Review of Jennifer M. Miller, *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan*

Over twenty-five years ago, in an edited volume entitled *Postwar Japan as History* (1993), Andrew Gordon called on fellow historians to begin viewing postwar Japan through the lens of history. John Dower’s Pulitzer Prize-winning study of the occupation, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (1999), was one of the first books to answer this call. Since then, historians have produced an accelerating number of studies of the country’s ever-lengthening postwar period. They have explored a variety of topics besides the occupation, from the postwar monarchy and politics of war memory to the idea of growth and the impact of the massive 1960 protests.

Diplomatic historian Jennifer M. Miller’s *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan* makes a stellar contribution to this growing scholarship. The chief focus of her study is the 1950s. Though she says less about culture than Dower does, Miller essentially picks up the story of U.S.-Japan relations where he leaves off, as his coverage of the last two years of the occupation is sparse. Because the transpacific relationship and the early postwar decades were so central in shaping Japanese politics, society, and culture, Miller’s book, like Dower’s, will long be required reading for anyone who wants to understand Japan then and today.

By “Cold War democracy,” Miller means the multiple views of democracy that contended for dominance in Japan during the decades of geopolitical tension between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its satellite states. In this instance, “democracy” is best understood as plural rather than singular. U.S. policymakers wielded the most dominant interpretation of democracy, though it was contested and challenged. American political and military leaders believed that equality and representative government would bring Japan peace and stability. But during and after the occupation they became so concerned that communist power would put democracy in peril that they enacted “almost antidemocratic democracy” (3), which was marked by contradictory impulses—authoritarian paternalism and continued support for the establishment of democratic institutions in Japan.

After the Cold War began in 1947, most Japanese conservatives aligned themselves with the Americans. They shared the U.S. “obsession with communist deviance,” which they, like American officials, believed “could only be combatted through a commitment to political stability and the development of a ‘healthy’ national spirit that would channel the masses into following state authority” (5). Other Japanese, especially those on the Left, embraced very different ideas about democracy. Suspicious of state power because of the war, “they argued that the public’s role in a democratic society was not to mobilize behind stability and state power,” but rather for “the people . . . to mentally separate themselves from the demands of the state and vigilantly hold its leaders accountable to popular desires for peace and democratic representation” (6). Though Miller acknowledges that the situation was more complicated than a simple binary, she argues that these two views formed a dialectical process that contended to define democracy and played a constitutive role in shaping the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Miller’s approach to Japan’s postwar history is characterized by connectivity—emphasizing links across space (transnational) and time (transwar) that are emblematic of recent historiography and that sharpen her analysis. One would hope for equal attention to both sides of an international relationship in diplomatic history, and Miller delivers. Thanks to intensive language study followed by thorough archival research in Japan, she gives each side its due. This is evident in every chapter. Throughout the book, Miller mines sources, primary and secondary, in both English and Japanese. She uses those sources to explore how competing notions of democracy shaped policy even as one side has the upper hand, as the Americans do until the occupation comes to an end (along with her first three chapters), after which the Japanese, conservative and liberal (but especially liberal), seized the initiative.

Chapter 1 analyzes visions of democracy in the context of American wartime planning and first five years of the occupation. Chapter 2 examines discussions of democracy and “spirit” (seishin) as the United States military reestablished a Japanese military after the outbreak of war in Korea forced General Douglas MacArthur to rush American troops in Japan to the peninsula. The third chapter explores how Americans and Japanese sought to use the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which ended the occupation, to mobilize Japan to join the “so-called free world” in the struggle against global communism (115).

Chapters 4 and 5 assess the protests opposing the expansion of the Tachikawa Air Force Base in the mid-1950s and the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, during which many Japanese—not just activists and intellectuals—used their visions of democracy to resist American Cold War policies and the U.S.-Japan alliance.
The sixth and final chapter, “Producing Democracy,” investigates how Americans and Japanese used U.S. technical assistance to craft new visions of democracy that were based on economic productivity and growth. Miller argues that by the early 1960s, these developments brought about a shared rationale for the alliance that pervaded the rest of the Cold War and endures to this today.

The value of Miller’s transnational approach, which at times becomes multinational as she explores how Japan was held up as a model for other Asian countries, is that it allows for a more nuanced interpretation than one that privileges one side of a relationship. Repeatedly, Miller challenges existing historiographical conclusions using evidence based on this approach. Historians of Japan, for example, have traditionally explained the 1960 protests by pointing to the domestic evolution of democracy. Miller argues that because the U.S.-Japan alliance had long impacted the development of democracy, international as well as national factors must be part of any explanation (210). Just as democratic ideas shaped the alliance, the alliance shaped notions of democracy, in Japan and elsewhere in Asia.

I wish Miller had gone further, though. She lays out a persuasive argument for “Cold War democracy” in Japan and the United States, but is this concept applicable elsewhere? Miller rules out other Asian allies of the United States, such as Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam, where American policymakers supported authoritarian leaders, but how about in Europe, Africa, and Latin America? Are the dynamics she describes applicable only to the U.S.-Japan alliance? I wish she had at least speculated on this question.

The transwar nature of Miller’s study also allows for new contributions. Like the work of historians of Japan that has highlighted continuities between wartime and postwar thinking, her study dips back into the pre-1945 years to highlight both Japanese and American ideas that kept animating the relationship during and after the occupation. One of her most interesting assertions is that “understandings of democracy” in the United States and Japan came to be based “not simply on the existence of democratic institutions and individual rights and liberties,” but on the “mentality and mindsets of the people” (8). She identifies wartime-era expressions that informed the postwar position that a defense of democracy required “a psychological—even spiritual—commitment to national unity and stability” (10). This requirement was used to justify the suppression of supposedly antidemocratic voices in both countries.

This transwar—and again, transnational—approach enables Miller to offer a more complete explanation for what historians have called the “reverse course”: the sudden shift from progressive policies to an anticommunist crusade in the late 1940s. Because American policymakers believed both during and after the war that democracy was a “mental and spiritual project, which could only be sustained through constant vigilance and psychological strength,” the shift in policies exhibited continuity rather than simply a rupture. This emphasis on psychology, combined with a racialized sense of superiority, led occupation officials to re-militarize and from political reform to economic recovery and development. Faced with the return of vibrant socialist and Communist movements in Japan, the victory of the Communist Party in mainland China, and the Soviet Union’s successful nuclear bomb testing, Douglas MacArthur released Japanese wartime leaders and elite bureaucrats from prison while purging the labor unionists and leftists he had released from their wartime imprisonment only a few years earlier.

The basic narrative of the book does not diverge from the narrative established by Japan scholars. Cold War imperatives reversed American goals in the military occupation of Japan from demilitarization to re-militarization and from political reform to economic recovery and development. Faced with the return of vibrant socialist and Communist movements in Japan, the victory of the Communist Party in mainland China, and the Soviet Union’s successful nuclear bomb testing, Douglas MacArthur released Japanese wartime leaders and elite bureaucrats from prison while purging the labor unionists and leftists he had released from their wartime imprisonment only a few years earlier.

Cold War Democracy is a model of historical scholarship. It makes contributions well outside diplomatic history. It is superbly written and organized. Miller has also selected striking and original photographs to illustrate the narrative. One of my few complaints is that all the references for a paragraph are grouped into single-citation endnotes, but that was surely a decision made by Harvard University Press. As this criticism suggests, I strained to find flaws in this book. Instead, I found myself wishing that Miller had continued her examination of the alliance further into the 1960s and beyond. Perhaps we can look forward to a sequel that will shed more light on postwar Japan as history.

Note:

Review of Jennifer M. Miller, Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan

Hiromi Mizuno

This is a well-researched and ambitious book that examines the process of U.S.-Japan alliance-making and U.S. hegemony-building in Asia from 1945 through the 1960s. Author Jennifer Miller does a wonderful job of portraying the dynamism of this process, which was propelled by the common interests of the two governments but also intercepted by domestic politics in both countries. As a historian of modern Japan, I especially appreciate chapter 4 on the Sunagawa anti-air base expansion movement and chapter 5 on the anti-security treaty movement, two pivotal developments in postwar Japan that have received little attention from American scholars of the Cold War. Miller shows that, while the United States undoubtedly maintained the upper hand, the Japanese protest movements against U.S. hegemony did impact American policies.

The strength of the book lies in its sophisticated weaving of rich details from archival research into a highly readable narrative that captures an overarching picture of how U.S. hegemony was achieved and maintained. Miller's mastery of the secondary literature, ranging widely across U.S. and Japanese history in both English and Japanese, is remarkable. This is very mature scholarship, and it is especially impressive for a first monograph.

The basic narrative of the book does not diverge from the narrative established by Japan scholars. Cold War imperatives reversed American goals in the military occupation of Japan from demilitarization to re-militarization and from political reform to economic recovery and development. Faced with the return of vibrant socialist and Communist movements in Japan, the victory of the Communist Party in mainland China, and the Soviet Union's successful nuclear bomb testing, Douglas MacArthur released Japanese wartime leaders and elite bureaucrats from prison while purging the labor unionists and leftists he had released from their wartime imprisonment only a few years earlier.

The postwar U.S.-Japan alliance—and Japan's economic prosperity—was based on the congruence between American Cold War warriors and conservative Japanese wartime leaders. Japan scholars have examined this congruence as manifested and maintained in the so-called San Francisco System (international relations defined by the San Francisco Peace Treaties and the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty, both signed on September 8, 1951) and the 1955 system (the domestic political structure in which the conservative Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] reigned, albeit with significant opposition from the Socialist Party). As John Dower has put it, the “San Francisco System’ and ‘1955 System’ vividly symbolize the intense political conflicts over issues of peace and democracy” that “pitted liberal and left-wing critics against the dominant conservative elites,” especially in the most volatile period of the 1950s and 1960s. According to Dower, “Peace became the magnetic pole for both legitimation and criticism of external policy; democracy served the same function for highly contested domestic issues.” For Japan, this resulted in a “separate peace” from a diplomatic point of view and a shaky democracy at home under the dominance of the LDP. Both results were legitimized by what would become by the mid-1970s the Japanese “miracle economy.” By the mid-1970s, the Japanese “miracle economy” legitimized peace.

Miller’s chapter organization follows this narrative line: chapter 1 focuses on the Occupation and its reverse course, chapter 2 on the Korean War and remilitarization of Japan, chapter 3 on the 1951 peace and security treaties, chapters 4 and 5 on the most intense Japanese protests against the U.S.-Japan military alliance, and chapter 6 on Japan’s economic growth and the productivity movement. Where Miller differs from other scholars is in her central focus on democracy in the arena of diplomacy. She argues that that American leaders and delegates conceived of democracy not simply as a system of government but as a “state of mind”; the Japanese people, and by extension the Asian peoples, needed to believe deeply in American values and its capitalist system in order to be effective allies in the Cold War. What good would it do if the United States gave universal suffrage to the Japanese, but they voted for a socialist leader? (In fact, the very first general election in postwar Japan produced a socialist prime minister!)

The idea of what Miller calls “psychological democracy” runs through all the chapters, illuminating American policymakers’ deep—and sometimes remarkably naïve—faith in molding the minds of the Japanese while also mitigating their sense of insecurity when faced with Japanese liberal, leftist, and/or pacifist movements that promoted non-American democracy. A rich array of quotations from archived memos, classified security notes, and recorded interviews and memoirs of numerous American policymakers and Cold War warriors documents the broad American consensus in democracy as a “process of mental and psychological transformation” (29). Miller argues that congruence between the American Cold War warriors and Japanese wartime elites was based on “the shared goal of not only preventing communist infiltration but also building Cold War democracy” (23).

I am not sure if one can separate the two aspects of this shared goal. In fact, as I was reading the book, I could not stop myself from putting scare quotes around the word “democracy” and substituting “Pro-Americanism” or “anti-communism” for it. Take a sentence on page 126, for example: “Yet for Dulles and others, for Japan to become a model for all of Asia—a key treaty objective—the United States would have to continue to mold Japanese minds in the shape of democracy.” According to Miller, American policymakers demanded from Japan not only economic and military vigor but also the psychological strength to resist communism globally and to achieve stability and consensus at home. I do not disagree with this, but Miller’s emphasis on the “spiritual” dimension and her attempt to re-read anti-communist politics through it creates an unintended effect: the more the author takes American policymakers’ advocacy of democracy seriously and highlights their spiritual and psychological approach to it, the more the book reads like a story of brainwashing and psychological warfare.

Or perhaps she did intend the book to be read as such. Perhaps that is why the book ends with Prime Minister Abe. I appreciate Miller’s attempt to illuminate the “ideological continuities in democratic visions and ideologies between the Cold War and the so-called war on terror” (275), but how absurd it is to have Mr. Abe as a concluding example of democracy— unless one is mocking Cold War “democracy.” Miller, in her conclusion, discusses the phrase “common interests and shared values,” which was used in the title of a 2014 report by a congressional study group on Japan. The use of the term “shared values” in reference to the U.S.-Japan alliance, she notes, “is now commonplace” (274). It seems to me, however, that it is “common interests” that continue to keep the U.S.–Japan alliance strong and that define the two countries’ shared values. In 2015, Abe achieved what American policymakers and his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke could not do in the 1950s—that is, a militarization of Japan—by passing new laws that allowed the Self-Defense Forces to be deployed overseas for the United States, against strong domestic public opposition. Photo images of citizens’ protests in front of the Diet building show a remarkably cunning similarity to those from the failed anti-Anpo protest demonstration of 1960. To most Japanese, the passing of the 2015 legislation yet again cast doubt on the saliency of democracy in Japan. It would make more sense, thus, to see the relationship between Abe and American leaders through the lens of “common interests” rather than the “shared values” of democracy (274–78).

I do not disagree that democracy, the definitions and visions of which once contested violently in Japan and Asia, has come to be equated with capitalism. But in fact, that equation is quite remarkable, because Marxism, socialism, and communism also have democracy as an ideal. The history of prewar Japan—not covered in Miller’s book—is rich with leftist and liberal intellectuals and unionists who struggled to reconcile democracy with the absolute power endowed upon the emperor (Andrew Gordon has called this “imperial democracy”). Miller’s work helps us understand how the erasure of democracies happened, but it is also clear that it was not because democracy became a shared value, but because the democracy that was defined as anti-communist carried such political and diplomatic weight in dealing with Cold War America.

In other words, it is not necessarily “ideological continuities in democratic visions” that characterize the U.S-Japan alliance from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period as Millar concludes. Miller makes it clear at the beginning of the book that the aim of her project is to highlight the role of ideological rationales over that of security and economic rationales (8). I would argue, however, that one cannot and should not separate ideology from security and economic concerns. Let me explain.

One place I disagree with Miller is in chapter 6, where there is an otherwise very informative discussion of the industrial productivity program. Led by the United States and embraced by Japanese leaders, the program brought Japan unprecedented economic growth, calmed political unrest, and enabled Japan’s return to Asia as the model of a “Cold War democracy.” Miller concludes the chapter by arguing that economic development became the most attractive field of U.S.-Japan cooperation, especially after the Anpo crisis, because it “promised to provide the mental transformation necessary to combat communism in Japan and Asia and revitalize Japan with a new sense of purpose” while maintaining Japanese and American regional and global dominance: “Development, after all, did not require economic redistribution, colonial redress, or apologies for Japan’s wartime aggression” (272).

I maintain that it did require those things. As is well known, Japanese postwar development aid began as reparations for Japan’s wartime aggression. Japan
concluded bilateral reparations treaties with Asian countries in the 1950s: with Burma in 1954 (and 1963) for US$200 million, with the Philippines for US$550 million, with South Vietnam for US$39 million, and so forth. These treaties—as well as so-called quasi-reparations treaties with South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand—stipulated that the amount be paid not in cash but in technical aid, using Japanese capital goods and services. Dams, roads, and factories were built by the Japanese throughout Asia as reparations payments. The development aid programs that Miller discusses—such as Third Country Training—functioned alongside these much bigger projects, as well as numerous Colombo Plan projects. As reparations were paid off in the 1960s, those projects turned into development aid and commercial contracts, enabling and propelling the high growth of Japan’s export-oriented economy. (I would add that the rise of the 1960s development aid that Miller points out occurred also because of this timing.)

Through this developmentalist network of technology, Asian nationalist leaders established military regimes in their newly independent countries, Japan re-entered Asia both diplomatically and economically, and the United States built its Cold War Asia. Meanwhile, individual victims of Japanese war aggressions, such as former comfort women and forced laborers throughout Asia, were ignored, forgotten, and silenced by these governments. I have called this “the kula ring for the flying geese” to articulate the simultaneously symbolic, diplomatic, and economic nature of the developmental network in Cold War Asia. Japan’s postwar economic prosperity was possible not because the US provided efficiency technologies to Japan and Japan perfected it. Daniel Immerwahr has critiqued such US-centered “hub-and-spoke” approach of Cold War studies in this journal. I agree with Immerwahr. In order to recover and grow, Japanese capitalism required access to the market and resources in Asia, not just capital and technologies from the US.

Postcolonial dynamics in postwar Asia make Cold War ideological concerns less central than scholars of Cold War Studies assume. It may be a surprise to Americanists that Japanese aid projects and trade agreements with Asian countries were surprisingly free of Cold War constraints and language. Japan semi-formally traded with Communist China throughout the 1950s and 1960s and continued reparations/aid projects when Southeast Asian leaders such as Sukarno did not seem fully committed to the “free world.” Asia Kyokai, a quasi-government organization whose English publication Miller used for chapter 6, was absolutely essential in this process. However, in my analysis of its Japanese-language publications, Cold War concerns and rhetoric were expressed much less frequently by Japanese leaders and businessmen than their far bigger concerns with the lingering negative effects of Japan’s colonial and wartime occupation in the minds of Asians. To Asian dictators whose aspiration was to achieve economic independence from their former European colonizers and to solidify their legitimacy domestically, Japanese political and business leaders emphasized the language of “cooperation,” replacing the wartime language of co-prosperity. They did not, to my knowledge, use the language of “democracy” to promote this developmentalist network with Asian leaders. This is not to refute Miller’s work in any way. Instead, as a future direction, I want to suggest looking at the U.S.-Japan alliance-making together with Japan-Asia relationships and the US-Southeast Asia relationships. It would illuminate much nuanced and layered processes of the making of Cold War Asia and should generate stimulating discussions in graduate seminars.

In his 2019 book Anti-Japan, Leo T. S. Ching, who is concerned with the dead-end crash of neo-nationalism in post-Cold War East Asia, calls for “the decolonization of democracy.” Especially in Japan, Ching maintains, anti-militarization movements should be “questioning and challenging the complicity of democracy in suppressing the colonial question in the postwar capitalist order” if they want to effectively create transnational alliances beyond Japan. I agree. Miller’s work is extremely helpful here as it demonstrates how hard the United States pushed to perpetuate the colonial condition of democracy in postwar Japan. American Cold War policy still deeply matters to post-Cold War Asia, where the separate peace arrangement of the Cold War—two Koreas and two Chinas—continues to shape international and domestic politics. This troubling legacy of the “Cold War peace” has been examined and criticized by many scholars, but Millar and Ching remind me that doing so should also mean paying attention to the troubling legacy of “Cold War democracy.”

There is one question that I would like to ask Miller to address in her response to the reviews in this roundtable. Why is there no discussion in her book of the tension within the Occupation authorities between left-learning New Dealers and conservative Cold warriors? Charles Kades, Harry Kelly, David Conde, and some other New Dealers who conventionally appear in studies of the Occupation do not make any appearance in Cold War Democracy, and their dismissal as part of the reverse course is not mentioned.

Notes:
3. Hiromi Mizuno, “Introduction: The Kula Ring for the Flying Geese: Japan’s Technology Aid and Postwar Asia,” in Engineering Asia: Technology, Colonial Development, and the Cold War Order, eds. Hiromi Mizuno, John S. Moore, and John DiMoia (London, 2018), 1-41. The Kula Ring refers to the gift exchange system in Papua New Guinea, made famous by anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski in the 1920s. My critical use of this analogy is to highlight the simultaneously symbolic and economic function of international aid in modern capitalist economy. The flying geese refers to the Flying Geese Model, which was originally conceived by Kaname Akamatsu in the 1930s but became internationally popular in the 1980s to explain the “catching-up” process of industrialization of latecomer economies.

Review of Jennifer M. Miller, Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan.

Andrew C. McKevitt

I worry that readers will see the subtitle of this book—“The United States and Japan”—and skip these roundtable reviews, mistakenly believing that a book about a bilateral relationship is primarily for specialists in that relationship, even though monographs about U.S.-[pick a country] relations speak to an earlier era of scholarship and public concern. We live in a transnational era, after all, both in terms of our research subjects and our material lives. Many graduate students are trained to think transnationally rather than bilaterally. And beyond that, the U.S.-Japan relationship today just seems so pedestrian.

It is a point Jennifer Miller makes in the conclusion of Cold War Democracy. Nobody batted an eye in the twenty-first century, she writes, when George W. Bush or Barack Obama spoke of the “shared values” between the United States and Japan. Viewed from the perspective of the book’s subject, however—roughly, the first two postwar decades of this relationship—such an outcome would have seemed extraordinary. Would anyone in 1945, or even 1960, have predicted that two enemies that had waged a war of mutual
extermination could have established a partnership that, in 2019, stands as modern history’s longest bilateral military alliance? Somehow, as Miller notes, that extraordinary development became ordinary in the last several decades, to the point where we don’t consider its regular, ritualized renewal newsworthy.

I begin, then, with more of a plea than an argument: read this book, please, because it is probably for you even if you’re among the readers who think the U.S.-Japan relationship is pedestrian. That I have to begin with such a plea speaks to the state of the field on U.S.-Japan relations. Works on the subject have carved out their own cubbyhole in U.S. foreign relations history and have persisted even in an era when bilateral studies have gone out of fashion.1 The historians who write these books, however, have long believed that buried in the postwar history of U.S.-Japan relations lies a bigger story than simply a bilateral one. We’ve seen more “there” there than the grand historical narratives of the postwar era suggest.

Miller’s Cold War Democracy reads like such a victory to me, then, because it finally actualizes that feeling, so difficult to nail down, that the U.S.-Japan relationship could tell us something more about the Cold War than just the alliance’s place in it or the value of its mammoth trade flows. Despite Ambassador Mike Mansfield’s claim that the “U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none,” or Chalmers Johnson’s description of it as “the most valuable transoceanic relationship that has ever existed,” or Singapore’s founding prime minister Lee Kuan Yew’s characterization of the partnership as “without parallel in history,” foreign relations historians still need to be convinced of Japan’s greater significance to the Cold War narrative. Miller has, as the kids might say, brought the receipts.2

For Miller, the bilateral relationship is a vehicle for exploring the larger issue of the U.S. construction of a democratic ideology during the Cold War. U.S.-Japan relations were, in that sense, a laboratory in which U.S. policymakers could experiment with ideas about democracy, ideas that would evolve into “modernization theory” and shape U.S. government thinking about the nonwhite world. Certainly Miller is not the first historian to prioritize the concept of democracy in the Cold War. Arguably, the idea was central from the start of the conflict. Indeed, a simple outline of the traditional historiographic swings of the field of U.S. foreign relations might be construction from how historians wrote about democracy. To the “orthodox” school of the Cold War’s first decades, the United States and (most of) its allies were democratic, and the Soviet Union and its allies stood in opposition. To the revisionists of the Vietnam era, the United States claimed the mantle of democracy but behaved hypocritically around the world, suppressing legitimate democratic-nationalist movements in the name of anticomunism.

The post-revisionist syntheses of the last decades of the century acknowledged the revisionists’ charges of hypocrisy but also seemed to conclude that U.S. policymakers did the best they could with the tools they had, captives of ideology as they were, and anyway new archival revelations proved the Soviet Union to be as antidemocratic as George Kennan had claimed it was in 1946. A parallel post-revisionist literature turned the telescope that had been pointed overseas into a magnifying glass examining the Cold War on the home front, exploring the way groups like African Americans challenged government claims to be leading the “free world” while allowing for the suppression of democratic rights at home.

Cold War Democracy comes out of that post-revisionist tradition, but it also treats democratic ideology as an analytical subject in a more distanced and nuanced way than most of its predecessors. It is closest in this regard to Odd Arne Westad’s careful parsing of ideology in the Cold War or Vladislav Zubok’s treatment of Soviet ideology, but Miller’s archival foundation and analysis is more fine-grained, focused as it is on a single idea within one bilateral relationship over just a couple of decades.3 Like other works in this tradition, her book takes ideology seriously as an explanation rather than simply a cover for material interests. “While both security and economic rationales were crucial to the construction of this alliance,” she writes, “this relationship also arose from a larger American ideological project that elevated ‘democracy’ as the rationale for this alliance’s existence” (8).

Writing of democratic ideology as a specific project of U.S. Cold War liberals opens it up to nuanced interrogation. It was easy for Americans to neglect the way democracy in the abstract was contested during the Cold War, to forget that the Soviets and Chinese Communists also laid claim to it, let alone that popular Japanese visions clashed with those of U.S. policymakers. Indeed, it was the importance of democracy to everyone—and the consequent clashing of these visions of democracy—that made it so important to the Cold War. Miller argues that in this sense democracy was as important a rationale for the alliance as security or economics. Indeed, democracy was security and prosperity, in the way policymakers framed it at the time. Democracy was strength against totalitarianism, an idea that predated the end of the Second World War; it was freedom to prosper. This is as much a historical argument as a historiographic one: to understand the Cold War, we can’t separate ideology from national security or economic considerations. For Miller, they are mutually constitutive.

Taking ideology seriously in practice means taking Americans seriously when they used phrases that historians of the past easily dismissed as rhetorical flourish: James Byrnes speaking of the “spiritual disarmament” and “spiritual liberation” of the Japanese people (27); George Kennan famously cabling from Moscow in 1946 about the “self-discipline, confidence, morale, and community spirit” needed to win political victories over the Soviets (10); Paul Nitze calling for “vitality” and “confidence” alongside a massive military buildup in NSC 68 (53). These are squishy words, difficult to pin to any category of analysis, but Miller’s exploration of the ever-present language of psychology, mental health and fortitude, and the democratic “spirit” separates the book from previous analyses of ideology and the Cold War.

These were not throwaway words to the people who used them; they really did believe that the battle between Japanese militarism and democracy, or Soviet communism and democracy, was rooted in a struggle over individual and collective mentalities. Alien ideologies could not pervert “healthy” minds. Democracy was not just synonymous with institutions of representative government but also with a cultivated and bolstered democratic “spirit.” As Miller writes, “democracy required a psychologically strong citizenry that was capable of remaining vigilant about protecting democratic values while distinguishing between healthy and harmful ideas” (2). Policymakers who articulated these ideas worked in a professional world in which psychological sciences held great sway. Fears of communist “brainwashing” were not metaphorical. Vigilance against such threats sometimes required sacrificing rights and freedoms. Out of such obsessions, then, a clash of democratic visions was born.

U.S. policymakers’ obsession with “healthy” minds explains their responses to the clash of democratic visions that occurred on the ground in Japan, from the occupation era through resistance to the U.S. military presence in the 1950s and in the 1960 Anpo protests, when millions of Japanese turned out on the streets to object to the renegotiation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. This clash, between U.S. officials and Japanese conservative leaders, on the one hand, and Japanese activists, intellectuals, and
protestors, on the other, was a product of characteristic American paternalism mixed with anxieties about deviations from a narrow vision of democratic practice, one directed by elites toward a liberal consensus.

But the clash also produced unexpected U.S. concessions to Japanese resistance. Eventually, in the wake of the Anpo protests, U.S. policymakers reconfigured their approach to Japan, and no one figure better symbolized that reconfiguration than new U.S. ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer. Reischauer, who was born in Japan to educational missionaries, was a Harvard historian who came to the attention of the new Kennedy administration in early 1961 for his pointed criticism of the U.S. response to the Anpo protests. He quickly became a popular figure in post-Anpo Japan.

Miller digs up a real archival gem from Reischauer, however. In 1962, he wrote a letter from his ambassadorial post to William Lederer, author of The Ugly American (1958) and a novelist who himself had something to say about American international ignorance. “The most important thing in Japan-American relations,” Reischauer told Lederer, “is to help more of the Japanese public see how absolutely wrong their ideas are” (224). Surely this remark was tongue-in-cheek, but the line nevertheless succinctly conveys the American liberal elite consensus toward Japan that Miller develops throughout the book: democracy is what we say it is and claims to the contrary stand outside the narrow confines of acceptable political debate.

While staking out important ground in the literature of the Cold War, Miller also intervenes in the specific historiography of U.S.-Japan relations by challenging inherited interpretations, including the influential “reverse course” thesis. At some point in the first year or two of the occupation, the reverse-course school contended, U.S. policymakers retreated from their initial progressive goals of demilitarization and democratization, broadly conceived, and instead, as the Soviet Union appeared more menacing to postwar U.S. plans for Asia, prioritized building anticomunist political and social institutions, even if it meant collaborating with former leaders of the militarist regime.

Cold War Democracy offers a significant interpretive breakthrough on a half-century of reverse-course scholarship. The reverse-course interpretation offered a narrative of betrayal carried out by New Dealers who initially sought to rein in the excesses of militarism and capitalism but failed to resist the tide of anticomunist rhetoric and the promises of hegemony that a cowed, compliant, conservative Japan offered to an emerging, ambitious superpower. In Dower’s magisterial Embracing Defeat (1999), for instance, the reverse course serves a tragic narrative purpose. Scholars writing during the Cold War couldn’t help but buy into the struggle’s grand narratives of liberation, either of the American liberal variety or the Soviet social justice kind. Inescapable Cold War ideology demanded its interpreters judge its developments by the extent to which they were democratic or antidemocratic. To Cold War liberals, the reverse course built Japanese democracy. To revisionist critics, it reversed a democratic process.

Miller’s writing is free of any such ideological baggage, and consequently, she does not seek to blame anyone for the loss of a postwar Japan that could have been. In her framing, if there was a reverse course, it was a tactical rather than a strategic one. To be sure, U.S. policymakers abandoned progressive goals early in the occupation, but, crucially, those policymakers saw it not as a betrayal but as a recalibration. They remained unusually consistent in their belief that they were always building democracy in Japan, a democracy that had to be strong enough to resist, both institutionally and psychologically, the threats of authoritarianism and militarism. Communism was not a new threat, in that sense, then, but one that looked uncomfortably like the fascist ones just vanquished. And it was democratic ideology that was malleable, not necessarily anticomunism. The latter was simply a tactical shift within the former.

The Anpo protests serve as both the climax of the book and the turning point for postwar U.S.-Japan relations. Again here the author manages to make clear connections between developments that historians have often fumbled, tied as they have been to national security or economic analyses. The Anpo protests rocked the streets of Japan and rattled U.S. policymakers but otherwise had no substantive impact on the security treaty, which the Japanese government ratified on schedule in 1960. It did teach the Americans, however, about “the broader failure of consensus-focused and militarized democracy, as well as the United States’ ability to foster democratic transformation in nonwhite states” (225). We might think of it as one of the “teachable moments” in the development of modernization theory in the United States. U.S. policymakers interpreted Anpo as a failure of democratic ideology and in their recalibration of the U.S.-Japan relationship replaced their focus on “psychology, democracy, and anticommunism” with greater attention to “productivity, development, and political stability” (230). In demonstrating the evolution of democratic thinking on both sides of the Pacific at this moment, Miller ably explains the transition to a very different U.S.-Japan relationship in the 1970s and beyond.

Using the framework of democratic ideology to tie together what have often felt like loose ends in the historiography of U.S.-Japan relations is a valuable service. But more importantly, Miller’s sensitive treatment of that ideology in the context of the early Cold War should have a significant impact on how historians understand and continue to study the United States in the world in the twentieth century.

Notes:

Review of Jennifer Miller, Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan

Marc Gallicchio

I

n December 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles complained to Dean Rusk, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, about Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s unwillingness to support a major increase in Japan’s new military establishment. Dulles told Rusk that he was “terribly disappointed in the way things have
been going in Japan” and that he felt there had not been “any rebirth of moral strength as in the case of Germany.”

That statement, equating military rearmament of America’s recent enemies with moral strength, has always struck me as peculiarly Dulles-like. However, it turns out that, as Jennifer Miller shows in Cold War Democracy, Dulles was not alone in his thinking. A great many American officials, and some Japanese leaders as well, believed that the sustainability of democracy in Japan required the mobilization of the moral and spiritual strength of the Japanese people.

Miller begins by showing that Americans’ understanding of democracy in the mid-twentieth century was the product of specific historical circumstances. Looking inward, American intellectuals and policymakers praised Americans’ supposed political pragmatism as evidence of a healthy state of mind sustained by individualism, rationality (as opposed to emotionalism), and a vigilant defense of democratic ideals. They worried, however, that America’s openness, one of the hallmarks of its democracy, might leave the public susceptible to Communist misinformation and propaganda. To head off such a possibility, Congress created the notorious House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) before World War II, and the executive branch followed by establishing an expansive internal security bureaucracy during the early days of the Cold War. The result was a series of purges of suspected Communists, arrests, and crackdowns on Communist influence in labor unions. The so-called Red Scare, otherwise known as McCarthyism, carried over to Japan, where the same security measures were employed as part of the reverse course.

It is one of the strengths of this book that Miller shows how Cold War practices in the United States were applied to Japan. In Japan, as in the United States, the defense of democracy perversely resulted in the suppression of freedom. Cold War Democracy also succeeds in showing continuities in American approaches to Japan that cause us to rethink the standard periodization used by historians. For example, chapter 1 shows that concern for creating a healthy democratic mindset was a common thread running through American planning for postwar Japan, the liberal phase of the occupation, and the reverse course.

More generally, Miller offers new and persuasive interpretations of familiar subjects such as Japanese rearmament and protests against American military bases in Japan. Throughout, she shows that many Japanese citizens developed and defended their own definition of democracy, one that emphasized the people’s responsibility to hold the state to account. This was a form of spirit and vigilance that neither American policymakers nor Japanese leaders welcomed, especially when it led to protests over rearmament, military bases, and the security treaty with the United States.

Cold War Democracy consists of an introduction, six substantive chapters organized around specific moments in the U.S.-Japan relationship up to the early 1960s, and a provocative conclusion that demonstrates the continuing influence of Cold War policies on the relationship today. Miller draws on a wide range of Japanese and American sources and highlights the importance of non-state actors in the bilateral relationship. She establishes her thesis regarding the origins of American ideas about democracy in an introduction that nicely summarizes the views of social scientists and public intellectuals. The first three chapters look at U.S. efforts to institutionalize the required rationality and spiritual strength in Japan during the occupation. The next two focus on the Japanese response to those efforts, and the sixth looks at how U.S. and Japanese officials addressed the furore created by their previous policies.

Chapter 2 deserves singling out because of its originality. It covers the controversial effort to rearm Japan, beginning with the development of a National Police Reserve (NPR). Miller gives this familiar story a new twist: she shows that American officials justified rearmament by touting military service as a nursery of the civic virtues that were necessary for the defense of democracy. As Miller shows, American officials did not conjure that rationale out of thin air. They made the same argument in defense of the failed proposal for Universal Military Training and the subsequent implementation of a peacetime draft in the United States. Americans were also willing to see Japan rearm, because they believed they had successfully eliminated the danger of resurgent militarism in Japan by disbanding the Imperial Army and reducing the emperor to a symbol of the state with no government function.

Nevertheless, as Miller shows, Americans ended up tying themselves in rhetorical knots once they realized they needed to recruit former Imperial Army officers to staff the NPR. The creation of the NPR provoked criticism and protest from Japanese civic groups committed to a vision of the unarmed Japanese democracy established in the Japanese Constitution. It also placed the Japanese government in a delicate position as it hedged its compliance with American proposals in response to the public. No one was satisfied with the outcome, except perhaps the formerly purged officers who found themselves back in uniform again.

As the Truman administration pushed Japan to begin rearming, it was also working on a peace treaty and a security treaty to anchor Japan in an anti-communist alliance in Asia, as Miller shows in chapter 3. Japan “reformed and redeemed” through the occupation would stand at the center of an anticommunist system in Asia (153). Hopes for a broader regional pact in which Japan would serve as a model for other Asian nations had to be scrapped in favor of a bilateral security treaty between the United States and Japan.

The idea that other countries might wish to emulate Japan had some foundation in history. In the early twentieth century many Asian nationalists were inspired by Japan’s modernization. But close encounters with Japan during World War II had nationalists looking elsewhere after the war. Even when they turned to the United States for support, they were unwilling to have their interests subsumed in a pact that included Japan. As Miller shows, while planning for the security treaty and the peace treaty moved ahead, Americans sought to strengthen the Japanese public’s commitment to proper democratic values. Occupation officials were particularly concerned by Japanese intellectuals’ fondness for theoretical Marxism. They hoped that a strong dose of empirically based social sciences, facilitated by educational exchange programs, would cure them of that infatuation. Much of this work was turned over to private foundations (hence Dulles’s lament to Dean Rusk, quoted above), but they coordinated with the State Department.

Japan emerged from the occupation anchored to the United States through the security treaty and isolated from China and the Soviet Union as a result of an otherwise generous peace treaty. Japanese intellectuals rejected their government’s acceptance of this subordinate independence and sought to make officials in Tokyo responsive to the Japanese people. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the mobilization of a large segment of that public against the presence of American bases in Japan and ultimately against renewal of the treaty. Chapter 4 offers a case study of the protests against expansion of the airfields at Tachikawa Air Base outside Tokyo. The opposition to runway extensions at Tachikawa is usually viewed as a localized dispute, a case of farmers resisting the expropriation of their land. Miller shows, however, that the movement expanded into a broader indictment of the Japanese military relationship with Japan. Other incidents, like the dosing of the tuna trawler Lucky Dragon with radiation during nuclear weapons tests and...
the murder of a Japanese woman on a firing range by a GI, vividly demonstrated to many Japanese that they were not made more secure by the security treaty.

Opposition to the treaty and to Tokyo’s neglect of Japanese opinion regarding the Cold War alliance with the United States came to a head in the massive protests against renewal of the security treaty in 1960. Although the revised treaty addressed some of the obvious inequalities in the original, it still tied Japan’s fortunes to American Cold War policies. The authoritarian methods of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke inflamed the Left and led to nearly two months of protests.

The U.S. embassy chided these violent demonstrations up to a small pro-Communist minority, but Miller shows that opponents were far more varied than that. In the postmortem that followed the passage of the treaty, the embassy compiled a lengthy report that darkened back to wartime characterizations of the Japanese as immature, emotionally unstable, and easily led. A more astute analysis by Japan expert and soon-to-be-ambassador Edwin Reischauer fixed the blame on the Americans’ failure to interact with the opposition. In that respect, American diplomacy operated much like it did in the prewar era, when American representatives spent most of their time with the cosmopolitan elite of Japanese society. There were, however, limits to Reischauer’s insights. As Miller notes, the ambassador still thought it was his job to explain rather than to listen to and take seriously the criticisms made by the opponents of the treaty.

As Miller notes, the attempts by American officials to understand their failures showed that they remained committed to building public support for the alliance. The relationship, as defined by the United States, depended on active Japanese support, as opposed to a sullen acquiescence imposed by the government. The agreed remedy was to focus on economic expansion through development of “productivity consciousness.” Once again, the emphasis was on psychological mobilization, only this time in pursuit of “capitalist dreams.” An economically expanding Japan would also take the lead in development aid in Asia, in effect substituting economic assistance for the military role Americans had hoped Japan would play. The Japanese government willingly embraced these plans, welcomed managerial and engineering consultants to Japan, and announced a goal of income doubling.

As Miller notes, this emphasis on realizing capitalist dreams ignored thorny issues like economic equality in favor of expansion and the promotion of consensus between labor and capital. Once again, the United States was applying homemade remedies to Japan. The promotion of productivity consciousness as the technocratic antidote to extremist ideologies was not very different from the American way of life being peddled by a new form of spiritual leader in the United States, the managerial guru.

A year after the treaty protests, Maxwell Taylor, President Kennedy’s military adviser, downgraded the military value of the alliance. Restrictions on the storage of nuclear weapons, the constant pressure to reduce the military footprint in the home islands, and the unwillingness of the Japanese government to meet American expectations for rearming lessened Japan’s value as an active ally and raised the value of Okinawa, where the Americans still exercised dominion over the Japanese. Minimal American security interests were met by keeping Japan out of the communist camp. In Taylor’s view, “military considerations need not shape U.S.-relations with Japan.” This lowering of expectations probably had as much to do with calming U.S.-Japan relations as the new emphasis on economic growth.

One of the themes running through Cold War Democracy is that Americans viewed their Japanese allies in racialized and gendered terms that made it easy to dismiss the genuine causes of Japanese discontent. That point is well supported by the evidence. It remains an open question, however, as to how distinctive American views toward the Japanese were and how important they were in shaping policy toward Japan. It is probably not too much of an exaggeration to say that American officials viewed opposition to their policies at home and almost anywhere abroad as irrational. And American officials often viewed the French in gendered terms. Would a more culturally sensitive approach have resulted in different policies in Japan? The evidence presented by Miller suggests not. The Americans wanted one kind of democracy and their Japanese opponents wanted another. What the majority of Japanese wanted is less clear. The Japanese and Americans regularly surveyed Japanese opinion through the 1950s. Some discussion of that information would have helped place the Left-opposition in context and shown how pervasive their view of democracy was.

That may be a subject for future discussion. All books leave the reader with questions. This one is no different. That does not lessen the value of this impressive book. Miller’s original thesis, her prodigious research, and her ability to connect her topic to the broader international setting and move its focus from grass roots organizing to high policy will make Cold War Democracy the standard treatment on this important but relatively neglected period in the U.S.-Japan relationship. For those reasons, it is also an ideal text for graduate classes on the Cold War and U.S. Foreign Relations.

Notes:
1. Dulles to Rusk, December 29, 1953, folder #1, Chronological File, John Foster Dulles Papers, Dwight D, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

Reflecting on the Complicity of Democracy: Author’s Response for Passport Roundtable on Cold War Democracy

Jennifer M. Miller

I want to open by thanking the reviewers for taking the time to read my work and for writing such engaged and thoughtful reviews. It is an honor to see this book discussed so seriously by such accomplished scholars, especially since they so generously and effectively captured my arguments, intellectual agenda, and scholarly interventions. I deeply appreciate the opportunity to take part in this conversation.

While the reviewers raise a plethora of important questions, I want to focus on three issues that run through their comments. First, how should we judge the centrality of “democracy” to both American and Japanese discourse in the postwar era? For example, when American policymakers, after writing a constitution that explicitly banned postwar military forces, invoked democracy to herald the necessity of Japanese rearmament, should we criticize their ideas as a betrayal of “true” democracy? As Hiromi Mizuno aptly puts it, should we put democracy in scare quotes, something that I considered doing while writing?

As Andrew C. McKevitt highlights, Cold War Democracy was my attempt to go beyond debates about American policy as an either/or: either genuinely concerned with democracy
promotion or guided by raw power calculations. Instead, I wanted to think critically about democracy as an ideological project. The meaning and goals of democracy, after all, are neither stable nor timeless; my goal was to explore the different ways that historical actors understood the roots and consequences of democracy, and to trace how these understandings enabled and foregrounded a wide variety of political, military, and economic arrangements.

In particular, I was struck by how often American policymakers talked about democracy as not simply institutional or procedural, but psychological and even spiritual, a “state of mind” that was seriously threatened by the propaganda and misinformation propagated by militarists, fascists, and communists alike. It is a conception that I believe my actors took seriously; it stretched across time (the 1950s, World War II, and the Cold War) and space (the Pacific), and they consistently invoked it—both intentionally and offhandedly, publicly and privately—to argue for and explain policy choices. For example, explaining democracy in psychological terms facilitated both early occupation policies like the writing of a postwar Japanese constitution that emphasized citizens’ rights and later occupation policies such as anti-Communist purges and anti-subversive laws that many observers believed were anti-democratic. My goal, then, was to separate “democracy” from its immediate positive normative meaning and explore its specific meanings in the early Cold War, with all their limits and consequences.

In investigating the meanings assigned to democracy, I also wanted to bring the Japanese into the story. One of the book’s goals was to examine the political clashes of postwar Japan as not just a fight between a democratic camp and its authoritarian enemies, but also as a contest over different visions of psychological politics. On the one hand, there was shared terrain across the Japanese political spectrum. Both those who opposed the alliance with the United States and those who supported it believed that Japan’s future depended on its citizens forging the “right” psychological disposition. Moreover, they all believed that Japan’s place in the Cold War—and its relationship with the United States—was a key factor in building this proper “state of mind.”

On the other hand, the major figures shaping Japanese political discourses (whether they were politicians, military leaders, intellectuals, or activists) believed that the proper “state of mind” would lead to very different outcomes. Many (especially on the left) claimed democracy required a psychological capacity to separate one’s mind from the exigencies of the state, to question authority, to oppose militarism, and thus reject cooperation with the United States. Others (especially on the right) believed that Japan could build democratic stability only by mobilizing the “national will” behind state power and in particular by building national confidence and military strength. In this regard, by including Kishi Nobusuke or Abe Shinzō in my book I did not mean to mock the concept of Cold War democracy (as Mizuno wonders) or to “reclaim” them as democratic figures in the way we might understand it, but rather to show the harsh and problematic nature of this language and mode of thinking. I wanted to ask how and why such actors used the language of democracy to make their own policy goals possible.

The second question raised by the reviewers concerns the role of ideology and its relationship to interests. Does Cold War Democracy prioritize ideology above interests, or does it emphasize that ideologies and interests are mutually constituted? Throughout the book, I do emphasize the importance of ideology and dedicate a chapter to the question of how ideologies and interests are mutually constituted. As noted by Marc Gallichio, this was a key point of my second chapter, which examined the creation of Japan’s postwar defense forces. Drawing parallels between the United States postwar debate over Universal Military Training and the process of Japanese rearmament, this chapter argues that Japan’s rearmament was not simply the product of concerns about security. Rather, it was made possible by a growing belief that military experience and training would produce the mental vigilance and commitment necessary for “open” societies to resist Communist propaganda and infiltration. Security, essentially, had a mental, psychological, and ideological dimension. Such thinking made the U.S. occupation authorities open to using members of the former Japanese imperial military purged in the early years of the occupation—people whom U.S. military advisors valued for their leadership and “spirit” more than their tactical capabilities—as a way to strengthen Japan’s postwar defense forces.

As I make clear in my conclusion, I think this entanglement of interests and ideology, the latter of which is now expressed as “shared values,” has largely continued to the present. The language of “shared values” has done important work to continue to legitimize U.S.-Japan security goals and military ties under a broader claim that the U.S.-Japan alliance operates in moral service to peace and humanity. I was not seeking to deny the importance of geopolitical or economic interests in shaping the U.S.-Japan alliance or sustaining its longevity, but rather to interrogate how certain ideological constructions were vital to shaping and legitimating policy outcomes.

Third, the reviewers make important points about Cold War Democracy’s examination of U.S.-Japan cooperation in the field of development. The book is part of an effort to correct Japan’s absence from the recent wave of literature on postwar development and aid, which I find startling, given the country’s economic importance in this field (it had, for example, some of the largest foreign aid budgets in the world by the end of the 1980s). For this purpose, I included my sixth chapter to examine the role that the U.S.-Japan relationship played (whether as a model for other Asian nations, a facilitator of training, or a source of money) in development efforts elsewhere.

Mizuno notes that my assertion that Japanese development efforts did not require redress or regional redistribution is not accurate. Japan’s largest development efforts, she reminds us, came in the form of reparations for World War II. This is an important point, and I could have been more precise in my language, because her own work on how such programs turned into commercial contracts is crucial. In this sense, when I noted a lack of redress or redistribution, I was thinking explicitly about how such efforts also had goals that were openly commercial, like reentering former colonial spaces, and about the ways these efforts helped Japan achieve unprecedented growth. Due to length concerns, I prioritized the areas in which the United States and Japan cooperated, such as productivity programming in Japan, the creation of the Japan-led Asían Productivity Organization, and Third Country Training, rather than Japan’s own reparations efforts. Still, reparations programs are a crucial part of the story of Japanese foreign aid and development.

Similarly, Mizuno wonders how accurate I was in linking visions of development to earlier visions of democracy. The language of democracy, after all, does not play a large part in the publications of the Japan Productivity Center (funded largely by the United States in the 1950s) and is almost totally absent from those of Asia Kyokai, the quasi-governmental Japanese organization that facilitated programs like Third Country Training in Japan. But my claim was not that these development efforts were explicitly designed to achieve political
democracy. Rather, I wanted to explore how language about mindsets and consciousness that was once used to describe democracy instead became central to discussions of economic growth, productivity, and development, both inside and outside Japan. Just as policymakers and commentators in the early 1950s claimed that democracy required the right mindset (rather than egalitarian policies), they now argued that economic growth stemmed from the proper psychology (rather than empowering labor or economic equality). Equally important, with U.S. assistance and support, this language and mode of thinking resurrected imperial and wartime tropes. As I argue in chapter 6, Japanese development efforts reproduced the language of “cooperation” and friendship, which clearly echoed Japanese World War II propaganda while seeking to replace the language of democracy in the U.S.-Japan alliance (expressed "vis à vis" Japan than they did in many other states—especially non-white states—in the Cold War era. In part, this was because many of them had accepted the early twentieth-century hierarchical notion that Japan was an “advanced” civilization, more “developed” than other non-white societies. U.S. policymakers and military leaders also felt that the stakes in Japan were very high after four years of extraordinarily bloody warfare. The Cold War perpetuated these high anxieties, especially as American leaders like General Douglas MacArthur made a direct connection between the threat of Japanese militarism and the threat of Communism, arguing that both drew their power from seizing and manipulating the minds of the people.

However, I think that the discourse of U.S. leaders and their way of thinking about Japan, with its emphasis on “healthy” politics, maturity, and rationality, was common during the Cold War, applied to a wide range of states, and helped justify military interventions and coups across the globe. Similarly, the belief that only conservative and even authoritarian and military leaders could provide the mental stability and “spirit” necessary to building democracy was common throughout the Cold War. More broadly, as I explore in my third chapter on the peace treaty that ended the U.S. occupation (an underappreciated Cold War moment), a “free” Japan was important to U.S. policymakers precisely because they believed it gave them bona fides. It was proof, they claimed, of American forgiveness, benevolence, and goodwill; of the inherent goodness of American hegemony; and of the United States’ ability to spiritually and politically liberate foreign and nonwhite peoples. Put another way, the language of democracy in the U.S.-Japan alliance (expressed today as “shared values”) was the flipside and enabler of imperial aggression and violent intervention elsewhere. As a post-imperial rather than postcolonial state, Japan was a historical exception to much of postwar Asia. But it was precisely this idiosyncrasy that made an “advanced” Japan useful to the rhetorical, ideological, and tactical construction of U. S. imperial hegemony, in the Cold War and beyond.

Notes:
1. Hiromi Mizuno, Aaron S. Moore and John DiMioa, eds., Engineering Asia: Technology, Colonial Development, and the Cold War Order (London, 2018) is an excellent addition to this literature.
2. See Hiromi Mizuno, Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern Japan (Redwood City, CA, 2008) and Aaron Stephen Moore, Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology and Empire in Japan’s Wartime Era (Redwood City, CA, 2015).