In this issue

The National Archives and Presidential Libraries
Henry Kissinger and Vietnam
How I Survived D-Day

And more...
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More than a story of American child (cultural) soldiers during the 1950s, Victoria Grieve’s *Little Cold Warriors* explores a wide chronology of U.S. (and some Soviet) propaganda, education programs, and advertising, which amounted to a global ideological struggle over the meaning of modern childhood and youth. This disconnect between the book’s empirical research and narrative (on the one hand) and its title and framing (on the other) has resulted in a vibrant roundtable, one in which the monograph’s biggest fans sometimes come across as detractors. One reviewer, Donna Alvah, even worries that Grieve’s restrictive framing could damage the cause of Childhood Studies, leading traditional (diplomatic?) historians, already “suspicious of the contention that… actual children played a part in foreign relations,” to simply “judge the book by its title and dismiss it as too cute by half.” I agree with Alvah that this reaction “would be mistaken.” In Grieve’s treatment of the elusive concept of agency, for example, readers of *Passport* might sense echoes of the state-nonstate tensions identified by the New Diplomatic Historians or by advocates of the transnational turn.1

The roundtable kicks off with Julia Mickenberg’s largely positive review, which is tempered only by her concern that the Press waged a lackluster copyediting effort and her sense that Grieve set up a few historiographical strawmen. Pinpointing Grieve’s contribution as her emphasis on “diplomacy programs and work targeting children abroad,” Mickenberg evaluates the book’s methodological approach as having a “great deal of merit.” To be sure, Mickenberg concedes that it deals with how “school-age children were used by adults” rather than “how young people exercised agency.” Yet she hails Grieve’s “fascinating evidence,” which makes for an “exciting” narrative. Mickenberg was particularly impressed with the chapter on adults’ fascination with (and political mobilization of) supposedly innocent, non-political child art. She also praises the chapter on more politicized efforts of the United States Information Agency (USIA) to secretly subsidize the translation of American literature (including children’s books) abroad.

Like Mickenberg, Lori Clune laments the book’s title. In the most positive review of the four, she describes Grieve’s book as covering not just “American Childhood in the 1950s,” but the U.S. government’s wider “democratic approach” to diplomacy and propaganda in the early Cold War. She praises Chapter 1’s discussion of the federal government’s employment of Lone Ranger comics to sell savings bonds, and Chapter 4’s “fascinating” description of the corporate-friendly Ad Council’s evolution from wartime propagandists to postwar advocates of *laissez-faire* free markets at home and abroad. Clune was particularly impressed by Grieve’s final chapter, which would “work quite well as an assigned reading for any high school or college history class,” as it “does a great job of putting duck-and-cover drills into a broader civil defense context.”

Wedge between Clune’s enthusiasm and Alvah’s engaging finale, Mary Brennan’s review is curt, though not exactly hostile. Declining to speculate on alternative framings or titles, Brennan accepts that book is conceived as an exploration of the essentially “typical” U.S. 1950s childhood, as white, middle-class Cold Warriors. In her author’s response, Grieve expresses appreciation for Brennan’s candor and her willingness to evaluate the book as it is, rather than dream of what it might have been. Most interesting about Brennan’s review is her contention that Grieve’s book contains a “glaring omission,” the “voices of children” themselves.

Grieve responds graciously to Brennan’s critique, but one finds a longer rejoinder to the “childhood agency” question in Donna Alvah’s closing review. Like Mickenberg and Clune, Alvah dislikes the titular framing of *Little Cold Warriors*, offering instead the alternative of *Children, Youth, and Images of Children in Cold War Foreign Relations in the Long 1950s*. In the roundtable’s most thought-provoking review, Alvah notes that this book is about representations (or “images”) of children, rather than about children themselves. Overall, Alvah finds a great deal to like about Grieve’s “unique and compelling” inclusion of such a diverse range of histories, which “bring together the study of representations of children” in everything from art exchanges and literature-in-translation, to corporate advertising and civil defense campaigns.

In what may be the highlight of the roundtable, Alvah then enters into a sustained theoretical engagement with Grieve’s concept of agency. Acknowledging the book’s central paradox, identified by Brennan as the dearth of child voices in a monograph ostensibly about “American Childhood in the 1950s,” Alvah strikes a forgiving tone. On the one hand, as Alvah notes, Grieve made a “valiant effort” to explore children’s perspectives through their art and limited use of quotations and pen pal letters. On the other hand, Alvah identifies a poignant theoretical passage in the book’s introduction, in which Grieve discusses the paradoxes and dilemmas of analyzing agency in the field.
of Childhood Studies. The thorny concept of agency has been a trendy one across the history profession, and it is possible that foreign relations historians will take special pleasure in Alvhall’s quip that sometimes “it is hard to say where coercion ends and agency begins.” By the end of the roundtable, it should be clear that international and diplomatic historians will find in this book a fascinating story, not of children themselves but of a broader set of narratives regarding early Cold War propaganda and education programs, and what they meant for the global struggle over the meaning of youth.

Note:

Review of Victoria M. Grieve, Little Cold Warriors: American Childhood in the 1950s

Julia L. Mickenberg

In Little Cold Warriors: American Childhood in the 1950s, Victoria Grieve puts diplomatic history into conversation with the history of childhood. She does this by drawing upon largely untapped archival evidence to build upon existing scholarship on public diplomacy and the “cultural Cold War” as well as work in childhood history. Grieve makes the claim that her work will get beyond stereotypical understandings of Cold War childhood, and she mentions Duck and Cover, Leave It to Beaver, Dr. Spock, and the baby boom. In many ways, she accomplishes her objectives, but she limits her rhetorical effectiveness by claiming that scholars still tend to see Cold War childhood in limited terms.

Recent scholarship—much of which Grieve cites—has already done much to challenge stereotypical or one-dimensional images of postwar childhood. Indeed, early on in my reading of Grieve’s book I found myself wishing she had set forth the claims for her project’s significance in more precise terms. Doing so would have enabled her to advance a stronger case for the original contributions she does make.

In her introduction Grieve notes that “scholars have made the case for understanding the Cold War beyond traditional state politics and through cultural politics, but they have largely ignored the Cold War battle for the world’s youth” (6). Work by Margaret Peacock, Andrew Hartman, and other scholars upon which Grieve herself draws undercuts this claim; she even notes, later in the book, that “recent scholarship on postwar childhood makes the case that children were vital participants in Cold War politics on both sides of the Iron Curtain” (57). That said, Grieve’s engagement specifically with diplomacy programs and work targeting children abroad seems to me to be quite original and marks the book’s important contribution to scholarship.

Following a trend among historians of childhood, Grieve makes an effort to document not only ideas about and images of children but also children’s actual experiences as historical actors. Her efforts on this front occasionally yield exciting results, but, not surprisingly, the book reveals more about the ways in which school-age children were used by adults as tools in Cold War ideological battles than about how young people exercised agency or what they thought about their experiences. However, Grieve does illustrate ways in which children were involved in what she describes, borrowing a term from Sarah Glassford, as “voluntold” efforts that involve subtle or not-so-subtle coercion to encourage children’s involvement in various programs. Still, as Grieve emphasizes, children may have understood and experienced these efforts in ways that were different from what adult organizers intended. It is difficult to look at children’s political activity in terms of exercising agency when they were so often acting at the behest of, or with encouragement from, adults.

The book is divided into five chapters, along with an introduction and conclusion. Chapter 1 is called “Cold War Comics: Educating American Children for a New Global Role,” but its focus is on various permutations of the Lone Ranger in American popular culture, including comics, but also radio, television, board games, and most revealingly, the Treasury Department’s Savings Stamps and Savings Bonds program, whose records in the National Archives Grieve mined. Grieve offers some wonderfully granular evidence about children’s involvement in this program (for which the Lone Ranger was a spokesman), mentioning, for instance, the “sixth graders at the Fulton and Marshall Schools in Dubuque, Iowa [who] took turns serving as record-keepers and cashiers for younger students who purchased Saving Stamps” (47).

I found Chapter 2, focusing on children’s art exchanges, and Chapter 3, on the Franklin Books program, to be the most interesting sections of the book. In Chapter 2, Grieve concentrates on a program created by a member of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) (and run for years out of her living room) called Art for World Friendship (AWF). Here Grieve highlights a fascinating series of paradoxes: that “the assumed innocence of children’s art became a vital tool in negotiating questions of American “national identity” and America’s “fight for peace during the 1950s and 1960s” (55) and that a program coming from a group being targeted by the FBI (the WILPF) would be a key tool in international diplomacy.

Grieve historicizes her discussion well and includes examples of art works by children from both the United States and the Soviet Union that illustrate the ways in which art submitted by children from both countries tended to eschew negative representations of life in their home countries. It is not clear whether program organizers or children themselves curated or censored images to emphasize certain aspects of each society, though the Soviet images Grieve includes in the book do suggest that there was an effort on the Soviet end to allow only the most talented child artists to share work with their American counterparts.

Grieve does present a couple of images that show or allude to less savory images of life in the United States. She describes one picture that shows a Detroit housing project with broken windows, graffiti, and overflowing trash, and she reproduces a picture of an African-American boy and a white boy shaking hands, an image that is striking because it was so unusual and because it affirmed official U.S. discourse vis à vis race. She also documents young people’s responses to the children’s art that they viewed in public exhibitions.

I was especially interested in Grieve’s discussion of the Franklin Books program, which set up a structure for enabling local groups in foreign countries (especially in the
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Middle East) to choose books by American authors (including children’s books) for translation, with unacknowledged support from the United States Information Agency (USIA). Grieve demonstrates the ways in which officials at Franklin and in the USIA sparred over whether the program should be understood as means of “strengthening international understanding and expanding the American overseas market”—the view taken by Franklin officials—or “as a weapon to fight the Soviet propaganda machine” (92)—the USIA preference. She frames Franklin’s work in relation to the USIA’s own translation program and its libraries abroad.

On the publishing front, Grieve mentions a number of the titles that Franklin shepherded through publication and analyzes one title, Boys Who Became Famous, by Sarah K. Bolton, to suggest the quite different ways in which children might interpret books published through the program. But she seems to accept a notion, which was widely held in the postwar period, that science books, the category of children’s books most in demand from Franklin, were, by definition, apolitical. Grieve says such books could serve the USIA by making young people in foreign countries associate the United States with progress and technological advancement.

However, it is probably worth noting that science was also the most popular subject among left-wing writers of children’s books in the United States. They occupied a significant share of the market when it came to children’s books on scientific subjects, because the assumption that science was “objective” made it less likely that such books would arouse suspicion. Indeed, several of the authors and texts that Grieve cites as having been translated through the Franklin Books program were also recommended by the Marxist magazine New Masses for the ways they could teach children critical thinking and thus empower them to challenge capitalist logic.¹

Chapter 4, “Cold War Advertising,” and Chapter 5, “The Cold War in the Schools,” suggest the organizational challenges of Grieve’s effort, in that both chapters encompass but move well beyond their ostensible focus and might have been better served by more capacious titles (the former might have been something about “youth and propaganda” and the latter might have used the broader category of “education” rather than schools). The great variety of efforts that go well beyond the labels of “advertising” or “schooling” demonstrates the many ways in which American children were employed in official and unofficial propaganda, selling not just products but also the American Way of Life to Americans and to young people throughout the world.

Chapter 5 begins to hint at Grieve’s conclusion. She notes that “the inquiry-based methods of the new social studies encouraged some students to question the onedishness of AVC [Americanism vs. Communism] classes and to demand a more rigorous and honest approach to studying their own nation’s politics, as well as those of the Soviet Union” (171). She also mentions examples of students (like a young Joan Baez) who refused to participate in “duck and cover” drills. Still, the majority of her examples discuss ways in which young people took part in projects—from Sister Cities to the People to People program (the focus of Chapter 5)—that served to upheld the Cold War status quo.

In her conclusion, Grieve circles back to a claim she made on the book’s first page: that “American childhood in the 1950s is best understood as an era of political mobilization” (1) and that, in this sense, the 1950s do not look so different from the 1960s. Young people were active all along, but the political focus changed, she insists. Grieve notes early on in her book that her focus on “typical” children precludes discussion of the Communist left, but she opens her conclusion with a protest by Women Strike for Peace (WSP), an organization with strong influence from the left, and one that echoed arguments made in more openly leftist publications like Albert Kahn’s Game of Death: The Effects of the Cold War Upon Our Children (1953). Of WSP’s arguments about ending nuclear testing because of its dangers to children, for instance, she says, “children were no longer the reason to fight the Cold War; children were the reason to end the Cold War” (196). The influence of WSP activism in the early 1960s was indeed evidence of changing times, but their rhetoric was not new.

I would find Grieve’s arguments about continuity with the 1960s more convincing if she pointed to the ways in which foundational texts such as the Port Huron Statement (1962) combined Cold War triumphalism with evidence of young people’s disappointment about the older generation’s hypocrisy.

Grieve touches upon, but not in a sustained way, and there is less attention to race throughout the book than there might be. Gender issues and distinctions likewise receive little attention.

In addition to fleshing out some of her arguments more effectively, Grieve could have profited from several works that came to mind while I was reading. Her discussion of the Lone Ranger as frontier hero would have benefited from engagement with the paradigm and evidence that Tom Engelhardt sets forth in The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusionment of a Generation (1995, 2007), a book that also reads children’s culture, especially westerns, in relation to postwar politics and battles against “reds” of various kinds. Grieve’s discussion of aid programs like CARE (in chapter 4) made me wish she had engaged with the idea of Cold War “integrationism” as the counterpart to the strategy of “containment,” a paradigm Christina Klein sets forth in Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1943–1957 (2003). The latter book includes a discussion of the ways in which foreign adoption and aid programs like CARE served this goal. Grieve’s book also has more copyediting errors than one would like to see in a book by a first-rate press.

Obviously, any ambitious work will have limitations, and I should emphasize that there is a great deal of merit in Grieve’s Little Cold Warriors, most of all in the fascinating evidence she unearthed from archives and newspapers. Grieve’s work demonstrates an effort to uncover children as historical actors on the world stage and also urges caution about presuming to understand children’s motivations or the meanings they drew from various texts. Her book brings important new insights to both diplomatic history and the history of children and youth.

Notes:
1. On the cultural Cold War and public diplomacy, Grieve cites Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York, 2001); Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art (Chicago, 1983); David Caute, The Dancer Defeats: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War (New York and Oxford, UK, 2005); Michael L. Krenn, Fall-out Shelters for the Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2005); Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge, MA, 2004); and Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War (New York, 1999), among others. For school-

2. For further discussion see Julia L. Mickenberg, *Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American School* (New York, Oxford, 2006), Chap. 6 is devoted to books about science.

**Review of Victoria M. Grieve, *Little Cold Warriors: American Childhood in the 1950s***

*Lori Clune*

Entertainer W. C. Fields famously warned actors never to work with animals or children. Luckily, scholars have ignored his advice—or at least the second category in it—and have boldly ventured to give voice and agency to children. Their works expand and enrich traditional historical narratives, to the considerable benefit of the profession. Victoria M. Grieve makes her contribution to this literature with *Little Cold Warriors: American Childhood in the 1950s*. She notes that the U.S. government, particularly under the Eisenhower administration, took what she describes as a “democratic approach to diplomacy” and used all Americans as cultural diplomats in the vital propaganda component of the Cold War (14). However, like other historians who have moved over the past two decades to explore the role of artists, activists, and intellectuals in various propaganda efforts, she goes beyond the study of government officials to shine a spotlight on the actions of young Americans. We cannot understand the Cold War solely “through the actions of politicians, diplomats, and generals,” she writes, but must include “ordinary Americans, including children” (5).

In Grieve’s telling, American children “functioned as ambassadors, cultural diplomats, and representatives of the United States.” They were still innocent enough that observers could differentiate them from children in the Soviet Union, who were often characterized by Americans as subjects of state-sponsored “brainwashing and ideological indoctrination” (2, 3). However, Grieve steps away from nostalgic and de-politicized visions of the lives of children during the 1950s and examines multiple efforts to politically mobilize American youth. She moves well beyond Bert the Turtle, the animated character that taught children to “Duck and Cover” in the filmstrip of that name, to show the large number of school-age baby boomers who were “mobilized and politicized by the U.S. government, private corporations, and individual adults to fight the Cold War at home and abroad” (2).

Thanks to Grieve’s first chapter, which examines Cold War comics, readers may never look at Lone Ranger comics – and Westerns in American film and television more broadly – in the same way. The author builds on the work of others to show how the character of the Lone Ranger was fighting for “law and order on the western frontier,” taming the West through “benevolent supremacy” to show how the United States could tame the world and make it “safe for democracy” (21). Children were encouraged to see the Lone Ranger as a stand in for the United States, “not conqueror or colonizer” but “civilizer and savior” (21).

When Senator Homer Ferguson, in praising the values of the Lone Ranger in 1953, referred to the “principles of good citizenship, patriotism, fair play,” I could not help but think about the Doolittle Committee report (30). Written in 1954 to convince Eisenhower of all that the CIA was capable of in waging the Cold War, the report argued that the United States was “facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American concepts of ‘fair play’ must be reconsidered.” What would the Lone Ranger and his legions of innocent followers have thought?

In one of the clearest connections between U.S. government officials and cultural products directed at children, Grieve explains how the U.S. Treasury Department used the character of the Lone Ranger to support the Peace Patrol, a U.S. Savings Stamp and Bond program. Between 1958 and 1960, the Lone Ranger urged children to collect coins to donate to the program. The money would help to “build the economic and military strength required to preserve our freedom,” because, simply stated, “peace costs money.”

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As is often the case in a well-structured book, several of the chapters would work well as stand-alone articles. Chapter 2 covers the interesting story of cultural diplomacy and children’s arts programs, while in chapter 4, Grieve examines advertising and its use to depict free market capitalism as superior to Soviet communism. Her discussion of the American Economic System ad campaign is fascinating and is outdone only by the riveting elements of the Cold War in schools in chapter 5. “The Cold War in the Schools: Educating a Generation for World Understanding”.

Grieve does a great job of putting duck-and-cover drills into a broader context of civil defense. Chapter 5 would work quite well as an assigned reading for any high school or college history class. What student could quickly forget Grieve’s terrifying description of the mandatory blood-type tattoo program for Logan, Utah schoolchildren? Dog tags, identification bracelets, and mandatory tattoos? Beyond duck and cover, indeed. And who could help but admire the fascinating story of students and teachers who pushed back against the traditional Americanism-versus-Communism curriculum in the late 1950s and 1960s by seeking out more politically challenging textbooks such as the *Communism in American Life Series*, so “students could make up their own mind” (173)? The impulse behind the anti-war and free speech protests of the 1960s and 1970s can be traced back to these earlier student rumblings.

My main criticism is a general one. I think the title is too narrow for the broader work that Grieve has produced. American childhood is too limiting a description. It cannot accommodate, for example, her exploration of Soviet comics in chapter 1. The subtitle is catchy but confining. Also, the 1950s are only part of her story. The author explores the Kennedy administration, for example, and occasionally (as in chapters 3 and 5) ventures well into the 1960s and early 1970s (see also the Lone Ranger board game and toys discussed in chapter 1).

I was left wanting more from chapter 3 as well. In her
discussion of books, Grieve argues that the U.S. government used “books as weapons” (90), but she largely limits her discussion to children's books overseas, such as an Arabic translation of Little Women. The story of the U.S.-funded Franklin Books was fascinating, but it made me want more on American children and the children's literature industry in the United States. This would have been a great chapter in which to build on the work of Louis Menand concerning Dr. Seuss and children's literature as a Cold War industry. In The Cat in the Hat Comes Back, for example, Seuss uses numerous little cats residing in the big cat's hat to rid the home of a growing pink stain. They finally succeed with a nuclear explosion and the resulting sterilizing fallout. I read this children's book to my survey classes every semester to great effect and I was hoping to learn more about such literature. I would also have loved even more political discussion, an addition to the well-chosen ones included. I often feel the lack of those in books grappling with cultural history.

I must admit that I am drawn to the study of children. This is in part because my students are often quite fascinated by the study of young historical actors. Whether it is children's meals during the Great Depression, toys and games during World War II, or 1950s elementary school children ducking and covering and reading The Cat in the Hat, students are drawn to the study of children and teenagers since they can readily remember those ages. I have no doubt that this volume will be read and enjoyed in many history classes, particularly those that deal with the Cold War, cultural history, or the history of childhood.

Grieve concludes with the – surely uncontested – observation that the current Trump administration has not made the role of the State Department and cultural diplomacy a priority in fortifying relations with nations around the world. She also wonders if children will have a say in this action, as she argues they have had in the past. Current events would indicate that young Americans may be as politically engaged as ever in our nation's history.

In early November 2018, for example, when the Supreme Court rejected a Trump administration request to halt a lawsuit involving climate change, they were handing a victory (albeit perhaps only a temporary one) to those who initiated the lawsuit – children. Lawyers for the plaintiffs explained that the more than twenty children and young adults involved are suing the federal government, in a case that originated during the Obama administration, over its inaction on climate change. They are asking the Supreme Court to order the executive branch to craft a plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions, since, they argue, they are already suffering from the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The actions of these young Americans certainly speak to their political interest and activism.

They are not alone. In the aftermath of the murder of seventeen individuals, including fourteen students, at Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida – the deadliest high school shooting in U.S. history – survivors became activists. Student survivors, such as high school senior Emma González, have channeled their anger and fear into political action and gun-control advocacy.

It is not difficult to imagine increased activism among young Americans, as issues that affect them personally pull them into political awareness. School shootings, climate change, and voter suppression, like the dangers of nuclear war, will continue to prompt even more politicized and activist children and young Americans. We welcome the histories, sure to come, that will include children as an essential component of the emerging complex narratives of U.S. history in the third decade of the twenty-first century.

In sum, this is a slender volume that makes a significant, thought-provoking contribution to the fields of propaganda, public diplomacy, culture, childhood, and Cold War history. Grieve's depictions of the agency and activism among children and young adults during the Cold War are sure to provoke additional penetrating histories, along with many fascinating classroom discussions.

Review of Victoria M. Grieve, Little Cold Warriors

Mary C. Brennan

Victoria M. Grieve's Little Cold Warriors, which focuses on children and childhood, adds to the growing literature on the cultural ramifications of the Cold War mentality in the United States for the American people. Grieve is very clear that she is concentrating almost exclusively on white American children raised in middle-class homes. To her credit, she acknowledges that the perceptions of children of different races and socioeconomic circumstances would change the discussion and require a different argument. And although she does mention Soviet children on occasion, she does so only to further her argument concerning American youth. Children from other nations are mentioned only in passing or in relation to receiving information from or about American children.

Grieve's main argument is that children became another tool utilized by various American governmental and nongovernmental forces to challenge the perceived communist threat posed externally by the Soviet Union and internally by the liberal mindset and agenda. To that end, Grieve provides ample evidence of children serving as “public diplomats” and childhood being utilized as a marketing tool for the “American Way.” Turning children into marketers of the American worldview, Girl Scout and Boy Scout leaders, educators, and government officials encouraged young people to become pen pals with children in an “occupied” or potentially problematic country. American youngsters would tell their foreign correspondents about the wonders of America, thus undermining Soviet propaganda about the materialism and depravity of life in the United States.

A similar goal motivated art teachers and government officials to encourage the exchange of hand-drawn portraits of American home life. Educators and members of the United States Information Agency asked students to draw pictures depicting everyday life as a counter to what they characterized as lies being spread by their communist enemies. Young people also participated in activities such as raising funds (“Trick or Treat for UNICEF!”) and gathering books to send to underprivileged children in foreign lands.

In addition to serving as public diplomats, children as a general group functioned as a vital tool for ratcheting up the concern about the dangers posed by communism. The image of pure American childhood depicted in movies, books, and television shows and promulgated from pulpits and in political ads made a wonderful backdrop for anyone trying to raise the fears of American adults. All propagandists had to do was imply that communism...
threatened this idyllic stereotype to intensify already existing anti-communist sentiments. The Ad Council in particular became extremely adept at utilizing the image of the ideal nuclear family (breadwinner father, stay-at-home mother, several children, white, middle class) to promote not just anticommunism but pro-capitalism as well.

Grieve also spends a significant amount of time showing the ways in which various pro-America, pro-capitalist forces subtly (and sometimes overtly) educated American children about the evils of communism and the rewards of capitalism. Using every means at their disposal—comic book characters such as the Lone Ranger, specialized educational programs provided to schools, government projects like the People-to-People program—important adults ensured that children absorbed the correct message about their world.

The greatest challenge Grieve faces in trying to accomplish her goals was one she acknowledges in several places in the book: she can readily demonstrate that children saw, heard, read, and watched a wide variety of anti-communist propaganda, but proving that the children absorbed the intended message is a completely different matter. Were children buying Lone Ranger comics because he was a wholesome American hero or because they liked cowboys? Did they trick-or-treat for UNICEF because they supported its goals or because it was the latest fad?

Although Grieve admits that it is almost impossible to ascertain what the children thought about their situation, she clearly would like to be able to discover what the kids thought about all of this. In fact, the voices of the children are the most glaring omission of the book. The reader longs for the occasional anecdote from young people. Are there no copies of the letters written to pen pals? No diaries? Even memoirs would provide some indication of the voices of the young. This might be asking for a different book. If so, then I apologize. I did want to know, and I think Grieve did as well.

After World War II, private individuals and organizations, schools, and museums in the United States won the State Department’s endorsement of their efforts to help facilitate international exchanges of children’s art. In their view, children could serve as “diplomats” and “cultural ambassadors” to the Soviet Union and other nations via their artworks, even if the art was created within parameters defined by adults. Children, Youth, and Images of Childhood in Cold War Foreign Relations during the Long 1950s

Donna Alvah

Although it is less catchy, this review’s title more accurately reflects the content of Little Cold Warriors: American Childhood in the 1950s than the book’s actual title does. Victoria Grieve’s thesis is that, contrary to the popular conception of American childhood in the 1950s as a carefree time for the young that was distinct from the difficult, politicized eras of World War II and the 1960s, images of American children and childhood were used extensively in the politics of U.S. Cold War foreign relations, as were actual children and youth.

Businesses, private organizations, and the U.S. government employed several means—art created by children, books, and advertising—that depicted idealized American childhoods—both domestically and abroad to show audiences the positive aspects of the American way of life and to persuade them of the need to oppose communism. However, to secure alliances in the international fight against communism, the private distributors of such images tended to focus on portraying Americans as benevolent people who sought “world friendship” and “mutual understanding” with people in other nations. The U.S. agencies involved in propagandizing tended to prefer sending messages to foreigners that focused not on “mutual understanding” or cultural exchange but on conveying American superiority via a “one-way intellectual street” (92).

Grieve contends that “children of all races, classes, ethnicities, and geographical locations engaged in Cold War culture, civil defense, and internationalist cultural activities.” Her focus is on what she characterizes as “typical” children and childhoods, not the “explicitly political activities of communist or leftist children” (6–7). Many of the “internationalist cultural activities” that she describes resemble those that military officials, parents, and teachers in this same period encouraged children in military families living abroad to engage in: to enact “cultural diplomacy” by representing American ideals and advancing U.S. foreign policy goals in encounters with residents of occupied Germany and Japan and in nations hosting U.S. military bases. In fact, thanks to Grieve’s discussion of the origins of public diplomacy, I suspect that the inspiration for such instructions to U.S. military family members abroad originated with Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William B. Benton (5, 9).

Grieve shows that American children in civilian families also contributed to Cold War aims from their schools and communities in the United States. Central to Grieve’s analysis is that notions of children as universally innocent and thus transcending nationalistic and base political objectives were, paradoxically, extraordinarily powerful tools in the ideological war between the United States and the Soviet Union (5). Here she builds on Margaret Peacock’s argument that Soviets and Americans used images of children and childhood as “innocent weapons” in their Cold War rivalry to demonstrate the alleged superiority of their economic and government systems and win the allegiance of decolonizing nations. Although Grieve draws upon an impressive array of archival and popular sources, her interpretations of them may not be entirely new or unexpected to those familiar with histories of modern children and youth and the political use of their images in the Cold War. Yet the way in which she brings together the study of representations of children and childhood in art, books, and advertising is certainly unique and compelling, as is the information that she provides about actual children’s activities.

Much of the book examines various ways that representations of children and childhood—as well as art exchanges, books and advertising—figured into U.S. Cold War foreign relations. In chapter 2, “A Small Paintbrush in the Hands of a Small Child: Children’s Art and Cultural Diplomacy,” Grieve traces the international circulation of ideas, beginning in the 1920s, about the ways in which children’s art could advocate for international understanding and peace. After World War II, private individuals and organizations, schools, and museums in the United States won the State Department’s endorsement of their efforts to help facilitate international exchanges of children’s art. In their view, children could serve as “diplomats” and “cultural ambassadors” to the Soviet Union and other nations via their artworks, even if the art was created within parameters defined by adults. “Depictions of war,” for instance, were excluded (55, 57, 60–61, 67–71, 74, 79).

Chapter 3, “The Accidental Political Advantages of a Nonpolitical Book Program: Franklin Publications and Juvenile Books Abroad,” is not really about “American Childhood in the 1950s” and is only indirectly about childhood anywhere else. Rather, it is mainly about how the Franklin Books Corporation and the United States
Information Agency (USIA) partnered to provide fiction and science books, textbooks, and other types of books to juveniles in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa (97, fig. 3:1; 114). Grieve states that “scholars have largely neglected a key audience of both public and private international book programs—young people.” Yet this chapter tells us less about this audience than about the interesting politics of disputes between the USIA and the Franklin Books Program, Inc.—“a gray propaganda program that operated at the nexus of US public-private cultural diplomacy”—over what books were appropriate for recipient nations (91).

Chapter 4, “Your Grandchildren Will Grow Up Under Communism! Cold War Advertising and American Youth,” examines the use of images of children by the Advertising Council (known as the War Advertising Council during World War II) in the advertising campaigns called “The American Economic System,” which was designed for a domestic audience, and “The Crusade for Freedom,” which was aimed at Eastern Europeans (137). Children were “both image and audience,” according to Grieve (129). “The Crusade for Freedom,” a CIA enterprise, not only used images of American children but also enlisted their participation in the campaign (138–39).

Grieve’s findings that the art exchanges, books, and advertisements discussed in these chapters usually presented idealized visions of American society and childhood are unsurprising. It was the rare child whose artwork alluded to troubled race relations or acknowledged poverty in the land of plenty (77–78, 80, 81). Advertisements featured white children and families and depicted the United States as a land of “Classless Abundance for All” (133, 143, 146). For contrast, Grieve intersperses her study of American-made images of American children and life with Soviet depictions of the United States, Soviet comics, Soviet children’s artwork, and American depictions of foreign children.

The first and last chapters of Grieve’s book focus on how American children were taught a particular vision of the United States in the Cold War, a vision shared by the U.S. government and mainstream American society. Grieve argues in chapter 1, “Cold War Comics: Educating American Children for a New Global Role,” that educating the young to see their nation as a force for good in the international battle against communism extended beyond the classroom and into the realm of popular culture. She focuses on Lone Ranger “texts” comprising radio and television programs, comic books, novels, games, and toys. (There are pictures of some of these as well as other items throughout the book, but the halftone images are too small to allow one to easily see details.)

Grieve makes the case that the “ubiquitous” Lone Ranger represented the virtuous United States (28). Parents tolerated their children’s consumption of Lone Ranger products because of the character’s high-mindedness: he was fair, tolerant, patriotic, and he did not shoot to kill (in contrast to gangsters and other disreputable types also prominent in popular culture). Narratives about him attempted to inculcate in children a view of the United States as fair and tolerant and to provide them with a model of ideal American behavior (30, 39). Grieve writes that after World War II, “the masked hero represented American ‘benevolent supremacy’ in relation to [the Native American character] Tonto, who embodied ‘Third World peoples’” (21). Although the television program’s writers intended to have Tonto “[provide] a heroic role model for African American children,” she notes that African Americans criticized the character and other aspects of the television program as racist depictions (35).

In most of the chapters, Grieve provides evidence that children and youth engaged in activities that promoted U.S. Cold War aims. In the first chapter, she acknowledges that it is difficult to ascertain how diverse children responded to the Lone Ranger’s teachings. However, she points to millions of children participating in a U.S. Treasury “Peace Patrol” savings stamp and bond drive promoted by Lone Ranger actor Clayton Moore as evidence of the character’s appeal to the young, suggesting that they may have wanted to emulate his virtues and that they bought into the program’s narrative about the character and role of the United States in the world (26, 48, 49). To establish that “children were central symbols and actors in both domestic and foreign propaganda campaigns,” she points to a myriad of children’s activities: art exchanges, essay writing, letter-writing for pen-pals, “patriotic contests and awards,” the Youth Committee of the People-to-People program, Boy Scout efforts for civil defense, the International Farm Youth Exchange program, photo album and scrapbook projects, and more (128, 133, 135; examples are from chaps. 2, 4 and 5).

Among the challenges for those studying children and childhood in the past is finding sources that give insight into children’s own perspectives as opposed to relying on sources that tell us about what adults were thinking about children’s perspectives. Grieve wants to allow children’s voices to be heard, but this is easier said than done, though she makes a valiant effort. She incorporates quotations from children, including some who supported U.S. Cold War goals and some who criticized them. I enjoyed her readings of the artworks depicting “typical life” for children, such as playing in the snow. Grieve believes that “the art collected and distributed by AWF [Art for World Friendship, an art exchange program] offers a rare opportunity to recover the perspectives, experiences, and agency of American children through their depictions of ‘daily life’” (79–82, 177–78, 178–83, 187–89). But my impression is that the artworks allow us just a glimpse of this. For most of the book it is adults’ voices that we hear, since it is adults who articulated visions of children as representatives of American ideals and Cold War aims and organized the art exchanges and other events that asked children to function as the nation’s messengers.

Grieve takes on another challenge for historians of children: locating their agency. She both assumes children’s agency and questions its extent:

All human beings, adults as well as children, act within a universe of limited options and possibilities. Although it is important to understand the special constraints that can limit some children’s voices, these constraints vary over time and place, and according to gender, race, nationality, class, and many other factors. The question of agency, therefore, might be best understood as one more paradox at the heart of Cold War American childhood (6, 7).

Grieve sees play as an area in which children could exercise agency. Even though adults created the Lone Ranger cultural products enjoyed by children, she suggests that “if play is understood as a form of repetitive rehearsal for adult roles, we can read comics and other forms of children’s pop culture as one way to understand the historical processes by which young people acquire agency as historical actors” (26). And although adults organized the activities that they expected children to engage in to
embody and communicate American ideals, Grieve reads children’s agency in these roles.

Countering the popular image of children “ducking under school desks during a nuclear attack drill,” she argues that “children in the 1950s were not simply victims. They exercised agency in their chosen volunteer activities, engaged with popular culture on a variety of levels and intentionally participated (or perhaps refused to participate) in particular school and extracurricular programs.”

She acknowledges the difficulty of determining children’s agency, however—in knowing whether children’s creations expressed their actual perspectives or merely reproduced what they thought adults wanted, or some combination of both. For instance, excerpts from essays by Philadelphia children sound as if their authors had merely imbibed and repeated back adults’ anticommunist messages.

Thus, doubts remain: did these children exercise agency in what appears to be mimicry or following adults’ instructions? What types of evidence might give us insight into what children actually believed? Do adults not also at times say what they think others wish to hear even if they do not embrace or even entirely understand it themselves? I like Grieve’s use of the term “voluntold,” denoting adult authorities’ “subtle coercion” of children to compel or persuade them to do what the grown-ups wanted.

Though Grieve admits that identifying agency in children’s activities on behalf of U.S. Cold War policy goals can be tough, I think that at times she verges on unnecessary overstatement. For example, she declares that “American children and youth, politicized by the federal government as well as by private organizations, corporate America, and the public schools, became little Cold Warriors, ambassadors, and representatives of the nation.”

Without evidence that gives us insight into what children were thinking (which, as historians of children and youth well know, can be very difficult to come by), it is hard to say, when writing of children and youth engaging in activities en masse, where social expectations and coercion end and original thought and individual agency begin. Propagandists’ intentions and ideas, articulated throughout the book and well supported with evidence, don’t tell us what children thought they were doing. To argue that children played a significant part in the Cold War, I think it is sufficient to show how they did so while maintaining a critical distance from the “propagandists”.

I admit to being uneasy about the first part of the book’s title, Little Cold Warriors. I am persuaded that American children were significant participants in the pervasive, adult-designed promotions of the United States as superior to the Soviet Union and in the programs to win foreign alliances, but I fear that the moniker may overstate children’s agency and conceptions of their activities and so may detract from the validity of the book’s argument. (Did people use the term “little cold warriors” in those days, or even “cold warriors”?) As a historian of children and youth in the Cold War, I worry that scholars who are uninterested in or even suspicious of contentions that actual children, and not just images of children, played a part in foreign relations—or who are not even convinced that the history of children and youth is a worthwhile area of study—may judge the book by its title and dismiss it as too cute by half. That would be a mistake, because Grieve succeeds in demonstrating that children and depictions of children both played important parts in U.S. Cold War foreign relations and that the Cold War shaped many children’s lives, regardless of what their own understanding of it was, or what they thought about activities that adults saw as pertinent to the Cold War.

Notes:
5. Grieve cites a 2015 conference paper for the term “voluntold,” but the neologism came into use at least several years earlier.

**Author’s Response**

_Little Cold Warriors: American Childhood in the 1950s_ was a project long in the making. Initially rooted in my interest in Depression-era literature written for children and art created by children under the auspices of the Works Progress Administration, this book approaches foreign policy from a Childhood Studies perspective. My intention was to contribute to ongoing conversations about American public diplomacy during the Cold War and particularly to address how it politically mobilized children and made use of notions of childhood innocence.

Among the challenges that all historians of childhood face are locating the voices of their subjects in the historical record and determining to what extent children acted independently. Each of the reviewers assesses my efforts on those questions. But before responding to their critiques, I would like to thank them for taking the time and effort to write such thoughtful reviews. It is a daunting task to respond to these respected scholars, whose work I have read and appreciate. Thanks also to Andrew Johns for providing this valuable opportunity to discuss my book.

Donna Alvah succinctly summarizes my point that “businesses, private organizations, and the U.S. government employed several means—art created by children, books, and advertising that depicted idealized American childhoods—both domestically and abroad to show audiences the positive aspects of the American way of life and to persuade them of the need to oppose communism.” Chapter 1 of the book argues that The Lone Ranger, one of the most popular radio and television children’s shows of the decade, came to embody American values both at home and abroad. Children demonstrated their understanding of this connection by participating in the Lone Ranger’s Peace Patrol and buying U.S. Treasury bonds “to defend the peace.”

Alvah also notes my attempt to build on the work of Margaret Peacock and others in chapter 2, where I argue that children’s presumed “natural” innocence was put to explicitly political purposes that were couched in the language of “world friendship.” Although she states that my interpretations are “not entirely new or unexpected . . . to those familiar with histories of modern childhood,” the ways in which I brought all these representations together are “unique and compelling.”

While Alvah is correct that the politicization of children is not a new or unexpected claim for Childhood Studies scholars, I hope that readers and students in other fields find the information new or surprising. My goal was less to prove that children were politically engaged, which scholars of childhood have been doing for decades, but to show the utter pervasiveness of this politicization during the Cold War in almost every facet of children’s lives, from leisure activities to classrooms and textbooks.
to extracurricular activities, as well as through exposure to political propaganda on television, radio shows, and print advertisements.

Powerful organizations, from the federal government to large corporations, specifically targeted the political potential of children through innocent messages of world friendship and mutual understanding and attempted to channel that potential toward meeting the nation’s foreign policy goals. Children learned these messages in numerous ways: they participated in public diplomacy programs and carried the intended message of “world friendship” to other nations through pen pal letters, art work, and study abroad programs.

Alvah acknowledges my attempts to wrestle directly with the two main challenges for historians of childhood. The first of these is finding sources that give insight into children’s own perspectives and thinking, rather than describing what adults thought about children and childhood. Despite my “valiant effort” to allow readers to hear children’s voices, Alvah says, it is mostly adult voices we hear. She uses the Art for World Friendship chapter to illustrate her criticism that we see “just a glimpse of” children’s thoughts through their artwork. Indeed, I am painfully aware of the difficulty of locating children’s voices in the historical record. Children tend not to write books or document their feelings about international politics in traditional historical sources. I turned instead to unusual sources to “hear” their voices.

I didn’t use diaries or other written sources, in part because my sources did not include them, but I also think that historians of childhood should look to nontraditional sources to understand what children thought and felt. I am not convinced that reading the diary of a ten-year-old girl from 1957 would have provided a clearer or more “truthful” account of her impressions of her role in the Cold War than her art work or pen pal letters. Nor am I convinced that reading the memoirs of baby boomers gets us any closer to how children might have conceptualized their actions when they were in elementary school. And this is the crux of the problem. What sources inch us toward the truth? A picture? A letter? A diary? Where is it that children most fully express their thoughts and ideas, particularly about abstract topics like politics?

In my opinion, historians should use all the sources at their disposal: both formal, written sources as well as those that require reasoned and cautious interpretation. By using all available sources, we may piece together some broad understanding of what particular children thought and felt about something as large and abstract as the Cold War. In that spirit, I explored popular culture, toys and games, artwork, and participation in public diplomacy programs in an attempt to add to the conversation.

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In my opinion, historians should use all the sources at their disposal: both formal, written sources as well as those that require reasoned and cautious interpretation. By using all available sources, we may piece together some broad understanding of what particular children thought and felt about something as large and abstract as the Cold War. In that spirit, I explored popular culture, toys and games, artwork, and participation in public diplomacy programs in an attempt to add to the conversation. Of course, finding documents that describe what children thought they were doing when they were playing “cowboys and Indians” in the back yard is likely impossible. So, as in my attempt to “hear” children’s voices through their drawings and paintings, I tried to envision other ways of understanding the concept of agency. I borrowed a word that Sarah Glassford used at the 2015 conference of the Society for the History of Childhood and Youth. Her term “voluntold” seemed to capture our doubts about freedom of choice as it related to the mobilization of young women who served in the Canadian Red Cross during World War I, and it gets to the heart of the question of children’s agency. Yes, children did what their parents, teachers, and Scout leaders told them to do. But within certain boundaries, in pictures of “daily life” in the United States or in pen pal letters, for example, children were free to draw or write what they wished.

Alvah asserts that I sometimes overstate children’s agency without providing enough evidence to support my contention that children did in fact sometimes think of themselves as ambassadors of the United States. She may be correct. However, this idea was introduced to very young children through art and play, as well as advertising and book drives and UNICEF collections. Perhaps very young children did not have fully formed ideas about themselves as ambassadors. Yet, it is clear that some older children and teenagers clearly recognized themselves as such. When and how did this process evolve? At what point can we say that children, or any individuals, are acting as independent agents? In the end, Alvah allows that both depictions of children and children themselves played important roles in U.S. Cold War foreign relations, and that the Cold War shaped many children’s lives. Whether they developed their own ideas about their place in it did not matter.

Julia Mickenberg, like Alvah, finds that my efforts to document how real children thought about their experiences fall short of the mark. She too thinks “the book reveals more about the ways in which school-age children were used by adults as tools in Cold War ideological battles than about how young people exercised agency or what they thought about their experiences.” On the other hand, Mickenberg finds some persuasive evidence of children’s agency in the Art for World Friendship program. Here she sees at least some children alluding to “less savory images of life in the United States,” including pictures that raised doubts about the narrative put forth by the U.S. government about ever-improving American race relations. Nevertheless, she too notes the use of the term “voluntold” as an appropriate indication of my own ambivalence about children’s agency. On one level, it seems that Mickenberg sees agency only when young people pushed back against the messages they heard, whereas I see agency in children acting in concert with them as well. Although both reviewers claim that I overstate my arguments, I thought that my ambivalence was clearer. I certainly recognize the limitations of what my sources reveal, but I chose to highlight instead what we can learn from them.

Mickenberg rightly notes that my goal was to put diplomatic history into conversation with the history of childhood “by drawing upon largely untapped archival evidence to build upon existing scholarship on public diplomacy and the ‘cultural Cold War’ as well as work in childhood history.” However, she takes issue with what she characterizes as overly broad claims and wishes I had stated...
my arguments in “more precise terms.” Mickenberg found the most important contributions of *Little Cold Warriors* to be the book’s “engagement specifically with diplomacy programs and work targeting children abroad.” Although she finds the chapters on popular culture, advertising, and the schools less convincing, they contributed important evidence about the ubiquity of Cold War propaganda in children’s lives and the ways children engaged with these messages.

I must take issue with Mickenberg’s contention that I accept the notion that science books were “apolitical.” In fact, I was trying to make the opposite point. Science books were indeed political. As Datus Smith, the director of Franklin Books, said, the USIA should publish science books precisely because they served to link the United States with the notions of progress, free inquiry, and the peaceful uses of atomic energy. When USIA officials failed to see any foreign policy benefits to publishing science textbooks or supplementary science readers, Smith pointed out the political benefits of seemingly apolitical books. However, I appreciate Mickenberg pointing out that many left-leaning authors found employment writing science books during the Cold War because they were seen as apolitical, in that they could not be spun for ideological purposes. The irony of both Franklin Books and New Masses recommending the same science books only heightens the questions of children’s reception and agency.

Finally, Mickenberg doesn’t find my argument of continuity between the 1950s and the 1960s as convincing as it could have been had I focused on sources explicitly tied to the New Left, such as the Port Huron Statement. If I am understanding her correctly, she seems to be indicating that I am arguing for the continuity of the politics from the 1950s to the 1960s youth movements. My point is not that there was sustained ideological continuity between the two decades, but that because young people had been involved in Cold War politics since the end of World War II, the rise of the New Left and the New Right and the political activism of young people in the 1960s should not be understood as a sudden manifestation of political consciousness. Mickenberg points out that although I note some examples of dissent in the 1950s, such as young Joan Baez refusing to take part in her high school’s civil defense drills, most of my research emphasizes the degree to which young people supported the Cold War status quo.

Here again, Mickenberg seems to see agency only in terms of dissent. But many children seemed to accept the Cold War logic, and most Americans in general continued to support the government’s policy in Vietnam, even in polls taken immediately after the Tet Offensive. In a 1966 Gallup poll, 47 percent of Americans defined themselves as “hawks” and 26 percent as “doves.” Another poll found that 48 percent would vote to continue the war, while 35 percent would vote to withdraw. The New Left represented a vocal minority of young people, not a majority, and the rise of the New Left took place simultaneously with the rise of the New Right. Agency cannot be understood only as dissenting from the status quo.

Although Mickenberg criticizes my lack of “sustained attention to race and gender,” reviewer Mary Brennan notes that I was “very clear” that I was “concentrating almost exclusively on white American children raised in middle-class homes.” Each chapter, however, does engage in some analysis of these issues. Native Americans and African Americans took issue with the representation of minority communities in *The Lone Ranger* television show. Advertisers imagined the American child who needed protection as exclusively white and middle class. Some children offered drawings that contradicted the standard American line on race relations. And Franklin Books struggled to find a book by author Richard Wright that the USIA would approve for translation.

I chose not to offer a sustained analysis of race or gender because, as Brennan notes, doing so would have changed the fundamental nature of the book. Such an emphasis also risked focusing even more on adult perceptions of their raced or gendered audiences, a focus that I was trying to avoid. Further, an attempt to analyze the reception of popular culture, advertisements, and government programs by a raced or gendered audience would have been largely speculative, given my evidence base.

Like Alvah and Mickenberg, Brennan points out the challenges of hearing the voices of actual children. However, she differs from the other reviewers in recognizing my explicit acknowledgment of this challenge. She notes that I ask several questions of my sources: were children buying *Lone Ranger* comics because he was a wholesome American hero, or because they liked cowboys? Did they trick-or-treat for UNICEF because they supported its goals or because it was the latest fad? In wrestling with the questions, my answer in the end was “Yes.” American children likely did both.

Lori Clune’s most pointed criticism deals with the title of the book, which I will discuss in detail below. Although she was interested in the USIA’s Franklin Book Program, which was the focus of the third chapter of *Little Cold Warriors*, Clune says that it made her want to learn more about how popular literature for children in the United States might have politicized young readers. Her point is well taken. The best book I’ve read about Cold War children’s literature is Julia Mickenberg’s *Learning from the Left: Children’s Literature, the Cold War, and Radical Politics in the United States* (2006), which focuses on how leftists tried to educate their children against the Cold War status quo. I am sure a book could be written from the opposite side of the political spectrum as well, focusing on how conservatives and Cold Warriors tried to inculcate their own political ideas into children via literature. Clune likewise raises the question of reception when she wonders how American children might have interpreted Dr. Seuss’s *The Cat in the Hat Comes Back* (1958), with the Voom’s holocaust-like eradication of the spreading pink stain. Although I don’t know the answer to that question, I can assure her that the book wasn’t translated for publication by Franklin Books!

There seems to be universal discontent with the title of the book, *Little Cold Warriors: American Childhood in the 1950s*, as well as the titles of some of the chapters. Alvah differs from the other reviewers in recognizing my explicit acknowledgment of this challenge. She notes that I was interested in the USIA’s Franklin Book Program, which I will discuss in detail below. Although she was interested in the USIA’s Franklin Book Program, which was the focus of the third chapter of *Little Cold Warriors*, Clune says that it made her want to learn more about how popular literature for children in the United States might have politicized young readers. Her point is well taken. The best book I’ve read about Cold War children’s literature is Julia Mickenberg’s *Learning from the Left: Children’s Literature, the Cold War, and Radical Politics in the United States* (2006), which focuses on how leftists tried to educate their children against the Cold War status quo. I am sure a book could be written from the opposite side of the political spectrum as well, focusing on how conservatives and Cold Warriors tried to inculcate their own political ideas into children via literature. Clune likewise raises the question of reception when she wonders how American children might have interpreted Dr. Seuss’s *The Cat in the Hat Comes Back* (1958), with the Voom’s holocaust-like eradication of the spreading pink stain. Although I don’t know the answer to that question, I can assure her that the book wasn’t translated for publication by Franklin Books!

There seems to be universal discontent with the title of the book, *Little Cold Warriors: American Childhood in the 1950s*, as well as the titles of some of the chapters. Alvah dislikes the book’s title because she fears “the moniker may overstate children’s agency” and possibly encourage historians in other fields to discount the importance of Childhood Studies in general. Julia Mickenberg takes issue more specifically with the titles of chapters 4 and 5, which she suggests are too narrowly focused to encompass the actual content of the chapters. Lori Clune thinks the “title is too narrow” to accommodate the broader themes and chronological periods that the book addresses. She notes that I explore not only American childhood but Soviet comics, as well as later examples from the 1960s and 1970s.

I must confess to being a little surprised by these comments, and I am largely without an adequate response. In retrospect, my editors and I should have given more thought to the specificity of the titles than we did. I don’t presume to think that my choice of titles, however, will impact the integrity of the field or otherwise diminish the research presented in the book.
SHAFR Policy on Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct

In spring 2018, SHAFR President Peter Hahn asked the Conference Committee to discuss safeguards that SHAFR should adopt to prevent sexual harassment and misconduct at our annual meetings. At the June 2018 Council Meeting, following that committee’s recommendations, SHAFR Council voted unanimously to develop an organizational policy on these issues. Subsequently, Hahn and SHAFR Vice President Barbara Keys appointed a Task Force on Conference Conduct, composed of members of SHAFR Council, the Conference Committee, and the Committee on Women in SHAFR. During fall 2018, in consultation with one another and with leadership of other professional organizations, members of this task force researched, developed, and drafted a code of conduct. At the January 2018 AHA meeting, Council members discussed this draft and voted to approve it, pending minor revisions and review by SHAFR’s legal counsel. Council has now voted unanimously to approve and adopt the final version of this document, titled, “SHAFR Policy on Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct.” From this point forward, attendees at all SHAFR-sponsored events, including the June annual meeting, must affirmatively agree to abide by this policy.

Julia Irwin, Task Force Chair

SHAFR is committed to fostering an environment free from discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Our organization’s collective professional and intellectual pursuits can only be realized when we treat one another with dignity and respect. To this end, SHAFR prohibits discrimination or harassment on the basis of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and sexual orientation. The protections and prohibitions in this policy extend to any guests and members participating in SHAFR-sponsored events. All members and participants, including employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, and guests, are expected to engage in professional and respectful behavior and to preserve common standards of professionalism.

The following policy pertains to all SHAFR activities, including events associated with SHAFR conferences and any SHAFR-related business occurring throughout the year. It encompasses interactions in person, by telephone, and by electronic communication.

Sexual Harassment. SHAFR has absolutely no tolerance for sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is behavior (speech or actions) in formal or informal settings that demeans, humiliates, or threatens an individual on the basis of their sex, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation. Sexual harassment can also take nonsexual forms and includes discriminatory remarks or actions based on an individual’s sex, gender, gender expression, or sexual orientation. Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal comment or physical conduct of a sexual nature, including situations in which the request or conduct involves any implied or expressed promise of professional reward for complying; or the request or conduct involves any implied or expressed threat of reprisal or denial of opportunity for refusing to comply; or the request or conduct results in what reasonably may be perceived as a hostile or intimidating environment. Sexual harassment does not refer to occasional compliments of a socially acceptable nature or consensual personal and social relationships without discriminatory effect. It refers to behavior that reasonably situated persons would regard as not welcome and as personally intimidating, hostile, or offensive. According to U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, the victim of harassment can be anyone affected by the offensive conduct, not just the individual at whom the conduct is directed.

Sexual Misconduct. SHAFR has absolutely no tolerance for other forms of sexual misconduct. Sexual misconduct is a broad term encompassing any unwelcome behavior of a sexual nature that is committed without consent or by force, intimidation, coercion, or manipulation. Sexual misconduct can be committed by a person of any gender, and it can occur between people of the same or different genders. Sexual misconduct may vary in its severity and consists of a range of behavior or attempted behavior. It can occur between strangers or acquaintances, including people involved in an intimate or sexual relationship. It includes but is not limited to: sexual assault (a continuum of conduct from forcible intercourse to nonphysical forms of pressure that compel individuals to engage in sexual activity against their will); sexual exploitation (taking nonconsensual, unjust, or abusive sexual advantage of another person); and sexual intimidation (threatening another person that you will commit a sex act against them or engaging in indecent exposure).

Consent. For the purposes of this policy, consent is a freely and affirmatively communicated willingness to participate in particular sexual activity or behavior, expressed either by words or clear, unambiguous actions. Consent can be withdrawn at any time, and, by definition, a person is incapable of
consent if the person is unable to understand the facts, nature, extent, or implications of the situation and/or if the person is incapacitated, which includes incapacitation by extreme intoxication, drug use, mental disability, or being unconscious. Critically, the person initiating a particular sexual activity or behavior bears the responsibility of receiving consent. In examining the existence of consent under this policy, SHAFR will seek to determine, in view of the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable person would conclude that the recipient of the initiated sexual activity or behavior was (a) capable of consenting and (b) affirmatively communicated consent to the sexual activity or behavior at issue by words or clear, unambiguous actions.

Retaliation against a complainant of sexual harassment or other forms of sexual misconduct is also a violation of these policies.

Members and other conference attendees should be aware that their home institution’s policies (such as Title IX) may require them to report allegations of sexual harassment or other forms of sexual misconduct involving people affiliated with their institution. SHAFR reserves the right to respond truthfully to authorized inquiries received from a member’s employer concerning allegations, proceedings, and outcomes under this policy.

This policy will be clearly and prominently displayed on the SHAFR website. All participants in the annual meeting and anyone obtaining or renewing a SHAFR membership will be required during the registration process formally to acknowledge the policy and their responsibility to abide by it.

Complaints

SHAFR will designate a complaints team that will be available to receive complaints from, describe reporting procedures to, provide advice on resources to, and discuss issues with participants in any SHAFR-sanctioned activity who have experienced or witnessed violations of this policy. The team’s contact information will be made available on the SHAFR website and in annual meeting registration materials. Neither the team nor any other SHAFR official can provide legal advice to those who make reports under this policy.

Members, staff, or guests who in good faith believe that they have been aggrieved by or witnessed conduct prohibited by this policy should contact the SHAFR complaints team. SHAFR will review each report and endeavor to respond proportionally and fairly. Responses may range from informal resolutions agreed to by the parties to investigations conducted by trained external investigators. SHAFR reserves the right to take interim steps during an event, such as a narrowly tailored “no contact” directive between the parties.

Annual Report

The Executive Director will prepare an annual report of complaints or other evidence of policy violations (with no names used). The report will be circulated to the full Council at the January meeting and made available to the membership on request. The report may also identify how many reports were received, the forms of discrimination and misconduct alleged, how long the matter took to be resolved, and the outcome.

Some text in this policy is adapted from documents produced by the American Historical Association, the Shakespeare Association of America, the Society of Biblical Literature, and the University of Iowa.

Amanda Demmer, Richard A. Moss, Scott Laderman, Luke A. Nichter,  
David F. Schmitz, Robert K. Brigham

Introduction to the Roundtable on Robert K. Brigham, *Reckless*  
Amanda Demmer

Few historical figures from the second half of the twentieth century provoke disagreement like Henry Kissinger. More than the usual dose of healthy scholarly debate, Kissinger inspires assessments so diametrically opposed that readers can be forgiven for wondering if authors are writing about the same person. It is unsurprising, then, that Robert K. Brigham’s new book, *Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of Vietnam,* has already ignited a fresh round of debate about Kissinger and his legacy.

There are three things upon which each of this roundtable’s participants agree. The first is that Brigham’s book is incredibly well-written and will appeal to specialists, undergraduates, and popular audiences alike. The second is that Brigham’s book pursues an ambitious and worthwhile goal. In *Reckless,* Brigham sets out to be the first scholar to hold Kissinger’s “record to a scrupulous account based on his own definitions of success and the evidence provided by recently released material.” In what we might call a temporally and thematically focused biography, *Reckless* provides an overview of Kissinger’s Vietnam-related thinking and diplomacy from 1965 to 1973 in six chronological chapters. Brigham’s final assessment is clearly indicted in his title. He argues that “it is clear that the national security adviser’s war for peace was more tragically ‘made a bad situation worse…with his reckless assumptions about the use of force and diplomacy.’”

In David F. Schmitz’s assessment, *Reckless* “brilliantly succeeds” in its objectives. Schmitz characterizes *Reckless* as a “seminal study” of Kissinger’s Vietnam War diplomacy that crucially “challenges and corrects many of Kissinger’s and his defenders’ distortions, setting the record straight on a number of important points.” Scott Laderman offers a similar assessment and notes that Brigham “fills a surprising gap in the literature.” Although Kissinger “features prominently in a number of important works,” Laderman explains, “very little of the literature has placed Kissinger at its center.” Like Schmitz, Laderman also praises *Reckless* for calling “into question the myth of Kissinger—which Kissinger himself studiously helped to foster—as the man who successfully achieved ‘peace with honor’ in Vietnam.” Richard A. Moss and Luke A. Nichter offer disparate evaluations. Moss suggests *Reckless* suffers from “sins of commission as well as omission” and is “uneven,” with the core of the book offering more nuanced assessments than the opening and closing. Moss’ review, more specifically, takes issue with *Reckless’* coverage of Operation Pennsylvania and Operation Lam Son 719 and some of Brigham’s sourcing decisions. Nichter also suggests that *Reckless* is ultimately “not convincing” because “Brigham focuses on too many issues that are not important while overlooking too many issues that are.”

The reality that Kissinger is still alive and actively seeking to influence the history written about the events in which he played a principle role is apparent in each of these reviews. Whereas Schmitz and Laderman commend Brigham for dispelling some of Kissinger’s own mythmaking, Nichter challenges Brigham’s approach and argues—based on a “recent meeting” with Kissinger—that the National Security Adviser “did not have nearly the freedom of action that Brigham assumes he did.” While Sarah Snyder has recently reminded us that there were important limits to Kissinger’s influence, Brigham makes a persuasive case that Kissinger believed he was the only man who could achieve peace with honor and, based on this assumption, did everything he could to consolidate policymaking in the White House at the expense of the rest of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy. That both Kissinger’s underlying assumptions and his methods were flawed, Brigham argues, is part of the tragedy.

Whether offering praise or disapproval, a third common thread in each of the following reviews is the desire for more. While some roundtable participants would have liked to have seen Brigham expand his coverage of events that appear briefly in the text, others note that inclusion of non-Vietnam related concerns would have provided greater context. I also wonder how expanding the book’s temporally scope to incorporate Kissinger’s involvement in planning the U.S. evacuation from Saigon in April 1975 would have impacted *Reckless’* narrative. Brigham acknowledges that this desire for an expanded “portrait of Kissinger” is a “fair critique” and the inevitable result of writing “a trade press book…with a strict word limit.”

Although the participants in this roundtable disagree vociferously about many aspects of Brigham’s new book, the points of consensus demonstrate resoundingly that *Reckless* is an accessible, necessary intervention that revisits well-tread topics in new and provocative ways. Indeed, despite his many criticisms, Nichter describes *Reckless* as “the first in a new genre” and suggests “we will be talking about this book, and others it will prompt, for many years.” While the scholarly debates about Kissinger and his legacy are far from settled, then, it is clear that moving forward such discussions will be incomplete without serious engagement with *Reckless.*

Notes:  
2. Ibid, xi.  
3. Ibid, xii.  
4. Sarah B. Snyder, “Beyond ‘The Architect,’” *Sources and Methods,* 23
As I read *Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of Vietnam*, I was torn between hope in the book’s claim to be “the first to hold [Kissinger’s] record to a scrupulous account based on his own definitions of success and the evidence provided by recently released material” (xi) and the dissonance I experienced as I dug into the details. This review focuses on the evolution of Kissinger’s thinking about Vietnam, a sequencing error in *Reckless* on Operation Lam Son 719, and the Nixon tapes and Kissinger telephone conversation (telcon) transcripts related to Nixon and Kissinger’s relationship.

First, an aside. I’m something of a one-trick pony in my relationship and exposure (by choice) to the Nixon tapes. It was my day-job at the State Department to transcribe the tapes for inclusion in the official documentary record, the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, for longer than was probably healthy (mentally or physically) or prudent. Adding to the exposure, I have used the tapes extensively in my own research since 2002, when the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) made public its Third Chronological Release (tapes recorded between January and June 1972).

Thanks to the tapes (“the gift that keeps on giving,” per Bob Woodward), the copious telcon transcripts kept by Kissinger and others, the diaries of chief of staff H. R. “Bob” Haldeman, and the millions of pages of other textual records, the Nixon administration is one of the best-documented U.S. presidential administrations (if not the best-documented). In these rich sources there is ample evidence to support one school of thought, which holds that Henry Kissinger was a self-aggrandizing, manipulative, scheming, emotional sycophant who was, arguably, guilty of war crimes during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Another school of thought, also supported by the documentary record, can claim that Kissinger was a principled, thoughtful, tireless public servant who sought peace and tried to improve America’s position in the world vis-à-vis adversaries and allies alike. Contradictory traits exist in everybody to some degree, but the level to which they existed (and still exist) in Henry Kissinger make him a fascinating subject of inquiry, a one-trick pony in my study group. Although separate from the failed negotiations under the auspices of the Soviet-American Disarmament Study group. Although separate from the failed negotiations of the summer of 1967, this trip was an attempt to revive the PENNSYLVANIA talks. It demonstrated that Kissinger had begun to develop his ideas for linkage between Moscow and Hanoi more than a full year before he became Nixon’s national security advisor. U.S. documents released in 2008, coverage of this trip in Niall Ferguson’s biography of Kissinger, and a 1992 memoir account by Soviet foreign policy expert Georgi Arbatov show that Kissinger came to believe that the road to peace in Vietnam went through Moscow.

As Brigham argues, the idea that Moscow would try to persuade Hanoi to make meaningful concessions in negotiations with the United States out of a desire for progress on arms control and other areas of superpower relations was largely flawed. Ultimately, there would be no linkage. Kissinger did not understand that for Moscow, want and the weak suffer, as they must” (45). Brigham points out that Kissinger’s prolific output—three volumes of memoirs, documentary collections, and foreign policy analyses—has been an attempt to shape (and distort) the historical record (93–94, 146). Perhaps Kissinger is living by Nixon’s comment to him many decades ago: “Now, Henry, remember, we’re gonna be around to outlive our enemies.”6

Brigham provides a readable, entertaining account that will no doubt appeal to a broad audience. However, it is not a comprehensive account of the tragedy in Vietnam under Kissinger and the president he served. The book is uneven in its treatment of the subject; its first quarter and last chapter have a more argumentative tone, while the middle half of the book is more nuanced. The depiction of the twists and turns in U.S.-North Vietnamese negotiations in 1972 are particularly revealing. Unfortunately, some of the details throughout the book could be better sourced, and there are issues of omission as well as commission.

For example, in his first chapter on the evolution of Kissinger’s thinking about Vietnam, it is surprising that Brigham does not explore the role Kissinger played in Operation PENNSYLVANIA, an effort to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table in 1967 via two French intermediaries, Herbert Marcovich and Raymond Aubrac. Instead, Brigham focuses on the details surrounding Kissinger’s first trip to South Vietnam in 1965.

In his first chapter on the evolution of Kissinger’s thinking about Vietnam, it is surprising that Brigham does not explore the role Kissinger played in Operation PENNSYLVANIA, an effort to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table in 1967 via two French intermediaries, Herbert Marcovich and Raymond Aubrac. Instead, Brigham focuses on the details surrounding Kissinger’s first trip to South Vietnam in 1965 (15–21). The narrative then jumps from late 1965 to Kissinger’s *Foreign Affairs* article in January 1969, as if little or nothing happened over the intervening three years.4 While Brigham mentions Operation PENNSYLVANIA in the second chapter, it is only a passing reference to an initiative that “went nowhere” and to the fact that the relationship between Kissinger and Aubrac aided in setting up a back channel with North Vietnam in 1969 (57–58).

There should be little doubt that Operation PENNSYLVANIA served multiple purposes and showed an evolution of Kissinger’s thinking on Vietnam. PENNSYLVANIA paved the way for what would become known as the “San Antonio Formula,” after a speech (in San Antonio) in which President Johnson said that the United States would stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam in exchange for peace negotiations.5 It has been publicly known since 1968 that Kissinger promoted the San Antonio formula and was directly involved in the negotiations.6 In the words of biographer Walter Isaacson, “Thus began Kissinger’s first experience with secret diplomacy and his baptism into the difficulties of dealing with the North Vietnamese.”7

In December 1967 Kissinger made a trip to Moscow under the auspices of the Soviet-American Disarmament Study group. Although separate from the failed negotiations of the summer of 1967, this trip was an attempt to revive the PENNSYLVANIA talks. It demonstrated that Kissinger had begun to develop his ideas for linkage between Moscow and Hanoi more than a full year before he became Nixon’s national security advisor. U.S. documents released in 2008, coverage of this trip in Niall Ferguson’s biography of Kissinger, and a 1992 memoir account by Soviet foreign policy expert Georgi Arbatov show that Kissinger came to believe that the road to peace in Vietnam went through Moscow.8

As Brigham argues, the idea that Moscow would try to persuade Hanoi to make meaningful concessions in negotiations with the United States out of a desire for progress on arms control and other areas of superpower relations was largely flawed. Ultimately, there would be no linkage. Kissinger did not understand that for Moscow,
forcing Hanoi to concede its first principles carried with it unacceptable costs and risks” (45). Brigham contends that Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States and Kissinger’s sparring partner in a secret back channel, was an “unwilling partner in the plan,” and “neither would be happy with the result” (45).

While flawed, Kissinger’s beliefs about Moscow were not entirely wrong. Moscow was Hanoi’s primary patron, and the Kremlin had some influence with its client state. North Vietnam did not manufacture sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, jetfighters, and main battle tanks, and Moscow could (and occasionally did) moderate the flow of arms and materiel to Hanoi’s war machine. Kissinger used “the Channel” with Dobrynin to pass messages to Hanoi, attempt to limit Soviet assistance to North Vietnam, and make it possible for Moscow and Washington to delink Vietnam from superpower relations with a successful and politically profitable summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972. Kissinger and Dobrynin built an institution that made an improvement in superpower relations possible, and they were largely pleased with the results. Kissinger solidified his power and that of the White House-based National Security Council (NSC) vis-à-vis the State and Defense departments, while Dobrynin became a member of the Central Committee.

Nevertheless, it took time to realize that there was a limit to how much influence a patron can exert on its clients. In a back-channel meeting after the North Vietnamese launched the Easter Offensive in 1972, Dobrynin remarked, “Isn’t it amazing what a little country can do to wreck well-laid plans?” Kissinger replied, “The president wants you to know we will under no circumstances accept a defeat there and we will do what is necessary not to.” The eventual result was Linebacker and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. Both Washington and Moscow considered cancelling the Moscow summit; Washington because it saw Soviet aid to the North as facilitating the Easter Offensive, and Moscow because of ideological solidarity with Hanoi. The Kissinger-Dobrynin channel made possible the delinking of Vietnam from the larger issue of superpower relations.

Brigham describes several Kissinger-Dobrynin exchanges but, curiously, does not mention or cite Soviet-American Relations: The Detente Years, 1969–1972, jointly compiled, translated, and annotated by the U.S. Department of State and the Russian Foreign Ministry in 2007. This treasure trove includes both Kissinger and Dobrynin’s accounts of their back-channel exchanges. Dobrynin’s contemporary observations of Kissinger would have enabled Brigham to avoid relying solely on Kissinger’s reports of the meetings and probably would have bolstered some of his arguments.

In addition, Brigham’s account of Operation Lam Son 719, the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese incursion into Laos in 1971, could use more detail. Brigham does a good job of describing the operation, but the inclusion of a map or two showing the geography of the area would be very helpful, and photographs, say, of South Vietnamese troops clinging to helicopter skids, would have added a lot to his well-written descriptions. Also, sourcing is again an issue. Brigham mentions that Kissinger “had recent intelligence estimates suggesting Hanoi’s strength in the area was nearly twenty-five thousand troops and that two more North Vietnamese divisions were likely to arrive soon” (141). However, there is no source provided for this statement.

In the same paragraph, Brigham describes how General William Westmoreland, then Army chief of staff and formerly the U.S. commander in Vietnam, told Kissinger that Operation Lam Son 719 “was too complex, required too much close air coordination and communication, for the ARVN to be successful (141–42).” In view of the (uncited) intelligence he received and the advice he got from an experienced military commander, it would seem that Kissinger should have known the raid would fail. However, the Westmoreland conversation took place in April 1971. It was a postmortem of the operation, not an advance warning.

The formula that Kissinger was wrong and should have known better is a little too much like Monday morning quarterbacking for my taste. Brigham repeatedly mentions that North Vietnam was going to settle the conflict by force of arms, and yet Kissinger continued to negotiate and gradually eroded the U.S. conditions.

The formula that Kissinger was wrong and should have known better is a little too much like Monday morning quarterbacking for my taste. Brigham repeatedly mentions that North Vietnam was going to settle the conflict by force of arms, and yet Kissinger continued to negotiate and gradually eroded the U.S. conditions. Boxed in by the realities on the ground and Nixon’s desire to Vietnamize the war, what were the alternatives to using force? Politics is the art of the possible. Hanoi seemed willing to accept nothing less than a complete withdrawal of American forces, but that was probably beyond the realm of the possible for a conservative Republican administration. Therein lay a Catch-22. The recent past was no guide, either. The United States had not unilaterally withdrawn from Korea, and American forces remain on the Korean Peninsula today; nearly seven decades after a ceasefire. Did Kissinger and Nixon consider a similar solution for Vietnam? Aside from criticizing the escalation policies, perhaps Brigham could have explored this possibility or others.

Brigham is generally correct about the fallout from the India-Pakistan war, the leak of sensitive crisis-response documents to investigative journalist Jack Anderson, and the subsequent discovery by the Plumbers (of Watergate ignominy) that the military was spying on the (NSC) (160–64). The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) received information via a Navy yeoman, Charles Radford, who was assigned to the JCS-NSC liaison office. Brigham appears to have fallen prey to Kissinger’s explanation in his memoir that he was “out of favor” with Nixon for “several weeks” after the India-Pakistan war and the Moorer-Radford affair, as it was called. In White House Years, Kissinger stresses that the disagreement between him and the president was less about substance on the India-Pakistan crisis and more about Nixon’s public relations attempts to deflect blame: “The result was...
an effort by the White House public relations experts to deflect onto me the attack on our conduct during the India-Pakistan crisis. The policy became my policy. For several weeks Nixon was unavailable to me. Ziegler made no statement of support, nor did he deny press accounts that I was out of favor.9

Alluding to the Anderson leaks, Kissinger contended that “the departments were not admonished to cease their leaking against me. Nixon could not resist the temptation of letting me twist slowly, slowly in the wind.”13 Yeoman Radford admitted taking documents and passing them to the JCS but denied being the source of the leak under repeated questioning sessions, including polygraph examinations. Anderson went to his grave in 2005 without revealing his source, but he told one author that “you don’t get those kind of secrets from enlisted men. You only get them from generals and admirals.”14

Nixon worried aloud about Kissinger suffering an emotional collapse at the end of 1971 and decided almost immediately to give him a boost. He made that decision not because of Vietnam, but rather because of the larger role Kissinger played in the administration. He could not afford to lose him with the summit meeting in the Soviet Union and the opening to the People’s Republic of China coming up, both of which had been announced before India and Pakistan blew up. During a dramatic Christmas Eve conversation, Nixon told his chief domestic advisor, John Ehrlichman, that “[Kissinger] is extremely valuable to us. He is indispensable at this point because of the China trip . . . and to a lesser extent the Russia trip.”15 Two hours later, Nixon asked Kissinger’s former benefactor, Nelson Rockefeller, to reassure Kissinger and, somewhat awkwardly, to wish the Jewish Kissinger a Merry Christmas. “Tell him to pay no attention to this nitpicking by people how we handled it,” the president told Rockefeller.16

Getting back to Vietnam, Brigham claims that Nixon “kept Kissinger at arm’s length about the content of his Vietnam speech right up until January 12, [1972] when he asked for Kissinger’s advice in advance of his troop withdrawal announcement now scheduled for January 13” (164). Unfortunately, Brigham is factually incorrect on this point, and the telecon he cites for January 12, 1972, does not support the claim that Nixon was holding Kissinger at arm’s length at that time (165, 271). The idea of splitting up the announcement about the peace plan and the announcement of the withdrawal of 70,000 more American troops and instead, discussing Vietnam in the State of the Union and the later making a separate announcement that Kissinger had been negotiating secretly with the North Vietnamese for thirty months was not Nixon’s, and Kissinger was not in the dark. In fact, Kissinger is the one who recommended precisely this course of action to Nixon in a phone call captured by Nixon’s taping system on New Year’s Day 1972:

Kissinger: Mr. President, I have had this idea for your consideration. I’ve already gone ahead with [Ambassador Ellsworth] Bunker and everything is moving for the earliest date [on the troop withdrawal announcement] you want to go, so—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —so nothing is blowing up. Whether we mightn’t split the troop announcement and the peace plan? In other words, do the troop announcement before Congress comes back, and hit them with the peace plan right after your State of the Union?
Nixon: Yes, we could do that.

After debating the pros and cons of doing the troop announcement at different times and speculating about the play it would receive in the press, the president and his national security advisor came back to the sequence of announcements:

Kissinger: For the first two or three weeks it’s going to go like the ceasefire. For the first two or three weeks it will sweep everything.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And therefore, it isn’t all that disadvantageous supposing they come in with the Mansfield amendment again.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: We can prove we made these proposals before they ever did.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: So, and then we could say, make the peace plan, just for an example, around the 25th of January.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: Then you’d have two weeks of riding that.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: Then we come out with the foreign policy report.16 Then you’re going to China.19 Then you’re in the middle of March. And then it’s—
Nixon: Mmm. Yeah?
Kissinger: That’s the advantage of doing the peace plan a little later. While, otherwise, they might come back at you with a full-scale attack before you go to China.
Nixon: Um-hmm. Um-hmm.
Kissinger: I have no problem with ever—whatever, with making the troop announcement as early as possible.
Nixon: No, there’s no problem on that.

Nixon agreed with Kissinger’s suggestion to have a separate, televised announcement of the peace plan that the administration had put forward in secret channels; it would come after the State of the Union and the troop withdrawal announcement. The men also explored the possibility of mentioning the administration’s shift to avoid using draftees in Vietnam:

Nixon: I would like if we could do the troop announcement and the draftees, uh, then it should be done separately from the State of the Union, I think…Id like to have the State of the Union—we’re going to get so much foreign policy—
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: —benefit from other things that I think we’d better—
Kissinger: I think if you have the troop announcements before—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —then the State of the Union domestic, then the peace plan right after the foreign policy after the State of the Union, say the week after—
Nixon: See, I will just say in the State of the Union that I am going to make a major report, “I’m going to make a report to the Congress on foreign policy on blank, and I will not cover it in this speech.” Just as I have before.
Kissinger: Yeah. Right, and we will have it ready this time on the 8th [of January].
Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger suggested January 25th as the date to make
the peace plan announcement, which is what Nixon ended up doing, Nixon was less receptive to Kissinger’s seemingly serious suggestion to cut Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird out of the details:

Kissinger: Ah, ah, Mr. President, I have almost reached the point where you may have to do this without telling Laird beforehand.
Nixon: Whoa! Couldn’t do that, Henry, he’d go up, he’d just—
Kissinger: He’d go up the wall.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: But, uh—
Nixon: But you’re afraid he’s going to leak it out, huh?
Kissinger: But I’m afraid he’s going to come back with so many caveats. Let me talk to Moorer; he owes us one.

To be fair, there were no telephone conversation transcripts of this important conversation. However, the audio for conversation has been available since the Third Chronological Release of 2003 and was listed online in 2008 at http://nixontapes.org/hak.html. (The website includes digital audio of each conversation, NARA-produced finding aids, and lists which taped conversations overlapped with telcons.) In addition, the Digital National Security Archive has a comprehensive collection of Kissinger telcons and Nixon-Kissinger conversations from the Nixon tapes available through its subscription service at ProQuest.21

This brings up a minor point, but one that is revealing. Brigham cites the Kissinger telephone conversation transcripts as “White House Tapes.” Like the White House tapes, the telcons have a fascinating history, but they are an entirely separate collection. Moreover, the telcons were processed in a unique way and thus differ from many other textual records and the White House tapes.22 According to the NARA finding aid, secretaries initially listened to Kissinger’s phone calls on a “dead key” extension and made summaries of conversations, although this practice evolved into verbatim transcripts written up from shorthand notes. Many conversations were recorded, but the tapes were immediately transcribed and then destroyed or reused.23 Therefore, citing the telcons as “White House Tapes” simply is not accurate.

Despite the issues outlined above, I believe Reckless adds to the debate over the tragedy of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, an “argument without end,” as Robert McNamara and others put it. If Brigham spurs public discourse on issues of war and peace and morality, all the better. He is spot on when he says that nearly as many Americans died with Nixon and Kissinger at the helm of the ship of state as during the Johnson years, and the prolongation of the war was a tragedy for Americans and Vietnamese alike. Further, Brigham is an engaging writer, and Reckless was enjoyable to read. Its shortcomings should serve as a reminder for historians to properly caveat and contextualize their sources but always remain open to engage.

Notes:
1. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication, in addition to any mistakes, are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the U.S. government or its components.
2. The quote that the Nixon tapes are “the gift that keeps on giving” is widely attributed to investigative reporter Bob Woodward, of Watergate fame, who apparently listens to the tapes as he drives. Bob Woodward, “Landon Lecture” (Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, March 29, 2000). http://www.mediarelations.k-state.edu/newsreleases/landonlect/woodwarddext300.html.
3. Nixon Tapes (NT), Oval Office Conversation No. 823–1 between Nixon and Kissinger, December 14, 1972. This is the same conversation in which Nixon decided to go through with the “Christmas Bombing” against North Vietnam.
12. Brigham mentions North Vietnamese concerns that the United States intended to stay in South Vietnam as it had in South Korea (199–194), but there is no discussion of whether or not the Nixon administration ever considered a Korea-like solution.
17. Nixon-Kissinger Telcon, January 12, 1972, 12:20pm, HAK Telcons, RNPLM.
22. See also “’Dr. Kissinger, Mr. President’: Kissinger’s Telcons
The last two decades have witnessed a virtual explosion of scholarship on Henry Kissinger, who must register as the most polarizing figure in twentieth-century American diplomacy. Kissinger has of course always commanded attention in the historical literature, though usually alongside Richard Nixon. Just consider the number of books in which the words “Kissinger, Nixon, and...” appear in the title or subtitle. Along these same lines, Kissinger features prominently in a number of important works exploring the Nixon administration and the Vietnam War.

Yet very little of that literature has placed Kissinger at its center, which is quite surprising when one considers that the Paris Peace Accords apparently count among his greatest triumphs—so much so, in fact, that he, along with the Vietnamese revolutionary Le Duc Tho, was awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for his role in negotiating the agreement. (Tho had the decency to turn the prize down, explaining that “peace has not yet really been established in South Vietnam.”)

Robert Brigham’s Reckless makes a compelling case that Kissinger’s role in the Indochina wars is undeserving of any accolades. When Kissinger accepted the offer to serve as national security adviser in the new Nixon administration, he shared with the president a pessimism about the war and a desire “to move on to what they considered more important foreign policy issues, such as arms limitations with the Soviets” (11). But the war could not be ignored. To end it, Nixon and Kissinger would pursue what the former called “peace with honor.” What this meant was a compromise of sorts. (Brigham argues that Kissinger did everything possible to marginalize Laird and Secretary of State William Rogers, greatly enlarging the staff of his National Security Council and essentially conducting policy in secret [65–66].) It appeared to meet Congress’s and the American public’s desire for an end to the war by gradually withdrawing American ground troops. This would allow time for the administration to achieve victory through an escalation of the air war, in neutral Cambodia as well as the north, and increased training of ARVN forces. The goal was to enable the Saigon regime to successfully repel the revolutionary insurgency and, with American assistance, survive. Both Nixon and Kissinger felt its survival was essential to American “credibility.”

While Kissinger shared the goal of a viable Saigon government, he hated Vietnamization. He believed that diverting military operations and diplomacy in Vietnam had been a problem in earlier years (11), and he thus saw the presence of U.S. troops as a lever to push the revolutionary forces to concede to American demands. Their voluntary withdrawal, Kissinger worried, undermined what little leverage Washington enjoyed. “How,” Brigham asks, “could U.S. negotiators demand a mutual withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam if the United States was going to withdraw its troops anyway because of domestic political pressure?” (27–28)? But Kissinger consistently failed to appreciate the American political realities, Brigham notes, including the need to demonstrate to a frustrated Congress and public that the war was not without end. What Kissinger needed, then, were other ways of illustrating to the revolutionary forces the U.S. commitment to a military victory. Initially this meant the “secret” bombing of Cambodia.

As we now know, the United States had in fact been bombing Cambodia since at least 1965. But the bombing campaign that Nixon and Kissinger pursued in 1969, which was dubbed Operation Menu, was a tremendous escalation, and the consequences of using B-52s to ultimately carpet-bomb the country were devastating. (Kissinger, Brigham writes, “felt no moral qualms” about it [42].) The devastation was immediate for the tens of thousands of Cambodians who lost their lives, of course. But the bombing was also devastating in the longer term. Ben Kiernan and others have compellingly argued that the American bombing from 1969 to 1973 was “probably the most important single factor in Pol Pot’s rise.” Readers of Passport are well aware of what that rise meant, with the Khmer Rouge genocide, according to leading famine scholar, knocking approximately a fifth to a quarter of the Cambodian population, or 1.67 to 1.87 million people. That horrific loss of life must count among Henry Kissinger’s legacies.

When Nixon and Kissinger launched the U.S. “incursion” into Cambodia in 1970, the widespread domestic opposition that followed apparently surprised Kissinger, only further underscoring his tin ear when it came to American politics. He was also taken aback by the reaction to the “Christmas bombing” in December 1972, which met with outrage both across the United States and around the world. The growing call to end the war following the Lam Son 719 operation in Laos seemed to surprise him, too (146–47).

The Kissinger that appears in Reckless is less a shrewd diplomat than an incompetent opportunist. He is not a brilliant strategist or global theorist. Nor is he an “idealist,” as Niall Ferguson would have it. Rather, he comes across as an ambitious and amoral climber who thought “his strategic compass pointed truer than most” (21), and he was looking to secure his place in the pantheon of great statesmen. (Whence this “self-confidence” in his abilities derived is “not entirely clear,” Brigham adds cuttingly [25].) To get there, he repeatedly played to the president’s insecurities (139) and misled him about the nature of his
negotiations in Paris (93, 98, 100, 128, 194) and later, Saigon (221, 231). And as Brigham reveals, Kissinger showed no interest in the concerns of others.

This is most evident in his treatment of the RVN authorities. Brigham makes it clear that, whether out of arrogance, racist contempt, or indifference, Kissinger made no effort to consult with RVN officials in Saigon while negotiating the fate of their U.S.-backed government with Hanoi (99, 155, 196, 207). Indeed, he “purposefully kept Saigon in the dark” (103). He had no appreciation for the complicated politics in the south, including the considerable support for a “third force” (83–84). He seemed not to care about South Vietnam at all. He believed “coercive power” (85) would force Hanoi’s hand in the negotiations, and he seemed totally uninterested in exploring more creative terms that took Vietnamese political realities into account. While for years Kissinger did insist on the preservation of the RVN regime in the face of Hanoi’s insistence that it be dissolved, he appeared to do so for the sake of American credibility. He worried about what the regime’s overthrow might suggest about American power and security guarantees.

It was with both this global credibility and the domestic American reaction in mind that Kissinger and Nixon, by most accounts, insisted on the end on a “decent interval” between the U.S. military withdrawal and what was assumed to be the inevitable demise of the Saigon government. Brigham recognizes the idea of the “decent interval” (149–52), but despite acknowledging the evidence suggesting its explanatory force, he seems unconvincing. “Perhaps” Kissinger pursued it, he writes (215). Brigham explains that the national security adviser miscalculated (202), but he acknowledges that Kissinger did concede that “our terms will eventually destroy” RVN president Nguyen Van Thieu (213). Brigham even calls Hanoi’s overthrow of the Saigon government a “practical outgrowth” of the eventual settlement, with Kissinger telling Le Duc Tho that the United States was “prepared to start a process in which, as a result of local forces, change can occur” (218). Kissinger, moreover, “did not believe” that “the South is strong enough to defend itself,” according to Brigham and he warned Nixon that “this thing [i.e., the Paris settlement] is almost certain to blow up sooner or later” (235, 242).

So why the hedging on the decent interval? And a related question: Given Nixon’s concordance with his national security adviser’s apparent embrace of the decent interval, we might ask, in light of Brigham’s other findings, whether it in any way resulted from his being misled by Kissinger?

While scathing in its portrait of Henry Kissinger, Brigham’s book operates within certain frames of reference, including the assumption that by the 1970s “South Vietnam” had become a legitimate entity worth preserving. Some critics will take issue with this. Brigham does not hesitate to recognize the corruption and unpopularity of the RVN government, but he writes that there was a growing consciousness of a South Vietnamese identity that led to “a strong sense of cultural and political identification with the state,” even if people in the south were “dubious about its leadership.” Here Brigham is referring to notable recent scholarship that more fully addresses the complexities of southern society in the late 1960s and 1970s. Within this context, Brigham concludes, the plan negotiated by Kissinger “was more than a betrayal of a corrupt Saigon government”; it represented “the abandonment of all of South Vietnam” (225). Kissinger, like others in the administration, cast the South Vietnamese “as passive actors in their own history, one of the greatest tragedies of the Vietnam War” (155). For Brigham, this ultimate betrayal of South Vietnam “raises serious questions about the efficacy and morality of pursuing a war for political means that are then surrendered” (220).

Whatever one might think of the war, the division of Vietnam, and the Nixon administration, these are serious and important points. They call into question the myth of Kissinger—which Kissinger himself studiously helped to foster—as the man who successfully achieved “peace with honor” in Vietnam. Brigham may not go as far as others in painting Kissinger as an unrepentant war criminal who ought to be behind bars, but his excellent new study does force readers to question the grotesque spectacle of Kissinger still being toasted on the Washington cocktail circuit.

**Notes:**


Review of Robert Brigham, Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of Vietnam

Luke A. Nichter

With Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of Vietnam, Robert Brigham has given scholars a great gift. We will be talking about this book, and others it will prompt, for many years. Henry Kissinger, one of the most significant secretaries of state in American history, has long been deserving of a fair-minded critique. Neither the polemists nor the memoir accounts will stand the test of time. The story of Kissinger’s management of the Vietnam War, which he left office, Henry Alfred Kissinger is still active at nearly a century old. Complicating scholarly efforts even further, newly declassified documents, tapes, and foreign sources continue to become available to scholars at a staggering rate, and it takes serious effort simply to keep up with these releases.

Brigham’s highly readable book has an immensely ambitious agenda despite containing only six chronological chapters and under 250 pages of text. The volume tells the story of Kissinger’s management of the Vietnam War, which Brigham says, “remains Kissinger’s most enduring foreign policy legacy.” He adds that his book “is the first to hold [Kissinger’s] record to a scrupulous account based on his own definitions of success” (xi). One does not need to look much beyond the work’s title, Reckless, to locate the author’s main conclusion: “It was a total failure. . . . Kissinger failed in each of his stated goals, to achieve peace with honor” (xi).

Brigham goes on to note twelve specific ways in which Kissinger failed, exuberantly using some form of the word “failure” thirteen times in two paragraphs (xi). The book’s bottom-line assessment is that he “did much more harm than good . . . Kissinger (no matter what) could not change reality on the ground. He made a bad situation worse, however, with his reckless assumption about the use of force and diplomacy” (xii). One day, when all the documents and tapes are released, Brigham’s assessment might become the conventional wisdom. However, the presentation in this volume is not convincing for a variety of reasons.

The first chapter, “The Apprentice,” summarizes Kissinger’s activities during the 1960s and how he felt his way into the Vietnam issue prior to being appointed Nixon’s national security adviser in late 1968. The book unquestioningly incorporates too much from previous works. Of Nixon’s campaign headquarters, Brigham says, “The Pierre [Hotel in Manhattan] was an unlikely place for the president-elect to have his transition headquarters, given its ties to the East Coast establishment that Nixon so despised” (1). A more thoughtful assessment could have considered whether it was the obvious location for someone who had practiced law in New York since his defeat in the 1962 California governor’s race. The neighborhood is full of private clubs with memberships dominated by Republicans, such as the Links Club, where influential New Yorkers met in early 1968 and agreed to support Eisenhower’s loyal former vice president. To them, the bi-coastal Nixon was the only acceptable compromise between the Dewey-Lodge-Rockefeller wing of the party, on the one side, and the Taft-Goldwater-Reagan wing on the other.

Nixon and Kissinger charted their own courses during the decade, each hoping their foreign policy credentials. Nixon took twice as many trips to Vietnam as Kissinger, although the latter, with multiple trips under his belt, was no slouch. Although they moved in different circles, they did have a link between them that—in a major oversight—has been overlooked: Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. The liberal Republican from Massachusetts, who, despite Brigham’s claim, was not a “presidential hopeful” (15), served in Vietnam and worked on related issues in more roles and for a longer period of time than any contemporary. Lodge was ambassador in 1963–1964 and again from 1965 to 1967, served as a consultant between his tours and after, and was appointed to lead the Paris peace talks when the Nixon administration took office on January 20, 1969.

Kissinger was close to Lodge’s son George and quietly endorsed his ill-fated 1962 Senate run against another political newcomer with a famous last name, Edward M. Kennedy. Lodge hosted Nixon’s visits to Saigon in the wilderness years and gave Kissinger his first Vietnam experience, as Lodge’s consultant, in the autumn of 1965. It was in these years that Nixon’s thinking on Vietnam matured, through trip after trip. His thoughts are documented in extensive notes handwritten on his ubiquitous yellow legal pads. Entries from a 1967 trip to Vietnam, just a year before Kissinger’s appointment, are particularly noteworthy and offer a kind of blueprint for his eventual Vietnam policy.

The book’s sparse coverage of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s activities in the 1960s and of tumultuous changes at home and in both major political parties makes it feel less like something Brigham worked on for fifteen years than a hasty 125,000-word response to Niall Ferguson’s first volume in his biography of Kissinger. This weakness is on full display in his coverage of the pivotal year of 1968. Brigham raises the old canard that Kissinger leaked secret information about the Johnson administration’s negotiating position without identifying what it was, what was secret, what was significant, and whom it benefited (2). Kissinger was not for Nixon in 1968; he was for Nelson Rockefeller. In addition, according to conversations between this reviewer and former staff members of Vice President Hubert Humphrey, on two occasions Kissinger offered to serve as a consultant to the Humphrey campaign.

Brigham gets the politics of the October 31 bombing halt wrong.² Since he relies on sources that did no serious research on the so-called “Chennault Affair,” he gets that wrong, too. Anna Chennault was a minor player who has
been elevated to a starring actress. She was not “a steadfast supporter of Republican politics and politicians” (4), nor was she ever part of Nixon’s inner circle. In fact, she disagreed openly with his Vietnam and China policies. As someone who lost almost everything in her homeland as a result of the communist takeover of China in 1949, anticommunism was Chennault’s key issue. The primary vehicles for her concerns were usually, but not always, Republicans critical of Truman’s China policy, but she was also a strong supporter of Democrats such as Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey and offered to work for them as late as 1967. Chennault was more complex and more sophisticated than the capricious figure in the accounts Brigham and others unquestioningly accept.

There are statements in the book that illuminate why complicated figures such as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger have escaped nuanced biographical treatment. “It was not access to information that made Kissinger so appealing to Nixon,” Brigham writes. “It was in equal measures Kissinger’s understanding of power—Nixon believed that he needed Kissinger to shape and implement his broad foreign policy designs—and his willingness to make difficult decisions in the face of public pressure” (5). No, more significant was the fact that, during the 1960s, Nixon and Kissinger each made their own journeys, intellectually and globally. They were the only members of the loyal opposition to do so extensively, and they developed similar convictions about the importance of ending the domestic and international irritant of Vietnam so that the United States could resume constructive activity. Also, Brigham tells us that Nixon and Kissinger had “a profound disdain for bureaucracy” (7). Did other presidents love bureaucracy? Nixon and Kissinger were outsiders who distrusted establishment liberals” (7). Then how does one explain that their rise to power occurred through their experiences as insiders, enabled by insiders, with Nixon having one of the most linear paths to the White House? In Brigham’s account of the Nixon White House years, not much is new. On the foundations of Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy, Richard Moss has done a better job. On Nixon’s proto-Vietnam policy, Jeffrey Kimball has written more than anyone. On Kissinger’s pre-White House years and how they affected his later thinking, there is Niall Ferguson. On Nixon’s pre-presidential life, no one has been more thorough, and no one may ever be, than Irwin Gellman.

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officials, to name just a few examples. No author can be held completely accountable for a publisher’s marketing claim that a book is based on extensive research at the Nixon Library, on Kissinger’s personal papers, and on materials from the archives in Vietnam. But while widely researched, the mining at individual archives is quite shallow. The volume cites just enough archives, just enough collections, and just enough of each collection to appear as though it were thorough. There is no original work using the Nixon tapes, which would have been a goldmine for a book like this. Among the sources the author lists that are now available to scholars, Brigham does not even mention the Nixon tapes, or the fact that more than five hundred hours remain restricted (xii). If the author wanted to get full value from the tapes, he could have compared precisely what Kissinger said to Nixon with what Kissinger then said to others in order to bolster his argument that Kissinger betrayed the president.  

In addition, the papers of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. are cited, but the most valuable portions, as they pertain to Kissinger’s early years and the Vietnam negotiations, are not cited. 8 These are critically important, not just because Lodge spent more time working on the subject of Vietnam in more capacities than any other contemporary and because his relationship with Nixon went back to the early 1950s, but because Lodge’s role in elevating Henry Kissinger has been overlooked. “You started the sequence that led to this appointment by inviting me to Saigon. I shall not forget this,” Kissinger wrote to Lodge on December 10, 1968, after being named Nixon’s national security adviser. 9 The research at the National Archives Center 2 in Hanoi is impressive. Two endnotes cite two documents, and one of those is a collection of public government statements. 10

By using foreign documentation, Brigham has admittedly gone further than many American diplomatic historians. He deserves credit for that. However, it is fair to ask whether he has interpreted this foreign documentation properly. Similar questions could be asked about his earlier works, Guerilla Diplomacy and ARVN. 11 Citations to foreign works are time consuming and more difficult to inspect. For example, Brigham makes a significant claim that after Kissinger met with Xuan Thuy on August 4, 1969, at Jean Sainteny’s apartment in Paris, he told the North Vietnamese that Nixon was prepared to open a secret communications channel and would create the most favorable circumstances to arrive at a solution (64–65). The claim is central to Brigham’s broader argument that Kissinger was reckless, acted without authority and betrayed Nixon. However, the book cited, by Bai Ban Bo, covers only secret contacts with Kissinger during the Johnson administration and does not discuss such contact in 1969. The citation to the book is also more wrong than right. It was indeed published in 1985, but not by Nha Xuan Ban. This reviewer is fairly confident that Le Duan said no such thing in his letters as they were published in the original 1965 version. 

A final occasion where this pattern recurs is in chapter 3. Regarding Kissinger’s secret meeting on February 21, 1970, with Le Duc Tho, Brigham writes, “Although he made no mention of it to Kissinger, Tho told his associates in Hanoi that he thought Washington would eventually be forced to concede on the troop withdrawal to end the American war.” 96–97. Again, it is a key point in support of the view that Kissinger exceeded his authority during negotiations in which he was outmatched. However, the book cited simply provides a report on Kissinger’s presentation during their meeting, and Tho says nothing about the United States being “eventually forced to concede on the mutual troop withdrawal.” 713

The book is not all bad, however. Since it is the first in a new genre, the critics will naturally be harsh on it—this one included. But Brigham is impressively balanced on some topics where his predecessors were not. His best material is in chapter 6, “Peace is at Hand.” In fact, following the attention-getting introduction, the rest of the book as a whole is surprisingly balanced.

For example, some scholars have had an almost single-minded obsession with the “decent interval” theory to explain Nixon and Kissinger’s overarching Vietnam theory. Brigham is more nuanced (150–51). It is absurd to believe that strict adherence to a single philosophical concept explained all actions taken by Nixon and Kissinger with respect to Vietnam. The tapes reveal that on some days they felt the war was going well and on others they were pessimistic. Their moods, words, and actions revolved around many things outside of their direct control: the weather in Vietnam, weekly casualty figures, and domestic political opinion. There are even times when adherents of the decent interval theory are too generous. On some days Nixon and Kissinger spoke about desiring no interval at all other than the time necessary to withdraw POWs and get out. Finally, Brigham does not blame Nixon and Kissinger for the overthrow of Sihanouk (111). North Vietnam had a longer history of destabilizing Cambodia than the Americans did, although this is overlooked by many scholars.

The Vietnamese have a phrase—đâu voi, đuôi chuột. It means the head of an elephant and the tail of a mouse, which can be translated as “making a mountain out of a molehill.” Robert Brigham has performed an admirable service by offering a critique of Henry Kissinger’s Vietnam diplomacy. With the appropriate passage of time, Kissinger deserves a dispassionate critique commensurate with the role he played in these historic events. That is not this book. It will take a bigger book to mine the tapes, personal papers, and newly declassified documents in the United States and numerous foreign countries. Kissinger is only ninety-five. Perhaps it is still too soon.

Notes:
1. See Niall Ferguson, Kissinger, vol. 1, 1923–1968: The Idealist (New York, 2015). Ferguson started a conversation that will only be amplified once the second volume of his biography is published. He deserves a response, but it should be as well researched as his counterattacks. This reviewer, for one, is hesitant to describe Kissinger as an idealist in the 1960s. He was hardworking, ideologically malleable, ambitious, and sufficiently successful with the mainstream of both major political parties that he was an obvious choice for a political appointment no matter who won.
in 1968. But that does not make him an idealist.

2. Currently the best book on this subject, including the bombing halt, the 1968 election, and the relationship between President Lyndon Johnson and Vice President Hubert Humphrey, is Arnold Offner's Hubert Humphrey: The Conscience of the Country (New Haven, CT, 1996). However, most other sources continue to cite the more sensational accounts written by non-scholars.


5. Meeting with Henry Kissinger, New York, NY, June 27, 2018, 3:30–4:30 p.m.


7. Brigham extensively cites my work, published with Douglas Brinkley, The Nixon Tapes: 1971–1972 (Boston, 2014). While the work of other scholars is also included, the Nixon tapes transcription volume, many having to do with Vietnam were cut during production due to space limitations. In addition, there are many that have not been transcribed. It would have been especially fruitful to listen to and transcribe portions from the time Kissinger left for another negotiating session, or just after he returned.

8. Recently I reviewed all of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.'s personal papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society for my upcoming biography of him, to be published by Yale University Press. If not for this deep dive over the past four years, I could not have written this review with the same level of detail. The best parts of Lodge’s papers as they pertain to Brigham’s book include Reels 9–10, 13–14, and 22–23, Microfilm Edition, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Papers II, which provide important background on the Nixon-era Vietnam negotiations, the relationship between Lodge and Kissinger and Nixon, and what the Nixon administration learned from the LBJ negotiations. In addition, Reel 12 covers Lodge-Nixon conversations during the transition and early part of the new administration, Vietnam negotiations, and Lodge’s role leading the talks in Paris. Lodge also wrote countless memordas for the file, which, taken together, are as thorough as a diary. His “Lessons of Vietnam” in Reel 20, written in 1973, is one that is particularly relevant to Brigham’s book. Another is “United States Policy in Vietnam” in Reel 23.


10. In Brigham’s acknowledgments, he writes that “Tung Vu conducted research in the Vietnamese archives in Ho Chi Minh City.” The computerized finding aids in the research room at the Trưng Tam Luu Tru Quoc Gia II [National Archives Center II] are not as intuitive as, say, a Google search. The folder level index includes typographical errors, and unless searches are made with all spellings of the individual’s name, many having to do with Vietnam were cut during production due to space limitations. In addition, there are many that have not been transcribed. It would have been especially fruitful to listen to and transcribe portions from the time Kissinger left for another negotiating session, or just after he returned. His “Lessons of Vietnam” in Reel 20, written in 1973, is one that is particularly relevant to Brigham’s book. Another is “United States Policy in Vietnam” in Reel 23.

11. From Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy to the Politburo: Content of the private meeting between Xuan Thuy and Kissinger.


David F. Schmitz

In the days leading up to D-Day, June 6, 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt prepared two announcements. The first, which told the American people about the successful operation and the establishment of a beachhead in Normandy, France, was the one actually released. The second was prepared in case the cross-channel attack met disaster. Roosevelt was prepared to take full responsibility and blame for the failure.

The contrast between FDR’s approach to D-Day and the approach of President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger to events in Vietnam could not be greater. In one of the striking examples from Robert K. Brigham’s superb study of Kissinger’s management of the war in Vietnam, Brigham points out that the finger-pointing and blaming of others for the failure of the incursion into Laos in 1971, Operation Lam Son 719, began even before the operation started and was typical behavior for Kissinger, who refused to take responsibility for any mistakes, failures, and shortcomings during his time in office. This is just one of the many insights and key themes Brigham explores in his seminal study of

Kissinger entered office believing the only way to end the war was through a negotiated agreement. From his perspective there were, as Brigham notes, “simply too many explicit constraints on US power to make a military victory likely” (ix). At the outset, Kissinger believed he could achieve a settlement that was based on a mutual withdrawal of North Vietnamese and U.S. troops (as well as the removal of Hanoi's forces from Cambodia and Laos), the recognition of the DMZ as an international boundary, a release of all POWs, and the preservation of the Saigon government intact and in full control in South Vietnam. Kissinger's goal, Brigham writes, was “to negotiate a final peace agreement in Paris that traded an American exit from Vietnam for political guarantees for Saigon” (x). As the author unequivocally states: the national security advisor’s effort “was a total failure. Kissinger failed in each of his stated goals to achieve ‘peace with honor’” (xi).

Brigham's work, as he notes, is the first comprehensive study of “Kissinger’s strategic and diplomatic failures on the final peace agreement.” It sets out to show that “Kissinger’s misplaced faith in his own abilities to secure an honorable peace prolonged the war unnecessarily and sealed South Vietnam’s fate” (xii). In this Reckless brilliantly succeeds.

However, Brigham also does much more. He shows how the national security advisor “made a bad situation worse … with his reckless assumptions about the use of force and diplomacy” (xii). In addition to explicating how Kissinger's failures stemmed from his shortcomings as a negotiator and how his tactics deepened the tragedy of Vietnam, Robert Brigham challenges and corrects many of Kissinger's and his defenders' distortions, setting the record straight on a number of important points. He directly rejects Niall Ferguson's recent portrayal of Kissinger as an idealist, stating he was “a classical realist who ironically acted with great emotion and personalized much of his effort to secure America’s place in the international system. As a lone actor, an instrument of free will, he was determined to shape history.” (45)

Brigham also rejects the theory that Kissinger sought a decent interval for withdrawal. Rather, the national security advisor held “to the idea that he could coordinate punishing military strikes against North Vietnam with diplomacy in Paris” to achieve his goal, which by 1972 was not saving South Vietnam but was “getting Nixon reelected” (150-151). Brigham further demonstrates that Kissinger developed his policies toward Vietnam and negotiated in Paris from a series of false assumptions and premises about the war and Hanoi's goals. In the end, of course, Kissinger's efforts only resolved the role of the United States in the war in Vietnam as he willingly sacrificed the needs of Saigon to conclude a deal.

Henry Kissinger has worked hard to shape a favorable portrayal of his role in Vietnam through his writings and public appearances, and despite the obvious failure of the Paris Peace Agreement, he continues to be seen in power and in the public as a wise senior statesman. Brigham consistently challenges Kissinger’s version of events wherever the historical record clearly demonstrates that the former national security advisor has dissembled to further his own image. Space will not allow for a discussion of all the cases, but Brigham demonstrates, for example, that Kissinger did support the Cambodian invasion even though he has worked hard to keep his role secret and create a different impression, and that his recounting of his negotiations with Le Duc Tho is either incomplete or deliberately distorted.

From 1969 to 1973, and subsequently, Kissinger had to keep changing his positions and explanations because he held to incorrect assumptions about the Vietnam War. This behavior started with an early articulation of the madman theory, which Kissinger expressed during his first weeks in office. He wanted to make the North Vietnamese think that Nixon was utterly obsessed with beating communism; and he was convinced, Brigham shows, that North Vietnam “would be forced to negotiate a mutual withdrawal from South Vietnam” despite having “no evidence to support these claims” (24). “I can’t believe that a fourth-rate power like North Vietnam doesn’t have a breaking point,” he said. All the United States had to do, he told Nixon, was “hit them” and “Hanoi would be for private talks” (x).

Kissinger would also encourage Nixon “to think that acts of toughness—such as bombing Cambodia—could substitute for tactical and strategic disadvantage in Vietnam” (41). Therefore, he negotiated by issuing ultimatums and threats, which the North Vietnamese dismissed or ignored. Another constant that Kissinger held to in the face of clear evidence to the contrary, including Soviet denials, was that Moscow could force Hanoi to make concessions favorable to Washington.

Brigham argues that Kissinger’s style of negotiating ran contrary both to negotiating theory and to successful examples of negotiations from history. Instead of building “a negotiations constituency,” he isolated himself and cut out the rest of the national security bureaucracy along with Congress and Saigon. In place of “first negotiating principles,” Kissinger “conditioned each meeting in Paris with military escalation, or at least the threat of escalation,” an approach that has never yielded success (66-68).

This strategy led to a lack of “buy-in” for the talks among allies and to long periods of inactivity. Kissinger remained focused on the stick of military power and failed to make negotiations a sufficiently attractive carrot for Hanoi. “His coercive strategy in Paris lacked vision, shutting out potential allies. Altering this approach would have taken him away from his privileged position, but it might have led to more expansive and coordinated negotiations to end the war” (66-68).

Finally, from the outset, the national security advisor cut Saigon out of the negotiations of the war to enhance his control over the process and to keep South Vietnam in the dark about the concessions he was making over time in his effort to secure a peace deal prior to the 1972 presidential election. As Brigham notes, when Kissinger ultimately realized he could not achieve a mutual troop withdrawal and switched to the position of seeking a standstill ceasefire to enable the United States to devise a process for the final removal of U.S. forces, he did so without informing, much less consulting, Saigon. When the Thieu government learned the details about the agreement, it balked. Nixon briefly backed Saigon, but in the end joined with Kissinger to force Saigon to accept the Paris accord that sealed its fate.

I have a couple of concerns that arise from solely focusing on Kissinger and seeking to correct many of the national security advisor’s distortions and lies both when he uttered them and when he wrote about events later. The chronology gets confusing at a few points as the time frame shifts so Brigham can follow through on a theme. This, however, is a small price to pay for the value of Brigham’s judicious analysis and weighing of the evidence against Kissinger’s claims.
A more substantive concern involves the explanation of how the Nixon administration would escalate in 1969 at the same time it announced it was pursuing Vietnamization and beginning the troop withdrawals that would consistently undercut Kissinger’s and Nixon’s threats. Brigham writes that after a National Security Council meeting on January 25, 1969, “no one present ... could have predicted that the administration would pursue military escalation and troop withdrawals simultaneously” (27). By examining only Kissinger’s position, Brigham misses the fact that when Nixon came to office, he still believed the United States could win the war militarily, and he held to that position until the failure in Cambodia in April and May 1970. Meanwhile, Kissinger saw escalation and bombing as a threat in negotiations.

To try and win the war by force, the president had to buy political time for his madman policy to work. He therefore set out to create the impression that he was starting to wind the war down through Vietnamization while he was actually escalating it through the secret bombing campaign and planning for Operation Duck Hook and the invasion of Cambodië. The national security advisor opposed the troop withdrawals, in part, because they were associated with and supported by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and, as Brigham clearly demonstrates, Kissinger wanted to keep Laird away from decision making on Vietnam.

Kissinger also opposed Vietnamization because he knew the impact it would have on his ability to threaten the North Vietnamese. Thus, he and Nixon were not always on the same page, a situation that led the national security advisor to consistently misrepresent the content of his talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris. As Brigham explains, Kissinger wanted to keep his secret talks alive and “concluded therefore that truthful reporting of these meetings threatened that goal because the president was not fully committed to a negotiated settlement” (108). Like so many of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s policies toward Vietnam, Vietnamization conflicted with other policies, and it ultimately failed.

In his conclusion, Brigham pulls no punches. “Despite his considerable intellect and talent,” Brigham states, “Kissinger was never able to secure a peace agreement that settled the major question of the war: the political future of South Vietnam” (243). North Vietnamese forces remained in South Vietnam as the United States left, leaving Saigon to fight on its own. The United States originally escalated its commitment in 1965 because South Vietnam could not succeed on its own despite ten years of American aid and military support. The subsequent eight years of fighting had not changed that reality.

Nixon and Kissinger could have achieved similar result from the Paris Peace Agreement in 1969 without four more years of fighting. Brigham thus concludes that “the war in Vietnam was an American disaster” made even worse by the escalations and by the duplicity of the Nixon administration. Nonetheless, Kissinger, “despite his failures in Vietnam, has emerged as a symbol of American shrewdness in exercising power.” Reckless fully demonstrates how wrong that view is and how Kissinger “recklessly sought ends beyond his mean” (244).

Author’s Response

Robert K. Brigham

I want to thank the four reviewers of Reckless for their comments. SHAFR members are known for taking ideas seriously, and I was pleased to see that these reviewers lived up to that reputation. I was especially heartened that all four found Reckless highly readable and a valuable contribution to the discussion on the Vietnam War. All four reviewers also wished that I had expanded my portrait of Kissinger to include other aspects of his foreign policy agenda that might shed light on the Vietnam negotiations. This is a fair critique. Deciding what to include and what to leave out of a trade press book written for a general reading audience—and with a strict word limit—is always difficult.

Scott Laderman clearly understands and agrees with the main themes of the book. He was particularly drawn to the idea that Kissinger never fully appreciated American political realities, “including the need to demonstrate to a frustrated Congress and public that the war was not without end.” Kissinger was much more interested in domestic politics than any of his writings on the Vietnam War indicate. More work needs to be done to highlight the strained relationship between Kissinger, the public, and Congress. Laderman also found intriguing the issue of South Vietnam’s legitimacy, and I must confess that this remains a topic that fascinates me. Much of the new writing on Vietnam from those with significant language skills focuses on the “idea” of South Vietnam.1 This is also a subtext in some of the writings by Viet Thanh Nguyen, Thi Bui, Andrew Lam, and Andrew Pham, among others.

Any author appreciates it when a reviewer focuses almost exclusively on the main themes of the book, and this is certainly true of David Schmitz’s review. He suggests that Reckless is, at its heart, a book about Kissinger and the secret negotiations in Paris. He understands my criticisms of Kissinger as a negotiator. He also agrees that Kissinger’s efforts “only confirmed suspicions about the part the United States had played in the war in Vietnam, as he willingly sacrificed the needs of Saigon to conclude a deal.” For example, the final peace agreement did not include a mutual troop withdrawal from South Vietnam. By agreement, ten PAVN main force infantry divisions were allowed to stay in South Vietnam. There were no enforcement mechanisms built into the peace agreement. There was no legitimate oversight for a political process in South Vietnam after an American withdrawal. Schmitz also supports my view that Kissinger thought that toughness could help replace any political, tactical, or strategic disadvantages the United States may have faced in Vietnam. Being tough did not always work out the way Kissinger intended.

Luke Nichter and I disagree on the degree to which Kissinger’s ego and ambition (and emotions) influenced his negotiating strategy in Vietnam. I thank Nichter for finding a few Vietnamese citations that were mangled by my dyslexia software. On the meeting with Jean Sainteny on August 4, 1969, the quote is entirely accurate. Its source is Lưu Văn Lợi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Cac cuoc thuong luong Le Duc Tho-Kissinger tai Paris (91–92). The English translation of the same book, Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris, carries that same passage on page 100.2

Le Duan’s well-known opposition to negotiations and his emphasis on the need to build up revolutionary forces are major themes of his “Letters to the South,” properly cited as Le Duan, Thu Vao Nam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su
That, 1965). For a good description of Le Duan’s attitude toward negotiations, see Lien-Hang Nguyen’s Hanoi’s War. She writes that “Le Duan, who had already marginalized Ho Chi Minh in the Party leadership by invoking his failed negotiation attempts with the French, remained apprehensive of a diplomatic solution and moved to block the powerful ‘peace’ proponents. In other words, he drew a significant lesson from the First Indochina War: diplomacy without military superiority should be avoided at all costs.”

I appreciate Nichter’s suggestions for further research on Lodge and the political turmoil of 1968.

Richard Moss has some questions about Lam Son 719. He rightfully criticizes my use of a conversation between Westmoreland and Kissinger in April 1971 to show the general’s opposition to the Laos invasion by ARVN troops that began in February 1971. I should have used an earlier source—one from December 11, 1970—that clearly shows that Westmoreland had been critical of Abrams’s plans for a frontal assault on Laos using ARVN troops all along.


Moss disagrees with my conclusion that Nixon was keeping Kissinger at arm’s length in late December 1971 and early January 1972, following the Radford affair and the Jack Anderson piece in the Washington Post. One source for my thinking is Kissinger. On December 30, 1971, Kissinger confides to Haldeman that the “president has lost confidence in him.” He feels that Nixon has been handling him the way he handled Rogers, “and this worries him.” During that same conversation, Kissinger even threatened to resign his NSA position. Kissinger also told a friend that he feared he “was out of favor” with the president.

Historian Robert Dallek agrees. “Nixon limited Henry’s access to him,” he writes. “Regular morning meetings with the president were canceled and Nixon would not take Henry’s phone calls.” Moss also claims that the footnote associated with my assessment of Nixon’s cool treatment of Kissinger “does not support the claim that Nixon was holding Kissinger at arm’s length at that time.” But there is no such footnote. That sentence, on page 164 of Reckless, does not have a footnote. I use other sources earlier in the text to reach that determination. The footnote Moss refers to comes two footnotes and two paragraphs later, on page 165 (fn. 14). It shows that Nixon eventually brought Kissinger in from the cold on January 12 to help with his Vietnam speeches of January 1972. The footnote is clearly about their conversation of January 12, not the events that proceeded it.

Moss does ask one very important question. Since Kissinger was “boxed in by the realities on the ground and by Nixon’s desire to Vietnamize the war, what were the alternatives to using force?” I answer that question throughout Reckless, as I explore paths not taken by Kissinger and opportunities missed in Washington, Paris, and Saigon.

Notes:
1. See the work of Sean Fear, Ed Miller, and Nu-Anh Tran.
4. For a good discussion of Westmoreland’s opposition to Abrams’s plan, see Richard A. Hunt, Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 1969–1973 (Washington DC, 2015), 176–77. Footnote 37 on page 177 gives a host of sources on this conversation and on Moorer’s decision on December 18 to reject Westmoreland’s suggestions for a quick air mobile attack on Laos and instead to follow the Abrams plan.
5. Hunt, Melvin Laird, 175, 179; James Willbanks, A Raid Too Far: Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnamization in Laos (College Station, TX, 2014), 115.
Intelligence, U.S. Foreign Relations, and Historical Amnesia

Calder Walton

“It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backwards,” the Queen remarked.

—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass

Spies, poisonings, Russian election meddling, disinformation, FBI scandals, international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, mass surveillance, cyber espionage, and data harvesting: the use and abuse of intelligence is one of the most contested and scrutinized subjects in contemporary news and current affairs. It generates almost daily news headlines across the globe. For anyone on social media, it often seems as if barely an hour passes without another spy scandal breaking. Such scandals are the subjects of many heated dinner-party conversations on university campuses.

By contrast, for a student of history who is eager to understand the similarities and differences between clandestine operations today and those in the past, there are yawning gaps in the literature and the classroom when it comes to intelligence, U.S. foreign relations, and international relations. These gaps exist even in some of the latest and most authoritative publications, as well as the history classes of major U.S. universities. Intelligence is either wholly missing from them, reduced to passing comments and historical footnotes, or, when it is addressed, taken out of context. As far as intelligence and U.S. foreign relations are concerned, we are living in the United States of Amnesia.2

The terms “signals intelligence” and “National Security Agency” (“NSA”)—the Western world’s largest and best-funded clandestine agency—do not appear in authoritative histories of U.S. foreign relations, spanning thousands of pages of scholarship.3 Consider Diplomatic History itself: a search on its website for “American foreign relations” produces 2,177 results, while a search for “National Security Agency” produces a meager 35. However, when “American foreign relations” is combined with “National Security Agency,” there are, bizarrely, zero results.4 This means that no current articles in Diplomatic History expressly link the NSA with American foreign relations.

Search terms are clearly imperfect, but these results do reveal a broader historical amnesia about major parts of U.S. intelligence. Anyone reading some of our most esteemed works about U.S. foreign relations is left with the mistaken impression that signals intelligence broadly, and the NSA in particular, did not play a significant role in postwar U.S. foreign policy. This means that important chapters of U.S. foreign affairs are not only incomplete but are likely distorted. No history of the Second World War would now fail to mention the role of signals intelligence in the Allied war effort and the successes of British and U.S. codebreakers in cracking Axis codes. However, key studies of the Cold War and postwar U.S. foreign relations seem to be saying that these codebreakers abruptly ceased their work in 1945.

In reality, signals intelligence continued to play a role in U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War, just as it had done during the Second World War. Failing to incorporate signals intelligence into the history of postwar U.S. foreign relations is like playing a piano with one hand tied behind your back: you might produce a tune but never the full score.

Intelligence: Still a Missing Dimension of Major Published Works

To start, it would be useful to establish what I mean by “intelligence.” The best definition I know is that it is information acquired from secret sources against the wishes and generally without the knowledge of its originators or possessors. This information is processed by collating it with other material, then validated, analyzed, assessed, and finally disseminated to consumers.5 Intelligence should thus be distinguished from political or diplomatic reporting, which is not subject to validation, analysis, and assessment by a dedicated independent agency.

Intelligence is concerned with understanding the intentions and capabilities of enemies. In the spy world, professionals like to distinguish secrets (hidden but knowable information) from mysteries (hidden and unknowable information). Intelligence does not necessarily mean secret information: today there are enormous efforts to obtain “open source intelligence” from publicly available data. Likewise, simply because an assessment is stamped with the seductive words “Top Secret,” it is not necessarily more important or accurate than reports lacking those words (although there is a tendency by some policymakers to conflate “secret” and “important”). On the contrary, agencies today operate in a saturated world where consumers drink from a firehose of information. If an intelligence assessment fails to deliver something extra for a consumer—something s/he cannot read in the New York Times—then its value should rightly be questioned.

Traditionally, intelligence was seen as a “missing dimension” in the history of diplomacy and international relations in the twentieth century.6 It is not missing today to the extent it once was. Some chapters of U.S. foreign affairs are obviously impossible to discuss without including an intelligence dimension: Pearl Harbor, the CIA and MI6’s coup in Iran in 1953, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, and 9/11 are all clear examples. However, outside crisis moments like these, major parts of intelligence still tend to be missing from the historical landscape of U.S. foreign relations. The curtain is raised at specific moments; secret agencies appear during foreign emergencies like these; but thereafter they vanish, exiting stage left. This
means that their ongoing role as everyday contributors to U.S. statecraft, not just emergency actors, is omitted and thus misunderstood.

Consider the role of the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) in U.S. foreign policy. One magisterial thousand-page study of U.S. foreign policy discusses the PDB only once, in relation to 9/11. However, PDBs (and their differently named successors) were given to all U.S. presidents from the 1960s onwards. Some, like Nixon, generally ignored them, while for other presidents the PDB was the first document they read each morning. The problem with addressing intelligence in isolation, at specific moments, is that there is no proper context about its use and abuse; that is revealed only by examining its broader prior and later development. To understand catastrophic failures of U.S. intelligence like Pearl Harbor or 9/11, we need to appreciate how they differ from moments when intelligence was successfully collected and successfully informed U.S. foreign policy. I am not aware of any existing published study of U.S. foreign relations that points out that on the outbreak of the First World War, the U.S. president, Woodrow Wilson, had a weaker grasp of intelligence than his eighteenth-century predecessor, George Washington. This deficiency was overlooked by Wilson's contemporaries and has been by subsequent historians. Taking a long-term perspective reveals deviations from norms.

In addition to approaching intelligence in a chronological vacuum, many histories of U.S. foreign relations fail to provide its international and comparative context. Histories of U.S. foreign relations, which largely overlook the role played by America's largest secret agency, the NSA, often do mention the activities of America's foreign intelligence-collection agency, the CIA. They usually do so with reference to CIA “covert action” conducted in foreign countries. Inexplicably, however, these same studies habitually fail to mention parallel—and often much larger-scale—Soviet covert action, which the KGB called “active measures.”

Discussing CIA covert action while failing to discuss its foreign equivalent in the Cold War, KGB active measures, produces a lopsided and misleading view of U.S. foreign affairs. It is the historical equivalent of the sound of one hand clapping.9 It is like writing about the history of the Second World War and discussing Allied troop deployments while omitting any mention of the Wehrmacht. SHAFR’s own online guide, which offers a "near comprehensive, 2.1 million-word online annotated bibliography of historical work covering the entire span of U.S. foreign relations" since the year 1600, does contain one entry for Soviet “active measures,” even though they were a significant focus of American foreign policy during the Cold War.10 It is impossible to understand CIA covert action in South American countries like Chile, for example, without understanding KGB activities there.11 Given a large body of secondary literature, as well as the archival resources on Soviet and Eastern Bloc services that have opened up, there is now no excuse for historians of U.S. foreign relations not to include the KGB and its Eastern Bloc allies in research.

As anyone who even fleetingly follows current affairs today can appreciate, the KGB is a subject with a reach beyond the historical grave. Much of the public shock and confusion about Russian active measures directed against the United States in 2016, measures that involved meddling in the presidential election and, allegedly, gathering compromising material (Kompromat) on Donald Trump, may be derived from a failure to appreciate the Kremlin’s longstanding efforts to conduct similar active measures during the Cold War. Moscow interfered in U.S. presidential elections by promoting its favored candidates and undermining those hostile to the Soviet Union. For example, the Kremlin secretly offered to subsidize Hubert Humphrey’s Democratic election bid in 1968, when he was running against the veteran anti-communist, Richard Nixon. Humphrey politely declined the offer. The KGB also attempted unsuccessfully to meddle in Ronald Reagan's election campaigns, with Moscow—correctly—fearing him more than any other Western politician. The KGB tried to find Kompromat on Reagan, but when it failed to do so, it settled for spreading disinformation (“fake news,” in modern parlance) about him within the United States, promoting public protests under slogans such as “Reagan means War!”—all of which, to Moscow’s disappointment, had minimal impact.

A greater appreciation of the long history of KGB active measures, which involved a spectrum of political warfare activities, from “influence operations” at one end to assassinations at the other, and their impact on U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, would help correct the frequently reported claim that Russian active measures today are “unprecedented.” They may appear new, but in fact, President Putin, a former KGB officer, has merely adapted older KGB active measures for the modern age, harnessing new digital cyber technologies for older Cold War ends. He has spread disinformation to undermine public confidence in Western governments, promoted conspiracy theories to make it seem that nothing can be trusted and everything is a sham, and driven wedges between members of Western strategic alliances like NATO. All these measures are straight from the KGB’s Cold War playbook. A valuable and policy-relevant subject of research at present would be to study how the United States and its Western allies countered Soviet active measures in the past—or failed to do so.

The Broader Problem: The Decline of Political and Diplomatic History

As readers of these pages will doubtless appreciate, there has recently been a vigorous debate about the decline and fall of political history taught at U.S. universities. Subjects labeled “traditional,” like the history of high politics and statecraft, biographical studies of statesmen, and diplomatic and military history have been shunted aside in research and teaching agendas at major U.S. universities, with “new” subjects taking their place. During the 2015–16 academic year, only three out of 572 history jobs advertised with the American Historical Association were for positions in diplomatic or international history, a fall from a still pathetic nine positions the year before.

Undoubtedly, readers will immediately and correctly point out that “new” subjects, like social, cultural, and gender history, are expanding and moving traditional political history in invigorating new directions. However, arguments between these two camps, traditionalist and non-traditionalist, are really attacking straw men, and they miss a more important point: so far as I can tell, nobody is seriously contending that subjects like gender, social, cultural history should not be researched and taught. All disciplines benefit from the ways in which they are advancing and enhancing our understanding of U.S. foreign affairs and diplomacy.

Still, can anyone reasonably contend that diplomatic and military history, which address major subjects such as statecraft and war, should not be taught by university history departments? Unfortunately, whichever way one looks at it, subjects like diplomatic and military history
have been sidelined or eliminated altogether at the history departments of leading U.S. research universities. There are inevitably contrary examples, but these subjects are trending into oblivion at major institutions in this country. Take Princeton University, for example. With a more than 60 faculty in the History Department on a tenure track or with tenure, not a single one does U.S. diplomatic history or the United States and the world.16

At the same time, overall undergraduate enrolment in history majors at U.S. universities is in decline—in free fall, in fact.17 Since 2008, the number of students majoring in history at U.S. universities has dropped 30 percent, falling more than any other humanities subject.18 Some have suggested that the cause of our fall off a cliff is the 2008 financial crisis, after which students began to vote with their feet, choosing STEM majors, which have “safer” employment prospects. However, the awkward reality is that history’s collapse started long before the financial crisis.

The unpalatable truth for our profession is that history seems to be dying at U.S. universities—committing slow-motion suicide, as two commentators recently put it—because history departments are failing to provide courses that students see as relevant and appealing: those about diplomacy, war, and peace.19 Notably, when universities have offered history courses on subjects like grand strategy and warfare, they have proved popular. History departments should also recognize that other university departments, like government, international relations, and political science, are only too happy to offer courses on subjects like statecraft and warfare. There is a serious risk that, if history departments continue to fail to offer relevant courses, they will, amid a large marketplace for university majors, steadily work themselves out of a job. It thus seems to me that the real debate that university history departments need to be having is not whether any one field should be pursued at the expense of another, which is really a false dichotomy; instead, it should be how to pursue both “traditional” and “new” areas of historical research—not either/or, but both/and.

Intelligence history is a striking example of how traditional subjects like diplomatic and military history need to be reinvigorated. The recent declassification of voluminous intelligence records from the United States and its key Cold War allies, like Britain, as well as the opening of the secret archives of former Soviet-Eastern Bloc countries, enhances and in some cases changes our understanding of hitherto established chapters of U.S. foreign relations, diplomacy, and warfare.

Intelligence History: State of the Field

Theoretically, the recent explosion of trans-national history should have led to a similar boom in the way intelligence history is studied and promoted. However, it has not. There is a puzzle at the heart of this state of affairs. I am not qualified to comment on the psychology of why many historians ignore intelligence—some who are vocal about intelligence matters today fail to incorporate them into their own scholarship—but I will offer some speculation, falling happily short of psychoanalysis.

Traditionally, historians may have shied away from incorporating covert agencies into their work because they viewed them as frivolous subjects, more suitable to the pages of an Ian Fleming novel than serious scholarship. This is fair enough. James Bond has done serious damage to the study of intelligence history. In many ways, the aim of those of us working in the field is to rescue it from 007.

Second, historians could legitimately claim in decades past to have been frustrated by a lack of archival intelligence material.20 This was fair enough. Previously there were striking gaps in publicly available sources such as archives and the memoirs of statesmen—gaps that arose either through imposed or self-imposed censorship. For example, in the 1,500 pages of his memoirs about his time in the White House, Henry Kissinger did not mention the NSA once; he justified the omission with the quip that the NSA stood for “No Such Agency.”21 However, the NSA is certainly no longer the non-existent agency it once was. (In fact, even in the face of silence about the subject in memoirs, some pathbreaking scholars showed that significant archival material was available in the public domain about the NSA’s activities and its historical impact on U.S. foreign relations, if one was prepared to look for it.)22 Recently declassified records now unsurprisingly show that, contrary to the impression he left in his memoirs, the NSA in fact provided Kissinger with the intercepted secret communications of foreign powers.23

There has never been a better time to study to intelligence history. It is a rapidly developing subject of research, essentially a subfield of diplomatic and military history, which can boast of a large body of specialized scholarship, with dedicated, peer-reviewed journals publishing widely about intelligence and U.S. foreign relations.24 Scholars are taking the subject in new directions, exploring topics like the CIA’s role in America’s cultural Cold War, for example.25

Anyone who decides to study the subject now faces the happy problem of having so many declassified U.S. intelligence records available that it is difficult to know where to start. The National Archives at College Park, as well as presidential libraries, contain valuable intelligence records revealing the impact, or lack thereof, of clandestine agencies on policymaking by different U.S. administrations. The CIA has recently placed its entire declassified record system, CREST, containing 12 million pages, online, so scholars no longer even need to travel to College Park and use the awkward dedicated computer terminal there, as used to be the case. The FBI has put 6,700 of its historical documents online, and the NSA has undertaken similar efforts. Even selected portions of the CIA’s most sensitive document, the PDB, have been declassified.26 Likewise, the Foreign Relations of the United States series includes intelligence material, so readers can begin to study its use and abuse in U.S. foreign affairs.

Below are some of the archival sources that I have found valuable in writing a book about U.S. and British intelligence during the Cold War:

For U.S. intelligence:
- CIA27
- FBIm
- NSA29
- “U.S. Declassified Documents Online”30
- National Security Archive31
- Holdings at presidential libraries, papers of U.S. intelligence officers held at the Library of Congress and at various university libraries

For British intelligence:
- MI5 and GCHQ records and those of Britain’s high-level intelligence assessment body, the Joint Intelligence Committee, now at the UK National Archives32

For Soviet/ Eastern Bloc intelligence services:
- The “Mitrokhin Archive,” material compiled by a senior KGB foreign intelligence archivist, Vasily Mitrokhin, and smuggled to Britain, parts of which are now publicly available in Cambridge, UK33
- National Security Archive34
- East German (Stasi) records,35 Bulgarian (DS) records,36 Czech (StB) records,37 and Lithuanian (KGB) records38

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- National Security Archive34
- East German (Stasi) records,35 Bulgarian (DS) records,36 Czech (StB) records,37 and Lithuanian (KGB) records38
For further information on the opening of Eastern Bloc records and on doing research in them, and for a look into the ways in which Soviet Bloc services influenced U.S. foreign relations, I would recommend a recent publication by Philip Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva.48

Despite an avalanche of source material that has come crashing into archives, some of which now appears in published document collections, history departments of major U.S. universities have failed to promote intelligence history as a subject in its own right. I am not aware of a single lectureship in a history department of a U.S. research university specializing in intelligence history. Those U.S.-based scholars who study intelligence, under the rubric of “intelligence studies,” tend to be trained as political scientists,49 or, if they are historians, tend to be housed in political science/ international relations departments, public policy schools, or specialized military schools. The U.S. historians Tim Naftali, Nick Cullather, Kathryn Olmstead, and Hugh Wilford are exceptions to this rule. In fact, there seem to be more British-based historians specializing in intelligence and U.S. foreign policy than U.S.-based historians—leading one well-placed commentator to remark that the subject is facing a British invasion.50

U.S. history departments are missing a significant opportunity here. The course I helped to teach and develop on intelligence history at Cambridge University, “The Secret World: The Rise of Governments and Intelligence Communities,” was persistently one of the most popular undergraduate courses offered in history at Cambridge University and produced a number of pioneering undergraduate and graduate research dissertations.

Opportunities for Original Research: U.S. Signals Intelligence

The issues raised above are not intended as criticism, but to highlight gaps in existing scholarship—gaps that provide opportunities for new research and forward momentum. My central contention can be summarized succinctly. It would be misleading to suggest that intelligence was pivotal in U.S. foreign affairs. In reality, U.S. statesmen used intelligence as just part of their decision-making; rarely, if ever, in history has it been decisive by itself in statecraft or warfare.

My central contention can be summarized succinctly. It would be misleading to suggest that intelligence was pivotal in U.S. foreign affairs. In reality, U.S. statesmen used intelligence as just part of their decision-making; rarely, if ever, in history has it been decisive by itself in statecraft or warfare.

To understand U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War, it is thus necessary to incorporate not only the NSA, but GCHQ. UKUSA's now-declassified text also dispels a conspiracy theory that the NSA used GCHQ to “spy” on U.S. citizens, circumventing legal restriction placed on it, but not the British: the agreement only relates to foreign communications, with U.S. and British communications expressly exempted. Under UKUSA's terms, it was thus expressly prohibited for the United States or Britain to collaborate to collect each other's communications. Furthermore, Britain and the United States could not establish SIGINT sharing agreements with third parties without notifying each other. As the Cold War chill descended, UKUSA was expanded to include British commonwealth countries Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, forming what became known as the Five Eyes Agreement, which is still in existence today. Five Eyes entailed the vast global pooling of SIGINT resources during the Cold War.

Britain and America's transatlantic secret arrangement during the Cold War influenced U.S. foreign and domestic policies. A series of Soviet communications broken by U.S. and British cryptanalysts, later codenamed VENONA and shared through UKUSA, provided Washington and London with probably the greatest source of information about Soviet espionage in the early Cold War. VENONA was the postwar successor to Britain and America's wartime SIGINT efforts against the Axis Powers at places like Bletchley Park, discussed in many history books. VENONA revealed that approximately two hundred U.S. citizens had worked as Soviet agents during the war and in some cases after it and that Soviet agents had penetrated every major branch of Franklin D. Roosevelt's wartime administration.

Among those agents were Alger His (codenamed “ALES” in VENONA) at the State Department, Larry Duggan (codenamed “FRANK”) at the State Department, and Harry Dexter White at the Treasury (“JURIST”). In 1944, FDR's then vice-president, Henry Wallace, had selected Harry Dexter White and Larry Duggan to be his secretary of state and secretary of the Treasury, respectively, in the event of FDR's death, which at the time seemed likely. If FDR had died then, and Wallace had become president, Soviet agents Duggan and White would have occupied two of the highest offices of the land.44 VENONA shows that the FBI was correct at the time to have suspicions about Wallace's affiliations with Russia. It also shows that present-day allegations about the FBI investigating whether Trump is a Russian asset are not unprecedented: now is not the first time the FBI has had concerns about Russia and incumbents inside the White House.

VENONA revealed Soviet intelligence had penetrated the top-secret Allied atomic bomb program in New Mexico, the “MANHATTAN” project, with agents literally sending plans for the world's first nuclear bomb to the Kremlin.
Authorities on both sides of the Atlantic used VENONA in lockstep to identify and prosecute a series of “atom spies,” including Klaus Fuchs (codenamed “CHARLES”) and Julius Rosenberg (“LIBERAL”), though neither they nor the press reporting their stories at the time knew it was SIGINT that revealed their guilt. VENONA also revealed the most able and damaging group of foreign agents ever recruited by Soviet intelligence: the five “Cambridge spies.” The VENONA decrypts present remarkable opportunities for original research, as some Soviet agents, listed only under their codenames, still have not been publicly identified.45

Britain and America’s SIGINT cooperation through UKUSA produced more than counterespionage investigations: it influenced U.S. foreign policy. As Britain withdrew from its global empire in the postwar years, it became apparent that far-flung outposts of the British empire, like Cyprus and Hong Kong, were valuable Cold War real estate, essential bases for British and U.S. SIGINT collection on the Soviet Union. In fact, as I have shown elsewhere, recently declassified records reveal that SIGINT collection was so important for U.S. national security that in some cases Washington guided London in its exit from empire.46 In Cyprus, the United States helped to bankroll Britain’s continued presence in military compounds after independence, effectively turning British “sovereign bases” there, where British flags continued to fly, into vast GCHQ and NSA SIGINT collection sites, with radar and antennae pointed at the Soviet Union.

This information confirms an older thesis put forward by two influential historians, Ronald Robinson and Wm. Roger Louis, about the imperialism of decolonization: during the Cold War the United States picked up responsibilities in Britain’s former colonial empire.47 In some cases, like that discussed below, the Cold War drove the United States to be a stronger advocate of British colonial rule than the British government was.

U.S. Covert Action: Meddling in Foreign Elections

The United States has a long history of meddling in foreign elections. One of the first covert actions conducted by the CIA after its establishment in 1947 was to interfere in democratic elections in Italy in 1948, with the aim of preventing the Communists from winning. Facing Soviet active measures to influence the election there, the CIA deployed a range of dirty tricks learned from its wartime predecessor, the OSS. These included black propaganda against Communist candidates and the secret use of $10 million of captured Axis loot to fund, literally with bags of cash, anti-communist candidates.48 The CIA and president Truman got the result they wanted: the Communists failed to win a majority. It is unclear whether the CIA’s covert activities were decisive, but as far as Truman was concerned, the CIA played an important role. He sent his Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, his personal congratulations.49

The CIA continued to meddle in the domestic affairs of foreign countries during the Cold War. Well-known examples of such interference are Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in the 1970s. Less well known is the CIA’s covert action in British Guiana, on the Atlantic/Caribbean coast of South America. The source of London and Washington’s concern there was its Marxist leader, Cheddi Jagan, and his Marxist American wife, Janet. Under Jagan, British Guiana became the first British imperial territory with a Marxist prime minister.

The extent to which Jagan’s Marxism bled into communism became a matter of intense debate in London and Washington, as Britain looked to withdraw from British Guiana and grant it independence in the 1950s. British intelligence informed colonial policymakers in London that it had no evidence that Jagan was a fellow-travelling Communist. In fact, MI5’s intensive surveillance of the British Communist Party in London, which Jagan communicated with and visited, showed that he was, as one MI5 report put it, little more than a fairly pink “London School of Economics Marxist.”50

Non-alarmist assessments like these fell on deaf ears in London and Washington. Churchill, who became prime minister in 1953, saw the specter of communism looming large in British Guiana. When Jagan won an election victory there in May 1953, Churchill told the colonial secretary that the British “ought surely to get American support in doing all that we can to break the Communist teeth in British Guiana.” He then added sarcastically, “Perhaps they would even send Senator McCarthy down there.”51 Churchill resorted to extraordinary measures to remove Jagan from power. After the premier had been in office just over a hundred days, Churchill suspended the constitution in British Guiana, claiming that Jagan was undermining the constitution and furthering communism. Jagan was ousted from power.

To London and Washington’s consternation, Jagan’s Progressive People’s Party (PPP) continued to win elections in British Guiana, even after London redrew voting districts to make it more difficult. The PPP won elections in 1957 and again in October 1961, at which point Jagan became prime minister. Soon after his election victory, Jagan visited President Kennedy in the Oval Office. Photos show an amicable meeting between the two leaders. Afterward Kennedy said that, although Jagan was a Marxist, the “United States doesn’t object, because that choice was made by an honest election, which he won.”52

In private, Kennedy said the opposite. Following the humiliating failure to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba six months earlier in the CIA-backed landing at the Bay of Pigs, JFK was determined to prevent another Castro-type leader in America’s backyard. He wanted what he called “a good result” in British Guiana. The Kennedy administration pressured London to delay its transfer of power in British Guiana until an alternative to Jagan could be found, even suggesting the British could reimpose direct rule. The British responded that it was impossible to bring back colonialism. But the Kennedy White House persisted.

In February 1962, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a message to the British foreign secretary, Lord Home. “I must tell you that I have now reached the conclusion that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan,” he wrote. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told Home that Rusk’s letter was “pure Machiavellianism,” exposing a “degree of cynicism” that he found surprising, considering that the secretary of state was “not an Irishman, nor a politician, nor a millionaire.” Home shot back a terse letter to Rusk. “You say that it is not possible for you to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan and that Jagan should not be allowed to accede to power again.” How would you suggest that this can be done in a democracy? And even if a device could be found, it would almost certainly be transparent.53

The British and Americans held a series of high-level meetings about how to steal elections in British Guiana. At some meetings, the British joked fun at their American counterparts by getting them to say how important British colonial rule was. At one point, the colonial secretary told the U.S. ambassador in London, “If you Americans like British Guiana so much, why don’t you take it over?”54 In March 1962, JFK’s special adviser, Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger, noted that British Guiana, a colony of just 600,000 people, was consuming more man-hours per-capita in Washington and London than any other issue. Jagan, he added, would doubtless be pleased to know this.55 In March 1962, a U.S. economic adviser in British Guiana poignantly asked the White House whether the United States could legitimately maintain that it respected the freedom of the

*Passport April 2019*
ballot and a choice made in a democratic election, even if it was not the choice America would make, and then coerce a people to choose a government that Washington wanted.56 In August 1962, JFK authorized a $2 million CIA covert action to do just that: drive Jagan from power before British Guiana reached independence.57 British Guiana thus became the only British territory where a U.S. agency, not one of Britain’s own services, became the dominant intelligence force. JFK ordered that the CIA’s plans for British Guiana were not to be put on paper for the White House, only discussed in person; information would be available to the State Department on a strict need-to-know basis. Records at the JFK Presidential Library suggest that funds were pushed through Congress under the pretext of conducting economic feasibility studies for British Guiana.58

In October 1962, the colonial secretary, Duncan Sandys, agreed that the CIA should approach Jagan’s main political opponent, Forbes Burnham, whom Washington regarded as suitably pro-Western. The CIA provided funding for the British Guiana Trade Union Council, which in April 1963 launched a crippling ten-week-long general strike—at that point the longest general strike in any country in history. In December 1963, CIA covert action in British Guiana got the result that Washington wanted: Jagan’s PPP lost the election, and Forbes Burnham came to power as head of a coalition government. Burnham led Guyana (as British Guiana was renamed) to independence in 1966. However, as so often appears to be the case with U.S. covert action, short-term “success” was replaced by longer-term failures, determined by unintended consequences known as “blowback” within intelligence agencies. Washington’s man, Burnham, ruled Guyana incompetently and corruptly, wrecking the Guyanese economy. Ironically, by the 1970s, he had proclaimed that Guyana was “on the road to socialism,” and he formed friendly ties with the Soviet Bloc. It is impossible to know the extent to which Jagan would have aligned with the Soviet Bloc if he, not Burnham, had led Guyana to independence.59

Conclusion: An Agenda for Applied History, or Historical Sensibility

In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs debacle in April 1961, President Kennedy asked his special counsel, Theodore Sorensen, “How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?”60 We can now see that a reason for his miscalculation, or “stupidity,” was wishful thinking about the situation inherited from his presidential predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower. He believed that covert action could achieve the removal of Castro, when in reality that could be achieved only by overt military action—to which Kennedy would never have consented. Kennedy’s miscalculation was also derived from understandable ignorance about U.S. peacetime intelligence. The history books he read, first at university and then while president, gave little guidance about what a covert agency could reasonably be expected to achieve. In particular, he failed to grasp the gulf between the CIA’s directorate of plans (operations), which exaggerated its ability to conduct successful covert action to remove Castro in Cuba, and the CIA’s directorate of intelligence, which provided sober assessments.

In the 1990s, Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government published a twenty-page condensed history of “The CIA to 1961.”61 Anyone who reads those twenty pages will know more about the CIA than Kennedy did when he became president. It would be tempting to suppose that the level of historical knowledge among U.S. policymakers about U.S. intelligence has improved since Kennedy’s time—or since the 1990s. However, there are good grounds for believing it has not. A senior U.S. official who worked on national security matters in President Obama’s White House, with history and politics degrees from some of the best universities in the world, told me that when he took his job all he knew about intelligence was from James Bond and Jason Bourne films.62 Though anecdotal, his comments are symptomatic of a larger problem. Yawning gaps in the historical literature about intelligence, which I have illustrated in the paragraphs above, have contributed to public policy misunderstandings about the nature, role, capabilities, successes, and failures of U.S. intelligence.

Intelligence is a significant, but often neglected, subject in the history of U.S. foreign relations. Correcting historical amnesia about it has historical merit and also provides opportunities to influence public policy through “Applied History,” or what another commentator has called “Historical Sensibility”: lessons learned from precedents, drawing analogies with the past, and warning of false analogies.63 To paraphrase Winston Churchill, in order to understand the present, let alone predict the future, we first need to look back to the past—and the further back we look the better.

Christopher Andrew and I have recently launched a landmark new project in intelligence history that follows Churchill’s suggestion: The Cambridge History of Espionage and Intelligence, to be published in three volumes by Cambridge University Press. It will study the use and abuse of intelligence in statecraft and war from the ancient world to the present day. With approximately ninety chapters by leading scholars, it will be the most authoritative collection ever assembled on intelligence history and will also set new research agendas. However, given the voluminous publicly available archival material now available, scholars of U.S. foreign relations have no excuse to wait for our publication, in five years’ time, to incorporate intelligence into their work. In fact, historians of U.S. foreign affairs now have a stark choice: either to include intelligence in their scholarship or explain why they have chosen not to do so. The latter is not a tenable position.

Notes:

1. I would like to thank Ben Edgar, a Master in Public Policy student at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, for assisting me with some of the research for this article.
6. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, UK, 1984).
8. See, for example, Cohen, The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations.
10. Search by the author conducted on Nov. 13, 2018. The CIA publicly testified before Congress in 1961 about the nature and implications of its covert active support for Sukarno. See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Eighty-Seventh Congress, first session, on June 2, 1961 (Washington DC, 1961). In September 1961, Communist Forgeries became the first Senate hearing ever translated into the foreign language (Spanish). Ronald Reagan later established an “Active Measures Working Group” that was responsible for reports like Department of State, Soviet


16. The author would like to thank Stephen Kotkin for discussing this.

17. Niall Ferguson, "The Decline and Fall of History," remarks accepting the Philip Merrill Award from the American Council of Trustees and Alumni for outstanding contributions to liberal arts education (Washington DC, Oct. 28, 2016).


21. Niall Ferguson, "The Decline and Fall of History," remarks accepting the Philip Merrill Award from the American Council of Trustees and Alumni for outstanding contributions to liberal arts education (Washington DC, Oct. 28, 2016).


32. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk. MI5 records are found under catalog reference “KV,” JIC records under “CAB,” and GCHQ records under “HW.”


40. These include scholars like Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, Loch Johnson, Gregory Treverton, and Amy Zegart.


42. See Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency (New York, 1995), 161.

43. Government Communications Headquarters, HW 80/1 to 80/11 inclusive, The National Archives of the UK [TNA]; see also https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/venona/.

44. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, 144.


46. Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (New York, 2013), ch. 4.


49. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 172.


51. Prime Minister’s Office, PREM 11/827 Churchill to Lyttelton (2 May 1953), TNA.

52. Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 221.

53. Prime Minister’s Office, Rusk to Home (19 Feb. 1962) and Home to Rusk (26 Feb 1962), PREM 11/3666, TNA.

54. Memo from President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to Kennedy (March 8, 1962) attaching Memo for US Ambassador in UK (Bruce) (Feb. 27, 1962), box WH 27, file 2, Arthur Schlesinger Papers.

55. "Schlesinger memo for President" (March 8, 1962), box WH 27, file 3, s.36f, Schlesinger Papers.


58. Schlesinger memo for president, box WH 27, file 3, s.13 (Sept. 15, 1962), Schlesinger Papers.

59. Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London, 2009), 480. This author was a principal researcher for that book.

60. Cited in Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 257.


The Diplomatic Character(s) of the Early Republic

Katrina Ponti

In its early years the United States, a nation attempting to distinguish itself from the monarchical norms of Europe, sought to arrange its own rules of foreign engagement. What was the diplomacy of a republic supposed to look like? Who would conduct the activities of foreign affairs? Thanks to the formidable digital project Founders Online, a cooperative effort from the National Archives and the University of Virginia Press, one can begin to trace the development of American diplomacy through its first thirty fragile years, 1783–1812.

Most people researching diplomatic activity during this era would begin searching Founders Online by looking for the noun “diplomat.” However, that word does not come up. The phrase that does emerge to describe a person who participated in the general activity of foreign affairs is “diplomatic character.” This term describes a far-flung group of Americans abroad who acted in some diplomatic capacity, big or small. It includes government-mandated actors such as ministers, consuls, and treaty negotiators as well as a sundry range of merchants, naval officers, intellectuals, and sailors. Anyone who even briefly took on foreign intercourse on behalf of the United States, whether officially or not, could be said to have a “diplomatic character.” The term is useful to describe the rag-tag group of Americans who were on the earliest frontlines of American engagement with the wider world, an engagement that included—and went beyond—the official and often Eurocentric activities of America’s first foreign ministers.

It is from the perspective of these diplomatic characters that I revisit the diplomatic history of the American early Republic in its first thirty years. By shifting the lens of study from secretaries of state and ambassadors to a subgroup of diplomatic actors, we can change the way we look at American foreign intercourse. The American government had only recently been freed from its imperial bond to Great Britain. It had survived its political realignment from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution. But each of the government’s framers had his own vision for the domestic and international future of the nation. The presidential administrations of George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison each followed separate and often contradictory foreign policies.

As a result, American foreign policy lacked continuity from president to president and even from cabinet member to cabinet member. The United States government forged an inconsistent path through a diplomacy that was often conducted by trial and error. This state of affairs encouraged individuals, official actors or not, to engage in dealings with foreign contacts that were not necessarily coterminous or consistently aligned with American foreign policies. Historians have begun to approach the diplomatic and global history of the early Republic by looking through the eyes of these individuals and considering how their actions constituted diplomatic activities. From the perspective of diplomatic characters, two major elements in diplomatic history shift: geography and demography. Americans of all stripes experienced a change in their sense of space as they went into the world and moved from their base in the North Atlantic and Europe to the Atlantic Ocean, which became their highway to the rest of the world. For historians, this change incorporates new oceanic systems into the narrative and shifts it away from shoreline interactions to other contested spaces inland, such as borderlands.

Occupying these new geographies were new American demographics. Frontline commercial and merchant activity perpetuated these initial geographic shifts, acting as the impetus for American interaction with the world. However, as these mercantile relationships solidified, other groups of actors came on the scene, traveling and working on board merchant vessels. There are significant studies that have brought to light these other groups, including consuls, naval officers, intellectuals, sailors, and Native Americans, and have shown how they participated in the American diplomatic project.

One of the more recent historiographic discussions of American globalization and diplomatic activity in the early Republic occurred in a roundtable forum in Diplomatic History entitled “Globalizing the Early Republic.” Konstantin Dierks’s contribution provides a brief but comprehensive discussion of how the American globalizing project transcended traditional containers of nation and empire. He draws from a variety of milieus to catalog the ways in which Americans encountered the world.

Despite the arc of the global turn in early American history, the early American Republic, and more particularly these thirty years, gets short shrift in discussions of diplomatic history. Separating itself from the era’s most global empire, the United States still retained its transnational character. Even during the American Revolution, Americans traveled abroad and maintained far-flung networks of communication, preparing the young nation for its diplomatic debut. Their diplomacy took on an ad hoc character that was somewhat different from the rapidly institutionalizing diplomatic programs of Europe. How have historians discussed the American foreign relations of this period? And how was diplomacy conducted through such a range of official and unofficial channels?
Geographic Shifts

The emergence of Atlantic history in the 1980s and 1990s as a conceptualizing framework for transnational American history provided a fresh geographic lens to study the colonizing enterprises of European empires in the early modern era. It helped scholars reconsider the formation of the United States separately from traditional nationalist narratives. This geographic perspective suggested that the individuals who lived in the region that would become the United States were already deeply ensconced in a centuries-old geographic system of trade, intelligence, and politics. But the creation of the United States at the end of the eighteenth century marked a turning point in the periodization of the Atlantic world. By the time the United States emerged as a nation in 1783, the Atlantic was increasingly becoming a route to the rest of the world, not just a space to cross or a place to explore new connections.6

The concept of the Atlantic as an entry point to the rest of the world introduced Americans as a mobile, global, and globalizing people and paved the way for Nancy Shoemaker's proposal of “maritime geographies” that comprised the extraterritorial United States during the early Republic. But arbitrary geographic boundaries did not restrain the movements of Americans. They created and occupied their own spaces of foreign engagement.5

The Atlantic world was already part of a global system of imperial trade by the late eighteenth century and was thoroughly emmeshed in a global network of trade and commerce. And as Paul Gilje asserts, since it was commerce that drove Americans into the world in the first place, it was natural that commercial agents would form the first cohort of diplomatic characters in the early Republic. These people helped to create and negotiate new geographies on behalf of the United States.7

I wish to discuss three broad geographic lenses that historians have recently used to approach early American commercial-diplomatic activities: the oceanic world, the South Atlantic, and the American West. The first geographic lens completely shifts the Eurocentric mode of American diplomacy. In 1783, the first American merchant vessel left for China, exposing a vast transoceanic region to American markets and interests. As vessels left the Atlantic to reach Asian markets, they traveled through the South Atlantic, a region slighted by the dominant North Atlantic lens of American diplomatic history. Examining the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and South America uncovers informal American involvement in revolutions and colonial unrest. Finally, often overlooked in broad discussions of American global history and foreign affairs are the borderlands of the American West. These became spaces that Americans entered as foreigners, spaces where they acted in both peaceful and violent ways.

From the perspective of individual activities, the narrative of the United States's relationship with the world made its truly international debut not in Paris or London, but on a half-mile strip of land in Canton on the China Sea. The Asian and Pacific world became a realm where American influence was surpassed only by that of the British.8 James Fichter describes the United States's trade with Asia in the thirty years following independence as “greater than that of any other Western nation on earth, save Britain.”9 While the ink was drying on the Treaty of Paris in September of 1783, a syndicate of merchants that included statesman and financier Robert Morris re-outfitted the American privateer Chinese Queen and rechristened it Empress of China. The American government struggled to make sense of its new place in the world, but this cohort of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia merchants knew exactly where the future lay: in Asia.10

The story of the Empress of China is now a common point of embarkation for historians who are attempting to illuminate the movement of American foreign activity away from the Atlantic and outline the role of private initiatives in making such new movements possible. The “first generation” of American sailors, merchants, and officers in Asia, which is described in Dane Morrison’s book True Yankees, left remarkable documents describing experiences that helped to shape a young American identity, one that valued individual enterprise over political influence. These documents show that the American government had a limited role in guiding the growing number of American vessels entering the Asian markets.11

However, the United States did play a small role in these early forays to the Pacific. John Haddad, also using the Empress of China as a point of introduction, initially focuses on the vessel's supercargo, Samuel Shaw, who left a detailed diary of the voyage and the personal relationships that he formed in Canton. From Shaw's account we find that the Americans, who wanted to escape the political grasp of the British in the Atlantic, eagerly sought economic acceptance from them in the Pacific. British approval in Canton also came with the approval of the port's international community, which was equally valuable to Shaw. He was tasked not only with forming economic relationships, but also with establishing political contacts within the community. He did not seek the role, but the Continental Congress had provided him with a letter notifying him that Congress had appointed him U.S. consul to Canton. Shaw could also use the letter to introduce himself to the political powers in that port.12

Shaw was not entitled to a salary or any other type of remuneration. The American government saw its chance to expand American foreign relationships without actually paying for the service, in what Haddad calls “low-budget diplomacy.”13 Shaw’s appointment set a precedent for the selection of future consuls and other individuals who permanently or temporarily acted on behalf of the U.S. government abroad. It relied on preexisting, cost-free networks of communication that were facilitated by individuals who had established relationships within such networks.

The China trade opened new oceanic worlds for Americans, connecting them to the Pacific and Indian oceans, which they passed through on the way to Asia. Pacific world encounters are beginning to frame a new area of study in early American history. Dissertations by Dael Norwood and Michael Block focus particularly on the journeys of American merchantmen through the Pacific and on the relationships they made along the way. The creation of these relationships played on the American political imagination and confirmed that the United States had a bright commercial future in the international marketplace.

American vessels further expanded their reach in the Pacific world, exploiting its wealth of natural resources, including seal furs, sea otters, and guano, to sell in the Chinese and Asian markets, which had little interest in North American grain and rum stores. The exploitation of these resources brought these Americans into direct contact with the Spanish colonial empire that governed the eastern Pacific.14

American merchants also took the Indian Ocean
route to Asia around Africa to Madagascar and India. Kevin McDonald refers to the integration of this route into American travels as the “Indo-Atlantic world,” which he sees as an extension of the Atlantic system to accommodate the American merchant networks in Madagascar and India. These oceanic approaches to American globalization begin to uncover merchant networks and relationships that the U.S. government believed would form the foundation for American foreign affairs. It also became a low-maintenance and low-cost intelligence network that the government could harness more directly when the situation required.

Transit through new oceanic spaces also enabled Americans to create new personal trade relationships in the Latin world that were otherwise limited while the American colonies remained in the British Empire. However, the way was not always free of conflict. When the Americans opened the South Atlantic to new influences, for example, that region was fraught with colonial mismanagement and anti-colonial revolutions. To take advantage of this political unrest, the Americans took on additional commercially driven roles as adventurers, privateers, and smugglers. They manipulated the shifts in the political landscape of the Latin Atlantic and, as the Age of Revolutions crested, put themselves in the center of the unrest in pursuit of personal gain. At the same time, they were also America’s eyes and ears abroad amid the major diplomatic quarrels of the time.

In Spanish Florida and Louisiana, American adventurers, acting independently of the American government, hoped to exploit the uncertain political control of these borderlands between the United States and the Spanish Atlantic world. It is easy to forget that in these thirty years Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana were not the inevitable anchors of what is today the United States’s Deep South. When Americans did enter the region, they were vastly outnumbered by the Spanish, French, Creoles, blacks, and Native Americans who had occupied this space for hundreds of years. These Americans shaped foreign affairs in this landscape both through collaboration with the Spanish colonial occupiers and through conflict, conducting filibustering raids on West Florida lands in hopes of overthrowing the Spanish regime. The emphasis on a pragmatic balance between collaboration and conflict as a mode of conducting American foreign affairs in this region was also characteristic of American privateers and smugglers. Americans joined Spanish privateers to actively manipulate American, Spanish, British and French powers to their own ends. These Americans negotiated for physical and economic space in this region to achieve personal aims; they were not acting as American citizens trying to achieve manifest destiny for their nation.

American commercial agents became experts at negotiating the uncertain commercial and political landscape and altering it in their favor. Tyson Reeder’s dissertation examines the techniques used by American merchants to shift their trade networks to accommodate political unrest in Portuguese Brazil and the larger South Atlantic. The activities of Americans during the Haitian Revolution show similarly creative navigation. In his book, James Dun explores how the reports written by American merchants who were observers of the Haitian Revolution came to influence culture and foreign policies in Philadelphia. Their published observations exposed Americans to the nature of these foreign revolutions and outlined the limited role that the U.S. government could play in supporting them.

Political participation in these foreign events required creative individuals to navigate the waters of unrest. In Democracy in Black and White, Ron Johnson argues that ultimately, while merchants did provide intelligence on the state of affairs in Haiti, it was Dr. Edward Stephens who proved the most resourceful diplomatic and economic actor forwarding information on Haiti to the United States. Such individuals, in their private capacities, inventively negotiated the new political landscapes of the Atlantic world and enabled the U.S. government to understand the nature of the political unrest in its hemisphere without risking financial and military entanglement in its outcome.

Finally, the ongoing work of Paul Mapp and Alan Taylor continues to point to the American West for a vital geographic perspective. Building off this work, historians have harnessed the perspectives of diplomatic characters in continental/borderland studies to consider the weak role of the federal government in acquiring and militarily controlling western lands. Again, commercial factors and agents proved the initial points of entry into this still-foreign territory through frontier trade forts. However, Peter Bottiger and John Reda note that these endeavors in the Mississippi and Ohio valleys, while partially supported by the U.S. government and the military, became subservient to the individual, familial, and often violent initiatives of European fur traders, American settlers, Native Americans, and métis communities. The struggle of the American government to understand this creole world as truly foreign territory further complicated the federal system in the West. It was a space that used kinship bonds, commercial relationships, and violence as the tools of diplomacy rather than “early American” ideologically based attempts to civilize an untamed landscape.

Americans with commercial objectives moved in all directions from their Atlantic home base. Asian markets, open from the nation’s inception, cast the nature of American foreign engagement in a new geographic light and set a precedent for the U.S. government’s hands-off and cost-free approach to diplomacy, using merchants and other actors with commercial aims. As American global traffic increased, Americans creatively inserted themselves into old communities experiencing political upheaval around the southern Atlantic. They participated in these Atlantic revolutionary moments as citizens of a new nation, as well as independent actors harnessing uncertainty for personal economic ends. This participation in turn influenced American policies.

These diplomatic actors functioned largely without the direct intervention of the American government, but it is from their perspective in the American West that we find the federal government struggling to control relations in transnational borderlands. Initially, thwarted by independent commercial actors, the government resorted to violence to force negotiation. These geographies, which shifted with American independence, altered the diplomatic outlook of the United States in the early Republic and paved the way for new groups of diplomatic characters to come to the fore.

Demographic Shifts

Commercial goals became a major means of conducting American diplomacy around the world, and merchants paved the way for other groups of Americans to participate in the American diplomatic project. Historians have begun to discuss these Americans from two thematic angles: institutional actors and social actors. American institutions of foreign engagement were in their infancy. They had little regulation and were subject to serious lags in communication, as well as shifts in policy from president to president. The U.S. consular corps and the navy were the earliest government institutions to encounter the world; however, their diplomatic successes were limited.

Recent historiography has also begun to alter the types of social groups that are discussed as part of American foreign affairs. It is likely that a majority of Americans abroad in this period were white male merchants. However,
not all fit this description, nor were all affluent. Americans went abroad for assorted reasons: scientific discovery, literary endeavors, service in a labor force, and fortune. Their diplomatic activities were frequently secondary to these primary motivations.

The largest group that might be considered a diplomatic institution was the U.S. consular corps. A widespread and motley group of merchants, expatriates, and sometimes just foreigners who could speak English served as the points of contact for American vessels in major global ports. Historians who discuss these disparate and poorly managed consular networks focus on consuls within small regions. Bernadette Whelan’s research concentrates on Ireland, for example, while Brett Goodin’s focus is on North Africa.24 Efforts are being made, however, to chart this global institution by collating more of the stories and connections of individual consuls. Two historians have begun digital mapping projects to uncover the full international (but still incomplete) reach of consuls. Nicole Phelps at the University of Vermont is in the early stages of her project, which endeavors to map the complete U.S. Consular Service between 1789 and 1924.25 Jean Bauer’s Early American Foreign Service Database maps a smaller portion of the U.S. Foreign Service.26 Both are wonderful resources for charting the proto-consular service; both introduce digital methods to understand the wide reach but limited efficacy of early consular networks.

While the U.S. contingent of consuls existed throughout the early Republic as a geographically extensive form of diplomatic engagement, the U.S. Navy formed a smaller corps for conducting foreign affairs. Disbanded at the end of the Revolution and not recommissioned until 1794, the navy’s international presence was limited, and it struggled to find an identity, veering between defense force, offensive military force, and agent of diplomatic intimidation. It built up its complement of ships and men slowly, relying largely on sea-hardened civilian officers and sailors with limited military experience.

When we view naval officers as diplomatic characters, we find that some steered their ships at will, ignoring or creatively interpreting official orders. For example, Captain David Porter’s voyage to the Pacific in the USS Essex resulted in the conquest of the Marquesas Islands. This act, which was not directed by the government, proved disastrous for his crew.27 There are many similar stories about naval officers that show how often they blurred their martial and diplomatic roles. Oliver Hazard Perry and Stephen Decatur were both dashing heroes of military engagements, but their diplomatic credentials reflected the confused identity of the institution that they represented.28

Other recent biographies show that pursuits of the mind sometimes led young Americans abroad. Poet Joel Barlow and polymath Nathaniel Bowditch followed their intellectual inclinations into the world. In doing so, they unwittingly submitted themselves as candidates for diplomatic roles. Barlow, initially sent to Europe as an agent to sell land in Ohio, stayed to join the literary circles of London and Paris with his wife Ruth and eventually numbered Mary Wollstonecraft among his intimates. Well known and liked by the American ministers in Paris, he found himself appointed by the U.S. government, first as a treaty negotiator with Tripoli and eventually as an envoy to Napoleon. He died in the line of duty in Poland during the French retreat from Moscow.29

As a young man, Nathaniel Bowditch followed the life of a merchant supercargo on vessels to the Pacific and indulged his interests in navigation and mathematics by writing the American Practical Navigator, the quintessential reference book for American naval officers and sailors. His travels connected him with international scientific networks, and the information that he gathered informed American presidents, particularly Thomas Jefferson, about the commercial and political landscape of the new Asian markets.30 For young men of acumen, going abroad in the early years of the Republic often entailed conducting personal business, but it could also mean having to act on behalf of their country.

Less well-educated young men sometimes found themselves caught up in diplomatic disputes and had to scramble to assert their own vital roles on the world stage. American sailors who manned the vessels that skirted the earth navigated rough waters during the early Republic. Often the first Americans that anyone encountered abroad, sailors were what Brian Rouleau refers to as “ambassadors in the forecastle.”31 People from regions that had yet to learn of the nation’s existence formed their initial opinions of the United States from their encounters with sailors, who were often placed in awkward or precarious positions as a result.32

Sailors also faced hardship at the hands of foreign entities that did not recognize or abide by American understandings of rights and citizenship.33 Uncertainty about their citizenship left them subject to impressment, which drew them into international disputes. It was because of such international pressures that sailors saw the need to assert their rights as Americans in every port they visited. The American government fought to protect sailors by printing reams of official documents and passports. Sailors also willingly participated in touting their national origins in a world where such declarations—at least with paper backing—were rare.34

It is easy to understand why the notion of citizenship might have become more problematic when we look at the ethnic makeup of sailors. While many American sailors were white, African Americans and Native Americans also went to sea. Jeffrey Bolster’s work deals with the world of African American sailors, but it is only recently that anyone has examined the activities of Native American sailors.

As a young man, Nathaniel Bowditch followed the life of a merchant supercargo on vessels to the Pacific and...
world and creates a more nuanced view of the conduct of American foreign relations. However, it is important to note that many of these monographs consider these thirty years in single chapters or as background for nineteenth-century events. A comprehensive study of these thirty years through the eyes of diplomatic characters still remains to be written. Geographic studies also have some potential new routes to take. For example, both the eastern and western coasts of Africa remain open for study. What role did Americans and the American slave trade play in diplomatic activity on the continent?

Demographically, American women also remain curiously elusive in this story. While not as numerous as men abroad, American women did enter the world. Among them were Joel Barlow’s wife, Ruth, and Alexander Hamilton’s sister-in-law, Angelica Schuyler. They accompanied spouses, siblings, and children on their travels and formed their own intellectual, familial, and occasionally political networks around the world. I eagerly await discussions of their role in the American diplomatic project.

Far from a modern powerhouse of international influence, the United States relied on a diverse crew of diplomatic characters to project its ideas, identity, politics, and economic aims into the world. From the birth of their nation, these characters participated in the foreign affairs of their country largely without the knowledge of and without direction or pay from the U.S. government. Yet the government harnessed their knowledge and the networks they created for intelligence and personnel when the need arose. It could draw from a global pool of Americans that appeared on vessels in every sea, in the ports of every continent, and in the territories of kings, sultans, chiefs and emperors. These people marked trails and left webs of connections across the world, following, at least initially, the public and private drives for commerce and wealth.

Historians use this global geography to trace the creativity of merchants and commercial actors as they negotiated new regions of the world and reoriented east-facing, European modes of activity. Perspectives shift south and west to shine light on and study new oceanic and continental spaces. The individual activities of these travelers harnessed political, social, and commercial relationships, but other Americans also sailed on these merchant vessels, following personal inclinations for adventure, intellect, and fortune. Even the transnational institutions of the U.S. government were subject to the whims and movements of individual initiatives. The U.S. government harnessed these diplomatic characters, but further highlight the limited influence of the U.S. government in the conduct of foreign relations, but they also illuminate the wide variety of individuals who participated in making the United States a recognized nation among nations.

Notes:
1. Eliga Gould, in *Among the Powers of the Early: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 2012), charts the nature of the young American nation not as an isolated and neutral republic but as one inexorably caught up in the laws and activities of other nations.
4. A discussion of the early Republic similar to the one in *Diplomatic History* appears in Emily Conroy-Krutz et al., “Interchange: Globalization and Its Limits between the American Revolution and the Civil War,” *Journal of American History* 103, no. 2 (September 2016). While both forums point to earlier examples, they mostly focus on discussions of the early to mid-nineteenth century rather than the immediate aftermath of the Revolution.


In the next issue of Passport

- A roundtable on John Thompson, Great Power Rising
- The historiography of science and the Cold War
- Christopher Nichols on TED talks

And much more!
The 2019 SHAFR annual meeting will be held from June 20-22 at the Renaissance Arlington Capital View in Arlington, Virginia, site of the 2015 and 2017 conferences. We hope you will join us there!

The 2019 Luncheon Address will be delivered by Kristin Hayden, founder and senior advisor of OneWorld Now!, which seeks to develop the next generation of global leaders. Founded in 2002 as a global leadership program, OneWorld Now! runs programs for under-served high school youth, including language programs in Arabic and Chinese and leadership and study abroad scholarships. Within two years, OneWorld Now! was recognized as “one of the nation’s most innovative after school programs” by the Jack Kent Cooke Foundation and led to Hayden’s appointment to the Board of Trustees for Evergreen State College (2007-12) and as the official spokesperson for the Global Access Pipeline (GAP), a national consortium with the goal of increasing the representation, preparedness, and retention of under-represented groups in the international arena.

The conference also will feature a Thursday afternoon plenary entitled “99 Years after the 19th Amendment” chaired by Brooke L. Blower of Boston University. Other participants will include:

- Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, University of California, Irvine
- Keisha N. Blain, University of Pittsburgh
- Joanne Meyerowitz, Yale University
- Chris Capozzola, MIT

The central question guiding the participants will be: how have shifts in the distribution of gendered power at “home”— in both the household and the nation—reshaped foreign relations? A century after women acquired the vote in many Anglophone countries, and in our current moment of female empowerment, the 2019 plenary panel analyzes the ways in which the history of political participation, enfranchisement—and disenfranchisement—shed light on the history of transnational relations and the projection of U.S. power around the world.

The presidential luncheon address will be delivered by SHAFR President Barbara Keys and will be entitled “How International Relations Become Personal: Diplomats as Friends, Enemies, and Everything in Between.” Tickets for the Presidential and Luncheon addresses will be sold separately at $50 standard or $25 for students, adjunct faculty, and K-12 teachers (limit of one reduced-price ticket per person).

Printed program booklets and registration forms will be mailed out to all SHAFR members with a current domestic U.S. address prior to the conference. Online registration, including luncheon and social event tickets, will be available in early April. Registration fees for the 2019 conference are $100 standard and $40 student, adjunct faculty, or K-12 teacher. After June 1, 2019, fees increase to $120/$55.
This year’s Friday night social event will be at the Ruth’s Chris Steakhouse that faces Dulles Airport, at 2231 Crystal Drive, 11th Floor, Arlington—just a short walk from the conference hotel. We hope you will be able to join us for this opportunity to eat and talk together in an informal setting. Vegetarian and vegan options will be available. Tickets are $50 standard or $30 for students, adjunct faculty, and K-12 teachers.

The LEED-certified Renaissance Arlington Capital View is located at 2800 South Potomac Avenue, two miles from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (airport code DCA). There is complimentary hotel shuttle service every 20 minutes between 7 am and 11 pm to DCA and the Crystal City Metro (blue and yellow lines).

In the lobby, SOCCi Urban Italian Kitchen and Bar serves breakfast, lunch, and dinner, while Espressamente illy Coffee House serves coffee and light fare during the day. A 24-hour fitness center is also available on site, and there is complimentary wi-fi access in the lobby.

Conference room rates are $175/night, single or double occupancy, plus tax (currently 13%). Hotel guests will receive complimentary high-speed internet access in their rooms. On-site parking is available for at a 20% reduced rate for conference attendees.

Hotel reservations can be made by through the link on the “Events” page of the SHAFR website or by calling 1 (800) 228-9290 and mentioning “SHAFR 2019.” The deadline for receiving the conference rate is May 31, 2019.

The hotel is required to honor the reduced rate until this date OR until all the rooms in the SHAFR bloc have been booked. Once the block is fully booked, the hotel will offer rooms at its usual rate, if any are available, or may even be completely full. Please make your reservation as early as you can.

For more details about conference arrangements, visit https://shafr.org/conferences/annual/2019-annual-meeting or follow us on Twitter @SHAFRConference.

For questions about registration and other conference logistics, please contact Amy Sayward, SHAFR Executive Director, at Amy.Sayward@shafr.org.
How I Survived D-Day

Stephen G. Rabe

The title of this article might seem misleading. I am old (b. 1948), but not that old. I did not land on Omaha or Utah beaches. And I have never jumped out of a C-47 transport plane. But paratroopers like Staff Sergeant Rene E. Rabe, my father, and his buddies, like Technician Fifth Grade Edward T. “Eddie” Page, Corporal Homer H. Poss, and Private Arnold J. Martinez, jumped into the swamps and marshes of Normandy on 6 June 1944. The year 2019 will mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of what SHAFR member Jeff Engel has characterized as “the most epic operation of the twentieth century, if not all of history.” Engel will again be leading a tour of Normandy in the spring of 2019 for the Center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University. He and his group will not be alone.

What I present here is a tale of how Rene Rabe, Eddie Page, and Homer Poss survived the harrowing events that befell them between 6 and 16 June 1944. It is also a story of how Arnold Martinez was severely wounded, captured, and murdered by vile Schutzstaffel (SS) troops. But what happened in the village of Graignes, Normandy, is more than a compelling incident in the history of U.S. foreign relations.

In the spirit of Kathryn C. Statler’s September 2018 Passport article and her forthcoming study Lafayette’s Ghost, we can interpret the incidents at Graignes as a testament to the enduring nature and significance of the Franco-American alliance. In current historical lexicon, the story is also a study of “agency.” The villagers of Graignes voted to join forces with the paratroopers. In particular, two sisters, Odette Rigault, 19, and Marthe Rigault, 12, risked everything to save the lives of paratroopers like Rene Rabe and Eddie Page. The issue of “historical memory” also infuses the story of Graignes. For forty years, the massacre of villagers and paratroopers there went largely unaddressed by scholars in the United States. There has never been an official investigation of this hideous war crime.

For members of Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 507th Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division, D-Day began at 11:59 p.m. on 5 June 1944. Nine C-47s took off in formation from Barkston Heath Airport in Lincolnshire, England, with each plane carrying fourteen to seventeen paratroopers in what was called a “stick.” The airplanes circled for a time, joining the larger formation that carried the regiment’s 2,004 paratroopers toward Normandy.

The attack marked the culmination of more than a year of training for the untested, “green” regiment. The paratroopers had undergone basic training and “jump school” at Ft. Benning, Georgia, advanced training at Alliance Army Airfield in western Nebraska, a long sea voyage in convoy to Liverpool, a temporary transfer to Portrush, Northern Ireland, and their final training in the village of Tollerton, near Nottingham, England. They had made numerous practice jumps, including a “night jump” in England.

The men were also highly intelligent and physically fit. The 82nd Airborne preferred that its recruits have an IQ fifteen points higher than the military average. Paratroopers did two hours of running and two hours of calisthenics daily, in addition to military training. Normans were overwhelmed when they first encountered the soldiers they called the paras. One schoolteacher, who lived near Ste. Mère Eglise, testified that “everything about them evokes the outlaws of the Wild West: their massive size and big round helmets, the large knife stuck inside the shaft of their beautiful tall, yellow leather boots, their bearing and gait.” She added that the confidence of the paras was so contagious that “we consider the Liberation to be already accomplished.”

The confidence of Headquarters Company would be tested on the flight to Normandy. Their mission was to land near Amfreville, just west of Ste. Mère Eglise, and move eastward to assist in securing that strategic crossroads town. The flight initially went well, with clear skies over the English Channel. With the door removed from his C-47, Eddie Page spotted the Guernsey Islands and the Allied armada of six thousand ships heading for Normandy. The plan was for the C-47s to swoop over the Cotentin Peninsula from the west, drop the paratroopers, and cross back to the eastern part of the Channel. The pilots were under strict orders not to bring any paratroopers back to England. The planes would be over Normandy for twelve minutes. General James M. Gavin, the acting commander of the 82nd and future U.S. ambassador to France (1961–62), expected to be dropped eight minutes and thirty seconds after crossing the coastline of Normandy.

However, thick clouds covered the Normandy coast. The 507th was also the last of the six paratrooper regiments to fly in. By then the German occupiers were well aware...
snatched men from the village for forced labor duty. The villagers used the derogatory term *Boches* to characterize the foreign occupiers. Villagers were associated with the French Resistance and possessed intelligence about military movements. In the days before 6 June, for example, Gustave Rigault, father of Odette and Marthe, told his family that the invasion was coming. As related by Marthe in her childhood diary, her father had learned of the imminent attack after he had spoken with a “Mr. Mauger” of the Resistance.

The paras soon relaxed amid the hospitality of the villagers. The men were cold and soaked, or as a villager put it, “some of the drenched and wet shivered and rattled their teeth.” Villagers invited the paratroopers into their homes to warm themselves at fireplaces and even offered Calvados, the local brandy. A large contingent of paratroopers initially gathered at dawn on 6 June at the Rigault farm, which was situated on a canal in Le Port St. Pierre, about three kilometers south of Graignes. To the family’s astonishment, the first paratrooper to knock on the door was a Louisiana Cajun who spoke excellent French: Sgt. Benton J. Broussard. Sgt. Broussard had jumped from the same plane as Rabe, Poss, and Martinez. He carried a map and was stunned to discover that they were so far off target that Graignes did not appear on it. He and his comrades made their way to the village. Before going, they left candy and chewing gum for the Rigault children.

Eventually there were 182 American soldiers at Graignes. The core of the group was the Headquarters Company. But a contingent of paratroopers from the 101st Airborne, who had also landed way off course, moved into Graignes; and among other Americans who wandered into the village were a glider pilot, a downed pilot from a C-47, and, incredibly, two lost infantry soldiers who had walked from the invasion beaches. What to do next became the pressing question, and it evoked a contentious debate. The paratroopers had encountered minimal enemy contact on D-Day. Captain Brummitt argued that the assigned mission should be honored. The troopers should head north through the swamps and marshes and find a way to rejoin their battalion and regiment. Headquarters Company had troopers trained in crew-served weapons—machine guns and mortars—that could support the infantry companies of 3rd Battalion. Rabe, Poss, and Martinez were mortar men.

Major Charles D. Johnson, the ranking officer at Graignes, “curtly” dismissed the captain’s plan. He ruled that it would be too challenging to navigate the wet lowlands. Paratroopers might drown, and it would be impossible to carry heavy weapons like 81mm mortars through the marshes. He ordered that Graignes be defended...
and that they should wait until U.S. forces moved toward them. In the meantime, the paratroopers would patrol and disrupt enemy communications and movement.

The overwhelming enthusiasm for the paras shown by the villagers surely influenced Major Johnson's order. On 6 June, Major Johnson met with Mayor Voydie, and the French leader agreed to encourage the villagers to go out into the marshes to look for bundles of equipment. The villagers could move around in their boats without raising German suspicions. The C-47s had dropped bundles, often with blue parachutes, that included mortars, machine guns, ammunition, mines, communication equipment, and medical supplies. Ginette Decaumont, then 15, recalled that "my father, my uncle, my brother . . . [went] out on the marsh many times to look for equipment which they [the paratroopers] lost." The Rigault and Folliot families, who were related, began of their own volition on 6 June to retrieve bundles and bring them by horse-driven carts to Graignes. Odette and Marthe took care to gather the white silk parachutes for future dressmaking. As Eric Groce of Appalachian State University beautifully put it, the paras had brought "silk from the sky."

On 7 June, Mayor Voydie called a town meeting. Without dissent, the villagers pledged to assist the paras. Father Leblastier agreed with his parishioners' decision. With the bundles being retrieved, military officers judged that they had sufficient ammunition to defend Graignes. Feeding 182 young, hungry men posed another challenge. Germaine Bourzi, the owner of the local café, and her daughters organized women in the village to cook so the paras would have two hot meals a day. Major Johnson sent two of his men to assist the volunteers. They and the village children delivered the food to the soldiers who were positioned in foxholes and other defense positions. Denise Bourzi-Lereculey remembered that the paras "were charming and impeccably correct in their dealings with the population."

Paratroopers proudly dubbed Madam Boursier their "Mess Sergeant." Bourzi and Renée Meunier risked their lives traveling by cart to German-occupied villages to obtain additional groceries.

One of the more prominent members of Headquarters Company was Captain Abraham Sophian Jr., a medical doctor and the son of an accomplished physician whose family had fled anti-Semitism in Tsarist Russia. He and the medics who accompanied him set up a surgery in the village to attend to paratroopers who had been injured in their jumps, but he also made "house calls" on villagers, including Gustave Rigault, who had suffered a coronary incident. As military historian G.H. Bennett aptly noted, the paratroopers and French civilians had "turned their town into an outpost of liberty in the heart of enemy territory." The Nazis also riddled Father Leblastier with bullets and that they should wait until U.S. forces moved toward them. In the meantime, the paratroopers would patrol and disrupt enemy communications and movement.

Between 6 and 10 June, the paratroopers patrolled the surrounding area. Joseph Folliot and Charles Gosselin accompanied the paratroopers and asked to carry weapons. The paratroopers discouraged this, pointing out that French civilians captured with weapons would surely be executed. There were sporadic violent contacts with German soldiers. Led by Lt. Francis Naughton of Headquarters Company, the paratroopers blew up a bridge north of Graignes to prevent an attack on the village from that direction. Lt. Naughton gave the signal to blow the bridge as German soldiers crossed it. The paratroopers inflicted numerous casualties and suffered none, but they had alerted the German military to their movements. The regiment of the newly formed 17th SS Panzergrenadier (armored infantry), which had been inspected a couple of months earlier by Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler—an architect of the Holocaust—moved into position. The American defenders of Graignes would be outnumbered ten to one.

Sunday, 11 June 1944, proved to be "The Longest Day" for the people of Graignes. Villagers and paratroopers attended morning Mass celebrated by Father Leblastier. During the service, the SS troops initiated a probing attack that the troops handily repulsed. The Waffen-SS (Armed SS) launched a second major attack in the afternoon. The ground assault had been preceded by mortar shelling, but the U.S. defense held again, with the mortar men and machine gunners laying waste to the SS troops. An 81mm mortar team took out a German mortar emplacement. But the U.S. forces began to take casualties and were running short of ammunition and food. Captain Sophian set up an aid station in the church sanctuary. The priests and their two elderly housekeepers assisted in the care of the wounded. When a lull in the fighting occurred at 7:00 p.m., Sgt. Broussard instructed the parishioners to flee. The congregation had been in the church since the morning attack, reciting the rosary and listening to Father Leblastier discuss a religious tract.

The definitive attack began around 8:00 p.m. Sgt. Major Salewski recorded in his diary that the Germans seemed "to be throwing everything at us but the kitchen sink."
The SS troops had placed 88 mm artillery out of range of the U.S. mortars. Artillery blasts destroyed the town and killed many of the men. The artillery took out the church tower and the men who were directing fire from there. Sgt. Broussard was killed by an artillery shell, and Arnold Martinez was wounded by artillery fragments. PFC Harold Premo, another trooper who had jumped with Broussard and Rabe, died of shell wounds to the thorax region. Major Johnson, the commanding officer, also died from an artillery blast.

The paratroopers defended Graignes as best they could. Eddie Page recalled a machine gunner on a roof who "ran out of ammo and started to pull slate off the roof and throw it at them." When the SS troops breached the defense perimeter, paratroopers ducked down in their foxholes, let the enemy pass, and then turned and fired at them. By the end of the night, the black-uniformed SS troops were poised to occupy Graignes. The Rigault family spotted red flares, a distress signal, over the village late at night on 11 June.

Captain Brummitt, now in command, ordered a night withdrawal, calculating that "our chances of survival would be slim indeed if we continued to defend the position." Private Harvey Richig recalled that the order was "to disassemble our crew-served weapons, pair off, and try to make it to Carentan or Ste. Mère Église." But the proverbial "fog of war" had enveloped Graignes. Captain Brummitt later related that he did not know whether Captain Sophian, the medics, and the wounded had been informed of the withdrawal order. Sophian perhaps decided he could not abandon the wounded and could continue their care as a prisoner of war. Eddie Page and two comrades also did not hear of the withdrawal order. They spent the night of 11–12 June sleeping in a foxhole just outside the village. At daybreak, Page made a reconnaissance mission to Graignes and reported that "the town is filled with Krauts—there must be a thousand of them."

The SS occupiers of Graignes lived up to their reputation for ruthless and gratuitous violence. They ransacked and looted the village. They murdered Captain Sophian, the medics, and about fifteen wounded soldiers. Pvt. Martinez was probably among the wounded. Some personnel were shot on the spot, others were shot, bayoneted, and forced into a nearby pond. Villagers testified to seeing the body of a paratrooper with a bayonet in his back. Another group of Americans was taken to a field in Mesnil-Angot, a few kilometers from Graignes. They were forced to dig a pit and then were executed with a bullet to the back of the head. The Nazis also riddled Father Leblastier with bullets and
shot his colleague, Father Lebarbanchon, in the head. The two female housekeepers, both in their eighties, were shot in their beds.

All told, the Nazis murdered over thirty civilians. To cover their crime, they burned the bodies of the priests. That fire and others they set raged out of control. Of the two hundred structures in Graignes, all but two were either destroyed or damaged by fires or artillery bombardment. Among those severely damaged was the church, which had stood for over eight hundred years. It was not until the late 1950s that the village was restored. By any standard, elements of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier had perpetrated war crimes. Eddie Page was succinct in an interview he gave in the 1990s about what the Nazis did to captive paratroopers and civilians. “Just murdered them. Not war. Murder.”

The Nazis rounded up forty-four villagers and tried to make them confess to collaboration. No one broke. The Nazis demanded to know the whereabouts of the mayor. The villagers responded with the casuistry that the mayor was dead. Acting Mayor Voydie had, however, gone into hiding. The venal Germans forced the villagers to dispose of the bodies of the substantial number of dead SS troops. They later ordered an evacuation of Graignes and the surrounding region, including Le Port St. Pierre. Civilians would not return until mid-July 1944, when advancing U.S. forces liberated Graignes. On 22 July 1944, a U.S. priest and a French priest celebrated Mass in the village to commemorate the victims.

Despite the death and devastation, the people of Graignes never publicly questioned their alliance with the paratroopers. In a 17 July 1952 letter to Samuel Martinez, father of Arnold, Mayor Voydie wrote that his citizens attended annual memorials “and showed by their reverence their appreciation for the heroism of your son who gave his life for the liberty of our people.” The mayor added that “the inhabitants of Graignes, now before your sorrow,” in 1964, at a twentieth anniversary memorial service, Father Louis Binet mocked the Nazis, sarcastically observing that his parishioners had committed the crime of being “too hospitable” to the paratroopers. In his homily, he drew an analogy between the paratroopers floating down from the sky and God sending his only Son to earth. Rene, Eddie, and Homer, working-class fellows who despised pretention, would have been amused to learn that they were being compared to Jesus Christ.

Homer, Rene, and Eddie made their way to survival in different ways. Groups of paratroopers assembled with different officers. Captain Brummitt eventually consolidated the groups into a contingent of approximately ninety men that included Cpl. Homer Poss. Neither T/5 Page nor Ssgt. Rabe was with Captain Brummitt. The contingent of ninety troops moved through the swamps at night and used Normandy’s imposing hedgerows as cover when they rested. French civilians provided intelligence and food. Sgt. Major Salewski’s diary recorded that at 6:00 p.m. on 13 June “a few civilians came around with milk and boiled gourds and butter.” On that evening, Brummitt and his troops encountered a reconnaissance patrol from the 2nd Armored Division. U.S. forces, including the 101st Airborne, were in the process of liberating Carentan. In short order, the 101st Airborne command arranged for the survivors of Headquarters Company to be trucked to Ste. Mère Eglise, where the 82nd Airborne had established its command post. By the night of 13–16 June, the company’s paratroopers were back in combat in Normandy. Captain Brummitt was awarded a Silver Star for his courage and leadership.

In the meantime, the Rigault and Foillot families saved the lives of T/5 Page, Ssgt. Rabe, and nineteen other paratroopers. Odette and Marthe found two lost and confused paratroopers and brought them to the family barn. They initially did not tell their father, fearing it would be too much stress for him because of his recent coronary issues. By 13 June, there were ten paratroopers hiding in the loft of the barn. They had been at the Rigault farm on 6 June and wandered in from the swamps and marshes. The group included Ssgt. Rabe, who would spend three nights hiding in the barn.

Eddie Page and his two comrades spent an additional day hiding in their foxhole before moving out and hiding in the hedgerows. Jean Rigault, 15, a cousin of Odette and Marthe, encountered the three paras on 13 June and guided them to the barn. The number of paratroopers in the loft grew until they became the “Rigault 21.” As Odette recalled, “it was a joy to find them like that . . . after the battle with all the dead left behind to find each other again.” She added that “the only thing we wanted was to save them, so we put them up in the barn and I said I would bring them something to eat.” Odette and Marthe surreptitiously left food for the paras in the barn. The grateful Ssgt. Rabe never forgot a meal of boiled cabbage with melting butter.

An outbreak of violence would have been catastrophic for both the paratroopers and the Rigault family. Two close calls marked the stay of the twenty-one paratroopers. A unit of thirty German soldiers moved near the farm. The shrewd Madame Marthe Rigault, the family matriarch, posed as a friendly civilian and gave directions to the Germans that took them away from the barn. Then, on 14 June, two German soldiers entered the barn. The paratroopers trained their rifles on them, and Eddie Page pulled the pin on a grenade, but the soldiers did only a cursory search and did not climb up into the loft. Page later commented that “it is a good thing that the Krauts goldbrick sometimes; just like we do.” He admitted, however, that he was so nervous that he needed a comrade to replace the pin in the grenade to prevent it from exploding.

The close calls convinced Gustave Rigault that his family was too much at risk. And the news from Carentan was good. He arranged for Joseph Foillot to bring a large boat of seven to eight meters in length to the canal near his farm. At 10:00 p.m., on 15 June, Foillot pushed off with the paras. Marthe had placed a flower in each man’s lapel, and the family had offered each man coffee with Calvados. By midnight, the boat reached its destination and the paratroopers, after a short walk, found a U.S. sentry. Foillot made it safely back by 3:00 a.m. However, his father, Isidore, would subsequently be machine-gunned to death by the
By dawn, the paratroopers were trucked to Ste. Mère Église, and by the end of 16 June they were back with their company and battalion. On that day, Rabe and two others from his fourteen-paratrooper stick, Durward Biggersstaff and the appropriately named Stephen Liberty, received battlefield promotions. Three of the fourteen had not survived, however, including Pvt. Martinez.

Given what they had endured, T/5 Page speculated that the defenders of Graignes would be immediately sent home as heroes. Not a chance. Another month of combat in Normandy awaited Page, Poss, and Rabe. Then seven more weeks of combat, beginning on Christmas Day, 1944, at the Battle of the Bulge, and a second combat jump, on 24 March 1945, over the Rhine River. Poss and Rabe again jumped together. They all fought until VE Day. Page and Rabe also pulled occupation duty with the 82nd Airborne in Berlin in the second half of 1945.

The three friends experienced a total of seven battlefield wounds. Page took a bullet in the chest. In late March 1945, Poss woke up in a field hospital in Holland. He had been wounded by mortar shell shrapnel, which was embedded in his skull. The same mortar round apparently also hit Rabe, spraying his face with shrapnel. Rabe was immediately sent back into action, and Poss rejoined him thereafter. My first lesson in “history” occurred in the early 1950s, when my father showed me the tiny flecks of metal that worked their way to the surface of his face.

As civilians, Page, Poss, and Rabe fit into the patterns of postwar life in the United States. By 1947, the three were married, and they stayed married. There followed a total of nine children. The veterans achieved middle-class status through working-class occupations. Page and Poss were meat cutters. Remarkably, Poss became the city manager and mayor of Highland, Illinois. Page became a leader of the veterans of the 507th regiment and was named in 1992 the “507th Paratrooper of the Year.” He often held reunions at his home in Stamford, CT, where I first met Eddie and Homer sixty years ago. Rene Rabe worked as cable splicer for the Southern New England Telephone Company, and, at the age of 42, earned his high-school degree and subsequently became a foreman at the telephone company.

Arnold Martinez did not have the opportunity to enjoy the fullness of life. A Graves Registration unit entered Graignes after liberation in mid-July. Martinez’s body would have been examined at Blosville. His final resting place was at Colleville-sur-Mer, Normandy, among the White Crosses and Stars of David. His family has an amazing story. Descended from Colorado homesteaders, Arnold came from a family of twelve children. In late 2018, three of his siblings were still alive. One of his brothers, Samuel, worked for Coors Brewing Company, which commissioned a portrait of the paratroopers landing in the marshes. Another, Elias, served in the Coast Guard and was assigned to guard the waters off Hyannis Port when President John F. Kennedy vacationed there. The two living brothers, Gilbert and Jim, served in the military in Korea. And—small world!—Arnold’s niece, Felicia Naranjo Martinez, is the executive director of the Colorado European Union Center of Excellence at the University of Colorado and is a colleague of Tom Zeiler, past president of SHAFR.

The events at Graignes moved in and out of historical memory. In 1948, France awarded the village the Croix de Guerre with Silver Star. The next year, U.S. Ambassador to France David K.E. Bruce attended a ceremony to establish a Franco-American memorial in the ruins of the church. The memories of what happened at Graignes thereafter faded in the United States. The paratroopers who escaped Graignes were not fully aware of the massacre perpetrated by the Nazis. In any case, Eddie, Homer, and Rene spent the period from 16 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 focused on staying alive in Normandy, the Ardennes Forest, and the Rhineland. But in 1984, the Martinez family started writing letters asking the U.S. government about the circumstances of Arnold’s death.

The unusual evolution of the 507th Regiment probably contributed to the loss of memory about what happened at Graignes. In mid-July 1944, what was left of the regiment’s 2,004 paratroopers returned to England from Normandy. The unit had suffered an appalling sixty-one percent casualty rate during thirty-five days of combat in Normandy and needed time to rebuild its forces. It was detached from the celebrated 82nd Airborne and transferred to the 17th Airborne Division. From the perspective of the paratroopers, they had become an orphan regiment that did not receive the respect and historical attention it deserved.

Complicating the issue was the massive fire at the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis in 1973, which destroyed most individual service records. PFC Harold Premo’s record, replete with burn and water marks, survived. Premo’s service record detailed the actions taken by the Graves Registration unit and suggested the procedures that the unit followed when it found the bodies of Captain Sophian, Sgt. Broussard, Martinez, and others.

In the 1980s and 1990s, as they entered their retirement years, the paratroopers pressed for recognition of the 507th Regiment. Their leader was Colonel Francis Naughton, who had become a career military officer after World War II. Naughton and Lt. Colonel Earle Reed, another career military officer, lobbied the Department of Army to recognize the heroism of the people of Graignes. On 6 July 1986, in a grand ceremony, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. awarded eleven Distinguished Service Medals, several of them posthumously, to the people of Graignes. The medals are the highest recognition that the Department of Defense can award to a civilian.

The Rigault sisters, Odette and Marthe, were there to receive their awards. Odette called it “the most beautiful honor I have ever received.” Another award recipient was Germaine “Mess Sergeant” Boursier, now 90, who walked with a cane and was supported by her two daughters. She announced that she was “very happy to see this day.” A plaque was dedicated that included the names of the villagers and paratroopers who died at Graignes. The village named a road after the 507th Regiment. Colonel

Naughton, paratroopers, and Samuel Martinez, brother of Arnold, attended the ceremony.

The historical record is not complete. A comprehensive examination of why the War/Defense Department and the Harry S. Truman administration did not press war crimes charges against the SS officers who authorized the massacre of medical personnel, the wounded, the priests, and villagers has not yet been undertaken. There were many contemporary witnesses to the crimes. Perhaps Cold War imperatives triumphed over the defense of human rights. The circumstances surrounding Captain Abraham Sophian’s decision to stay with the wounded also call for further analysis. Martin K.A. Morgan, who has written a scholarly account of the 507th Regiment in Normandy, Down to Earth (2004), believes that Captain Sophian merits a Congressional Medal of Honor. It is never too late to rectify or celebrate the historical record.

SSgt. Rene E. Rabe, who died in 1982, has three children, six grandchildren, and three great-grandchildren as his direct descendants. The newest arrival is our granddaughter, the beautiful Emma Clare, who was born on 15 November 2018. Without the courage of the people of Graignes and the Foillot and Rigault families, this would not have come to pass. I plan to visit Graignes in 2019, and I hope to meet Marthe Rigault, who lives now in Carentan, and thank her. I might mention one other connection we may have. Marthe and Odette, who died in 2018 at the age of 93, used the parachutes that they recovered from the marshes to make First Communion and wedding dresses. My father’s stick landed near the Rigault farm. I like to think that his “silk from the sky” served as material for their dressmaking. Vive l’alliance franco-américaine!

*Because of the personal nature of the article and to save space, I have not included footnotes. I would be pleased to send a documented version of the article upon request. I can be reached at rabe@utdallas.edu.
SHAFR-Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Workshop on Public Engagement

18-19 June 2019

In June 2017, just prior to the annual SHAFR conference, SHAFR and the University of Virginia’s Miller Center co-hosted a workshop on public engagement for historians “to consider ways in which we might play a larger role in public conversations about the United States and the world.” The workshop also sought to “allow attendees to experiment with different formats and strategies for communicating with various audiences in ways that more effectively align our expertise with an evolving media landscape.” The ensuing two years has certainly not diminished the need for such a workshop, and, as an attendee at the Miller Center workshop, I believe a needed and useful conversation was begun in Charlottesville.

With this in mind, SHAFR and Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) would like to invite up to 75 participants to a second iteration of the workshop on public engagement. The workshop will take place on the Georgetown University campus the evening of June 18, and all-day on June 19, just prior to the 2019 annual SHAFR conference in Arlington, Virginia. The workshop will discuss public engagement through multiple venues, to include: Teaching, podcasts, print news media, high visibility websites and blogs, television, local community engagement, and others. In short, we will discuss scholarship as well as platforms. SHAFR will offer a limited number of grants to cover the cost of lodging for graduate student and faculty members of SHAFR lacking resources from their home institutions.

ISD was founded in 1978 as an integral part of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and brings together diplomats, other practitioners, scholars, and students from across and beyond Georgetown University. ISD believes in, and holds as part of its mission, the need for strong public engagement to enhance and expand an appreciation of the role of diplomacy and history. Likewise, as with its rationale in 2017, SHAFR recognizes “the workshop as an opportunity to pursue its own mission of disseminating knowledge about the history of U.S. foreign relations and helping its members develop the tools and strategies necessary to project their collective expertise into the public sphere.”

In her January 2018 write-up in this review of the first public engagement workshop, Stefanie Georgakis Abbot described some of the impetus behind the workshop’s convening. Following the 2016 election and amidst the flurry of “alternative facts,” Professor Kimber Quinney (California State University, San Marcos) issued an email to some fellow SHAFR members. It is worth reprinting again here:

“For the past fifty years, policy makers—let alone the general public—rarely seek out or pay much attention to historians’ views. Why is that? Why do historians today seem to have less influence over public policy than, say, economists or journalists? I am eager to facilitate a conversation about the notable lack of influence among historians in the public sphere and, in particular, how historians of American foreign relations can break the silence. Our expertise can be leveraged and conveyed in new ways to emphasize the essential importance of historical perspective, evidence-based analysis, and sound policy-making in a healthy democracy.”

This notion, and the questions it raises, are no less important today, and are likely even more so. As political polarization has increased, echo chambers have amplified, and competing facts and “truths” run rampant, it is more important than ever for historians to make their voices heard. Moreover, as a recent study has shown, the decline in history majors (and history departments for that matter) runs the risk of creating a generation less historically knowledgeable, and less attuned to critical thinking and analysis.
More recently, Peter Hahn expanded upon the merits of, and the need for, public engagement in his June 2018 SHAFR Presidential Lecture. Hahn described our current era as one in which “the digital revolution and onset of the post-truth era coincided with and perhaps drove a polarization of the American electorate.” Further, Hahn noted that these larger societal shifts have coincided with declines in Americans’ belief in experts and the number of students studying history. In order to combat these issues, Hahn surmised, “we should enhance proactively the means by which our ideas infuse discourse.” Speaking directly to this workshop’s raison d’être, he suggested that “building on the consensus formed at the 2017 symposium cosponsored by SHAFR and the University of Virginia’s Miller Center, we should engage in national discussions on public affairs through a variety of media.” Concluding his call to arms, Hahn called upon SHAFR members to “form a generation that remembers its past, channels the enormous power of the Internet to discern the truth, practices civic and civil dialogue, and restores academics—both professionals and their craft—to their important roles as guardians of humane interests and instruments of enlightenment.”

It is this workshop’s goal to continue and expand upon discussions begun at the Miller Center, and in any number of conversations between interested SHAFR members, in order to endeavor to build just such a generation. If historians don’t reach out and engage broader audiences to build a stronger public historical consciousness, someone will (and historically has), opening the door to “charlatans, stooges, and tyrants,” in Jill Lepore’s recent words. As we look forward to the second iteration of the public engagement workshop, it is worth revisiting the words of E.H. Carr: “The past is intelligible to us only in the light of the present; and we can fully understand the present only in the light of the past. To enable man to understand the society of the past and to increase his mastery over the society of the present is the dual function of history.”

For more information and to register for the 2019 SHAFR-ISD Workshop on Public Engagement, please visit the SHAFR website.

Notes:
3. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 25.
8. Ibid., p. 30.
CIA’s Historical Review Panel, the Second Installment

Robert Jervis

The April 2009 issue of Passport carried my article describing the mandate and activities of the CIA’s Historical Review Panel (HRP). This note takes the story through mid-February 2019. The first installment was quite up-beat because I thought, and still think, that the CIA was quite open with the HRP and even if it did not always take our advice, at least it listened (and argued with) us. The second installment is not so happy, however.

Before telling it, let me give a bit of background drawn from the original article. As explained in our semi-annual public statements, our charter (provided by CIA) was to:

Advise the Central Intelligence Agency on systematic and automatic declassification review under the provisions of Executive Order 13526.

• Assist in developing subjects of historical and scholarly interest for the Intelligence Community declassification review program.

• Advise CIA and the Intelligence Community on declassification issues in which the protection of intelligence sources and methods potentially conflicts with mandated declassification priorities.

• Provide guidance for the historical research and writing programs of the CIA History Staff, and when appropriate, review draft products.

• Advise Information Management Services on its mandatory and voluntary declassification review initiatives and the Center for the Study of Intelligence on its academic outreach programs.

• At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, advise on other matters of relevance to the intelligence and academic communities.

• Advise Information Management Services on archival and records management issues.

In accord with an agreement with the Director, we could only mention the topics discussed and not give the substance of the discussion, our public statements were brief and anodyne. Here is a typical one, complete with the passive voice that I hated but could not avoid:

HRP met June 7-8, 2017, with Frank Costigliola, Robert Jervis, William Inboden, and Thomas Newcomb in attendance. We discussed how to balance the competing demand for resources among the declassification programs, and especially the need to continue to serve the Presidential libraries and the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series which are of such great value to scholars and the public. We discussed FOIA releases and how responsiveness to requests could be improved. There are significant opportunities for targeted releases on issues and cases of great interest and historical importance, but also a continuing need to review and release under the standing 25-year and 50-year programs. As the former and the Reagan-era FRUS volumes encounter email and related electronic documents, reviewing demands increase so much that new technologies are required, and we discussed the progress of CIA’s Next Generation Information Management (NGIM) program. We met with CIA leadership and presented our written recommendations to Director Pompeo, and we will meet again in December, probably including a joint session with the State Department’s Historical Advisory Committee.

It is important that all our members had Top Secret/Code Word clearances so we could discuss topics without inhibition and read the documents that CIA was withholding as well as those it was releasing. This was crucial because we could point out where we thought CIA was inappropriately withholding material, especially when it had high historical value. On some occasions, furthermore, we were able to work out compromises that would tell historians and the general public what was most important in the documents while still protecting sources, methods, and liaison relations.

Although some of us served on HRP for a long period, others rotated through, and we always had at least one leading historian among our members. Past members included Ernest May, Marc Trachtenberg, and Melvin Leffler. Current members are historians Tami Biddle, Frank Costigliola, and Will Inboden, and Jeffrey Taliaferro, Thomas Newcomb, and myself from political science and law. It was important not only to get the judgment of leading figures like this, but also to have them be able to tell colleagues that while we did not always agree on the CIA’s decisions, we did not think that it was seeking to cover up its mistakes or misdeeds.

It was also important that HRP reported to the CIA’s Director. This not only boosted the morale of the declassification staff (and there are few jobs more thankless than being a CIA declassifier), but enabled us to raise issues at the highest level.

As I mentioned, our agreement with the Director was that we would keep confidential the advice we gave him (this pronoun is merited because we did not have the opportunity to meet the current Director Gina Haspel). I think this restriction was reasonable in that the Director did not want HRP to become a group lobbying him and mobilizing opinion behind its favored policies. Not only was this not in his interest for obvious reasons, but he feared that a larger public role would negatively influence the advice we would give and might lead us to take stands that would appeal to our constituencies. This restriction makes it impossible for me to say even in retrospect what specific advice we gave. I can say, however, that on something like one issue a year we had significant impact on what CIA
was doing, made positive suggestions that were taken, and pointed out errors that the CIA was committing (in several cases our advice was not taken, with unhappy results for CIA and perhaps for the country as a whole). To give one example, when the White House changed its policy and permitted old President's Daily Briefs (PDBs) to be available for declassification, we were able to review the first pass through the Kennedy and Johnson briefs and make recommendations, which were accepted, on how more segments of them could be declassified.

Not all of our semi-annual meetings were equally productive, of course. In late 2016 (but before the November elections) there was a turnover in the leadership positions at Information Management Services (IMS), the office in charge of keeping and declassifying records. As a result, significant historical memory and momentum was lost. The December 2017 meeting was particularly disappointing in part because IMS failed to provide us with the documents that were needed to have a fruitful discussion. In May 2018, I was informed that because the previous meeting had been so unproductive, IMS wanted to skip the June meeting to give it time to adequately prepare for a longer and more thorough discussion in December. I thought we could have prepared for a good meeting but could not dispute IMS’s judgment since it had the responsibility for putting the materials together. In the fall of 2018 I sent IMS suggestions about the agenda and how the meeting should be staged, but after a long period without a response was finally told that we would not meet in December and that the HRP would be “rechartered” (a term later replaced by “restructured”). No reasons were given, and when I suggested that the CIA make an announcement of what it was doing to supplement or even replace the public statement I would have to post on H-Diplo, I was told that this would not be done.

For a month or so I sought clarification, but none was forthcoming. When Richard Immerman, Chair of the State Department’s Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), told CIA that he would like to discuss the matter at their December meeting he was told that “any reformulation of the HRP will preserve the original intent of the panel upon its founding to advise on releasable topics of historical interest to the public and researchers.” After attempts to probe what this meant, where CIA got the idea that what the HRP had been doing for 20 years diverged from the “original intent,” and why restructuring rather than merely instituting a more regular rotation of members was needed produced no result, I drafted a brief public statement that was posted on H-Diplo on January 14, 2019, and that I reproduce here:

In our last public statement, we said that the CIA’s Historical Review Panel (HRP) would meet again in June 2018. Personnel transitions at the CIA prevented that meeting from occurring, and we have recently been informed that the Panel is being restructured and will not meet again until this has been done. The reasons for this remain unclear to us, and no schedule for resumed meetings has been announced.

The State Department’s Historical Advisory Committee (HAC) will continue to monitor the CIA’s cooperation in producing the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes.

Had we met in December 2018, we would have discussed and presented recommendations to the Director concerning the following topics: the status of the FRUS volumes and any current disputes; the implications of the change in the reviewing of documents in the 25-year program from making redactions to the application of the pass/fail standard to the entire document; the review processes and standards for documents that are 50 years old; the possibilities of closer contact with Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requesters; the CIA’s role in reviewing documents for the presidential libraries; and the criteria for selecting topics for special releases.

Efforts to understand the situation included a meeting for over two hours with a high IMS official, but this did not yield either a clear statement of how CIA was going to proceed or what problems they had seen with the previous arrangements.

Steve Aftergood from the Federation of American Scientists subsequently asked CIA’s Public Affairs what the situation was, and reported that while a regular rotation of members would be instituted, the “Panel’s activities will be unaffected.” Subsequent emails about the contradiction between this and the plans for “rechartering” or “restructuring” yielded the reply that CIA was still deciding what to do. So we were given three accounts of what was happening, and my requests to be told which one, if any, was correct were met with silence for two months.

As you can imagine, and as some previous high-level CIA officials have indicated to me, to restrict the HRP to advising only on what topics CIA should focus on would be exclude the bulk of what we have done in the past. For example, we couldn’t tell CIA whether or not we thought its decisions to withhold information from FRUS were reasonable or not; we could not comment on the progress and problems with the mandated review of documents after 25 years and 50 years, or talk about problems with declassifying documents at the Presidential Libraries. We also could not help CIA with declassification problems. And unless HRP does these things and examines both declassification guidelines and documents being withheld in some detail, its members will not be able to provide the reassurances we were able to do in the past.

Why CIA would want to return the HRP to its odd notion of its “original intent” escapes me. Even if it were the case that before its members had clearances HRP’s role was more narrowly restricted, this in itself would not be an argument for returning to such an arrangement, and no one from CIA has told me or other members of the Panel, let alone the general public, why it would want to exclude these topics from HRP’s purview and deprive itself of scholars’ confidential advice and suggestions about vital aspects of the declassification program. The lack of an explanation is disturbing, and perhaps CIA is adopting the stance that Dean Acheson attributes to Louis Brandeis, who “often mentioned the impression made on him by a man who wrote: ‘I regret that I cannot comply with your request. So that you may know that my refusal is final, I give no reasons.”

In early February 2019, CIA reaffirmed the decision to return the panel to its original mission, but said that this included discussing FRUS and the other mandatory and voluntary declassification programs. This is heartening, but of course is yet to be confirmed by actual HRP meetings, and raises the question of why CIA put the Panel on hiatus rather than simply rotate membership in an orderly manner.

The obvious explanation is the Trump Administration’s desire for secrecy. While I cannot disprove this hypothesis, I think the decisions we are talking about are so under the radar screen that this is unlikely. My guess is that it is the product of bureaucratic maneuvering combined with the normal organizational aversion to outsiders. But this is only speculation on my part. As historians and political scientists, we should not be surprised when organizations try to shield themselves from criticism, even confidential
criticism. But our scholarship also tells us that these efforts rarely end well.

There are problems of substance as well. As some Passport readers know, the 25-year program has yielded a great deal of material that was put on the CREST system, originally at the National Archives and now available on the web. Although many of the millions of pages released are uninteresting, there also is a great deal of high-quality material, and looking at the articles in Diplomatic History and Journal of Cold War Studies shows that historians are making good use of it. Unfortunately, resource constraints have led to the decision to change the practice from reviewing individual documents and making redactions when that was possible to a system of pass-fail, which will mean that almost nothing of value will come out of this program. This decision was not classified, but CIA rebuffed HRP’s request that it make a public statement to explain that a stream of documents on which historians and journalists had come to depend will no longer be continued.

I write all this more in sorrow than in anger, if you will excuse the cliché. As some of will know from my Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War, I have done other jobs for CIA and, more recently, the National Intelligence Council. In general, I have found the people I have worked with to be highly motivated, non-political, and highly skilled. The current episode with HRP and declassification seems to me yet an additional case of CIA shooting itself in the foot, if not in more serious parts of its anatomy.

Of course the fate of the HRP is not important in itself, but only as a means toward a robust program of declassification of CIA documents and the ability of outsiders to reassure—or fail to reassure—scholars, journalists, and the general public about the integrity of the program. It is to be hoped that the CIA develops arrangements that contribute to these goals.

At this writing (February 15, 2019) I do not know what will happen with the HRP or whether I and the community will be notified.

Notes:
This essay charts a wave of writing and scholarship on Iranian education from the start of Harry Truman’s “Point Four” program to the integration of education into Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s “White Revolution.” In more recent years, some SHAFR scholars (myself included) have flipped these older books and articles into primary sources and have read them alongside archival documents to study the convergence of the American and Iranian systems of higher education during the last shah’s reign (1941–79).1

As readers of Passport know, our various subfields have, for the better part of two decades, pointed in different ways to “development” and “modernization” as drivers of U.S. power around the world and in the Middle East.2 It is my contention that ideas about education are as essential as economic theories or approaches to rural development when considering the matrix of mid-century developmentalist thought, and I turn here to the publications of the 1950s and 1960s. Some of these writings were pioneering in their fields, but all are artifacts of the American-Iranian encounter of the early Cold War that shaped the intellectual parameters of the “discourse of development” as it was understood at the time from the American shore. Two articles from our decade, both published in the International History Review, provide frameworks for situating the postwar educational encounter. Christopher Fisher analyzes the work of David Lilienthal in Iran’s Khuzestan province and finds that Lilienthal was a practitioner who understood the human elements of development better than theorists like Rostow and Millikan. Yet Lilienthal failed, Fisher argues, because he was “caught between contested intellectual tides in Iran and the US.” Lilienthal’s work, like that of his contemporaries in education, “is more than a story of the Shah’s failed attempts at modernization; it is also a window into the complex and unsettled world of post-war development in the United States.”3 In that unsettled world, Fisher finds, “modernization theory” was just one of many modernization theories, or approaches to development, available.4 The same was true in the educational arena.

Andrew Warne also delves into the cultural impact of U.S.-Iran relations on the United States. Warne scrutinizes the more pernicious side of developmentalist thinking as it became manifest, not in Khuzestan, but in Washington. He finds that many mid-century Americans “denounced racial and religious bias and based their claims [of superiority] on the popular science of psychology.” They lived in Jim Crow America, projected Orientalist stereotypes onto the Middle East, and offered commentaries on “Iranian irrationality and backwardness” that were similar to those of previous generations. A range of Americans thus “modernized Orientalism” through the language of social science in a way that led Kennedy administration officials, at least, to paint a skewed “psychological portrait of Iran.” That portrait presented Iran’s middle class—the most important audience for American educationalists—as suffering from “an identity crisis in which they were torn between the traditional world and the modern one.” For this reading, Warne builds on the work of Edward Said and Mary Ann Heiss.5

The arguments of Fisher and Warne are significant because they show how America’s Cold War encounter with Iran, and the ensuing dialectics that flowed from the people and ideas that moved between the two countries, transformed modes of thought and foreign policy. In the following pages, I apply their two main findings to the writing of American and, to a lesser extent, Iranian authors who published with U.S.-based, English-language journals and presses during the developmentalist moment.

The first finding comes from Fisher and relates to the many “developments” and “modernizations” that percolated at mid-century. I contend that this hybridity resulted from the wildly divergent disciplines and methodologies of the writers and analysts at the time. The second finding relates to Warne’s argument about how the prominence of behavioral psychology in the academy informed prejudicial views of Iran and Iranians. Such views were based on exceptionalist understandings of modernity, and they were often expressed through the language of social science and almost always represented through teleological developmentalist frames.

Getting Started in the Point Four Decade

The Iranian education system was changing dramatically during the 1950s. The University of Tehran, established two decades earlier, remained the flagship institution, but the five new institutions that opened between 1949 and 1955 were not enough to accommodate the growing population.6 Writing for UNESCO during the shah’s last decade in power, the U.S.-educated personnel psychologist Iraj Ayman described the 1950s as a period of pedagogical “experimentation.” He linked this atmosphere to the accomplishments of the Point Four program, which he thought “was responsible for many educational innovations in Iran.”7 Truman’s program was so called because it was the fourth of the resolutions in support of world peace that the president made in his 1949 inaugural address, and the educational moment that began with Point Four continued in Iran until the 1960s.

Point Four produced mixed results, but it was significant within the context of U.S.-Iran relations for multiple reasons. The question is not whether the program “failed” or “succeeded” in “modernizing” Iran; it is about how the aid program gave meaning to a bourgeoning American-Iranian educational dialogue. It was a historic moment when, on October 19, 1950, the United States and Iran signed the first Point Four agreement of the Cold War era.8 The agreement marked a formal, though limited, commitment by the U.S. government to the sharing of knowledge and technology with Iran. Work was done in a range of areas, but Point Four workers were embedded throughout all levels of the educational system, in administrative circles, and with nomadic tribes.9
The program sent approximately three thousand Americans to Iran to do this work during the first half of the 1950s. Their return generated interest in Iran stateside, and it was in this way that the first U.S. aid program to the extra-European world created space in American universities, think tanks, and publishing houses to support writing and reflection on Iranian education.

The first writers on contemporary education in Iran came from this pool of educationalists and developmentists. Franklin Harris was one such individual, and he wrote for the *Middle East Journal*, the house publication of the Middle East Institute in Washington. From 1947 to 1967, the MEJ ran twenty-seven articles that dealt solely with Iran. The journal’s charge of producing policy-relevant research meant that most of the articles centered on development and security. It also meant that most of the writers worked for the U.S. or Iranian government or had spent time in Iran with a non-governmental organization. Early issues of the journal covered subjects that related to education, such as agricultural reform and economic planning. In the 1960s, however, the MEJ ran articles on Iranian education because of its significance to U.S. aid programs and the Pahlavi state-building project.

Harris was one of the first practitioners to inform American audiences about Point Four. He was a longtime university president, first at Brigham Young and then at Utah State, and a point-person for early aid work in Iran. He was called upon for service abroad because of his leadership positions in higher education and his reputation as an agronomist specializing in soil science in a state with historic ties to Iran. Unlike many later development officials, he “showed an interest in Iranian culture and history.” Harris explained to readers that Point Four employees and contractors were working hard on a number of goals and doing their best “to bring the program in line with the newest in modern education.”

William Warne was another early practitioner and writer. The former New Dealer was the Point Four director in Iran during the early 1950s and oversaw a binational team (future ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi was a member) that promoted low-level development projects. Upon completing his tour, Warne published a memoir recounting his work and experiences. While Harris’s article provided a brief synopsis of early Point Four projects for readers inside the Beltway, Warne’s book was, one reviewer noted, “the fourth in a series written by Americans who have struggled with the problem of aiding Iran,” with the first by Morgan Shuster and the second and third by Arthur Mocquaugh.

Point Four also provided a platform for an emerging generation of Iranians. Many young Iranians of the postwar years studied abroad, earned advanced degrees, worked for the shah’s government and, like the shah, wrote for international audiences. Among the most important was Jahangir Amuzegar. After receiving a Ph.D. in economics from UCLA in 1955, Amuzegar held a range of positions. He was ambassador-at-large to the United States from 1963 to 1979 and, in the late 1970s, executive director of the International Monetary Fund.

Amuzegar wrote widely in the late 1950s about Point Four in Iran. As he saw it, “Technical assistance is nothing but a process of ‘education’ over time.” When considering actual educational projects, Amuzegar wrote that “university people as a whole are likely to be more qualified than the rest of the present experts.” However, he warned international educationalists to get in tune with Iranian realities. After all, “a superintendent of public schools . . . may be highly competent in the Michigan educational system, but could not necessarily serve as an education expert in an Iranian provincial administration.”

In his book on technical assistance, published in 1966, Amuzegar explained Point Four’s shortcomings by pointing to its lack of strategic focus. It claimed to be “a program of all things to all men.”

The final major writer of this era was, like Harris, a scientist and a university president at an institution with historic ties to Iran. Gaylord Harnwell was a physicist and president of the University of Pennsylvania for most of the 1950s and 1960s. He was part of an international cohort that knew that, in the age of dam-building and other largescale development initiatives, “the thoughtful planning for the effective role of universities in our foreign relationships is as yet in its infancy.” He believed, like Jahangir Amuzegar and Phillip Coombs, that educationalists had a greater role to play in the Cold War during John F. Kennedy’s presidency than they had during Dwight Eisenhower’s. “Though curtains may be made of iron and bamboo,” Harnwell wrote, “they cannot be made of ignorance.”

In 1960 he went on a scouting mission to Iran to determine if it was feasible for his university to help the shah build an American-style university. He determined that it was, and the University of Pennsylvania received a government contract to build Pahlavi University in Shiraz. Harnwell wrote about his experiences in a 1960 travelogue, *Educational Voyaging in Iran*, which contained all the contradictions of postwar developmentalist thinking. He mused about “rubbing the lamp and summoning up the magic carpet” to get to Iran, and he placed the country among “the growing nations of the Middle East” that allegedly needed educational reform to develop a “mature nationality.” Harnwell also spoke crudely of “the utilitarianism of primitive societies and their structural components.” His proposals for the global role of the American university in the 1960s seemed to contradict each other. On the one hand, he wrote about “transplanting an educational system” and “the transference of practices and customs.” Harnwell assumed that “science and health were flowing in from the long-disinterested West” and that the shah was attempting to “assimilate our modern civilization.” On the other hand, he called for “adapting and transforming the practices of one society to those of another.” In other words, Harnwell knew, as did Amuzegar, that “ideas could be drawn from American experience, but their application had to be in Iranian hands.”

Unfortunately, the need for balance was often acknowledged on paper and obscured in practice. And while the contract model that educationalists such as Franklin Harris and Gaylord Harnwell pioneered proliferated in following decades, applied social scientists came to dominate the writing on Iranian education in the 1960s.

**The Applied Social Sciences and the White Revolution**

Richard Frye, an eminent Persianist at Harvard who directed the Asia Institute in Shiraz in the last decade of the Pahlavi period, noted that at the time, “there were two different currents in Iranian studies.” In reality there were many more, but Frye’s observations are telling. He saw that there were some international scholars “who were most appreciative, and who really were touched by Iranian culture,” but he also saw that many researchers went to Iran “to use it as a field for study” or as a country to “put [their] model in.” At no time was this dynamic more apparent than at the start of the White Revolution, the shah’s socio-economic program of authoritarian development that ushered in the second postwar moment of transformation to Iran’s education system. The educational transformation that began in the 1960s and accelerated into the 1970s was less about experimentation than it was about “the rapid expansion of educational opportunities.” A byproduct of these expanded opportunities was a spike in U.S.-based writing on Iranian education and a marked shift in the perspectives and methods of the authors.
was the first social scientific monograph in English on Iran's education system. Arasteh began the book, which was published in 1962, by noting that portrayals of Iran "have been greatly distorted by hasty travelers, biased missionaries, subjective orientalists, and more recently by untrained social scientists." He differed from many of his contemporaries in arguing that "foreign intervention has often been the major barrier to modernization in Iran." If one wanted what was at the time called "modernization," Iran needed "full sovereignty," and "the nationalist movement should be allowed to fully express itself." He told international audiences that "although many in the West may feel that Iran is not yet prepared to assume this responsibility . . . the Iranian people have persistently sought to become the masters of their own house."28 Yesthe historian Mikiya Koyagi notes, Arasteh wrote "with a language heavily embedded in modernization theory," and he took "the dichotomous split between modern and traditional for granted."29 Arasteh's argument was that a small group of Iranians began to reform Iran's education system in the mid-nineteenth century, but their progress was "slow and marked by discontinuity and disharmony." A "reconstruction" was needed in the twentieth century, he contended, to reverse "such stagnation from a nation which played a significant role in the ancient and medieval world."26 While he criticized imperialism, he did so because it created a situation where "Iranians have never had a good opportunity to appreciate the real inner force of progress in Western society." Just as important for understanding the intellectual landscape of the 1960s is Arasteh's professional biography. He was a professor of psychology with a Ph.D. from Louisiana State University. His legacy, according to a team of psychologists who reconsidered his life in 2009, was not in the field of education or history. Rather, he "combined Westernized psychology with Sufism to emerge as an important voice in the integration of psychology and religion."30 Arasteh did the English-speaking world a favor by writing a narrative history of Iranian education, but his most important research was in other areas.31 Stilh, his book signaled the arrival of the applied social sciences to the field of Iranian education.

Another writer who saw a world bifurcated between "tradition" and "modernity" was George Baldwin. An MIT-trained economist, Baldwin went to Iran in the late 1950s with the Ford Foundation-backed Harvard Advisory Group to help the economists in the Economic Bureau of the Iranian government's Plan Organization—the agency tasked with designing development plans—to draft a structural blueprint for the modernization of the 1960s.32 After working in Iran, Baldwin joined the World Bank's economic staff and continued to publish in numerous forums on the international dimensions of Iranian education. He was surely inspired by the talented U.S.-educated economists with whom he worked in Tehran, as he noticed during his time there that "appeals to [return to Iran] went out frequently from the Shah and from the Managing Director of the Plan Organization" to the student community abroad.33 The political activism of the student community also generated interest in the subject of international education among professors, graduate students, and diplomats in the 1960s.34 In the Middle East Journal Baldwin drew on a sample of 414 individuals of the postwar generation to sketch "a profile" of "the foreign-educated Iranian." In what became a common theme for the 1960s, Baldwin found that students "reflect the ambivalence of the contemporary Iranian towards his society and the régime that governs it."35

Baldwin was as ambivalent about Iran as his data allegedly suggested his Iranian interviewees were. His ambivalence was in part due to the fact that his expertise was in economic development, and he published books on the subject as it related to Iran but also to Great Britain, Papua New Guinea, and South Asia.36 As Frye saw the situation, individuals such as Baldwin "could have just as well gone to Indonesia or Paraguay, or whatever; they came to Iran instead because they had a fellowship."37

Nowhere are the intellectual implications of these problematic circumstances more apparent than in Baldwin's 1967 book on Iran. Baldwin challenged "the caterpillar-and-the-butterfly model of Iran" and argued "that inside the chrysalis the caterpillar is not only still alive but may not be turning into anything new." He explained away his pessimism "within a culture-bound framework" and with reference to Iran's "national character, its underlying psychological patterns, perhaps even its own distinctive biochemistry." Here the relevance of Andrew Wain's argument about the prevalence of pseudo-scientific and socio-psychological theories of "others" emerges in bold relief. In contrast to the hints at two-way exchange in Harnwell's text, Baldwin concluded that "it is not Iran but her friends who must change their [the Iranians'] thinking."38

If Baldwin's interest in Iran stemmed from his work there in the late 1950s, a different cohort of American academics would, during the mid-1960s, gain greater access to Iran. Like many of the decade's scholars, Lawrence Brammer and Arthur Doerr approached Iranian education from diverse methodological perspectives and published their findings in the establishment Middle East Journal. Brammer taught counseling and human resources at the University of Washington and took advantage of the increased opportunities for educational exchange to travel twice to Iran as a Fulbright scholar to study comparative systems of education.39 Doerr was a geography professor at the University of Oklahoma, a school that was attractive to Iranian students because of its oil geography program. He spent eighteen months in the mid-1960s at Pahlavi University, and he presented the project that Harnwell helped initiate as a test case for understanding "educational development."40 Both Brammer and Doerr were among the cadre of analysts who began work in comparative education and, in turn, expanded the modernization paradigm out of the socio-economic realm during the decade of the White Revolution.

The establishment of Pahlavi University in Shiraz offered educationalists plenty to consider. Doerr found that, after years of contract work by the University of Pennsylvania and its partners, "much of the form of an ‘American-type’ university has been captured, but the substance seems to be missing." He wrote that "in true Madison Avenue style it seems to be the image that counts" in 1960s Iran. Criticisms aside, however, he wanted to believe that Pahlavi University was "a great dream yet to be realized." While not free of the biases of other authors, Doerr's critique of the Pahlavi project was related to politics and funding and often derived from his pedagogical and administrative preferences. Although Doerr worked in Shiraz toward "the development of a liberal arts curriculum" that "resembles those present in American colleges and universities," he lamented that such a curriculum was rejected by "career-oriented" students and faculty. One of his biggest concerns, then, was that the liberal arts curriculum was "poorly understood" in theory and "badly hybridized" in implementation at Pahlavi University.41

Brammer most directly addressed the educational consequences of the White Revolution, especially the Literacy Corps. In a classic case of "military modernization," the Literacy Corps allowed high school graduates to substitute their mandatory military service for two years of literacy work in the countryside. The corpsmen and corpswomen had access to military resources and attempted to translate the drilling of the parade grounds to rural education.42 Under such circumstances, analysts such as Brammer
were forced to consider “whether agencies outside of established educational institutions, as the military, should have such a prominent role in basic education.” Not all agreed, Brammer’s answer was a resounding “yes.” He came to that conclusion for Iran because he thought the military could “fight serious traditional bureaucratic customs” and alleged “culture-lag problems.” He went beyond an acceptance of cultural essentialism and, moved by “the great reform spirit sweeping the country in all areas of endeavor,” set aside his doubts to champion the shah’s “orderly” yet “truly massive educational and social revolution.”

Both Doerr and Brammer identified what they considered “problems” in the Iranian education system, but Brammer’s explanation for those problems illustrates most clearly the ways in which the traditional-modernity binary and racialized understandings of difference overlapped with social scientific inquiries during the 1960s. Brammer spoke to 131 students in three Iranian cities as “part of a broader program to sample student attitudes” in authoritarian states—among them South Vietnam and the Philippines. Without any questions about politics, he explained little about student life and a lot about the normalization of “a Western-oriented value system” in academic circles. According to Brammer, students were “caught” in “value conflicts” and suffered an “identity crisis” caused by a “past-present time perspective.” This analysis was rooted in the assumption that Iran was “a society in transition with the ancient and the modern often existing in the same personality” and a country whose citizens had a “strong belief in ‘fate’ and the immutability of the social order.”

Similar socio-psychological commentaries appear elsewhere. In the 1960s, many U.S. officials shared the conviction that, as one diplomat reported, “a psychiatric approach to analyzing the Iranian political scene might be more pertinent than one based on political science.” Unwilling to consider alternatives to Pahlavi rule, the State Department’s Iran hands mused in 1965 that dissent was “at least as readily subject to analysis by students of Jung and Freud as by students of Marx and Mill.” With similar social scientific claims appearing in the decade’s books and journals, policymakers advocated for the “right kind of revolution” in Iran.

**James Bill versus Marvin Zonis**

The binational conversation changed after 1967. That year, Iranians witnessed the shah’s coronation, the termination of the U.S. AID mission, and another round of educational nationalization as part of an expanded White Revolution. In the United States, SHAFR and what is now the Association for Iranian Studies were established in 1967, along with the flagship journals *Diplomatic History* and *Iranian Studies*. No longer were scholars subject to the editorial mandate set by the Middle East Institute and constrained by U.S. security concerns in the Persian Gulf region. Because of these developments and others, consensus-era thinking on Iranian education began to splinter. This broader academic phenomenon became manifest in the debates between two political scientists whose work would later inform many historians of U.S. foreign relations: Marvin Zonis and James Bill.

Zonis was an MIT-trained political scientist whose original research came from data that he extrapolated from interviews with 167 members of Iran’s “political elite” and then analyzed with the help of early computational methods. He served in many leadership capacities in academia, holding positions at both the University of Chicago’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies and the American Institute of Iranian Studies. Unlike other Americans who wrote on Iran, Zonis was among the first area studies specialists in the United States to write a dissertation on contemporary Iranian politics. Like many others, however, Zonis developed a psychological explanation for Iran’s encounter with Cold War modernities. He processed his data in the late 1960s with the assistance of Chicago’s Committee on Human Development, and while his research interests moved away from Iran after the 1979 revolution, his methods in psychological analysis remained consistent, as can be seen in his biography of the shah.

James Bill (d. 2015) was a Princeton-trained area studies specialist with a focus on Iran and comparative politics. He worked at the University of Texas for twenty years beginning in the late 1960s, after which time he relocated to the College of William and Mary where he established the Reves Center for International Studies and published on a range of subjects. While most readers of Passport will be familiar with his later book *The Eagle and the Lion*, his early scholarship on Iranian politics challenged exceptionalist and teleological understandings of “modernization.”

More important, Bill’s debates with Zonis speak to the two main points of this essay, namely the hybridity of developmentalist thinking and the ways in which the social sciences “modernized Orientalism.”

In their writings from the 1960s, the two scholars shared many common characteristics but with slight variations. Both addressed what Bill described as “the challenge of modernization” from within a structuralist paradigm, although Zonis was more attentive to how “intellectual concerns could be useful for facilitating the modernization” of Iran. Both studied high politics. Bill was interested in “the processes of social change and political modernization” analyzed in terms of group and class relations, especially the professional middle class, while Zonis focused on the behavior of the political elite in and around the royal court. Both worked within an interdisciplinary academic landscape that Zonis captured best when he wrote that “recent years have witnessed a remarkable convergence in formerly disparate disciplines and distant geographical areas. . . . Where the anthropologist had long studied the economists, followed by political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists.” Zonis described the work of his cohort as “interdisciplinary studies” conducted “interculturally.” Both he and Bill turned their attention to the Iranian education system in some of the inaugural issues of *Iranian Studies*.

Zonis titled his article “Educational Ambivalence in Iran,” which is a theme that pervades the postwar literature. He argued that “social and psychological factors are mutually reinforcing” and combined “to impede the development of a technically educated modernizing cadre.” His argument was based on the notion that there were “divergent traditions” between “cultural continuity and technological, i.e., Western, innovation” that continued to impact Iran’s education system in the 1960s. Zonis reportedly found “a fascinating and seemingly contradictory amalgam of the traditional and the modern,” and he concluded that Iran’s elites were “remarkably well-educated” but displayed a “deep-seated ambivalence . . . towards education.” Zonis was not speaking of education per se, but rather the “new knowledge” in the hard social sciences that he believed was “the cultural and ideological basis of Western progress.” In contrast to Doerr’s assessment of Pahlavi University, Zonis contended that Iran’s political elite embraced “archaic curricula” based in the “liberal arts” because they were “compatible with Iran’s traditional culture.” Whatever the source, he concluded that “this ambivalence among the political leaders of Iran appears to be reflected in the development of Iran’s educational institutions.”

Bill wrote about “the politics of student alienation.” He turned to this subject in the late 1960s, for obvious reasons. As he wrote, “The student has become the loudest spokesman for social change and a leading catalyst...
for political transformation.” Student protest culture was significant in Iran because, as his broader research indicated, “students are located at the key birth point of the new class.”

Bill attempted to correct the record in at least two ways. He first dealt with the politics of authoritarianism and its relationship to education. While Baldwin and Brammer highlighted other sources of disenchantment, Bill found that the top concern for 46 percent of those he surveyed was “eliminating inequality and injustice,” a category that carried “strong political implications.” The concerns that preoccupied behavioralists and economically determined modernization theorists—namely, “bettering the spiritual and moral level of society” and “planning and expanding economic development”—together concerned only 16 percent of his pool. In sum, Bill found that young Iranians were demanding “the right to acquire that education as well as the right to use it.”

In a broader sense, Bill rejected the assumptions and methodologies of many of his peers. He offered a non-Marxian understanding of Iranian society and class structure that foregrounded material factors and bargaining between classes and groups. To do that, he focused on the socio-political arena, elevated power and interests over values and culture, and moved the literature away from what he characterized as “descriptive history in which the political component has been ultimately viewed as a by-product of cultural traits, religious heritage, or the idiosyncracies [sic] of particular political actors.” Bill insisted that “the behavioral movement that gained ascendency in the 1950s and 1960s,” along with the conflation of “quantitative rigidity” with “scientific rigor,” worked to “divert the attention” of U.S.-based researchers and “dilute the explanatory power” of many interdisciplinary studies. Bill’s scholarship had many limitations, but he consciously avoided the pitfalls that he identified in the work of his contemporaries.

In addition to their methodological differences, Bill and Zonis had different relationships with the Pahlavi dynasty. In his acknowledgments, Zonis thanked the shah for his “kingly grace” and for promoting international research in a way that was “both courageous and laudable.” Bill said nothing of the shah, but he noted that he was “deeply appreciative” of the empress, Farah Diba Pahlavi, for speaking in an “inspired” way that, to him, “epitomized the magnificent strengths that inhere in Iran.” The methodological and political differences between Bill and Zonis were made evident in a public dialogue in 1975. Three years later, as the shah’s government began to falter, their differences of opinion on the shah were made public on the pages of American periodicals and to policymakers in the U.S. government.

Conclusion

In the age of development, and amid the backdrop of the White Revolution, most mid-century writers pointed to the monarchy as the saving grace of an otherwise “ambivalent” development effort. Triumphalist views of the Pahlavi period and the U.S. role in postwar Iran became less common in the 1970s, but it took the revolution of 1979 to bring about the paradigm shifts in intellectual life that would influence future generations of scholarship on Iranian education written from the American shore.

Yet there are sources of both continuity and change in the scholarship written on either side of the revolutionary divide. Some topics, such as the brain drain, concerned scholars of education during the late Pahlavi period and continue to occupy the attention of analysts since the creation of the Islamic Republic. Others address newer research lines, such as women in education. The most important similarity between the recent historiography and the mid-century literature is that scholars continue to engage with interdisciplinary methods and scholarship, or at least contribute to “multi-disciplinary” conversations. Such efforts can be seen in major works written outside Iran after the revolution about the Qajar and Pahlavi periods.

The initial post-revolutionary writing on pre-revolutionary education came in the form of individual monographs. David Menashri produced the most comprehensive study of Iran’s education system of the twentieth century, though scholars have since identified its limitations. Roy Mottahedeh offered a window into many educational worlds, including the religious dimension so important in Iran but overlooked by many abroad. Monica Ringer explained how educational debates were not always divided along “sacred” and “secular” lines, as many mid-century scholars argued; instead, she identified a multilayered “discourse of cultural reform” during the Qajar era.

There is additional scholarship that speaks to the rise of U.S. global power and the educational internationalism that linked the United States with nations around the world. Michael Zirinsky has written on the early American-Iranian educational encounters, most of which involved Presbyterian missionaries. Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi has published widely about missionary and women’s education, and scholars have studied the educational opportunities for religious minorities such as the Baha’is. Camron Michael Amin’s work on the University of Tehran is especially insightful. In his work and that of others, gender has proved a useful category of analysis for studying the first Pahlavi shah’s educational reforms. Scholars of his son’s reign have written on tribal education, the Peace Corps, the Literacy Corps, and “educational modernization” in the 1970s.

Histories of opposition and dialogue examine what Hamid Dabashi has called “Iran Without Borders.” The groundbreaking book by Afshin Matin-Asgari, Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah, remains the starting point for English-language readers interested in the student movement abroad. Other books, including Quinn Slobodian’s Foreign Front, build on the literature on the global sixties and human rights to place the Iranian student movement within American, German, and transnational contexts. Interdisciplinary studies explore the experiences of Iranian students in the United States within the contexts of gender and Chicano/Chicana activism.

Post-revolutionary writing tends to be critical of Pahlavi state-building efforts and U.S. foreign policy in Iran, and authors are often more aware of their own relation to power than was the case in the early Cold War era. The most recent scholarship is certainly influenced by the various “turns”—whether linguistic and cultural or international and transnational—that have transformed most areas of inquiry across the social sciences and humanities in recent decades. Equally important for the study of U.S.-Iran relations has been the growth of the diaspora from its pre-revolutionary concentration in the student population to what is today a community that extends into all areas of American life. While much has changed, Iranian education will remain a significant area of inquiry for scholars across the academy, including many readers of Passport.

Notes:


4. While this point is made elsewhere, a succinct explanation can be found in Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations (Redwood City, CA, 2010), 67–73.


12. Based on author’s own analysis. The pieces on education are discussed in the second section of this essay. References here are to Lyle Hayden, “Living Standards in Rural Iran: A Case Study,” Middle East Journal 3, no. 2 (1949): 140–50; and S. Rezaezaheh Shafaei and J.D. Lotz, “The Iranian Seven Year Development Plan,” Middle East Journal 4, no. (1950): 100–105.


15. William Warne, Mission for Peace: Point 4 in Iran (Bethesda, MD, 1999); Garlitz, A Mission for Development, 36.


24. The Pahlavi University Projects Records (UPB 107) are available at the University of Pennsylvania’s Archives and Records Center.

25. Harnwell, Educational Voyaging in Iran, 13–17, 30, 57.


27. Ayman, Educational Innovation in Iran, 3–4.


46. American Consul Tabriz to State Department, May 18, 1964, RG 59, Records Relating to Iran 1964–1966, box 1, folder: From the Consulates, NARA.
52. I again refer to Fisher, “Moral Purpose is the Important Thing”; and Watts, “Psychoanalyzing Iran.”
57. Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, ix.
SAVE THE DATE: June 14-18, 2020
SHAFR Summer Institute: WOMEN IN THE WORLD

The 2020 SHAFR Summer Institute will focus on the dynamic study of “Women in the World,” featuring these exciting scholars:

- **Allida Black**—her research has focused on the role of Eleanor Roosevelt, especially during her years of work on the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights; on Hillary Rodham Clinton’s work as First Lady at the 1995 U.N. World Women’s Conference in Beijing and as Secretary of State working to promote human rights issues; and on the challenges of constructing Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s history when the Liberian civil war violence destroyed essential records.

- **Katherine Marino**—her research has focused on Latin American women’s efforts to promote a human rights agenda across borders in the 1920s-1940s. Indeed, her new book—*Feminism for the Americas: The Making of an International Human Rights Movement*—argues that women from Latin America and the Caribbean were central to crafting a feminist human rights agenda.

- **Brandy Thomas Wells**—her research has focused on African-American women’s anti-colonial and anti-racist activism both at home and abroad from the 1890s through the 1960s through the National Association of Colored Women Clubs (NACWC) and the National Council of Negro Women (NCNW).

- **Julie Laut**—her research has focused on the role of women in the Indian National movement. Her dissertation centered Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who was the first female leader of a U.N. delegation in 1946 and one of the most prominent female diplomats in the post-WWII era. Her research analyzes the ways in which gender helped structure emotional discourses over the issue of racial oppression, as she argues for a cultural approach to understanding the early U.N., its diplomacy, and its early focus on decolonization.

The Summer Institute will be held in New Orleans in the days leading up to the 2020 SHAFR Conference, so participants are encouraged to consider also proposing papers and panels for that conference meeting in conjunction with their institute participation. Both graduate students and junior faculty members are invited to participate in the institute. Institute participants will receive housing and most meals as well as some level of travel assistance.

In addition to scholarly conversations about the history of women in the world led by the scholars listed above, the institute will also include discussions on

- gender dynamics in the classroom and workplace
- career options (traditional and alternative) for history professionals
- resources on women in the world for research and teaching
- professional networking, mentoring, and opportunities
- publishing strategies
- managing work and life

If you are interested in further information, please email Amy.Sayward@shafr.org.
My interest in the Vietnam War is what got me interested in history. I grew up in the eighties, and at that time, you really couldn’t escape the Vietnam War because of movies and TV shows – Platoon, Full Metal Jacket, Born on the Fourth of July, Hamburger Hill, Rambo, etc.; and on TV, China Beach, Wonder Years. On top of all that, it was the war of my parents’ generation, and I remember hearing my mom and dad talk in solemn tones about friends who had gone to Vietnam and weren’t right ever since, or guys from their high school who had been killed there. So the seed was planted when I was a kid, but two professors I had as an undergraduate student at Marquette University—Dr. Steven Avella and Dr. Philip Naylor—made me want to do what they did. I went on to get a Ph.D. in history from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and I’ve been a history professor at the University of Southern Mississippi for more than a decade. I was born and raised in northwest Indiana, basically Chicagoland, and I live in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, with my husband, three young children, two dogs, and two cats.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?


What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

Taking my Ph.D. orals – I still feel anxious when I think about those awful two hours! My friends had planned a big party for me afterward, but all I wanted to do was crawl into bed and hide.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Golda Meir, Indira Gandhi, and Margaret Thatcher – I’m fascinated by women heads of state, especially those whose legacies are points of contention among historians.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Pay off the mortgages of several family members and friends, ensure that my children were financially set for college and beyond, and fund the construction of a state-of-the-art fieldhouse for my children’s school. Then I’d buy a royal blue 1972 Chevy Nova for myself.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?

I was born and raised a Chicago sports fan - White Sox, Bears, and Bulls. I played tennis in high school, and I’m a runner now – I’ve run the Chicago Marathon five times, and the NYC marathon once. I also coach my middle child's soccer team, and that’s probably my most favorite team of all!

What are five things on your bucket list?

1. Run all six Abbott World Marathon Majors - two down (Chicago and NYC), four to go.
2. Run the Athens Marathon (the original!)
3. Take the Trans-Siberian Railway from Moscow to Vladivostok in the winter.
4. Visit every continent (including Antarctica!)
5. See the Rolling Stones in concert

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I’d be a film director, a surgeon, or a women’s college basketball coach. Yeah, my interests are all over the place!
Basically, I’ve ended up where I started. My wife and my mom grew up within ten minutes of my house, and I take my daughter to visit her great grandmother on the weekends. (Not a typo.) My 95-year old grandmother lives in a nursing home across the street from her great granddaughter’s elementary school.

Not the scenario you draw up at the start of grad school . . .

I think I’m a historian because my dad read Lord of the Rings to me and my brother when we were kids. From there, my trajectory was straight like an arrow: graduated from an oversized/underfunded high school, went to an undersized/underfunded college, fell for a girl, tried to save the world (failed), married the girl, and ended up at Ohio State. For various reasons, I spent five years at Yale, which opened the door that took us to UAlbany, where I’ve taught U.S. foreign relations since 2013.

Along the way, I wrote a book about apartheid (really a book about decolonization) and started a family. Currently, I’m writing a book about liberals, chugging away on various article-length things, and trying to be a good colleague, a good husband, and a really good dad.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

For television: Seinfeld, The Wire, Game of Thrones, and The Great British Baking Show. For movies: I’m a fanboy of Alfonso Cuaron and Alejandro Iñárritu, love all Harrison Ford movies from ‘80 till ‘94, and never miss a chance to rewatch Jaws. I’ll go to the theater to see a Marvel movie, and then call my brother and argue. Have I gone over ten?

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

Hmm, lots of options. My favorite bad moment happened in 2003. My undergraduate thesis advisor suggested that I apply for a conference, and I took her literally, which was not her intention. When I close my eyes, I can still see the conference organizer’s face as I approached the sign-in desk. I didn’t yet own tie; he’d assumed I was on the faculty. I’ve embarrassed myself plenty of times since then, but that was the only time I caused another person’s embarrassment. The ensuing experience gave me a life philosophy.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Abraham Lincoln, James Baldwin, and Michelle Obama. I mean, I’d get to tell people that I heard the 19th century’s greatest politician, the 20th century’s greatest critic, and the 21st century’s greatest cultural icon discuss the country’s oldest question: Does race define America?

I think they’d understand each other’s arguments without accepting each other’s conclusions, and if they let me cook, I’d make penne pasta with roasted red peppers in a cream sauce.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Hmm, I’d upgrade our cabin in the Adirondacks. Then I’d pay down the mortgage and put aside money for our daughter’s education. The sort of stuff that confirms I can’t count to 500 million? Amy, my partner, is an elementary school principal and she’d do something noble with the rest of the money. She’s an idea factory.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?

Somewhere in my parents’ basement is a three-ring binder with pages and pages and pages of laminated Don Mattingly baseball cards. He was my first hero. The Yankees got my father-in-law and I through the darkest days of the Bush administration, when we could talk about A-Rod and nothing else. There’s something Zen about baseball.

My dad (like his dad before him) is a diehard Syracuse fan, and ‘Cuse basketball is the closest thing you get to a pro team if you’re a Central New Yorker, so I am also partial to the Orange. But I don’t watch many games. Whenever my dad watches, he transforms into that father from The Christmas Story—curse words become nouns, verbs, and adjectives—and my wife believes this is an inherited genetic trait. So, I watch basketball in March . . . at our neighborhood bar.

I got a couple black belts when I was young and competed in karate tournaments, but that was a lifetime ago. Today, I run and ski. I’m like a robot: a half-marathon in April, another in August, and a big autumn race somewhere cool with my old college roommate. I’m not sure he’d characterize these races as “competition,” since I’ve never beat him, but that is going to be his downfall. Mark my words . . . .

What are five things on your bucket list?

First, a five-week road trip across the United States. I’ve done this trip twice and I desperately want to do it with my wife and daughter. Second, I would like to live long enough to see my daughter accomplish something she cares about passionately. Third, a long itinerary-less European vacation with my wife. Four, I want to write a book you would want to read more than once. Fifth, I’d like to summit all the high peaks in the Adirondacks.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I like to tell myself that I’d be a judge or a policymaker. But I’d probably be a teacher. I love to teach.
I am an assistant professor of history at Trinity University in San Antonio, TX, where I teach courses on U.S. foreign relations, modern United States history, and public history. I date my interest in historical work back to a high school elective that required a trip to the town archives. Handling 17th and 18th century Connecticut town records was such a cool and transformative experience—I was hooked! At Vassar, I deepened my fascination with modern U.S. political and foreign policy history through archival research and internships at area museums, including the FDR library. After college I completed a museum studies degree and worked in museum exhibition design for a few years before attending the University of Virginia and earning my Ph.D.


Though we are native northeasterners, my husband and I are enjoying all that Texas has to offer, including top-notch tacos, interesting places to hike, and a vibrant music community (we’re both musicians).

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

For television shows, my favorites include The Prisoner, Firefly, Justified, The Americans, The Venture Brothers, Archer, and The Good Place. For movies, I love adventure, classic films, science fiction, and westerns, everything from the The Goonies to Ex Machina to The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

Oh I have so many, but aside from the typical anxiety of first conference presentations and the burning shame of once going over time, most of mine seem to include spilling things. Like when, right as I was being picked up for my first ever on-campus interview, I managed to dump an entire cup of hot tea right down the front of my white shirt. Great first impression! I also memorably started off my oral exam for comps in grad school by gesturing wildly about something and knocking over a huge bottle of water on the table. My advisor kindly chalked this up to nerves, but the reality is that I’m just preternaturally clumsy.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Ada Lovelace (because she was essentially the first computer programmer and I would love to listen to her discuss her ideas about symbolic logic—and to let her know where those ideas have led us in terms of modern computing), Eleanor Roosevelt (I would want to ask her all about her work with the UN and UDHR, and have her weigh in on current political and international affairs), and Sister Rosetta Tharpe (the godmother of rock and roll. I could listen to her play guitar and sing for hours and would love to talk with her about her songwriting and her experiences, both in life and as a performer).

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

After devising a sensible savings and investment plan, I would travel extensively, make some renovations to our house in San Antonio and to the Turek family cabin up in Maine, and then start expanding my historical artifact collection (I like to bring artifacts into the classroom and I am planning to write a material culture history of U.S. foreign relations). Being able to buy virtually any artifact would be delightful and would help with the realization of this book idea. I would also, of course, donate to organizations that champion causes I care about—conservation, women’s rights, racial justice, animal welfare, humanities research, public education and public media, etc. And I would make sure SHAFR had a healthy enough endowment to keep it in the black in perpetuity.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?

As a San Antonio resident I feel a general sense of pride and loyalty to the Spurs and I love cheering my Trinity student-athletes on when they compete, but truthfully, I am not a big sports fan. The only time I follow any televised sport is during the Olympics. When the Olympics roll around, my husband and I drop everything and watch obsessively, whether it is swimming and gymnastics for the summer games or ice skating and biathlon in the winter. One of our bucket list items as a couple is to attend a summer Olympics if we can afford to do so someday.

When I was younger, I played field hockey for a little while but stopped before high school so that I could devote myself to music (in high school and college I played in the concert band, woodwind quintet, pit band, marching band, and jazz band, then afterward continued playing in various rock banks—I play six musical instruments). Although I’m not into team sports, I do enjoy running, weightlifting, and rollerskating for my exercise.

What are five things on your bucket list?

1. The aforementioned trip to see the Olympics
2. Getting tenure
3. Visiting Lalibela in Ethiopia
4. Becoming a fluent speaker of Spanish and Polish
5. Taking a grand tour of Europe

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

If I had not gone back to graduate school to become an academic, I imagine I would still be working in the museum field, either designing exhibits for museums at the company I used to work for or actually working in a museum as a curator or collections manager.
My interest in history came from spending so much time with my grandparents, and growing up in houses filled with all kinds of books. When I went to college, at the University of Virginia, I was a pre-med major until I got to Organic Chemistry. After switching to history (thankfully), I was advised by the incomparable historian of the U.S. South, Paul Gaston. But I took my first diplomatic history course with Norman Graebner, in his very last semester of teaching. Enough said. I did not follow a straight path to a PhD in history, but I was fortunate enough to have had exceptional mentors along the way, especially Ken Clements, at South Carolina. When I first approached him in 1992 and said I was interested in “something with gender and diplomatic history.” He just said. “OK, sounds interesting. Let’s start reading.” Over the years I have written mostly about the U.S. foreign service and the work of social diplomacy, and especially the roles of the wives of diplomats. I was very lucky also that my mentors also helped instill in me the magic of teaching, which sustains me every semester. Thank you to Andy Johns and Passport for allowing me the space to have a little fun here.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

TV Only (movies too hard to choose):
Homicide: Life on the Street, Seinfeld, The Office, West Wing, VEEP, Law and Order
(Especially the ones with Lenny Briscoe), Frasier, ER (the early years), WKRP in Cincinnati, Parks and Rec

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

I regularly hang out in public at SHAFR meetings, and occasionally other venues, with Mitch Lerner.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

My grandparents. (Yes, I know, that’s four.)

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Well, I never play the lottery. But if $500 million fell from the sky, I wouldn’t turn it down. I would enjoy myself, to be sure, but I’m not inclined to extravagance. Though I would get a hot tub and hire someone to take care of it. I would take care of family and friends who haven’t pissed me off recently. (If you are unsure whether or not you qualify, then you don’t.) Also, I would start a huge animal rescue for any and all creatures great and small. I would spend a lot of my time hanging out with baby goats, and the horses.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?

I watch college sports much more than professional. I’ve lived and died with University of Virginia Cavaliers (Wahoos) basketball all my life, as some of you already know.
Love sports generally. Played basketball and ran track in H.S. I used to have a killer baseline jump shot. Grew up riding horses, but never competed much. More fun just taking care of the horses, riding and eventually teaching lessons to little kids.

What are five things on your bucket list?

- Riding (horses) tour in Ireland and another long walking tour somewhere in Europe (See how I turned two things into one here?)
- Live in Edinburgh for a year (or two, or maybe forever)
- Get the Band back together! I’d play rhythm guitar and if I could sing, I would sing. I’d probably be ok as backup. (OK. I was never in a band but that’s the idea here, right?)
- Cat Café (but I would have to employ people to make the coffee and serve customers, and to scoop litter. I would be in charge of petting, lap sitting, playing and napping.)
- Paint and draw again. For real.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

- Stand-up comedy? Seriously, 25-years experience in the classroom.
- International woman of mystery?
- Supreme Court Justice?
- Actually, I’m entertaining suggestions from the educated masses out there. Anyone got any ideas??
Currently, I’m a U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow at Dartmouth’s Dickey Center for International Understanding. I graduated in August 2018 with a Ph.D. from Temple University, and I have a Master and Bachelor of Arts from Tübingen University in Germany. Though I’m a German national, I spent most of my childhood in St. Louis because my father worked for the local branch of a German company. Hence, my slight midwestern accent in English! Since I encountered foreign countries and cultures at a young age, I’m interested in the ways in which people bridge their differences and collaborate across national boundaries. My current project, growing from my dissertation, analyzes how security officials in the United States and Europe conceptualized terrorism, and correspondingly, set parameters for acceptable counterterrorism policies from the late 1960s onward. I write a lot about air travel security, but my focus means that I can’t actually discuss my work at the airport. I’m also a geek and an animal enthusiast – I’m that person at conferences who can provide random facts about the Cold War, travel, science fiction, video games, dinosaurs, and dogs.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

The funniest movie I know is One, Two, Three. It is a 1961 screwball comedy about the CEO of Coca Cola in West Berlin, who needs to prevent the elopement of his boss’ daughter from Atlanta with an East German communist. With references to everything from Soviet missiles in Cuba to Lend-Lease, this movie is a treasure trove of jokes for Cold War historians. I also enjoy tv series such as Firefly or Star Trek that use science fiction settings to explore political extremism, nationalism, racism and other fundamental issues.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

As a second-year Ph.D. student, I found myself stuck at a regional airport after a SHAFR conference because of a delayed flight. Several other historians of political violence were in a similar predicament. I used the opportunity to discuss how they researched terrorism, what actors to focus on, and where to find sources. When my flight was called, I noticed that every single employee at that airport was staring at me with a carefully cultivated blank poker face. The context of my discussion was perhaps not ideal.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

How do you gain security, and what tradeoffs do you make for it? I would really enjoy debating this topic with Elizabeth I, Dag Hammarskjöld, and Richard Nixon.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Fund a research center and travel around the world. What a life...

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?

I do not follow professional sports in any detail, but my ancestral soccer team is Borussia Dortmund. My family hails from the industrial Ruhr area surrounding Dortmund - and my forefathers and foremothers have supported this team since its foundation in 1909.

What are five things on your bucket list?

My bucket list revolves around travel. I want to see the ruins of Petra and of Machu Piccu and visit old-city Kyoto and Seoul. I can never spend enough time in France to sample all the cheeses, but I can try. Finally, I want to go to Comic Con in San Diego - if I win their admission ticket raffle.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I’m organized to the point of over-planning, and I can deescalate interpersonal conflicts. These skills would translate well into a career as an event planner.
What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

*Cheers* and *Homicide: Life on the Street* are the two best shows ever, followed closely by *My Name is Earl*. Movies include *The Third Man*, *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*, and *The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly*. *The Rookie* gets an honorable mention for using John Hiatt’s *Slow Turning*.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

When I went for my interview at UNH in 1994, I tried to be a good guest and ask questions of my host. At lunch, I turned to the person next to me and asked “what is your research about?” Before I got to the “about” I realized that I was talking to Pulitzer and Bancroft winner Laurel Ulrich. She was incredibly gracious, and I saved the self-administered dope slap for when I got back to the airport. The mark is still visible.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

I’d love to talk to some of the early naturalists who explored North America when the fauna was still largely intact, like Audubon or Wilson. OK, and TR, because he would probably have the best stories.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Regret having lost the ticket in a pile on my desk.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?

I sadly still pay close attention to the Cincinnati Bengals and Reds. I have no athletic skill but I chair UNH’s Fieldhouse Committee, an interdisciplinary group of staff, grad students, townies, and faculty who meet in groups of 5 on the hardwood three times per week.

What are five things on your bucket list?

- see the Bengals win a Super Bowl
- get to Antarctica
- launch our kids into the world (so we can rent out their rooms)
- find that lottery ticket from question 4
- outlive the idea of bucket lists

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I’d certainly be a failed field biologist.
SHAFR benefits from the generosity of its members as well as those who are interested in promoting its mission of ensuring excellence in teaching and research related to international history. Contributions—like those of the late Dr. and Mrs. Bernath—allow SHAFR to provide discounted membership and conference rates to our graduate students. We have benefited greatly from the generosity of those who have supported SHAFR for the past 51 years. We invite everyone to invest in our future. You can give on-line anytime: http://shafr.org/donate

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The Norman and Laura Graebner Prize was established through the generosity of Norman's students to recognize the lifetime achievement of a senior historian of foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service. The Graebner Prize Committee (Edward Miller, Kristin Hoganson, and Lien-Hang Nguyen) announced that Emily Rosenberg is the 2018 recipient of the Graebner Prize. In addition to her award-studded years of teaching at both Macalester College and the University of California-Irvine, she reached and taught countless others through her textbooks, Teaching American History workshops, and scholarship. That scholarship includes more than a dozen books and some seventy articles, essays, and scholarly introductions and has had a profound impact on the field; it anticipated the cultural turn in the field and practically introduced the history of globalization. Yet Emily also found time to serve the profession in countless ways; to focus simply upon her contributions to SHAFR, she served as its President in 1997 and has headed countless committees, councils, boards, conference panels, and roundtables on behalf of our organization and its work. For all of these reasons, she is a very worthy recipient of the 2018 Graebner Award. Emily will receive her award at the upcoming SHAFR Conference.

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize is awarded annually to recognize excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. It is a testament to the vitality of SHAFR that every year the selection committee is faced with a difficult decision among so many outstanding nominees. After careful deliberation, this year's Bernath Lecture committee (Carol Chin, Mark Bradley, and Hugh Wilford) have selected Professor Kelly Shannon to deliver the Bernath Lecture in 2020. Kelly Shannon received her Ph.D. from Temple University under the direction of Richard Immerman. She taught for three years at the University of Alaska, Anchorage, before taking up her current position at Florida Atlantic University. Her book, U.S. Foreign Policy and Muslim Women’s Human Rights, draws together key themes of transnational feminism, global human rights, and Western discourse on Islamic societies. She carefully delineates the tensions, as well as points of agreement, between Western feminists, with their universalist and often Orientalist assumptions, and the Muslim women themselves. In addition, Shannon makes an important intervention by bringing the history of human rights politics right up to the end of the twentieth century. Many of her nominators also attested to her superb abilities as a teacher. For these reasons, the committee is delighted to award the Bernath Lecture Prize to Prof. Kelly Shannon. She is pictured above, right, with committee chair Carol Chin.

Amira Rose Davis's book manuscript, “Can’t Eat a Medal: The Lives and Labors of Black Women Athletes in the Age of Jim Crow,” is an original and innovative study that sheds new light on an understudied topic in U.S. and global history—the experiences of black women athletes. By positioning black women athletes as Cold War diplomats, the author challenges conventional images of both athletes and of diplomats in fascinating ways. The project draws on over a dozen oral histories and extensive print sources in the U.S. and abroad to expand our understanding of sports, labor, and diplomacy through the lens of gender. Dr. Davis completed her Ph.D. in History in 2016 from Johns Hopkins University.
University. She currently serves as Assistant Professor of History and Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Penn State University. Amira is pictured on the previous page with Williams Junior Faculty Grant Committee Chair Keisha Blain.

Joan Flores-Villalobos’s book manuscript, “The Silver Women: Intimacy, Race, and Empire at the Panama Canal, 1904-1914,” makes a significant contribution to the history of international relations by centering the experiences of West Indian women during the building of the Panama Canal. The study draws on original, underused sources and situates itself in multiple histories, such as those of gender, labor, race, empire, the Caribbean, and Central America. It will make important contributions to both U.S.-Latin America and U.S.-Caribbean historiography. Dr. Flores-Villalobos completed her Ph.D. in History in 2018 at New York University and currently serves as an Assistant Professor of History at The Ohio State University.

SHAFR’s Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship honors the long-time editor of Diplomatic History and is intended to promote research in foreign-language sources by graduate students. Chaired by Arissa Oh, this year’s award committee (Karine Walther and James Stocker) was pleased to make this award to Samantha Clarke, a doctoral candidate at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, studying with Pamela Swett. Clarke’s dissertation, entitled “Polioitics: International Medical Collaboration, Cold War Competition, and Polio in Germany, 1947-1965,” brings together Cold War history with the history of medicine to examine how Cold War politics influenced the fight against polio in East and West Germany—specifically, in divided Berlin. The Hogan Fellowship will allow Samantha to enroll in an intensive eight-week foreign-language course through the Goethe Institut in Berlin.

The Graduate Student Grants & Fellowships Committee—chaired by Geoffrey Stewart and including Sarah Miller-Davenport, Gregg Brazinsky, Sam Lebovic, and Kate Burlingham—gave out the lion’s share of awards at the luncheon:

Yi Lu has been awarded the W. Stull Holt Fellowship to defray the costs of travel necessary to conduct research on his dissertation, “Sinological Garbology: How America Came to Know China,” which examines the role of “knowledge objects” or the data used by scholars in the establishment and development of China studies. Not only does it look at the intellectual genealogy of China studies, but it also examines the complex web of relationships between intellectuals, the state, and non-governmental organizations. Mr. Lu is a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University under the supervision of William Kirby.

Vivien Chang received the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant. Her dissertation, “Creating the Third World: Anticolonial Diplomacy and the Search for a New International Economic Order, 1960-1975,” examines the New International Economic Order (NIEO) from the vantage points of postcolonial elites in Ghana, Tanzania, and Algeria along with black power activists in the West as a lens to understand the rise and fall of Third World solidarity in a global context. Moving beyond the Cold War, these newly emerging nations promoted anticolonialism, development, transnational racial solidarities, and nonalignment to establish the NIEO, and its commitment to economic self-determination over territorial sovereignty as an alternative form of decolonization. Ms. Chang is a doctoral candidate at the University of Virginia under the supervision of William Hitchcock. Vivien is pictured to the left with committee representative Sarah Miller-Davenport.

The Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport-Walter LaFeber Fellowship was established to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president; Armin Rappaport, founding editor of Diplomatic History; and Walter LaFeber, former president of SHAFR. This year’s recipient was Daniel Chardell, for his dissertation “Shifting Sands: The Gulf War as Middle Eastern and International History, 1988-1993.” Taking advantage of the growing number of declassified documents at the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and Iraqi Ba’th Party archives at the Hoover Institute along with records from the Middle East, this work situates the 1991 Gulf War amidst the larger turmoil of the Middle East state system at the end of the 1980s and the global currents related to the end of the Cold War to reconceptualize our understanding of this conflict as international history. Mr. Chardell is a Ph.D. student at Harvard University, working under the supervision of Erez Manela.

Ten doctoral students received Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants to further their doctoral research projects:

Marino Auffant for his dissertation “The Global Origins and Impact of the 1970s Energy Crisis,” which examines the oil crisis from a global perspective. His preliminary research shows that Nixon’s liberalization of oil imports was contingent upon a multiplicity of political and economic factors that connected all corners of the globe. Auffant is particularly interested in reflecting on the Cold War in the Global South as well as bridging the “academic compartmentalization” that divides Latin America from the Middle East. Mr. Auffant is a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University, and his project is under the direction Dr. Erez Manela.

Robert Bell for his dissertation “American Influence in Iran, 1911-1963: From Financial Missionaries and Colonial Administrators to Shirt-Sleeve Diplomats and New Deal Developers.” The dissertation explores the relationships between Iranian officials and American advisors in the decades prior to the Cold War and the infamous 1953 coup. Paying particular attention to the history of economic management and based on research into the records of state and non-state actors from both nations, the dissertation will provide new perspectives on the longer history of U.S.-Iranian relations. Bell is a Ph.D. student at New York University, working under the supervision of Arang Keshavarzian.

Augusta Lynn Dell’Omo for her dissertation “‘A Dark Nation Born in a Day’: American Political Extremism in South Africa, 1980-1994.” Her project reconsiders U.S.-South Africa relations in the final years of apartheid from the new perspective of an organized and devoted American pro-apartheid lobby. In doing so, she expands our understanding of the final years of the apartheid government while shedding new light on the global origins of contemporary conservative anti-democratic movements. Ms. Dell’Omo is a Ph.D. candidate at University of Texas at Austin, and her project is under the direction of Dr. Jeremi Suri.

Amanda Joyce Hall for her dissertation, “TRIUMPH: Grassroots Activism against South African Apartheid and the Global Challenge to Anti-Black Racism.” The committee saw it as an innovative, multi-sited study exploring how the international anti-apartheid movement intersected with various local movements opposing racial and economic inequality. With the decline of New Left activism in the
early 1970s, a new generation of university students across the U.S., Europe, Africa, and Australia channeled their dissent into the anti-apartheid cause as a way to fight back against the South African state—and against domestic racism and the rise of conservative politics. Ms. Hall is a Ph.D. student at Yale University under the supervision of Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore.

Brendan A. Collins Jordan for his dissertation “States of Emergency: Disaster and Displacement in Nicaragua’s Twentieth Century,” which considers “the political implications” of disasters, both environmental and man-made. These disasters moved large portions of local populations from the countryside to the city, in the process transforming social and environmental relations. He looks at all these relations in Nicaragua, where disaster and displacement have been frequent aspects of that nation’s twentieth century. Mr. Jordan is a Ph.D. candidate at New York University, and his project is under the direction of Greg Grandin.

Harrouna Malgouri for his dissertation “Francophone West African Internationalism and U.S. Cold War Politics, 1946-1987.” This dissertation explores the international activism of French-speaking West Africans between 1946 and 1987, particularly their impact on the thinking of U.S. foreign policymakers. Mr. Malgouri is a doctoral candidate at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, working under the supervision of Jeannette Eileen Jones. He is pictured to the left receiving his award from committee member Sarah Miller-Davenport.

An Thuy Nguyen for her dissertation “Third Force: Urban Opposition to American Imperialism during the Vietnam War, 1963-1975.” She explores the significance of the Third Force, an urban coalition of nonviolent South Vietnamese antiwar activists, on the Vietnam War. Though the Third Force never achieved its aim of a nonviolent solution to the fighting, she contends that it emerged as a potential source for reconciliation with the 1973 National Council of Reconciliation and Concord. Ms. Nguyen is a Ph.D. student at the University of Maine working with Ngo Vinh Long. An is pictured to the right, receiving her award from committee member Sarah Miller-Davenport.

Minami Nishioka for her dissertation “Civilizing’ Okinawa: Intimacies between the American and Japanese Empires, 1846-1919.” This dissertation examines how U.S. imperialists colluded with the Japanese to facilitate the spread of American culture to Okinawa. Ms. Mishioka is a Ph.D. student at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville. She is working under the supervision of Luke Harlow. Minami is pictured to the lower left receiving her award from committee member Sarah Miller-Davenport.

Kent Weber for his dissertation “Expanding America’s Gate: Chinese Exclusion and U.S. Empire in Hawaii and Cuba, 1874-1943.” By comparing the enforcement of Chinese exclusion in two islands within the U.S. overseas empire, Weber’s study explores the entangled histories of immigration and empire. Drawing on research in a number of institutional repositories throughout the U.S. as well as Spanish-language research with Cuban sources, the study will provide new perspectives on the histories of racialization, immigration law, and imperial power. Weber is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, working under the supervision of David Chang.

Ida Yalzadeh for her dissertation “Solidarities and Solitude: Tracing the Iranian Diaspora.” It is a study of the lived experiences of Iranians in the U.S. from the Cold War through the War on Terror. Located at the intersection of diplomatic history, Arab and Muslim-American studies, and immigration history, the study draws on institutional records, cultural texts, and oral histories to analyze how Iranian Americans created communities in a nation that often portrayed them as enemies. Yalzadeh is a Ph.D. candidate at Brown University, working under the supervision of Naoko Shibusawa.
How reliable are the nuclear security guarantees today that were offered to U.S. allies in the Eisenhower era and thereafter? Is the United States retrenching on its commitment to its allies' military security? And was Charles de Gaulle speaking for America's Asian allies as well when he said that in the event of a nuclear war, the United States would never risk Paris for New York?

These are questions that Japanese and South Korean policymakers have been grappling with under the Obama and Trump administrations as North Korea expanded and continues to expand its nuclear weapons arsenal and missile capabilities. Newspapers in Japan and South Korea publish opinion pieces expressing fears about “alliance decoupling” in East Asia—i.e., a refusal by the United States to come to the aid of either country in the event of an attack by nuclear-armed North Korea—and about the prospect of a potential “proliferation cascade” of independent nuclear weapons programs by Japan and South Korea.

Against the current backdrop of fears and anxieties regarding the current U.S. administration’s intent and ability to protect its Asian and European allies, Terence Roehrig’s Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella is a timely and valuable work for anyone interested in the challenges and opportunities of extended nuclear deterrence.

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Terence Roehrig, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017)

Jayita Sarkar

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That said, Roehrig’s book is a lucid exploration of the past and present of extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia. It provides the historical background that is often missing in international relations literature. It might not fully satisfy those of us keen on discovering new historiographical debates, but it performs well as a piece of international relations scholarship. As a result, it is most definitely a useful teaching tool for those of us looking for a worthwhile resource for graduate and undergraduate students interested in the nuclear dynamics of that part of the world. It is succinct, comprehensive and not overly dramatic, and it will effectively enlighten the uninitiated young minds in our classrooms.


Stewart Anderson

Historians have long understood the period of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union to have been relatively short-lived. It reached a zenith with the Helsinki Accords in 1975 but eroded during the Carter and Reagan administrations. Stephan Kieninger’s well-researched monograph rejects this narrative, arguing that while the term fell out of favor among its opponents and adherents alike, many of the key tenets of détente—quiet diplomacy, backchannel communication, cooperative security policies, economic interdependence, and long-term objectives—persisted in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Kieninger furthermore claims that the Western European proponents of these strategies played a pivotal role in shaping Reagan’s thinking about the limits of confrontation. At the center of Kieninger’s argument about détente is West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his nuanced, carefully measured approach to relations with the Soviet Union. Schmidt famously believed that dialogue, trust, and a Kantian sense of responsibility were the keys to a successful relationship with the members of the Warsaw Pact. He endorsed NATO’s 1979 dual-track decision to modernize its nuclear arsenal in Central Europe while offering to negotiate with the Soviet Union on arms control for intermediate-range nuclear weapons, in spite of Brezhnev’s strong objections. For Schmidt, however, the concept of deterrence was but a necessary precondition in the pursuit of long-term stability. The deterrence aspect of the dual-track decision, as Kristina Spohr has argued, cemented a status quo within which other mutually beneficial agreements could be reached. Kieninger outlines several of these, including a German-built nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union (later made impossible by U.S. intransigence), financial support for a desperate East Germany (a policy continued to great effect by Helmut Kohl), and the construction of the Urengoy natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe. The latter example receives the lion’s share of attention and, indeed, is the most compelling part of the book’s narrative. Reagan’s secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, pushed hard to stop Urengoy, citing martial law in Poland and the invasion of Afghanistan as examples of the Soviets’ unwillingness to follow the Helsinki Accords and as a basis for retaliatory measures. Indeed, Reagan did slap the Soviet Union with sanctions, leaving the pipeline, heavily reliant on American patents and contracts, in serious jeopardy.

Schmidt, for his part, rejected the notion of “linkages” between one foreign policy issue and another. The Federal Republic sought an alternative to Middle Eastern petroleum, and the Soviets desperately needed a way to sell gas from their newly discovered reserves in Puvorstwo. Schmidt calculated that economic interdependence would allow the West German government to create a situation of trust and to extract political and human rights concessions. In this sense, he was continuing Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. With Friedrich Wilhelm Christians, head of Deutsche Bank, in the lead, West Germany convinced Reagan to soften sanctions and allow construction to continue. As Kieninger puts it, “East-West trade blossomed in the shadow of the Euromissile crisis” (133). Furthermore, cooperative endeavors such as Urengoy preserved the West Germans’ diplomatic backchannels with the Russians and, by extension, contributed to European security as a whole.

Kieninger describes Schmidt’s policy vis-à-vis the Eastern bloc as “diplomatic cathedral building.” This metaphor, frustratingly underdeveloped in the book, describes the long-term, organic nature of the foreign policy pursued during Schmidt’s chancellorship. A somewhat similar metaphor, “gardening,” is attached to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and his system of diplomacy. Shultz, who took office in 1982, disagreed with Reagan’s earlier cabinet members, who advocated inflexibility and aggression in containing the Soviet Union. Influenced by Schmidt, Shultz favored a patient, preventive approach. In spite of Reagan’s “evil empire” speech, Kieninger argues that Shultz won out in the battle for influence within the administration. In the wake of the KAL007 disaster, for example, Reagan condemned the incident but declined to link it to other points of friction.

Economic contacts between the Americans and the Russians began to thaw somewhat, and Reagan finally decided to bring his considerable aptitude for interpersonal communication to bear when dealing with the other side. The book does not explore Reagan’s second term, but Kieninger implies that much of the de-escalation stemmed from Shultz and, ultimately, from Schmidt’s diplomatic philosophy. In this conception, diplomacy, trade, and human contacts yielded more productive results than linkages and confrontation.

The Diplomacy of Détente rests on an impressive set of archival sources, from presidential libraries to the historical archive of Deutsche Bank. One has the sense that Kieninger has explored every available Western European and American source on the topic. Sadly, he does not consult Soviet sources at all. While understandable, the absence of such sources does make the book seem incomplete. Russian and Eastern European reactions to economic interdependence and cooperative security appear only as they are recorded in Western records.

Without a doubt, the book is an important contribution to the field of diplomatic history. Kieninger’s claim that the existing literature focuses on the arms race and a developing sense of potential catastrophe in the late 1970s is a bit overstated; several historians, including Oliver Bange and Rasmus Mariager, have explored the same period without assuming the existence of an impending crisis. To his credit, however, Kieninger explores the relationship between personal diplomacy and economic interdependence in a satisfying and largely original manner.

Unfortunately, The Diplomacy of Détente contains a high number of jarring mistakes and stylistic deficiencies. Spelling errors are rampant, even in critical passages where the author puts forward his main arguments. The phrase “back in…” is criminally overused, sometimes occurring three or four times on the same page. One expects the editor to overlook a few minor errors in any manuscript, but mistakes seem ubiquitous here. Perhaps the editors at Routledge decided to dispense with editorial precision when they recognized that the book would appeal only to a relatively narrow audience.

Having said that, I believe historians of Cold War international relations, especially those who study détente, will find the volume a worthwhile addition to their libraries. Other potentially interested parties might feel a bit disappointed with the results, however. Historians of modern Germany, for example, might be excited to learn that Kieninger proposes a reevaluation of Schmidt’s legacy as chancellor (18). But Kieninger never situates the book within the historiography of German politics, nor does he seem particularly interested in exploring his book’s significance within German history. This seems a missed opportunity.

In the final analysis, The Diplomacy of Détente is a
meticulously sourced, careful monograph. Experts in the field will want to weigh and consider Kieninger’s claims. But sloppy editing and a rather single-minded attention to esoteric questions in the history of détente, even when the evidence lends itself to a broader interpretation, mean the book will struggle to resonate with a general audience.


Kenneth Osoldo

In just twenty-five years, the literature on American cultural interactions abroad has evolved from relative obscurity into a veritable subfield of the history of U.S. foreign relations. With prize-winning monographs and journal articles, specialized conferences and edited volumes, the field engages enduring questions about the relationship between culture and power, ideas and influence, creativity and corruptibility. Yet for all its vibrancy, the field has lacked an overarching synthesis.

Enter Michael Krenn’s welcome volume covering the revolutionary era to the present. In a brisk and breezy 156-pages of text, Krenn provides us with a sorely needed overview of American efforts to harness the power of culture to advance the nation’s foreign policy over more than two centuries. It is an indispensable introduction to the topic, with fresh ideas and perspectives that are sure to inform and inspire researchers at all levels.

His point of departure is cultural diplomacy, an ill-defined concept throughout the academic literature, sometimes employed as a catch-all for describing a virtually limitless array of cultural activities abroad. In Krenn’s capacious narrative, such disparate activities as missionary expeditions, abolitionist speeches, popular entertainments, ballet, boxing, and even taxidermy (I’ll get to that) emerge as variants of U.S. cultural diplomacy over the centuries. But if anything can be cultural diplomacy, what then is the utility of the term? Each is a manifestation of human creativity, but what binds them collectively as cultural diplomacy?

One potential marker of cultural diplomacy could be the involvement of the state. Cultural diplomacy could be defined as the deliberate deployment of cultural initiatives by governments to achieve foreign policy aims. Yet Krenn refrains from such a narrow definition, showing many cases where cultural diplomacy was carried out by private groups, unconnected or only loosely connected to the state. Could it be funding? Not necessarily, for similar reasons. Money for international cultural exchanges and exhibitions came from many varied sources, public and private.

In the end, we get no straightforward definition of what is, or what is not, cultural diplomacy—except perhaps that it is a cultural product of the United States being shared internationally. Even that generic definition has problems. What separates cultural diplomacy from cultural relations? Or cultural transfer? Cultural exchange? Krenn acknowledges these questions and conceptual difficulties, but does not resolve them. Instead he uses them as analytical threads to tell a story of contrasting visions for culture’s role in international affairs. From the founding era to the present, Americans had shifting ideas about how—or indeed if—the United States should use culture to advance its goals. There was never a consensus about how to do so. It was never clear just who spoke for America. Nor was there agreement about what American culture is, was, or should be. Krenn emphasizes that ideas about what constituted American culture and identity were contested, sometimes virulently. Fractional debates about how to present American culture, ideals, and values to the world characterized American cultural diplomacy almost from the beginning. The controversies over cultural diplomacy are illuminating in their own right, as Krenn shows well.

Most usefully, Krenn explores early attempts to use culture as an instrument of foreign influence during the revolutionary era and early Republic. He begins fittingly enough with Thomas Jefferson, who sought to counter European notions of American degeneracy by penning his *Notes on the State of Virginia* and publishing them in France in 1785. He intended to rebut a French naturalist, Comte du Buffon, who supposed without evidence that all species in North America were “weak and feeble,” thereby implying by association that their degeneracy transferred to the continent’s human inhabitants. Jefferson put the lie to Buffon’s buffoonish stereotypes of the Americas and, to drive home a contrasting picture of American virility, Jefferson shipped to France the remains of an enormous, preserved moose corpse, “the first object to be successfully utilized as part of American cultural diplomacy” (12). It is a colorful anecdote that puts intentionality (and taxidermy!) at the heart of cultural diplomacy. The moose exhibition was an act of persuasion, consciously employed to impact foreign perceptions.

Moving into the nineteenth century, other manifestations of American cultural diplomacy similarly functioned as agents of influence. Krenn thoughtfully explores how the work of missionaries and abolitionists functioned as cultural diplomacy, as did international exhibitions at successive world fairs, mass entertainments such as *Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show*, and sporting exhibitions such as the Spalding world baseball tour. He also makes a intriguing case that the compilations of diplomatic documents in the State Department’s *Foreign Relations of the United States* series originated as efforts of public and cultural diplomacy (though his writing here has an insider quality that may not resonate with readers unfamiliar with the series and its import to diplomatic historians).

There was an intermingling of persuasion, commerce,
and conversion to these efforts. But the cultural endeavors were episodic and had little to no connection with the American government. They were “certainly not parts of a well thought-out plan of American cultural conquest,” Krenn concedes (29). One might question whether any of it amounted to cultural diplomacy in any meaningful sense. Krenn readily admits this, but he makes a fascinating case for viewing them as important precedents for more sustained programs of cultural diplomacy that followed. To date the field has been overburdened with work on twentieth-century, so one hopes Krenn’s creative interpretation of an earlier time will inspire fresh work on eighteenth and nineteenth century incarnations of cultural diplomacy.

Most of Krenn’s book (four of the five chapters) discusses the twentieth century, as the government became more involved in systematic attempts to use culture to influence foreign perceptions. Governmental institutions anchor the narrative. Teddy Roosevelt’s great white fleet, Woodrow Wilson’s Committee on Public Information, Nelson Rockefeller’s cultural propaganda blitz in Latin America, FDR’s Office of War Information, the State Department’s exchange programs, and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) take center stage. The story here is well told and well synthesized. It will be mostly familiar terrain for scholars familiar with the literature, but Krenn’s detailed attention to the contested nature of these cultural programs offers a useful perspective. Each time a sponsoring agency sought to project a particular vision of “American culture” abroad it ran into a problem: the country’s pluralistic political culture belied attempts to package the nation and its identity.

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The U.S. “scored first” and “Soviets struck back,” but the Americans “won this first round” (73). Later he describes ballet as “a particularly potent weapon in the Soviet cultural offensive,” without reflecting on how strange it is to consider dancers in tutus as weapons (132). In the early periods, missionaries were “moral warriors” and “foot soldiers in the march of American empire” who launched “barrages” of cultural “artillery” (13). They were “shock troops” for an “invasion” (14). Even Jefferson’s moose was a “volley in the war to influence foreign opinion” (12). In writing this way, Krenn reflects reasonably well how some American officials viewed cultural diplomacy at various moments, but one wishes he had stepped back from the fray to offer a more critical reflection on the meaning of such language—and its limitations. Likewise, he too often employs U.S. officials’ characterization of various episodes as “wins” and “losses” without offering us any criteria by which to objectively assess successes and failures. As such, he invites skepticism about his claims for effectiveness, as well as to the whole “rise and fall” narrative structure.

Such quibbles aside, Krenn’s text is otherwise rich and sophisticated. He packs a lot of punch in this short little survey, and his ability to balance narrative, synthesis, and analysis testifies to his skill as a historian. The book will be useful especially for graduate seminars and some advanced undergraduate courses. There is much here, too, for experts in the field to ponder as we look ahead to another quarter century of enterprising scholarship on cultural diplomacy and related endeavors, however we define them.

Evan D. McCormick

S tefan Rinke’s Latin America and the First World War is the latest contribution to a wave of scholarship surrounding the centennial of World War I that has highlighted the global significance of that conflict far beyond European battlefields. Drawing on newspapers, autobiographies, and archival materials from across Latin America, Rinke argues persuasively that the war transformed the region’s connection to global politics. “Because of the breakdown of the European civilizational and development model and the unresolved belief in human progress in the years from 1914-1918,” Rinke writes, “a world where Latin America had occupied a fixed position was effectively gone.” (3) This rupture in Latin Americans’ self-perceived place in the world ushered in a new sense of identity and modernity centered around nationalism and transnationalism—with an eye to the emergent hegemony of the United States. While Rinke’s argument for World War I’s importance is fleshed out in ways that at various times seem vague or overly mechanical, the book nonetheless captures the global dimensions of a pivotal moment in the region’s history.

That the repercussions of the war in Europe were experienced across the Atlantic will come as little surprise to modern scholars of international history. Beyond succinctly synthesizing the political and economic ripples felt in Latin America, Rinke’s most valuable contribution is to illustrate the social dimension in which the war’s violence—and debates over Latin Americans’ relationship to it—enmeshed Latin Americans of all classes in the war. From the arguments of policymakers and public intellectuals to the demonstrators who rallied both for and against joining the conflict, Rinke identifies a new “global mindset” that took root as a result of the war’s pervasiveness in public media. He sees this not as Latin American cosmopolitanism—for Latin American elites had long been embedded in European cultural and financial networks—but instead a new and more widespread “awareness of the importance of worldwide interdependencies and processes of integration.”

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The book does a spectacular job of showing how a confrontation with modern warfare hastened Latin Americans’ critiques of the failures of Eurocentric progressivism which had begun to emerge during the long 19th century. The collapse of time and space, embodied in the pervasive public media coverage of the war, made the neutrality initially favored by many Latin American policymakers an impossibility. Economic and social dislocations felt in Latin America—together with active propaganda campaigns by both Germany and the United States—elicited new forms of participation in public life, along with new ideas of gender and race (201-203). Internationally, the experience of the war “gave rise to emancipatory ambitions” (254) that included continental solidarity in opposition to the United States. The result was a bifurcated new reality for the hemisphere at the war’s end: “the war had unleashed the genie of nationalism from the bottle” (227), as Rinke states, paraphrasing Argentine politician Augusto Bunge, but it also exacerbated internal social conflicts, creating “new social movements with highly distinct orientations” (255) and transnational power. These developments were the result of deep-seated historical problems in the region, Rinke concedes, but it was the war that served as “catalyst and transformer” (255) for Latin Americans to make new demands on the state.

The book’s third chapter on 1917 as the crucial year during which U.S. entrance into the war catalyzed a shift in Latin American perceptions of Europe suggests the strengths of this social-military approach. Rinke reframes the traditional narrative of a reluctant United States rallying client states for war, showing instead the “undertow effect” (122) under which various Latin American policymakers struggled to maintain neutrality while dealing with the uncontrollable effects of war fever. When the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, Latin American attitudes were generally supportive, though Rinke shows that several prominent newspapers, and intellectuals like Chilean diplomat Alejandro Álvarez, argued deliberately that Latin American states should guard their own interests by remaining apart from the conflict (116-118). Here Rinke challenges a familiar story of how U.S. propaganda—advanced by the Creel Committee—and wartime economic policies, including blacklists, forcefully turned Latin American perceptions in favor of the Allied war effort. Rinke emphasizes instead that Latin Americans responded in ways that were unique to particular political circumstances and to plural nationalisms that varied in their perceptions of the war.

His discussion of Brazil, the only country to sever relations with Germany and to enter the war in 1917 despite massive protests against participation, and Argentina, which maintained its neutrality despite intense public fervor in support of participation, is particularly illuminating. Upon severing ties with Germany in April 1917—a decision hastened by the sinking of the merchant coffee ship Parana by German U-Boats—Brazilian leaders and public intellectuals like Rui Barbosa stoked anti-German nationalism by promising that the war would usher in a new era for Brazil on the world stage (131-32). Rinke argues that “in joining the alliance, the government hoped to obtain easier access to markets” and to alleviate social discontent already manifest in the general strike movement. To elites, “entry into the war offered the appropriate pretext for forcibly tackling the issue and for construing the experienced deprivations as a patriotic duty.” (135) In Argentina, meanwhile, fierce public debate between pro-ally Kupturistas and Neutralistas did not convince president Hipólito Yrigoyen to abandon his policy of neutrality. In 1917, Yrigoyen attempted to organize a conference of Latin American neutrals, but gained support only from Mexico, El Salvador, and Colombia, and the disapproval of the United States. Even as public fervor surged in favor of support for the allies after German U-Boats targeted Argentine ships, Yrigoyen stood his ground on neutrality. Like for Brazil, the choice reflected a new sense of place in a changing global order. Among other reasons, Rinke writes,
“Argentina viewed its stance towards the war in the context of a country taking a leadership role in Latin America. Its own neutrality, as a consequence, was to be understood as a counterweight to Brazil’s participation in the war.” (151)

The book is not without problems. The argument that the war was transformative for Latin Americans’ relations with the wider world appears a bit overstated at times, such as when the author claims that “in discussing the War, Latin Americans participated in what for the first time became a global public sphere.” (195) Curiously, much of the evidence to challenge the singular importance of the war can be found in the book. Reading the first chapter, where Rinke dutifully relates the efforts of Latin American diplomats and lawyers to establish the principles of non-intervention in response to both U.S. and European provocations during the 19th century, the reader will wonder whether mediated images of violence after 1914 were in fact formative in Latin Americans’ experiences with nation-building. Similarly, the argument that the War proved decisive in Latin America’s turn away from European ideas of civilization and a “reversion to America and the project of an independent nation” also focused on relations with a new colossus to the North is a bit mechanistic. It runs counter to some of Rinke’s own exposition on the power dynamics in the Americas that had existed since at least the turn of the century and the Spanish-American War. Finally, although Rinke rightly emphasizes the Mexican Revolution as the crucial episode in the broader break with Eurocentric liberalism, the portions of the book that analyze Mexican revolutionary nationalism seem out of joint with the material on Central and South American experiences.

Rinke acknowledges some of the suggestiveness in his methodology when he says that “The goal is not to establish direct causal connections, as if the First World War first brought about and determined the changes in Latin America during this time” (5) but to see how “specific, local, social developments and perceptions become embedded in world contexts and how certain local and regional discourses can be comprehended only in terms of the larger discursive framework.” (5) Although Rinke effectively incorporates military and social developments throughout much of the book, the fifth chapter dealing exclusively with media debates shows the limits of a narrow cultural approach. In that chapter, the problems of scope seems to be most obvious; Rinke moves from country to country, briefly introducing politicians and intellectuals, but with little space devoted to their intellectual networks or those of their newspapers and publications. (207) While he artfully depicts a region consumed by war fever and grappling with its after-effects, the cultural lens prompts the reader to wonder the extent to which media coverage of the war became spectacle that served as backdrop to more immediate causes of social unrest.

These limitations do not undermine the overall strength of the narrative, which portrays a regional order in transition with admirable scope and appropriate complexity. Beyond a timely addition to historiography on the global dimensions of World War I, Rinke’s *Latin America and the First World War* should serve as a valuable contribution to understanding how Latin American state- and nation-building was inflected by total war during the long 20th century.
SHAFR Council Meeting Minutes  
Friday, 4 January 2019  
8:00 am to 1:00 pm  
Palmer House Hilton, Indiana Room  
Chicago, Illinois

Council Members Present:
Barbara Keys (presiding), Vivien Chang, Mary Dudziak, David Engerman, Kristin Hoganson, Julia Irwin, Andrew Johns, Adriane Lentz-Smith, Brian McNamara, Lien-Hang Nguyen, Amy Sayward (ex officio), and Kelly Shannon

Council Members Absent: Matthew Connelly, Peter Hahn, and Kathryn Statler

Others Present:
Nick Cullather, Anne L. Foster, Savitri Maya Kunze, Ilaria Scaglia, and Patricia Thomas

Introductory Business:

SHAFR President Barbara Keys called the meeting to order at 8:00 am. Keys welcomed the Council, briefly outlined meeting business, and thanked retiring members Terry Anderson, Amy Greenberg, Amanda Demmer, and Tim Borstelmann.

Executive Director Amy Sayward noted that since the June 2018 meeting, Council had approved the following items via correspondence: minutes of June 2018 Council meeting; motions related to matters of concern following the annual meeting; contracts for the SHAFR 2020, 2021, and 2023 conferences; and a survey of the membership regarding the advocacy issue. There was no further discussion.

Diplomatic History Business:

Nominees for Editorial Board

Keys introduced the nominees put forward by the editors of Diplomatic History for the editorial board: Max Friedman, Erez Manela, and Joy Schulz. The new editorial board nominees would serve terms from January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2021. Brian McNamara motioned to approve the editors’ nominees for the editorial board, David Engerman seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously (11-0-0).

Scholarly Debate and Norms of Professional Conduct in SHAFR Publications

Council had a lengthy discussion about the norms of scholarly publishing as they are implemented in SHAFR publications, including the format for debates, decision-making policies and adherence to them, and civility and respect. Council emphasized the place of the Stuart L. Bernath Prize and Presidential lectures in Diplomatic History, noting that the journal publishes them without peer review, thus setting them apart from other types of contributions. Council also noted the importance of asking the incoming DH editors to adhere to Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) recommendations.

Editors’ Report

Anne L. Foster and Nick Cullather, editors of Diplomatic History, joined Council to discuss their editors’ report. Conversation focused on the editorial processes used in relation to unsolicited rebuttals published in the journal and on adherence to the policies on the DH website, and stressed the importance of adhering to usual practice of seeking more than one external review of unsolicited essays. Council suggested, and the editors agreed, that when a response to an article is published in a subsequent issue of the journal, the website should include a link to the response with the original article (or some other indication that the article was followed by a response).

Publisher’s Report

Patricia Thomas, Executive Editor, US Humanities Journals at Oxford University Press, joined Council to discuss the publisher’s report. She pointed out that the new Oxford University Press browser platform had successfully brought more traffic to their journals’ websites. She also noted the success of the cross-journal digital collection of articles (a “virtual issue”) on the intersection of history and food. Both Thomas and Council expressed enthusiasm for pursuing other such digital collaborations in the future.
Mary Dudziak brought up a matter that SHAFR leadership has raised previously with OUP: how a SHAFR demographic survey of its membership could interface with Oxford University Press, suggesting that after the membership sign-up process, the press website could link members directly to a SHAFR website so that the Society would be able to collect relevant information. The Council as a whole affirmed the importance of this measure. Council also affirmed the need to add an ethics agreement as a mandatory aspect of the membership sign-up process.

There was also discussion of how funds would be divided (between membership fees and subscription fees) under the new publisher’s contract. Engerman requested and Thomas agreed to provide a model based on the previous year’s numbers that the Executive Director and Council could use for future financial planning.

Conference Business:

Bids for Conference Coordinator

Council discussed the status of the conference coordinator vacancy and offered support for Sayward’s efforts to move forward with the process in a timely way.

Sexual Harassment and Misconduct Policy and Procedure

Julia Irwin presented the report that she and Brian DeLay had compiled in their capacities as co-chairs of the Task Force on Conference Conduct. The task force was created in late October in response to former SHAFR President Peter Hahn’s request to discuss safeguards SHAFR should adopt to prevent sexual harassment and misconduct at the annual conference. Irwin explained the importance of creating two documents: a public-facing policy statement on sexual harassment and misconduct and an internal document of procedures.

Council commended the task force’s work in researching and creating the policy and procedural documents on sexual misconduct and harassment. Council members expressed general approval of the public-facing document. Kelly Shannon asked if the public-facing document could include a definition of consent. She emphasized the importance of spelling out explicitly, in language that might mirror that used on U.S. college campuses, that if a person is impaired or physically incapacitated, they are unable to give consent. Council agreed that this addition would be in the best interest of promoting a productive and safe environment in future conference settings. Other small changes to the draft document included a deadline for the annual report and changing the “Title IX” wording to be more reflective of campus policies beyond the United States. Engerman moved that the amended policy draft be adopted, pending approval by SHAFR legal counsel. McNamara seconded the motion, which passed unanimously (11-0-0).

Council then turned to discuss the procedural document regarding conference conduct. Members were in general agreement that it would be helpful if a third-party individual, outside of SHAFR (such as a professional ombudsperson), could be available during the annual conference to act as a resource for conference participants. Returning to the public-facing document, Keys suggested that Council add another friendly amendment to the report that would remove the formal requirement of having an ombudsperson onsite, rather than accessible in some way, during the conference. Council agreed to formalize the internal procedural document via e-mail correspondence in consultation with legal counsel so that the procedural document would be in place by the June annual meeting.

Dudziak noted that the additional requirement that all SHAFR members agree to ethics standards would likely require a change to membership requirements in the by-laws. Council agreed to place the item on the agenda for the June 2019 meeting and suggested that it could create a task force to review the by-laws and recommend needed changes. Council also agreed that all conference participants would need to accept the terms of the sexual harassment and misconduct policy before they could complete their registration for the conference.

Financial Business:

Overall Financial Picture

Sayward presented her financial reports to Council and summarized what SHAFR had spent in the previous fiscal year. She noted that the previous work of Council accounted for the good financial position that SHAFR found itself in during the past fiscal year and that the budget estimate for the fiscal year that had just started on November 1 indicated a small projected surplus.

Keys, in presenting the work of the Ways & Means Committee (which had met the previous evening), expressed the committee’s views that any further decisions about significant budget adjustments could be
deferred until there was clarity in how the new Oxford contract would divide the membership/subscription rates. Following that, Council could choose to trim the budget, to adjust its endowment spending rule (for example, raising it from 3% to 4%), to adjust its membership rates, or to continue holding its present course.

Dudziak moved that Council approve a 2% cost-of-living adjustment for IT Director George Fujii. Shannon seconded the motion, which passed unanimously (11-0-0).

Pre-Conference Public Engagement Workshop Proposal

Keys introduced a proposal from Kelly McFarland, the Director of Programs and Research Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, which the Ways & Means Committee had considered previously. The proposal requested a contribution of $1,000-$2,000 to help defer travel and hotel costs for SHAFR members who attend the Institute's pre-conference public engagement workshop. It also asked for SHAFR's assistance in publicizing the event and registering participants, similar to the ways in which SHAFR had supported the Miller Center's 2017 workshop. The motion that SHAFR contribute $1,000 was made by Adriane Lentz-Smith, seconded by Andrew Johns, and approved unanimously (11-0-0).

Membership Rates

Council then discussed the possibility of raising membership rates for SHAFR for the 2020 renewal cycle. Council noted a number of items in favor of and against such a change. Sayward noted that SHAFR membership now included access to the online SHAFR Guide, which in the past year was only available to members for a fee. Council members agreed that this benefit increased the value of SHAFR membership but decided to postpone a vote on membership rate increases for the coming year (noting that May is the deadline each year for notifying Oxford of membership rate increases).

Summer Institute Proposals

Council then discussed the proposals that it had received for a 2019 or 2020 SHAFR Summer Institute. (Sayward recused herself given her involvement in one of the proposals.) After expressing general praise for the merits of both proposals, Council examined the funding structures and resources detailed in each proposal. Lentz-Smith motioned to support the “Women in the World” Summer Institute proposal. Lien-Hang Nguyen seconded the proposal, which passed with ten votes in favor and one abstention (10-0-1).

Endowed Prize Policy

Keys introduced the draft “Endowed Prize Policy.” Council expressed its commitment to covering a specific prize amount regardless of the earnings in any given year. It reached consensus that the Endowed Prize Policy should follow the endowment spending rule and be part of SHAFR's endowment fund, except in exceptional circumstances, such as the Bernath endowment. Sayward agreed to revise the draft policy in line with these recommendations.

Additional Business:

Report from Committee on Women in SHAFR

Ilaria Scaglia joined the meeting on behalf of the Committee on Women in SHAFR to present “The Status of Women in Diplomatic and International History, 2013-2017: A Follow-up Report.” She discussed how the Committee on Women in SHAFR had focused its attention on how best to offer broad support to women in the field. She specifically suggested initiating a mentorship program and some type of grant or workshop to assist members in working toward completion of their second monograph. Council members praised the report, particularly the compilation of data on women in SHAFR. They agreed with the committee’s recommendations and indicated their support for implementing a mentorship program and a second-book workshop.

Clarification of Advocacy By-Law Vote

Sayward’s presentation of her Executive Director’s report highlighted the first-ever vote by the membership on whether to support an advocacy issue under the new by-law amendment. Noting that at least one member had requested the option of abstaining, she asked for guidance on the question of whether members should have the option to abstain (in addition to the option to vote “yes” or “no” to support the advocacy being promoted) and whether an abstention would count as part of the 30% of the membership that had to vote in order for SHAFR to take a public stand. Dudziak moved to add abstention as an option for such online voting and moved that members deciding to vote “abstain” would count toward meeting the quorum required by the by-laws. Shannon seconded the motion, which passed with ten votes in favor and one vote against (10-1-0).
Formation of a Membership Sub-Committee for Two-Year and Community College Faculty

After reviewing the report and recommendation of the Membership Committee, Council supported the creation of a Sub-Committee for Community-College and Two-Year College Faculty Members within the existing Membership Committee and encouraged the President and Vice-President to take steps to create the sub-committee.

Teaching Committee Report and Voices & Visions Project Proposal

As part of its written report, the Teaching Committee endorsed a proposal related to Voices and Visions, an on-going, primary-source project of the University of Wisconsin, Madison. The proposal recommended a formal connection between SHAFR and Voices and Visions. Sayward noted that the project’s organizers had volunteered to attend the Council meeting in person to discuss the proposal. Dudziak expressed the opinion that the Web and Teaching committees should be involved in a discussion about the merits of the proposal. McNamara expressed the consensus that Council request a more in-depth proposal from Voices and Visions that would specifically indicate how SHAFR’s partnership would be qualitatively different for SHAFR members than the current link under the “Teaching” section of the SHAFR website.

Passport

After Johns recused himself, Council members expressed concern about the gender distribution of the authors/editors of books reviewed in Passport, which had also been noted in the report by the Committee on Women in SHAFR and by Council in its January 2018 meeting. The consensus was that the SHAFR President should request the Passport editor to include in the regular June 2019 report on Passport an indication of how this issue was being addressed.

McNamara motioned to adjourn at 1:00 pm, Engerman seconded, and the motion was approved unanimously (10-0-0).
Professional Notes

Max Paul Friedman (American University) has been selected as the recipient of a Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Award. The award recognizes international scholars whose research has influence on their discipline beyond their immediate field of work.

Recent Books of Interest

Allcock, Thomas Tunstall. Thomas C. Mann: President Johnson, the Cold War, and the Restructuring of Latin American Foreign Policy. (Kentucky, 2018).
Bachman, Jeffrey S. The United States and Genocide: (Re)Defining the Relationship. (Routledge, 2019).
Bertellini, Giorgio. The Divo and the Duce: Promoting Film Stardom and Political Leadership in 1920s America. (California, 2019).
Callaghan, John, Brendon O’Connor, Mark Phythian. Ideologies of American Foreign Policy. (Routledge, 2019).
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. The Hidden War in Argentina: British and American Espionage in World War II. (Bloomsbury, 2019).
Dobbs, Michael. The Unwanted: America, Auschwitz, and a Village Caught In Between. (Knopf, 2019).
Fields, David P. Foreign Friends: Syngman Rhee, American Exceptionalism, and the Division of Korea. (Kentucky, 2019).
Fry, Joseph A. Lincoln, Seward, and U.S. Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era. (Kentucky, 2019).
Green, Michael J. By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783. (Columbia, 2019).


Khalil, Osamah F. *United States Relations with China and Iran: Towards the Asian Century*. (Bloomsbury, 2019).


Lomas, Daniel and Christopher John Murphy. *Intelligence and Espionage: Secrets and Spies*. (Routledge, 2019).


White, Christopher M. *The Drug War in the Americas*. (Routledge, 2019).

Jamison Travel Report: Gelfand-Rappaport-LaFeber Fellowship

During the January and Spring terms of 2018, I used support from the Gelfand-Rappaport-LaFeber Fellowship to conduct research in the United States and the United Kingdom. My dissertation, “Pacific Wars: Peripheral Conflict and the Making of the U.S. ‘New Navy’ 1865-1897” explores how conflict in the Pacific shaped the first peacetime U.S. military expansion: the creation of a steampowered, steel Navy in the 1880s and 90s. Previous research trips took me to Chile, Perú and China. Support from SHAFR allowed me to research how policy makers, arms manufacturers and military officials in the North Atlantic perceived military trends in those states.

My primary focus was on documents housed at the Library of Congress and the respective National Archives in Washington D.C. and Kew Gardens, U.K. My interest in U.S. institutions made Washington an essential port-of-call. In addition, I found British Admiralty and Foreign Office documents useful not only in juxtaposition to U.S. sources, but because the nineteenth-century Royal Navy approximated a global panopticon. Pick a crisis, then check against the Admiralty files. Surprises abound.

While in the U.K., I also explored corporate collections in Liverpool at the Wirral Archives and Newcastle’s Tyne and Wear Archives. These repositories house documents from leading international arms-manufacturers such as the Laird and Armstrong Corporations. Information on private contractors and corporate agents provided valuable insights which complimented materials produced by state actors. At a minimum, I discovered an almost unspeakable irony: the corporate documents of one of the nineteenth century’s most prolific arms-makers are today housed in a wing of the Newcastle children’s museum. One can ponder sales proposals from the merchants-of-death while listening to the cries and footsteps of several dozen third graders running around the “Discovery Museum” above. Hephaestus wept.

Finally, after returning to the United States, I used the remaining support from the fellowship to conduct a series of trips to the the Naval Historical Collection at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I. My first trip to Newport in 2009 was as an Officer Candidate attending the Naval Officer Candidate School. I am happy to report that the staff and facilities at the Naval Historical Collection are considerably more accommodating.

Tommy Jamison
Harvard University
In Memoriam:
Henry W. Berger

On December 10, 2018, the world of diplomatic history lost a great champion when Henry W. Berger, Professor Emeritus of History at Washington University in St. Louis, left this earthly existence. He was not the most well-known among us, but he was a great hero nonetheless for the courageous way he lived his life and the marks he left on the lives he touched. The family he left will mourn him most, but humanity has lost a powerful advocate for the best in all of us.

Henry was born in Frederick, Maryland in 1937 and earned his bachelor’s degree from Ohio State University in 1959. He went on to graduate school at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Working there with U.S. diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams, he received his master’s degree in 1961 and a doctorate in 1966. His dissertation on the foreign policy of the AFL-CIO in Latin America has been called a pioneering study in the developing “New Diplomatic History” that integrated insights of the social sciences and the role of state and non-state actors into the study of American foreign relations.

During his years in 1960s Madison, Henry was active in the Young Democrats as well as the Civil Rights and antiwar movements, and he made significant contributions to those times. One notable example was when he helped to hatch a plan to hand over 1964 Democratic National Convention delegate credentials to members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, giving his credential to Fannie Lou Hamer. He also contributed to and signed the Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and braved gunfire directed at him and other workers when delivering supplies to civil rights organizers in Mississippi. While a graduate student at Wisconsin, Henry inspired many with his fearless speeches protesting the U.S. policy on Cuba, and—most importantly—he forcefully articulated early opposition to the Vietnam War.

Henry taught first at the University of Vermont from 1965-1969 before joining the faculty at Washington University in St. Louis (Wash U as it’s known there) in 1970, where he taught classes in United States history and U.S. foreign policy until his retirement in 2005. From 1981-84, he served as chair of the Jewish Studies Program and from 1984-89 as chair of Jewish and Near Eastern Studies. His courses were among the most popular on campus. In 1984, he received the Undergraduate Teaching and Service Award from the Council of Students of Arts & Sciences. When Senator Thomas Eagleton retired, he joined Henry in teaching a Vietnam War seminar. It was perpetually oversubscribed with long waiting lists of students hoping to enroll. Students’ enthusiasm for Henry’s teaching was matched by the affection he earned, and a pilgrimage to his office was a feature of many an alum’s return visit to campus.

Over the years, Henry received grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, as well as from Wash U. He contributed chapters to several books, including Cold War Critics (1971) and The American Working Class (1979). He wrote numerous articles, reviews, and opinion pieces for publications such as the American Historical Review, The Nation, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and The Baltimore Sun.

The first class on my first day of graduate school at Wash U in the fall of 1990 was Henry’s undergraduate diplomatic history survey. The room was one of those old-fashioned steep-stepped lecture halls with wooden seats and individual desk tops that held about 100 students. I had taken few classes in such large rooms as an undergraduate at University of Illinois, but Henry made that large hall seem like an intimate living-room conversation by drawing me in with the power of his words. Before the end of that first semester, I wanted to do diplomatic history for my dissertation.

Henry always seemed more involved with his students than with any publishing work, although he was a wealth of information about the process, and was perennially researching for what was his final book, St. Louis and Empire: 250 Years of Imperial Quest and Urban Crisis (2015), which traced the city’s role in foreign affairs since its founding in 1764. We discussed St. Louis history multiple times and I always learned something new about my adopted city. His previous major work, A William Appleman Williams Reader...
(1992), helped illuminate how his own graduate school advisor at Wisconsin reshaped the views of U.S. diplomacy in the Cold War era. It certainly made me that much prouder to be a scholarly grandchild of Williams, and gave me a new appreciation of Henry’s skilled teaching.

One of my student colleagues at Wash U, Fabian Hilfrich, remembered this about our graduate advisor:

Henry was a wonderful teacher and a great friend, with outsized influence on my life and academic career. In 1988, I enrolled in his Vietnam War class as a German exchange student; this was the class Henry co-taught with Senator Thomas Eagleton which was absolutely fascinating and engaging—so engaging in fact, that the Vietnam War has remained one of my research areas ever since. I will also never forget the short sequence in the documentary film *Hearts and Minds* when you can see Henry, in silhouette but unmistakable, giving an antiwar speech at the University of Wisconsin, Madison! By now, I teach my own class on the war in Scotland (where students still occasionally claim that the British are better at counter-insurgency) and I am deeply indebted to Henry for being able to do that.

In his teaching and supervision, Henry always went the extra mile. During my first year at Wash U, I needed to re-learn writing. At the outset, my writing was very “German;” a sentence that did not run the length of at least half a page, consisting of about twenty sub-clauses was not worth writing. Hence, I was surprised and disappointed to receive a heavily marked up copy in return, which emphasized above all that the sentences needed to be much shorter. “Still shorter” was the comment on subsequent essays until I finally got it.

Henry was equally instrumental in my decision to stay at Wash U for another year to write a Master’s thesis. I have not regretted that for one moment—either academically or personally. I met my wife during my time in St. Louis, and the Master’s thesis became the basis of my subsequent Ph.D. at the Free University in Berlin. Throughout that time, I kept in touch with Henry, could always use him as a generous sounding board and editor for my Ph.D. thesis, and as the organizer of the panel that brought me to the OAH for the first time—more than twenty years ago now!

We kept in touch after my Ph.D. We met whenever we visited St. Louis, we were invited to Henry and Mary’s house, and they visited us in Berlin. We also exchanged lengthy emails about the state of the world in subsequent years, discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. foreign policy, and the virtues (or lack thereof) of successive U.S. presidents since the 1990s. What struck me in all these discussions, meetings, and interchanges was Henry’s deep and authentic humanism, his humor and wit, his passion for justice, and his impatience with dogma. Both in academic and personal respect, Henry was a model of a committed university teacher and researcher. I am very honored that I had the opportunity to know him and to work with him over the years. I will greatly miss him!

In Henry’s retirement speech, he echoed his old Madison activist days by confessing to helping students who were protesting the Washington University ROTC avoid the police by climbing through his office window. And in later years, Henry played a pivotal role in gaining a presidential pardon from the Clinton administration for Howard Lawrence Mechanic, a Wash U undergraduate student accused of throwing a firecracker during the ROTC unrest on campus in the spring of 1970.

Henry combined a dry wit with a humane intensity for social justice. Behind his self-effacing manner was a life of extraordinary involvement—from his activist days in the 1960s through to the last years of his life, Henry was attuned to the political beat of the day, and always had a view to share. He is survived by his wife Mary, and their two children, David and Leah Berger.

Memorial contributions can be made to the Henry Berger Scholarship Fund. To do so, visit gifts.wustl.edu and enter Henry Berger Scholarship Fund into the “Special instructions” field. Alternatively, checks should be made out to Washington University, with Henry Berger Scholarship Fund in the subject line, and sent to History Department, Campus Box 1062, Washington University in St Louis, 1 Brookings Drive, St Louis, MO 63130.

—Catherine Forslund
(With contributions from Leah Berger, Edward Crapol, Fabian Hilfrich, David Konig, and Richard Walter)
The Last Word:
The National Archives Has Lost its Archival Way

Bob Clark

Last spring, I published an essay in the journal *The Public Historian* (May 2018 issue) that sounded the alarm on the decision made by the Obama Foundation and the National Archives and Records Administration to forego the building and staffing of an official, NARA-administered Barack Obama Presidential Library. As a former longtime NARA and presidential libraries staffer with nearly 25 years in the archival profession, I felt it was important to raise public awareness of that decision and its implications for the Obama legacy and for our informed democracy.

The SHAFR community was outspoken and supportive in its response to the concerns raised in my article. The issues were shared, talked about at conferences and in classrooms, and apparently even leveraged in discussions with NARA officials. I believe the keen interest in the Obama Library decision is rooted in the fact that historians of foreign relations often come into regular contact with the presidential libraries’ records and archivists (foreign affairs, after all, is a major part of a president’s portfolio), and as a result, intersect with any number of NARA’s policies and procedures that help or hinder historical research. So, I am grateful that the editor of *Passport* offered me this opportunity to expand my observations on the Obama situation and to offer my own perspectives on the challenges facing the National Archives today.

To begin, let’s recap the Obama Library situation, which requires a brief primer on presidential library history. Begun in 1941 by Franklin D. Roosevelt, the thirteen presidential libraries that are part of the NARA system cover the administrations from Herbert Hoover to George W. Bush. By law, the libraries are built to NARA specifications with private funds raised by a private entity (typically, a foundation), and then the library is turned over to NARA to be maintained by the government and staffed by impartial government archivists, museum professionals, and administrators. Originally, a president’s White House papers and records legally were his to do with as he saw fit. Following FDR’s example, later presidents (and his predecessor Hoover) transferred legal title to their papers to the National Archives, i.e., to the American people. These libraries (Hoover through Carter, with Nixon a special case as always) are referred to in NARA-speak as Deed of Gift libraries.

It was not until Richard Nixon resigned and a fight ensued over his papers and tapes that steps were taken in Congress to change the legal status of the presidential records housed in the libraries. The Presidential Records Act of 1978 stated that beginning with the president taking office on January 20, 1981, presidential records were the property of the people of the United States with NARA having ultimate custodial responsibility. Presidential records could be housed in a presidential library if the money was raised and a library was built to house them, but the records remained NARA’s responsibility to preserve and make accessible to the public regardless. Presidential libraries built in the wake of the Presidential Records Act (Reagan to Bush 43) are known as PRA libraries.

Understanding that new buildings eventually become old ones, a 1986 law established an endowment requirement in the amount of 20% of library construction costs to be raised by the foundations to cover the government’s long-term library maintenance expenses. During the Bush 43 administration this endowment requirement was increased twice: in 2003 to 40% and then in October 2008—just before the presidential election—to a whopping 60% effective, of course, with the next president, not George W. Bush. It is unclear why this last endowment increase was seen as necessary, unless the intent was to create a poison-pill that no fiscally responsible foundation would swallow, thus indirectly killing future presidential libraries. It’s a topic worthy of further research and discussion.

I believe the keen interest in the Obama Library decision is rooted in the fact that historians of foreign relations often come into regular contact with the presidential libraries’ records and archivists (foreign affairs, after all, is a major part of a president’s portfolio), and as a result, intersect with any number of NARA’s policies and procedures that help or hinder historical research.

Originally, the private fundraising entities served their purpose—building the building—and then dissolved or fell into desuetude. But as the modern presidency has become more imperial, so the presidential foundations associated with the presidential libraries have become more imperious. They expanded their roles beyond constructing buildings and moved into the business of building legacies, including funding (and in some cases leading) the public facing side of presidential library operations such as museum exhibits, public programming, gift shops, and educational offerings. More dollars meant a desire for more influence over the outcome. In some cases, legal title to portions of the building and real estate were retained by the foundations so that events and activities happening there could be freed from government ethics rules and optics constrictions. There is always a simmering tension between public agency and private foundation just below the surface at the libraries, but all of these institutions are founded on the bedrock of a NARA government-led repository dedicated to providing access and transparency to the records and history of a president, his administration, and his era.

The initial stages of development for an Obama Library appeared to be on track with previous libraries. A foundation was established, a site was selected, Obama presidential records in NARA’s custody were moved to a storage facility in the Chicagoland area, NARA staff was hired and relocated, and a job posting was issued for a NARA library director (albeit for the first time separate
The discussions and process by which the Obama Foundation and NARA decided to dispense with building a traditional presidential library are completely opaque. As previously mentioned, the Obama Library had been on track for nearly two years, and public resources had already been expended to advertise for and hire staff and to transport Obama records to Chicago. What, then, caused the project to take a complete left turn and to forever change the role of presidential libraries in documenting our nation’s history? Without no public hearing, there was no opportunity for interested stakeholders to articulate the value of traditional presidential libraries and to perhaps influence the decision. There was no chance for the citizens of Chicago to weigh in on a fundamental shift in how the public land dedicated to the Obama Presidential Center would be used. Without transparency, we must rely on logic and pattern to discern the motivation behind the Obama decision. As I articulated in my Public Historian essay, over the years NARA has transformed itself into an agency driven by business metrics. The result is decision-making that is based on the concept of Return on Investment (ROI); how much a NARA facility costs per square foot in terms of construction, maintenance, and staff salaries and benefits versus how many people are served or reached by that facility.

By documenting institutional functions, activities, and decision-making, archivists provide an important means of ensuring accountability. In a republic such accountability and transparency constitute an essential hallmark of democracy. Public leaders must be held accountable both to the judgment of history and future generations as well as to citizens in the ongoing governance of society. Access to the records of public officials and agencies provides a means of holding them accountable both to public citizens and to the judgment of future generations...

Without transparency, we must rely on logic and pattern to discern the motivation behind the Obama decision. As I articulated in my Public Historian essay, over the years NARA has transformed itself into an agency driven by business metrics. The result is decision-making that is based on the concept of Return on Investment (ROI); how much a NARA facility costs per square foot in terms of construction, maintenance, and staff salaries and benefits versus how many people are served or reached by that facility. It’s why NARA announced in 2014 to close its facility in Anchorage, Alaska, moving the records held there documenting Alaska’s long history as a Federal territory and records related to its indigenous peoples to another NARA facility in Seattle. This action created a 2,000-mile long geographic barrier preventing ready access to those materials despite the Anchorage facility’s history of being visited by hundreds of researchers per year, and, no doubt, hundreds more assisted by NARA personnel via email and phone. Apparently, the cost per square foot calculation just didn’t work in Alaska’s favor.

NARA reported told stakeholders, including Alaska’s congressional delegation, that it would make the records being moved fully accessible to their constituencies by digitizing all the records and making them available online. I believe they’re still waiting. While NARA’s website indicates that some groups of important Alaska records now located in Seattle have been digitized, the total volume of records digitized and made available online over the last three years appears to be only a small fraction (by my calculation, some 375 cubic feet) of the nearly 12,000 cubic feet of records moved from Anchorage. These past promises of fully digitized access to millions of records as a substitute for an actual archival facility seem to track closely with those promises being made today about the Obama Library. At best, the promise is naïve; at worst, deception. Without a fully transparent decision-making and information gathering process, we’ll never know for certain which it is.

Let’s examine a little more closely, and in the context of archival values, this notion that digitizing everything is a viable, cost-effective, and adequate substitute for a bricks-and-mortar archive staffed by knowledgeable archivists. I’ve been able to trace this idea back at least to 2013 when David Ferriero, the current Archivist of the United States, announced a new goal: the complete digitization of NARA’s entire analog holdings, or some twelve billion records. This goal has been characterized by the Archivist at different times as NARA’s “moon shot” and as a “Big Hairy Audacious Goal”, and it has since been officially incorporated into NARA’s Strategic Plan to “Make Access
Digitization projects are extraordinarily costly. The initial and then ongoing costs of all these steps, the human labor, the infrastructure, the processes and procedures, and the long-term maintenance, have to be factored into digitization selection decisions.

Archivists promote and provide the widest possible accessibility of materials, consistent with any mandatory access restrictions, such as public statute, donor contract, business/institutional privacy, or personal privacy. Although access may be limited in some instances, archivists seek to promote open access and use when possible.

Archivists make choices about which materials to select for preservation based on a wide range of criteria, including the needs of potential users. Understanding that because of the cost of long-term retention and the challenges of accessibility, most of the documents and records created in modern society cannot be kept, archivists recognize the wisdom of seeking advice of other stakeholders in making such selections. They acknowledge and accept the responsibility of serving as active agents in shaping and interpreting the documentation of the past.

Digitization projects are extraordinarily costly. First, there is the simple physical act of doing the digitization. Care must be taken to preserve the integrity of fragile or unique historical materials. You can't (or shouldn't) just run them through an automatic feeder. Someone has to remove staples, handle the item, lay it on an overhead scanner, quality control the scans, and rescan any missed or blurry pages. The scans (both high resolution masters and lower resolution web-friendly access copies) have to be managed and connected to descriptive information (metadata). The digital files then have to be saved on a server and maintained for the long-term, which means the continuous use of digital preservation tools and techniques, the constant demand for additional server space, and an ever increasing energy usage with significant environmental impacts. The initial and then ongoing costs of all these steps, the human labor, the infrastructure, the processes and procedures, and the long-term maintenance, have to be factored into digitization selection decisions.

Every archival repository has collections of materials that are saved because of their informational value, but which have a narrow potential audience. A collection might get used once a year, or once a decade, but can still have informational value worth saving. Is that collection worthy of the same digitization priority as a collection requested or accessed every day, or several times a day? No. Choosing everything is no choice at all. It's a lazy way to avoid making a selection, and thus violates a core archival value.

Finally, I see the Obama Library decision as contrary to the most core archival value of all, access and use, articulated by SAA as:

Archivists promote and provide the widest possible accessibility of materials, consistent with any mandatory access restrictions, such as public statute, donor contract, business/institutional privacy, or personal privacy. Although access is contrary to the core archival value of selection, described by the Society of American Archivists as:

Archivists make choices about which materials to select for preservation based on a wide range of criteria, including the needs of potential users. Understanding that because of the cost of long-term retention and the challenges of accessibility, most of the documents and records created in modern society cannot be kept, archivists recognize the wisdom of seeking advice of other stakeholders in making such selections. They acknowledge and accept the responsibility of serving as active agents in shaping and interpreting the documentation of the past.

The value of selection is manifested through the archival practice of appraisal: not appraisal in the monetary sense, but the appraisal of a record for informational and long-term evidentiary value. Not every record has informational value worth saving; in fact, it's a relatively small percentage of the total number of records created by humans. And just as every record shouldn't be saved, not every record saved has such a high level of informational value that resources should be devoted to digitizing it.

Digitization and posting archival materials online as an alternative to making them physically available in-person or through reference assistance gives only the illusion of equitable access to the historical record. It is wrong and misguided to presume that everyone has access to the internet. Studies have shown that access to broadband internet is often dependent on your age, race, education, income level, and geographic location, and whether you live in an urban or rural setting. And by giving the impression that everything is online and only allowing the viewing of individual digital surrogates in a display system that you have designed, you have curated the archival experience. You have steered the research process. You have removed the serendipity of archival research, the productive collaboration with well-informed archivists, the browsability of whole boxes and files of materials, the joy of finding a document you didn't know existed and didn't know you needed or that changes the meaning and context of the documents you already had.

The loss of a dedicated archival staff at an Obama Library also means a loss of subject matter knowledge which is critical to the research process, to the development of historically contextualized and primary resource grounded museum exhibits, public programming, and educational offerings, and to the efficient declassification of classified records. And the failure to create a repository for the Obama presidency means that NARA's only holdings of that period will be the presidential and other government records required to be kept by law. As any user of presidential libraries will tell you, though, it's often not the official government records that are the most important or the most informationally valuable to a researcher. Rather, it's the related and complementary personal papers and other historical materials that are donated by individuals associated with the president. These additional collections of the papers of cabinet officials, administrators, political advisers, close confidants, friends, and family are the materials that lend texture and details to deliberations, shine light on controversial actions and decisions, and sometimes contradict or reveal gaps in the official record. They lend three-dimensionality and humanity to the people at the center of events. They complete the historical record.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, who created the National Archives in 1934 and opened the first presidential library (his own) in 1941, understood the importance and role of
these additional historical papers in documenting the story of his time. In fact, he purposely built his library large enough to accommodate the donation of additional archival materials, and he wasn't shy about encouraging his associates to do so. In February 1939, Roosevelt publicly peer-pressed his colleagues by saying, “...they all know that at Hyde Park there exists a place where they can send [their papers] for the permanent care for the benefit of the public and under the control of the Government itself...”

By the time I left the Roosevelt Library in 2015, there were some 385 different collections available to researchers. Failing to build a NARA-run Obama Library has robbed the American people of possession and access to critical historical materials. Without a dedicated repository for those additional archives to go, they will be scattered around the country or lost forever.

I do not write this commentary lightly. I have great affection and respect for the many professionals working in NARA who desire to stay true to their archival training and the values our profession embraces. But as with the Obama Library, many of NARA’s recent decisions can and should be closely examined and weighed against the accepted archival values of transparency, selection, access, and use. That will require diligence, activism, and advocacy by the Society of American Archivists, the broader archival profession, researchers, the public, and Congress.

As FDR said when he dedicated his presidential library on June 30, 1941, I “believe that people ought to work out for themselves, and through their own study, the determination of their best interest rather than accept such so-called information as may be handed out to them by certain types of self-constituted leaders who decide what is best for them.” The National Archives and Records Administration has lost its way. Let’s work together to set it back on the right path.