In this issue

- The Historiography of Race and U.S. Foreign Relations
- A Roundtable on *This Vast Southern Empire*
- Woodrow Wilson and World War I

And more...
Passport
THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS REVIEW

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In This Issue

4 Contributors

7 A Roundtable on Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy
William E. Weeks, Joseph A. Fry, Matthew Mason, Jay Sexton, James M. Shinn, Jr., and Matthew Karp

19 From Sidebar to Centrality: The Historiography of Race and U.S. Foreign Relations
Michael L. Krenn

31 Woodrow Wilson and World War I
Lloyd E. Ambrosius

43 Cruising as Power Projection: Seriously...
Kathryn C. Statler

45 A Roundtable on the Obama Administration’s Foreign Policy
Jeremy Kuzmarov, Robert David Johnson, Lubna Qureshi, and Jeremy Lembcke

52 How to be Heard by Congress and Federal Agencies on Policy Matters
Kristin Hoganson

54 Agents of Civilization: A Review of Joanna Williams, Academic Freedom in an Age of Conformity: Confronting the Fear of Knowledge
Kimber Quinney

59 Book Reviews
Daniel Strieff on Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power: Islamists & Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014)


65 Minutes of the January 2017 SHAFR Council Meeting

70 The Diplomatic Pouch

74 Dispatches

78 In Memoriam: Marilyn B. Young
Mary L. Dudziak

79 I Know What Marilyn Young Felt
Kenneth Osgood

82 The Last Word
Lloyd C. Gardner

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A Roundtable on
Matthew Karp,
This Vast Southern Empire:
Slaveholders at the Helm of
American Foreign Policy

William E. Weeks, Joseph A. Fry, Matthew Mason, Jay Sexton, James M. Shinn, Jr.,
and Matthew Karp

Roundtable Introduction
William E. Weeks

The study of antebellum U.S. foreign relations is not what it used to be. A 1989 Diplomatic History article characterized the field as a historiographical "desert," largely bereft of new work and mostly ignored by both the historical profession at large and, rather surprisingly, foreign relations specialists, too. Since that time and especially in the last ten years or so, conditions have changed markedly. Specialists in a range of sub-fields in history and certain scholars from other disciplines, particularly literature, have come to see (to continue the previous analogy) the "great American desert" as fertile ground for digging into the history of U.S. race relations, nationalist ideology, economic growth, and the like. Indeed, some of the recent work done in the field has also been some of the most prestigious: Sven Beckert's Empire of Cotton: A Global History, which emphasizes the centrality of southern cotton as a major force in 19th century world affairs, was awarded a Bancroft Prize in 2015. The following year, Deborah Rosen's Border Law: The First Seminole War and American Nationhood was awarded a Bancroft Prize, as was Andrew Lipman's examination of 18th century Euro-Native American relations The Saltwater Frontier: Indians and the Contest for the American Coast. It seems that many contemporary scholars and their students have come to see antebellum American foreign relations as a sort of academic virgin land, abundant with previously unexamined or underutilized historical sources and ripe for reinterpretation.

This brings us to the text at hand: Matthew Karp's This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy. In my view, it is at least deserving of a nomination for the Bancroft Prize, if not of the prize itself—such are its many strengths. The participants in the roundtable that follows, while perhaps not in every case ready to bestow the Bancroft Prize upon it, all agree that This Vast Southern Empire is a work of considerable intellectual and historiographical significance.

Joseph A. Fry lauds This Vast Southern Empire as "a model monograph: deeply researched in both primary and secondary sources, skillfully situated in a complex historiographical context, lucidly organized around provocative themes, forcefully argued, and beautifully written." He sees Karp as having "appropriately assessed southerners on their own terms while also deftly situating them in a national and international context." Acknowledging that previous scholars have addressed many of the book's major themes, he nonetheless affirms "no previous historian has offered Karp's sustained, interconnected, cohesive, and forceful linkage of slaveholders and these regional assumptions and interests to U.S. foreign relations over the thirty years preceding the Civil War." Notwithstanding these words of high praise, Fry would seem to undercut a major contention of the author by arguing that by the 1850s, slaveholders "looked abroad more out of fear and desperation than confidence." Certainly the slaveholding elite portrayed by Karp comes across as neither fearful nor desperate.

Jay Sexton, too, enthusiastically endorses This Vast Southern Empire by favorably comparing it to Walter LaFeber's classic text, The New Empire: "Both are of that rare breed: first books that at once give common voice to an emerging scholarly literature while still placing their distinctive interpretations front and center." But Sexton raises three "questions" (not criticisms) about the text: first, he suggests that the tight focus on slaveholders "at the helm of American foreign policy" risks overlooking the fact that by the 1850s a "northeastern capitalist class, which was connecting itself to important Midwestern agrarian constituencies and, in time, coalescing into the Republican Party, already was beginning to call the foreign policy shots in the high antebellum period." Second, he wonders whether, in certain cases, concerns over slavery and its preservation are as all-important as the author claims, particularly as regards the naval build-up of the 1850s. Finally, Sexton appreciates (as did I) the fascinating chapters in the book dealing with what is represented as the emerging Southern antebellum worldview, but he calls on the author to examine the "intra-regional debate" that produced the triumph of the secessionist outlook.

James M. Shinn notes the contribution This Vast Southern Empire makes to the evolving view of the master class as being informed, engaged capitalists rather than parochial hicks "at odds with modernity." He sees the book providing "a new focus to aspects of the master class that have previously been overlooked: its intellectual sophistication, its economic dynamism, its qualified embrace of state power, its cosmopolitanism." He observes that "There is a great deal to admire" about the book and that Karp's "careful reconstruction of the slaveholders' antebellum worldview allows us to see that secession was not a quixotic shot in the dark, but the fitting culmination of decades of proslavery foreign policy." Shinn offers two questions for
the author. First, he wonders, “Simply put, how universal was the proslavery globalization that Karp describes? Was it only a concern for mandarins like Calhoun, or did it command a popular following as well?” Second, Shinn declares that he is “…intrigued, but not entirely persuaded, by the connection Karp draws between slaveholding and late nineteenth-century imperialism” in the epilogue of the book.

Matthew Mason, echoing the praises of the other panelists, notes “the important contributions” This Vast Southern Empire makes to numerous areas of study. Yet his criticisms are a bit more pointed than those of our other commentators: “…due to its few weaknesses of interpretation and focus, ultimately this volume illuminates the historiography on the South more than that on American foreign policy.” Mason goes on to argue that “The macro critique to be made is that this volume situates that foreign policy in its domestic context only very unevenly” and faults Karp for paying inadequate attention to the partisan and sectional aspects of the debate.

Notwithstanding these objections, Mason finds much to like about the text, seeing it as “…an unusually sophisticated entry in another growth field: the internationalization of the historiography of the early American republic.” He lauds Karp’s characterization of the slaveholding elite as “aggressive centralizers” who did not hesitate to employ the enhanced foreign policy powers of the federal government in the name of defending the institution of slavery internationally.

In sum, Matthew Karp has produced a volume that seems destined to be read and discussed for a long time. An early contribution to that legacy is what follows.

Notes:

Review of Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy

Joseph A. Fry

The primary thesis of Matthew Karp’s This Vast Southern Empire is that southerners employed their prolonged control over the executive branch of U.S. government, especially the “outward state” or the parts of the federal bureaucracy overseeing “foreign relations” and “military policy,” to devise and implement a “foreign policy of slavery” (5, 7). That policy originated in Dixie’s response to the British abolition of slavery in the West Indies in 1833 and in the South’s subsequent conviction that Britain constituted an ongoing threat to the institution of slavery in the Western Hemisphere because of its opposition to the international slave trade and its alleged aspirations to end slavery in Cuba and Texas.

Over the subsequent three decades, the foreign policy of slavery also coincided with and embodied a response to the rise of abolitionism in the United States and the sectional competition over slavery’s expansion into the western territories. Southerners championed this foreign policy designed to protect slavery not just in the United States but across the hemisphere until Abraham Lincoln and the Republicans took office in 1861. No longer under southern control, the U.S. government was transformed from the primary protector of slavery to the primary threat to the institution’s survival and the South’s economic, racial, and political welfare.

According to Karp, key southerners advocated for and advanced U.S. naval and military power as an essential instrument of this foreign policy and of the more general pursuit of national empire. Abel Upshur, President John Tyler’s secretary of the navy and the principal proponent of “proslavery navalism,” agreed with Matthew Fontaine Maury on the critical importance of the Caribbean Sea as an international commercial entrepôt and with John Calhoun on the strategic necessity of defending the coasts of the slave states against attacks by potential invaders who might foment slave rebellions (44). Although Upshur failed to secure the ambitious shipbuilding allocations he sought, he did reconfigure the U.S. fleet, positioning it to better defend the South and exercise influence in the Caribbean, and he convinced Congress to authorize a restructuring of the Navy Department in ways that enhanced the secretary’s power. As Karp notes correctly, Tyler, Upshur, and Calhoun, all rigid states’ rights advocates on the domestic front, cast aside fears of centralized federal naval power when arming the nation for the defense of slavery.

This same, seemingly contradictory ideological dynamic was evident in the 1850s, when James C. Dobbins and Jefferson Davis served as secretaries of the navy and war under President Franklin Pierce. Dobbins convinced Congress to approve eleven new steamers and a thousand additional seamen, and he kept a wary eye on the threat of slave insurrections in the Caribbean and the prospects for the U.S. annexation of Cuba. Davis achieved a similar expansion of the army, which grew from 11,000 to 16,000 active troops. Dobbins and Davis, Karp contends, were not just defending slavery, but also envisioning “the United States as a great nation among other great nations” (215). Even as domestic sectional strife had become ever-more acute, they, like Tyler, Upshur, and Calhoun, were willing to strengthen the navy, army, and central government to further foreign policy goals.

Rather than emphasizing the accepted argument that southerners sought to employ foreign policy as a means to ward off minority status at home and to establish a favorable balance of power in the Senate, Karp accentuates the slaveholding elites’ international perspective. While confronting the British threat, southern policymakers sought to defend the institution of slavery not only in the United States but across the Western Hemisphere. Tyler administration officials stated this objective explicitly: safeguarding slavery in the South meant defending it in Texas, Cuba, and Brazil. They deployed the navy strategically, utilized diplomatic agents, and pursued quasi-alliances to forestall what they feared would be a domino effect if abolition were enacted in any of these places.

Texas was the most critical of these locations, and its annexation forestalled the dire threat of a non-slaveholding republic adjoining the South and constituted the “quintessential achievement of the foreign policy of slavery” (100). Tyler had no compunction about casting aside commitments to states’ rights or strict construction while pursuing this foreign policy prize, and his strategy was consistent with southern support for increased and more centralized U.S. naval and military power. His use of a joint congressional resolution rather than a treaty of annexation typified this ideological flexibility.

Although the foreign policy of slavery reached its “high-water mark” during the Tyler presidency, James K. Polk acted as a “worthy legatee” of the southern perspective (103). Polk’s worldview and foreign policy assumptions did not accord exactly with the Tyler-Upshur-Calhoun vision, but the Tennessee president’s foreign relations record “accommodated slaveholders’ needs and responded” to their “desires” (122). He accepted Tyler’s joint resolution
strategy for annexing Texas, avoided a war with Great Britain over Oregon that would have endangered slavery in the South, and imposed an imperial settlement on Mexico that was geared toward assuaging southern racist fears and concerns for slavery’s safety in the borderlands. Through his expansive use of executive power to dispatch special agents and deploy U.S. armed forces, Polk displayed an even more blatant disregard for southern constitutional scruples. And despite some largely inefﬁctual public carping, his fellow slaveholders, including Calhoun, recognized and supported the regional and hemispheric beneﬁts of Polk’s actions.

During the 1850s, the foreign policy of slavery yielded no tangible gains comparable to those made in the Tyler and Polk years. The South’s standing within the Union and the western territories steadily eroded, as did slavery’s. Still, Karp asserts, “the most inﬂuential slaveholding elites remained deeply invested in . . . national power building” and continued to consider the U.S. government slavery’s “most powerful and reliable ally” (177, 178). They also supported “an ambitious vision of American international power” and “felt a new geopolitical conﬁdence” (182, 186).

The persistence of these aspects of South’s foreign policy perspective derived in part from the annexation of Texas and the successful war with Mexico. Acquiring Texas and the American Southwest and demonstrating U.S. military power had, southerners declared, ensured the safety of slavery in the Caribbean Basin and signaled clearly that the United States would dominate North America. Therefore, Great Britain was no longer a serious strategic or abolitionist threat. Still, as Karp illustrates, ongoing southern conﬁdence in foreign policy solutions amidst domestic crises and setbacks resulted from much more than geopolitical calculations.

Southern foreign policy leaders and publicists such as James Dunwoody De Bow, the New Orleans editor of De Bow’s Review, also placed their faith in the power of “King Cotton” and the “Emperor Slavery” (141). Because they produced “nearly all of the world’s useable raw cotton” in the 1850s, southerners were convinced they had a stranglehold on the major North Atlantic economies, especially those of Great Britain and France, but also that of the United States (136). As Senator James H. Hammond of South Carolina proclaimed in March 1858, “without ﬁring a gun, without drawing a sword,” the South “could bring the whole world to our feet. . . . No, you dare not make war on cotton . . . . Cotton is king!”1 Cotton was unquestionably the agricultural staple most important to the Atlantic economy, but southerners also touted the inﬂuence of sugar, coffee, and tobacco and emphasized that the successful cultivation of all these crops was dependent upon slave labor. Indeed, without coerced labor there could be no productive agriculture in the tropics and by extension no viable Atlantic economy.

Mid-century southerners cited the European use of Chinese, Indian, and African workers as a practical acknowledgement and conﬁrmation of their belief that black slaves were the most viable tropical work force. They were the vanguard of modern progress and the South’s self-conscious region in the three decades preceding the Civil War, Matthew Karp has appropriately assessed southerners on their own terms while also deftly situating them in a national and international context. His analysis depends upon portraying the South as a self-conscious region that assessed and whenever possible implemented U.S. foreign policy based on perceived self-interest—an interest inextricably tied to the institution of slavery. The slaveholding elite, he asserts, envisioned these regional interests as virtually synonymous with U.S. national ones and promoted enhanced U.S. military strength and active, central governmental actions to pursue those interests and American imperial expansion. Buttiressing all of these actions was the southern conviction that the production of essential agricultural staples (especially cotton) with African American slave labor provided the most viable path toward American and international modernity.

Previous historians have explored many of Karp’s central themes: the South’s self-conscious regional approach to U.S. foreign relations; Dixie’s antebellum control of the national government and its use to protect slavery and other regional interests; the region’s ideological ﬂexibility and willingness to forego strict construction and states’ right in the foreign policy realm; the South’s international economic perspective and its conﬁdence in slavery’s essential role in the development of the tropics; the power of cotton in international commerce and foreign relations; the southern preoccupation with controlling the fate of Cuba and the Greater Caribbean; the particular importance of Texas to South’s economic and political future; and the South’s persistent apprehension regarding Great Britain’s abolitionist and imperial threat in the Western Hemisphere. But no previous historian has offered Karp’s sustained, interconnected, cohesive, and forceful linkage of slaveholders and these regional assumptions and interests to U.S. foreign relations over the thirty years preceding the Civil War.

Two of the author’s other primary theses should be mentioned here. First, antebellum Southerners have not been the only Americans to equate their regional foreign policy agenda with the national interest and a preferred approach to foreign policy: we could also cite antebellum New Englanders and Midwesterners of the 1920s and 1930s. In addition, prewar southern slaveholders acted on that equation only when they controlled the federal foreign policy bureaucracy. This essential precondition
was evident in Dixie's response to Lincoln's election in 1860 and in the postwar South's opposition to Gilded Age Republican foreign policy. Tellingly, the majority of southerners and their congressional representatives opposed postwar expansion of the navy, adhered to states' rights and strict construction in foreign policy, and did not favor U.S. imperial expansion if it included the potential addition of nonwhites. The South was deeply ambivalent about, if not simply opposed to, U.S. participation in the late nineteenth-century race for empire that Karp links to the region's heritage of racial hierarchy and coerced labor. Only when Woodrow Wilson, a southerner who posed no threat to southern racial practices, and an administration and a Congress that were both dominated by southerners reclaimed power did the South resume support for an activist and interventionist U.S. foreign policy based on American military and naval strength.

Second, Karp's emphasis on the slaveholders' continued confidence during the 1850s in the strategic, economic, and racial power of the foreign policy of slavery bears discussion. Sustaining this argument requires minimizing the contention that southerners were convinced that their honor, their masculinity, and their personal and regional independence, all closely tied to the institution of slavery, were no longer safe within the Union and that they looked abroad more out of fear and desperation than confidence. Accentuating southern confidence also conflicts with the reality that by the 1850s the great bulk of Dixie's capital was invested in slaves and that there was no way to extract it. Perhaps this fiscal reality compelled southerners to make the case for the superiority and modernity of slavery and plantation agriculture and to look beyond American shores for regional salvation.

With This Vast Southern Empire, Matthew Karp has authored a model monograph: deeply researched in both primary and secondary sources, skillfully situated in a complex historiographical context, lucidly organized around provocative themes, forcefully argued, and beautifully written. Although the southern state of mind in the 1850s may be open to debate, the overall quality of this book and the scholarly contribution it makes are not. Nor is the fact that the pursuit of a vast southern empire led only to vast regional and national tragedy

Notes:

Review of Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016)

Matthew Mason

This excellent book makes strong contributions to multiple contemporary historical literatures. It is built on strong research across a wide range of available documents, and features excellent turns of phrase throughout—including some that should help the book appeal to scholars of American foreign relations working outside the nineteenth century. But because of a few weaknesses of interpretation and focus, this volume ultimately illuminates the historiography on the South more than that on American foreign policy.

The idea that antebellum Southern slaveholders were at their core modern rather than backward-looking is an increasingly popular interpretation to which Karp makes a powerful addition. He demonstrates persuasively that most Southern elites adopted an “optimistic and forward-looking” (153) worldview at odds with traditional historical and pop-culture portrayals of their world as “a faux-medieval daydream” (255). As they surveyed the nineteenth-century global scene, they understood that “the South's commitment to bondage made it distinctive, not irrelevant or obsolete” (4). And that confidence only grew in the late 1840s and 1850s, as leading spokesmen from global superpower Great Britain seemed to admit the failure of their 1830s emancipation experiment. From the 1850s through the Confederate States of America adventure, then, Southern slaveholders were keenly aware of their critics at home and abroad, but their actions were based on a growing rather than a waning confidence that in the nineteenth century's global order, "slavery and progress had proved impressively congruent” (169).

Karp also contributes one more sturdy nail for the coffin of the interpretive zombie that is the notion that Southern slaveholders were zealous defenders of state rights against the intrusions of the national government. He shows that when it came to foreign and military policy, Southern elites were aggressive centralizers. From their cabinet posts and other positions of power, they expanded the army and, more especially, the navy; annexed Texas; sent a naval squadron to Cuba; argued vigorously for the federal government to build a railway across Panama; and sought to entangle the United States in a loose international coalition of slaveholding powers.

All this, Karp argues forcefully, “was not hypocrisy; it was ideology, and strategy, too” (6). In terms of constitutional thought, these Southern centralizers carefully preserved a distinction between domestic policy (in which the federal government's power should be strictly limited) and foreign policy (in which it should have sweeping powers). Another ideological presupposition that enabled this stance was the belief that slavery was truly a national rather than just a sectional interest; American abolitionists, not slaveholders running the federal government, were the sectionalists. The embrace of federal power was also strategic, Karp shows, because Southern leaders “almost universally looked to the federal government as the natural savior of slavery, both at home and abroad” (198). Indeed, Karp’s excellent discussion of the secession crisis and the founding of the Confederate States of America shows how threatening Lincoln's election was, how reluctant to secede many Southerners with experience directing American foreign policy were, and how natural it was for such secessionists to imbue the CSA executive branch with sweeping powers. These attitudes were all legacies of slaveholders’ control of American foreign power to that point.

This volume offers an unusually sophisticated entry in another growth field: the internationalization of the historiography of the early American republic. For one thing, Karp establishes that most of the historiography on his subjects’ global vision is unduly reductionist, ascribing their internationalism to simple desires to expand slave territory or to protect their property and export markets. More—even more than the sum of all these material interests—was involved in what Karp describes as a “cold war over race and labor” (82) whose blocs were led by abolitionist Britain and the slaveholding United States. In this cold war, the fate of the Western Hemisphere's remaining slave societies was the most pressing concern,
followed at no great distance by “oscillations in global attitudes toward emancipation” (3). Leading Southern slaveholders carefully monitored and sought to influence both these areas. With this compelling framework, Karp is able to show, for instance, that John Tyler and John C. Calhoun had far more than Texas in mind when they pushed for its annexation and explained that push to a transatlantic audience.

Another significant implication of this argument is that the solicitude of Southern slaveholders did not stop with “King Cotton.” They were ultimately concerned with “Emperor Slavery” (141). A member of Britain’s Parliament captured it well in 1845 when he told his colleagues in the Commons that the United States’s government leaders had “put themselves at the head of the slave interest, just as Queen Elizabeth put herself at the head of the Protestant interest in Europe” (100).

Karp’s analysis is also sophisticated because it reveals that for all the breadth of these slavery cold warriors’ vision, not all global events or indicators or places were of equal significance to them. The doings of other powers, for instance, carried nowhere near the weight of what Britain’s government and opinion leaders said and did. In the 1840s, the “larger hemispheric struggle between slavery and abolition” took place on a vast canvas, but “Cuba, Brazil, and Texas were the brightest flashpoints in that struggle” (59). The disproportionate importance of Brazil and Cuba persisted throughout the antebellum era. And in the 1850s, when bonded labor seemed to be on the march rather than the defensive, the future of free labor in Haiti drew special scrutiny for Southern internationalists keen on that island’s symbolic weight. As the internationalization of American historiography proceeds, one of its less salutary impacts has been a tendency to ascribe the same weight to all global places and events. Karp’s book easily avoids that trap.

But for all these strengths—and they are considerable—this book has some key limitations that keep it from reaching its full explanatory potential vis-à-vis American foreign policy. The macro critique to be made is that this volume situates that foreign policy in its domestic context only very unevenly. Karp makes a valid point when he insists that “even the most dramatic sectional clashes unfolded in a political atmosphere regularly informed by, and strongly sensitive to, the larger universe of world affairs” (176). But what happened in the larger universe was also affected by what occurred on the domestic front. And while he nods to the domestic context with his basic framework of Southern slaveholders on the defensive at home and on the offensive abroad, Karp generally takes the former for granted rather than fully exploring it. And apparently he does so not only because he assumes knowledge of the growing sectional crisis in his readers, for he insists that “the South’s international confidence demands an independent analysis” (126). But given that American as well as British abolitionists were the major antagonists in their cold war, the adversaries against whom they constantly framed their arguments, their internationalism could never take place in a sphere that was separate from the domestic.

In addition, towards the end of the book, Karp’s otherwise good discussion of how revolutionary Abraham Lincoln’s antislavery administration was points up the weakness of neglecting or assuming the domestic political context. Broken down into its constituent parts, that weakness includes giving partisan politics short shrift and failing to account for the actions and attitudes of the multiple Northerners who inhabit Karp’s narrative alongside his central subjects. The relative absence of these themes in the narrative makes the Republican revolution of 1860 seem to come out of the blue, but the harm goes beyond that.

Party politics get some attention, but Karp’s treatment of them offers nothing of explanatory value. In fleeting passages he does acknowledge that the Jacksonians took a different approach to the international politics of slavery from the one the Jeffersonians took; that those same Jacksonian Democrats sought to distinguish themselves as slavery cold warriors who were superior to “the Anglophile elites in the Whig Party” (22); that Southerners in the Tyler administration pushing for naval expansion found bipartisan support; that the Democratic administration of James K. Polk and the no-party Tyler administration approached the foreign policy of slavery differently, in large part because of the exigencies of preserving a truly national party; and that Democrat Franklin Pierce came to the presidency vowing to pursue a more “forceful American presence in foreign affairs” (189) than his Whig predecessor, Millard Fillmore, had. Book reviews are notorious for complaints that the author in question failed to write the book the reviewer would have written, but in these passages Karp opens the door to an analysis of the partisan dimensions of his story without entering the room beyond it. The decision to stop where he did diminished the explanatory power of his book.

The same can be said, with even greater regret on my part, of the sectional dimensions of Karp’s story. He begins that narrative by framing it as a Southern story in light of the numbers: from the 1830s to the 1850s, slaveholders served as secretary of state two-thirds of the time, and as secretary of war and secretary of the navy four-fifths of the time. Further, “80 out of 134 U.S. ministers abroad hailed from the slaveholding states” (4–5). Those are striking figures, but they beg two questions. First, what about the other one-third, or one-fifth, or fifty-four? A full study of antebellum foreign policy would have to account for the roles these Northerners played and the stances they took. On the one hand, it is fair for an author to set his or her own limits, and Karp set out to study “the slaveholding statesmen at the helm of U.S. foreign policy” (8). But on the other, Karp’s supporting cast includes Northerners like Edward Everett, Daniel Webster, James Buchanan, William Marcy, Lewis Cass, Millard Fillmore, and Franklin Pierce—all of whom occupied significant foreign and military posts. And as Karp perfunctorily acknowledges, his central Southern cast saw some but not all of these Yankee characters as reliable allies. In the case of Everett, many Southern leaders had real doubts about his ability to represent their interests as the U.S. minister in London. But Pierce’s presidential policy on Cuba flowed from much the same considerations as Tyler’s policy on Texas did.

And this point raises a second, related question that goes to the heart of the book’s argument. Karp’s is a story of slaveholders’ “deep well of confidence in American power, and the southern ability to manipulate that power for the protection and benefit of slavery” (91)—that is, until the abrupt change that was Lincoln’s election that brought to fruition the domestic threat. But why did they have such assurance, especially in light of the ongoing sectional controversy? Karp’s narrative, along with other recent historians’ accounts, does show that they did get their way far more often than not. But his account does not fully explain their certainty beyond this track record and their general expectation that slavery would win its global contest with free labor. Without sustained attention to their many and powerful Northern co-laborers in the foreign and military sphere, Karp’s book only partially explains slaveholders’ abiding trust that they could control the levers of American foreign policy.

It is customary for book reviewers to end by saying that while their critiques are not minor, they should not be read as severely diminishing the value of the books being reviewed. I have no reason to conclude on any other note than that conventional one in reference to this fine volume.
While reading Matthew Karp's superb new book, my thoughts kept turning toward Walter LaFeber's 1963 The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898. Both are of that rare breed: first books that give voice to an emerging scholarly literature while still placing their distinctive interpretations front and center. Both are the kind of books that breathe new life into old topics and in the process open up fresh lines of enquiry for their successors. And both, for all their many strengths, remain open to similar lines of questions and criticism.

First, a prefatory remark. To say that Karp's This Vast Southern Empire is on a par with LaFeber's The New Empire is very high praise. The highest, really. To this day, more than fifty years after its publication, LaFeber's work remains in my view the single most important study ever written on late nineteenth-century foreign policy—despite its oft-noted shortcomings. When I can assign only one book to grad students on this topic, I still choose LaFeber's.

Like LaFeber before him, Karp hears a neglected harmony within the cacophony of nineteenth-century foreign policy. He zooms in on a group of powerful southern elites who articulated and pursued a coherent foreign policy committed to the preservation of slavery. This vision was most fully on display and realized in the Tyler administration, but Karp finds compelling evidence of it throughout the antebellum period, including during the Pierce presidency.

Proslavery southern statecraft was inextricably linked to relations with the dominant power of the era, Great Britain, though the precise relationship varied over time, with anglophobic anti-abolitionism dominating the early chapters of the book, only to give way to a nascent spirit of transatlantic cooperation based upon shared economic interests, racial attitudes, and, ultimately, perceived common geopolitical interests. But southern statecraft, Karp carefully argues, was not simply a reaction to British power any more than it was merely a response to rising antislavery sentiment among the Yankees. It also emerged in relation to an embryonic international economic order anchored in various forms of unfree trade, the production and exportation of raw materials, and a political economy that curiously combined elements of free trade with state support. And in the case of southern imperialism, Karp's proslavery foreign policy was linked to an increasingly powerful central state.

For all their talk about states' rights and limited government in their domestic context, Karp's southern statesmen had no qualms about embracing central power when it came to foreign policy and the security of slaveholders across the hemisphere.

The ingredients behind Karp's overall argument echo those identified by LaFeber in his study of Gilded Age expansionism. The common denominators include: (1) a coherent foreign policy objective (the defense of slavery for Karp; the expansion of economic interests for LaFeber), (2) an unexpectedly powerful state (run by proslavery Democrats in Karp's period; northeastern capitalists, most often Republicans, call the shots in LaFeber's book), (3) the centrality of British power, both as a threat and an enabler (for Karp, this is the tangle of Britain being at once the abolitionist bogeyman and the South's greatest trading partner; the story in LaFeber is similar—Britain's expansionism was the great rival to America's but Britain served simultaneously as an imperialist model), (4) links to a broader economic order (the age of slavery and unfree labor; Gilded Age industrialization and capitalism), (5) an eagerness to pursue expansionist policies when the opportunity presented itself, but a willingness to accept more moderate policies when it did not (southerners aggressively moved to take Texas, but not Cuba; Gilded Age statesmen gobbled up new territories in 1889, but not in 1875), (6) a preoccupation with naval power (a prominent theme in both books), and (7) a first-rate group of intellectuals, lobbyists, and public figures, who played an important cheerleading role (for Karp, characters like William Trescot and James De Bow; the analogues in LaFeber would be Alfred Thayer Mahan and the National Association of Manufacturers). Like LaFeber before him, Karp expertly probes how these various structures' commonalities came into being before demonstrating to the reader how they intersected and, in so doing, came to define the diplomacy of the age.

Let me pause for a moment to pose a historical rather than a historiographical question. Might there be something about the political structure of the United States that makes the nation's foreign policy apparatus susceptible to domination by motivated, powerful minorities such as proslavery southerners, Gilded Age capitalists, or, to give a more recent example, the neoconservatives of the George W. Bush years? Longue durée studies of U.S. diplomatic history have tended to make the case for continuity over time in the U.S. approach to the world. But these studies run the risk of obscuring the point raised by books such as Karp's: the foreign policy of the United States has been derivative of divergent groups of powerful interests over the course of American history. If these have been united by a common tradition and set of cultural symbols, we nonetheless should be aware of the different purposes to which they have put U.S. power. Furthermore, we are not as conditioned as we should be in diplomatic history to think about distinct political regimes or eras. A basic aspect of Karp's argument bears emphasis here: some of the most powerful forces in the making of U.S. foreign policy have been ephemeral—most prominently, Karp's slaveholders.

Now, back to Karp and LaFeber. How sound are these structural interpretations of nineteenth-century foreign policy? I find them very persuasive, hence my enthusiasm. But questions remain. The questions I want to ask take their inspiration from David Pletcher's classic (and underappreciated) critique of the New Left. First, from a bird's eye view, there is the matter of contextualization of the argument. Karp succeeds in connecting the dots in imaginative ways to reconstruct the long-underappreciated worldview of the planter elites, but to what extent did this worldview determine U.S. diplomacy as a whole? The case is strongest for the Tyler administration, with a secondary phase in the mid-1850s. But the slaveholding elites did not get to remake the world in all the ways they dreamt of. Karp is alert to this point, to his credit, but the crucial comparative questions remain to be asked.

A case could be made, for example, that the northeastern capitalist class, which was connecting itself to important midwestern agrarian constituencies and in time would coalesce into the Republican Party, already was beginning to call the foreign policy shots in the high antebellum period. A list of discussion points here would be different from those covered in This Vast Southern Empire: the campaign for a homestead act and a transcontinental railroad; the rise of Wall Street as early as the late 1840s, the Panama railroad and Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; the development of the U.S. consular service; the "opening" of Japan and the revival of a U.S. commercial presence in China; the nascent truce with Great Britain and rapid improvements in transatlantic communications; the boom in U.S. securities on the money markets of Europe. The list could go on. The question here is whether the proslavery vision and set of policies were as dominant in this period as This Vast Southern Empire proposes. Were southern grand strategists already locked into a losing long game with a Yankee rival that was rapidly developing its own worldview, a worldview anchored in its...
own peculiar social structures and political economy?

A related question concerns isolating one theme to explain a number of different policies and perspectives. Karp makes the preservation of slavery the lens that most often shapes his interpretation (there is a parallel here with LaFeber's *New Empire*, in which economic expansion assumes a central role in the argument). He makes a strong case for doing this, and he certainly achieves his objective. Yet one can still ask if slavery is always the defining explanation for specific policies. Again, Karp is aware of the possibility that a number of factors might lie behind a given proslavery policy; he notes, for example, that the annexation of Texas could not have been achieved without northern support in Congress. Similarly, and rightly, he recognizes the crucial role of northerners in episodes like Walker’s filibusters and the Ostend Manifesto.

But the question remains: was such multi-causation also decisive in the episodes that Karp views as triumphs of the slave power in foreign policy? Consider, for example, congressional spending on convertible steamers/ warships for the navy in the 1840s. Karp gets this episode right by highlighting the central role played by southern elites, namely Abel Upshur and Matthew Maury, while still noting that the proposed naval build-up of this period “was not a wholly southern measure” (47). But should this caveat be given more argumentative emphasis? Northern support was, of course, required in Congress. When such support was forthcoming, these northern votes came not from the desire to protect slavery, but from other vested interests, such as shipbuilding (Philadelphia and New York), port businesses, exporters who stood to gain from faster sailing times, advocates of an assertive foreign policy vis-à-vis Britain, and so on. In other words, and to jump a step or two ahead, the bigger question is as follows: in a study of proslavery policy, how much emphasis should be given to the South’s worldview and how much to the domestic political story of the South’s position within the Democratic Party—a position that southerners deftly exploited to achieve proslavery ends? The domestic perspective is not antagonistic to Karp’s thesis, but prioritizing it would change the argumentative weight of international versus internal factors carry argumentative weight in a discussion of international versus internal political factors.

Another question concerns source contextualization. Here I am referring to those very illuminating middle chapters that deal with aspects of the southern worldview as it came to reach a maturity of sorts in the 1850s. This is such a compelling section of the book. Karp very powerfully yet delicately recreates the southern worldview in the fashion of the best intellectual history. One of the goals of this section is to demonstrate that southern elites faced the world in this period with increasing confidence in their institutions. They were forward-looking and optimistic, not panicked members of a dying class who desperately pined for the glory days of the past. Karp very powerfully yet delicately recreates the southern worldview in the fashion of the best intellectual history. One of the goals of this section is to demonstrate that southern elites faced the world in this period with increasing confidence in their institutions. They were forward-looking and optimistic, not panicked members of a dying class who desperately pined for the glory days of the past.

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To sum up, the points above are not so much criticisms of Karp’s argument as they are questions about how his argument fits into the broader picture. And none of these points are meant to take anything away from Karp’s book. *This Vast Southern Empire* will stick around. SHAFR readers might not know that there is a dynamic and growing group of nineteenth-century historians working on the South in similarly innovative ways. Among them are Bob Bonner, Brian Schoen, Robert May, Stephanie McCurry, Don Doyle, Frank Towers, Steve Hahn, Skye Montgomery, Paul Quigley, and William Freehling, to name only a few.

Karp appropriately draws from these scholars. Yet he manages to put his own spin on things in the course of this distinctive book. He does this argumentatively as outlined above. He also does this through his distinctive style. He has enviably cogent lead-in and sum-up sentences; he anticipates counterarguments, acknowledges them, and then makes a renewed argument and his book is full of lively anecdotes and biographical sketches, particularly at the opening of chapters, that help the reader along. It is a book that I read in just three sittings and have taken off the shelf to revisit several times since.

Most of all, this is a timely book. *This Vast Southern Empire* speaks to our era by zooming in on the growth of the central state—a key political question of our age and the subject of an emergent historiography that is particularly rich in studies of the nineteenth century. The book is also an exemplar of the global turn: Karp has successfully planted the planter class in its wider world.

Finally, this book speaks to our coming era of politics and statecraft—an age in which disjuncture and regime change (at home and abroad) will be as important to understanding foreign policy as was the Cold War consensus back in the days of the New Left. The most significant takeaway from Karp’s book might well be how it highlights distinct eras and ruptures within the history of U.S. foreign relations. For all of its similarities to the old work of the New Left, *This Vast Southern Empire* differs from that historiography, which did so much to emphasize continuities over time in the U.S. encounter with the world. Those working on nineteenth-century U.S. foreign relations in similar ways might not yet have a compelling label and
institutional anchor (like the New Left of the Wisconsin School), but in Karp’s This Vast Southern Empire, we have a lasting model and a source of inspiration.

Notes:

Review of Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy

James M. Shinn, Jr.

Were antebellum slaveholders “modern”? The question may seem ridiculous on its face. After all, we usually think of slaveholders as the stubborn enemies of nineteenth-century progress. They were reactionaries in an age of liberalism, federalists in an age of ascendant centralization, localists in an age of increasing global interconnection. Most damningly, they championed an immoral, economically retrograde way of life. However, over the past decade or so, historians have begun to reexamine the conventional wisdom that slaveholders (and, indeed, slavery) were at odds with modernity. In part, this shift reflects a change of thinking about the nature of modernity itself. But it also bespeaks a new focus on aspects of the master class that have previously been overlooked: its intellectual sophistication, its economic dynamism, its qualified embrace of state power, its cosmopolitanism. The result is a radically unfamiliar picture of a group we thought we knew well.

By focusing on the role slaveholders played in shaping antebellum U.S. foreign policy, Matthew Karp’s This Vast Southern Empire makes an important contribution to this continuing reappraisal of the master class. Karp’s slaveholders are not myopic hicks, but astute observers of the international scene. “Few mid-nineteenth-century Americans,” he claims, “were more deeply engaged with international politics” (3). There was a good reason for this. In 1800, slavery spanned the length and breadth of the New World, from the Hudson River to the Rio de la Plata, from the Peruvian lowlands to the Lesser Antilles. But over the course of the nineteenth century, the institution came under increasing stress because of slave resistance, abolitionist agitation, and revolutionary upheaval. In the U.S. North, Spanish America, and the Caribbean, bondage steadily lost ground to free labor—or, at least, to different kinds of bondage.

Slaveholders in the U.S. South, who believed that the future of slavery at home was bound up with its fate abroad, watched these developments with no little anxiety. But they did not despair. And why would they? The slaveholders were not a beleaguered minority, but a shrewd, confident ruling class with substantial resources at its disposal. Not least among these was the national state. As Karp notes, slaveholders maintained a “vise-like grip” on the executive branch of the antebellum federal government (4). Proslavery statesmen like John C. Calhoun, Robert M.T. Hunter, and Jefferson Davis were thus able to enlist the State Department, the military, and other entities in the defense of bonded labor throughout the hemisphere—an approach that Karp calls the “foreign policy of slavery” (7).

Elements of this story are well known to specialists. Don Fehrenbacher, Robert E. May, and other historians have remarked on the crucial role that proslavery statesmen played in the push for new territory in Texas, Mexico, and the Caribbean during the 1840s and 1850s. Karp’s innovation is to show that there was more to proslavery diplomacy than expansionism as such. Southern policymakers also sought closer ties and greater cooperation with the other New World slave powers. U.S. diplomats regularly shared intelligence about slave unrest and abolitionist intrigue with their opposite numbers in Spain and Brazil. At times, this proslavery soft power could take on a harder edge. In 1843, President John Tyler dispatched three warships to Cuba in response to persistent rumors of slave conspiracy on the island. When the ships arrived in Havana, the U.S. consul, a South Carolinian, eagerly placed them at the service of the Spanish captain general. (The offer was declined.)

Karp argues that such incidents show that territorial acquisition was not in itself the overarching goal of proslavery statecraft. Rather, for men like Calhoun, the aim was to ensure slavery’s survival in its remaining New World bastions, irrespective of their political allegiance. If acquisition was seen as necessary in order to preserve slavery in a neighboring site (as had seemed to be the case with the Republic of Texas), then so be it. But proslavery statesmen were also willing to let foreign slaveholding polities operate as independent “client regimes” under the watchful eye of the United States (67).

In order to command international respect, the “foreign policy of slavery” required the backing of a powerful military. Thus, throughout the antebellum period, proslavery statesmen worked to expand and modernize the U.S. armed forces. They initially focused on the U.S. navy. In 1841, Secretary of the Navy Abel P. Upshur proposed an ambitious plan of expansion and reform intended to elevate the United States into the first rank of global naval powers. Although Upshur’s plan went largely unheeded at the time (and Upshur himself suffered the freakish fate of being killed in an accident on one of his own warships), his ideas laid the groundwork for a substantial increase in the size and technological sophistication of the U.S. navy during the 1850s.

Slaveholders also made the case for a larger regular army, with more immediate results. In the mid-1850s, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis added nearly five thousand men to the ranks of the U.S. Army. Davis equipped the newly expanded force with state-of-the-art weaponry, including rifles capable of firing the lethally accurate minié ball. All told, the 1850s witnessed the largest peacetime expansion in the history of the U.S. military to that point. Such a crusade seems at odds with our traditional image of slaveholders as opponents of centralized power. But in fact, as Karp argues (echoing much recent scholarship on the subject), proslavery statesmen had little trouble suppressing their strict-constructionist scruples when it suited them. In the case of military expansion, they justified their support for a more powerful national state by making a handy distinction between domestic and international powers. While the former were strictly limited by the constitution, the latter, in their view, labored under no explicit legal check. As a mechanism of international power, the military could thus be augmented virtually at will. (One assumes that slaveholders eventually came to regret this bit of constitutional hairsplitting.)

By the 1850s, slaveholder confidence was running high. Boosters like James D.B. De Bow predicted a glorious future for slavery both at home and—with proper U.S. guidance—around the world. This bullish outlook, so hard to square with the period’s deep political discord, has long puzzled historians. Indeed, some have seen it as little more than
empty posturing, “bursts of desperate arrogance” designed to conceal “southern weakness” (126). Not so, according to Karp. In his view, domestic tensions, however dire, were only a part of slaveholders’ calculations about the future. The international scene was just as important—and it was looking increasingly favorable to slavery.

Ironically, a major reason for this cheering prospect was Great Britain, which was showing signs at midcentury of retracting from its recent commitment to abolitionism. In the late 1840s, Parliament sharply reduced import duties on cotton and sugar. Meanwhile, British public opinion, once fervently anti-slavery, seemed to be shifting in line with disappointment over the aftermath of West Indian emancipation. Influential commentators like Thomas Carlyle denounced Britain’s “mighty experiment” as a debacle—an assessment that was breathlessly repeated in the southern press. Perhaps the clearest sign of Britain’s conservative turn was the country’s increasing reliance on indentured labor from East Asia and West Africa in its colonies. (France, which had abolished slavery in 1848, likewise made use of indentured labor.) Technically speaking, indentured laborers were not slaves. But southerners nevertheless saw their use as a tacit admission that economic development in the tropics depended on compulsory nonwhite labor. At the dawn of the age of imperialism, they believed it was only a matter of time before the European powers came to see slavery as an indispensable tool for managing their new, far-flung, racially mixed empires.

Taken together, these trends convinced proslavery policymakers that the world was coming around to their way of thinking—even as the United States was not. This divergence became more pronounced as the sectional crisis deepened. Slaveholders increasingly came to believe that their future lay outside the Union, as an independent power among powers. To be sure, many of the leading architects of the “foreign policy of slavery” resisted secession at first. But even they embraced independence when it became clear that Republicans intended to bring an end to the South’s traditional control over U.S. statecraft. For slaveholders, secession was as much an effort to preserve their place in the international order as it was to preserve their power at home. It was both an act of “geopolitical ambition” and a “defensive maneuver” (241, 233). Ultimately, it was a fatal mistake. However, Karp’s careful reconstruction of the slaveholders’ antebellum worldview allows us to see that secession was not a quixotic shot in the dark, but the fitting culmination of decades of proslavery foreign policy.

There is a great deal to admire about This Vast Southern Empire. It draws on extensive research in the papers of two generations of proslavery statesmen and in a wide selection of southern periodicals. Its arguments are well crafted and pointedly revisionist, but never querulous. Not least, it is extremely persuasive. I will merely make attempts to straddle several overlapping subfields—including Southern history, slavery and abolition, and the origins of the Civil War—it all began in N. Gordon Levin’s diplomatic history seminar at Amherst College, where I conceived my undergraduate thesis on Anglo-American relations and the annexation of Texas. It is thus especially gratifying for me to learn that these scholars of American foreign relations are able to recognize the book as one of their own.

All of the authors seem to be convinced by the book’s two most fundamental arguments: first, that southern elites organized U.S. international relations around an increasingly confident, forward-looking “foreign policy of slavery”; and second, that in pursuit of ambitious proslavery objectives abroad, slaveholders eagerly enlisted the power of the national government. That is a considerable relief. Yet all four scholars raise important questions about the scope, shape, and significance of these two contentions. If we accept that “proslavery statecraft,” in James Shinn’s handy phrase, was a real thing, what implications does it have for our view of antebellum southern history and the causes of the Civil War? How did this swaggering foreign policy of slavery intersect with the complex domestic politics of Whigs and Democrats or the fraught sectional tensions between northerners and southerners? And what conclusions can we draw about the relationship between master class foreign policy and the langue durée of U.S. foreign relations? These are the central questions the authors have pushed me to consider, and I will do my best to respond to them here.

Joseph Fry makes the important point that the book approaches the antebellum South as a “self-conscious region.” This does not mean that I view southern elites as

Author’s Response

Matthew Karp

I am grateful to Joseph Fry, Matthew Mason, Jay Sexton, and James M. Shinn, Jr. for their generous and penetrating comments on my book. Although This Vast Southern Empire attempts to straddle several overlapping subfields—including Southern history, slavery and abolition, and the origins of the Civil War—it all began in N. Gordon Levin’s diplomatic history seminar at Amherst College, where I conceived my undergraduate thesis on Anglo-American relations and the annexation of Texas. It is thus especially gratifying for me to learn that these scholars of American foreign relations are able to recognize the book as one of their own.

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Simón Bolívar.) Still, it would be good to know what ordinary slaveholders thought about military buildup and the necessity of preserving foreign slaveholding regimes. Did such issues have any purchase in southern electoral politics? Was there a popular constituency for the “foreign policy of slavery”?

Additionally, I was intrigued, but not entirely persuaded, by the connection Karp draws between slaveholding and late nineteenth-century imperialism. While it is implicit in various places throughout the book, this connection comes to the fore in the epilogue, which is inspired by W.E.B. Du Bois’ 1890 address, “Jefferson Davis as a Representative of Civilization.” Du Bois argued that slaveholders were the precursors of the racist, ravenously extractive imperialists of his day—a view that Karp endorses. The hallmarks of imperialist Karp writes, were “anticipated and vividly embodied in the slaveholding American South” (253). He further describes slaveholders as a “vanguard” for imperialism (254). What kind of claim is being made here? Note that Karp does not say that slaveholders “inspired” later imperialists, or something to that effect; he carefully avoids delineating causality. So what, then, was the connection between a Jefferson Davis and a Theodore Roosevelt, or a James D.B. De Bow and a Josiah Strong, beyond a certain family resemblance? Karp’s vagueness on this point underscores the need for more work on the deep intellectual roots of U.S. overseas imperialism. We can only hope that such work will meet the high standard set by This Vast Empire of Slavery.
primarily “sectionalist.” In fact, as Fry notes, what defined southern leadership in the 1840s and 1850s was its capacity to see its distinctive interest in slavery as “virtually synonymous” with U.S. national interests abroad. Fry helpfully suggests that other self-conscious regions in American history, such as antebellum New England or the early twentieth-century Midwest, likewise equated a distinctive agenda with national foreign policy. This strikes me as an idea worth pursuing. It made me think of other plausible candidates, including late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Virginia, with its vision of agrarian expansion, or perhaps even the coastal metropolitan enclaves of the Clinton-Obama era, with their commitment to liberal internationalism.

Yet in other ways, I think the book attempts to go beyond Fry’s emphasis on southern elites as the representatives of a self-conscious region, and approach them instead as the leaders of a self-conscious class. Antebellum America’s most powerful proslavery internationalists—from John C. Calhoun to Jefferson Davis—identified themselves as “southerners,” to be sure, but above all, they understood themselves to be members of a slaveholding elite. Their “South,” as Fry observes, was a place whose borders were defined by the presence of slavery; and their conduct of U.S. foreign policy was shaped not by geographical concerns but by a commitment to the social, political and economic mandates of the slave system. In that sense, I would suggest, the “fiscal reality” of southern investment in slave capital, as Fry puts it, may have been less binding—and less decisive in shaping the politics of secession—than the ideological reality of southern investment in their class power atop a slave society. The relative importance of the latter investment is one reason why This Vast Southern Empire concentrates so much on the South’s ideological confidence in slavery as a system with an international future. That international confidence, I believe, solidified southern faith in the Union for much of the 1850s. But after Lincoln’s election, it also played a crucial role in recycling slaveholders to their painful decision to leave the United States and establish an independent slave republic.

Thinking about proslavery elites as representatives of a class rather than a region might also help address Shinn’s question about what kind of popular constituency their foreign policy generated in the South. It is difficult to make any confident claims about popular opinion in antebellum America, and in some ways This Vast Southern Empire, with its focus on influential policymakers and intellectuals, does not even try to investigate the question. Its concern is with the slaveholders who wielded power at the summit of national politics, rather than the social base that put them there. Thinking about proslavery elites as representatives of a class rather than a region might also help address Shinn’s question about what kind of popular constituency their foreign policy generated in the South. It is difficult to make any confident claims about popular opinion in antebellum America, and in some ways This Vast Southern Empire, with its focus on influential policymakers and intellectuals, does not even try to investigate the question. Its concern is with the slaveholders who wielded power at the summit of national politics, rather than the social base that put them there.

Overall, I think this a fair line of criticism. Mason may well be right that the domestic political arena is where the book is weakest. But let me make two brief points in my defense. First, although northern politicians played an important role in the foreign policy of slavery, they were following a script largely written by southern elites. If, as Mason notes, Franklin Pierce’s policy in Cuba nearly matched John Tyler’s—with a priority on the preservation of slavery rather than the acquisition of territory—to me, that argues for paying more attention to Tyler and his

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ideological descendants rather than to Pierce. It is not that the slaveholders’ northern allies were irrelevant: from a certain perspective, they held the domestic balance of power in the 1850s. Mason’s recent biography of Edward Everett suggests the kind of work we need to illuminate the conservative Unionism that led men like Pierce and Buchanan to accommodate so much proslavery policy. But if we are to understand the origins and the goals of the policy itself, I think the emphasis must be on the slaveholders who formulated it.

A second and rather frail but I think honest justification for “giving short shrift to domestic politics” has to do with the shape of the existing historical literature on antebellum America and the origins of the Civil War. That literature is extremely large and overwhelmingly concerned with domestic partisanship and sectionalism. From the master narratives of Allan Nevins, David Potter, James McPherson, Michael Holt, John Ashworth, William Freehling, and Sean Wilentz, to the even more focused studies of the second party system and the sectional crisis—including Mason’s own work—domestic politics has rarely left center stage. Nor should it. Fundamentally, I see This Vast Southern Empire, and its focus on proslavery foreign policy, as a complement rather than a challenge to much of that scholarship.

That said, I do believe that the bulk of this existing literature, with its pronounced emphasis on domestic politics, has probably overstated southern anxieties and underrated southern confidence in the 1850s. This is a key point. Viewed from within the political boundaries of the United States, slaveholders were clearly on the defensive, even if their defensive strategy amounted to an bold effort to secure slavery in the West. But from an international perspective, things looked very different. Here is where the intellectual and ideological focus of the book’s “middle chapters,” as Sexton calls them, attempts to inform the political narrative at the end. Mason wonders why slaveholders like Jefferson Davis remained so devoted to U.S. national power, even in the teeth of the sectional crisis. For him, “a general expectation that slavery would win its global contest with free labor” does not seem sufficient.

Yet the book tries to make the case that southern international confidence was anything but vague or general. The primacy of slave-grown staples in global free trade, the apparent failure of emancipation in the Caribbean, the rise of coercive imperial labor systems, the transatlantic advances of racial science: for slaveholding elites, these trends were tangible and significant. Collectively, they boosted the southern belief that antislavery politics, in the North as in Europe, was not modernity’s final destination, but merely a passing storm. I agree with Mason that we need to know more about exactly how slaveholders like Davis expected to maintain their power over the state through domestic politics. But the argument of This Vast Southern Empire is that those investigations should begin with the premise—not present in much previous scholarship—that the domestic calculations of men like Davis were framed by a confident belief that their slave system was on the right side of modern world history.

Of course, as the Civil War demonstrated persuasively, it wasn’t. So what was the longer-running legacy of the foreign policy of slavery? I think Shinn is right to characterize my epilogue, framed around W.E.B. Du Bois’s address on “Jefferson Davis as a Representative of Civilization,” as speculative rather than definitive, or “more rhetorical than analytical.” Certainly Du Bois’s speech is a brilliant piece of rhetoric rather than detailed analysis. His later and much more analytical treatment of this history, in Black Reconstruction, stresses not continuity but rupture, with the Civil War eventually leading to the triumph of a “new capitalism,” led by “a new industrial oligarchy” in the North. My own interpretive opinion leans closer to this view.

Nevertheless, I think there is something worth holding onto inside the young Du Bois’s rhetoric. In some larger sense, Du Bois’s point is not about influence but essence: Jefferson Davis may not have directly inspired the late nineteenth-century Age of Empire, but he did embody many of its core values. Indeed, Sexton’s own essay offers a range of highly illuminating parallels between the proslavery internationalists in This Vast Southern Empire and LaFeber’s Gilded Age imperialists. Although my book briefly mentions Alfred Thayer Mahan’s respect for the southern naval reformers of the 1850s, I had not thought to extend the comparison, which Sexton does convincingly, both in historiographical and historical terms. Perhaps it makes more sense to think about the problem this way—as a question of comparative history rather than direct influence. Theodore Roosevelt’s source of inspiration from the antebellum era was certainly not Jefferson Davis (although it may have been Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri). Yet the very structural similarities between Davis and Roosevelt that Sexton lays out—regarding the surprising power of the central state, the importance of British power, the role of the navy, and so on—seem worth considering.

In any case, my ultimate goal is not to trace the long-term influence of proslavery foreign policy. It is to retrieve the contemporary international ambitions of the slaveholding elite—large, confident, and terrible as they were—and to show what impact they had on the Civil War era itself. I hope This Vast Southern Empire has gone some distance toward that goal, and I thank all four commenters for helping push the conversation further down the road.

Notes:
SHAFR is celebrating its 50th anniversary at our annual meeting on June 22-24 in Arlington, Virginia. We hope all members will strongly consider attending the conference. There can no better demonstration of SHAFR’s vitality than the sheer intellectual energy, enthusiasm, and collegiality coursing through the hallways and meeting rooms of the annual meeting. This year’s conference will be held at the Renaissance Arlington Capitol View hotel, a lovely venue convenient to Washington, D.C.’s attractions.

We hope that members will also consider making a financial “thank-you” to SHAFR in honor of its 50 years of growth and success. Though the slogan “50 for 50” suggests a $50 gift, any amount, such as $5 from a graduate student, will be greatly appreciated. More generous gifts can, of course, go further toward building our organization’s future. SHAFR has for a half-century offered a vibrant and supportive intellectual home for its members. The organization aims to continue its influential work in promoting U.S. international history and the careers of its members. All contributions are tax-deductible.

Tim Borstelmann, Chair, SHAFR 50th Anniversary Celebration Committee
Frank Costigliola, Chair, SHAFR Development Committee
As I am writing to an audience of scholars who routinely look back over more than two centuries of U.S. diplomatic history I know I should not say this, but... It seems very long ago (1978-1981) that I was working on my MA thesis at the University of Utah. I chose what I thought was an interesting topic—the United States intervention in Haiti in 1915—and began my research. What my work revealed was a complicated picture of military intrigue, strategic maneuverings, questionable business dealings by U.S. banks and companies, and an American occupation that cost the lives of thousands of Haitians. The most surprising discovery of all, at least for me, was the role that racism played in the actions taken by the U.S. government. From President Woodrow Wilson, to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, and throughout the political, economic, and military officials who oversaw the intervention and occupation came a steady stream of appalling comments about the racial inferiority of the Haitian people—an inferiority that served as justification for the necessity of American intervention and guidance. The lowest point came when Secretary Bryan, after receiving an insightful briefing from an American businessman who was familiar with the island nation's history and culture, expressed his wonderment: “Dear me, think of it! Niggers speaking French.”

In retrospect, of course, I was simply being unbelievably naïve. I was fully aware of the racism that permeated American society during the so-called Progressive Era. In fact, it was anything but for the millions of African Americans who suffered daily doses of humiliation, discrimination, and brutal violence. The fact that I could not fully grasp the idea that domestic racism could bleed (quite literally, as things turned out) into the nation's foreign policy spoke volumes about my inability to see the interconnections between the domestic and the international aspects of America's history, as well as my unwillingness to consider the thought that the nation’s “best and brightest” would actually be infected with the same racist ideas that I normally associated with half-witted crackers wearing white sheets and pillow cases. Was it possible that race played an even larger and longer role in the history of U.S. foreign relations? As it turned out, this was the most complicated picture of all to emerge from my initial foray into in-depth research into the history of our nation’s diplomacy.

This essay examines the historiography of race and U.S. diplomatic history in three stages. The first looks at some of the earliest efforts to incorporate the issue of race into the study of America’s international relations. Many of these works gained little traction at the time of their publication, but they helped to establish the foundation for the second stage of scholarship. Starting in the 1980s and then exploding in the 1990s and early-2000s, research into race, racism, and U.S. foreign policy not only increased in terms of sheer volume but also in the ways in which the topic was approached and applied. In the last section of this essay I will summarize where we now stand in terms of the existing scholarship and posit some thoughts about topics and theories that we might most profitably explore in the future.

The starting point for so many historiographical essays (including some of my own) dealing with any aspect of U.S. diplomatic history has come to be Charles Maier’s 1980 piece that charged that the field was simply “marking time.” Instead of moving forward scholars of American diplomacy seemed content to work the same old archives, using the same old theories, and focused on the same old topics, unlike their colleagues in other fields who were busily incorporating all sorts of new sources, other fields of study, and approaches. In the past nearly-forty years the validity of Maier’s criticisms has been roundly debated, with some arguing that his points were far off the mark, while others somberly agreed that his observations should be taken to heart if we wished to save the field of U.S. diplomatic history from irrelevance and possible extinction on college campuses. In fact, there is merit in both sides of the divide and the field of race and U.S. foreign relations is a perfect example of how Maier got it right, and wrong.

While it has become popular to argue that Maier’s accusations motivated U.S. diplomatic historians to reach out to other fields and sources, an examination of the historiography of race and American foreign policy suggests that such an argument is a bit overstated. When many of us started writing about race and U.S. diplomacy in the 1980s and 1990s it did often feel as though we were breaking down old walls and moving our field away from the ossified study of “great (and always white) men” doing great things. Considering racism in the same light as economic, military, and political objectives promised to open the way to a more thorough (and relevant) understanding of the nation’s diplomacy.

Of course, we were mistaken about the magnitude of our trail breaking. In fact, whether knowingly or not, we were following in the footsteps of previous scholars whose own work in the field of race and U.S. diplomacy had never elicited the excitement and attention it deserved. (And so, although Maier went too far in arguing that diplomatic historians seemed stuck in neutral, he also accurately gauged the resistance of the field to radically new approaches.) There is little doubt that some of the pioneering works failed to make much of a dent in the dominant historiography of the field. So, when Albert Weinberg argued in his 1935 book on Manifest Destiny that, at least in part, the racist outlooks of American settlers and government officials helped to fuel the nation’s continental and overseas expansion during the 19th century, reviewers virtually ignored Weinberg’s discussion of race. Only the giant of U.S. diplomatic history, Samuel Flagg Bemis, mentioned the impact of the “white man’s burden,” and then only to quickly dismiss its importance by declaring that “the unsatisfied reader may ask how the United States would ever have come to occupy a position from which the much-prized concept of world-leadership could be envisioned if it had not taken advantage of the manifest opportunity for expansion across a vacant continent to its present status as a world-power fronting on the two oceans.” Bemis thus brushed aside any relevance for racism; after all, how could racism serve as a motivating factor in taking over a “vacant continent”? He also made...
clear his annoyance with Weinberg’s foray into other fields of study: “the weaknesses result from a distressing sociological and philosophical technical pattern.” It was best to contain the study of diplomatic history within well-defined disciplinary boundaries.

In the decades that followed, however, other scholars continued to make a strong argument for the role of race. Picking up from Weinberg’s study, many of the works that appeared from the 1950s through the early-1980s focused on the 19th century, using race as an explanation for America’s westward expansion in the mid-1800s and its “imperial thrust” overseas in the late-1800s. Reginald Horsman, Richard Drinnon, Gary Nash, Roy Harvey Pearce, David Weber, and Gene Brack explored the racial component of Native American removal, Manifest Destiny, and the eventual war with Mexico in some depth.5 A smaller number of scholars turned their attention to early American contacts with the China and the Far East.6 Perhaps the most sustained effort came through the use of race to better understand U.S. overseas imperialism in the 1880s and 1890s. These studies employed American racial views to better understand the impetus for overseas expansion as well as the subsequent occupation of Cuba and the Filipino Insurrection.

A handful of scholars also began to raise the issue of the African American viewpoint during this tumultuous period, serving as some of the first scholarship to examine the African American voice in U.S. foreign policy.7

Examining the role of African Americans in the nation’s Cold War diplomacy proved to be one of the most important directions for the study of race and U.S. foreign policy. Metz’s work, for example, focused on the criticisms leveled against the Nixon administration’s policy toward South Africa by the Congressional Black Caucus.

Contemporary issues, particularly the growing Civil Rights Movement and the controversial Vietnam War, no doubt provoked much of this new interest in race and U.S. foreign policy. Judging by the articles appearing in its flagship journal, Diplomatic History, all of this had a limited impact on the field of U.S. diplomatic history. There were some notable exceptions, to be sure. Paul Gordon Lauren’s important study of race and U.S. actions at the Versailles Peace Conference appeared in the second volume of Diplomatic History in 1978 (as did Stuart Anderson’s piece on the racial component of the U.S. response to the Boer War) but by and large the scholarship on American foreign relations reduced the issue of race to a sidebar.8 Most of us might recall the U.S. history textbooks that appeared in the wake of many of the social movements from the 1960s and 1970s—civil rights and women’s rights in particular. The narrative of these texts remained largely unchanged, but in deference to the changing social environment they now included what I refer to as “sidebar history”—little boxes, set aside from the main text and almost always focused on the accomplishments of a single black American or woman. While the authors and editors of these volumes likely felt as though these efforts represented real breakthroughs, in truth they often served as vivid reminders of just how marginalized the stories of African Americans, women, members of various ethnic groups, workers, etc., were from the “main” themes of U.S. history. And so, to a large extent, it remained with the issue of race and American diplomacy: an interesting topic, to be sure, but not on the same level as the more traditional areas of focus—military power, political strategy, and economic aims.

Much of the reason for the marginalization of race as an important topic for scholars of U.S. diplomatic history had to do with the fact that nearly all of the works discussed so far focused on the 1800s, and by the 1980s and 1990s the nineteenth century was simply not a high agenda item for most researchers. The continental expansion of the 1800s was hardly deemed to be diplomatic history at all; even the sudden eruption, and then disappearance, of America’s overseas imperialism in the space of just a few years did not appear worthy of sustained scholarship. World War II, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War were the most attractive topics and did race really have a role when one was studying these? As things turned out, by focusing on the post-World War II period U.S. diplomatic historians from the mid-1980s through the early-2000s found the most fertile fields yet for utilizing race as a theoretical approach. And while some of this might fairly be attributed to Maier’s exhortations, it is also clear that much of this work was built on the foundations laid years before.

One topic that immediately attracted attention was the controversial U.S. relationship with the apartheid regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia. Thomas J. Noer was one of the first scholars to sketch out the racial components of that relationship in his 1985 book, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968. (In addition, Noer’s work also examined the American policies toward the continuation of European colonialism in Africa in the postwar period.) Other studies soon followed, including Stephen Metz’s analysis of the impact of the antiapartheid movement during the Nixon administration and Thomas Borstelmann’s in-depth look at the early years of U.S. policy toward South Africa.9 In many ways, this proved to be an ideal place to start, for the issue of apartheid and its ramifications for U.S. diplomacy brought into sharp focus many of the topics that would henceforth engage scholars: the links between domestic and international racial issues; the Cold War dilemma posed by America’s own racial problems; and the greater African American participation in U.S. foreign relations.

Examining the role of African Americans in the nation’s Cold War diplomacy proved to be one of the most important directions for the study of race and U.S. foreign policy. Metz’s work, for example, focused on the criticisms leveled against the Nixon administration’s policy toward South Africa by the Congressional Black Caucus. As noted earlier, this was not an entirely new area for research—scholars had already studied the African American reaction to late-19th century U.S. imperialism, and others extended the timeframe into the early-20th century by looking at the black response to the American intervention in Haiti, World War I, and Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia.10

Beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing to the present day, the study of the issue of African Americans and the Cold War resulted not simply in a vast new literature, but also provided a starting point for a way of reinterpreting the post-World War II conflict. Much of the previous work featuring African Americans and U.S. foreign policy depicted them as outsiders, condemned by American racism to be excluded from any meaningful participation in discussions about America’s role in the world. The newer scholarship, however, posited that the years after 1945 provided a unique opportunity for African Americans to utilize that very racism as a means by which they could simultaneously criticize a variety of U.S. policies abroad and gain support for the civil rights movement at home.

Many early studies on the African American voice in American diplomacy focused on individuals—Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois, for example—and this approach has continued since the 1980s with new works appearing on Du Bois, Josephine Baker, and Paul Robeson. These studies again portrayed their African American subjects as outsiders—Du Bois, Robeson, and Baker all suffered from being branded as “un-American” or, even
worse, communist, during the post-World War II period and were subjected to governmental investigations and persecution. Their criticisms of the U.S. government’s tacit support of the old European empires and its close relationship with the abhorrent South African regime made them suspect during the Second Red Scare and American officials made every effort they could to silence or at least marginalize them.11

Other studies, however, looked at African Americans who managed to work their way inside the foreign policy making bureaucracy. Ralph Bunche, who would win the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in trying to settle conflicts in the Middle East, was certainly the most notable figure. His career was also marked by controversy: starting out working with the Department of State Bunche ended his diplomatic work by serving in the United Nations after refusing to accept an appointment as an assistant secretary of state because he did not want to subject his children to life in segregated Washington, D.C. Despite Bunche’s action, the African American press and civil rights organizations consistently pushed the Department of State to take in more African Americans. Critical of what had long been referred to in the black press as the “lily-white club,” they now argued that having more African American diplomats would serve a dual purpose: helping the civil rights movement at home and sending a powerful message about America’s commitment to equality abroad. My own study of the struggle to integrate the Department of State and the Foreign Service noted some highlights—the appointment of the first African American ambassador, Edward R. Dudley, Sr., in 1949, and Carl Rowan’s rapid rise through the State to becoming director of the United States Information Agency—but concluded that bureaucratic resistance to increasing the number of black diplomats ultimately led to disappointing results.12

An important series of publications expanded the focus from individuals to African American organizations and their impact on U.S. foreign relations. In 1996 two significant works by Brenda Gayle Plummer and Penny M. Von Eschen appeared. Both scholars effectively argued that the African American involvement with U.S. foreign policy that began in the 1930s with vocal criticism of U.S. inaction in the face of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia served as a springboard for the sustained campaigns against colonialism, international racism, and the apartheid regime in South Africa carried out by groups such as the Council on African Affairs (which had as early members a diverse group of African Americans such as Du Bois, Robeson, Bunche, and Mary McLeod Bethune) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Carol Anderson focused her attention on the role of the NAACP in the human rights issues tackled by the United Nations in her 2003 book Eyes Off the Prize, and in her next book, Bourgeois Radicals, examined the important role played by the NAACP in the movement against colonialism in the post-war world.13

All of these studies, whether focused on key individuals or national organizations, made important points that would be further elaborated upon by other scholars. Of primary importance was their linking of the domestic struggle for civil rights and America’s Cold War foreign policy. In fact, for people such as Du Bois, organizations such as the NAACP, and for many black journalists, this was the key point: that America’s civil rights problem could no longer be contained within our national borders. The savage attacks on African Americans that dominated the headlines; the ugly incidents of discrimination in housing and schooling; and the quite obvious disenfranchisement of millions of black Americans became foreign policy liabilities. America’s “Achilles heel” as one U.S. official put it. Just as important, however, was the fact that America’s foreign policy decisions to give support to European colonial exploitation of people of color, to remain silent in the face of the horrors of apartheid in South Africa, and to ignore the warnings sounded at the Bandung Conference of 1955 that white domination would no longer be tolerated also had impacts at home as African Americans saw such actions as merely extensions of the racial bigotry they faced every day in the United States.

Soon, connections were being drawn between this new research into race, African Americans, and civil rights and the burgeoning fields of cultural and public diplomacy. Since America’s glaring race problem posed an embarrassing issue for the United States on the international stage it was natural that U.S. officials would use any and all weapons to counter this publicity—particularly since the Soviets were eager to play the race card as often as possible in their own propaganda. Soon, pamphlets, magazines, and documentaries were being shipped around the world, all declaring that the civil rights issue was nearly settled and that African Americans’ lives were improving on a daily basis. The highlight (or low point, depending on one’s perception) was the “Unfinished Business” exhibit at the 1958 World’s Fair in Brussels. This controversial exhibition was perhaps the most forthright effort on the part of the U.S. government to publicly deal with the race problem by admitting that a terrible situation existed (which was self-evident, given the fact that the ugly incidents over school desegregation at Little Rock, Arkansas had taken place just the year before), that the United States was making some incremental progress in dealing with the problem, and that the ultimate goal was, in fact, equality for all Americans. While Europeans were impressed by the exhibit’s truthfulness, back at home southern congressmen convinced President Eisenhower that the story being told in Brussels was certainly not their truth and demanded that “Unfinished Business” be shut down—which, after some bureaucratic hemming and hawing, was exactly what happened.16

Other works examined the role of African Americans as “cultural ambassadors.” Both State and the USIA utilized musicians, artists, sports figures, and writers to serve as living examples of the American commitment to both culture and racial equality. Substantial work, for example, has been done on African American jazz musicians. The musical Porgy & Bess, featuring its all black cast, became another mainstay of America’s cultural diplomacy. As Dorothy Bass has pointed out, “musical diplomacy” had two key points: “the U.S. government was the motive force and the justification for the project; second, it was presented as a means of promoting the American way of life.”17

Much more could be written about African Americans and their role in U.S. foreign policy (indeed, there’s an idea for another historiographical essay!), but suffice it to say that as important works by Mary L. Dudziak, Thomas Borstelmann, Brenda Gayle Plummer, and others appeared in the early-2000s that began to synthesize the explosion of research that had taken place since the mid-1980s about black Americans, civil rights, and American diplomacy, it was clear that an important benchmark had been reached in terms of the still-developing field of race and U.S. foreign relations. While this important sub-field continued to grow and expand into a variety of areas of research, it also served to spur investigation into some older topics and new directions. Recent works, such as Eric Love’s Race Over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-1900 and Paul Kramer’s The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, & the Philippines, provide useful re-examinations of race and American empire-building in the late-19th century. Other scholars, such as Laura Briggs, have demonstrated that American concepts of race and gender often worked hand in hand in building the U.S. empire. Looking even farther back in the 19th century, Thomas Hietala, Brian DeLay, and others have provided striking reinterpretations of Manifest Destiny, the destruction of Native Americans,
We need to continue to push our research both backwards and forward. While the Cold War period certainly provided very fertile soil for the burst of studies on race and U.S. diplomacy, in order to maintain the relevance of the field we must continue to look back at the origins of American racism and chart its development and application to foreign policy.

A series of work appearing in the past few years has accepted that challenge by focusing on race as a manifestation of power relationships and centering their studies on the issue of how notions of white supremacy were central to U.S. foreign policymaking in the post-World War II period. Gerald Horne’s 1999 article in Diplomatic History was an important step in the development of this line of thinking. Horne carefully surveyed the ideological and intellectual framework upon which white Americans constructed their racial worldviews and in so doing turned the spotlight away from the anti-approach to racism (anti-African American, anti-Chinese, etc.) to the pro-white aspect. In approaching whiteness and white supremacy as essential components of the foreign policy outlook of U.S. officials, Horne provided an alternative way of understanding the role of racism—not simply as an irrational fear of the other, but as a tightly constructed ideology that viewed white supremacy as a key element in retaining power and control. Other scholars have adopted many of the basic tenets of Horne’s argument, including George White, Jr. in his study of U.S. policies toward Africa during the Eisenhower years, and Robert Vitalis’s recent book that examines the work of African American intellectuals in battling against the dominant views of racism, imperialism, and white supremacy that held sway among the foreign policy elites in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century.

Although this essay, in many ways, barely scratches the surface of the many important works appearing on the topic of race and U.S. foreign policy it is certainly clear that this field of study is dynamic and has staked out a significant role in the history of American foreign relations. Articles on race now appear with some regularity in the pages of Diplomatic History. The question that confronts us now, however, is where do we go from here? In the last section of this piece I would like to suggest four ways we can maintain the field as an important part of the study of U.S. diplomacy while simultaneously pushing beyond the boundaries of an already impressive body of literature.

First, we need to continue to push our research both backwards and forward. While the Cold War period certainly provided very fertile soil for the burst of studies on race and U.S. diplomacy, in order to maintain the relevance of the field we must continue to look back at the origins of American racism and chart its development and application to foreign policy. We already have a strong base of studies that focus on relations with Native Americans, westward expansion and the Mexican War, and late-19th century imperialism. However, nearly all of these studies focus on racism as a role in fomenting or justifying conflict. If we wish to make the argument that racism is a sustained element of the nation’s diplomacy we need to examine race in the broader context of all facets of America’s international relations. In addition, we should also push forward, utilizing race as a means to understand post-Cold War American diplomacy. When I was asked to do a piece on race and U.S. foreign policy during the Obama years my first reaction was to wonder what a historian might contribute. However, in confronting the notion of a “post-racial America,” I found a new and important relevance for my work on earlier periods of U.S. foreign policy. Again, if we wish to maintain the relevance of the field, we need to assure the larger public that race and foreign policy is a topic that is not an historical artifact or oddity but a continuing part of the nation’s international relations.

Second, we need to move beyond the fruitful work done on African Americans and U.S. foreign policy to examine the roles played by other American minorities. There has already been some initial research into the Chicano voice such as Rodolfo O. de la Garza’s study of the Chicano impact on U.S. relations with Mexico and Lorena Oropeza’s recent examination of Chicano involvement in the antiwar protests of the Vietnam War. More is needed on this particular population (the fastest growing minority group in the United States), Asian Americans, and—particularly relevant to today’s world—Middle Eastern Americans. As these groups continue to grow in size and power we will doubtless see, as we did with African Americans, a demand for greater participation in and influence on the nation’s foreign policies.

Third, the field of race and U.S. diplomacy must look to internationalize as much as possible. This can be done in several ways. We can examine the ways in which...
American views on race intertwined with the racial views of other nations. For example, Travis J. Hardy’s recent article in *Diplomatic History* pointed out some interesting ways in which racism—both from the U.S. and Australian sides—served as part of the ideological glue holding the two nations together during World War II. In addition, we need to better incorporate the work being done by other scholars on race, racism, and foreign policy in other nations. Philip E. Muehlenbeck’s edited volume on race and the Cold War that appeared in 2012 contained pieces that detailed the interconnections between race and foreign policy in South Africa, Panama, Papua, Portuguese Guinea, the Soviet Union, the Congo, and Cuba and Angola. This scholarship not only enlightens our understanding of race and America’s foreign relations, but also offers valuable opportunities for comparative histories.

Finally, we should be aware of and incorporate other theoretical perspectives into our work. To cite but one example that recently attracted my attention, the field of settler colonialism seems to me to provide a wealth of valuable insights that might be put to use. Through positing that racism is not merely a way in which white Americans view others, or simply serves as a justification for power, Hixson concludes that for American “settlers,” the racist annihilation of other cultures was a necessary prerequisite for white American settlement and imperialism. Instead of focusing on racist speeches and writings by U.S. officials and leaders of society, Hixson claims that the American people (the settlers) did not need to be led to racism by the state; they fully embraced their own racial superiority and the belief in the necessity to eliminate other races and cultures so that their own race might thrive. Such an interpretation certainly helps to explain the sheer brutality of American expansion, whether directed at Native Americans, Mexicans, or Filipinos. But it also helps us move racism to the central position it has always held in American history, instead of reducing it to an embarrassing “blot” that the nation has consistently (and, according to the dominant narrative, largely successfully) eliminated. Unfortunately, Hixson’s study ends with the imperial surge of the late-19th century, but another volume dealing with settler colonialism provides us with interesting views of how it continued throughout the twentieth century. *Forms of United States Colonialism*, edited by Alyosha Goldstein, contains a wealth of valuable essays that take us from the nineteenth century treatment of Native Americans and Mexicans, to the 1900s where settler colonialism continues its destructive force in areas such as American Samoa, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and contemporary Native American societies.

These suggestions hardly exhaust the possibilities for future research into the field of race and U.S. diplomacy. And, to be sure, there is still a great deal of scholarship that is needed on the topics that have been covered in the past eight decades. We have most certainly progressed quite far from Bemis’s off-handed dismissal of race as some kind of “distressing sociological and philosophical technical patter.” In fact, it might be argued that we made more progress than some of our related disciplines. Just a short time ago, in 2008, Wendy Theodore wondered when her field of international relations would move more fully to address “the elephant in the room”—race. As she lamented, “why is race—or racism, racial subordination, race relations, and so forth—also on the margins of a discipline charged with making sense of international relations forged through issues of race?” Nevertheless, we should not rest on our laurels. Given the forces gathering power both here in the United States and abroad, we must do whatever we can as scholars to ensure that the larger public understands both the historical impact of racism on international relations but also its potential for even greater destruction in the future.

Notes:
3. I particularly remember the excitement I felt when I was asked to participate in a special symposium on African Americans and U.S. foreign relations for *Diplomatic History* 1996. It featured articles by Carol Anderson, Helen Lavell and Scott Lucas, and myself, together with commentary by Gerald Horne, Penny M. Von Eschwege, and Brenda Gayle Plummer (*Diplomatic History* 20:4 (Fall 1996): 531-650. Working with this amazing group of scholars remains one of the highlights of my professional career.


The conference also will feature a Thursday afternoon panel moderated by SHAFR President Mary L. Dudziak entitled, “Can Law Restrain War?” Participants include:

- **Rosa Brooks**, Professor of Law, Georgetown University  
  *Author of How Everything Became War and The Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon*

- **Jack Goldsmith**, Henry L. Shattuck Professor, Harvard Law School  
  *Author of The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration*

- **Helen M. Kinsella**, Associate Professor in Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison  
  *Author of The Image Before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction Between Combatant and Civilian*

- **John Fabian Witt**, Allen H. Duffy Class of 1960 Professor of Law, Yale Law School  
  *Author of Lincoln's Code: The Laws of War in American History*

The presidential luncheon address will be delivered by SHAFR President Mary L. Dudziak, Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law. The lecture will be entitled “‘You didn’t see him lying...beside the gravel road in France’: Death and the History of American War Powers.” Tickets for the Presidential and Keynote Luncheons will be sold separately at $50 standard or $25 for students, adjunct faculty, and K-12 teachers. The reduced-price luncheon tickets are available for both Friday and Saturday, but will be limited to one per person.

Printed program booklets and registration forms will be mailed out to all SHAFR members with a current domestic U.S. address prior to the conference. Online registration, including luncheon and social event tickets, will be available in early April. Registration fees for the 2017 conference are $100 standard and $40 student, adjunct faculty, or K-12 teacher. After June 1, 2015, fees increase to $120/$55.
This year’s Friday night social event will be a seafood feast on the gorgeous East Pier at National Harbor catered by Foster’s Clambake. We hope you will be able to join us for a full meal and complimentary beer/wine/soda bar. Vegetarian and vegan options will be available. Tickets are $50 standard or $30 for students, adjunct faculty, and K-12 teachers. Round-trip chartered bus tickets will be available for separate purchase.

Hotel Venue Information

The LEED-certified Renaissance Arlington Capital View is located at 2800 South Potomac Avenue, two miles from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (airport code DCA). There is complimentary hotel shuttle service every 20 minutes between 7 am and 11 pm to DCA and the Crystal City Metro (blue and yellow lines). In the lobby, SOCCI Urban Italian Kitchen and Bar serves breakfast, lunch, and dinner, while Espressamente illy Coffee House serves coffee and light fare during the day. A 24-hour fitness center and heated indoor pool are also available on site, and there is complimentary wi-fi access in the lobby.

The Renaissance Arlington Capital View is ADA compliant. All meeting spaces will be held on one level and are accessible via elevators (these elevators are connected to the lobby level and guest rooms). There are a total of eight ADA king rooms, three of which have a roll-in shower/shower chair. In addition, eighteen king rooms are hearing accessible. Please contact the conference coordinator if you have any other questions regarding accessibility.

Conference room rates are $165/night, single or double occupancy, plus tax. The tax rate is currently 13%. Hotel guests will receive complimentary high-speed internet access in their rooms. On-site parking is available for the reduced rate of $18 per day self-park or $20/day valet.

Hotel reservations can be made by calling 1(800) 228-9290 and mentioning “SHAFR 2017,” or by going online to https://goo.gl/hKdPyC. The deadline for receiving the conference rate is June 1, 2017. The hotel is required to honor the reduced rate until this date OR until all the rooms in the SHAFR block have been booked. Once the block is fully booked, the hotel will offer rooms at its usual rate, if any are available, or may even be completely full. Please make your reservation as early as you can.
Other Conference News

Look for announcements coming soon about a unique opportunity to engage in legal research training in coordination with the Library of Congress. We are pleased that the Library of Congress will also host a table at our book exhibit this year!

New this year: a hospitality suite for nursing mothers will be available throughout conference. See the SHAFR 2017 webpage for more information as well as links to childcare resources in the area.

Looking to cut down on conference attendance costs? The Coordinating Council for Women in History (CCWH) offers support for finding a roommate. People interested in taking advantage of this opportunity should contact the CCWH-SHAFR Liaison Ilaria Scaglia at scaglia_ilaria@columbusstate.edu (subject line: SHAFR roommate).

Volunteers wanted! Julie Laut, Conference Coordinator, is looking for volunteers to offer three hours of their time at the conference in exchange for a registration fee waiver. Email her at the address below for more information.

It’s not too soon to indicate your interest in the SHAFR 2017 Job Workshop as a mentor or a mentee. Email Julie to get your name on the list now!

Questions?

For more details about conference arrangements, visit https://shafr.org/conferences/annual/2017-annual-meeting or follow us on Twitter @SHAFRConference. For questions about registration and other conference logistics, please contact Julie Laut, Conference Coordinator, at conference@shafr.org.
Woodrow Wilson and World War I

Lloyd E. Ambrosius

Recent scholarship on Woodrow Wilson and World War I has both contributed to and benefited from two major developments in historiography since the end of the Cold War. The first was the establishment of the field of world history, which offered new perspectives on the past as well as the present in this era of globalization. The second was the internationalization of the study of American history, which placed the United States in the broader context of transnational or global history. Historians of U.S. foreign relations, including those focusing on Woodrow Wilson and World War I, embraced these two developments in their scholarship. They sought to escape America-centric or Eurocentric interpretations, which were based on an unexamined premise that exalted the West and its civilization over other regions and cultures of the world and judged the West to be inherently more important to global history.

In Navigating World History (2003), Patrick Manning, one of the pioneers in the field of world history, described how he and others created a global past and made it a significant part of historical studies. In particular, he examined Western ideas about world history and traced their origins to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment in early modern Europe. During the nineteenth century, Europeans further developed a philosophy of history that placed Western civilization at its center. They privileged Western cultural values and institutions over those of other peoples elsewhere in the world. “In the emerging hierarchy of empires, nations, and colonies,” Manning observed, “the term civilization became part of the vocabulary of every philosophical camp. The term served as a double-edged weapon for confirming the primacy of European (and later, North American) nations in the world order. . . . For modern times, civilization meant the civilized world, including the leading nations and imperial homelands but not the colonies.”

As Manning recognized, Wilson adopted this Western perspective on American and world history, both as a historian and as president during the First World War, and expressed it in his nationalism and his internationalism. He was a historian who “participated actively in the nationalistic style of writing about American history,” and then “became a theorist for a new world order once he became president and a leader of the Allied war effort”; and “his vision of the League of Nations contributed, in the minds of some, to the notion of world government.” But like others who developed the idea of governing the world, he thought of this new international order from a Western viewpoint.

Manning emphasized that scholars in the new field of world history approached their subject from a fundamentally different perspective from that of Wilson and other Western leaders in the twentieth century, who embraced the historical tradition they had inherited from the nineteenth century. Contemporary world historians, in contrast, recognized much greater diversity among historical actors. “The logic of world history,” Manning wrote, “while reliant on the facts as they are known, leads inevitably instead to a multiplicity of interpretations. Thus, writers a century ago chose to focus on ‘civilization’ as the basic concept in world history, and attempted to write master narratives focused on this concept. . . . By the opening of the twenty-first century, civilization had ceased to be an absolute standard. It maintained its significance, but, like everything else in world history, civilization had to be relativized.”

Historians of the First World War have increasingly interpreted it within the framework of world history and have eschewed a single national viewpoint in favor of the perspective of international and transnational history. In The Cambridge History of the First World War (2014), edited by Jay Winter, the authors interpreted the war as both global and total, affecting all aspects of the state and civil society. Other historians also adopted this approach in their studies of the war and postwar peacemaking. Hew Strachan noted in The First World War (2001) that too many British military historians had still not broken the bounds of Anglocentricism, even though “the First World War was global from its outset.” Accordingly, he reduced his book’s focus on the Western Front and expanded its coverage of other areas throughout the world. Likewise, Margaret MacMillan recognized the global scope of peacemaking in Paris 1919 (2001). “The peacemakers of 1919” she observed, “believed they were working against time. They had to draw new lines on the maps of Europe, just as their predecessors had done in Vienna, but they also had to think of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. . . . If they could, they had to create an international order that would make another Great War impossible.”

Niall Ferguson’s The War of the World (2006) made the same point. He placed the Great War in the global framework of the fifty years of warfare that included the First and Second World Wars. In 1900, European empire-states dominated much of the world, but by the mid-twentieth century they had collapsed, resulting in the relative decline of the West. Even the apparent victors in the world wars lost their empires and thus their status as great imperial powers. “It is only when the extent of Western dominance in 1900 is appreciated that the true narrative arc of the twentieth century reveals itself,” Ferguson argued. “This was not ‘the triumph of the West,’ but rather the crisis of the European empires, the ultimate result of which was the inexorable revival of Asian power and the descent of the West. . . . This was nothing less than the reorientation of the world, redressing a balance between East and West that had been lost in the four centuries after 1500. No historian of the twentieth century can afford to overlook this huge—and ongoing—secular shift.”

In The Wilsonian Moment (2007), Erez Manela examined Wilson’s role in the process of decolonization that shifted the global balance between East and West. Changing the focal point, Manela sought “to reconstruct the story of the colonial world at the Wilsonian moment” by removing “the Eurocentric lens through which the international history of 1919 . . . has most often been viewed.” He noted that “most historians have told the story of the Paris Peace Conference from the inside out, focusing on the views and actions of the leaders of the great powers of Europe and North America.” He aimed “to tell it from the outside in, from the perspectives of peoples who were on the margins.
of the peace conference and of international society more generally.” Wilson’s universal rhetoric promised those nations self-determination, but he never intended to break up the empires of the victorious Allies. Ironically, he was not ready for the Wilsonian moment. The resulting disillusionment in countries such as Egypt, India, China, and Korea fed an anti-colonial nationalism that rejected his pro-Western liberal internationalism. World history took a different direction from the one he had heralded.

Adam Tooze’s *The Deluge* (2014) also adopted the framework of world history in examining America’s role in remaking the global order during and after the Great War. He emphasized the influence of American exceptionalism on Wilson’s vision of a new international order and on U.S. foreign policy more generally. Americans were not alone in believing that their nation had an exceptional destiny, but, as Tooze stressed, “what was remarkable in the wake of World War I was the degree to which American exceptionalism emerged strengthened and more vocal than ever, precisely at the moment when all other major states were coming to acknowledge their condition as one of interdependence and relativity.” For Wilson and other American statesmen, “it was their sense of America’s God-given, exemplary role that they sought to impose on the world.”

Tooze also pointed out what he called “the central irony of the early twentieth century”—an irony that he described as “the red thread” running through his book: progressives were committed to preserving, not repudiating, the continuity of American and world history. “At the hub of the rapidly evolving, American-centred world system there was a polity wedded to a conservative vision of its own future. Not for nothing did Wilson describe his goal in defensive terms, as one of making the world safe for democracy.”

Tooze observed, too, that just as the United States was emerging as the preeminent global power, others began to advocate alternative forms of internationalism that challenged Wilsonianism, the liberal internationalism that expressed American exceptionalism. Presidents such as Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan had asserted that the United States was a providential nation with a unique history and mission. In the new era of globalization after the Cold War, Reagan’s widely shared belief in American exceptionalism continued to shape how the United States defined its place in the world.

Internationalizing American history involved comparisons between the United States and other nations and required a reexamination of the popular and scholarly claims of American exceptionalism. Presidents such as Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan had asserted that the United States was a providential nation with a unique history and mission. In the new era of globalization after the Cold War, Reagan’s widely shared belief in American exceptionalism continued to shape how the United States defined its place in the world.

Alan Dawley sought to internationalize American history in *Changing the World* (2003). He placed early twentieth-century progressivism in the context of the Great War and revolutions in Mexico and Russia. “For American progressives,” he observed, “there was no escaping these world-historical events, and from that time forward, the dual quest for improvement at home and abroad was at the heart of what it meant to be a progressive.” Dawley made Wilson the central figure in his book and examined how others viewed and interacted with him. “It was the first American moment in world affairs,” he wrote, “and it was no coincidence that the first world leader to come from the United States was also the preeminent progressive in the country.” Progressives offered a “new internationalism” that rejected balance-of-power politics in favor of making the world safe for democracy and peace and creating a “world consciousness.” Empire and reform—or imperialism and progressivism—went together during this era, but Dawley generally exonerated Wilson of imperial ambitions. In his view, the president’s wartime statecraft laid the foundation for America’s future role in international relations. Oddly enough, however, while seeking to internationalize American history, Dawley did not escape a nationalist bias in his scholarship. He ignored outstanding books on Wilson written by foreign historians, including Klaus Schwabe, Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, and John A. Thompson.

In *Reforming the World* (2010), Ian Tyrrell examined “the creation of America’s moral empire” during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era by Christian churches and missionaries and by other organized reformers who wanted to transform the world. He eschewed the American exceptionalism that Wilson, both as historian and president, had epitomized. “While moral reform networks and missionaries did contribute at times to specific policy outcomes,” he observed, “these were usually determined by realpolitik. Rather than determine statecraft, the Christian coalition contributed to a missionary and reformist *Weltanschauung* within the higher echelons of American politics.” Wilson’s vision of a new world order came out of this transnational—but particularly Anglo-American—liberal culture of progressive reform.

Historians of U.S. foreign relations not only pioneered the new international and transnational direction in American historiography, they also crossed the artificial boundaries between subfields of American history. The breaking down of national borders and disciplinary boundaries yielded new insights into Wilson’s statecraft and diplomacy during the First World War era, notably with respect to religion and race. His beliefs as an Anglo-American Protestant from the South shaped his understanding of Americanism, and thus his foreign policies. Throughout the history of the
United States, religion and race intertwined as key factors in the nation's identity and consequently in its international relations. Until recently, however, most diplomatic historians have not integrated religion or race into their interpretations of U.S. foreign relations.

Andrew Preston heralded “the religious turn in diplomatic history.” In Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith (2012), he examined the role of religion in American war and diplomacy throughout the history of U.S. foreign relations. He noted that, during World War I, American “religious leaders, and through them their congregations, invested America's role in the war with transcendent meaning and millennial yearning. They provided the moral platform from which the United States would launch a new world order.”

Wilson articulated this redemptive vision of global reform, although he did not originate it. “Independently of the world’s covenants for various groups such as debating societies. They “served a number of functions: they brought order and rationality to anarchic conditions; they promoted the cause of democracy through political debate and emphasized the Christian duty to perform good works; and they could be applied to virtually any sphere of human endeavor—even to affairs of the heart or to the setting of goals for a career in politics.” Naturally, Wilson expressed this worldview in creating the League of Nations.

Walter A. McDougall also emphasized the religious factor in U.S. foreign relations in Promised Land, Crusader State (1997). In his chapter on Wilsonianism, he noted the president’s promise of peace through the redemption of the old world and observed that it was a greatly exaggerated promise that the United States could not possibly fulfill after World War I. “As a blueprint for world order,” McDougall concluded, “Wilsonianism has always been a chimera, but as an ideological weapon against ‘every arbitrary power anywhere,’ it has proved mighty indeed. And that, in the end, is how Wilson did truly imitate Jesus. He brought not peace but a sword.”

In contrast to diplomatic historians who wrote before “the religious turn,” theologians and historians of religion recognized early on the importance of Christianity in Wilson's private and public life and viewed him through that lens. Like them, I noted in Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition (1987) the crucial role of the president’s faith in shaping his vision of a new world order. The Social Gospel profoundly influenced his worldview. As a Calvinist Presbyterian, he hoped the League of Nations, whose founding document he called the Covenant and whose headquarters he wanted to locate in John Calvin's Geneva, would enable the world to move progressively into the kingdom of God on earth, as Social Gospel theologian George D. Herron proclaimed and Wilson affirmed during World War I. After the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, when the president presented the Versailles Treaty, including the Covenant, to the Senate, he called for its ratification to enable the United States to fulfill its God-given destiny. He believed that Divine Providence had guided him and the nation through the war and the postwar peacemaking, and he wanted the United States to join the League of Nations to fulfill its redemptive mission in the world.

Thomas J. Knock also observed the impact of Wilson’s religion on his quest for a new world order. In To End All Wars (1991), he noted that “the central influence of Wilson’s early personal development was his upbringing in a Presbyterian household.” His father, Dr. Joseph Ruggles Wilson, was a prominent Presbyterian pastor in the South. By the nineteenth century, “American Presbyterians had expanded the idea of the covenant to account for their perception of a special relationship between the United States and Providence; the new nation, they believed, would prosper as long as it remained righteous. Dr. Wilson embraced this concept, along with another—one that held that the nations of the world also were administered in harmony with God’s moral law. This ‘theology of politics’ constituted a comprehensive scheme in which the individual, the church, society, and the nations of the world were all properly juxtaposed in the firmament.”

From his boyhood on, having absorbed this theological viewpoint, Woodrow Wilson drafted constitutions or covenants for various groups such as debating societies. They “served a number of functions: they brought order and rationality to anarchic conditions; they promoted the cause of democracy through political debate and emphasized the Christian duty to perform good works; and they could be applied to virtually any sphere of human endeavor—even to affairs of the heart or to the setting of goals for a career in politics.” Naturally, Wilson expressed this worldview in creating the League of Nations.

In What the World Should Be (2008), Malcolm D. Magee placed religion at the core of Wilson’s faith-based foreign policy. The thesis of this book,” he wrote, “is that the future president was immersed in a particular Princeton and Southern Presbyterian tradition that he absorbed, quite literally, at the knees of his father, Joseph Ruggles Wilson, his devout mother, Janet Woodrow Wilson, and the religiously active clergy, family, and friends he was surrounded by from his youth onward. This tradition and these influences shaped the way Woodrow Wilson perceived the world.” Unlike many modern historians, the president did not distinguish between secular and religious aspects of life. Wilson believed the United States was divinely chosen to do God’s will on earth. This allowed him to blend even more seamlessly the central elements of his faith with those of his mission in politics. Thus, during World War I, he pursued a new world order. “For Wilson, this war was still about peace. It was still about a new order. He continued to believe that America was above the fray even as American soldiers were killing and dying in Europe.” As a “messianic crusader,” he thought he could lead the world into a new era of peace with the creation of the League of Nations.

Mark Benbow also emphasized the religious factor in Wilson’s diplomacy. In Leading Them to the Promised Land (2010), he interpreted the president’s response to the Mexican Revolution as an expression of his covenant theology. Wilson imagined various relationships as covenants among members of a particular group. He was convinced that the United States had emerged as a nation-state in this manner and that all viable nations either had done or should do the same. He interpreted the revolutionary events in Mexico in this light and consequently assigned himself the duty of nurturing developments there and judging which Mexican leader could best fulfill that nation’s destiny as he conceived of it. Within his own framework, which he took as the norm for how nations should behave and relate to each other, Wilson intervened in Mexico while believing he was adhering to non-intervention. He expected the Mexican government to conform to the same test for legitimacy that he believed the United States had passed.

Milan Babik also traced the origins of Wilson’s liberal internationalism to his Christianity. In Statecraft and Salvation (2013), he recognized not only the obvious religious references but also the underlying assumptions in Wilson’s thinking. In doing so, he made a contribution not only
to the religious turn in the historiography of U.S. foreign relations but also to international relations (IR) theory in political science. He observed that in the attempt to make their field scientific, IR scholars often defined concepts in such a way as to exclude religion from consideration. Early “realists” such as E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgenthau understood the eschatological dimensions of Wilson’s liberal internationalism, but recent political scientists overlooked their insight. Thus the common definition of “realism” in recent IR theory became such an artificial creation that it bore almost no resemblance to the realist perspective of Carr, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau, among others.28

Beyond this reconsideration of IR theory, Babik contributed to intellectual history by placing America’s, and particularly Wilson’s, liberal internationalism within a long tradition that went back to “manifest destiny” in the nineteenth century and to the Puritans in the seventeenth. Other scholars had made this connection, but Babik traced this lineage in an original way by connecting it with the secularization debate. Later generations of scholars perceived Wilsonian liberal internationalism as essentially secular, whereas it was actually a secularized eschatology with religious origins.29

Some of Wilson’s biographers emphasized the influence of Wilson’s Christianity on his statecraft and diplomacy. A. Scott Berg observed the centrality of his faith in all aspects of his life. He used religious terms for all chapter titles in Wilson (2013). He observed that “the Wilson Cabinet of 1913 was a ten-way mirror, each panel of which reflected a different aspect of the man at the center. This was mostly a team of Rebels—lawyers from the South who had pursued other professions and never shed their Confederate biases, Anglo-Saxon Protestants all, mostly newcomers to Washington, if not politics altogether. . . . Every decision from this administration, noted one close observer, would contain a moral component, inspired by ‘the breath of God.’” Berg also emphasized that after the United States entered the Great War, Wilson hoped “to carry the ‘Gospel of Americanism’ to every corner of the globe.”30

Similarly, Richard Striner argued in Woodrow Wilson and World War I (2014) that we cannot deny “the religious heart of Wilson’s sensibility” and that “Wilson’s brand of Christianity was heavily (and perhaps unusually) millennial.” French premier Georges Clemenceau may have gone too far when he sneered that the president thought of himself as another Jesus Christ. “And yet,” Striner stressed, “since the very beginning of the war, he had felt that he himself might be destined by God to play the central role in putting an end to the horror: he himself would find a way to create the new dispensation.” Viewing himself as God’s agent to redeem the world left the president no option but to pursue his vision of a new world order during the war and the postwar peacemaking. “With Wilson being the stubborn and delusional man he had become by the final months of 1918,” Striner concluded, “what good would the presence of leading Republicans in the American delegation have done? Wilson, being Wilson, was his own worst enemy in ways that were far beyond retrieval. Any blunders he committed were the latest missteps in a very long series that were leading him, his country, and the world to disaster.”31 At the peace conference and in the subsequent fight with the Republican-controlled Senate over the Versailles Treaty, particularly the League of Nations, the president refused to compromise his core principles, as he believed that these expressed not just his will but God’s will for the world.

In sharp contrast to these recent interpretations, which emphasized the influence of Wilson’s Christianity on his statecraft and diplomacy, John Milton Cooper, Jr. argued in his biography, Woodrow Wilson (2009), that the president “practiced a severe separation not only between church and state but also between religion and society.” Cooper claimed that Wilson was not “a secular messiah or a naïve, woolly-headed idealist” but “one of the most careful, hardheaded, and sophisticated idealists of his time.” He led the United States into the Great War as a shrewd statesman, not as a crusader for democracy in a new world order. “Wilson spoke the language of exalted idealism, but he did it in a humble, circumspect way. . . . He did not say that Americans must make the world safe for democracy; he did not believe that they could. They could only do their part, join with other like-minded nations, and take steps toward that promised land.”32 Under Wilson’s leadership, in Cooper’s view, the United States sought to reach the “promised land” as a member of an international community working for progressive reform of the world, not as an exceptionalist redeemer nation.

Historians of U.S. foreign relations have also recently begun to integrate race into their interpretations. I noted the racial factor in Wilson’s diplomacy during the drafting of the League of Nations Covenant at the Paris Peace Conference in Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition (1987). American and British delegates rejected racial equality and resisted Japan’s efforts to affirm this principle. They ensured that the League could not jeopardize white supremacy in their countries by opening their empires to nonwhite immigration. As a substitute for colonial annexation, they also agreed to establish a new system of League mandates that would allow the British Empire to expand into former territories of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and into former colonies of the German Empire in Africa and Pacific islands.33 In Power and Prejudice (1988), Paul Gordon Lauren focused on the politics and diplomacy of racial discrimination in international history. He confirmed that Wilson and his closest adviser, Edward M. House, joined the British delegates in rejecting Japan’s attempts in Paris to amend the Covenant to affirm racial equality in the new League. “The factor that seemed to hurt the Japanese most,” he observed, was “the failure on the part of those from the West even to appreciate the importance of their efforts to secure agreement on the principle of racial equality.”34

Other historians have also focused on the color line in U.S. foreign relations during the First World War era.35 They too recognized that Wilson’s diplomacy expressed his understanding of democracy in the United States: it was reserved for white Americans in accordance with Jim Crow racial segregation that the South had established since the end of Reconstruction after the Civil War. Thus, under Wilson’s leadership, Jim Crow shaped both the national and international agenda of the United States.
president, a southerner, had impeded the cause at home, and had shown little inclination to provide for black America the democracy he was determined to provide for the rest of the world.” African Americans, like the Japanese at the peace conference and colonial peoples elsewhere in the world, eventually learned once more that Wilsonianism, despite its ostensibly universal principles, still left them on the other side of the global color line.

As Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds emphasized in Drawing the Global Colour Line (2008), white men in the British Empire and the United States excluded nonwhite peoples from the freedom and equality that Anglo-American liberalism presumably affirmed for all peoples. “The project of whiteness was thus a paradoxical politics,” Lake and Reynolds explained, “at once transnational in inspiration and identifications but nationalist in its methods and goals. The imagined community of white men was transnational in its reach, but nationalist in its outcomes, bolstering regimes of border protection and national sovereignty.” White men like Wilson and Jan Smuts of South Africa restricted democracy to themselves. “In the figure of the white man, the imperialist became a democrat and the democrat an imperialist.”

Paul A. Kramer and Erez Manela offered keen insights into Wilson's concept of national self-determination, a key tenet of Wilsonianism. He approached the peacemaking in 1919 from the perspective he had developed on the Philippines. After the Spanish-American War of 1898, he favored annexation of the Philippines as a U.S. colony, even though this imperial pursuit led to the Philippine-American War. In The Blood of Government (2006), Kramer observed that advocates of that war “subsumed U.S. history within longer, racial trajectories of Anglo-Saxon history that folded together U.S. and British imperial histories... Americans, as Anglo-Saxons, shared Britons’ racial genius for empire-building, a genius that they must exercise for the greater glory of the ‘race’ and to advance civilization in general.”

Wilson, however, along with Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, began to recognize both the costs of empire and the liberal dilemma posed by a democratic government holding a permanent colony and denying self-government to others. Using the language of evolutionary development to justify the delay, American leaders resolved that dilemma by promising independence to the Philippines after they achieved a sufficient level of political maturity as a nation to manage self-government. President Wilson signed the Jones Act of 1916, which authorized eventual independence for the Philippines, but only after he succeeded in revising it to postpone that promise to the distant future. The law allowed him to regard America’s empire as exceptional, unlike the European empires that would retain their colonies forever.

The president's wartime rhetoric led Philippine nationalists to hope that they might gain their independence soon, but they found that “Wilson was too busy ‘liberating’ the colonies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire to liberate the Philippines.” But he did not do that either. At the peace conference he ensured that these territories would be ruled as mandates under the League of Nations. As underdeveloped nations, in his judgment, they too required the kind of tutelage that the United States imposed on the Philippines. The peace treaty used the language of development to divide former Ottoman and German territories in the Middle East, Africa, and Pacific islands into A, B, and C mandates, thus expressing a racial hierarchy in the future implementation of national self-determination. Wilson's use of the language of development as the rationale for delaying self-government for peoples of color abroad mirrored his justification for Jim Crow at home; he told African Americans that they needed to develop themselves under white tutelage before they could expect freedom and equality. In this way he could reconcile the theoretical universality of his liberalism with its postponement in practice for peoples of color.

Although this recent historiography has emphasized the centrality of race in Wilson's statecraft and diplomacy, John Milton Cooper, Jr. downplayed the president’s racism. He depicted him as a liberal southerner who was a moderate in his racial posture, and he claimed that “Wilson had separated himself early from the political attitudes of his native region” and “sought a larger vision that was more national, more rational, and, above all, more self-controlled. Race offered an uncomfortable reminder of all that he sought to put behind him.”

Cooper saw the president as a victim of Thomas Dixon, Jr., who persuaded him to watch The Birth of a Nation at the White House in 1915. Dixon, whose novel The Clansman furnished the basis for this racist film, had joined D. W. Griffith to make the movie, which glorified the Ku Klux Klan's violent role in helping to redeem the South from the interracial governments of the Reconstruction era. Cooper identified Dixon as Wilson’s former student, whereas in reality he was a classmate at Johns Hopkins in 1883. They remained friends after graduation and frequently exchanged correspondence. Cooper ignored their letters and Wilson’s historical writings when he claimed that there are virtually no documents that reveal Wilson's thinking about race before 1910. Dixon’s correspondence with Wilson during his presidency showed that he shared Dixon’s dedication to Jim Crow. Dixon and Griffith even went so far as to use quotations from the fifth volume of Wilson’s A History of the American People (1902) in the film to validate their glorification of the KKK as the defender of white democracy. When Wilson viewed the film, he would have realized that these quotations amounted to an implicit endorsement of it. His silence afterward did not mitigate his responsibility for the film’s message.

However, Cooper ignored Wilson’s contribution to this embedded validation of the film’s historical accuracy. “Effectively,” he wrote, “Wilson’s engagement with the politics of race ended in 1915 with the outcry following the showing of The Birth of a Nation. For the rest of his presidency, he lapsed back into his sphinxlike silence about anything to do with African Americans.” Nor did Cooper attribute Wilson’s role in blocking Japanese attempts to affirm racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant to his racial views. He did acknowledge Wilson’s racism, but he discounted its influence on the president’s domestic and foreign policies and failed to recognize the subtlety of racism in his liberalism.

In Colonel House (2015), Charles E. Neu downplayed the racial factor in the politics and diplomacy of Wilson’s close friend and advisor, Edward M. House. For Neu, race was not the key issue in southern politics. He described the end of Reconstruction, which was, in his view, “less severe” in House’s home state, Texas, than elsewhere in the South, as “the opening of a new, less ideological era of American politics.” House, he wrote, had “traditionally southern and paternalistic attitudes toward African Americans” and simply ignored the Wilson administration’s implementation of Jim Crow in the federal government. Neu did not cover race as a factor in House’s role in the presidential elections and the New Freedom reforms. He focused on his involvement in Wilson’s diplomacy during the Great War and the Paris Peace Conference. He noted House’s contributions to the creation of the League of Nations and other parts of the Versailles Treaty but not his role in rejecting Japan’s attempts to affirm racial equality. Although House viewed the peace treaty as a victory for “Anglo-Saxon Civilization,” Neu did not highlight the racial factor in his or Wilson’s diplomacy. In his brief coverage of House’s service on the Mandates Commission in 1919, he noted the different A, B, and C mandates, but not the racial
hierarchy that these represented. For the most part he did not discuss race or religion as influences in House's life as Wilson's "silent partner."43

In contrast to Cooper and Neu, Cara Lea Burnidge emphasized the religious and racial factors in Wilsonianism. In A Peaceful Conquest (2016), she showed how religion shaped Wilson's statecraft, including his racist and paternalistic ideas about American nationalism and internationalism. "Southern evangelicalism and social Christianity shaped Wilson's conception of democracy," she noted. "For Wilson, democracy was a form of government based in a Calvinist notion of God's order that regulated citizens according to social divisions he understood to be natural and inherently good, particularly whites' racial superiority and patriarchy. He also regarded democracy as a national way of life, an ideal society reflecting the ethos of the social gospel and, therefore, worth spreading around the world. Successful evangelization of this democracy unified America's domestic politics and foreign policy with the telos of humanity." While Burnidge agreed with Cooper that "Wilson supported the separation of church and state," she emphasized that religion and politics merged in his vision of a new world order. She observed that the president failed to understand that his particular Christian American perspective was not universally relevant. "Following the tradition of social Christians before him," Burnidge explained, "Wilson conflated his particular, and peculiarly, white American Protestant view of equality with a universally applicable truth." She added that "Wilson's Presbyterian childhood taught him that all people were equal in the eyes of God, but it also taught him that God created both masters and slaves who were equal in their sin, salvation, and access to God's grace but not equals in society on earth." Although others might view him as hypocritical, he regarded racial inequality as an "integral part" of "providential design." He did not see the disparity between his advocacy of universal democracy and his commitment to a global color line. "His effort to spread democracy, then, was an enterprise qualified by a particular type of democracy, born in America and made more perfect through the 'civilizing' force of his Christianity."44

American exceptionalism shaped Wilson's religion and thus his understanding of America's place in the modern world. "Drawing upon white Protestant moralisms," she wrote, "hebased his version of American exceptionalism upon a teleological interpretation of U.S. and world history in which the U.S. government, formed by the consent of the people, served as the culmination of Christian progress. In this way, Wilson believed, American democracy stood as a testament to God's order and represented the progressive unfolding of God's will." Having incorporated modern British liberalism into his vision of a new world order, he collaborated with the British Empire in establishing it at the Paris Peace Conference. The British also sought to preserve global leadership for white men who presumably represented the best of Western civilization, including Protestant Christianity. They too drew a global color line. Burnidge noted, "Wilson's particular understanding of democracy, like the British delegation's view of world order, assumed the superiority and authority of white Protestants to properly lead. While male leadership, especially by Protestants, was the fundamental assumption at the heart of the informal moral establishment that had made America exceptional and social Christianity a unique social justice enterprise."45 This exceptionalist American vision seemed universally relevant as the foundation for a new, predominantly Anglo-American, world order. Wilson's American nationalism and internationalism expressed his fundamental religious beliefs.

Race and class intersected in Wilson's wartime statecraft and in responses by others to Wilsonian internationalism. In Making the World Safe for Workers (2013), Elizabeth McKillen analyzed the interactions between labor and socialist leaders, on one side, and the Wilson administration, on the other, from the Mexican Revolution through the Great War to the Versailles Treaty. The president favored capitalism, not socialism. Unlike the Socialists, led by Eugene V. Debs, he did not embrace industrial democracy. Nevertheless, Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labor supported Wilson during the war and the fight over the peace treaty, which included the new International Labor Organization. McKillen provided excellent coverage of connections between racial/ethnic identity and labor politics. Because American workers, including recent immigrants, came from diverse backgrounds, racial and ethnic issues overlapped with questions of class in domestic and transnational labor relations.46

The development of the new field of world history and the internationalization of the study of American history produced new perspectives on Wilson and World War I, but some historians and political scientists still reaffirmed the nineteenth-century European philosophy of history, with its assertion of Western superiority. Despite the new historiographical trends, they viewed the history of the West as a progression from primitive origins to modern civilization. In this framework of unidirectional progress, so-called backward peoples were expected to follow the model of Western development. The president and Europeans and Americans claimed to have followed and now prescribed for others. The belief in progressive history influenced not only Western leaders such as Wilson, but also Vladimir I. Lenin and other communists. But the Marxist variety of modernization had obviously failed by the end of the Cold War. Its failure appeared to leave the Wilsonian alternative of liberal democracy and capitalism as the only viable option.

Thus, in the new era of globalization after the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed "the end of history." Despite temporary failures and apparent exceptions, he declared, no other ideology still challenged the universality of "the liberal idea." He asserted that "the process of democratization" and the growth of its counterpart, the market economy, formed "the larger pattern that is emerging in world history. The apparent number of choices that countries face in determining how they will organize themselves politically and economically has been diminishing over time. Of the different types of regimes that have emerged in the course of human history . . . the only form of government that has survived intact to the end of the twentieth century has been liberal democracy."47

Despite Wilson's obvious failure to transform or redeem the old world with the League of Nations after World War I, in the post-Cold War era of globalization he appeared to several prominent American scholars, as well as presidents and other U.S. policymakers, to have offered the right approach. Among historians who affirmed this
communism. Michael Mandelbaum agreed, affirming that Wilson's legacy of "making the world safe for democracy and its totalitarian challengers. In that contest over power..."

Tony Smith praised the president for defining "America’s mission" in the worldwide struggle for democracy in the twentieth century. Frank Ninkovich proclaimed that this was not just the American century, it was "the Wilsonian century." Amos Perlmutter interpreted international history from World War I through the Cold War as a global struggle between Wilsonianism and its totalitarian challengers. In that contest over power... Wilson's legacy of "making the world safe for democracy" triumphed over the alternatives of fascism and communism. Michael Mandelbaum agreed, affirming that liberal democracy and capitalism prevailed and provided the foundation for world peace. History could not progress any further, having already reached its ultimate destination. Wilsonian ideas of peace, democracy, and free markets, he concluded, were "the ideas that conquered the world." All of these scholars, with their triumphal interpretations of America’s contribution to world history, praised Wilson for defining the essential elements of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush reaffirmed this triumphal Americanism, which expressed the nation’s exceptionalism, to justify his global war on terrorism. Despite differences between him and Wilson, several historians, political scientists, and journalists noted the similarities in their worldviews and linked the Bush Doctrine, which justified his wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, to Wilsonianism, although Bush himself did not explicitly claim this ideological connection.

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Others denied that Wilson’s legacy was in any way responsible for Bush’s wars. Frank Ninkovich and Thomas J. Knock declared that Wilsonianism was no longer an ideological definer of contemporary history. "For the foreseeable future, Ninkovich concluded, “suggests that Wilsonianism would remain the supreme expression of the nation’s exceptionalist spirit.”

Rejecting that view in his new interpretation, Ninkovich emphasized the process of globalization rather than Wilsonism. Its central feature, the League of Nations, was actually “far more ambitious and European than American,” he wrote. Moreover, the president was not a crusader for democracy. “For Wilson, making the world safe for democracy did not mean democratizing the world. As John Milton Cooper, Jr. has noted, the phrase was crafted in the passive voice that did not envision an American jihad against nondemocratic infidels.” Although Wilson advocated anti-imperialism and national self-determination, Ninkovich pointed out that he restricted the application of this vision. “For the foreseeable future, democratization and national self-determination for most peoples was a pipe dream.”

In the peacemaking after World War I, Wilson’s ideals failed to produce a new world order. “The story of the League fight,” Ninkovich concluded, “suggests that Wilsonianism was not the paradigmatic example of American idealism at work, but an anomaly in the history of U.S. foreign relations—an exceptionalist exception whose guiding ideas were short-lived in practice.” Ninkovich discounted any particular ideology, such as American exceptionalism or its manifestation in Wilsonianism; instead, he emphasized the universal and progressive historical process of globalization toward modern civilization. Essentially, he echoed the nineteenth-century view of world history that placed Western civilization at its center. Yet like Wilson, he projected presumably universal principles of modern...
Anglo-American liberalism onto the world, Ninkovich conflated Western civilization with global civilization and American nationalism with internationalism. Wilson and Ninkovich were not the only people subject to such confusion. As Glenda Sluğa observed in *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (2013), even with "the international turn" in the modern Western world, self-identified internationalists often fail to escape their own nationalism.

Legacies of the Great War shaped the subsequent history of the United States and the world throughout the twentieth century, as David Reynolds emphasized in *The Long Shadow* (2014). The problems that Wilson and his contemporaries faced during the war and the postwar peacemaking—problems that involved nations, democracy, empire, capitalism, civilization, and peace—remained on the international agenda, as their successors continued their quest for a new world order. The war’s legacies thus cast a “long shadow” over American and world history.

This was obviously the case in the Greater Middle East, where the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent rivalries among old empires, new states, and non-state terrorists challenged Western governments for the next century. Whether or not the Bush Doctrine expressed all tenets of Wilsonianism, America’s leaders still based their foreign policies on nineteenth-century ideas about civilization and progress in history, as Wilson had done during World War I. In *America’s War for the Greater Middle East* (2016), Andrew J. Bacevich observed that U.S. presidents from Jimmy Carter to Barack Obama shared this conviction, deeply embedded in the American collective psyche, provides one of the connecting threads making the ongoing war for the Greater Middle East something more than a collection of disparate and geographically scattered skirmishes.

Recent presidents have reaffirmed the earlier understanding of history that undergirded Wilson’s call for making the world safe for democracy during the Great War. Despite the new conceptualization of world history and the internationalization of American history, America’s interventions in the Greater Middle East still manifest the earlier Western historical tradition that characterized not only European statecraft and diplomacy but also Wilsonianism. American presidents continue to defend Western civilization against its enemies through the pursuit of a new world order of freedom and democracy. The historiography on Wilson and World War I thus remains relevant to a better understanding of U.S. foreign relations in the present as well as the past.

Notes:

24. Knock, *To End All Wars*, 5.
34. Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and
42. Cooper, “Woodrow Wilson and Race,” in Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson, 156. In his biography of Woodrow Wilson, Cooper correctly identified Dixon as Wilson’s Johns Hopkins classmate (272–73), not his student, after I called the error to his attention, but he did not change his interpretation.
46. Elizabeth McKillen, Making the World Safe for Workers: Labor, the Left, and Wilsonian Internationalism (Urbana, IL, 2013). See also Jeannette Keith, Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight: Race, Class, and Power in the Rural South during the First World War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004); Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of Modern American Citizens (New York, 2008); and Julie Greene, The Canal Builders: Making America’s Empire at the Panama Canal (New York, 2009).
60. Ninkovich, Global Republic, 118.
The Bernath Lecture Prize Committee—Matthew Jones, London School of Economics and Political Science; Brian DeLay, University of California, Berkeley; and Carol Chin, University of Toronto—was faced with a particularly difficult decision this year as it had several excellent candidates who were nominated, but after careful deliberation, the final and unanimous choice for the winner of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations 2017 Bernath Lecture Prize is Daniel Sargent. An Associate Professor at UC Berkeley, Sargent has won numerous plaudits for his strikingly ambitious first book, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s. The book has already led many to reconsider the way they view this period and helped to bring the “lost” subject of political economy back into the field; it touches on many different areas, such as human rights, international economics, geopolitics, the rise of non-state actors, ideological shifts, and the agency of key individuals. One nominator describes it as a “remarkable achievement” that advances “a powerful argument for understanding the fragmentation and transformations of the 1970s, and their connection to the events of the subsequent decade.” Another hails it as a “landmark contribution,” while a third put it, “All U.S. international historians of this era must now begin with this book.”

Sargent’s several book chapters are also praised for the luminous clarity of their prose and their immense value for teaching purposes, and he is now embarked on another large-scale project dealing the rise and fall of the Pax Americana, which promises to connect to a wider reading public. Sargent has been highly productive in his research but also keen to engage in outreach activities, being called by his nominators, “a superb interlocutor in public settings” and “the best possible public speaker.” The Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes excellence in teaching, and here Sargent has also shown exemplary engagement and service, with his active involvement with the “Teaching American History” series at Berkeley, pedagogical grants from the Teagle Foundation, and panel presentations on teaching at the AHA. In view of his outstanding early career achievements and the resounding recommendations he has received from his nominators, we believe Sargent is a worthy winner of the prize and will deliver a memorable Bernath Lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the American Historical Association Luncheon in January 2018.

The 2016 Myrna Bernath Committee—Ann Heiss, Andy DeRoche, and Meredith Oyen—selected Amanda Demmer, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of New Hampshire, as this year’s winner of the Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship. Amanda is completing a dissertation titled “The Last Chapter of the Vietnam War: Normalization, Nongovernmental Actors, and the Politics of Human Rights, 1975-1995” under the direction of Kurk Dorsey. Two outstanding research projects were recognized with William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Grants by this year’s committee of Dustin Walcher (chair, Southern Oregon University), Sarah Snyder (American University), and Keisha Blain (University of Iowa). Both will benefit substantially from the funding SHAFR provides. They will also expand our intellectual horizons in important ways. In “The Geopolitics of Compassion: The International History of the Indochinese Refugee Crisis, 1955-1994,” Sam Vong—Assistant Professor of History at the University of Texas, Austin—highlights how a range of individuals and state agencies employed the discourse of compassion to respond to several world crises in the twentieth century. The second awardee, Simon Toner—the Dorothy Borg Postdoctoral Scholar in Southeast Asian Studies at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University—reinterprets the last years of the Vietnam War by highlighting the importance of economic development initiatives in “After Tet: The United States, South Vietnam, and Global Development at War, 1968-1975.” Both projects are likely to make a substantial impact on the field when they are published in book form.

SHAFR Announces 2017 Award Winners

Sam Vong (left) receives his Williams Fellowship award from committee member Sarah Snyder at the SHAFR Awards Ceremony at the AHA

Amanda Demmer (left) receives the Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship from committee chair Ann Heiss at the SHAFR luncheon at the AHA
The Michael Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship Committee chaired by W. Michael Schmidli (Bucknell University) and including Joy Schulz (Metropolitan Community College) and Arissa Oh (Boston College) recognizes Michael A. Hill with its 2017 award. A decorated Army veteran who served in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Hill is currently earning a Ph.D. in the Department of History at the University of Kansas with Sheyda Jahanbani as his doctoral adviser. His dissertation, “Rehearsal for Empire: the Role of Alaska in the Reimagining of American Empire in the Late Nineteenth Century,” is an international history of Alaska’s place in the expanding American empire. Hill’s dissertation seeks to illuminate Alaska’s role in the development of an “imperial imaginary” among American policymakers and the public. Drawing on archival research in Canada, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, Hill’s dissertation identifies Alaska as a site of contested imperial space between three of the nineteenth-century’s largest empires—a worthy topic that has been largely overlooked by U.S. foreign relations historians. In particular, this research project promises new insight into U.S.-Russian relations, and Hill will use the Michael Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship to deepen his proficiency in the Russian language.

Joy Schulz (left) recognizes Michael A. Hill with the 2017 Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship

The members of SHAFR’s 2016-17 Graduate Student Grants and Fellowship Committee – Todd Bennett (chair), Gregg Brazinsky, Jessica Chapman, Sarah Miller-Davenport, and Geoffrey Stewart – reviewed dozens of outstanding applications for the suite of dissertation research grants and fellowships it administers.

The committee is pleased to announce the award of the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant to Alvita Akiboh, for her project, “Imperial Material: Objects and Identity in the U.S. Colonial Empire,” which shows how the material culture of America’s formal empire established the hegemony of U.S. rule in the absence of a significant colonial bureaucracy. Akiboh is a doctoral candidate at Northwestern University. Daniel Immerwahr is her advisor.

The committee awards the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship to Nguyet Nguyen, for her project, “The World Is on Our Side: People’s Diplomacy in the Second Indochina War,” a study of Vietnamese “People’s Diplomats,” who fanned out across the West and worked through transnational networks of sympathizers and the Vietnamese diaspora to stoke opposition to the U.S. war. Nguyen, a doctoral candidate at American University, won the Bernath Dissertation Research Grant in 2013-14. Max Paul Friedman is her advisor.

The committee awards the Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport-Walter LaFeber Dissertation Fellowship to Rachel Steely, for her project, “From Bioprospecting to Biodiesel: Soy Commodity Frontiers in the Twentieth Century,” which promises to draw new connections between international history, agricultural history, and the history of capitalism. Steely is a student at Harvard University. Sven Beckert is her advisor.

The committee also awards Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants to the following eleven students:

Ashley Black, for her research project, “The Politics of Asylum: Cold War Revolutionaries, Human Rights, and Mexican Foreign Policy, 1944-1961,” which conceptualizes asylum and “reception” as political processes in contrast to exile and “expulsion” to explain Mexico’s acceptance of leftist political exiles during a period marked by improved relations with the United States and increasing social and political conservatism. Black is a doctoral candidate at Stony Brook University supervised by Eric Zolov.

Rachel Bunker, for her project, “Invisible Empire: The Consumer Credit Score and the Making of Global Corporate Power, 1890-1980,” which reveals the little-known story of the credit score and how this empire of information shaped global markets since the late-19th century. Bunker is a Ph.D. candidate at Rutgers University. Jennifer Mittelstadt is her advisor.

Fumi Inoue, for her project, “American Military Justice in Postwar Japan, 1952-1972,” which offers an innovative new way of looking at the U.S.-Japan relationship during the years after the occupation. Inoue is a student at Boston College. Franziska Seraphim is her advisor.

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Erik Moore, for his dissertation, “Defining Rights: Contesting Reagan and the Contra War through Human Rights Advocacy,” which questions whether NGOs operating in the United States were able to successfully use human rights advocacy to influence American foreign policy and limit the Reagan administration’s support for counterrevolutionary forces in Nicaragua. Moore is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Oklahoma. Alan McPherson
is his supervisor.

Heidi Morefield, for her project, “Making Technology Appropriate: Modernization, Health, and Development in the Global Cold War,” which promises to break new ground in the important new field of critical global health studies. Morefield is a doctoral candidate at Johns Hopkins University. Jeremy Greene is her adviser.

Kaete M. O’Connell, for her project, “Feeding the Enemy: Humanitarian Aid and the Power of Hunger in Occupied Germany,” exploring food relief in U.S.-occupied Germany after World War II and how such relief helped transform the U.S.-German relationship heading into the Cold War. O’Connell is a student at Temple University. Petra Goedde is her adviser.

Aileen Teague, for her project, “Americanizing Mexican Drug Enforcement: The War on Drugs in Mexican Politics and Society, 1964-1982,” an examination of U.S. power as it manifested in Mexican politics and society via drug policing. Teague is a Ph.D. candidate at Vanderbilt University. Thomas Schwartz is her advisor.

Yuan Yi, for her project, “Malfunctioning Machinery: The Global Making of Textile Factories in Early Twentieth-Century China,” an examination of the industrialization of Chinese textile production in the early twentieth century with emphasis on the machinery business between American manufacturers and Chinese cotton mills. Yi is a doctoral candidate at Columbia University. Eugenia Lean is her advisor.

SHAFR extends its congratulations to all of the winners and thanks all of the committee members for their hard work at the end of the fall semester.

SHAFR Partners with the Law Library of Congress to Provide Legal Research Training Opportunity

Mary L. Dudziak

SHAFR members have been incorporating legal history in their scholarship on human rights, immigration, trade, and other topics. Most foreign relations historians have not had access to the kind of legal research methods taught in law schools, however. While some historians have benefitted from attending law classes and using a law library on their campus, not everyone has that opportunity.

In order to make expertise in legal research more accessible, SHAFR is working with the Law Library of Congress to develop a legal research training session at the 2017 SHAFR Conference. The Law Library has extensive materials on international law, United States law, and the laws of other nations. Their collection, like the Library of Congress as a whole, is open to all researchers and is free. A SHAFR task force chaired by Sarah Snyder, and including Ben Coates and Clara Altman, is working with the Law Library to design a program that fits the research needs of SHAFR members. More details will be available before conference registration.

There is no cost for this special program. SHAFR members interested participating should make plans to arrive at the annual meeting a little early. It will be held on the morning of Thursday, June 22, and will conclude before the first panels begin.

If you would like to attend, please plan to sign up for this program when you register for the conference.
Cruising as Power Projection: Seriously...

Kathryn C. Statler

I used to make fun of people who went on cruises—until my parents starting taking first my sister and me, then our husbands, and now our children on them. Feeling challenged at the idea of spending quality time with the entire family or close friends for an extended period? Cruising is your answer. Cruising companions retire to their respective staterooms at the end of the evening, which means everyone has private space. No one has to think about meals, share in making them, or clean up after them. There are no fights over logistics such as who will drive and where to go. Families and friends can come and go as they like. And when all is said and done, it’s an economical way to travel as a group. Granted, you catch only a small glimpse of a new territory, but isn’t that about all we are up for these days anyway? Cruising is the Twitter of travel.

I had never taken cruising seriously, except as a way of maximizing food intake, until prompted by a series of events in January 2016. Let me preface by noting that it’s hard not to pay attention to the military and economic potential of cruising when witnessing firsthand a “mega-ship,” the latest of the cruise industry’s offerings. The mega-ship I was on—Norwegian’s Getaway, which is not the largest—has an approximate 90,000-ton displacement, stands 179 feet tall, is 1069 feet long, can carry almost 4000 passengers and 1640 crew, and travels at 21.5 knots. With twenty-seven dining venues, a ropes course, climbing wall, multiple pools, and five waterslides, it is obscene. And yet, as I prepared for embarkation, I started to think half seriously about the cruise ship industry as a U.S. military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural tool. I took it more seriously when, after a little research, I learned that the top three cruise lines—Carnival Corporation and PLC, Royal Caribbean Cruises, and CDF Crosières de France. It has 64,000 employees and reports $8 billion in revenue and $21 billion in assets (2014)

maneuverability. They are also able to store months’ worth of food and other supplies, and they have their own incredibly efficient water and sanitation systems. They also have the latest communications and navigation technology. Even before the phenomenon of the mega-ship, the average cruise ship was a serious force.

Consider the largest cruise ship in existence, Royal Caribbean’s Harmony of the Seas. I witnessed it in action (from afar, thank god) and it is truly staggering, with a 120,000-ton displacement and accommodations for 6780 passengers and 2300 crew. It is a glorious 1188 feet in length and has a top travel speed of 25 knots [insert picture]. By way of comparison, the largest U.S. aircraft carrier in service is the USS George H.W. Bush. This Nimitz-class ship has a displacement of slightly over 100,000 tons, can accommodate approximately 5700 crew, is 1092 feet in length, and can travel at 30 knots. The new Gerald R. Ford-class supercarriers will be just slightly larger and faster than the Nimitz-class. The first is set to be commissioned in 2017, but even these ships will not be as big as the Harmony of Seas. Of course, the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers have the advantage of not having to refuel for approximately twenty to twenty-five years, and obviously cruise ships are not armed, but their overall capabilities are still most impressive.

Also of critical importance, the top three cruise lines—Carnival Corporation and PLC, Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., and Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings—are all based in Florida and together own close to 170 massive ships:

1. Carnival Corporation & PLC: Founded in 1972, it has a fleet of over 100 vessels and includes the Carnival, Holland America, Costa, Princess, Cunard, AIDA, Iberc, P&O, and Seabourn brands. It has almost 100,000 employees, reports $15 billion in revenue, and has close to $40 billion in assets (2015 numbers). As of 2016, it holds 44 percent of market share.
2. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd: Founded in 1997, it has over 40 ships, including vessels from Royal Caribbean International, Celebrity Cruises, and Azamara Club Cruises; it also has a 50 percent stake in TUI Cruises, Pullmantur Cruises, and CDF Croisières de France. It has 64,000 employees and reports $8 billion in revenue and $21 billion in assets (2014
numbers). As of 2016, it holds 25 percent of market share. 3. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings: It has 23 ships, including those of Oceania Cruises and Regent Seven Seas; 27,000 employees; $1.1 billion in revenue; $13 billion in assets (2016 numbers); and as of 2016, almost 10% of market share.1

These three companies represent a massive economic presence at home and abroad. In peacetime they operate as privately owned unofficial economic, diplomatic, and cultural tools, but during wartime they could easily be turned into military assets. Now I know D-Day is not the right analogy, and yet I couldn’t help but think how quickly tenders transferred hundreds of tourists at a time as we moored off Grand Cayman, and how these ships spew forth hundreds of thousands of American tourists onto foreign shores every day. I can also provide a more concrete example of their potential. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, three Carnival ships were chartered (such a nice word) by the U.S. government for six months as temporary housing. Their planned voyages were cancelled and passengers’ money was refunded.2 Thus there already exists a precedent for government use of cruise ships.

In addition to their current economic power and potential ability to project military power, cruise lines are often engaged in the delicate art of diplomatic projection. They must negotiate with foreign authorities on fees, docking, scheduling, customs, and every other aspect of naval travel to a foreign country. I also witnessed firsthand another role ships play: that of rescuer. On our cruise in January 2016, the Getaway managed to come to a full stop, turn on a dime, and then head toward a distress beacon in about five minutes flat. Passengers, riveted at the railings, watched as an unearthly ghost ship slowly appeared. Eventually it became clear that we were looking at people silently waving at us for help from atop a modified catamaran with water barrels lashed to its hulls in an attempt to keep it afloat. After much deliberation, and a few aborted attempts at using the lifeboats, our captain simply sidled up to the raft in his 200,000-ton ship, and crew members calmly hauled the raft’s occupants aboard.

As the ship picked up our ragtag group of seventeen Cuban refugees—one of whom was pregnant—I pondered the role cruise ships do and could play in addressing refugee crises. After doing some research, I realized that cruise ships commonly pick up five Cuban refugees here, another ten there, and have been doing so for a very long time. The lucky ones are found right before an American port; the unlucky, like ours, have to settle for Cozumel and the Mexican authorities. With the announcement in January 2017 by outgoing President Obama that the twenty-year-old “wet foot, dry foot” policy that allowed any Cuban who made it to U.S. soil to stay and become a legal resident, this particular refugee problem might end. Then again, it might not. It subsequently occurred to me to check on cruise ship rescues in the Mediterranean. It is hard to get a clear sense of scale, but a few examples reflect the global problem: in July 2015, Carnival’s Island Princess picked up 117 refugees off the coast of Greece; in August 2015, Royal Caribbean’s Vision of the Seas rescued 45 migrants; and in May 2016, the Norwegian Line’s Spirit assisted the Italian Coast Guard in saving 300 African refugees.3 I will also note that the cruise industry is losing business in the Mediterranean as potential passengers increasingly worry about the possibility of running into refugees and the cruise ships’ obligation under international maritime law to provide aid to distressed people at sea. Still, these rescues show the potential for using cruise ships to move thousands of people during natural disasters or a world crisis.

Finally, although I have found a preponderance of Americans on every cruise, cruising is in fact a globalizing force. Thousands of passengers from many nations interact on a daily basis in a relatively enclosed area. Consider as well the hundreds of crew members who come from all over the world who must work together (in much closer quarters than the passengers) and for and with the paying guests. Indeed, one can only marvel that mutinies do not occur on a regular basis. Moreover, passengers and crew members explore foreign lands and engage in millions of small economic and cultural exchanges every single day.

So onward cruisers. I will wave to you from my veranda as I slip into St. Petersburg this July, providing we are still on speaking terms with the Russians. And why wouldn’t we be? With Russian visas at $300 per person, we’re here to replenish their depleted economic coffers. As I eat my way through multiple four-course dinners, I will also reflect on the projection of military power represented by a mammoth ship on the cutting edge of modern technology. As I rush into my tour van and go forth to buy overpriced souvenirs, I will ponder the projection of economic power that each ship’s passengers bring. As I watch the ship blithely but gracefully negotiate another port, disgorging passengers, I will weigh the projection of these ships’ diplomatic power—symbols of the freedom to go anywhere (provided one has the money), rescuers of refugees, and careful mediators of international seas. Finally, as passengers intermingle aboard, get to know foreign lands, customs, and people, and leave their mark abroad—albeit most likely as the wet ring of a beer glass imprinted on an empty table in the local bar—I will muse about the long-term ramifications of the projection of cultural power.

I leave you with this obvious but important caveat: not all of this projection is American, but for the time being most of it is, and it has a long history. When considering official U.S. naval power, think of Commodore Matthew Perry’s first visit to Japan in 1853 aboard the Susquehanna, as he steamed towards Edo past Japanese lines and threatened to destroy them if they chose to fight. We can all appreciate Theodore Roosevelt’s implementation of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s ideas in The Influence of Seapower on History, as the Great White Fleet’s sixteen battleships visited ports around the world from 1907 to 1909. Henry Kaiser’s World War I shipbuilding frenzy made the United States the third largest naval power of the world, and our use of aircraft carriers in World War II and the Cold War assured U.S. naval dominance through the end of the twentieth century. Permanent bases like Diego Garcia and constantly deployed carrier strike groups have preserved that dominance. And now, in a way that is wholly appropriate for American naval power in the twenty-first century, the easily-made-fun-of, over-the-top, ridiculously huge cruise ship has become a symbol of U.S. economic, technological, and (potentially) military power. Underestimate it at your own peril.

Yours in cruising...

Notes:
1. All of this information is public and can be obtained from Wikipedia or company reports.
2. The six-month contract cost $236 million and was criticized because the vessels’ use was not maximized and the U.S. government paid more than what the cruise line’s normal sailing schedule would have brought in. “$236 Million Cruise Ship Deal Criticized,” Washington Post, September 28, 2005.
A Roundtable on the Obama Administration’s Foreign Policy

Jeremy Kuzmarov, Robert David Johnson, Lubna Qureshi, and Jeremy Lembcke

Editor’s note: This roundtable was proposed by Jeremy Kuzmarov. Passport thanks him for suggesting and organizing this timely discussion. AJ

Introduction

Jeremy Kuzmarov

In December 2016, I published a report card on the Obama administration’s foreign policy in the Huffington Post. I gave Mr. Obama a C-, crediting him with five major diplomatic accomplishments, most notably the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate accords and the opening to Cuba, while lamenting the institutionalization of a permanent warfare state under his direction. Obama, whose campaign received large donations from weapons manufacturer General Dynamics, expanded the war in Af-Pak, which has become almost another Vietnam; deceived the public in waging a war in Libya that destroyed the country’s social fabric; expanded the U.S. military base structure and increased arms exports to dictators, including the Saudis; and presided over the dronification of state violence, a move that hastened the erosion of democratic control over war-making.

Passport editor Andy Johns and I agreed that I should convene a roundtable on the Obama administration’s foreign policy. I was able to solicit responses from three distinguished scholars: Robert David “KC” Johnson, Lubna Qureshi and Jerry Lembcke. Each has provided a short synopsis of the Obama presidency, with differing conclusions.

Focusing primarily on Obama’s second term, Johnson argues that while previous presidents implemented modifications and improvements in their second term, Obama’s policies were divisive and not particularly successful. The high point was his administration’s restoration of commercial and cultural ties with Cuba. The low point was its inaction or perceived inaction on Syria and Russia, which strengthened the hand of Vladimir Putin.

Lubna Qureshi compares Obama to Henry Kissinger. In her view, Obama was yet another American leader who carried out aggression under the guise of spreading freedom and democracy. She casts a critical eye on the drone program, which violated norms of international humanitarianism and caused horrific human suffering that Obama helped cover up and deny, as Kissinger had done when Cambodia was drawn into the Vietnam War.

In the final essay, Jerry Lembcke criticizes those on the left who condemn all aspects of Obama’s performance, while suggesting that the fault for the direction of government policy lies not with the man at the top but with the social movements that failed to present alternative visions to neoliberal capitalism or effectively pressure Obama. Lembcke is especially critical of those on the left who cheered the downfall of Muammar Qaddafi, and he suggests the left could have made itself more relevant by championing the struggles of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The PKK fought for some of the same principles as the so-called Vietcong. In the Turkish province of Sirnak, the PKK’s youth wing created a communal model of self-governance and put women in charge. They also mandated education for girls, free speech, and freedom of religion.

The three essays generally yield some excellent insights and ideas that future historians of the Obama presidency will judge Barack Obama’s second-term foreign policy as an improvement on that of his initial four years. His second-term national security team did seem far less dynamic than his first, but the president also encountered significant political and congressional obstacles in implementing his international vision, as he had in dealing with domestic matters in his first term.

The Difficulties of Obama’s Second-Term Foreign Policy

Robert David Johnson

The foreign policy performance of the three two-term presidents who preceded Barack Obama improved in their second terms. Between 1985 and 1988, the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev helped bring about the end of the Cold War, while the Reagan administration abandoned its indifference to rightwing human rights abuses and promoted the restoration of democracy in the Philippines and Chile. Between 1997 and 2000, the Clinton administration learned from its failures in Rwanda and Bosnia and intervened more aggressively to prevent genocide in Kosovo. Between 2005 and 2008, the Bush administration moved to stabilize the situation in Iraq after first-term failures.

In each of these administrations, moreover, second-term personnel changes created a more dynamic national security team. George Schultz consolidated his power as Reagan’s term advanced, while the departures of Caspar Weinberger and William Casey removed the administration’s hard-line voices. Madeleine Albright succeeded the inert Warren Christopher as Clinton’s second secretary of state. And in Bush’s second term, the influence of Condoleezza Rice and (eventually) Robert Gates ascended as that of Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld declined.

By contrast, it seems unlikely that future historians will judge Barack Obama’s second-term foreign policy as an improvement on that of his initial four years. His second-term national security team did seem far less dynamic than his first, but the president also encountered significant political and congressional obstacles in implementing his international vision, as he had in dealing with domestic matters in his first term.

Obama seemed to enter his second term with a foreign policy mandate. Vice President Joe Biden’s boast
that “Osama bin Laden is dead and General Motors is alive” testified to his success in the war on terror. Obama humiliated Mitt Romney in the second presidential debate, after moderator Candy Crowley pointed out that, despite Romney’s claims to the contrary, the president had quickly described the attack on the Benghazi consulate as an “act of terror.” And Romney’s suggestion that Russia was the nation’s leading strategic foe was so unconvincing that the Democrats’ official Twitter feed mocked the GOP nominee’s failure to “realize it’s the 21st century.”

Most key players from Obama’s first term, however, departed after his re-election. Any chance that UN ambassador Susan Rice had of becoming secretary of state vanished amidst vitriolic Republican opposition to her having repeated incorrect talking points prepared by the intelligence community on Sunday talk shows a few days after the Benghazi attacks. Obama instead turned to Massachusetts senator John Kerry, who had provided him with a critical endorsement in the 2008 Democratic primary but who brought little energy to the position. The new secretary of defense, Chuck Hagel, fared even worse. Rather than receiving credit for appointing a former Republican senator, Obama earned strong attacks from Senate Republicans, culminating with a fact-free insinuation from Ted Cruz (R-Texas) that North Korea might have funneled money to Hagel. In the event, Hagel proved so ineffective that he lost the president’s confidence, and within two years he resigned under pressure. Although the full picture will not be clear until the opening of Obama’s papers, it appears as if White House staffers, most prominently Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, exercised increasing influence over foreign policy.

The high point of Obama’s second-term diplomacy came when he abandoned the Cuban embargo, which had lasted for more than five decades without any evidence of success. Vatican-brokered diplomacy maintained secrecy until the December 2014 announcement that the two nations would normalize ties. Obama traveled to the island in 2016, becoming the first U.S. president to do so since Calvin Coolidge attended the Havana Conference in 1928. Despite GOP control over both houses of Congress, legislators did little to obstruct the effort. While Donald Trump said he would sever relations unless Cuba offered a better deal (he offered no specifics), this threat seemed empty. The world had moved on; Jet Blue had already acknowledged close Cuban-American cultural and commercial ties by offering regular flights between New York City and Havana.

Obama’s flexibility on Cuba arose in part from domestic politics. In the 2012 election, he did better with the Cuban vote than any Democrat since Castro came to power. His 48 percent of the Cuban vote in Florida proved that younger Cubans had come to oppose the embargo. The grip of the Cuban lobby over American politics was no more.

Domestic politics was less helpful for the president’s other major outreach to a traditional American foe. The diplomatic deal with Iran removed some sanctions in exchange for the Iranians agreeing to scale down their nuclear program (for a fifteen-year period) and submit to international inspections. There was a reasonable argument to be made in favor of the deal, given the crumbling of the sanctions regime. But the administration oversold the deal (as it had the health care law) and was then outmaneuvered in the public debate, even as some in the White House seemed to boast about an intent to deceive. Ben Rhodes, for instance, told the New York Times Magazine that as “the average reporter we talk to is 27 years old, and their only reporting experience consists of being around political campaigns . . . they literally know nothing.” The administration could thus create an “echo chamber” in which sympathetic reporters “were saying things that validated what we had given them to say.”

Little wonder that support for the deal cratered and that Senate Democratic candidates who endorsed it, such as Wisconsin’s Russ Feingold, were subjected to negative ads during the 2016 campaign.

After the intervention in Libya, Obama’s second-term agenda moved away from the use of military power to protect human rights. “I don’t oppose all wars,” the then-Illinois state senator declared at a 2002 rally. “What I am opposed to is a rash war.” In the context of the 2008 campaign, this viewpoint, which received considerable attention, translated into a fierce criticism of Bush’s Iraq policy, but it was also an endorsement of an expanded U.S. role in Afghanistan.

By Obama’s second term, however, a different lesson had emerged, perhaps generated by the difficulties in Libya. This “Obama Doctrine” as the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg labeled it, had its foundations in the U.S. realist tradition and was an understandable reaction to the excesses of Bush’s foreign policy. But as events—especially those in Syria—would demonstrate, inaction had consequences as well.

Obama had few good options in Syria, but his announcement that the Assad regime’s use of chemical or biological weapons would cross a “red line” was reckless. And his 2014 description of ISIS as a “jayvee team” was rhetorically sloppy and strongly indicative of a failure to appreciate the threat ISIS posed to U.S. interests in the region. Both remarks reflected his administration’s tendency to be reactive rather than proactive in both the Syrian civil war and the subsequent refugee crisis. By the end of Obama’s term, Russia, rather than the United States, had emerged as the dominant foreign power in the country.

Obama possessed far less leverage in Russia than in Syria, and despite attacks from Senate hawks such as John McCain (R-AZ), it is hard to see how he could have prevented either the annexation of Crimea or the Russian intervention in Ukraine. But his relatively passive response (targeted sanctions directed at high-level members of the Putin regime) made the United States look weak, and Putin’s government made matters worse for Obama by making troubling overtures toward the Baltic states.

After a first term in which more Americans consistently approved of the president’s handling of international events, Obama slipped underwater in polls about his foreign policy performance in April 2013 and remained there until just before he left office. As the 2016 campaign intensified, it was not surprising that Hillary Clinton distanced herself from aspects of Obama’s international legacy. She promised a tougher approach to Russia (one reason, it seems, Putin intervened so aggressively on behalf of Trump). She maintained that “the failure to help build up a credible fighting force of the people who were the originators of the protests against Assad—there were Islamists, there were secularists, there was everything in the middle—the failure to do that left a big vacuum, which the jihadists have now filled.” Clinton even distanced herself from Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership, which she had helped to negotiate—a transparent play for protectionist support in the campaign that only reinforced her image as a politician who would do anything to get elected. With opposition from the populist right as well, the TPP was doomed, confirming the stillborn nature of Obama’s expected second-term “pivot” toward Asia. As Jonathan Chait has noted, one other Obama transnational initiative—the Paris climate change accords—contained far greater promise, but whether Trump will maintain the policy, which Congress never confirmed, is very much open to question.

After the election, Obama’s major foreign policy initiative involved Israel. During the 2008 campaign, conservatives had attacked the Illinois senator for his ties to anti-Israel figures such as Jeremiah Wright and Rashid
Khalidi, but Obama convincingly countered that his longstanding ties to the Chicago Jewish community and his rhetorical support for Israeli security revealed his true intentions in the Middle East.\(^{18}\)

Obama’s policy toward Israel never lived up to the promise of his 2008 rhetoric. His conviction that Israeli settlements were the key to achieving Israeli-Palestinian peace seems naïve in retrospect; his poor relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, along with Netanyahu’s increasingly blatant intervention in U.S. politics on the side of the Republicans, further complicated matters. Nonetheless, Obama’s decision to abstain from a UN Security Council resolution targeting not merely isolated West Bank settlements but also portions of East Jerusalem and its suburbs—areas that all sides understood would remain part of Israel in any peace settlement—represented a sharp departure from traditional U.S. diplomatic support of Israel. Moreover, the historical record contradicted suggestions by the administration’s defenders that Obama’s action resembled previous U.S. abstentions on Israel-related matters at the UN.\(^{19}\)

The administration’s decision to abstain occurred only after the election, so that Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton would not experience any political blowback. (Even many congressional Democrats opposed the U.S. decision not to veto a resolution whose terms held that Israeli occupation of the Western Wall violated international law.) But if Obama’s decision might not have reflected overall public opinion, it did mirror the viewpoint among key elements of his party. By 2016, more liberal Democrats sympathized with the Palestinians than with the Israelis, and the generational breakdown suggested that this percentage will only grow over time—even as conservatives become more sympathetic to Israel.\(^{20}\)

In this respect, perhaps one of the major legacies of the Obama era in international affairs will be the way in which the nation’s intense domestic political polarization spread to foreign policy issues.

Assessing Obama’s Foreign Policy

Lubna Qureshi

Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has inspired more historiographical debate than any other practitioner of American foreign policy. The mistake of many scholars is to present Kissinger, who acted under the direction of President Richard M. Nixon, as an exceptional policymaker. In Kissinger’s Shadow, Greg Grandin portrays the diplomat as an intellectual forefather of neoconservatism, because “what he did nearly half a century ago created the conditions for today’s endless wars.”\(^{21}\)

In truth, Kissinger was not exceptional among postwar Washington policymakers. His positive accomplishments have been overrated, and his misdeeds were merely part of a historical pattern of American activity abroad. The United States had committed aggression before Kissinger, and it has committed aggression since. I bring him up because my own examination of the Nixon administration’s sponsorship of the 1973 coup in Chile, as well as my current research on the Vietnam War, has led me to more clearly view former President Barack Obama as the most recent exemplar of this pattern.

Grandin is critical of Obama, but he also distinguishes “the reckless adventurism of the necons” from “Barack Obama’s pragmatic overcorrection.”\(^{22}\) I think it is important to refrain from intellectualizing Washington policymakers to an excessive degree. Whether traditionally conservative, neoconservative, or allegedly liberal, they have all committed themselves to the maintenance of the American empire.

While the president obviously outranks the secretary of state, a comparison between Kissinger and Obama is fitting because Kissinger has essentially assumed presidential status himself, overshadowing Nixon in U.S. diplomatic history. In addition, both are controversial recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, and there are parallels between the bombing of Cambodia and the drone strikes against Pakistan. The issue of the drones is very close to my heart because I am the daughter of Pakistani immigrants.

Kissinger ensured the secrecy of the Cambodia campaign for a considerable period of time, keeping Congress and the American public in ignorance. After the exposure of the bombing, he made light of the civilian casualties, effectively denying them. “The ‘secret’ bombing of Cambodia concerned small, largely uninhabited territories totally unoccupied by the North Vietnamese,” Kissinger insisted. “We attacked military bases bases unpopulated by civilians and at most only five miles from the border.”\(^{23}\) Professor Ben Kiernan of Yale University, a Cambodia specialist, later provided more accurate information. Writing to Grandin, Kiernan noted that “from 1969 to 1973, the US bombing spread out across Cambodia and killed over 100,000 Khmer civilians.”\(^{24}\)

Four decades later, the Obama administration denied that there had been a high number civilian casualties in Pakistan. “We are very careful in terms of how it’s been applied,” Obama said. “It is important for everybody to understand that this thing is kept on a very tight leash.”\(^{25}\) Speaking in 2011 as assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, John Brennan made an unsubstantiated claim. “In fact,” he said, “the types of operations that the U.S. has been involved in, in the counterterrorism realm, that nearly for the past year, there hasn’t been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities that we have been able to develop.”\(^{26}\)

How many civilians have fallen victim to the drones? In 2012, Stanford Law School and the NYU School of Law released an important study, Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan. According to this study, the data indicate that “from June 2004 to mid-September 2012 . . . the drone strikes killed 2,562–3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474–881 were civilians, including 176 children.”\(^{27}\) It is impossible to arrive at a precise figure, because Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the main target of the drone strikes in the country, are virtually impenetrable to outsiders, Pakistanis and foreigners alike. Nevertheless, this estimate is more believable than Brennan’s claim, unless hundreds of civilians died annually between 2004 and 2012, but none in 2010–11. It is highly unlikely that this was the case, as the 2010–11 period saw no cessation in drone strikes. Still, in 2012 one administration official insisted that the number of civilian fatalities in Pakistan was in the “single digits.”\(^{28}\)

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s estimates of civilian deaths for this period now go as high as 966. Who bears more responsibility for this horrible statistic: the liberal Obama or George W. Bush, that agent of the neoconservatives? It is important to note that Obama ordered 373 strikes against Pakistan. Bush, by contrast, authorized only fifty-one, which produced, according to Bureau researcher known as COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam), the Obama administration felt justified in using the drone strikes to combat the terrorist threat against the United States, even though that threat, for the most part, originated in Saudi Arabia.\(^{29}\) In reality, only approximately two percent of the fatalities caused by the drones were
“high-level.” By 2011, the White House knew that Osama bin Laden had sought refuge in Abbottabad, a Pakistani city nearly four hundred miles from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Moreover, the Obama administration did not target only those genuinely believed to have committed terrorism. It engaged in “signature” strikes against victims who resembled the terrorist stereotype, even if it had no idea who they were. With Kissingerian secrecy, the Obama administration refused to disclose what characteristics a victim would have to have to merit death by signature strike. Since the drone strikes were an operation of the Central Intelligence Agency rather than the U.S. military, the agency provided the casualty statistics. “It bothers me that the defendant state cannot bomb the military headquarters of the attacking state,” Khan observed. “The right to life and the right to vote is subject to such derogation. However, there is no way to prevent an emergency during the emergency,” Khan explained. “The problem was that a fiesty militant could hate the United States with a passion, yet still present no danger to the American people. A terrorist is necessarily a militant; a militant is not necessarily a terrorist. In any case, the aerial pursuit of terrorists in Pakistan came at the expense of civilians, militant or not.

The authors of Living Under Drones point out that both international humanitarian law and international human rights law could apply to the drone attacks against Pakistan. International humanitarian law deals with issues of armed conflict. As part of IHL, jus ad bellum determines whether a war is just and refers to matters such as self-defense and national sovereignty. Jus in bello, by contrast, deals with conduct in war. Liaquat Ali Khan of Washburn University School of Law clarified the matter further for me. “The humanitarian law is jus in bello, the law that regulates the course of war regardless of the fact whether the war itself is lawful or unlawful,” Khan explained. International human rights law, on the other hand, is relevant in both war and peace. “There are certain provisions of the human rights law that can be suspended under declared emergencies during the emergency,” Khan observed. “The right to vote is subject to such derogation. However, there are human rights such as right to life and the right to protection from torture, that cannot be suspended under any circumstance.”

Both Kissinger and Obama committed crimes against international law. During the Vietnam War, Cambodia had remained neutral. Prince Norodom Sihanouk never gave the Nixon administration permission to bomb his country. Although Sihanouk may not have liked the presence of the North Vietnamese within his borders, he contended that only an American withdrawal from Vietnam could bring about a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia.

Therefore, the world community could prosecute Kissinger for crimes against international humanitarian law—specifically, for the violation of the sovereignty of a neutral nation and the killing of civilians. The bombing of Cambodia was a sideshow to America’s aggressive war in Vietnam, so Kissinger could not credibly claim that the United States was acting in self-defense. In his disregard for civilian life in Cambodia, Kissinger also acted in defiance of international human rights law.

As for Obama, it is unlikely that he could ever be prosecuted for violating the sovereignty of Pakistan. Evidence from WikiLeaks indicates that the Pakistani government secretly permitted the drone strikes. A 2008 cable from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad reported Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s reaction to the drones: “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.”

In 2013, former President Pervez Musharraf also admitted that he authorized U.S. drone strikes but claimed he did so “only on a few occasions, when a target was absolutely isolated and [there was] no chance of collateral damage.” He probably authorized far more.

If Obama did not violate Pakistani sovereignty, one aspect of international humanitarian law that he did violate was the principle of proportionality. The United States has the right to defend itself against the terrorist threat, but the drone strikes are an overreaction. “Under criminal law, for example, if a person hits the defendant with hands, the defendant cannot shoot the attacker because the response lacked proportionality,” Khan informed me. “Likewise, if a state violates the border of another state with foot soldiers, the defendant state cannot bomb the military headquarters of the attacking state.”

Finally, the victimization of Pakistani civilians is also a clear breach of international human rights law. I do not expect that either Kissinger or Obama will ever stand trial in The Hague, but their policies had unanticipated consequences for policy planners in Washington. Grandin correctly understands that the bombing of Cambodia destabilized the country, enabling its takeover by the genocidal Khmer Rouge. The bombing sanctioned their extremism: When political-education cadres pointed to charred corpses and limbless children and said this was a ‘manifestation of simple American barbarism,’ who could disagree?” Grandin writes. Under the Khmer Rouge regime, 1.7 million Cambodians would die.

Not as many Pakistanis as Cambodians have died as a result of U.S. policy, but the long-term consequences of the drone strikes remain to be seen. By 2012, three-quarters of Pakistanis regarded the United States as an enemy. Remote North Waziristan, which is part of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, has been a major target of the drone strikes. “Before the drone attacks, we didn’t know [anything] about America,” said one man who bravely made the journey from North Waziristan to Islamabad for an interview. “Now everybody has come to understand and know about America…. Almost all people hate America.”

I have always believed that historians have the right to be emotional, provided they have solid facts at their disposal. Faheem Qureshi, who shares my surname but bears no familial relation to me, is a sharp reminder that the only difference between drone victims and myself is that my parents immigrated to the United States. On January 23, 2009, Obama sent in the drones for the very first time. As a result, the family compound of fourteen-year-old Faheem was struck in North Waziristan. “I felt my brain stopped working and my heart was on fire,” Faheem recalled during an interview in Islamabad. “My entire body was burning like crazy.” He had lost two uncles and a cousin.

Faheem no longer has his left eye, and he is deaf in one ear. Previously, he had excelled at his studies. “[A]t the time the drone struck, I had to take exams,” he said a few years later, “but . . . I couldn’t learn things, and it affected me emotionally.” If Faheem has regained his ability to concentrate since then, it no longer matters, for now he must support his devastated family. School is out of the question.

Some of Obama’s foreign policy initiatives met with my approval, such as the nuclear deal with Iran and the opening to Cuba. Despite these initiatives, I could never look Faheem in his remaining eye and compliment Obama’s foreign policy.
Obama’s Foreign Policy: A Postmortem

Jeremy Lembcke

The expected postmortems on the Obama presidency have commenced, with the only surprise being the negative tone of the left-liberal voices in the chorus. Writing on CounterPunch on January 12, Jack Rasmus totaled up Obama’s record with Trumpian one-sidedness.33 Nowhere on his scorecard for the domestic front do we see the president’s opposition to Trumpian one-sidedness.33 Nowhere on his scorecard for the domestic front do we see the president’s opposition to Trumpian one-sidedness.33

As weighed by his critics, Obama’s bailout of the auto industry and the banks is an inexcusable failure to see the opportunity presented by the crisis to restructure the economy. Why didn’t he nationalize the auto industry? Why didn’t he create a system of public banks?

Rasmus alludes to the refrain elicited by such questions—what would Roosevelt have done?—but he, like so many other left-liberals, seems oblivious to the vastly different political climates in which Obama and FDR governed. In 1934, the labor movement was in the ascendancy, inspired and energized by the Communist Party and a coterie of fellow-traveling academics who had both the will and the ability to lead a transition toward a post-capitalist order. The cultural infrastructure that nourished the political events of those years simply does not exist today. Had Obama let large capitalist institutions deteriorate into complete collapse, then what? The idea that there was a safety net of alternatives waiting in the wings is a fantasy worthy of Lenin’s (paraphrased) dismissal of “infantile leftism.” Lives were at stake in 2008, not just livelihoods.

Rasmus’s scorecard for the international front is just as lacking. The dressing-down given Israel for its West Bank settlements, the pollution-control agreement negotiated with China, the avoidance of a full-blown commitment to a ground war in Syria, the rapprochement with Cuba—all of it is missing or underrepresented in his CounterPunch posting. Obama’s reversal on the path toward war with Iran that Bush II had us on was huge. The nuclear agreement signed with Iran had game-changing implications for the Middle East. Obama critics on the left, like Rasmus, acknowledge the influence of the Clintonian neo-liberalism that shadowed his foreign policy, but where in their indictments do we read of the alternatives that their advocacy and activism made viable? As Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak was overthrown in 2011, Obama stood aside and let it happen; but so did the American liberal-left. Millennial hipsters were agog over the cell phones in young Arab hands; busy celebrating the world’s first “Facebook revolution,” a fanciful notion eventually debunked, they did not give a thought to the possible downsides of the free-marketing of Egypt’s economic life.53

The disastrous NATO-led and American-backed military undoing of Libya followed. And even though Muammar Qaddafi had once been embraced by the American left for his Green Revolution and the anti-colonial character of his Pan-Africanism, not a whisper was heard from that quarter. Uninformed as it was about the tribalism tamed by Qaddafi’s modernist (though imperfect) state, the agricultural development that state planning had brought to rural Libya, and the dispersing of economic resources to Saharan neighbors struggling to get out from under the crushing legacy of colonialism, even the academic left was unable to cut through the neo-liberal obfuscations of those realities with its simple-minded storyline that Qaddafi was a “bad guy” dictator who had to go. An antiwar listserve to which I subscribed at the time carried regular postings cheering his toppling and assassination.

The most consequential outcome of the Libyan state’s takedown—the real target of the NATO assault—was the power vacuum it created. That vacuum allowed Libya to become a staging area for the United States’s own military ventures into sub-Saharan Africa. Now, a small number of journalists, Nick Turse among them, are bringing into view the larger picture of the American emergence as a military power in Africa.55 But when an alternative voice from the left might have been able to give the Obama administration pause on Libya, there was silence.

If there was a learning curve in the fates of Egypt and Libya, it is mostly evident in the way the Syrian conflict unfolded. The presence of Russia and Turkey as players in the region may have stayed Obama’s hand, but the humanitarian mess left behind in Libya—witness the deadly migration of Libyans and other Africans moving through Libya—is a blot on the liberal legacy he seems to want to be associated with, a splotch he doesn’t want to see spread. His adoption of drones as the weapon-of-choice for the fight against ISIL has limited the numbers of civilian deaths and diminished the destruction of life-supporting infrastructure that was the trademark of modern wars right through the campaigns in Iraq and Libya. But as critics point out, drones create as many terrorists as they kill; and even if that were not the case, they are a cowardly technology, the use of which should be universally condemned.

As with the foregoing cases, though, critics on the left offered no alternatives to Obama’s Syria policy, save those suggested by the pacifist antiwar community, for which diplomacy, refuge, and the development of indigenous resources and support for peaceful resolutions are always the standing orders. The relative quietness with which the left accepted Obama’s approach to Syria (and other conflicts during his years in office) could be contrasted with the militant left-wing opposition to the U.S. war in Vietnam. Could a case be made that the righteousness of the Vietnamese cause for independence and the National Liberation Front’s leadership of its hardscrabble peasant movement gave the U.S. antiwar movement something to be for and not just a war to oppose—and that there is nothing comparable to the NLF in Syria?

In fact, the geopolitical complexity of the Syrian conflict brings with it opportunities to think outside the Obama box. But the left didn’t recognize any viable alternatives to the Obama policy, perhaps because of its limited knowledge of history or its political illiteracy. The Kurdish people in northern Syria and Iraq, southern Turkey, and a portion of Iran have waged a decades-long struggle for independence that has legitimacy equal to the Vietnamese struggle. Under the leadership of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), they have exhibited respect for the same principles for which the Vietnamese fought, and they haveanchored the recent military resistance to the Islamist ISIL forces. In the midst of their own horror, and with the guidance of the PKK (labeled a “terrorist organization” by the United States), young Kurds spawned the Revolutionary Patriotic Youth Movement (the YDC) in the town of Cizira in the Rojava District on the Turkey-Syria border and instituted a female-led communal model of self-governance with education for girls, free speech and freedom of religion.

The Rojava development got some notice from mainstream media, raising questions for the left, which could not have been unaware of the project.56 Where were the material aid projects for Rojava, like the 1967 American Quaker mission that defied government authority and took medical supplies to North Vietnam aboard the chartered Phoenix? Where were the Venceremos Brigades that ignored the embargo against Cuba in 1969 and mobilized young
Agree with Lubna Qureshi on her comparison of Obama and Kissinger and on the costs of the drone war, and I thank her for providing the perspective of someone who could have been a victim of drone warfare herself.

I think Jerry Lembcke makes some excellent points about Obama and the failings of the left, and he presents good ideas that the left should adopt with regard to supporting the Kurds. I agree with him that many of the failings of the Obama years had to do with the existing political climate in the country and weakness of organized labor and social movements; however, I also believe Obama could have done more to encourage and inspire the progressive base that voted for him. From another perspective, Obama could be viewed as an effective tool of the so-called military establishment. Despite having perpetuated many of Bush’s policies and expanded the drone war, he was able to defuse antiwar activism, which was far more pervasive under Bush.

Although the general thrust of KC Johnson’s essay makes sense, I think he makes some questionable statements about the Reagan administration and human rights and the Clinton administration and genocide. Reagan’s second term, for example, was dominated by the Iran Contra hearings, which influenced his administration’s policies. And I don’t believe the war in Kosovo prevented any genocide; in fact, it has been documented that human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing increased after the U.S. intervention, as had been predicted. Furthermore, the United States backed a group—the Kosovo Liberation Army—that was implicated in drug trafficking and had previously been considered a terrorist group by the State Department. The human rights climate has not been particularly good under their rule.

Johnson also claims that Obama was more interested in human rights in his second term. But how then does one account for the record number of arms deals Obama made with Saudi Arabia, one of the worst dictatorships in the world, as it was in the process of invading Yemen? And can it be true that Obama was actually weak on Russia when his administration expanded NATO into Eastern Europe, intensified competition for control of natural resources in the Arctic, supported the coup in Ukraine against Victor Yanukovych and provided financing for its new pro-Western regime? In Syria, Obama also armed anti-Assad rebels, escalated the use of private military contractors and began bombing there. In September 2013, he attempted to promote a wider military intervention based on unsubstantiated claims of chemical gas use by Assad, which the public rejected. Thus I don’t believe there is much substance to the idea that Obama was soft on Russia, despite all the cries of the right wing.

There are a couple of other points I wanted to raise. While I credited Obama for the opening to Cuba, neither I nor others who mentioned it raised critical questions about what the administration’s true motives might have been. Perhaps it was an attempt to revive America’s image and prevent its complete isolation in the wake of the leftist reorientation of the continent in the last decade. Obama’s Cuba policy could also be connected to the State Department’s tacit endorsement of the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil and the putsch of Michel Temer, an endorsement that was consistent with the long-lived U.S. policy of seeking to undermine the left in Latin America.

Another issue brought up in a couple of the essays concerns Israel and the settlements on the West Bank. KC Johnson notes growing public sympathy for the Palestinian perspective and increasing polarization over this issue. One could in turn critically address the contradictions in Obama’s overall policy toward Israel. His administration
provided huge weapons shipments to Israel while Israel carried out two major wars that resulted in shifts in public opinion because of their adverse humanitarian consequences.

Notes:
19. See, for instance, this 1967 conversation between President Johnson and Arthur Goldberg (audio at https://kc-johnson.com/lbj-goldberg-on-pakistani-un-resolution-re-jerusalem/), where the U.S. abstention was intended as a pro-Israel position.
22. Ibid., 225.
24. Grandin, In Kissinger’s Shadow, 70.
34. Becker and Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List.’”
35. Living Under Drones, 30; Becker and Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List.’”
36. Living Under Drones, 30.
38. Ibid., 105–7.
40. Ibid.
44. Lliaquat Ali Khan, e-mail to author, 8 January 2017.
45. Grandin, Kissinger’s Shadow, 180.
47. Living Under Drones, 133.
49. Living Under Drones, 70.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 72.
52. Ackerman, “Victim of Obama’s First Drone Strike.”
54. https:/ /www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/25/egypt-5-years-on-was-it-ever-a-social-media-revolution.
How to be Heard by Congress and Federal Agencies on Policy Matters

Kristin Hoganson

In a time of tectonic shifts in U.S. foreign relations, the expertise of diplomatic historians and area studies experts is of particular value. The members of SHAFR can also offer policymakers important perspectives on matters such as archival access, Freedom of Information Act implementation, and Fulbright and Title VI programs. With this in mind, Kristin Hoganson (SHAFR's representative to the National Coalition for History), has condensed some advocacy advice offered by NCH Executive Director Lee White and his collaborator, Heather Huyck.

1. Build Relationships Before You Need Them

Congressional staffers are the most likely contacts for you to develop on the Hill. Meeting with committee staffers is generally as effective as meeting with members. Hill staff members are often specialists, but they may not know about the issues that concern you. You do not need to travel to Washington. All members of Congress have state and district offices, and you can arrange a meeting there. Prepare before you meet, call, or write. Frame your issues in ways they will understand. It strengthens your case if you can make it clear to your members of congress or their staffers how your issues will affect their district and state.

2. If a personal visit is not practical and time is critical, make a phone call.

All members of Congress are accessible through the U.C. Capitol switchboard at (202) 225-3121. Once you reach a member's office, ask the receptionist for the person who handles the issue you care about. Be as specific as possible. For example, if it is a bill about National Archives funding, ask for the staff person who handles appropriations issues. If you know a specific bill number, use it to find the proper person. Phone calls give the member a sense of what constituents are thinking. On issues that garner little public attention, your influence will be magnified.

3. Be succinct with staffers.

If you do not have a relationship with a staff person who handles the issue in which you are interested, you will probably be connected to his or her voice mail system. Leave a succinct message (staffers are pressed for time), stating your name, phone number, place of residence, and views. Do not be discourteous or stridently partisan, and do not make threats about the next election. Strive to be as objective as possible. If there is opposition to your position, know it, acknowledge it, and address it. If you do get through to a staff person, stick to the succinctness rule. State the most important point first. Avoid jargon and arcane academic and technical terms. Politicians and their staff understand sound bites – so make the most of them. Expect only a few minutes and let the staffer ask questions. Get the staffer's name and e-mail address – it may be quicker and easier to get through to the staffer in the future using email.

4. If you cannot telephone, send an email.

If you want to weigh in on short notice, do not use snail mail. But keep in mind that Congress gets literally millions of emails every year. Emails tend to work best if part of a large, coordinated effort. You should also know that most congressional offices have computer systems that block emails from zip codes that do not originate from the member's congressional district or state. Be specific – email about one issue at a time. Be persistent – especially if the member is undecided.

5. Find out when your member of Congress will come to your community.

Go to the town hall meeting, campaign event, or other meeting to discuss issues that concern you. Invite your legislators to speak on campus, at meetings, and in public forums.

6. The best way to establish a relationship with a member of Congress or a candidate is to work on their election campaign.

You won’t always get what you want, but you will get to know staff members and enhance your chances of access.

7. Federal agencies develop the regulations and policies needed to implement the legislation passed by Congress.

Questions, expressions of concern, and suggestions can influence how federal agencies act. As with Congress,
establishing contacts within agencies can be helpful. You can provide expertise and real-world perspectives sometimes lacking in federal bureaucracies. You can be a source of information for federal employees, just as with congressional staff.

In the U.S. State Department, the Secretary’s Office of Global Partnerships strives to build public/private partnerships that strengthen diplomacy and development outcomes. The State Department’s Office of Public Engagement responds to public comments, as noted on its web page: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/index.htm. For information on its larger mission, see: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/about/index.htm. Contact information for Office of Public Engagement is also on its website: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/pc/index.htm.

8. Remember that you are representing not only yourself, but the History profession as well.

9. To stay informed on advocacy issues pertaining to the historical profession, you can subscribe to the National Coalition for History newsletter: http://www.historycoalition.org.

You can find user groups and blogs on the Internet that are devoted to the policy issues that concern you. If the policy work in you is strong, the Federal Register, published daily, lists all federal agency notices, proposed rules, meetings, and so forth. This is not easy for people with day jobs (even ones in legislation and lobbying) to navigate, but the Register does provide some tips to readers: https://www.federalregister.gov/reader-aids/using-federalregister-gov/advanced-search-tips-and-techniques.

10. Reach out to larger audiences.

Connect with others who share your expertise or concerns. Encourage them to contact their members of Congress as well. Identify venues for initiating mass calling and emailing efforts. Reach out to wider publics and encourage your audiences to become involved in the democratic process.


There are different views on advocacy. On a 2015 survey finding that personalized letters, e-mails, and letters to the editor influence lawmakers’ opinions more than telephone calls, and for other reflections on being heard, see Kathryn Schulz, “What Calling Congress Achieves,” The New Yorker, March 6, 2017 (available on-line). Another helpful resource is M.V. Lee Badgett, The Public Professor: How to Use Your Research to Change the World (New York: NYU Press, 2015).
Agents of Civilization: A Review of Joanna Williams, Academic Freedom in an Age of Conformity: Confronting the Fear of Knowledge

Kimber Quinney

Sixty years ago this year, a landmark Supreme Court case reconfirmed the relationship between academic freedom and democracy in the context of Cold War McCarthyism. Paul M. Sweezy, a professor at the University of New Hampshire, had been interrogated by the New Hampshire attorney general about his suspected affiliations with the Communist Party. Citing his First Amendment rights, Sweezy refused to answer questions about his lectures and writings, provoking the attorney general to file a petition on behalf of the state of New Hampshire to compel Sweezy to respond. The district court granted the petition, and again Sweezy refused to answer. On appeal, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), the Supreme Court decided in favor of Sweezy in his opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren emphasized the essential importance of academic freedom to a thriving liberal democracy:

Theessential of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation... Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will stagnate and die.1

Joseph McCarthy passed away in 1957, but the ghost of politicized censorship lingers in the halls of our universities in 2017.2 Joanna Williams’s Academic Freedom in an Age of Conformity: Confronting the Fear of Knowledge is the most recent among a handful of books published in the last five years that point to an apparent paradigm shift in higher education, a shift that has resulted in the sacrifice of academic freedom.3 Observers on both the left and the right—albeit for very different reasons—that academic freedom is under attack. The most recent incident at the University of California, Berkeley makes it clear that both sides of the political spectrum are concerned.4 Not surprisingly, this debate is couched in the context of political divisions and cultural wars. Williams explicitly links the fragility of academic freedom to contemporary social and cultural movements; in her view, it is not only academic freedom, but the mission of the university itself that is the victim of a changing relationship between scholar, student and society.

In Academic Freedom, Williams offers a sobering critique of contemporary trends in academia that threaten to stifle free thought and the essential primacy of knowledge creation and deliberation at the university. The author makes her claim loudly and unapologetically. “The aim of this book,” she reminds her readers, “is to make the case for academic freedom as foundational to the idea of a university” (20). If the subtitle, Confronting the Fear of Knowledge, isn’t sufficient to convey the gravity of her concerns, Williams reiterates throughout the book how and why cultural and social tides that advocate for social justice threaten to drown out academic freedom.

Williams seeks to defend against this risk by analyzing how we got here in the first place. Her focus is on the state of American and British university systems. She begins by tracing the origins and history of academic freedom, and then turns to explain how late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century intellectual fashions and emerging disciplinary and institutional structures pose a direct and deadly threat to the valued principle of academic freedom. In her view, the twenty-first-century university serves to cultivate (and protect) an environment in which administrators, faculty, and students have become intimidated by knowledge.

The result is nothing less than the erosion of the university’s mission. The notion that the university exists to identify and debate truth has given way to ideologically politicized social objectives that are, in Williams’s view, not merely inappropriate to the purpose of the university, but directly threaten the whole enterprise of teaching and learning in the tradition of liberal education. Her treatise seeks to expose the culprits in an effort to reverse the tides.

Academic Freedom is more than Freedom of Speech

“Academics,” Williams asserts, “should have all the same rights to free speech enshrined within law as other citizens” (7). Her book identifies the dangers to academic freedom when students and universities seek to enforce freedom from speech. But she also demonstrates the slippery slope between loss of freedom of speech and loss of intellectual freedom.

In the tradition of liberal education, she observes, “intellectual freedom is essential for making a ‘marketplace of ideas,’ a metaphor that draws upon concepts discussed in Mill’s On Liberty, a reality” (5). The metaphor of the marketplace of ideas refers to the notion that truth will emerge if ideas are set in competition with one another. “Exposing ideas to critical scrutiny,” she explains, “which is the liberal project that academic freedom supports, allows for some ideas to be discredited and better ideas to win out. Circumventing this intellectual process curtails both freedom and justice” (14). Ideological neutrality is essential to this search for knowledge, because the best ideas win
out, not the loudest advocates of any particular perspective or approach to thinking. It is from this traditional liberal appreciation for the pursuit of knowledge as a value in and of itself that the concept of academic freedom emerged.

In 1915, the American Association of University Professors first convened in New York. John Dewey was anointed as the AAUP’s inaugural president and chair of the AAUP Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure. Dewey was well known for his views on education and democracy. For him, education—and educators—had a fundamental role to play in the creation and preservation of democracy through what he termed “social science inquiry.” Educators, he argued, could do more than inform their students; they could help inform society. Dewey challenged the social sciences to engage in inquiry that was “artful.” Like art, he argued, social inquiry was a means for individuals to touch the “deeper levels of life” and reflect critically on their conditions.

In 1915, the committee issued its “Declaration of Principles of Academic Freedom,” articulating the three core purposes of the university (all of which are very familiar to those of us who hold jobs in higher education): (1) to promote inquiry and advance the sum of human knowledge; (2) to provide general instruction to the students; and (3) to develop experts for various branches of the public service. The declaration’s articulation of research, teaching, and service has of course become the standard measure of scholarly achievement in academia. What often gets lost in contemporary appreciation of the origins of academic freedom, however, is the original intent of the third component of service. The concept of public service has changed significantly in the one hundred years since Dewey’s committee articulated it in the 1915 declaration. Today, service typically refers to serving on departmental, college or campus-wide committees. But a central component of academic freedom as it was originally conceived by Dewey and others in the AAUP was to improve society. Following this line of thinking, educators had an obligation to contribute to the larger public good. They thought of universities (and primary and secondary education) as contexts for social inquiry and for informing society. However, the role of the university has evolved to prioritize and advance social justice, or what Williams refers to as “academic justice.”

The Dangers of Conflating Freedom and Democracy and Justice

The debate over the relationship between democracy and justice is beyond the scope of this review. But suffice it to say that they are not one and the same; moreover, they are likely to come into conflict. It is this very conflict between justice and democracy in higher education that Williams addresses. Williams asserts that academic justice—the focus on “justice and inclusion” in academia—is being valued over academic freedom. “Restricting terrain of discussion, placing some topics beyond challenge, presenting knowledge as simply individual perspectives and blurring knowledge, beliefs, and values all contribute towards the creation of a culture of conformity in academia. Such enforced consensus is the antithesis of academic freedom” (15). This model is not, according to Williams, an appropriate or democratic foundation for the university. And the irony is that the pursuit of this mission—in lieu of the pursuit of knowledge—perpetuates injustice. Those in favor of placing some ideas beyond discussion for fear that they will offend marginalized groups unintentionally undermine the agency and capacity of those groups to think for themselves. Limiting academic freedom in this regard, from Williams’s perspective, “assumes historically disadvantaged groups are unable to cope with free speech and to win debates on the merit of their arguments” (196).

The origin of the problem, Williams explains, is found in “new moral orthodoxies” that have led academics and students to police their language, monitor their behavior and self-censor. In this context, the commitment to academic freedom is sidelined in favor of a preconceived notion that the purpose of the university is to become an “agent of social change” and to educate students to do the same. Indeed, concludes Williams, “in a number of academic disciplines, research and teaching have become so inherently bound up with the promotion of a particular political outlook that it becomes difficult to determine where scholarship ends and campaigning begins” (179).

Williams identifies problematic trends in higher learning that help to explain how academia is strangled by a contemporary acceptance of (and codes for) conformity. “The assumption that some knowledge is incontestable contributes towards a culture of conformity in universities,” she writes (10). Emergent disciplinary structures discard a holistic approach to knowledge in favor of a far narrower and more specific focus. The vogue for interdisciplinarity in higher education actually represents a critique of disciplines as elitist and a rejection of the idea that knowledge is intrinsically valuable. “Teaching an interdisciplinary subject that highlights the voices of marginalized groups, questions the concept of a subject-specific canon, encourages students to create their own knowledge or focuses on teaching skills as opposed to content, is often seen as preferable to passing on a particular body of disciplinary-specific knowledge” (121).

The impact of cultural theory on academia is to some degree related to these trends. As a result of the application of cultural theory, “it came to be accepted that selection of cultural content, be it in the form of a canon or a curriculum, was a site of vested interests. The assumption was that
more education should move away from a straightforward transmission of knowledge . . . towards the exposure of ideology.” (147). Williams believes this shift had profound consequences. Whereas the intention was to push the pendulum against a perceived elitist tradition, the result has been that certain sources of knowledge are presented as more valid than other sources of knowledge and are prioritized over them.9

Curriculum content has come to be determined less on the intrinsic merit of the knowledge to be covered than on the perspectives it represents. By this argument, classic texts, especially those written by “Dead White European Men,” have less to offer students than works by people previously under-represented within the academy. Students are encouraged, not to take ownership of an intellectual birthright and to make it anew for their own generation, but to reject the past in favour of an ever-present focus on identity (148).

The two emerging interdisciplinary examples that Williams identifies are Cultural Studies and Women’s Studies. She makes a strong case for the ways in which these emerging studies, with the best of intentions, have prioritized social change as their purpose. “Cultural Studies,” she explains, “was the first incarnation of a subject to be built on the explicit premise that all knowledge is political and ultimately reducible to an ideological expression of power relations” (122). The result, she laments, is the total abandonment of any pretense to truth or objectivity.

Williams is especially critical of Feminist Studies for launching an attack on academic freedom from within the academy. In her view, the feminist perception that women are primarily victims of patriarchal norms, which originated on the Left, has had two profoundly negative impacts on academic freedom. First, the focus on identity politics—and “the assumption that no one can speak outside of their own biological or social experience on behalf of anyone else”—prevents criticism of any particular perspective (173). Second, the rejection of debate and the curtailment of any perceived opposition is “an indulgent academic exercise that fails to respect people’s lived experiences” (173–74).

The consequences have been devastating for the university. “By legitimizing the politicization of academic work, Women’s Studies and feminist academics more broadly, consciously abandoned the aspiration toward objectivity. The role of researcher and teacher no longer assumed a position of neutrality; an instrumental approach to teaching and research in order to promote particular political rather than intellectual goals was assumed” (160).

A third emergent “orthodoxy” that Williams takes to task is identity politics. As a foundational premise for the pursuit of knowledge, identity politics has had some profound effects on the academy, among which—again, in spite of an intention to create inclusive learning environments—is the sacrifice of objectivity to personal and individual sentiments. “Where once the academy saw emotion as detrimental to scholarship, now the focus on identity privileges subjectivity over objectivity and places feelings at the heart of the university. . . . A problem with bringing individual feelings into academic work is that it leaves little distance between the individual researcher and the knowledge pursued” (186–87).

Moreover, asserts Williams, identity politics make the very concept of critical thinking—of learning how to think, not what to think—a challenge. “The more the inclusive university prioritizes sensitivity to feelings and respect for individuals, the more difficult the formulation of criticism becomes. Criticism is avoided altogether, couched in provisos or presented as just a different understanding from a member of an alternative identity group. The prevention of offence requires the silencing of critics and potential offenders. It requires that dissenting voices be suppressed” (187). Earlier, Williams notes that “the replacement of a clash of competing views with a focus on sensitivity and respect prevents the exercise of academic freedom as it has traditionally been understood. Worse, it often serves to enforce an intolerance of dissent” (184).

This phenomenon helps to explain trigger warnings. The use of trigger warnings, in Williams’s view, “speaks to an assumption that students cannot distance themselves emotionally from the subject content under investigation and that lecturers [faculty] should not expect them to do so” (187). She cites plenty of evidence for this growing protocol and argues that demands for it close down debates to the point where the university’s mission becomes one of creating “a safe space” rather than intellectually challenging students. “For real learning to take place, students need to be pushed beyond their comfort zone” (17).10

Here Williams could perhaps explore further the role of students in the changing relationship between scholar, student, and society. She acknowledges that students are themselves responsible for the culture of diversity and the “era of conformity” that she describes, but students are slighted in her analysis. Whereas she emphasizes academic freedom for faculty and the duty of the university to advocate for and protect that freedom, what students think of free speech is perhaps more important than she realizes.

In 2015, two professors at University of California, Irvine, Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman, taught a course on free speech and shared their findings in the Chronicle Review. Their conclusions confirm the pedagogical focus on student learning and the growing centrality of the student perspective in higher education. But they also reveal a profound generational disconnect with regard to the perceived value and importance of “free speech.” The UC Irvine professors remind us that these students grew up with an anti-bullying culture. As a result, “this generation has a very strong and persistent instinct to protect others against hate, discriminatory, or intolerant speech, especially in educational settings.”11

For this reason, perhaps, students simply do not value free speech, nor do they appreciate its relationship to democracy. Chemerinsky and Gillman found, for example, that their students knew little about the history of free speech in the United States. “For today’s students, the historical link between free speech and the protection of dissenters and vulnerable groups is outside their direct experience, and too distant to affect their feelings about freedom of speech.” More tellingly, they discovered that their students’ “initial instinct” was to be “more trusting of the government and other public institutions, including the university, to regulate speech to protect students and prevent disruptions of the educational environment. . . . [I]n educational settings, they wanted officials to do all they can to create a supportive learning environment.”12 In other words, university college students today are far more concerned about limiting harmful speech than they are concerned about the harm done by limiting free speech.13

This is obviously part of the problem.

In addition to the ways that students think about free speech, another central factor in explaining the prioritization of academic justice over academic freedom is the professionalization and canonization of Student Affairs. In recent years, Student Affairs divisions across the nation have adopted co-curricular student learning objectives that explicitly define social justice as key to the education of the whole student. Moreover, for an increasing number of universities, the cross-cultural centers are housed in Student Affairs, further pressuring the institution to embrace a mission of social justice. Indeed, because of the perceived divides between Student Affairs and Academic Affairs, contemporary Student Affairs scholarship focuses largely on ways to bridge the gaps that persist between
those two institutional pillars. The result is an undetected (or at least underappreciated) cross-pollination between co-curricular learning objectives defined by student support staff and curricular (and content-driven) classroom learning objectives defined by faculty. The increasing emphasis on closer collaboration between Student Affairs and Academic Affairs might also explain the renewed attention being given to defining student academic freedom.\textsuperscript{14}

Agents of Change versus Agents of Civilization

At the most fundamental level, Williams asks her readers to think beyond the issue of academic freedom. She pushes us to ask a singular question that is on the minds of many people, educators and observers alike, as we make our way into the new century. What is a university? What is a university for? Or, as earlier scholars have asked, “What is the idea of the university?”\textsuperscript{15}

Merriam Webster defines the university as “(1) an institution of higher learning providing facilities for teaching and research and authorized to grant academic degrees; specifically: one made up of an undergraduate division which confers bachelor’s degrees and a graduate division which comprises a graduate school and professional schools each of which may confer master’s degrees and doctorates; (2) the physical plant of a university.”\textsuperscript{16} But the idea of the university—its purpose, its mission, its raison d’être—is not entirely agreed upon, as Williams’s book reveals. “Rejecting the liberal project of advancing knowledge through competing truth claims has left universities without a purpose” (197). America suffers from social injustices. Deep and painful divisions persist in the nation; it is plagued by racism, economic inequality, a broken criminal justice system, gender inequality, and religious discrimination. In such troubling times, an understandable response is to assert that the university exists to advance social justice and the culture of diversity and that faculty are thus agents of social change. But, as Williams shows, the relationship between social justice and academic freedom is complicated.

In the 1990s, in an article about the role of the university and social change, Doris Wilkinson confronted this dilemma. She acknowledged that, as the century was drawing to a close, “questions remain about the limits of the university to direct necessary social innovations and minimize the negative outcomes from ideological polemics. What is the logical place of higher education in addressing both the needs of the society and the risks to academic freedom?”\textsuperscript{17}

Well into the second decade of the twenty-first century, we now find ourselves in the midst of what Wilkinson fairly predicted: doing our best to balance the needs of society with risks to academic freedom.\textsuperscript{18} Whereas Dewy urged twentieth-century educators to bring education to society, in our century society has been brought to the university.\textsuperscript{19}

We should not be surprised to learn, then, that a number of universities have claimed social change as an explicit mission. For example, Saybrook University says that it provides “rigorous graduate education that inspires transformational change in individuals, organizations, and communities, toward a just, humane, and sustainable world.” The university offers an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Transformative Social Change. The Community Solution (TCS) is a non-profit collaborative of colleges, founded in 2009. Its professed mission is to prepare “innovative, engaged, purposeful agents of change who serve our global community.” Walden University—a fully online university—is unabashedly committed to social change.\textsuperscript{20} Is this the appropriate role for the university? Is social justice the idea of the university?

Major university administrators are not convinced. Columbia University president Lee Bollinger, in a speech to the American Bar Association, addressed the third guiding principle of academic freedom: contributing to the public good by informing society. He argued that “while faculty members and students are free to take whatever positions they wish on public matters, universities are not... The risk in joining the public sphere is that we jeopardize the scholarly ethos... The last thing we want to do is turn the campus into a political convention.”\textsuperscript{21} Similarly, in its “Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression,” the University of Chicago reiterated the primacy of academic freedom:

In a word, the University’s fundamental commitment is to the principle that debate or deliberation may not be suppressed because the ideas put forth are thought by some or even by most members of the University community to be offensive, unwise, immoral, or wrong-headed. It is for the individual members of the University community, not for the University as an institution, to make those judgments for themselves, and to act on those judgments not by seeking to suppress speech, but by openly and vigorously contesting the ideas that they oppose. Indeed, fostering the ability of members of the University community to engage in such debate and deliberation in an effective and responsible manner is an essential part of the University’s educational mission.\textsuperscript{22}

And most recently, former Stanford provost John Etchemendy warned of the “threat from within” in a speech to the Board of Trustees:

Over the years, I have watched a growing intolerance at universities in this country—not intolerance along racial or ethnic or gender lines—there, we have made laudable progress. Rather, a kind of intellectual intolerance, a political one-sidedness, that is the antithesis of what universities should stand for. It manifests itself in many ways: in the intellectual monocultures that have taken over certain disciplines; in the demands to disinvite speakers and outlaw groups whose views we find offensive; in constant calls for the university itself to take political stands.\textsuperscript{23}

A reappraisal of academic freedom one hundred years after the issuance of the 1915 declaration is badly needed, Williams says. And faculty would do well to reclaim the role of agents of civilization. Whereas some of us might indeed define ourselves as and volunteer to become agents of social change, the purpose of the university and its scholars, the purpose that will prevail is to be agents of civilization, and we should return to that calling.

In 1930, the philosopher Bertrand Russell described teachers as “guardians of civilization.”

Civilization, in the more important sense, is a thing of the mind, not of material adjuncts to the physical side of living. It is a matter partly of knowledge, partly of emotion. So far as knowledge is concerned, a man should be aware of the minuteness of himself and his immediate environment in relation to the world in time and space. He should see his own country not only as home, but as one among the countries of the world, all with an equal
right to live and think and feel. He should see his own age in relation to the past and the future, and be aware that its own controversies will seem as strange to future ages as those of the past seem to us now. Taking an even wider view, he should be conscious of the vastness of geological epochs and astronomical abysses; but he should be aware of all this, not as a weight to crush the individual human spirit, but as a vast panorama which enlarges the mind that contemplates it. To fulfill its mandate as an agent of civilization, to teach students to take “the wider view” and see themselves “in relation to the past and the future,” the university must protect academic freedom above all else. The creating, sharing, and deliberating of knowledge in an unfettered, uncensored way cannot be forsaken for any other potential good—including social change. If the university should succumb to the tides of social and cultural change, it will falter in its reason for being. As Williams persuasively argues, if we do not protect academic freedom, we risk far more than we can imagine.

Notes:
2. In contrast to George William McCarthyism, Williams avows that the current “attack” on academic freedom came “not from outside the university but from within, and not from the political right but from the radical left.” (172) Cited frequently by Williams, it is a good opportunity to revisit Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (Oxford, UK, 1986).
4. The violent protests against and eventual cancellation of the scheduled appearance by Breitbart News Network editor Milo Yiannopoulos at UC Berkeley in February 2017 provoked many conservatives to cry foul play with regard to the university’s failure to protect academic freedom. President Donald Trump’s tweeted response—that if U.C. Berkeley does not allow free speech and practices violence on innocent people with a different point of view — NO FEDERAL FUNDS”—provoked liberals to accuse the administration of threatening to violate academic freedom.
6. On December 21, 2010, Carey Nelson, then president of the AAUP, clarified academic freedom—what it was and what it was not. First and foremost, asserted Nelson, “academic freedom means that both faculty members and students can engage in intellectual debate without fear of censorship or retaliation.” Second, he reminded his readers, “academic freedom establishes faculty members’ right to remain true to his or her pedagogical philosophy and intellectual commitments. It preserves the intellectual integrity of our educational system and thus serves the public good” (my emphasis). Inside Higher Ed, https://www.inside-highered.com/views/2010/12/21/defining-academic-freedom.
8. It is unnecessary and even irrelevant to document the obvious benefits of teaching social justice in any given course. But it is crucially important to distinguish between a faculty member’s choosing to teach social justice as its mission and raison d’être. In response to “left-wing” critics who argue that academic freedom is elitist, Williams responds unapologetically that “it is true that academic freedom is an elitist principle but it is an elitism that privileges ideas based on their intellectual merit rather than their social origins.” Academic Freedom, 13.
9. It should be noted that Williams’s perspective is often shared in public debates. See “The right to fright: An obsession with safe spaces is not just bad for education: it also diminishes worthwhile campus protests,” Economist, November 14, 2015; and Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, “The Codding of the American Mind,” Atlantic, September 2015. Karin Agness, founder of the National Center for Public Impact, summarizes: “Students should not be intellectually bubble-wrapped, shielded from any idea that they might find new or frightening. They shouldn’t be Retreat to safe spaces and worse, our universities themselves shouldn’t become intellectually homogenous safe spaces where everyone marches to the same tune. The world does not work that way—nor should it—and universities do a disservice to their students by otherwise.” (10) In the wake of the 2016 presidential election, Mark Lilla, professor of humanities at Columbia University, makes a strong case for a “post-identity liberalism” in “The End of Identity Liberalism,” New York Times, November 18, 2016.
12. See, for example, Henry Reichman (AAUP’s first vice president, and chair of the AAUP Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure) “On Student Academic Freedom” Inside Higher Ed, December 14, 2015 https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2015/12/04/what-does-student-academic-freedom-entail-
t first glance, it would appear that the argument set forth in Shadi Hamid’s book, Temptations of Power: Islamists & Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East, could have unsettling implications for policymakers. “The idea that more democracy leads to greater moderation and the inverse—that political exclusion makes radicalization more likely—are intuitive,” Hamid writes (112). But neither idea is true. Hamid rejects what he calls the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis”—the oft-stated notion that inclusion in political systems moderates Islamist parties (39). Instead, he contends, it is repression that can lead to moderation once these parties enter the political system.

Just as provocatively, Hamid argues that for a long time Islamist groups lost elections on purpose because staying in opposition, and perhaps even under repression, helped solidify their popular support. They owed their popularity to the social services and deep community outreach they offered to make up for government failures. To maintain these activities, they needed to stay out of power but still remain part of the political system. The only way they could achieve that goal was to moderate their core messages (which they did primarily by de-emphasizing Islamic law). This pattern of behavior makes it clear, Hamid argues, that “increasing levels of repression, rather than resulting in radicalization, can have a moderating effect on Islamist groups, pushing them to reconsider and redefine their policy priorities” (56).

Hamid, a fellow at the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World in the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, seeks to answer the questions posed by many Western scholars and pundits: Can democracy work in Arab countries? Is Islamism—or Islam more generally—compatible with democracy? And does political repression work? He tackles his subject by examining three countries in depth—Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia—and by exploring the similarities and differences that drive the ideologies of the very different Islamist parties in the region.

Borrowing a term popularized by Fareed Zakaria, Hamid also presents a notion of “illiberal democracy” in the Middle East. Rather than the Western model—whereby liberalization preceded democracy; but the two generally progressed hand-in-hand—“third-wave democracies,” such as many developing countries, have tended to move toward democracy, with liberalism (possibly, but just as often not) to follow. As Zakaria notes elsewhere, constitutional liberalism may be marked by “the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property” but that “bundle of freedoms has nothing intrinsically to do with democracy” (quoted on 24). On the other hand, Hamid observes, illiberal democracies “in the developing world saw democratically elected leaders using popular mandates to infringe upon basic liberties” (25). Elections in such systems were basically free and fair, and an opposition, though often weak and disjointed, remained. But adherents to illiberalism had their limits.

Hamid observes illiberal democracies “in the developing world saw democratically elected leaders using popular mandates to infringe upon basic liberties.” Elections in such systems were basically free and fair, and an opposition, though often weak and disjointed, remained. But adherents to illiberalism had their limits.

It has become en vogue among publishers in recent years to include some variation of the phrase “the new Middle East” in books about the Arab Spring, that turbulent period between late 2010 and mid-2012 when a wave of revolutionary fervor shook a number of Middle Eastern states. Most of these works analyze the protests and their aftermath. John Esposito, Tamara Sonn, and John Voll take a slightly different approach in their recent book, Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring. They plunge into the causal mechanisms at work in that upheaval and conclude that, yes, democracy and Islam can co-exist, so long as we accept varying definitions and degrees of democracy. They stress differential levels of democratic governance across the region, based in part on influences such as the military, economics, and outside actors. Hamid’s approach also differs from that taken by the majority of Arab Spring books. The value of Temptations of Power is that, stripped of vacuous idealism, it offers a clear-eyed examination of the hard-fought realities on the ground in the years leading up to and during the Arab Spring. His excellent research, which includes Arabic sources, is underpinned by interviews with top Islamists in the three countries that serve as his case studies.

Among the most provocative arguments Hamid puts forward is that Islamist groups have frequently lost elections on purpose. For Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamid maintains, self-preservation has traditionally trumped political success. The Brotherhood has derived its popularity from its charitable, educational, and preaching activities. In reaching out to local communities, it has succeeded where state institutions have failed. It is seen as caring more about “helping ordinary people” and “providing high-quality services at affordable prices”; it is also viewed as “less corrupt” than its “secular counterparts” (117). But in order to continue to provide services, it has to remain in the opposition. Moreover, gaining power would compel “Islamist parties to take definitive positions on controversial issues, which is something they would rather avoid” (160).

In the wake of the early 1990s election disaster in Algeria, when Islamists won but were denied power by the secularists, and a brutal civil war ensued, Islamists across the Middle East faced fierce repression. They had to moderate their positions in order to survive. In Egypt, this period helped establish the Brotherhood as a likely
inheritor of the state in the event that Hosni Mubarak’s autocratic regime collapsed.

Yet Hamid demonstrates that it was the long history of repression that led the Brotherhood to moderate its positions, particularly in Egypt and Jordan. After a particularly intense crackdown in the 1990s, the Egyptian and Jordanian Brotherhoods issued “foundational texts” in which they expressed support for political pluralism and human rights while downplaying their support of Shariah. Why did they do this? Again, Hamid claims that it was because they had come to act as a sort of parallel state that provided the social services the government failed to provide—services that largely explain the Brotherhood’s popularity. But unless it moderated to some extent, the Brotherhood was likely to face fierce government repression that would affect those services—and thus greatly damage the Brotherhood’s legitimacy in its supporters’ eyes.

This balancing act seemed to work for a while. Then, in 2005, the Egyptian Brotherhood won eighty-eight seats in Parliament. It achieved this result by downplaying moral and theological issues and praising democratic processes and responsible governance. In opposition, “survival became a means as well as an end” for Islamist groups, according to Hamid (206). Indeed, the short-term moves Islamists made to ensure the survival of their movement eventually became intrinsic to their platforms. Their rising popularity provoked concerns in Mubarak’s regime, which again launched a crackdown.

But even for autocratic regimes, the outright eradication of Islamist parties has often proved counterproductive. It is in their interest to keep the parties in the system, but at arm’s length. “A ‘moderate’ party is a more viable substitute for the regime,” Hamid contends. “Such a party has a better chance of attracting liberal and leftist supporters, in the process forging a common front against authoritarianism” (136). Therefore, authoritarian regimes prefer to have a “radical” party in opposition rather than a “moderate” party because the former would be less likely than the latter to gain domestic and international support. Hamid suggests that “low to moderate levels of repression short of outright eradication” may have the most potent effect on moderating Islamist parties (45).

The period of moderate repression, then, has turned out to be when ideological moderation takes place. “Islamist groups in Egypt and Jordan moderated not because of democracy, but before it,” he writes (207). Hamid also sets out his own criteria for what constitutes moderation. Rather than go with the mainstream idea, sometimes derided as “doing the things we want Islamist parties to do” (45), he tracks “their approach to democracy and the democratic process and, relatedly, the primacy of Islamic law in the political order,” their “cooperation with non-Islamist groups,” “their position and policies toward women’s and minorities’ rights,” and their “degree of internal organizational reform” (47).

Hamid strongly suggests that Islamist parties lack the political wherewithal to actually govern. He demonstrates clearly how the decades spent underground or in opposition (or both) failed to prepare the Muslim Brotherhood for anything resembling governance. Of course, that experience is not exclusive to Islamist parties, as the secular Fatah’s record in the West Bank indicates. In their struggle to remain in power, Islamists often have to set aside their ambitions for imposing Islamic law and creating the longed-for Islamic state. Understandably, they focus instead on remaining stable and keeping their grip on what power they have.

The Brotherhood only began to re-emerge in the Arab Spring, when the leadership could regroup. In Egypt, their re-emergence culminated in Morsi’s victory in June 2012. These Islamists seemed to be genuinely committed to both democracy and Islamic rule. In their view, the people also wanted both, so they were convinced that their goals were workable and compatible. But Hamid seems doubtful. Once effectively in power under Morsi, the Brotherhood needed to curry favor among the hard-line Salafis, which led the new government to overreach. It was a major political blunder.

Hamid points to 2011 and 2012 Pew surveys that show that majorities in Egypt and Jordan supported the main planks of the Muslim Brotherhood’s platform—essentially, conventional Islamist positions (57–8). But in Egypt, the liberal minority, the military, and the judiciary would have none of Morsi’s policies, and continually undermined him until he was finally removed from office in July 2013. The Brotherhood had looked to solidify its conservative, Islamist base, not make concessions to liberal opponents. In Tunisia, however, the Nahda Party offered a more hopeful model. It showed itself willing to compromise with its secular opponents and therefore had the best chance of a long-term future.

I do have one minor quibble with Hamid’s book. It would have benefited from a more detailed look at the Tunisian model. Why did Tunisia become the only Arab actor to emerge from authoritarianism into some kind of post-Arab Spring constitutional democratic style? But that is a small matter. Hamid covers much ground, and his book is most penetrating in its analysis of the place of the Muslim Brotherhood within Egypt’s broader political system. Temptations of Power is undoubtedly an excellent book for students and researchers. It should also be required reading for Western policymakers.

Notes:
1. For example, see Mansour Moaddel, Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative analysis of State-Religion Relations in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria (New York, 2002).


Richard Drake

That Stephen Kinzer, an outstanding foreign correspondent and world affairs columnist, had contemporary American foreign policy uppermost in mind when he wrote this book becomes evident on page 37 when, regarding the expansionists of 1898, he observes, “They realized, as have their successors, that the best way to bring Americans to support a foreign intervention is to frame it as a rescue of oppressed people.” Periodic reminders of his overriding concern, taking the form of asides to the reader, recur throughout the book, culminating in the eleventh and final chapter, “The Deep Hurt,” which serves as a conclusion. This chapter deals much more with the history of American expansion since the First World War than with Theodore Roosevelt or Mark Twain, putatively

Page 60
the central characters of the book. Kinzer observes in closing, “Deeply embedded assumptions guide American foreign policy. They make the United States different from other countries. No one who questions them is welcome in the corridors of power in Washington” (246).

In a manner that will surprise no informed student of American history, Kinzer traces the origins of the country’s one-dimensional foreign policy back to the Spanish-American War. He has read Walter LaFeber’s *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* and fully understands that the Spanish-American War did not initiate U.S. foreign expansion. Kinzer’s argument concerns the way in which the year 1898 witnessed the debut of the central debate about American foreign policy, and he is right to identify Roosevelt and Twain as its paramount turn-of-the-century antagonists. The subtitle, however, suggests a plan not realized in the book: to focus sharply on the salient roles of Roosevelt and Twain in the struggle for America’s soul at this fateful moment.

The book is actually much richer than a literal understanding of the subtitle would indicate. Kinzer has a magnificent roster of characters to work with on both sides of the debate. In addition to Roosevelt, numerous other expansionists appear in important roles, including Henry Cabot Lodge, William Randolph Hearst, Albert Beveridge, and John Hay. They are all protagonists of “the large policy” destined to be embraced with seeming definitiveness now by the United States.

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The large policy has produced the sorrows of American empire, Kinzer concludes. In this volume, he makes an eloquent appeal for Americans to reconsider the bipartisan dogma that binds them to empire as a way of life.


*Stephen R. Ortiz*

Douglas Carl Peifer’s *Choosing War* is an excellent example of how historically informed comparative analysis can create a framework for our understanding of the uses of force and war-making. Peifer, a professor of history and strategy at the Army Air War College, examines three maritime crises that either led or could have led to war in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the sinking of the U.S. naval vessels *Maine* (1898) and *Panay* (1937) and of the British passenger liner *Lusitania* (1915). He compares the actual naval incidents, the presidential responses to them, and, perhaps most important, the specific contexts of international relations, domestic politics, and U.S. public opinion. He also explains in fine-grained detail how the events unfolded, and he rigorously historicizes the mechanisms and the parameters of the decisions for or against war. In doing so, Peifer emphasizes the range of options available to the American administrations involved, the multiplicity of interdependent variables that went into the decision-making, and the ways in which the historical memory of these events shaped subsequent analyses of related events over time.
Peifer’s study is laid out symmetrically, with each maritime episode having sections on the naval crisis; the contexts of American foreign relations; congressional, media, and public reactions; the presidential decision-making process; and finally, the consequences of presidential actions and the aftermath of the events. In each case study, Peifer writes with real narrative verve, employing both the vast secondary literatures on the events and his own extensive primary research. Even for those who know these stories, Peifer makes the crises in Havana harbor, on the Yangtze River near Nanjing, and on the Irish coast—and the responses to those crises in New York, London, and Washington—come to life. The ships’ sinkings are as finely depicted as the more tedious work of the naval boards of inquiry that passed judgment on the loss of vessels and lives. Moreover, Peifer steadily sifts through the official and back-channel diplomacy, the inner workings of naval life, the wrangling between Congress and the executive over appropriate responses, and the more personal, nuanced reflections of presidents McKinley, Wilson, and Roosevelt.

A book of this structure and complexity defies attempts to summarize it neatly. One way to approach the work, and indeed the episodes themselves, is to examine Peifer’s continual engagement with the theories of “coercive diplomacy” and the typologies of naval force advocated by scholars such as James Cable. Coupled with the intensely historical approach in this work, this theoretical engagement enables Peifer to compare events across time, place, and specific political contexts and gives him the unifying vocabulary for doing so. In part of his concluding section, he returns to coercive diplomacy and the four types of naval force—definitive, purposeful, catalytic, and expressive—to highlight the range of options available to policymakers in moments of crisis and the variety of meanings that force deployment can assume. But in the end, Peifer insists that Cable’s categories of force are found wanting as explanatory models and that only historical specificity can explain causality. He writes, “the different purposes of naval coercion meld and morph into one another in practice” (241) and concludes that while “using typologies maybe helpful when trying to analyze particular sorts of incidents….One gains a much better sense of the types and ranges of incidents when one studies several incidents…within their historical and geopolitical contexts” (242).

While scholars specializing in American foreign relations may not find too much that is novel in the treatment of the three incidents, Peifer is nonetheless to be applauded for this book. His historical and comparative approach is at once traditional and fresh, as he argues forcefully for a rich historicization of wars and presidential decisions and casts a suspicious eye upon both theoretical modeling and de-contextualized historical analogies. While scholars specializing in American foreign relations may not find too much that is novel in the treatment of the three incidents, Peifer is nonetheless to be applauded for this book. His historical and comparative approach is at once traditional and fresh, as he argues forcefully for a rich historicization of wars and presidential decisions and casts a suspicious eye upon both theoretical modeling and de-contextualized historical analogies. The Lover of the Game: A Review of Charles E. Neu, Colonel House: A Biography of Woodrow Wilson’s Silent Partner (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) Benjamin Coates

Any student who has studied Woodrow Wilson knows about his right-hand man, Colonel Edward M. House. They know that House befriended Wilson shortly before the latter’s election as president in 1912 and that he quickly became Wilson’s most trusted adviser. They know that House advised Wilson on policy, helped craft some of the president’s most important speeches and the draft of the League of Nations Covenant, and served as the nation’s unofficial envoy to the leaders of Europe during World War I. They know, too, that House and Wilson’s relationship was complex and that House was a skillful and brilliant diplomat. But what they may not know is that House was also a dedicated baseball fan. In his new biography, Charles E. Neu brings to life the story of House’s love of the game and his role in promoting baseball as a national pastime. This fascinating book is not only a biographical study of House but also a valuable contribution to the history of American baseball and its relationship to politics and society. Neu’s research is thorough and his writing engaging, making this an enjoyable read for anyone interested in the history of baseball or the life of Colonel House.
relationship broke down during the Paris Peace Conference and that Wilson spurned House’s advice to compromise with Senate Republicans, resulting in America’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. Scholars know these things because most have read House’s memoirs, and many have even examined his papers. The Colonel, then, is not an unfamiliar figure. Nor is he an uncontroversial one. House’s detractors argue that he betrayed Wilson at Paris by giving in to French demands for a punitive peace. His supporters praise him as a realist statesman whose advice Wilson lamentantly—and tragically—ignored.

Perhaps because House already seems so well known, there have been few studies devoted to his life and career. Not until 2006 did a full-length biography appear, when Godfrey Hodgson’s Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House, offered a sympathetic portrayal. In Hodgson’s telling, the Colonel and Wilson shared the same progressive ideals of peace and world order, but the president’s inflexible realism pushed aside House’s pragmatic realism.

Charles Neu’s new biography of House leaves his readers with a very different impression. Neu has been at work on this project off and on since the 1960s. He has mined not only House’s three-thousand-page diary and the extensive collection of papers at Yale, but also manuscript collections and oral histories of nearly one hundred of House’s correspondents. Neu even scored interviews with those who knew House personally, including Walter Lippman, Charles Seymour, several extended family members, and the daughter of House’s first political mentor, the unfortunately named Ima Hogg. Neu has been at work on this project off and on since the 1960s. He has mined not only House’s three-thousand-page diary and the extensive collection of papers at Yale, but also manuscript collections and oral histories of nearly one hundred of House’s correspondents. Neu even scored interviews with those who knew House personally, including Walter Lippman, Charles Seymour, several extended family members, and the daughter of House’s first political mentor, the unfortunately named Ima Hogg. For Neu, House was a “dilettante—the lover of the game—the eager secretary without profound responsibility.” House longed to stand “in the midst of great events,” Baker noted, merely to “gain ‘experiences to put in his diary,’ make ‘great humanit...
and refused to relocate to Washington, House turned his summer residences on the New England coast into a series of informal State Departments—Sandy Shore instead of Foggy Bottom, perhaps. A secure telephone line connected him to Washington. Foreign leaders made pilgrimages, while House’s associates and family members (his son-in-law, Gordon Auchincloss, was the State Department’s agent in New York) fed him information and forwarded him department cables. Wilson also sought House’s advice on his most important speeches—“Peace Without Victory” and “The Fourteen Points”—and tasked the Colonel with creating the Inquiry, the group of academics who drew up plans for a postwar world order. House put his brother-in-law Sidney Mezes in charge of the effort, a nepotistic choice that draws Neu’s disapproval.

What did all of this activity amount to? Did House’s influence push American foreign policy in a direction it might not have gone otherwise? Neu is reluctant to answer such big questions directly, but his occasional asides and sometimes biting observations suggest two interpretations. First, House shared much of Wilson’s general internationalist outlook, but not all of it. House was a consistent supporter of the League of Nations, and continued to believe, well into the 1920s, that it offered the best path to global peace. His vision of the league was hazy—its existence was more important than its precise format—but it differed at key points from Wilson’s. For instance, House proposed an international court and wanted to grant the great powers extra representation in league councils. Wilson opposed both measures. House was also more sympathetic to the Allies. He strongly believed that Germany was the aggressor in the war and would have accepted American belligerency as early as 1915, while Wilson tended to hold both sides responsible and clung to neutrality into 1917. Eager to smooth over differences, House capitulated to Wilson almost immediately. Perhaps as a result, it is unclear if House ever truly realized the extent to which Wilsonianism diverged from the legalistic internationalism of Lansing and leading Republicans such as Elihu Root and William Howard Taft.¹

Second, Neu is often critical of House’s diplomatic efforts. He depicts House as frequently operating beyond his authority, occasionally advocating policies opposed by the president, and often deluding himself. On a trip to France, House “exaggerated his own accomplishments, misunderstood French leaders, and conveyed to Wilson an inaccurate assessment of the possibilities for peace” (232). House was not nearly as “realistic” or pragmatic as his defenders often claim, Neu suggests.

House’s failings proved most significant when it came to making peace at Paris in 1919. He had hoped to lead the U.S. delegation to the peace conference and was upset when Wilson insisted on being present himself. Wilson convinced the assembled nations to approve the creation of a League of Nations and then headed home for a break, leaving House in charge. As Neu explains, House then gave away the store. In meetings with British and French leaders, he made a number of concessions, including the creation of a Rhenish republic, the French annexation of the Saar Valley, and an independent Poland with access to Danzig. “Despite the president’s explicit instructions,” House had “clearly exceeded his authority,” Neu argues (401). Wilson was furious; his wife recalled him fuming that House had “given away everything I had won before we left Paris” (406). House’s defenders (and House himself) suggest that these concessions were pragmatic and that the victorious allies would settle for nothing less. But although Wilson did make compromises of his own, the agreement he ultimately achieved was more “moderate” than House’s. Neu concludes that “in the supreme moment of his career, House had failed his chief, succumbing to [French Prime Minister Georges] Clemenceau’s flattery and his own conviction that he was the master of the negotiating process” (422).

After spending some five hundred pages with House, the reader develops some sympathy for him, especially as Neu chronicles his later years. During the Great Depression House experienced financial distress on top of health troubles and the decade-long Republican domination of national politics. But overall he emerges from this book as a smaller man than Wilson, more concerned with being at the center of things than advancing the interests of his nation and humanity. This interpretation is not substantially different from that presented in the works of Wilson scholars Arthur Link or John Milton Cooper Jr., but Neu’s formidable research bolsters their claims.⁵

However, Neu’s focus on the relationship between House and Wilson means that larger issues of American foreign policy often go unexamined. For instance, I had hoped that a study of House might reveal more about his (and by extension, Wilson’s) actions in Mexico. According to John Mason Hart, House had been “a key figure in American financial expansion into Mexico” and had urged U.S. intervention in 1914 in part to protect U.S. oil companies in which he had a personal interest.⁶ In Neu’s telling, however, House seems to have paid little attention to developments in Mexico.

Similarly, while Neu provides copious evidence of House’s racism and anti-Semitism, he does not investigate the implications of this mindset for the construction of a Wilsonian foreign policy. Neu notes in passing that House served on the League’s Commission on Mandates, which denied self-government to the former colonies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire. But he offers no explanation of what positions House took on that committee, nor does he engage with scholarship on the imperial contexts of internationalism (there is no citation, for instance, to Mark Mazower’s important work on the subject).⁷ These caveats aside, Colonel House is an impressive achievement. It is lucidly written and easy to follow, and its chronological organization will make it simple for scholars of Wilson and World War I to consult topics of particular interest. Neu has written the best biography of House to date. It is unlikely to be matched in scale or richness, but it might not be the last word on his subject.

Notes:
Council members present:
Amanda Boczar, Tim Borstelmann, Matt Connelly, Amanda Demmer, Mary Dudziak, David Engerman, Petra Goedde, Amy Greenberg, Peter Hahn, Julia Irwin, Paul Kramer, Fred Logevall, Kathryn Statler.

Others attending:
Amy Sayward (ex officio), Keith Aksell, Penny Von Eschen, Kimberly Taft, Mark Bradley, Ann Heiss, Chester Pach, George Fujii, Frank Costigliola.

Business Items:

Opening matters
Following introductions and a welcome from SHAFR President Mary Dudziak, a resolution of thanks for the service of past President Mark Bradley and of Council members Penny Von Eschen, Alan McPherson, and Bob Brigham passed unanimously.

Resolutions between June 2016 and January 2017
Dudziak reviewed the work of the Council between meetings, which included a unanimous resolution approving the minutes of the June 2015 meeting and a request from the Graduate Student Grants and Fellowships Committee to increase this year’s allocation for the Bemis Dissertation Research Grants, which was rejected by a majority vote.

Discussion of the Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17) Budget and Endowment
Executive Director Amy Sayward reviewed the budget documents with Council and answered questions from Council. She noted the new format of the budget document, which provides income and expenditures side-by-side for each budget category as well as additional detail on the items that make up each budget category. Additionally, there were new documents on past endowment spending as well as a five-year budget forecast document. In regard to the latter, Sayward called Council's attention to the need to adjust expenditures.

In regard to the endowment, David Engerman, chair of the Ways and Means Committee, shared with Council the original intent of the Bernath family in establishing a separate endowment and expressed the committee’s sense that Council must have a strategy for both utilizing and preserving the endowment moving forward. He reminded Council of its resolution at the June 2016 meeting to move toward an up to 3% endowment spending rule by FY18 and pointed to the budget report that identified the average value of the endowment over the past several years in order to determine the base-line figure for determining the 3% spending rule. He noted that the current budget under consideration exceeded this rule but also noted that significant changes to the current fiscal year budget would have little overall effect, so Council's fiscal decisions should primarily be aimed at the FY18 budget.

Engerman, on behalf of the Ways & Means Committee, moved that SHAFR's up to 3% spending rule (passed in June 2017) will be calculated as a rolling, three-year average of quarterly balances of each endowment. Council will review this policy in 2019. The motion passed unanimously.

Engerman also proposed a motion acknowledging the generosity of Gerald and Myrna Bernath and the crucial role that their gifts have played in allowing SHAFR to grow and develop, especially the support they have offered to graduate students and junior scholars in the form of reduced-rate student memberships, conference registrations, and fellowships. Petra Goedde seconded the motion, which passed unanimously.

Membership Rates
Penny Von Eschen reviewed the written report of the task force on membership rates, which also included Amy Greenberg and Amanda Boczar, highlighting its recommendations to make membership rates more equitable for those who are not employed on the tenure track. In subsequent discussion, a consensus emerged that there would be a student category, a category for non-fully employed members (with approximately $50,000 annual income) who would pay $35, and then a full membership rate, which would be increased by $10/year to make up the membership income lost by creating the medium membership tier.

Global Scholars and Diversity Grant Program
David Engerman suggested that one way to have an immediate impact on the FY17 budget as well as moving forward would be to trim the Global Scholars and Diversity Grant Program, which drew critical attention during the previous Council discussion due to an over-reliance by some scholars on those funds and the lack of correlation between receiving such funds and becoming on-going SHAFR members. Mary Dudziak expressed some concern about this proposed late change after the Program Committee was already in place and having its deliberations. Both Petra Goede and Fred Logevall expressed a desire to maintain the internationalization of the annual conference program, even if some longer-term goals of the Global Scholar program were not being met. Following a discussion, Kathryn Statler made a motion to reduce the Global Scholars and Diversity Grant program allocation to $20,000 for the current fiscal year, which was seconded by Tim Borstelmann and passed unanimously.
Kimberly Taft of Oxford University Press attended the Council meeting on behalf of Patricia Thomas. Taft highlighted the development of OUP's new website, which is easier to view across digital platforms, is easier to search, and provides better branding for both *Diplomatic History* and SHAFR. Mary Dudziak pointed out that Taft's area is communications, which can serve as a resource for the organization and the journal.

**SHAFR Budget and Salaries**
A motion to approve the FY17 budget (amended with the change to the Global Scholars and Diversity Grant Program line item) was made by Matthew Connelly and seconded by Petra Goedde; it was approved unanimously.

A motion to provide a 2% cost-of-living increase to the conference coordinator, the webmaster, and the executive director was made by Petra Goedde, seconded by Julia Irwin, and passed unanimously.

**Editorial Review Process**
Mary Dudziak noted to Council that SHAFR is engaged in the regular editorial review process for *Passport* and is preparing to launch the process for *Diplomatic History* as well. A Call For Proposals will be issued soon by the committee carrying out the editorial review process for *Passport*. This committee is chaired by Tom Schwartz and includes Salim Yaqub, Michael Allen, and Sarah Snyder.

**Summer Institute**
Mary Dudziak thanked Mark Bradley and Petra Goedde for their written report. Discussion followed on two options laid out in the report: changing the Summer Institute to an event that occurs only every other year (rather than the current practice of having it every year) or changing the model to an intensive workshop that occurs directly before and at the same location as the annual meeting (rather than the current practice of having it located at diverse locations based on the topic and institutional connections of the conveners).

Council discussed the idea that a reduction or elimination of the institute would be the easiest way to address SHAFR's budget shortfall. Council members also discussed concerns raised in a previous evaluation of the Summer Institute program, including concerns that the institute was competing with, rather than complementing, the annual meeting. Fred Logevall pointed out that last year's institute as well as this year's are hosted in Europe, which helps with the internationalization of SHAFR. Engerman supported the model of a pre-conference "boot camp" in order to provide greater oversight of the institute, given that past Council suggestions to institute conveners were not necessarily heeded. Amanda Demmer stressed the benefits to members from participating in summer institutes, including invaluable networking.

Dudziak recommended at this point that it might be appropriate to designate a task force to determine the format and details of a new summer institute. Paul Kramer recommended the possibility of Council identifying key subject areas for the institute and working proactively to obtain greater diversity.

Kathryn Statler made a motion that was seconded by Peter Hahn, both of whom accepted a friendly amendment from David Engerman resulting in the final motion that SHAFR will not host a Summer Institute in 2018, will move to a model that aligns summer institutes more closely with the annual meeting, and that Council will further study the best format for future programs. The motion passed unanimously.

**Conference Committee**
Mary Dudziak introduced the work of the new Conference Committee, which is helping SHAFR to think and plan future non-D.C. conference sites as well as tackling issues related to the conference itself. She thanked Ann Heiss, who chairs the committee and who was attending the Council meeting, for the work that she and the committee had undertaken, as evidenced in the written report. Heiss concentrated on the issues of accommodations for parents with small children and accessibility for SHAFR members with disabilities at the annual meeting. She also thanked Council that as a result of the report, a room for nursing mothers and parents of small children at the upcoming conference had already been identified. She suggested that the SHAFR conference website could provide resources to help parents find childcare providers and could enable SHAFR members to find members to share babysitting with. She highlighted cost-free steps for members with disabilities, including a query about needs for accommodation on the registration form and a notice about the hotel's accessibility. She expressed the desire of the committee to survey the membership in order to be better able to meet their needs.

Mary Dudziak expressed the opinion that these issues could be part of a broader survey of the SHAFR membership, which could also meet the needs of the Committee on Women in SHAFR. The committee's motion to include an accommodation statement on conference registration materials, to make available a list of baby-sitting options, and to create a member-to-member childcare sharing board was seconded by Paul Kramer and unanimously approved.

**SHAFR Distinguished Service Award**
Council excused Peter Hahn from the room before discussing a task force report on a SHAFR Distinguished Service Award. Tim Borstelmann spoke on behalf of the task force that had taken up the question of whether to create a service award. He highlighted the importance of service to members of the organization. The task force moved that such an award should be created and awarded annually at the June meeting awards ceremony; it was seconded by Mary Dudziak and passed unanimously. The task force then moved to make the first award (which will be presented in June 2017) to Peter L. Hahn; Petra Goedde seconded this motion, which also passed unanimously. Upon Peter's return to the meeting, Council announced the award and congratulated him.
Graduate Student Committee
Amanda Demmer and Amanda Boczar, the two Council members representing graduate students, accepted the charge given to them by Mary Dudziak to consider ways to more strongly link graduate students to the organization. Based on the written report and ensuing conversation, Boczar moved and Demmer seconded a motion to create a SHAFR Graduate Student Committee; it passed unanimously.

Communication Strategy
Mary Dudziak identified the improvement of SHAFR communications and outreach as a priority for this year and welcomed Chester Pach, chair of the Web Committee, and George Fujii, SHAFR’s Webmaster, to the meeting. She recommended a task force to help reorganize how we do things as well as recommend areas of the website, for example, that could be developed further. An example is an experts page that could help provide opportunities for SHAFR members to share their expertise with larger communities, including the media. Pach also pointed out that SHAFR members should be encouraged to send news about their op-eds and other public pieces so that they can appear on the website. Dudziak recommended monthly emails and more frequent communications in general as ways to keep both older and younger members connected to the social and digital footprint of SHAFR. Julia Irwin mentioned the relative lack of activity on SHAFR’s Facebook page, especially when compared to its Twitter activity.

Guiding Principles and Policies for Council Actions
Mary Dudziak stressed the importance of having a process in place to deal with requests from SHAFR members that Council take action on specific issues. She pointed out that such issues have been divisive in some professional organizations in recent memory and would like SHAFR to have a mechanism that allows Council to be responsive to concerns arising from the membership without presuming to speak on behalf of the entire membership through a simple majority vote. Peter Hahn mentioned that the by-laws currently mention a 2/3 Council vote. Paul Kramer suggested that a general meeting to discuss and vote on such issues would be appropriate, and Hahn mentioned that the by-laws allow for a general meeting at the conference (though one has not previously been held). Dudziak recommended that a task force examine the issue and report to the June Council meeting; in the interim, any urgent issue would be discussed by Council via email using the current voting process laid out in the by-laws, requiring a 2/3 majority.

Development Committee
Frank Costigliola, chair of the Development Committee, followed up the written report with information from his committee’s meeting the previous day. The Development Committee’s three-pronged plan intends to (1) reach out again to the senior members identified for the previous Leaders’ Fund campaign and provide greater detail on SHAFR’s current financial position, (2) meet in person with a small number of senior members about making an additional gift now or through a bequest, and (3) to work in conjunction with the 50th anniversary committee on a broader-based appeal. David Engerman discussed the relative merits of annual, “sinking,” and endowment funds; he posited that an annual fund would be most effective in the on-going work of supporting young scholars and graduate students. Peter Hahn suggested that Council set a level for endowment contributions and for naming particular ventures. Julia Irwin spoke to the positive impact that being named at the June luncheon as a contributor to the Leaders’ Fund had had on her peers. Petra Goedde suggested that a Summer Institute and/or the Global Scholars and Diversity Grant Fund were potential “naming” opportunities. The consensus that emerged was that it was best to have a variety of ways that people can give to the organization.

Adjournment
The available time having been consumed, Mary Dudziak closed the meeting by recommending an email discussion to consider a proposal from George Fujii to consolidate the deadlines for grants, fellowships, and prizes. The meeting was adjourned promptly at 11:00 a.m. so that Council members could travel to the site of the luncheon and Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lecture.

Keith Aksel/Amy Sayward
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations stands with our peer professional associations in strongly opposing the Trump Administration’s Executive Order 13769, which has suspended entry of all refugees to the United States for 120 days, bars Syrian refugees to the United States indefinitely and blocks entry to the United States of citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) for 90 days. The Executive Order has also created a great deal of uncertainty even for permanent residents (green card holders) of the U.S. and those with dual citizenship. Beyond the deeply troubling immediate consequences of Executive Order 13769, hostility to immigration and global exchange is stoking a climate of anxiety among students, scholars, and their families within and beyond our community, touching many who are not directly affected by the Executive Order but are not U.S. citizens and have entered a new threshold of insecurity.

Written and carried out without consultation with the U.S. intelligence community, military, or State Department, Executive Order 13769 places America’s foreign policy apparatus, our citizens, and the entire globe at greater risk. In alienating American allies, it puts U.S. troops abroad in greater danger and profoundly undermines the work of American career diplomats, injecting chaos into long and carefully cultivated relationships. The Executive Order’s deliberate targeting of Muslim travelers and migrants undermines American diplomacy and harms U.S. national security by fueling anti-Americanism abroad and Islamophobia here at home.

Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations is a non-political, non-profit international professional association open to all persons interested in the scholarly study of American diplomacy. It is a global community of more than 1,300 members that promotes the advancement and dissemination of knowledge about American foreign relations through the sponsorship of research, annual meetings and publications. The Executive Order directly affects all of our members as a threat to the principle of academic freedom and the free exchange of ideas. The Society will do all it can to assist those of its members who now face the prospect of being denied entry to the United States to attend our annual conference, conduct research in American archives, and exchange ideas with colleagues.

As historians of American foreign relations, we are deeply conscious of the need for well-informed and critical public debate when it comes to questions of national security and foreign policy. Historians have much to contribute to such debates, given their knowledge of the histories, languages and cultures of the “countries of particular concern” to the United States identified by the Executive Order. This expertise is developed over years, sometimes decades, of travel and engagement with these societies. We have every reason to believe that these policies, in addition to the immediate humanitarian costs of the Executive Order 13769, will, by limiting travel and exchange, impoverish not only the academic community, but the whole of American society.
Editor’s note: The preceding resolution was approved by SHAFR Council on 3 February 2017. The applicable voting procedure required a supermajority (two-thirds of Council) for approval; following deliberations, Council voted unanimously in favor of the resolution. SHAFR members who would like to share their views on the resolution may do so here: https://shafr.org/content/shafr-opposes-executive-order-13769-restricting-entry-united-states. A SHAFR task force, appointed in January 2017 prior to the issuance of Executive Order 13769, is currently considering whether SHAFR should have a policy on advocacy that limits the scope of matters the organization can address. The task force will also recommend whether the SHAFR By-Laws should be amended to establish a process through which the organization decides whether to make public statements, including whether such matters should be submitted to the membership for a vote. Council will address this issue in its June 2017 meeting. In support of the resolution, SHAFR has created a second task force to assist members who experience problems related to Executive Order 13769, including, but not limited to, an inability to attend the annual meeting due to the EO-prescribed travel ban (n.b. the executive order and the travel ban were on hold due to a temporary restraining order issued by Federal District Judge James Robart on 3 February 2017; that TRO was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a decision filed on 9 February 2017. The Trump administration issued a revised version of the Executive Order [as EO 13780] on 6 March 2017). The task force is chaired by Dr. Mark Bradley of the University of Chicago; those affected by the EO can contact the task force through SHAFR.org at https://shafr.org/content/shafr-opposes-executive-order-13769-restricting-entry-united-states. AJ


Robart decision: http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FDCO%20v.%20Trump


Professional Notes

Hal Brands has been appointed the inaugural Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Frank Costigliola has been appointed Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor by the University of Connecticut. He has also won an NEH Fellowship for the 2017-2018 academic year to complete his book on Russia and the inner life of George F. Kennan.

Jessica Gienow-Hecht has been appointed to the Alfred Grosser Chair at Sciences Po in Paris. Until July 2017, she will be affiliated with the Centre de Recherches Internationales, teaching courses on international history at the college and the Paris School of International Affairs.

Simon Miles has accepted a faculty position as Assistant Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University.

Christopher McKnight Nichols has been named Director of the Oregon State University Center for Humanities.

Call for Proposals for Editor of Passport

In 2014 the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) Council established a regular review and renewal process for the editorships of its publications. As a result, SHAFR is issuing a Call for Proposals (CFP) to edit its newsletter, Passport. The term of appointment will begin in August 2017 and, as stipulated in SHAFR's by-laws, will extend for at least three but no more than five years.

Passport publishes reviews, historiographical essays, articles on pedagogical issues relating to the teaching of U.S. foreign relations, and research notes; it also explores other issues of interest to SHAFR members. Passport is published by Oxford University Press on behalf of SHAFR in January, April, and September. SHAFR provides an annual stipend to the editor and a small stipend to a graduate student serving as assistant editor in addition to paying for copy-editing and design costs. The editor’s home institution should provide some level of financial and/or in-kind contribution to the production of Passport. The current administrative arrangement includes an editor, assistant editor, and production editor, as well as an editorial advisory board. While SHAFR's by-laws mandate a board of editors, they
do not mandate the current division of labor. The Editorial staff can be but is not required to be at a single institution.

In no more than five pages, applicants submitting a proposal should:
1. Specify the major individual(s) who would be involved and describe the role of each person.
2. Specify the support, both financial and in-kind, that the host institution guarantees it will provide to the Editorial office.
3. Assess the intellectual strength of Passport as it now stands.
4. Offer a vision for the newsletter as it evolves. Where would you like to take Passport if selected to serve as its editor?

Please submit applications to Thomas.A.Schwartz@vanderbilt.edu no later than 15 May 2017.

The final decision will be made by the President of SHAFR with the approval of Council. SHAFR's Council established an advisory committee to conduct this search composed of Thomas Schwartz (chair), Salim Yaqub, Michael Allen, and Sarah Snyder. Prospective applicants should feel free to consult with any member of the committee.

The advisory committee expects to make its recommendation to the President and to Council at the June 2017 SHAFR annual meeting.

Recent Books of Interest


Bowen, Wayne H. *Truman, Franco’s Spain, and the Cold War*, (Missouri, 2017).


Ghettas, Mohamed Lakhdar. *Détenue in Algeria: Foreign Policy and International Relations During the Cold War*, (Tauris, 2017).
Jackson, Donna Rose. *US Foreign Policy During the Cold War: From Colonialism to Terrorism in Africa*, (Routledge, 2017).
Johnstone, Andrew and Andrew Priest, eds., *US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Candidates, Campaigns, and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton* (Kentucky, 2017).


Payne, John D. *State-Sponsored Terrorism and the USA: Diplomacy, Terror, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Late-Twentieth Century*, (Tauris, 2017).


Riedel, Bruce. *Kings and Presidents: Inside the Special Relationship Between Saudi Arabia and America since FDR*, (Brookings, 2017).


EXECUTING THE ROSENBERGS: STATEMENT BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

In the January 2017 issue of Passport, a publication of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, a roundtable discussion addressed *Executing the Rosenbergs: Death and Diplomacy in a Cold War World*, by Professor Lori Clune. Records of the Department of State preserved in the National Archives are at the heart of the book. The National Archives and Records Administration is very pleased that records in its custody were so useful, and seeing them highlighted in a book such as *Executing the Rosenbergs* is welcome. Each of the scholars commenting on the book in Passport noted the account in Professor Clune’s preface of how she located the records. That story advances a theory that the records had never been seen before because they were repressed and hidden where nobody could find them and because no mention of the Rosenbergs was found in one of the key finding aids to the records. Unfortunately, that is not accurate.

The following explanation of how the Department of State created and maintained the records and related finding aids, which were subsequently transferred to the National Archives in their original order, provides a corrective.

The Department of State initiated use of the Central Decimal File, the source of the documents in question, in 1910. As the Department explained in the filing manual used for those records, the filing system was “so devised that the arrangement of the file itself serves the general purpose of a subject index.” In other words, by using the file manual to determine the appropriate file number for a topic, one can locate the documents of interest. As a result, when the NARA archivist credited with assisting Professor Clune locate the records asked the NARA specialist on foreign affairs records for help with her inquiry, it was a very simple matter for the specialist to tell the assisting archivist to guide her to the basic file category for records on Soviet espionage against the United States.

Although the files were intended to largely be self-indexing, as they accumulated, the Department of State created three main finding aids to assist with locating specific documents or to locate records on topics that are of a less straightforward nature, namely (1) the Purport Lists/Cards, (2) the Source Card Index, and (3) the Name Card Index.

- **Purport Lists/Cards.** These are a record of the documents indexed to each file, arranged in the same order as the records, showing the file and document number, date, from and to, and the gist or “purport” of the documents. The Department ended use of the lists in June 1944, at which time it switched to cards. Using the lists and cards can be easier than reviewing the documents themselves if one is looking for a specific document in a file rather than looking at all the documents in a file. Because the listing or card for each document includes only a brief summary of the document, however, not all names mentioned in it will be noted.

- **Source Card Index.** This index covers communications to and from various governmental organizations (e.g., U.S. diplomatic and consular posts, the Department of State offices originating a memorandum, foreign diplomats and consuls in the United States, other U.S. Government agencies). It is arranged by the source or destination of the communication thereunder to or from and thereunder by date. The cards generally are used to locate documents from a specific source or to locate specific documents referred to but with no file number given. These cards include a gist of the document, too, and similarly to the Purport Lists/Cards, because the card for each document includes only a brief summary of the document, not all names mentioned in a given document are noted.

- **Name Card Index.** This index serves as a finding aid for documents to, from, or about private persons and organizations. As explained by NARA staff who work closely with these records, users of the records cannot rely on this index to locate all documents relating to or mentioning a given individual. While the name index is an important tool and can assist with identifying documents and files of interest, the coverage is limited and the index does not include references to all documents mentioning an individual. Name cards do not exist for every name mentioned in the records, or there may only be one card leading to a file with many documents mentioning a given person. Most of the cards relate to communications to and from organizations and individuals. Therefore, in addition to using this index, to locate all pertinent documentation on a person or organization, one must determine the file designation(s) most likely to contain records of interest and then make a document-by-document or Purport List/Card search. While this can be laborious, it will result in the most comprehensive results and almost always leads to documents for which there are no Name Cards. Since the Purport Cards/Lists and Source Cards also do not include the names of all persons mentioned in the documents, the only sure way to locate documents on people is to make a document-by-document search.

Contrary to the comments found in the Preface of the book, the Name Card Index does include references to Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Unfortunately, through use the cards can become disarranged, and those on the Rosenbergs were slightly out of order, but in the appropriate box. (They have now been properly filed.) There are a total of 14 cards on Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. They refer to four different file designations.
While Professor Clune focused on the allegedly “missing” name cards as the reason the records purportedly could not be found, as noted above, that is not the only tool at the disposal of researchers. Using the Source Card Index for the highlighted May 1953 message from Ambassador Dillon in Paris would easily and quickly have led to the records on the Rosenbergs, too.

Finally, despite Professor Clune’s note regarding “newly unearthed documents” and that “[w]e may never know why the State Department hid these sources,” the documents on the Rosenbergs have not been hidden or otherwise withheld since they were declassified. The National Archives accessioned the 1950-54 segment of the Central Decimal File from the Department of State in the early 1980s, and they were systematically declassified in the mid-1980s. Since then, the records have been open to public use. Presumably, the documentation on the Rosenbergs has not previously appeared in the scholarly literature simply because no other researcher used those documents.

In summary, Professor Clune’s description of how to locate records in the Department of State’s Central Decimal File (especially the Name Card Index) is in error, the Name Cards Index entries on the Rosenbergs are not missing, and neither the Department of State nor the National Archives hid any records. We hope that future editions of the book will include corrected information.

David Langbart, the NARA specialist on Department of State records, prepared this response. Please contact him with any questions about the records or this response at david.langbart@nara.gov.

Response to NARA Statement

I appreciate David Langbart’s interest in the book and am confident that historians will benefit from his explanation of the State Department’s finding aids. The symbiotic and cooperative relationship between archivists and scholars is vital to the continued production of history. I stand by what I wrote in my acknowledgements: this project would have been impossible without the work of several patient and indefatigable archivists.

I agree that Name Cards “do not exist for every name mentioned in the records.” There were, however, cards for Charlie Chaplin, Joseph McCarthy, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and Paul Robeson. It was reasonable for the archivists I worked with to believe that there would be cards for Julius and Ethel, tucked between the cards for Berta Rosenberg and Ludwig Rosenberg. I wish we had found the “disarranged” Name Cards for Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 2008. It would have shaved years off the timeline of this project.

No other researcher had used these documents in College Park because no other researcher could locate them. I believe that if they could have been found, scholars before me certainly would have used them to add to the story of this fascinating case. I am happy to know the Name Cards are now in their proper place and look forward to the many and varied ways historians will use them.

Lori Clune

SHAFR Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant Reports

From 1968 onward, Western publics grouped together increasing numbers of cosmopolitan, transnationally organized terrorist actors under the common label of “international terrorism.” Because of these actors’ worldwide mobility, the U.S., Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, France, and other European states realized that domestic responses to this novel threat would not suffice. Instead, these governments turned to bilateral and multilateral anti-terrorism agreements, often under the auspices of significant international forums such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Council of Europe. My dissertation showcases how these statist multilateral solutions politically isolated and delegitimized transnational terrorist actors in the long 1970s.

The Samuel Flagg Bemis research grant funded my primary research stay in Germany. West Germany’s Brandt and Schmidt administrations were key proponents of international anti-terrorism efforts, especially after the catastrophic 1972 Munich Olympic Games. The German records showcase West Germany’s position as a central hub of anti-terrorism negotiations. By spending two months in German archives, I was able to trace a wide array of negotiations, access documents pertaining to terrorism that often remain classified elsewhere, and decentralize the U.S. in my narrative.

The Federal Archives in Koblenz hold the records of the ministries of justice, transportation, and the interior, among others. These ministries kept meticulous records of their anti-terrorism negotiations with neighboring European states. Most have been made available under Germany’s 30-year declassification regulations. During my three weeks at the archive, I used memoranda and letters to trace regional negotiations surrounding extradition, information exchange, and cooperation in investigative training and special forces buildup. A bonus was that much communication occurred through the European Communities’ Coreu telegram system. Bureaucrats representing the nine European Community states often meticulously laid out their thinking in such telegrams before reaching a common decision. Access to these telegrams allowed me to uncover key French, British, and other figures as well as lines of thought for further research.

I spent the next four weeks in Berlin at the Political Archive of West Germany’s Foreign Office, which maintains its own records in-house. Here, I found a wide range of correspondence with foreign ministries around the world. These records highlighted how West Germany collaborated with its allies and other countries on anti-terrorism agreements in the
international sphere during the 1970s. They also showcased how difficult it was for most states to address a problem that was highly complex, difficult to define, transnational in structure, and touched controversial issues such as the validity of national liberation movements.

The German research is the bedrock foundation of my dissertation. The documents I found enable me to showcase major negotiations, and have generated avenues for further research in France, Great Britain, the U.S., and Canada. Thank you to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations for enabling my archival stay.

Silke Zoller
Ph.D. Candidate, Temple University

With the support of SHAFR, I conducted research at the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE) for five weeks this summer in support of my dissertation. I focused on the collections of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Oil Industry, and Permanent Representation at the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. The documents that I consulted – many of which had never before been examined by a Western scholar – illuminated the economic motivations of Soviet foreign relations during the 1970s and the ways in which Moscow grappled with the dangers and opportunities that partial reintegration into the global capitalist economy posed.

The collections of RGAE confirm the interest of the Soviet Union in increased economic contacts with the West. In particular, the long-term contracts concluded with West Germany, Austria, Italy, and France for the delivery of natural gas demonstrate Moscow’s desire to engage with the capitalist world. As the Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolitchev told West German Minister of Economics Hans Friderichs in March 1976, “the Soviet Union never sought autarky.” Supported by complementary research in the East German archives, my findings dispute the contention that the Soviet Union emerged as a beneficiary of the energy crisis of 1973. As a net exporter, Moscow was in a good position to exploit the increase in oil prices, but its inefficient forms of extraction and lack of technology hindered its ability to capitalize. More importantly, its reserves failed to cushion the blow to its energy-dependent client states in Eastern Europe, and Moscow ultimately had to encourage its allies to turn to the capitalist market to help meet their growing energy needs.

Although few scholars would argue that the Soviet Union maintained a truly autarkic bloc, the Cold War-paradigm of bipolarity continues to shape the literature on post-1945 international history. The process of economic globalization, however, complicates this simple narrative and illustrates that the fluidity of the international system belies simple categorization. In the case of Soviet foreign policy, Soviet economic interaction with the capitalist world does not comport with analyses of Moscow’s international behavior that emphasize the leading roles of ideas and geopolitics. My findings in the RGAE do not by any means contradict the importance of communist ideology and traditional Russian imperialism as motivating forces, but rather demonstrate that the desire for economic engagement with the outside world represents yet another layer of Soviet international behavior. Economic engagement often conflicted with ideological and geopolitical imperatives, demonstrating the competing impulses and at times overall incoherence of Soviet foreign policy.

Michael de Groot

My dissertation looks at the history of Mexican students in the United States and the development of international scholarship programs over the course of the twentieth century. Using archives and oral history, my project has involved research in Mexico and the United States. I applied for and was fortunate to receive a dissertation research grant from SHAFR to cover part of the U.S.-based research.

In Washington, DC, I worked at the National Archives with the records of the Department of State. I focused on material related to cultural exchange within the US embassy in Mexico City’s files as well as the records of the now-defunct Office of Inter American Affairs. Through these files, I learned about the State Department’s entry into the world of scholarship granting, seeing how during the Second World War, this department sponsored the creation of a binational cultural institution that would advance U.S. foreign policy objectives in Mexico. The cultural institute offered various types of programming, from lecture series to English classes, meant to transmit to Mexican audiences a view of their northern neighbor that was more favorable to U.S. interests.

At NARA, I examined documents pertaining to student exchange, another function of the cultural institute. For officials in the State Department, bringing Mexican students to the United States was a way to gradually, subtly, and permanently enhance bilateral relations. Unlike propaganda, which officials believed might have a faster but fleeting impact on public opinion, student exchange was a long-term strategy. The documents in NARA showed how closely embassy staff and State Department officials monitored the process of selecting young Mexican candidates for scholarships, and I also noted U.S. officials’ concerns with Mexican participation in this process. This material helps me to paint a complex, detailed portrait of U.S. government involvement in scholarship granting in the 1940s and 1950s, and it will be a critical part of one of my dissertation chapters. It will also inform a paper, which I hope to present at the SHA FR 2017 conference, focusing on U.S. cultural diplomacy through the Rockefeller Foundation’s scholarship program.

Also in Washington, DC, I was able to research Georgetown University’s historical Mexican student enrollment, using data at that institution to sketch out the nineteenth century origins of the phenomenon of Mexican students coming to the United States. I also found a fascinating collection in the Smithsonian Institute’s holdings with research materials from an anthropological-psychological study of Mexican students at the University of California-Los Angeles in the early
1950s. These documents are an unparalleled resource for understanding the lived experiences of Mexican students in the United States, revealing an important and usually-omitted facet of cultural diplomacy: the fact that more than abstract ideas or high politics were at stake, for journeys abroad were also transformative, personally and professionally, for the individuals involved.

Currently, I am conducting research in the Cambridge, MA area related to LASPAU, a nonprofit organization affiliated with Harvard University that began granting scholarships to Latin American students in the 1960s. LASPAU began as part of the Alliance for Progress and had USAID funding in its early years. I was able to conduct an oral history interview of 2.5 hours with a former LASPAU staff member who worked in Mexico in the 1970s and 1980s. This yielded frank and intimate insights into the process of selection of scholarship candidates, showing how this U.S.-based organization pursued its policy objectives by making on-the-ground adjustments in Mexico. The staff at LASPAU are currently preparing documentation for me to review, and I expect to complete this research early this year (since they do not have a formal archive and are a busy working institution, they have needed additional time to accommodate my requests to view their historical files).

I extend my sincere thanks to the selection committee and SHAFR for its support of my research. It has already helped to shape my dissertation, and I expect it to continue yielding useful material in the future.

Rachel Grace Newman

IN THE NEXT ISSUE OF Passport

A roundtable on Salim Yaqub’s Imperfect Strangers

The historiography of religion and U.S. foreign relations

A tribute to Marilyn Young

AND MUCH MORE!
In Memoriam: Marilyn B. Young

Mary L. Dudziak

It is with great sadness that I share the news of the death of Marilyn B. Young, past president of SHAFR, influential scholar of U.S.-Asian relations, and a powerful critic of war. Marilyn died in her sleep at home on February 19, 2017. She had recently ended treatment for metastatic breast cancer.

Marilyn’s work will have a lasting impact. She pioneered critical work on ongoing war -- what she called the “constancy of war and its...constant erasure.” In her 2011 Presidential Address, “I was thinking, as I often do these days, of war: The United States in the Twenty-First Century,” Marilyn wrote:

I find that I have spent most of my life as a teacher and scholar thinking and writing about war. I moved from war to war, from the War of 1898 and U.S. participation in the Boxer Expedition and the Chinese civil war, to the Vietnam War, back to the Korean War, then further back to World War II and forward to the wars of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Initially, I wrote about all these as if war and peace were discrete: prewar, war, peace, or postwar. Over time, this progression of wars has looked to me less like a progression than a continuation: as if between one war and the next, the country was on hold. The shadow of war, as Michael Sherry called it fifteen years ago, seems not to be a shadow but entirely substantial: the substance of American history.

It is our work as historians, she insisted, “to speak and write so that a time of war not be mistaken for peacetime, nor waging war for making peace.” The address was published in *Diplomatic History*.

As past president Fred Logevall put it, “she was a giant in our organization, our field, our discipline. Her scholarship on U.S.-Asian relations was hugely influential to many of us, and she taught me early in my career that as historians we don’t have to check our passions at the door, as long as the passion is controlled and as long as we let the evidence lead us where it wants to go.”


Marilyn received her doctorate from Harvard University in 1963, where she worked with Ernest R. May and John King Fairbank. She was a proud 1957 graduate of Vassar College. She taught at the University of Michigan before joining New York University in 1980, where she was a full professor in the Department of History until her retirement last year. Marilyn taught about the history of U.S. foreign policy; the politics and culture of post-war United States; the history of modern China; and the history and culture of Vietnam.

Marilyn Young will be remembered at the SHAFR annual meeting in June. You are encouraged to share your memories of Marilyn on a memorial page, which will be available soon on the SHAFR website.

Editor’s note: In recognition of Marilyn Young’s contributions to and influence on SHAFR, Passport will publish a tribute to her in the September 2017 issue. A]
I Know How Marilyn Young Felt

Kenneth Osgood

I thought of Marilyn Young suddenly just a day or two before she died—a puzzling coincidence, since I didn’t know her well. I was making my way across campus to a meeting to discuss some university matter that, only a few weeks prior, would have seemed important. But on this day it struck me as strangely inconsequential, as I had become consumed by the worrisome chain of events since January 21—the day after Donald Trump took office. For weeks, the blitzkrieg of troubling tweets and destabilizing actions of the new president had assaulted my sense of complacency. Each day brought more anxiety, and my concern about the future of my country grew deeper with each news alert that flashed across my screen. Then it hit me like a thunderbolt: “Now I know how Marilyn Young must have felt!”

In truth, the Marilyn I conjured at this moment may have been little more than a caricature. We met personally just a few times, at conferences and the like—including a particularly memorable moment in Florida where we and other fine SHAFR friends drank many mojitos and talked for hours. I still can hear her voice as she told me stories of “Dan and Howie” (Ellsberg and Zinn) and the Vietnam War. She had been in the thick of it. I sometimes tell her stories to my students, but not well. The mojito fog made the details fuzzy.

To me, Marilyn was mostly a symbol. She represented to my mind the fiery passions of the 1960s, the moral awakening of a generation—a generation that preceded my own, but whose activism remade the country I grew up in. That terrible Christmas of 1972, as Richard Nixon unleashed his angry bombardment of North Vietnam, my parents celebrated my first birthday. For me, the terrific injustice that animated so much of Marilyn’s life and scholarship wasn’t even a memory. It conjured no feelings. The war was history. It was academic.

This changed for me when I went to write my first lecture on Vietnam. I had been on the job for just a few months, and the September 11th terrorist attacks formed the backdrop to my first semester on the tenure track. I didn’t realize it then, but that moment would shape my national destiny in much the same way that the Gulf of Tonkin did in Marilyn’s day. But I had no inkling of all this then. I was immersed, indeed overwhelmed, with the work of a new assistant professor. Every lecture was a research project. I had studied Vietnam, sure, but I didn’t really understand it. I never had to teach it.

So I piled a stack of books about the war on my desk and started flipping pages. At first my search was utilitarian. How should I organize my lecture? What themes should I develop? What did I need to cover in those short fifty minutes, and what could I skip? Then I picked up The Vietnam Wars for the first time. I started on page one. By page three, I was hooked. By chapter two, I had taken leave of my office chair and settled down into a recliner. I made a cup of tea. I read the book from cover to cover. I didn’t have time to do so—I should have been writing my lecture furiously. But I was hooked, captivated. For the first time I understood—because I empathized. I felt. I entered that world and experienced that time. I shared the shock and surprise that mobilized and transformed a generation. By the time I reached the end, I was angry. I understood how Marilyn must have felt.

Before this moment, I had seen Marilyn give a couple of talks and make comments on SHAFR panels. Each time she spoke with the same righteous conviction that I now discovered in The Vietnam Wars. In those days, her passion seemed odd to me. It clashed with my sensibilities, the detached attitude to historical inquiry I was cultivating. Indeed, I couldn’t relate to many of my older colleagues who had been shaped by the war. Some of them seemed too radical, too bent out of shape, too serious, too anxious, too angry—and, even, dare I say it, a whiff intolerant. It seemed like they wore their politics just a bit too proudly. They were reliving those days, relighting that war. Wasn’t it time to move on? I couldn’t relate. But The Vietnam Wars changed all that. I understood. From that moment forward, my own teaching about Vietnam would be shaped by the outrage and disgust and disillusionment that Marilyn felt.

Sure, I tried to bottle it up. My job, as I saw it, was to be balanced. I would be dispassionate. I would raise questions but not answer them. I would be cold and analytical, maybe even clinical. Or so I hoped. But then Marilyn came along and knocked me over the head. She made sure I would fail in this quest just a little bit. And over the years, as I taught the war again and again I had those moments—the ones where I must have seemed too radical, too bent out of shape, too serious, too anxious, too angry—and, even, dare I say it, a whiff intolerant. Marilyn’s Vietnam stirred my moral sensibilities.

To my mind, Marilyn the historian and Marilyn the activist were intertwined. She was the author of The Vietnam Wars and the one who protested with Dan and Howie. Her work as a scholar was interwoven with her life as a citizen. She used both to fight for change, to advocate for peace, to challenge nationalism and militarism, to inspire and champion dissent, to hold democracy accountable. Or so it seemed to me. But what did I really know? Marilyn was just a symbol to me. But in being that symbol, she haunted...
respect for democracy, the rise in hate crimes and anxiety, admiration for authoritarianism and the unexpressed collusion with a foreign government, the expressed run, the implicit anti-Semitism and the hostile nativism, immigration ban, the cabinet appointees known for lying, the verbal assault on two branches of government...it was my sense of purpose. When confronting great tragedy, just how neutral can I be...or should I be? At what point does my work as a teacher and scholar collide with my duties as a citizen, my moral obligations as an individual?

And so all this lay dormant in my head until that moment, just days before her death, when I found myself thinking unexpectedly about Marilyn. Now I knew how she must have felt when she took to the streets to oppose the war, when she suffused her historical writing with fiery passion and righteous indignation. For there is something about this particular historical moment—our shared moment in these portentous Trumpian times—that raises profound moral questions about our duties as individuals, citizens, and scholars. If so many analysts are right in forecasting that our very democracy is in jeopardy, and if people are already experiencing fear and intolerance, how neutral can we be...or should we be?

Like the Vietnam War did for Marilyn, Donald Trump’s bizarre and belligerent inaugural address changed everything for me. I didn’t watch the inauguration live, but I was shocked by the clips I heard on the radio as I drove to get a breakfast burrito the next morning. It was supposed to be an ordinary Saturday. Stunned by the echoes of the 1930s I heard on the radio, the portentous anger, the rejection of so many conventions of decency and democracy, I pulled over and read the full text on my iPhone. My day changed instantly. Within an hour, my wife and I were making our way to Denver to join the throngs gathering for the record-shattering women’s march. We both felt that we simply had to do something to take a stand for democracy and decency. People around us seemed to feel the same. A few advertised their personal histories of civic activism. Near the steps of the state capitol, three women carried a sign: “We Marched Back Then, We March Again,” with the years 1967 and 2017 inscribed (see the accompanying picture). We saw several other women, some much older, with signs that read, “I can’t believe I still have to protest this shit.” But most of those we met had no such history. Many told us they had never protested much of anything before. I hadn’t either. Soon, though, I found the Port Huron Statement buzzing in my head. I had been bred in least modest comfort. I was housed comfortably in universities. But now I looked uncomfortably to the world my children would inherit.

In the days that lay ahead, my comfort was penetrated by events too troubling to dismiss: the incessant and pointless lying, the verbal assault on two branches of government and the press, the hastily contrived and discriminatory immigration ban, the cabinet appointees known for expressing disdain of the agencies they were slated to run, the implicit anti-Semitism and the hostile nativism, the collusion with a foreign government, the expressed admiration for authoritarianism and the unexpressed respect for democracy, the rise in hate crimes and anxiety, the “bull in a China shop” approach to governance, and so on. I feel now like Marilyn must have then: that something must be done, and I must be a part of that something. I’ve never been an activist or a pessimist, and I’ve always fancied myself a centrist. I tip-toed uncomfortably in my new role of dissenter. I called my congressman and senators. I signed petitions. I wrote a statement for our Faculty Senate opposing the immigration ban, and organized a “teach in” on the issue. I donated to a refugee relief organization.

And yet, I also wonder if the approach of my generation must, of necessity, differ in crucial ways from that of Marilyn’s generation. Their outlook on the world was colored by the period of intense patriotism of the 1940s and 1950s. This was a time when, as many of us well know, our historian predecessors wrote about how we historians had a “total war” obligation to contribute to the fight against communism, as Conyers Read put it in 1949, or sang the praises of U.S. foreign policy and “the blessings of liberty,” as Samuel Flagg Bemis wrote in 1961. These were presidents of the American Historical Association. Against such a background, it’s small wonder that so much historical writing in later years basted the myths of our hyper-nationalistic myopia.

For all my own attempts to be “balanced,” how much of my own teaching also set out to “complicate”—my word—the historical narratives my students inherited from their gym teachers who taught them U.S. history in high school? My classes have zoomed in on the war in the Philippines, the assault on dissent during World War I, the atomic bombings, the overthrow of foreign governments, the FBI surveillance of Martin Luther King, Watergate, the Iran-Contra scandal, and so on. These are important moments in our recent past and they must not be forgotten. But did I give my students anything beyond cynicism and doubt? Did I really help them understand the complicated workings of democracy, the value of our institutions, the promise and peril of partisan politics, the inner workings of our legal system? Did I empower my students to affect change through our flawed system, or did I merely lead them to cast it out as corrupt and hypocritical? Should I be all that surprised that many young people today view democracy unfavorably, and no small number view authoritarianism as a respectable alternative? Do I have some obligation, as a citizen no less than a teacher, to help our students become citizens?

I don’t know the answers to these questions, or at least I don’t know where to start, how to begin. But these thoughts, too, were on my mind that day as I walked across campus...
ruminating privately about Marilyn Young. Had you seen me on the quad, you would have noticed something most unusual poking out of my backpack: a small American flag, the kind people wave on the Fourth of July. On an impulse, I bought one at Goodwill that very same morning—another coincidence.

It was the first moment in my adult life where I purposely displayed the stars and stripes in a calculated show of patriotism. What a strange moment to do so. Our country is being led by a narcissistic buffoon with delusions of grandeur, our institutions are under strain, the populace is up in arms, and I am parading around with an American flag on my back! I don’t know that I’ve ever seen a flag so displayed on my campus before, or indeed on any campus, save for those raised over official administrative offices or trotted out during sporting events. Students and colleagues caught sight of the flag protruding from my pack and stared at it. Clearly, it seemed odd to them, as it did to me.

But I feel now—in a way that I never did before—a need to stand up for my country, for democracy. I can even be patriotic about the value of our country’s democratic principles. Yes, as a historian I know all too well how unevenly the fruits of democracy have been shared, how our national story is rife with conflict and contradictions, how patriotism has been the handmaiden of conquest. But now that democracy seems imperiled, I can no longer take for granted my ability to criticize and complicate without consequence. If I am to dissent from the new president’s assault on our institutions, on our very constitutional republican traditions, I can take back that symbol, the flag that some wave with just a bit too much unthinking fervor, and carry it proudly. I can repurpose patriotism from the last refuge of scoundrels, to the last defense of democratic institutions.

I think I know now how Marilyn must have felt then. I wonder what she would make of me now.
When the founders of SHAFR met in 1967 hoping to get enough support among American historians specializing in the nation’s foreign relations—generally known then as diplomatic historians—two things favored their cause: first, academic disciplines were becoming more and more specialized; and, second, the Vietnam War demanded an explanation.

The 1960s really marked the beginning of a revolution in academia as both the humanities and the sciences gave birth to sub-disciplines, and these quickly became new “fields” of study. Some remained fairly close in identity to the old classic disciplines, others incorporated methodologies from related fields, and still others had not been heard of before. Mostly the brand new fields were in the sciences, but the humanities were not exempt. At the time of the founding of SHAFR there was not unanimous feeling—by a long shot—that a new organization was the best idea to meet what was felt (with some justice) that foreign relations or “old-fashioned” diplomatic history was out of step with the trends in American history.

In a way, then, the two factors favoring a new professional organization blended together, because the Vietnam War had intensified the search for historical explanations. World Wars I and II, at least superficially, had well understood “causes” and a genuine precipitating event. After the Cold War began Korea (now called the Korean War), which inaugurated a murkier era in terms of easily understood origins. Franklin Roosevelt had Pearl Harbor; Lyndon Johnson had the Gulf of Tonkin. Sending hundreds of thousands of troops into battle against the Axis powers was one thing, sending half a million soldiers to Vietnam quite another.

Courses in American foreign relations quickly filled up, and then there were courses on the Vietnam War itself. At the height of the interest in “Why Vietnam?”, I taught a course at Rutgers with over 200 students. But the real force driving these enrollments was not the old “what one diplomat said to another” style of the first generation of famous historians of American foreign policy. This is not to denigrate their achievement, not at all. My college text in American foreign relations was Thomas Bailey’s classic, A Diplomatic History of the American People. It seduced me. Probably there has never been a better written text. Years later I read in the Stanford student newspaper that Bailey had been compared to Liberace. He responded that he did not mind the comparison, so far as it went, because you had to interest a student before you could teach him.

But something was happening in Madison, Wisconsin, that would bring more and more people into the field, both directly and indirectly. William Appleman Williams arrived at the University of Wisconsin before the Vietnam War had become the main foreign policy issue of the 1960s. It is still argued by some after all these years that without Vietnam the “Wisconsin School” would not have gained traction, and that it set scholars off towards a dead end. But the search for the internal sources of U.S. foreign policy beyond Bailey’s emphasis on public opinion would have happened anyway, as the general study of history deepened into special interest groups and neglected social factors such as race. But more than that it expanded into explorations of how policymakers derived their views of the national interest, refined those views, and acted upon them. Other historians beginning to become famous at this time, such as Samuel Hayes at Pittsburgh, sought many of the same answers for domestic policy that Williams was stressing in courses at Wisconsin. The categories used by both overlapped, especially in identifying key “cosmopolitan” figures who shaped governmental decision-making. The old argument that American policy merely responded to world events no longer sufficed.

Wisconsin in the 1940s and 1950s still valued its heritage led by that giant Frederick Jackson Turner, whose “Frontier Thesis” had sought to explain what was “exceptional” about American history, and led others through similar avenues like Walter Prescott Webb to write his 1930s classic, Divided We Stand: The Crisis of a Frontierless Democracy. It was also a Beardian department of history, especially the Charles Beard of The Open Door at Home, and The Idea of National Interest.

I am not seeking here to suggest that SHAFR grew out of the Wisconsin “School,” however defined, but rather that the events that produced such works became relevant once again in the 1960s. Without that development it is hard to understand how the field of American foreign relations could so have expanded, and with it SHAFR to a “major league” organization with nearly 1500 members and a highly successful journal, Diplomatic History. What is perhaps equally important (or perhaps self-evident) is that from the beginning, SHAFR adapted successfully to the newer trends in historiography—as well as any of the traditional national professional organizations.

There was a feeling as SHAFR began to expand that it was necessary to found a new professional journal because the older journals did not welcome submissions from diplomatic historians out of a prejudice against the “idea” of diplomatic history as a sterile concept in the modern world of historiography. It was certainly true that the membership in the early years, for example, was over 90% male. Yet one of the founders was Betty Miller Unterberger, who later became a president of the organization. A look around the room at the 2016 convention luncheon at San Diego could leave no doubts that the organization was no longer a male bastion holding out against reality in academics. The range of subjects covered in Diplomatic History equally conveys the impression of a vibrant field exploring the many sources of foreign policy back to their origins in intellectual and social movements, as well as the role of NGOs, etc., in addition to traditionally identified forces in the idea and the formulation of Henry Luce’s famous essay on the eve of American entrance into World War II, “The American Century.”
The entire Spring 1999 issue was dedicated to a roundtable of major scholars on that essay, which suggested to its audience, that more than the attack on Pearl Harbor shaped the way Americans would have to view their new role in the world. In my own case, I have always felt at home at SHAFR conventions. The scholarly wars of the Cold War years never really interrupted the good feelings around the convention. I served as president of the organization in 1988. As I got ready to deliver my presidential address, Ernest May came up to the head table and said he had to leave early to catch a plane. When he got up to leave, I quipped that Ernest had told me that if I said anything outrageous, he would leave. When he heard me, he turned back and grinned and everyone laughed. The next year, when I introduced George Herring as my successor, he began his talk with an appreciation of my historical endeavors, which, he said, had turned him into a “Flaming Moderate.”

I have heard many very good addresses at SHAFR, attended excellent sessions, and enjoyed a warm fellowship with people I could never have met without the organization’s conference umbrella. There were doubts in the beginning. Now there is nothing but a sense of eagerness to see what is coming next.