-imperial rather than postcolonial state, Japan was a historical exception to much of postwar Asia. But it was precisely this idiosyncrasy that made an “advanced” Japan useful to the rhetorical, ideological, and tactical construction of U. S. imperial hegemony, in the Cold War and beyond.

Notes:
1. Hiromi Mizuno, Aaron S. Moore and John DiMoia, eds., Engineering Asia: Technology, Colonial Development, and the Cold War Order (London, 2018) is an excellent addition to this literature.
2. See Hiromi Mizuno, Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern Japan (Redwood City, CA, 2008); and Aaron Stephen Moore, Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology and Empire in Japan’s Wartime Era (Redwood City, CA, 2015).
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Democracy Promotion is History

Robert Pee

There is a good chance that democracy promotion is “history”: an idea and a set of policy prescriptions that had a moment of relevance in U.S. foreign policy but are now disappearing. The Trump administration has dropped the universal normative commitment to democracy promotion that has been an element of U.S. presidential rhetoric—if not always practice—since the 1980s and has attempted to slash U.S. government funding for democracy promotion programs. However, the U.S. retreat from democracy promotion did not begin under Trump and may continue after him, as some of his Democratic challengers have also de-emphasized this commitment in favour of tackling global inequality and climate change.

This political debate has been paralleled by an academic debate driven by several prominent Realist scholars of International Relations who have argued that the strategy of liberal hegemony that they claim the United States has pursued since the end of the Cold War has been costly and fruitless. One way to engage further with these debates is to examine the history of American democracy promotion. The beginning of the current era of American democracy promotion can be traced back to 1982, when Ronald Reagan, in a speech to the British Parliament, elevated democracy promotion to a label for the extension or contraction of American power.

But what sets this period apart from other eras in which presidents have explained their foreign policy in pro-democratic terms is the implementation of U.S. programs to strengthen democratic groups and institutions overseas, which has been carried out by democracy promotion foundations such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and government agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). These institutions and programs have played a key role in U.S. political, diplomatic and soft power interventions in Eastern Europe, in the former Soviet Union, and across the Third World to spur or influence transitions from dictatorship to democracy during the final phase of the Cold War, the post-Cold War period, and the War on Terror.

Scholars who want to go beyond the analysis of democracy promotion as a concept informing or legitimating American interaction with the international sphere to examine this dimension of implementation can expand on existing scholarship by treating democracy promotion as a specific foreign policy activity similar to other policy activities such as intelligence or foreign aid and by examining the interests, institutional frameworks, and cases that have shaped how the United States has “done” democracy promotion on the ground. It is time to historicize democracy promotion, examining it as the product of a specific historical moment and specific ideological, geopolitical, institutional and operational conditions, as historians have done recently with the U.S. modernization policies of the 1960s and the history of human rights. This approach can contribute to understanding the histories of political and economic development, soft power projection, and regime change in U.S. foreign policy.

Democracy Promotion: The State of the Field

Democracy promotion became an object of scholarly enquiry after the Cold War, popularized largely by scholars working in International Relations and political science. The title of one of the first and most seminal of these studies, Tony Smith’s America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy, points to the extent to which the end of the struggle with the Soviet Union led to a new understanding about the U.S. role in the world. Smith argued that role, which was to expand freedom, had been a constant component of U.S. foreign policy since the early twentieth century, if not necessarily the dominant one. Other scholars, such as G. John Ikenberry, have focused on the role of alliances between democratic states in producing a “liberal international order” since World War II, an order that also included free trade and supranational institutions. However, the most prevalent strain of scholarship in Politics/International Relations has conceptualized democracy promotion as originating from and being motivated by American cultural and political norms that extend back to birth of the Republic and before.

Much of the evidence used to discuss the motivations for U.S. democracy promotion in this literature is drawn from the public rhetoric of U.S. presidents and other policymakers. While the ideological/cultural approach taken by much of this scholarship certainly has merits, it also lacks clarity in some areas. In trying to derive evidence about policymaker intentions from public rhetoric, historians may unconsciously fail to recognize the extent to which such rhetoric is tailored to sell policies by rooting them in concepts that are immediately understandable and likely to be valued by American audiences. In addition, analysis of “democracy promotion” as an ideology and discourse does not provide conceptual clarity on policy content. The term “democracy promotion” has been used to describe policies as diverse as education programs to empower women in Lesotho and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Conceptual confusion is greatest when democracy promotion is used unreflectively, in an abstract sense, as a label for the extension or contraction of American power. This confusion, which is connected to the fact that U.S. nationalism has often been linked to and celebrated in the notion that the American state, uniquely among states, has historically had a commitment to spreading freedom, can lead to the term “democracy promotion” being used unreflectively as a proxy for America’s role in the world, regardless of whether specific actions and policies were intended to contribute to democratization overseas.

Furthermore, a focus on the continuity of democratic presidential rhetoric, from Woodrow Wilson to Barack Obama, obscures change that has occurred at the level of institutions and tactics. Over the last seventy years, U.S. democracy promotion, as a concrete policy, has experienced shifts from reliance on spurring economic development to support of parties and civil society groups to bring about...
democratic change, and swings in implementation from private groups to the U.S. government taking the lead. Each of these shifts has impacted how the United States has “done” democracy promotion on the ground in other states, but an approach which prioritizes the analysis of discourse may miss the significance of such changes.

The second key body of literature on American democracy promotion is written by practitioners and analysts of democracy promotion programs. This literature has tended to focus very little on wider questions of U.S. strategy and motivations. Instead, it has assumed that democracy promotion is simply an uncontroversial component of development in the modern world and has focused narrowly on generating problem-solving knowledge so that specific types of democracy promotion programs, such as election monitoring, strengthening civil society groups, and training political parties in organizational strategies and campaign tactics, can be done more effectively and efficiently.10 Thus, the current literature on democracy promotion sometimes treats it as an underlying ideological motivation for a range of policy actions or recommends changes in the management and delivery of specific programs without considering how these programs are connected to and shaped by the foreign policy objectives of implementing states, or the domestic politics of the states in which they run.

**Historicizing Democracy Promotion**

Scholars could expand on existing literature by taking an approach that examines “democracy promotion” as a foreign policy action implemented to achieve specific goals, through specific institutions, rather than primarily an ideal or moral value. A good beginning would be to define “democracy promotion” more clearly in terms of intentionality and action rather than cultural norms or discourse. In a recent co-edited volume on U.S. democracy promotion during the Reagan administration, William Michael Schmidli and I define democracy promotion as “a direct attempt to alter the political system of a foreign state to bring it into accord with democratic institutional models.”11

This definition would focus on intentionality and on actions, especially those connected to strengthening or altering foreign electoral systems, democratic institutions and democratic groups while excluding military interventions that did not include substantial planning for the creation of a democratic system in the target state. It would also allow a re-focusing of the academic study of democracy promotion on the institutions involved in shaping democracy promotion policies, including U.S. state agencies such as the USAID and the State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), formally private but largely government-funded U.S. organizations involved in democracy promotion such as the NED, and political parties or civil society groups receiving democracy promotion funding in other states. This in turn would lead to a focus on how these institutions have interacted with the wider U.S. national security bureaucracy and the tactics they have used to implement democracy promotion in specific states.

Focusing on institutions, programs, and cases would anchor democracy promotion as a specific foreign policy activity—an activity that has been aimed at transforming political systems and the relationships between elites and subordinate groups in other states—rather than a timeless ideological priority. A focus such as this would allow scholars to historicize democracy promotion and to consider how the geopolitical and policy contexts of decolonization, Cold War competition, and the perceived failure of the modernization policies of the 1960s increase our understanding of democracy promotion’s origins and implementation and how changes in these contexts have influenced its evolution.

This focus would also allow critical study of democracy promotion through historical research methods. Historians could investigate democracy promotion using policy memos and documents from presidential libraries; congressional records; declassified USAID documents available through digital systems such as the Development Experience Clearinghouse; the records of the NED’s decision-making and programs from 1982–1994, held by the Library of Congress;12 the private papers of key government officials and private actors connected to democracy promotion, held by institutions such as Stanford University; and oral history interviews with similar key decisionmakers and implementers.

Historians have already begun to do this work. Recent research on democracy promotion in the late 1970s and the 1980s at the level of institutions, programs, and tactics has highlighted an important shift from conceiving of economic development as an engine for democratization to a new policy of focusing on programs aimed at developing stronger political parties and civil society groups to build democratic states. It has also highlighted the key role of non-state actors in developing the blueprints for this approach and in implementing it through the creation of new public-private institutions such as the NED (1983). And it has shed new light on the role of state agencies—such as the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs—in this process of conceptualization.13

Other new literature has focused on the role of the USAID and the NED in delivering innovative new electoral registration and civil society democracy promotion programs in Latin America14 and on the integration of neoliberal economic ideas into the delivery of democracy promotion in Latin America and the Soviet Union.15 At the level of case and regime types, this new historical literature has also studied the impact of U.S. democracy promotion programs on policy towards hostile states such as Poland and the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War,16 and the national security reasoning and complex policy processes behind U.S. decisions to reduce American support for non-communist allied dictatorships in Asia and Latin America in favor of pushing for democratic reform during the 1980s.17 All of these works are based on archival sources and/or oral history interviews with working-level officials, and all of them examine democracy promotion as a morally and strategically complex policy initiative, one which is embedded in historical, geopolitical and economic contexts and shaped by shifting cooperative and antagonistic relationships between government and private democracy promotion organizations and the civil society groups and populations of other states.

**Towards an Agenda for Further Research: Democracy Promotion as History**

This work provides the basis for considering democracy promotion as a subfield of the history of American foreign relations or America in the World. However, there is room for further research along several mutually reinforcing tracks. The first track, which can be called “top down,” would focus on how and why democracy promotion policies and programs were formulated in Washington DC, and how private sector actors and government agencies have interacted among themselves and with each other to coordinate and manage democracy promotion strategies and programs. This approach could investigate the degree to which these actors have been mutually supportive or antagonistic, and in what circumstances these different relationships have been generated. It would be most useful in considering issues such as how U.S. policymakers have linked democracy promotion with other imperatives like
national security and economics in their overall policy designs over time.

Research on the relationship between the U.S. state and non-state actors in democracy promotion could be informed by the literature developed after 2000 on the “state-private network.” This work examined the relationship between U.S. government agencies—usually, but not always, the Central Intelligence Agency—and U.S. private or civil society groups involved in forging relationships with intellectuals, student groups, trade unions, and other types of civil society groups in foreign states from the 1950s to 1967, when the network came crashing down after its covert government funding was exposed.

The concepts articulated in this literature could inform research involving formally private U.S. democracy promotion groups that have received U.S. government funding, such as the NED and Freedom House. Using this literature as a template would not require researchers to posit that privately run U.S. democracy promotion organizations that receive U.S. government funds have been the equivalent of camouflaged CIA front organizations. In fact, the literature on the state-private network of the 1950s and 1960s typically takes a nuanced approach to its subjects, emphasizing the agency of private organizations, divergent state and private objectives, and the role of shared ideological conceptions about Communism and the United States’ global role in helping to forge alliances between private actors and the U.S. state that went beyond simple transfers of funding. This nuanced approach seems far more suitable for studying non-state democracy promotion organizations than one that sees them as purely private actors or, at the other end of the critical spectrum, as hidden branches of the U.S. state.

A further area for research along this track is the integration of democracy promotion programs into U.S. government departments. Since the Cold War, the USAID has been by far the largest U.S. executor of programs in government departments. Since the Cold War, the USAID integration of democracy promotion programs into U.S. government funding, such as the NED and Freedom House. Using this literature as a template would not require researchers to posit that privately run U.S. democracy promotion organizations that receive U.S. government funds have been the equivalent of camouflaged CIA front organizations. In fact, the literature on the state-private network of the 1950s and 1960s typically takes a nuanced approach to its subjects, emphasizing the agency of private organizations, divergent state and private objectives, and the role of shared ideological conceptions about Communism and the United States’ global role in helping to forge alliances between private actors and the U.S. state that went beyond simple transfers of funding. This nuanced approach seems far more suitable for studying non-state democracy promotion organizations than one that sees them as purely private actors or, at the other end of the critical spectrum, as hidden branches of the U.S. state.

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The second track could be called “bottom up.” This track would focus on cases of democracy promotion in specific states or types of state and examine how these cases have impinged on the concepts, strategies, and tactics of democracy promotion generated in Washington DC. As noted above, there is existing work on cases of democracy promotion in hostile states such as Poland and the USSR and in allied dictatorships in Latin America and Asia during the 1980s. However, there are still cases missing from the record that might illuminate the conceptualization and practice of democracy promotion as the United States made the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War worlds.

Examples of such cases would include the support given to democratic groups in South Africa by the USAID and other U.S. organizations from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, or the democracy promotion initiatives implemented by the USAID and U.S. private actors in Haiti during the troubled interregnum from the end of the Duvalier regime in 1986 to the country’s first successful post-Duvalier democratic elections in 1990. Notably, these cases bridge the Cold War and post-Cold War phases of American foreign policy and may illuminate the position of democracy promotion during this key shift. A further group of states that have been largely neglected in the existing literature are democratizing states—that is, states that experience a democratic transition due to domestic politics and then are sites for U.S. democracy promotion programs to help strengthen and consolidate their democratic systems, such as Argentina in the 1980s.

Development history and intelligence history can feed into studies of U.S. democracy promotion in specific states by providing frameworks for conceptualizing why and how powerful states attempt to influence politics and political systems in other nations. These literatures can also remind researchers that moments of political change, whether achieved through public demonstrations, democratizing elections, or the coups and episodes of political violence that often bring dictators to power, may be supported by powerful foreign actors, but this does not mean that they are exclusively shaped or manipulated by them. Research that incorporates analysis of the actions of U.S. democracy promoters and overseas democratic groups that have received assistance should go beyond a one-way model of communication and analysis based on examining U.S. policies, actions, and intentions to a two-way model that considers the agency of non-U.S. actors and the extent to which they accepted U.S. priorities, or co-opted and adapted them to suit their own objectives. This track and the “top-down” track previously discussed would be mutually supportive, as changes in strategy or organization in Washington had the potential to impact cases, while lessons from cases may have contributed to the reshaping of tactics, organizations, and strategies.

The largest limitation of the existing historical literature, however, is chronological. The bulk of this recent literature focuses on studies of U.S. democracy promotion in the 1980s, rather than engaging with the 1990s and the post-911 world. This is doubtless due to the difficulty of accessing declassified documents and archival sources dealing with periods after the 1980s. Yet it may be possible to use frameworks and approaches developed through work on earlier periods, combined with oral history interviews and publicly available policy documents, to investigate the later evolution of democracy promotion. Such work could consider how the bureaucracy and implementation of U.S. democracy promotion evolved under Bill Clinton. I would also consider the extent to which the George W. Bush administration’s democracy promotion policies beyond Iraq were influenced by tactics and organizational models that policymakers believed had been successful during the Cold War, and how these may have impacted the administration’s reactions to the “Color Revolutions” in several states within the territory of the former Soviet Union and democracy promotion in Arab states such as Egypt.

Little has been written on the role of U.S. non-state actors funded by the American government—the “state-private network”—in the Third World, as opposed to Western Europe. However, more recent research on U.S. government-supported political training in Latin America during the early 1960s and the involvement of African-American organizations in similar projects in Africa points to the conclusion that these earlier state-supported non-state actors groups played a role in development projects that were intended to lead to democratization and that such groups may have played a direct role in training political actors, as opposed to the more cultural/ideological role they played in Western Europe. Thus, the involvement of the American government and American civil society groups in training democrats may be a more longstanding activity than previously believed.
Conclusion

Democracy has often been defined and discussed as a transcendental ideal, but historicizing democracy promotion can allow scholars to go beyond discussion of its role in U.S. foreign policy thought or examination of its origins in American culture to consider its implementation over the previous forty years or more. Doing so will require a focus on the geopolitical and institutional context of American democracy promotion, as much as on the ideological context. It will require analysis of the institutions, both public and private, that have shaped U.S. democracy promotion policies and programs and of the relationships between them. It will also require case studies that focus on democracy promotion practices in individual states and that examine these practices in the context of a U.S. democracy promotion effort—rather than simply specific national histories—to consider how they impacted conceptualizations and strategies of democracy promotion in Washington. And it will require analysis that eschews simplistic binary concepts of influence and interaction to focus on convergence, divergence, and shifts in agency between U.S. government departments, non-state democracy promotion organizations, and actors in other states.

A focus on the dimension of implementation can also shed light on contemporary debates about democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy by illuminating why some in the United States are backing away from it. This dimension of implementation has been challenged by the failure of democracy promotion to adequately cope with the complexity of the Arab World before and after the Arab Spring. Similarly, recent protests in Iraq, motivated by unemployment, low-quality public services, and rejections of foreign influence, have strained the U.S.-designed political system to the breaking point. In addition, America has been confronted by a set of challenges that are not resolvable through democracy promotion programs. The rise of the Islamic State resulted in a response from the United States that was primarily military after 2014, while the current tensions between the United States and China are rooted in economics, not politics or ideology. Finally, U.S. support for political change in Ukraine in 2014 led to increased geopolitical confrontation with Russia.

Examining the history of how the United States has deployed and implemented democracy promotion and how its practices have been shaped by geopolitical factors and the political and cultural contexts of specific states could inform analysis of the current and future direction of U.S. policy in this area. In addition to intersecting with and informing debate on current issues, a historized approach will also yield a rich and complex picture of the functioning of American democracy promotion and will allow historians to explore a largely unfapped research area that will throw light on a key aspect of how America has influenced the world, and how the world has influenced America, since the final decade of the Cold War.

Notes:
12. The NED’s Annual Reports, which typically give brief details of funding for projects in specific states as well as an introduction setting out how the organization sees the political and strategic context for its work, are downloadable from ned.org. The organization’s founding papers, organizations’s fiftieth anniversary, which chronic its creation and work from 1982–1994, have been gifted to the Library of Congress. However, this archive is currently held at the NED’s Washington headquarters, and permission from the Endowment is required to access it until 2027.
20. See Pee, Democracy Promotion, 114–15, for the USAID’s initial reluctance to become a funder for democracy promotion activities; and USAID, “The Democracy Initiative,” December 1990, USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse, for the agency’s initial strategy for incorporating democracy promotion into its global foreign aid mission and programs toward the end of the Cold War.
22. In her work on American covert regime change, Lindsey O’Rourke classifies several cases of American democracy promotion during the 1980s as regime change operations, alongside well-known cases of covert regime change from other periods of the Cold War. See Lindsey A. O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War (Ithaca, NY, 2018), 66–68.
In a matter of eleven days, I became an old guy.” These are the words of Mike Smith, who in 1969 was a 21-year-old draftee infantryman in the Battle of Hamburger Hill in South Vietnam. His remarks were recorded in 2017 during a reunion of survivors of that battle. This interview and hundreds more are now accessible through the West Point Center for Oral History (www.westpointcoh.org). Smith’s account and others by combat veterans are intense and revealing and are the raw data of military history. This collection, however, reaches beyond well-curated war stories to include broad ranging reflections from many perspectives. In his recorded interview, military ethicist Michael Walzer—who as a young professor opposed the Vietnam War—observes, for example, “Wars are political military engagements, and public opinion, local public opinion, hearts and minds, global public opinion . . . affect whether you win or lose these wars.”

While researching my recent book, Vietnamization, I discovered this treasure trove for scholars working on the military history of the American war in Vietnam.1 It is a matter of fact that my editor encouraged me to make my own experience part of the narrative and analysis. I had witnessed, but I was hesitant about the limits of anecdotal history. I determined that my experience was in whole or in part with the Vietnam War.

When I began planning to write about Vietnamization, I was keenly aware that this policy was one in which I myself had participated. I served as a U.S. Army Signal Corps sergeant in South Vietnam in 1970 as the Nixon administration was undertaking implementation of its Vietnamization plan. My editor encouraged me to make my own experience part of the narrative and analysis. I certainly had memories and opinions based upon what I had witnessed, but I was hesitant about the limits of anecdotal history. I determined that my experience was relevant to the topic, but I immediately began searching for other eye-witness accounts to provide some context for my own recollections. I browsed published collections of oral histories and a number of memoirs looking for first-hand accounts of the 1969-1973 period that was my principal focus. I had used the Vietnam Center and Archive in Three Keys, such evidence provides needed balance to history as explained by historians and history as myth exploited by politicians and activists.2 Oral history is a window into history as experience, that is, the lived past. Modern digital technology adds the dynamics of “immediacy and poignancy,” in the West Point COH website’s words, because the researcher can see and hear as well as read the participants’ descriptions, emotions, and interpretations.

The mission of the West Point COH is “to record, preserve, and present the stories of Soldiers, statesmen, and others who have influenced the profession of arms.” This purpose is in three parts. First is the education of the cadets in the traditions and models of their profession and the techniques for capturing that history. Second is to help inform the interested public about the military experience. Third is to “create new primary source material for scholars.” It is this third point that will be of great interest to members of SHAFR and other historians.

The guest speaker at the formal launching of the West Point COH website was documentary film maker Ken Burns. His insightful remarks on the power of history and of first-person narratives are included in the COH collection. His theme was that this type of primary source provides the “inner history” of warfare, that is, as experienced by the soldier. A similar concept that I have found particularly useful in my own work is “warrior knowledge,” a term employed by James William Gibson in his book Perfect War.3 Over the years, I have conducted a number of interviews, often done many years after the individuals’ experiences. They had both their own memories and the benefit of reflection over time, which is the case of most of the West Point interviews. Burns maintained that oral history helps “comprehend the whole.” The individual interviews are only one element of the mosaic, but together they can begin to form a coherent image. Colonel Harry Summers, author of On Strategy and founding editor of Vietnam magazine, often pointed out that nearly three million Americans served in South Vietnam and that there are that many stories that vary widely depending upon time, place, and military occupation.4

At present, it is an overwhelmingly Vietnam-era collection. There are 289 interviews listed under conflicts that deal in whole or in part with the Vietnam War. Following far behind is the Iraq War with 101. Next in order are Afghanistan (70) and World War II (69). The center is focusing on capturing accounts from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan deployments, according to LTC Siry, the director of the center, reports that there are now 620 interviews online, and the center has been averaging approximately 150 new interviews a year since 2015. Interviews are recorded in both formats, audio only and video, and interviewers often travel to unit reunions to record a number of interviews at one time. Locations found in the index span the globe, but South Vietnam tops the list with 255. The themes are as might be expected in a military archive. The most referenced is leadership (363), followed by camaraderie (228), West Point history (208), military techniques (174), and courage (166). The organizers have thus far identified 88 themes, including such subjects as women in the service, race, and even a heading for navy. Of particular interest to me for studying Vietnamization was the theme of counterinsurgency.

The “About Us” page on the website modestly declares that “oral history supplements traditional sources,” but it can be argued that historical narrative and analysis are incomplete without well-done oral history that seeks and values accuracy. As a tool for historians, first-hand accounts have long been important sources, even allowing for the limits of narrow, anecdotal perspectives and flaws in memory. As historian Paul Cohen has argued in History
at Texas Tech University for some past projects and went to their online oral histories, where I found some useful interviews for the years in question. While pursuing my search, I serendipitously shared a session on a panel at the Organization of American Historians Annual Meeting with Colonel Gail Yoshitani, the chair of the Department of History at West Point. She directed my attention to the West Point Center for Oral History and put me in touch with LTC Siry. When I accessed the website, I found myself immersed in the Vietnam War in ways not readily available elsewhere.

The 289 Vietnam War interviews that have thus far been posted do not all deal directly and at length with the war. Some describe only briefly the respondent’s connection to Vietnam or discuss how the war has provided lessons or examples for him or her, even if the individual was not directly involved in the war. Other interviews are almost totally and intensely on the war and especially the interviewee’s memories of combat, imprisonment, flight as a refugee, or other deeply personal experiences. Many of the participants are West Point alumni, some of whom went on to full and distinguished careers in the Army or other services, and their interviews include reflections on high-level leadership, strategic planning, and other big picture issues. Others of these West Pointers served for a time in the military before having successful civilian careers, and they draw connections between West Point, their military experience, and their later life. The non-alumni include enlisted men, journalists, spouses of veterans, career military women who in their day were not admitted to the USMA, nurses, politicians, West Point educators, and soldiers from other countries.

Among the most valuable resources provided by the West Point COH for study of the American war in Vietnam are the views of the Vietnamese. Most of these interviewees were members of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces—army, navy, air force, and marines. Some were senior and others were junior officers. One interview is with a diplomat currently serving the government in Hanoi who experienced the war from North Vietnam while growing up. A few of the Vietnamese are men and women who were children in the South or were then adult women who recall the exodus from the RVN during and after 1975. Particularly revealing for study of the military and political course of the war are the perspectives of the members of the uniformed forces of South Vietnam. Some endured long captivity after the war. Most retain a sense of great pride in their service, and as a group they offer explorations and critiques of the course of the war that are introspective and thought provoking. ARVN Lieutenant Hon Nguyen, for example, observes that “even though we fought side by side, I don’t want you to destroy my country.”

For diplomatic and military historians, there are a number of specific topics and individuals that are particularly notable. Among more well-known individuals included in this Vietnam archive are Jan Scruggs, H.R. McMaster, Robert Kerry, J. Paul Rarson, Alexander Haig, Karl Marlantes, Katherine “Kitsy” Westmoreland, Andrew Bacevich, Stanley Karnow, Brent Scowcroft, Eric Shinseki, Robert Scales, and Jack Jacobs. Major military engagements or areas of operation detailed in these conversations include the A Shau Valley, Khe Sanh, Tet 1968, Lam Son 719, and Hamburger Hill. The story of the controversial 1969 battle at Hamburger Hill (also known as Hill 937 or Dong Ap Bia) is told by officers, NCOs, grunts, and helicopter pilots who gathered together in 2017.

All the interviews can be viewed through online videos, and transcriptions are available for some of the interviews. More transcriptions are underway. The search function is helpful but as yet limited. In my case, I could search “counterinsurgency” but not “Vietnamization.” Using the search function, the index, and some browsing, I readily located five interviews that were directly related to and valuable for my research questions. Interviews with ARVN lieutenants Khoa Tran and Hon Nguyen and with veteran journalist Stanley Karnow provided keen insights into strengths and weakness of the South Vietnamese military. Juris Jurjevics was an Army sergeant at a remote camp in the Central Highlands who provided graphic descriptions of the corrupt power of the local RVN chief, and Major General Victor Hugo Jr. recounted his respect for the ARVN commander he advised and the tragic fate of that officer in the politicized South Vietnamese military.

The West Point Center for Oral History is a work in progress that is already a valuable archive. The USMA history faculty has created a wide-ranging and growing collection of voices from which their students, the general public, historians, and other scholars will profit greatly in the study of military, diplomatic, political, and social history.

Notes:
Steering Committee of Members

A Practical Guide to the
Kissinger-Le Duc Tho
Negotiations Volume

John M. Carland, Robert Brigham, and Thomas A. Schwartz

Editor's note: The following article is a slightly revised version of a talk given by the author at the Wilson Center in February 2018. AJ

Commentary

John M. Carland

You pay a price by being the last one to speak. Some of my material has been previewed by Steve [Randolph] and Winston [Lord] but this doesn’t matter. Historians thrive on repetition.

As editor-compiler of this volume I should start and say right off the bat that I am immensely pleased with this volume which in turn makes me immensely grateful to those at the Historian’s Office who labored on it so skillfully and so diligently. I can only say what Steve said—thank you to all of you. It made such a difference, given the monster size of this volume, to have everyone work on it and to do it so well and professionally. My gratitude extends to my friend Steve Randolph, who as Director of the Historian’s Office supported this project through all its stages. Without Steve’s support, and I mean this literally, the volume would not have been.

My goal today is to supply what I call “a practical guide” to this documentary history. At first glance an 800 page book might appear daunting, even forbidding—and maybe at second glance, also. It’s not, or shouldn’t be. What follows is a series of examples and suggestions of how historians, indeed anyone interested in this subject, can enter the book and engage productively with its material. My suggestions are far from exhaustive.

I want to begin with a reminder of the role force plays in negotiations in a war-time setting: Simply put, force, or the threat of force, drives negotiations and becomes, directly or indirectly, the arbiter of negotiations and related diplomacy. Kissinger knew this very well. In his first meeting with the North Vietnamese on 4 August 1969, he said: “We realize that neither side can be expected to give up at the conference table what had not been conceded on the battlefield.”

On to the practical guide. The official title of this volume is Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations, August 1969-December 1973. The volume contains the transcripts of every meeting—all 68 of them in 27 rounds—Kissinger had with the North Vietnamese, the latter represented and led most of the time by Politburo member, Le Duc Tho. The transcripts are all word searchable.

In analytical terms, this volume has four essential organizational elements: table of contents, text, footnotes, and appendices. Conceptually the table of contents and text are so intimately connected that I will treat them as one.

In passing I would add that a good table of contents does much for the reader. It shows how the story in the text develops; it shows movement; and it provides signposts to the text’s journey and destination. In short, it’s the reader’s key to the text.

For example—If your research interest focuses on the initial negotiations in 1969 and 1970, when Kissinger believed so much was possible—the most important being the mutual withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Vietnam—you will know that the documents on pages 1 to 135—Section 1 which I called “Attempting the Impossible”—are for you. Although Kissinger insisted in the proposal that “mutual withdrawal” be an integral part of any settlement, he did so, in the face of absolute non-acceptance by the North Vietnamese, with diminishing conviction.

When it became clear that Hanoi would not be persuaded on the question of mutual withdrawal, Kissinger needed a work-around (transcripts might also call it). He developed a complex plan whereby the two sides would withdraw troops but each would do so independently of one another, although to an agreed upon schedule. This stratagem fooled no one on the other side. At the 4 April 1970 meeting Le Duc Tho’s deputy, Xuan Thuy, said: “In practice your proposal is tantamount to a demand for mutual withdrawal. Therefore we cannot accept this principle.”

During the last two 1970 meetings, Kissinger did not mention mutual withdrawal directly, though it was still a US goal. Instead he began to talk about a concession the United States was willing to make: namely, that it would commit to a total withdrawal of its troops, leaving no residual force behind as we had done in Korea if other problems were successfully negotiated.

Another example. Perhaps you want to examine Kissinger’s discovering what was possible, then you would additionally focus on pages 136 through 261, Section 2, which I titled, appropriately enough I believe, “Discovering the possible.” At the 31 May 1971 meeting, Kissinger presented to the other side what he called President Nixon’s “final proposal.” There are seven points in the proposal but the first three are the critical ones. First, he committed the United States to set a date for full withdrawal of all our forces; second, the Vietnamese, North and South would discuss how “other outside forces would withdraw from the countries of Indochina”; and third, there should be a ceasefire in place throughout Indochina when US force withdrawals began. The heart of this huge concession was that the United States formally abandoned the policy of mutual withdrawal, and in effect, committed to unilateral withdrawal if other conditions were met. It further admitted that North Vietnamese forces would stay in place in the South because we were simply unable to force them out. This was a critical moment in the US history of the negotiations. Kissinger had truly begun to learn what was possible! But, interestingly enough, the North Vietnamese did not or chose not to notice the concession. Therefore, the negotiations continued with little or no progress throughout 1971. Kissinger’s concessions, approved by Nixon, contain much food for thought for researchers in terms of how and why we made the concessions, and how and why there was no reaction from the other side.

Moving on. The negotiations in 1972 and early 1973 provide fascinating material for studying how force and diplomacy can influence one another and of course influence policy. For this period, sections 3 through 6 of the Table of Contents contain the transcript of Negotiations, November 1972–December 1972, “Breakdown of Negotiations, November, 1972–October 1972,” “Settlement Accomplished: The Accords Initiated and Signed, January 1973” tell the story. In that time 35 meetings took place—that is, the pace of talks sped up greatly. However, at the
start of this period, force took center stage. In the early spring of 1972 the North Vietnamese launched the Easter Offensive hoping to, as a North Vietnamese Politburo analysis stated, "force the American imperialists to end the war through negotiations conducted from a posture of defeat. President Nixon was determined not to let this happen and to substantially ramp up American power in theater—sending more B-52s, more fighter bombers, more carrier groups and other naval vessels-- and then pummeled and blockaded North Vietnam while providing massive fire power support to the South Vietnamese military against the invading North Vietnamese Army. At this point, things looked good for Hanoi. At the 2 May 1972 meeting, an emboldened Le Duc Tho and his colleagues, according to Kissinger's report to the president: "made very clear that they were not prepared either to deescalate the fighting or offer anything new concerning a settlement." The meeting went nowhere and Kissinger discontinued the talks. But over the spring and summer of 1972 American military efforts broke the back of the Communist Offensive and it stalled. American success persuaded Hanoi leaders that to win the war they had to get the US out of the war, and to do that they had to meet key American demands. That is, they had to sacrifice previously non-negotiable goals to achieve a more important long term one. Therefore, in late July Kissinger and Henry A. Kissinger met with Le Duc Tho and his colleagues to hammer-out changes. Le Duc Tho as follows: "When you go to Paris this time you will be the Commander of the Diplomatic Front. Do whatever you need to do, but you must achieve one thing in the agreement—The U.S. withdraws and our troops remain"—which sounds like two things, not one, but the two are allegedly opposite sides of the same coin. To this end, Le Duc Tho backed off from demanding a Communist dominated coalition government in the South, no longer demanded the resignation of South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu, and dropped North Vietnam's objection to the United States resupplying the South Vietnamese military in post settlement South Vietnam. And of course, America would get its POWs [prisoners of war] back. This Hanoi initiative worked. It resulted in the October 1972 negotiations which produced the October draft agreement. In passing, it's worth mentioning that the October negotiations represent one of only two periods in the war in which genuine negotiations took place, the other being in January 1973 in the wake of the Christmas Bombing, negotiations which led in this instance to the Paris Peace Accords. There's a great deal in these meetings from May 1972 through January 1973 for historians to deal with, especially from the October 1972 draft agreement to the final shape of the Paris Accords in January. If you are interested in Kissinger's meetings with the North Vietnamese after the Paris Peace Accords. If so, the last section, which I titled "Attempting to implement the Accords, February -December 1973," and wish I had titled it, "Attempting and failing to implement the Accords," provides stupendous food for thought, research, and writing. It's a dismal period for American diplomacy in Vietnam. Kissinger met with Le Duc Tho and others senior North Vietnamese officials in Hanoi in February, then met Le Duc Tho several times in May and June in Paris, and then for a last time in December, also in Paris. In these meetings, Kissinger hoped that the carrot of aid and the stick of airpower might persuade Hanoi to adhere to the Accords and observe a cease-fire. He was wrong. And in fact the American stick began in mid-year to look like a paper tiger. Consequently, with Watergate taking away the president's focus on Vietnam and with Congress making it difficult and then in June impossible to apply American force in Vietnam, American diplomacy failed. After the last meeting, the December 1973 meeting, Kissinger made an almost delusional upbeat report to the president about the Paris meeting and shortly thereafter did the same for senior officials—Colby, Schlesinger, Scowcroft, and others. For a more realistic appraisal, one should turn to our fellow panelists, Winston Lord. On 15 December 1973, five days before this last meeting, he wrote the following to Peter Rodman: Probably this [meeting] will just be another wearying, frustrating replay [of previous ones]. But does anyone have a better option? It should be accompanied by generous military aid to the G(S) VN and continuing diplomatic efforts in Peking and Moscow. These are about the only levers we have. We should also continue to shake the stick of American response and dangle the carrot of economic aid but should be under no illusions that the former is very credible or that the latter is very decisive in Hanoi's calculations.3

Ambassador Lord may want to further parse for us what he said, but to me these melancholic words provide a fitting epitaph to the negotiations. Previously, I mentioned, two other significant organizational elements to my "practical guide"—footnotes and appendices. They need not be discussed in any detail but their value should be made clear. Many of the footnotes I have turned into discursive mini-essays that are literally jam-packed with critical excerpts from documents—ours and theirs—documents often hard to come by elsewhere. I believe the footnotes, which I spent an immense amount of time on, clarify, contextualize, and amplify the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho documentary history. Don't miss them. There are three appendices. The first is a handy chart showing all the occasions on which Kissinger met with the North Vietnamese, and with whom he principally talked. The second is a hard to find copy of the October 1972 draft of the accords. The third is an essay on the then secret understandings to the Paris Accords.6 Keep in mind that the text of the agreement and the several protocols attached were made public at the time, not so the understandings, which dealt with some sensitive subjects and were kept secret. This is something that Steve and I and others in the Historian's Office believed should be made available as a starting point for anyone wanting to research and write about the not very well known understandings.

Let's end this talk with three observations. First, believe it or not, there's occasional humor in this volume. For example, on 4 December 1972, when things were so intense and so bitter in the meetings, Le Duc Tho accused Kissinger of introducing, as he put it, "many changes to the agreement. As for us, we have proposed only a small number of changes." To which Kissinger replied. "[Your changes are] Only on vital ones. Mr. Special Adviser [which is what he called Le Duc Tho] is like one who shoots you in the heart and says he fired only one bullet." Second, some topics such as the results of and the significance of the negotiations, and lessons learned from the experience, important in themselves have not been addressed. There simply has not been enough time to do justice to such questions if the practical guide, which I saw as my main task, was to be accomplished. Third, and this takes me back to my starting point: this 1800 page book is not impenetrable. I hope I've provided, as I said I would in the introduction, and why not quote myself—"examples and suggestions of how historians, indeed anyone interested in this subject, can enter the book and engage productively with its material. My suggestions are far from exhaustive. Rather they exemplify and encourage possibilities." The rest is, as we like to say, up to you.

Thank you.

Notes:
John Carland’s edited FRUS volume on the secret negotiations between U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger and Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s (or North Vietnam) Politburo member Le Duc Tho is an indispensable resource for scholars of the Vietnam War and anyone interested in détente, the Nixon administration, and negotiations to end deadly conflict. Carland has brilliantly put together—in one place—the important secret conversations taking place at 11, rue Darthe, Choisy-le-Roi, a working class suburb of Paris, that eventually led to the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement. Carland carefully contextualizes the documents with useful and substantive footnotes that guide the expert and beginner alike through the complicated secret talks. He also provides short essays embedded in the notes that help illuminate the transcripts at every point along the way in Paris. What is truly remarkable about these documents, notes, and short essays is that they also include the Vietnamese perspective on the secret talks. Carland uses translated Vietnamese source material as a solid evidentiary base for his expert analysis of the inner workings of the Politburo. We can see a negotiation strategy emerging in Hanoi as events on the ground come into sharper focus. It is rare to see a FRUS volume take such a comprehensive look at the diplomatic environment surrounding a conflict. In short, Carland’s edited FRUS volume is one of the most useful sources I have encountered in the last thirty-five years of teaching and writing on the Vietnam War.

Notes:
1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

Heathers, Varsity Blues, Grand Budapest Hotel, MI-5 (Spooks in the UK), Downtown Abbey, any Agatha Christie

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

I practiced my very first conference paper during my PhD several times, and every time it clocked 19.5 minutes -- spot on for a 20-minute presentation slot. When I actually gave the paper, it only took me 14.5 minutes. I'm a bit of a fast talker in general, and especially when I'm nervous.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Queen Elizabeth I, Princess Grace of Monaco, and Arnold Lunn

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Travel around the world and have amazing seats for the entirety of the Olympics every two years and for other sporting events.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Tori Amos, Joss Stone, Matt Nathanson, Matt Wertz, Madonna (1980s through early 2000s), G. Love and Special Sauce, Mika, James Taylor, Billy Joel

6. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

Working in the sport industry
I teach at Northwestern University and live in Rogers Park, Chicago. When I was young, I intended to be a musician. Then I went to Columbia and took classes with Anders Stephanson, Betsy Blackmar, and Eric Foner, which showed me that there was a far better way to not make very much money. It’s a happy life: I cycle to work, I get to wear blazers, and they let me check out as many books as I want from the library. I’ve written two books of my own: Thinking Small, about U.S. antipoverty strategies at home and abroad, and How to Hide an Empire, a narrative history of the United States’ territorial empire. Now I’m writing a one about urban fires in the nineteenth century.

1. **What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?**
   TV: *Twin Peaks* (first season) and *The Wire* (first four, and I’ll stand by season 2–twelve hours about the shipping container’s effect on the working class). Movies: *Vertigo*, *Seven Samurai*, and *Paddington 2*.

2. **What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?**
   My baseline level of mortification is extremely high. It’s an all-way tie between every class I’ve ever taught, every time I’ve had to eat in public, and every elevator ride I’ve taken with a stranger at the AHA.

3. **If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?**
   I like the oddballs whose biographies have an air of implausibility, to the point where their Wikipedia pages just sound made up. I’d invite swordswoman Julie d’Aubigny, civil rights activist Pauli Murray, and writer Stewart Brand (who is still alive and living on a tugboat in Sausalito).

4. **What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?**
   The planet’s on fire, so the correct answer is $500 million to 350.org, the anti–climate change organization. But I propose a variant: $499,999,950 to 350.org and a nice scarf. When people ask what I did with my winnings, I’d say “I gave some away, and I bought this scarf. Here, feel it. It’s really soft.”

5. **You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?**
   Oh, I’ve thought about this one. Warm the crowd up with Art Tatum solo piano. Then Duke Ellington’s Blanton Webster Band from the early 1940s. End with the Miles Davis Band, 1970 incarnation, with Keith Jarrett. For the afterparty, you give Art Tatum a Fender Rhodes and anything he wants from the Davis Band’s drug stash and see what happens.

6. **What are five things on your bucket list?**
   Medieval-style wooden bucket, Charlie Bucket, bucket of fries, galvanized metal bucket, and Buckethead.

7. **What would you be doing if you were not an academic?**
   Though I’m not good at it, I like making stuff on the computer: designing websites, drawing maps with ArcGIS, fussing over typography. There’s a certain fastidiousness to it all that’s engrossing. I could easily find happiness as a programmer.
My road to becoming an academic is as much about my professional interests as it is about who I am as a person. I was born and reared in Northern California, but I have always had an international outlook. My ancestry is Italian and I made many visits as a child to Savona in Liguria. Not surprisingly, I completed my B.A. in international relations and foreign languages. I went on to do an M.A. in International Relations at SAIS / Johns Hopkins and landed an entry-level job at the United States Institute of Peace. Most of my peers at SAIS went on to become diplomats and civil servants; at the time, I thought I wanted to do that, too. But it was 1989. Everyone in D.C. was attempting to explain “The End of History”—and (obviously!) the historians did that best. After working in D.C. for five years, I returned to graduate school at UC Santa Barbara and completed my PhD under Fredrik Logevall’s guidance. My doctorate focused on U.S. foreign policy toward war-time and early Cold War Italy. In my research, I explore how Italian Americans and Italian immigrants living in the United States influenced American policies toward Italy. I was a lecturer for fifteen years, and have only recently moved over to the tenure track at the California State University, San Marcos. I am a proud life-time member of SHAFR and deeply value the life-time relationships that our association has provided me.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

I tend to be drawn to films about the human condition and the ways in which our relationships—and not necessarily romantic ones—give meaning to our lives. I could name at least a dozen Italian films, but I will limit those to three: The Leopard, Divorce Italian Style, and last year’s The Disappearance of My Mother. In no particular order of preference: Harold and Maude (whatever you may thing of Cat Stevens, the soundtrack is great), Breaking the Waves, Rust and Bone, Wings of Desire, and most recently The Shape of Water and Pain and Glory.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

I have more than a few of those (!), but at the risk of embarrassing myself, I will share the most embarrassing among them: I was living and working in D.C. when I applied to return to graduate school for a PhD. I was very fortunate to secure an interview with a potential doctorate advisor at a prestigious university in the D.C. area. I was thrilled. Of course I had prepared: I wrote down all of the reasons that I would be a good fit for the university and with this particular scholar. I brought several papers that I had drafted as an M.A. student, and rehearsed important details about my academic interests and experience. I even arrived five minutes early to the interview (I’m typically five minutes late to everything). When the time came, I was ushered into the professor’s office and invited to sit down across from his large, intimidating desk. Dispensing with any formalities whatsoever, he immediately asked, “What did you think of my most recent book?” Had I read his most recent book? Did I even bother to learn the title of his most recent book? No. I felt my face flush and my stomach turn with excruciating embarrassment and of course I had nothing to say in response. His next sentence was “It was nice to meet you. My assistant will show you out.” I am eternally grateful to that professor for a life lesson that I share with graduate students every single semester: No matter how consumed we become with our own intellectual pursuits, our true north star must necessarily be to constantly and strategically strive to situate ourselves in the scholarship of others.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

I know this is nerdy, but I would want to have dinner with three Italian intellectuals, all of whom were political philosophers in the Italian fascist era: Benedetto Croce (liberal), Antonio Gramsci (communist) and Giovanni Gentile (fascist). I would enjoy focaccia with extra virgin olive oil and a good class of chianti, and I would listen closely to better understand how these three minds would attempt to persuade each other of their respective ideologies and world views. Especially given the strange moment of fracture in which we are currently living, I’d be as eager to learn how Gentile would explain his “philosophy of fascism” as Gramsci would describe his theory of the “hegemony of ideas.” I would want to better understand Croce’s version of liberalism and what to do about onagrocrazia—a term he coined to describe government rule by the ignorant and the arrogant.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

I don’t pretend to be selfless: I’d use some of the money to pay for my kids’ college educations. But I have to say that I would follow in the footsteps of George Soros (writing that just made me laugh out loud!) and commit the vast majority of the lotto winnings to the global refugee crisis. The world’s refugee crisis is of such magnitude that we cannot seem to imagine it—it’s “too big” to fathom. Not only do we need to fathom the crisis, we need to find ways to mitigate it. From Afghanistan, to Darfur, DRC, Myanmar, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen (and, sadly, yet more), 70.8 million people have been displaced worldwide. According to the UNHCR, that’s one person every two seconds. The Powerball money would be my attempt to do what I could to alleviate at least some of the human suffering.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Without a moment’s hesitation, I would reignite the American Folk Blues Festival of the early 1960s. The Blues speaks to (and for) authentic history in a way that nothing else can. The festival would necessarily include the greats. The world’s refugee crisis is of such magnitude that we cannot seem to imagine it—it’s “too big” to fathom. Not only do we need to fathom the crisis, we need to find ways to mitigate it. From Afghanistan, to Darfur, DRC, Myanmar, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen (and, sadly, yet more), 70.8 million people have been displaced worldwide. According to the UNHCR, that’s one person every two seconds. The Powerball money would be my attempt to do what I could to alleviate at least some of the human suffering.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

1. Summer in South America
2. Obstacle Course Race
3. Pacific Crest Trail
4. Learn to like opera
5. Talk about myself in Passport’s Spotlight

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

Without seeming pretentious, I’d like to think that I would have been an effective diplomat.
I’ve been teaching history at Ohio University for twenty-nine years. That’s the longest I’ve ever been in one place. I grew up in Schenectady, New York, earned an undergraduate degree at Brown University, and liked history so much that I earned a Ph.D. at Northwestern. I’m interested in international affairs, politics, and mass media, which explains why I’ve published extensively about TV news coverage of the Vietnam War. There’s no explanation for why I keep writing about Republican presidents—especially Eisenhower and Reagan—most recently as editor of A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower (Wiley-Blackwell, 2017). I’ve directed twenty completed Ph.D. dissertations, and I always get enormous satisfaction from teaching undergraduate courses on the United States in the 1960s and in the 1980s. The latter course is entitled “The Age of Reagan and Madonna.”

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

   Mad Men is my hands-down favorite. The show’s creators understood the 1960s and captured its mood and texture right down to the cereal boxes on the breakfast tables, the suits and skirts, and the songs. My current favorite movie is Atomic Blonde, which has the look and feel of the anxious days before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the intrigue of Cold War espionage. But I’ve watched Bullitt dozens of times, and Steve McQueen is cooler with every viewing.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

   Steve Ambrose was a visiting professor at the University of Kansas, where I was teaching, during the Eisenhower centennial year of 1990. I had just finished the manuscript for my book, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the publisher, the University Press of Kansas, had asked Ambrose—THE Eisenhower authority—to write a blurb. Ambrose decided to reveal what he had written in a face-to-face conversation. I had a major anxiety attack, which only got worse, when he started by saying, “You blame Eisenhower for every problem of your generation, while I praise him for all the successes of mine.” Anxiety became panic as I thought what might come next. But then he growled, “That’s exactly how it should be.” The blurb praised my book as “the best single volume on the Eisenhower presidency.” I was so thankful—and so relieved. I’m grateful to Ambrose for the generous praise, but I’ve also never forgotten that his bio of Eisenhower is two volumes.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

   The first would be Thomas Jefferson because of his brilliance, complexity, and contradictions. I’ve always wanted to have a conversation with Dean Acheson and see if I could hold my own. I’m not sure if she qualifies as an historical figure, but dinner with Maureen Dowd would be a thrill. I’ve been in the same room with her—along with about 200 other people. So, Ms. Dowd, if you’re reading this, can we talk someday about how you riffed on the Notorious B.I.G and came up with the Notorious D.J.T.?

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

   I’d make sure that I could live the rest of my life comfortably in Nice and other places on the Mediterranean, and I’d give the rest to Doctors without Borders.

5. What are your favorite sports teams? What is your participation in sports?

   I’m a lifelong Los Angeles Dodgers fan, and I’m old enough to remember when the Dodgers last won a World Series in 1988. It’s been a long time, Andrew Friedman (LA president for baseball operations); we Dodger fans have become very impatient. I run (usually three miles at a time), and I completed a couple of 10 K’s, but the only team on which I ever played was my high school, junior varsity football team. Most people are stunned when I tell them my position, since I’m hardly big enough. I was a defensive tackle, but back then I weighed forty pounds more.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

   1. Visit China and Vietnam
   2. Meet a sitting U.S. president
   3. Attend a tennis match on Centre Court at Wimbledon
   4. See a World Series game at Dodger Stadium
   5. Attend a Madonna concert

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

   I would have kept taking guitar lessons as a kid and would have grown up to be Keith Richards.
I am a professor and incoming chair of the History Department at the University of Victoria. I grew up mostly in the Seattle area, but between the ages of 5 and 23, I spent much of my time on commercial fishing boats in Alaska and Puget Sound. I got into history early in my time as an undergraduate at Whitman College. Although I began college intending to be a chemistry major, courses with SHAFR stalwart David Schmitz and others convinced me that history was my calling. My time studying and living abroad in Central America sparked an obsessive interest in the influence and impact of US corporations overseas. This led to my doctoral work at Cornell under Tim Borstelmann and Walt LaFeber and my first book, *The Business of Empire: United Fruit, Race, and US Expansion in Central America* (Cornell, 2011).

In recent years, I have turned more to marine environmental history. My recent book, *Orca: How We Came to Know and Love the Ocean’s Greatest Predator* (Oxford, 2018), explores the intersection of science, environmental culture, and international relations on the Pacific Coast, and my next project explores the history of humans and gray whales from Baja to the Bering Sea. I live in Victoria, BC, with my wife, two sons, and two cats. When not cheering and coaching my boys in soccer, I spend my spare time playing guitar, banjo, and harmonica.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

   Top three movies:
   1. *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid*
   2. *Lost in Translation*
   3. *No Country for Old Men*

   Top three TV shows:
   1. *Seinfeld*
   2. *Mad Men*
   3. *Game of Thrones*

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking professional moment?

   Hmm, many to choose from, but one stands out. In late 2005, I had a painful job talk. To begin with, the setup of the room was odd, with the audience in chairs against all four walls, including behind the podium. After I distributed handouts to everyone, I realized that I had accidentally handed out my notes for the talk as well. I spent the next 5-10 minutes walking around the room trying to collect and reorganize them. By the time I started, I was a wreck. Worst job talk I ever gave—just brutal.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

   1. Eleanor Roosevelt: So we could eat hot dogs on the White House lawn and talk about race, human rights, and US politics in the 1930s and 1940s
   2. Benjamin Franklin: I’d just want to ply him with beer and listen to every story he had
   3. Jackie Robinson: For the chance to talk sports, race, and history

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

   Instant wealth—excellent! Truth be told, this kind of money would stress me out, and I’d give away the vast majority of it. For myself, after taking care of basics such as mortgage and buying a nice boat, I’d have an absolute blast taking friends and family on trips.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

   Sam Cooke, Otis Redding, Aretha Franklin, Janis Joplin, Joe Cocker, Bob Dylan, and Bruce Springsteen. That would be a helluva party.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

   1. Visiting the Galapagos Islands
   2. Attending a game at Lambeau Field (preferably cheering for my beloved Seahawks)
   3. Taking a road trip to visit every national park in Canada and the US
   4. Learning to sail
   5. Living long enough to play with a grandchild

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

   I would probably be working on the water in some capacity—commercial fishing, merchant marine, or charter/tour boat guide.
I am currently the associate director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where I also teach the history of US-East Asian relations. My first book Foreign Friends: Syngman Rhee, American Exceptionalism, and the Division of Korea (Kentucky 2019) places the division of Korea in a broader historical context of Korean activism in the United States and American concerns regarding Korean christianity. I have been published in the Washington Post, North Korea Review, Journal of American-East Asian Relations, SinoNK.com, Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society-Korea Branch and in the Working Papers Series of the Cold War International History Project. My research and analysis has been featured on National Public Radio, Wisconsin Public Radio, C-SPAN, and CNN.

My interest in history started when I was twelve, when a quest to learn how local landmarks got their names took me to the Sparta (Wisconsin) Free Library where I borrowed and devoured the 700 page tome The History of Monroe County Wisconsin. While reading that book I learned doing history could be a profession and decided that is what I wanted to do. My interest in Korea developed rather late. Finishing my undergraduate degree heavily in debt, I moved to South Korea to earn some money, but ended up staying two years and developing an interest in US-Korean relations.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?
As an undergraduate I was fascinated with Ingmar Bergman and other “challenging” filmmakers. After becoming a parent, I just want to be entertained. I love That 70s Show (set in Wisconsin) and The Big Bang Theory. Anything directed or featuring Taika Waititi is also reliable. I watch anything by Werner Herzog and Terrance Malick. Daniel Craig is the best James Bond ever. Mainly I watch sports. I never miss a Packer game—even in Korea. I watch every race of the International Biathlon Union’s World Cup Series.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?
In 2014, I was invited to be the managing editor of an international team that would edit and publish the diary of Syngman Rhee. I had already been working as a professional document editor for five years and estimated that it would take us two years to publish the diary. The Korean sponsors wanted it done in two months. The next 12 months were some of the most anxious of my life while I balanced the demands of the sponsors on the one hand and professional standards on the other. I edited the final draft of the foreword on a flight to Seoul to attend the diary’s release ceremony. I sent the final changes to the publisher at 1:30am. The next morning at 9am, I entered the conference venue to see bound copies of the diary stacked high on a table, with all the changes I had made the night before in print. Such a thing can only happen in “dynamic” South Korea.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
Obviously Syngman Rhee. I have spent so much time with that man over the last ten years, but still have so many questions. I am sure we would not like each other and it would be a tense conversation. If I could spike his drink with truth serum that would be even better. Anna Wallis Suh (aka Seoul City Sue) would be another one. I think a supernatural meeting with her is quite possibly the only way to get enough material on her to publish a book about her. After the dinners with Rhee and Suh I would be ready to go in a different direction. My final dinner would be with Picasso and I would eat dinner while he painted my portrait—at least that is what I would tell him to do. Whatever he painted, I would at least come away with something tangible from these dinners.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
Retire to the snowbelt of Upper Michigan, hire Ole Einar Bjøndalen as my personal biathlon coach, and set my sights on a gold medal in biathlon in the Badger State Games (70+ age group).

5. What are your favorite professional sports team(s)…and did you ever compete at any level?
The Green Bay Packers—America’s only publicly owned and not-for-profit professional sports team. I played soccer for decades, but, as soccer is a young man’s game, about ten years ago I switched to squash. I now play twice a week religiously and enter 1-2 amateur tournaments a year.

6. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
Organizing a music festival sounds like way too much work. Instead I would just put U2 on a truck and drive them around Madison for an afternoon. Then I would resurrect Sergei Rachmaninov to play his complete piano concertos in a special concert series on campus.

7. What are five things on your bucket list?
Live in the Swiss Alps for any period of time (even a week). See a softcover edition of my first book published. Travel to a united Korea. Build a sauna in my backyard. Win a gold medal in biathlon (see above).

8. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
I tremble at the thought. I spent my summers as an undergraduate working in a factory on a team that ran a 3 story plough blender that mixed high protein drinks for athletes. As the youngest, smallest, and nimblest man on the crew, one of my key jobs was to clean every inch of the blender from the inside when we switched flavors. I was exceptionally good at this and could have enjoyed outstanding job security, but I much prefer my current gig.
The **Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize** was established through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their late son. The Bernath Lecture Prize is intended to recognize excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by scholars under 41 years of age or within ten years of receipt of the Ph.D. After careful deliberation, this year’s Bernath Lecture committee (Hugh Wilford, Jay Sexton, and Brooke Blower) have selected Professor **Julia F. Irwin** of the University of South Florida to receive the 2020 Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize. Professor Irwin earned her Ph.D. at Yale University where she was advised by John Harley Warner and Glenda Gilmore. The winner of numerous previous awards, including SHAFR’s Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize, she is the author of *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening* (Oxford University Press, 2013) and fifteen articles and book chapters. The Bernath Lecture Prize committee received a number of excellent nominations but was particularly impressed by the way Professor Irwin’s work transformed our understanding of U.S. humanitarianism in relation to state and non-state structures and opened up future lines of research. Many of her nominators were also eloquent on the subject of her brilliance as an educator.

The **William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Grants** were established by SHAFR’s Council to promote scholarly research by untenured college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D., who are working as professional historians, and who are working on the first research monograph. This year’s committee (Scott Laderman, Heather Stur, and Joseph Eaton) recognizes two outstanding projects for 2020:

**Jessica Levys**’s book manuscript, “Black Power, Inc.: Corporate America, Race, and Empowerment Politics in the U.S. and Africa,” draws on archival materials from government, corporate, and movement archives on two continents to examine the transnational rise of “black empowerment” politics in the United States and South Africa. In doing so, it pulls together two narratives central to twentieth-century U.S. history that until now have remained largely separate: the history of the black freedom struggle and the rise of corporate power. Black empowerment—which Dr. Levy defines as private and public programs promoting job training, community development, and black entrepreneurship—essentially appropriated black power, she argues, supplanting more radical demands from the movement for reparations and economic justice. Dr. Levy’s original and fascinating project, which was also recognized with SHAFR’s 2019 Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize, makes an important contribution by showing the ways that corporate America profited from black militancy, racial liberalism, and the seeds of political conservatism that blossomed within the global black freedom struggle, altering the political and material landscapes of black communities from North Philadelphia to Soweto. The book is under contract with the University of Pennsylvania Press. Dr. Levy received her Ph.D. in History in 2018 from Johns Hopkins University under the supervision of N. D. B. Connolly, and she currently serves as Postdoctoral Research Associate in the Department of History at the University of Virginia.

**Clayton Vaughn-Roberson**’s book manuscript, “Fascism with a Jim Crow Face: The National Negro Congress and the Global Popular Front,” addresses African Americans’ central contributions to the interwar anti-fascist movement, exploring in particular the transnational anti-fascism of the National Negro Congress (NNC). The NNC, through its occupation of key positions in the Popular Front, insisted that overcoming Jim Crow, labor exploitation, and extralegal violence was critical to preempting fascism in the United States. Dr. Vaughn-Roberson’s innovative, worthy manuscript, which examines the convergence of the NNC’s global and local activism, draws on extensive work in the NNC papers as well as those of a number of key participants. The book, which will make an important contribution, is under consideration with the University of North Carolina.
Press. Dr. Vaughn-Roberson received his Ph.D. in History from Carnegie Mellon University in 2019 under the supervision of Nico Slate. He currently serves as Research Fellow and Special Faculty in the Department of History at Carnegie Mellon University.

SHAFR’s **Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship** honors the long-time editor of *Diplomatic History* and is intended to promote research in foreign-language sources by graduate students. The committee is pleased to award the 2020 Hogan Fellowship to **Andisheh Ghaderi**, a doctoral candidate at the University of Kansas. She currently holds an M.A. in French Literature from Michigan State University. Her dissertation project, “American Dream: Critical Perspectives by Francophone Immigrant Writers,” analyzes how representations of the United States and the American Dream have evolved in Francophone Haitian Literature. Ghaderi’s project offers a fascinating examination of how the United States is imagined from outside its national boundaries. In doing so, it merges the study of literature with American foreign relations in important and imaginative ways. The fellowship will allow Ghaderi to pursue language courses in Haitian Creole at Florida International University this summer.

The Graduate Student Grants & Fellowships Committee—chaired by **Sarah Miller-Davenport** and including **Gregg Brazinsky, Sam Lebovic,** and **Kate Burlingham**—also made a number of awards at the SHAFR luncheon:

**Ji Soo Hong** received the **W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship**, which was established to honor World War I veteran and long-time University of Washington History Professor W. Stull Holt. Her dissertation, “Business of Détente: The Transpacific Development of Siberia in the Age of Energy Crisis.” Her research examines the seemingly unlikely cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the oil and gas fields of Cold War Siberia. As both superpowers faced energy shortages in the 1970s, they worked together to develop the Siberian gas and petrochemical industries. The dissertation demonstrates that détente was fueled not only by political concerns but also by economic pressure from below. Hong is a Ph.D. candidate at Brown University working under the direction of Ethan Pollack.

**Aries Li** won the **Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant**, which was endowed by the Bernath Family. Her dissertation, “Shared Past, Discordant Memories: American and Chinese Remembrance of the U.S. World War II Military Presence in China,” combines social and cultural history to explore the role of public memory in the shaping of perceptions between the United States and China, with a focus on the memorialization of those U.S. servicemen and women who served to support the Chinese fight against the Japanese invasion in the 1940s. The project opens up valuable new avenues for re-interpreting the U.S.-China relationship and how wartime memories can have lasting legacies for influencing the diplomatic environment. Li is a PhD candidate at Rutgers University supervised by David Fogelsong.

**Sarah Sklaw** has been awarded the **Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport-Walter LaFeber Fellowship**, established to honor Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president; Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*; and LaFeber, former president of SHAFR. Sklaw will use these funds to conduct research in Nicaragua for her dissertation, “Tell Your Mama to Surrender: Gender, Revolution, and Development in Nicaragua, 1972-1995,” which examines the relationship between gender and development in U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. She counters existing historiography by focusing on how local actors, such as homemakers and community organizers, engaged with international development, challenging and retooling programs to meet their own needs. Sklaw is a doctoral candidate at New York University under the supervision of Monica Kim.

Eleven doctoral students received **Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants** to further their doctoral research projects:

Arash Azizi and Sarah Miller-Davenport

Arab and Iranian activists separately, Azizi shows that radical and revolutionary Arab and Iranian parties, movements, and activists interacted in complex ways, yielding various kinds of political visions, alliances and tensions. Moreover, they were united not just by the support they received from Moscow but by a revolutionary Middle Eastern internationalism. Azizi is a Ph.D. candidate at New York University under the supervision of Zachary Lockman.

**Aniket De**’s dissertation, “United States of India: American and the Making of Federalism in South Asia, 1900-1947,” analyzes the role of American connections in shaping federalist thought and politics in South Asia in the half-century leading up to Indian independence. Drawing on a variety of English, Bengali, and Hindi sources, the study will provide new insight into the social, political, and intellectual histories of Indo-U.S. relations and new perspectives on the history of Indian anticolonialism. De is a Ph.D. Candidate at Harvard University, working under the supervision of Sugata Bose.

**Arang Ha**’s dissertation “Free Labor, Free Trade, and Free Immigration: The Vision of the Pacific Community after the Civil War” also received a Bemis grant. Ha’s project traces the trajectory of Republican free labor ideology as it intersected with the politics of the China trade and Chinese immigration in the second half of the nineteenth century. Working at the intersection of diplomatic, economic, and social history, the study will provide a new account of the politics of trans-Pacific relations. Ha is a Ph.D. candidate at Rice University, working under the supervision of Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu.

**Aden Knaap** also won a Bemis Grant to further research his dissertation, “Judging the World: International Courts and the Origins of World Organization, 1899-1945.” Knaap argues that the origins of U.S. support for world organization can be traced back to 1899, when the United States provided crucial support for a set of international courts located in Europe and the Americas. Unlike older tribunals, these courts were permanent and multilateral, possessed broad jurisdiction, and applied and made international law. Knaap’s dissertation reveals a deep and persistent U.S. interest in world organization, which many Americans believed would further the U.S. “legalist empire” that began well before the formation of the League of Nations and the United Nations. He is a PhD candidate at Harvard University under the supervision of David Armitage.

**Mira Kohl** was recognized for her dissertation, “A Railway for South American Unity: Migration and Regionalism on the Bolivian Frontier, 1935-1964,” which examines relations between the United States and Bolivia. Specifically, she explores the early 20th-century attempt by Bolivia and Brazil to build an interoceanic railway that would fuse relations between the two Latin American countries and undercut U.S. imperialist designs on the region. She will use SHAFR funds to travel to Bolivia in order to finish her research there. Kohl is a doctoral candidate at Tulane University working under the supervision of Justin Wolfe.

**Kevan Malone** received a Bemis Travel Grant for his dissertation, “The Magnetic Frontier: Urbanization and Environmental Diplomacy at the Tijuana-San Diego Border, 1920-1999.” Malone’s research explores the paradox at the center of the border zone’s development: the cities on either side grew in tandem, becoming increasingly interrelated, even as the United States and Mexico erected barriers between them. This “magnetic frontier” drew U.S. capital south and Mexican labor north and fueled rapid urbanization in both San Diego and Tijuana, even as two distinct landscapes and economies emerged. Malone is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, San Diego, under the supervision of Nancy Kwak. He is pictured above receiving his award from committee chair Dr. Sarah Miller-Davenport.

**Ashley Serpa-Flack**’s dissertation, “Shadow Diplomacy: The United States, the Portuguese Empire and the Cold War, 1961-1974” was also recognized. She presents an innovative take on a well-covered story, namely the U.S. interest in and efforts to hold on to the Lajes Field air base on the Azores. Serpa-Flack shifts attention to the role of transnational non-state activities in advancing for the continuation of Portugal’s colonial power and the domestic political battles that were fought in Washington regarding both the role of outside influence and the centrality of anti-Communism in the U.S. system. By doing so, the dissertation makes a strong case that even the well-known episodes in American foreign relations can be analyzed anew if new perspectives are taken on how to
approach them. Serpa-Flack is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Davis, supervised by Kathryn Olmstead.

**Varsha Venkatasubramanian** won a Bemis Grant for her dissertation, “Damned if You Dam: US-Indo Relations and the Rise of Environmental Opposition to Dam-Building,” which examines the emergence of India’s hydroelectric dam projects as a focus of popular protest movements in the 1980s and 1990s. As dams have been central to India’s post-1947 vision of development, Venkatasubramanian’s dissertation argues that anti-dam protests offered a broader critique of Indian democracy, environmental politics, and Indian foreign relations. Venkatasubramanian is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, working under the supervision of Daniel Sargent.

**Lael Weinberger**’s dissertation “The Politics of International Law in the United States, 1912-1954,” also received a Bemis Grant. It explores the internationalist commitments of U.S. lawyers through the interwar period. Based on research in the papers and publications of a wide variety of attorneys, the dissertation will provide a new account of both the rise of the international rights regime and the controversies it has produced in domestic American politics and law. Weinberger is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Chicago, working under the supervision of Mark Bradley.

**Sally Chengji Xing** was also recognized for her dissertation, “‘Pacific Crossings’: Sino-American Intellectual Exchange and the Architecture of Educational Reform in China, 1919-1949.” This is a transnational intellectual history that analyzes how U.S. intellectuals in the first half of the twentieth century influenced Chinese educational reform and, in turn, were influenced by their experiences in China. By focusing on the Pacific, her dissertation intervenes in the existing historiography on transnational intellectual history, which emphasizes trans-Atlantic exchange. Xing is a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University working under the direction of Mae Ngai.

**Kelsey Zavelo** also received a Bemis grant for her dissertation, “Apartheid Diplomacy: South Africa and the Rise of the American Right.” It explores the efforts of the South African government to generate a transnational constituency of support for its apartheid policies and how this coincided with and collaborated with the rise of the American New Right in the 1970s and 1980s. The dissertation reconfigures not only the South African role in international affairs but also the transnational interconnectedness involved in shifts in the U.S. political environment. Zavelo is a Ph.D. candidate at Duke University working under the supervision of Dirk Bonker.
This meeting was held in accordance with SHAFR by-laws.

Council members present: Kristin Hoganson (presiding), Vivien Chang, Mary Dudziak, Peter Hahn, Andrew Johns, Barbara Keys, Adriane Lentz-Smith, Kyle Longley, Lien-Hang Nguyen, Andrew Preston, Kelly Shannon, Lauren Turek, and Karine Walther. Council members absent: Brian McNamara

Also Attending: Anne Foster, Petra Goedde, Jeanna Kinnebrew, Antonina Javier, Amy Sayward (ex officio), and Patricia Thomas.

Introductory discussion:
Kristin Hoganson called the meeting to order at 8:00 AM, followed by introductions, and moved a resolution of thanks to retiring Council members Matthew Connelly, David Engerman, Julia Irwin, and Kathryn Statler and committee chairs and members whose terms ended in December 2019: Ellen Wu (Committee on Minority Historians); Ilaria Scaglia (Chair) and Astrid Mignon Kirchhof (Committee on Women in SHAFR); Cindy Ewing (Graduate Student Committee); Hal Friedman and Katharina Rietzler (Membership Committee); James Graham Wilson (Chair) and Micki Kaufman (Web Committee); Brian Etheridge (Chair), Kariann Yokota, James Siekmeier, Carl Watts, Kelly Shannon, and Silke Victoria Zoller (Teaching Committee); and Laura Belmonte (Nominating Committee). The resolution passed unanimously after being seconded by Kyle Longley.

Hoganson affirmed that any votes taken by email between meetings (only on urgent matters) would be affirmed in face-to-face meetings in order to comply with regulations in the State of Pennsylvania, where SHAFR is incorporated. Amy Sayward reviewed the votes taken between meetings, which included approval of the June 2019 Council minutes, approval of editorial board appointments, and a reciprocal discount with the American Foreign Service Association. Mary Dudziak moved that Council reaffirm the votes taken by email; the motion was seconded by Kelly Shannon and passed unanimously.

Report related to sexual harassment/misconduct at 2019 SHAFR Conference:
Per SHAFR policy, Sayward briefed Council on code of conduct adherence, stating that no reports of sexual misconduct or harassment were received from the annual SHAFR conference in June 2019. Hoganson reminded Council that the task force is becoming a regular body, with further reports on its work coming later in the meeting.

Financial issues:
Sayward reviewed the financial reports provided ahead of time to the Council as well as providing an overview of the three reports to Council members. She noted that while SHAFR had earned less than projected in the 2018-19 fiscal year (1 November 2018 through 31 October 2019), it had also spent less than projected and ended the fiscal year in the black, thanks in part of the signing bonus provided by Oxford University Press (OUP). This surplus should cover the deficit projected for the current 2019-20 fiscal year. She also noted that this past fiscal year saw SHAFR depositing funds into the General Endowment for the Hunt Prize in International History.

In reviewing the long-term budget projections sheet, Council observed that the decrease in journal royalties was the main reason for projected future deficits, with the need for a website overhaul also being a significant future expense in FY 2020-21. Peter Hahn asked what the plan was to weather the upcoming deficits. Sayward referenced upcoming reports from the Ways & Means and Development committees, noting that one way to address the decreased revenue from the journal would be to increase membership fees, which are separated from the journal subscription in the current contract with OUP.

Sayward noted that the detailed budget report before them—including its estimates, which tended to be on the conservative side—was a relatively recent development, created when David Engerman was SHAFR President. Similarly, the endowment spending rule (drawing no more than 3% of the three-year average value of the endowment) was on the conservative side, compared, for example, to universities’ endowment draw rules.

Barbara Keys, chair of the Ways & Means Committee, stated that the committee was recommending to Council that it consider reducing the average subsidy to the annual conference from approximately $70,000 to approximately $50,000 moving forward, which would be similar to previous Council guidance provided to conference planners on how to manage the costs of the social event. She noted that this reduction in the organizational subsidy to the conference could be achieved by raising conference registration fees and/or reducing conference expenditures. The committee believed that if approved this target should be implemented starting with the upcoming 2020 conference. The proposal, having been made by Ways & Means, did not require a second; Council voted 11-0-2 to have conference organizers aim to reduce the annual SHAFR conference subsidy to a target of no more than $50,000 per year.
There was extensive Council discussion in line with the previous recommendation on whether an increase in conference registration fees would be fixed or within a range (and therefore variable from year to year based on projected conference expenses). Hahn made a motion to increase the regular, early-bird conference registration rate up to $120. Andrew Johns pointed out that such a motion could raise up to $10,000 of additional revenue in meeting the goal of reducing the conference subsidy. Hahn revised his motion to authorize a registration rate increase up to $140. The motion was seconded by Longley. Council voted 13-0-1—in favor of this motion.

The projected future deficits could also potentially be addressed by increasing the endowment draw from a maximum of 3%, with each additional percentage point currently representing approximately $15,000 per year. This is something that the Ways & Means Committee is currently studying.

The Executive Director’s report recommended that the annual compensation for IT Director George Fujii be raised 5% in recognition of his excellent work and the upcoming work on the web redesign. Dudziak affirmed this judgment and made the motion to implement this, which was seconded by Adriane Lentz-Smith and approved unanimously by Council. Council deferred discussion of Conference Consultant Amanda Bundy’s compensation until the June meeting.

**Development Committee Report:**
Council endorsed the recommendation of the Development Committee to add more donation opportunities to the SHAFR website and its proposal to make bigger donors a focus of its work in 2021.

**Member Clicks:**
Keys reported that the Ways & Means Committee had recommended the investment in this new business office software package, primarily due to its ability to alleviate a number of past membership issues—especially surveying the membership, addressing difficulties in renewing, and making it clear that people are joining SHAFR, which provides a subscription to Diplomatic History as one of multiple benefits. Both Shannon and Karine Walther affirmed that these would be significant advantages over the current system based on their experiences. Member Clicks should also provide a better platform for fund-raising moving forward, which could help offset its annual financial cost. Council recommended that the Development Committee’s recommendations on fund-raising be built into the Member Clicks site (both conference registration and membership renewal).

Sayward updated her initial written report, as it had been discovered subsequently that SHAFR could not migrate its entire website free of charge to a Member Clicks platform, but she affirmed that such a move would still address a number of long-term membership issues and save significant time and effort by staff and SHAFR committees, including through its review panel features. Hoganson pointed out that it would also give SHAFR additional capacities, such as the creation of internal listservs that some of the committees were interested to explore and the ability for members to quickly and easily opt in to the experts directory and manage their entries in this directory. Sayward also pointed out that using a single software package would also facilitate the transition to a new executive director in the future.

Keys pointed out that the Ways & Means Committee had recommended to Hoganson that she inquire whether OUP might compensate SHAFR for taking up this work, which is currently managed by OUP. There was also a short discussion of the fact that the de facto discount to customers who currently pay their membership dues in British pounds or Euros to OUP would end, as the Member Clicks system would require all to pay in U.S. dollars by credit card or check. Keys made a motion to adopt Member Clicks, Lentz-Smith seconded the motion, and Council unanimously approved it.

**Membership fees:**
Hoganson informed Council that OUP had inadvertently applied the increase in its institutional rate to individual membership rates and having been alerted to this mistake was working to redress the problem through refunds and correct charges moving forward. A discussion of membership fees—tied to the discussion of SHAFR’s overall budget—ensued, which was informed by the report of the Membership Committee chaired by David Atkinson. That report suggested a wider range of membership rates tied to income (similar to the American Historical Association model). The Ways & Means Committee suggested a simpler model that maintained the cost of a student membership ($20) and the reduced rate membership for those earning less than $50,000/year ($35), while raising the regular membership rate (from $60 to $70) and creating one additional, higher rate for those earning more than $100,000/year ($90). Sayward noted that having a lower number of rate categories might also encourage more donations to SHAFR with the move to including donation options as part of the membership process.

Although a final decision was not needed ahead of the June 2020 Council meeting, Council discussion moved toward affirmation of the Ways & Means Committee’s recommendation. Longley moved to accept it; the motion was seconded by Walther. Discussion ensued about whether the by-laws needed amendment, but it was Council’s consensus that they did not limit Council’s ability to set different rates for regular membership, especially as Article I, Section 2 states that “specific qualifications of each class
of membership shall be established by the Council.” Council voted in favor of the motion, with one abstention (Johns, who abstained as a life member not affected by changes in membership fees). Keys said that the Ways & Means Committee will make a recommendation in June about the lifetime membership fee, as the current structure results in a net loss of funds to SHAFR over an average membership.

**Crisis in Academia Task Force:**
Keys reported that she had initiated the creation of a task force on the crisis in academia (approved by Council in June 2019), asking Michael Brenes and Daniel Bessner to chair the task force as an outgrowth of their article in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* on the issue. In turn, they had suggested to Council the need to compensate the three contingent and precarious faculty who would serve on this committee.

Dudziak asked whether there might need to be income limits defined for the task force members who would receive honoraria. Hoganson raised the concern that there might be contingent faculty members serving on other SHAFR committees and that such a proposal might set a fiscally unsustainable precedent. Dudziak pointed out that the logic for funding this task force service (and not others) is that SHAFR cannot have this task force without contingent faculty participation, and developing policy to assist the precariat is vital to SHAFR as a whole. In this case, SHAFR is specifically asking for the labor of contingent members, which is not the case with other committees.

Hahn asked if there was reason to suspect that the task force would propose to SHAFR something different than its chairs had recommended to the American Historical Association (AHA). Keys responded that it was clear that SHAFR could not serve as a vehicle for collective action across the profession and that instead the June 2019 proposal to form this task force noted several specific, tangible ways in which the organization could assist those members of the precariat, such as access to research funding.

The Ways & Means Committee had suggested waiving membership, conference registration, and conference meal ticket fees as compensation. Lentz-Smith moved that Council approve the suggestion of Ways & Means, and Longley seconded the motion. In subsequent discussion, Andrew Preston suggested that this motion perhaps allocated the compensation to the wrong area; although what was required was committee members’ time and effort, what was being primarily compensated was their conference attendance (which was not required by committee service). The motion did not pass, with two in favor, one abstention, and the remainder of Council voting no. In its place, another motion was made by Dudziak and seconded by Shannon to compensate contingent members of the committee with a $500 honorarium and free SHAFR membership for one year (with the possibility of a second year at the President’s discretion), contingent upon their service. Such compensation is not intended to set a precedent but to recognize the specific and special circumstances and needs of this committee. The vote in favor of the motion was 12-0-2.

**2022 SHAFR Conference:**
Council received proposals to host the 2022 SHAFR Conference in Cologne, College Station Texas, and Toronto. The hotel broker, Blue Janis, provided Council members with a report on potential conference hotels in each city. Hoganson noted that the specific hotel contract would be negotiated following Council’s decision on a location. Council members pointed to the likelihood that the Cologne location would attract European members and those in relatively proximate areas. They commented favorably on the significant price offsets of a campus-based conference, the proposal team, and the city. Concerns expressed included that exhibitors might not attend, that the relatively high cost of airfare from parts of the United States might preclude the attendance of others (especially U.S.-based contingent faculty and graduate students), that the Cologne hotels reserved the right to raise rates if trade fairs were scheduled at the time of the conference, and that the earlier date proposed to ensure access to campus facilities (thereby reducing costs) might reduce attendance. The Texas A&M proposal had the advantage of having a presidential library on site, having a large number of esteemed diplomatic historians in residence, and being a western location (SHAFR has met west of the Mississippi River just a handful of times), but it was not outside the continental United States (which Council had stated a preference for in the call for proposals) and posed travel challenges. After a wide-ranging discussion of relative advantages and disadvantages among the potential sites, Toronto was the top vote-getter in a straw poll of Council members.

Hahn initiated a discussion about whether SHAFR might partner with the Cologne proposers for a special topic conference or something similar to help build the organization’s European connections short of a full conference. Preston thought that this was a potentially promising avenue, given that there had been ad hoc meetings of SHAFR historians in the UK for several years. There was general support for this proposal. Hahn made a motion that Council move forward with planning the 2022 SHAFR Conference in Toronto, with Cologne as a back-up in case Toronto plans cannot be finalized, and with a subsequent discussion with the Cologne proposal-makers on a SHAFR co-sponsored event. The motion was seconded by Longley and passed with one vote in opposition (Keys).

**Diplomatic History:**
Patricia Thomas and Antonina Javier of Oxford University Press (OUP) joined Council after a short break. Thomas apologized for the error in the membership rates that had been distributed to SHAFR members in late November, promised to refund and correct the inadvertent rate increase, and averred that only SHAFR Council can set membership rates. Referring to the publisher’s report...
circulated before the meeting, Thomas highlighted the stable circulation rates and good usage rates of *Diplomatic History*, with over 10,000 full-text downloads per month, which in turn influence libraries’ decisions to renew their institutional subscriptions. She emphasized the long “shelf-life” of *DH* articles and praised the co-editors of the journal for their great production work that ensures that the journal is assembled and disseminated on time and even ahead of time. There was also a brief discussion about the changing contours of open access generally.

Hoganson asked whether OUP might compensate SHAFR for taking over the membership services (through Member Clicks) previously provided by Oxford. Thomas explained that those services were provided free of charge and therefore there would likely not be an offset. She affirmed that she would work with Sayward to ensure a smooth transition.

Javier talked about her work to drive usage and increase *Diplomatic History*’s international profile. She noted that 2019 had seen a 19% increase in usage. She highlighted both the *DH* roundtable on the Ken Burns and Lynn Novick Vietnam War documentary (which resulted in 293 full-text downloads) and the cross-journal promotion on the topic “Outbreaks.” She welcomes ideas for future promotions. Sayward suggested planning for the celebration of *Diplomatic History*’s 50th anniversary in three years.

*Diplomatic History* co-editors Petra Goedde and Anne Foster next joined the Council meeting. They talked about the smooth editorial transition as well as the outstanding work of the assistant editors at Temple and Indiana State universities. Foster pointed out that the number of submissions had been stable for the past year, which was an improvement over the slight decreases of previous years that were likely the result of challenges facing the profession.

Hoganson asked about being under the page budget for the most recent volume in light of the fact that *Passport* will no longer be publishing stand-alone book reviews. Goedde responded that they were publishing some of the backlog of reviews and that the editors had discussed the possibility of increasing the number of 1,200-word reviews by potentially three or four per issue (with a maximum of twelve). However, she noted that the journal’s ability to review important works relies on reviewers completing their work in a timely manner and that the journal has a policy of not reviewing edited collections and synthetic works.

**Task Force on Public Engagement:**
Council considered a written report from Kelly McFarland and Kim Quinney, co-chairs of a task force on public engagement, which was an outgrowth of the public engagement workshops at the University of Virginia in 2017 and at Georgetown University in 2019. The task force recommended creation of a permanent standing Committee on Public Engagement with a designated slot in each year’s conference program—similar to what the Teaching Committee and the Committee on Minority Historians currently have. Construing Public Engagement to mean conveying academic research to non-academics, the task force likewise recommended that the committee help SHAFR members engage with the public through means such as the SHAFR website, Twitter feed, Experts Directory, podcasts, a resource library, and training and workshops. Walther moved to accept the task force’s recommendations to establish a Committee on Public Engagement. Preston seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously.

**Conference Conduct Task Force:**
Shannon, referring to her written reports to Council, pointed out that the task force’s mandate has now expanded beyond the SHAFR annual meeting to other events hosted by SHAFR, such as the upcoming second book workshop and summer institute. The task force is also considering possible future scenarios and how best to handle them as well as policies for membership revocation, appeal, and reinstatement. While there were no reports of misconduct at the last conference, Shannon reported receiving plentiful feedback from members, much of it pertaining to concern for ensuring fairness in the event of an accusation and establishing trust in the process and procedures. She also explained that the task force would benefit from on-going interactions with the AHA and its affiliated societies that are also engaged in this work.

**Open Access Task Force:**
Longley reported on the recent establishment of an Open Access Task Force and the task force’s consultations to date with Keys, Foster, Goedde, and affected scholars in Britain to learn about this unfolding issue. He pointed out that in the United States the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) is currently considering applying open access requirements to anything published with NEH funds, but the challenge is where to obtain the fees most journals charge for various levels of open access publication. The task force will continue to monitor this issue.

**SHAFR publications:**
Council reviewed the publisher and editor reports for *The SHAFR Guide*. Sayward pointed out that the second on-line edition is scheduled for 2022, a launch date toward which Alan McPherson is working with contributors. She also pointed out that SHAFR IT Director Fujii reported relatively high usage rates, as this access is a SHAFR membership benefit. Hoganson reflected that Council will likely want to consider the future of the *Guide* following this edition. Dudziak supported this, pointing out that she had been part of the task force that previously considered the future of the Guide, which had recommended that SHAFR continue it in an on-line edition. The consensus was that a similar such task force should be established by 2021.
As Council moved to consideration of Passport, Johns recused himself from the discussion. Council considered the written reports from the editor and advisory board, with the former including the information that stand-alone book reviews would no longer be published in Passport. It then moved to consideration of a draft of a publishing agreement in line with the more formal memoranda of agreement recently developed for the editors of Diplomatic History and in line with those already extant for the executive director, conference consultant, and Passport assistant editor. The proposed agreement would put into writing Council’s earlier action in renewing Johns’ term as editor, setting his compensation, and stipulating general terms and conditions. Concerns were expressed that there were some new elements in the proposed general terms and conditions and that there might be some areas of ambiguity between this and the conflict of interest policy also under consideration. After some discussion, Council’s consensus was that there was not sufficient time to work through all of the issues related to the proposed general terms and conditions and that it desired the editor’s input on this phrasing as well. Therefore, Lentz-Smith moved that Hoganson ask Johns to sign the publishing agreement stipulating the term, honorarium, exclusivity, and editorial structure but removing reference to general terms and conditions until they had been agreed upon by Council. Shannon seconded. Council unanimously approved.

**Council composition:**
Council received a proposal that originated in the Nominating and Teaching committees, which was signed by 35 SHAFR members, calling for the addition of a Council seat designated for a member from a teaching-focused position (analogous to the way in which two Council seats are currently reserved for graduate student representatives and similar to the governing structure of other organizations, such as the AHA and the Society for Military History). The Ways & Means Committee report expressed concern about the fiscal implications of an extra seat and noted that this impact could be reduced if one of the existing seats was instead converted. Dudziak suggested that one way of offsetting the fiscal impact would be to shorten the length of Council service of past presidents from three years to two years (for a total of four rather than five total years of service). Lien-Hang Nguyen also noted that the fiscal impact might ultimately be lessened based on the report of the task force she is chairing on remote participation, which intends to make recommendations to Council in June. Remote participation by Council members would have a greening effect, allow for greater diversity on Council, and lessen the fiscal impact of broader participation.

Keys noted that the Nominating Committee already has the capacity to establish a pairing on upcoming ballots that accomplishes this end should it choose to do so. Sayward pointed out that a by-laws amendment would make this SHAFR policy rather than a matter of committee preference. Concerns were expressed that additional seats would lessen the ability of each Council member to weigh in on the discussion and make Council discussions more unwieldy. There was some discussion about the meaning of “teaching-focused positions.” As time was expiring and two Council members had to leave, Council tabled the decision until June.

**Additional issues:**
As Council’s meeting time was expiring, the proposals to establish a Code of Conduct and Ethics (submitted by task force chair Longley) and to adopt a Conflict-of-Interest Policy (proposed by Keys) were also tabled, with instructions to further clarify the wording in these documents and the relationship between them. Hoganson pointed out that there was information in the board packet about a proposal from Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO) for a partnership with SHAFR and that she would proceed by appointing a task force to evaluate this proposal. There was also brief discussion about proposed procedures for recording Council votes and making SHAFR committee reports public. When it was evident that there was a variety of opinion on Council, action on this recommended policy was also deferred as was action on revising the qualifications for the Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship. Vivien Chang alerted Council that she would email a written report on the activities of the Graduate Student Committee in lieu of the oral report listed on the agenda.

Council’s final action was to briefly consider a report from Matthew Connelly, SHAFR’s representative to the National Coalition on History (NCH), that expressed concern that the most recent federal budget saw a reduction in funding to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The consensus was that it was important to maintain a quality working relationship with NCH Executive Director Lee White and to explore ways in which SHAFR members interested in NARA advocacy could further support White’s work and that of the Historical Documentation Committee (chaired by Richard Immerman).

Council adjourned shortly after 12 noon with thanks being expressed to SHAFR President Kristin Hoganson and by Hoganson to Council for its work.
**Professional Notes**

**Mitch Lerner** (Ohio State University) has become the Director of the East Asia Studies Center at The Ohio State University. He has also been promoted to Professor and named to the Distinguished Speakers Bureau of the Association for Asian Studies.

**Recent Books of Interest**

Alamillo, José M. *Deportes: The Making of a Sporting Mexican Diaspora*. (Rutgers, 2020).


Ghazvinian, John. *America and Iran: The Long and Winding Road, from 1720 to the Present*. (Knopf, 2020).


Jones, Seth G. A Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and the Cold War Struggle in Poland. (W.W. Norton, 2020).


Kepel, Gilles. Away from Chaos: The Middle East and the Challenge to the West. (Columbia, 2020).


14 January 2020

To the Editor:

In the *Passport* editor’s latest personal essay (Andrew Johns, “From the Chancery: More Things I Think,” September 2019, pp. 6-7), Johns calls it an “absolute tragedy” and “puzzling” that the SHAFR Summer Institute program has been indefinitely suspended, and he urges “SHAFR’s leadership” to restore the Summer Institute.

In the same issue of *Passport*, on page 77, readers will note that Johns is a member of SHAFR Council and thus a member of the very SHAFR leadership whose decision-making he finds tragic and puzzling. As noted on page 77, Johns voted in his capacity as Council member for a package of budget measures, proposed in the face of a very large projected deficit, that included the indefinite suspension of the Summer Institute.

Sincerely,

Barbara Keys

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Editor’s response:

Dr. Keys is correct in noting that I did, in my capacity as an elected member of SHAFR Council, vote to support budget measures designed to safeguard and stabilize the organization’s finances. Yet voting in favor of an overall approach to financial matters does not necessarily indicate agreement with every aspect of that budget. Nor does it preclude one from having a personal opinion about a specific program—in this case, the SHAFR Summer Institute—that has conveyed significant benefits to the organization and its members. In the interest of maintaining confidentiality, I will not elaborate on the discussions which occurred at the June 2019 Council meeting beyond what appears in the minutes to which Dr. Keys referred.

In addition, I would suggest that the selective quotations contained in the letter to the editor misconstrue the intention of my commentary, the context for my use of the term “puzzling,” and the action I proposed. In the interest of clarity, I include the entire paragraph to which Dr. Keys refers from the September 2019 issue of *Passport*:

*I think that it is an absolute tragedy that the Summer Institute program has been suspended indefinitely by SHAFR. Having participated in the first SI in 2008 and having co-directed the program in 2015, I have a deep appreciation of what it has done for me and others who have been involved. While I objectively understand the financial reasons for the recommendation by the Ways and Means Committee given the projected fiscal crunch SHAFR could face, the rationale for doing so remains puzzling. The SI experience is invaluable to those who participate, and it creates relationships that pay dividends for the SI cohorts and for SHAFR for years to come. To be sure, the SI only engages 12-15 people each year—which may seem like a small number—but it does provides more opportunities than does a single dissertation fellowship at a comparable price...and that does not take into account the intangible benefits that accrue to the organization. SHAFR’s leadership should do everything that it can to figure out a way to restore the SI as quickly as possible—perhaps through a targeted campaign to create an SI endowment.*

*Passport* welcomes feedback and commentary from its readers.
Report on Research Conducted with the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant
Funded Project: “States of Emergency: Disaster and Displacement in Nicaragua's 20th Century”
Brendan A. Collins Jordan

With support from SHAFR and the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant, conducted a substantial research trip this past November at the US National Archives and Records Administration in Washington DC. This trip resulted in substantial findings that will prove invaluable to my larger dissertation project. My time at NARA also yielded ample information on which to build future archival inquiries and FOIA requests to round out still missing pieces of my dissertation narrative.

My dissertation project, now re-titled For They Shall Inherit the Earth: Missionaries, Disaster, and Environments of Poverty in Nicaragua’s Long Revolution, considers the environmental, social, and political implications of Church and state-sponsored development and disaster relief initiatives in Nicaragua during the second half of the twentieth century. Field research conducted in Nicaragua this past October and my work at NARA in November have significantly transformed the trajectory of this project and enriched my working arguments. The project as originally proposed concentrated on the impact of disaster—including war and economic calamity, as well as “natural” disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes—on the stability of Nicaraguan society and settlement. I asked at the outset how churches, states (including both the Nicaraguan and US governments), and NGOs shaped resettlement and relief initiatives according to their own political goals, and how frequent forced migration impacted both environmental conditions in vulnerable communities as well as possibilities for grassroots political resistance in Nicaragua. I expected when I posed this question that apparent collaborations between governments and missionary churches would be a significant factor in explaining the course that disaster relief took. I have been consistently surprised, however, at the degree to which states relied heavily, in cases even exclusively, on missionary churches to conduct disaster relief on the ground and provide essential resources, at times even in excess of government contributions. For example, of the USAID emergency relief meant for civilian impacted by the war between the FSLN and Somoza’s National Guard in 1978, the overwhelming majority was distributed by churches. Similarly, approximately two-thirds of voluntary organizations listed in an AID memo as collaborating on Nicaragua Earthquake relief in 1973 were church-run organizations. The role of church-state collaboration and the political and environmental impact of missionary church-sponsored disaster relief has thus taken more central importance in my dissertation project going forward, as my new title reflects.

I am particularly excited to share this revised trajectory with SHAFR, as I believe it pens up potentially dynamic and important terrain for future historical research in US foreign relations and, particularly, the functioning of US diplomacy and foreign aid in the world and how it is impacted by a broad network of trans-national religious organizations, as well as transformations in global religious life. My project suggests that far from a state-directed operation, US as well as Nicaraguan government aid to refugees and disaster victims was most of the time mediated by religious organizations and shaped by global supply networks controlled largely by churches. Indeed, processes of religious mission were foundational to creating this global church-state disaster response partnership. My research suggests that some of the most significant relief organizations operating in Nicaragua by the 1970s (including Caritas, Church World Services, CEPAD, and Catholic Relief Services) grew out of church mission operations from the 1940s and 1950s. I therefore hope that my dissertation can prove an example of how future studies might reckon with the implications that church-state partnerships have for the environmental and political outcomes of US foreign aid.

Thanks to SHAFR support, I was able to spend enough time in Washington DC to sift through a large volume of archival material. This material ranges from USAID field reports and cables to AID policy memos, administrative documents, and legislative recommendations, as well as a small collection of relevant State Department (mostly embassy) cables. This documentation comes from 36 different archival boxes and a range of different collection designations within the USAID and State record groups. Given the sheer volume of material I was able to work through at the National Archives, I should have an ample basis for writing a dissertation that takes an analysis of church-USAID partnership seriously. I also learned a great deal about how relevant AID files are organized and found a number of possible avenues for future exploration. Most significantly, I identified about 15 boxes of additional material that is currently classified, but which I hope to request through a FOIA to be filed in coming months.

Whether this FOIA is successful or not, my review of NARA holdings has turned up ample supporting material for my dissertation and shed a light on future paths for exploration in any return trips I might make in the future.

I would like to once again thank SHAFR and the Samuel Flagg Bemis Grant committee for their generosity and support, which has proved immensely helpful to my goal of writing the dissertation and completing my doctoral work.

Notes:
The Last Word

Unpacking Tragedy: Trump, Iran, and “Maximum Pressure”

Gregory Brew

In 1988, the historian James Bill published what is still regarded as one of the finest surveys of U.S.-Iranian relations. The Eagle and Lion laid out in 400-plus pages how the United States and Iran went from close allies in 1945 to bitter enemies in 1979. The subtitle, The Tragedy of U.S. Iranian Relations, points to a recurring theme in the literature, one which has grown more prominent since Bill’s book appeared thirty years ago. Misunderstanding, suspicion, and fate have conspired to keep the United States and Iran in a state of undying conflict. Yet “tragedy” does not quite cover the truth of the matter. Tragedy implies an absence of agency, or at the very least its subordination to surrounding circumstances. And as we have seen over the last three years, it is human action as much as fate which has brought the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States to the brink of war.

There is, of course, the inciting incident: the August 1953 coup d’etat, sponsored by the United States and Great Britain, which overthrew the government of Iranian prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh. My research has found that U.S. policy-makers were concerned with Iran’s internal stability. They worried that Mossadegh’s nationalist government, which refused to negotiate a deal with Western companies surrendering national control over Iran’s oil resources, would lead Iran towards collapse and eventual communist rule. The coup was motivated by an acute desire to “save” Iran from a dire future—a deliberate effort, though one which would have countless unforeseen consequences.

Generations of Iranians, conscious of the CIA actions in 1953, looked upon the United States with ambivalence, suspicion, and in many cases, outright contempt. When the shah’s military rule collapsed in the late 1970s, the new regime led by followers of Shi’a cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini denounced the United States as the “Great Satan.” Drawing on a century of discourse informing modern Iranian nationalism, Khomeini promised to preserve Iranian independence from further U.S. interference. When the Carter administration permitted the dying shah entry into the United States, furious students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979. The hostages were finally released on January 20, 1981, after 444-days in captivity.

The hostage crisis continues to inform U.S. policy towards Iran. Indeed, the 1980s were a formative decade for President Donald J. Trump, who has made pressuring Iran a key part of his foreign policy. Notably, President Trump assumed office during a period of declining tensions in U.S.-Iranian relations. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement reached between Iran, the United States, and the international community in July 2015, promised Iran relief from U.S. sanctions, so long as it restricted its nuclear program and limited uranium enrichment. On the campaign trail, Trump railed against the deal. Upon becoming president, he did not hide his disgust for Barack Obama’s signature foreign policy achievement.

Yet there was little strategic rationale for abandoning the JCPOA. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran was abiding by the agreement. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned Trump against pulling out of the deal. Experts agreed that a unilateral withdrawal without a strong justification would damage U.S. credibility and encourage Iran to pursue a more radical course of action, ratcheting up support for regional proxies and pursuing asymmetric attacks against the U.S. and allies like Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. But Trump hated the JCPOA, chiefly for personal reasons. The president came into office determined to undo the legacy of his predecessor, regardless of the repercussions. Advice from counselors dissuaded Trump until early 2018, when Tillerson and national security adviser H.R. McMaster made way for Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, respectively. In May 2018, Pompeo announced the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. Instead of diplomacy, Iran would get “maximum pressure.”

The purpose of the new U.S. policy was opaque. Pompeo claimed that Iran had not held up its end of the JCPOA, arguing—without evidence—that it still secretly desired a nuclear weapon. Re-imposing sanctions, including a near-total shut-down of Iran’s oil exports reminiscent of an embargo imposed on Mossadegh’s Iran in the early 1950s, was ostensibly meant to push Iran back into negotiations. But the extent of the maximum pressure campaign, the stringency of the terms proposed by the Trump administration, and the apparent glee U.S. officials have taken in Iran’s economic woes, have led many to speculate that the U.S. aim is more grandiose: nothing less than the collapse of the Islamic Republic and the rise of new, pro-U.S. Iranian government in Tehran.

Could economic sanctions push Iran back to the negotiating table? Certainly not on the terms laid out by Pompeo in May 2018, which include restrictions on Iran’s missile program and its policy of supporting regional proxies. Pompeo’s terms demand Iran subordinate its foreign policy to the United States, in return for a chance to negotiate. No Iranian government, and certainly not the Islamic Republic, would accept such an arrangement.

Will economic pressure bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic? Probably not. Inflation has caused...
tremendous economic pain inside the country, while sanctions cut off access to medicines and other life-giving commodities. But the Islamic Republic is a robust authoritarian state with a vast array of coercive tools at its disposal. In 2009, security forces put down mass protests in Tehran. When sporadic demonstrations over economic hardship exploded into widespread outrage in November 2019, the Iranian government shut down internet access and sent riot police and armed soldiers into the streets. Anywhere from 100 to 1500 Iranians were killed by regime forces.

The legacy of Mossadegh and the Revolution imbues Iranian nationalism with a firm resilience to foreign pressure. Opposition groups supported by foreign actors have uncertain political support inside the country. Imagining that the regime will collapse due to outside forces is to live in the world of fantasy.

Iran responded to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA precisely as experts had warned. In June 2019, Iran attacked several oil tankers passing through the Persian Gulf. On June 20, Iran shot down a U.S. drone, claiming it had entered Iranian air space. On September 14, an attack by missiles and drones on the Saudi oil facility at Abqaiq took half of all Saudi oil production temporarily off-line.

Since killing the JCPOA, Trump has been pulled in two directions. In June, he declined to respond to Iran’s downing of the U.S. drone. In September, the Iranian attack on Abqaiq registered only a weak U.S. response. Trump’s disinterest with Middle East politics, as well as his reticence to undertake actions which could potentially rebound politically, informs his moderation towards Iran’s provocations. It is easy to impose sanctions—but a war against Iran would be costly, both in material and political terms, for a president. Yet Trump is bellicose by nature. While he eschews strategy, the president embraces muscular displays of military power. Advisors more adept than Bolton at navigating his temperament, including Secretary of State Pompeo, have steered Trump into an Iran policy defined by displays of aggression. The maximum pressure campaign illustrates the President’s bellicosity, on display in Syria, where a decision to withdraw is limited by Trump’s ambition to “take the oil,” in contravention of international law.

On January 3, 2020, a U.S. air strike assassinated General Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad airport. The Trump administration, which had been mulling the decision for seven months, claimed the killing was justified, arguing that Soleimani—commander of the elite Quds force and architect of Iran’s foreign policy—was about to launch “imminent” attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and elsewhere. In Iran, hundreds of thousands came out to march in Soleimani’s funeral processions, a powerful display of Iranian nationalism, despite Soleimani’s bloody legacy and the simmering discontent towards the regime. An Iranian retaliatory missile strike in Iraq killed no Americans, though dozens were injured. President Trump—anxious to avoid further escalation and contended with his show of force vis-à-vis Soleimani—steered away from launching additional strikes.

“Tragic” implies the unavoidable. But to characterize the current course of U.S.-Iranian relations as a tragedy would be to elide the very human choices lying at its center. In Tehran, a brutal authoritarian regime rewards cronyism and incompetence while punishing dissent and free expression. In Washington, a mercurial president flexes his muscles as advisors push a punishing array of economic sanctions aimed at a tantalizing but ultimately fantastical goal—regime change in Iran.

It may be that Pompeo and Trump “stand with the Iranian people” as they often claim—that maximum pressure, the travel ban, restrictions on humanitarian relief, and economic punishment are meant to free the Iranian people from an authoritarian government. If so, it would echo President Eisenhower’s claim in the aftermath of the 1953 coup: “Whatever we have done, good or bad...we have saved Iran from communism.” That is the true tragedy—that the people of Iran must be made to suffer, not only from the vicious repression of their own government, but from the righteous fury of an angry superpower.
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