In this issue

Field Notes from East of The Iron Curtain
A Roundtable on The Diplomacy of Migration
Teaching with Popular Films

And more...
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Last year, SHAFR president Tim Borstelmann, acting on the advice of Council, appointed an ad hoc committee on development. With Frank Costigliola as chair, the committee consists of Mary L. Dudziak, Richard H. Immerman, Jeanna Lynn Kinnebrew, Fredrik Logevall, Melvyn P. Leffler, Randall B. Woods, and Thomas Zeiler. After meeting at the June 2015 SHAFR conference, the committee decided to send a letter to former SHAFR presidents and to other longtime members of the organization appealing for a $1,500 donation to the SHAFR endowment.

The committee is motivated by two principal reasons. First, we are eager to give something back to a unique organization that has provided us with so many gifts. SHAFR has advanced our scholarly careers while enriching our lives with friendships we never anticipated. SHAFR’s prizes, fellowships, and other awards have encouraged and facilitated our scholarship—and that of our students. The organization has done all this while asking from us a pittance in annual dues or conference registration. As we move closer to retirement, we intend our generosity to signal to the next generation—and the ones after that—how much SHAFR has meant to us. Our example will, we hope, set a precedent for the future.

Second, while SHAFR is not in a financial crisis, the organization anticipates flat or even declining revenue from *Diplomatic History*. Though the journal keeps getting better and better, the changing economics of journal publishing means that it will not generate the revenue that it has in the past. Our goal is to ensure that SHAFR has the resources to continue aiding younger scholars and graduate students, holding large and diverse conferences, and fostering the impressive vibrancy of our field. The organization is already using for annual expenses much of the income generated by the endowment. No one wants to draw money from our endowment’s principal.

The ad hoc development committee wishes to thank the generous donors who have already contributed:

- David Anderson
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- Tim Borstelmann
- Frank Costigliola
- Edward P. Crapol
- Mary L. Dudziak
- Lloyd C. Gardner
- Peter L. Hahn
- Garry Hess
- Michael J. Hogan
- Richard H. Immerman
- Lawrence S. Kaplan
- Walter LaFeber

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Gifts to SHAFR are tax deductible, and you will receive a receipt. The committee’s original appeal for $1500 is but a recommendation, and you may make your gift in one lump sum or in installments over the next few years. SHAFR has set up a secure site on its home page SHAFR.org for making your donation. Click on the black button “Donate” or “Leaders’ Fund.” Or you can mail a check made out to SHAFR Leaders’ Fund to:

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The 2016 elections will fill the following positions:

- **Vice President** (1 vacancy)
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- **Nominating Committee** (1 vacancy)

Please submit nominations to the members of the Nominating Committee by e-mail no later than **June 30, 2016**. Nominations must include the nominee’s name, e-mail address, institution (if applicable), and a statement of the nominee’s qualifications. We encourage self-nominations. It is helpful to indicate whether you have contacted the nominee about his or her willingness to serve.

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A Roundtable on Meredith Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War*

Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, David C. Atkinson, Madeline Y. Hsu, Priscilla Roberts, Eileen P. Scully, and Meredith Oyen

**Introduction to Roundtable: The Diplomacy of Migration**

Gregg Andrew Brazinsky

Historians of American foreign relations and historians studying migration and diasporic communities are two groups that should naturally have a lot to say to each other. They both write about subjects that span multiple languages and cultures and are impossible to understand through the parochial lenses of national or local history. Yet the dialogue between these two fields has been somewhat limited. Immigrants and migration are often relegated to a side note in studies of American diplomacy, while in studies of migration foreign policy often lurks in the background as a shadowy force whose impact is not clearly defined. Meredith Oyen's new book, *The Diplomacy of Migration*, makes a concerted effort to understand more fully how these two important phenomena intersect with and influence each other. In fact, the book's very title speaks to the way the problem of migration demanded the attention of government officials.

Oyen focuses on how the practice of using migration policy to achieve foreign policy objectives influenced the relationship between the United States and the Republic of China between 1942 and 1972. As the reviewers note, Oyen's chronological framing is an interesting one because it includes both the period before 1949 when the Guomindang government controlled the Chinese mainland and the subsequent period in which it had real authority only over Taiwan. According to Oyen, migration diplomacy during this period fell chiefly into three key patterns: it was used as a "direct tool of foreign policy" that signaled positive or negative developments in the bilateral relationship; it was deployed by both Washington and Taipei as a form of public diplomacy; and it sought to bring about the transformation of the Chinese American community. This framework allows Oyen to break down the conceptual barriers between migration history and diplomatic history, demonstrating conclusively that the two are not nearly as distinct as historians have thus far made them out to be.

*The Diplomacy of Migration* is based on prodigious, multi-national, multi-archival research. Oyen not only discovered a broad array of new materials in the American archives but also conducted research in both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, taking full advantage of recently declassified materials. As a result, she is able to shed light on many aspects of migration diplomacy that had been neglected by previous literature on the subject.

Given *The Diplomacy of Migration*'s many strengths, it is not surprising that all four of the reviewers applaud the book's methodological freshness and conceptual clarity. David Atkinson write that the book "ranges widely, deeply and innovatively across the war ravaged middle decades of the twentieth century." Madeleine Hsu similarly believes that Oyen's work is "positioned to make critical interventions in several disciplines." Ultimately, the reviewers raise few substantive criticisms and most of the ones that they do raise reflect more on the limited number of sources available than they do on the book's argumentation or organization. Priscilla Roberts, for instance, writes that Oyen was "somewhat the prisoner of her sources" and that "mainland materials on the PRC are probably under-represented." It is true that materials from mainland Chinese archives figure less prominently in the volume than those from the United States or Taiwan. Yet, as Roberts no doubt recognizes, this is to be expected given the reluctance of the Chinese government to declassify materials on sensitive topics. Atkinson's criticisms of the book are similarly mild. He wonders whether Oyen's argument that American officials tended to treat migration as a secondary issue inadvertently downplays the importance of the subject. Such a point does little to problematize Oyen's arguments, though it does—as Atkinson hoped to do—provide some "grist for discussion."

Ultimately, the reviewers leave little doubt that Oyen has produced a deeply researched and carefully argued work of scholarship. The book provides a new conceptual bridge between two related subfields whose numerous interconnections have not been fully appreciated. Moreover, it offers intriguing new insights into America's important Cold War partnership with Taiwan, which has also received far less attention from historians than it deserves. The four reviews leave little question that *The Diplomacy of Migration* can and should play a facilitating role in the emerging
dialogue between historians working in the fields of U.S.
foreign relations and immigration history.

Migration Matters: Review of Meredith Oyen's *The
Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the
Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War*

David C. Atkinson

In 1889, the United States Supreme Court adjudicated the
question of final authority over who could and could
not enter the country and determined that it resided
with Congress. In the words of Justice Stephen Johnson
Field, “that the government of the United States . . . can
exclude aliens from its territory, is a proposition which we
do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own
territory . . . is an incident of every independent nation.”1

According to that line of reasoning (which persists to this
day), the right to demarcate and police national boundaries
is the exclusive prerogative of sovereign governments,
without reference to the sensitivities of foreign powers or
their people. This formulation has enabled generations of
American nativists to articulate their anti-immigrant invectives regardless of the potential implications for
American foreign relations. From the
retrenchment of Asian and European immigration during the years 1882–
1924, to more recent rejections of an
expansive refugee policy, American
restrictions have historically
deflected international criticism by
wrapping claims of sovereignty and
national security over their rhetoric.2

Of course, border-making is
never an entirely domestic issue,
and the consequences of American
migration policies have resonated far beyond the nation’s boundaries,
as Meredith Oyen’s important new
book demonstrates. Throughout
eight chapters, Oyen marshals an
impressive array of evidence to
illustrate the ways in which governments on both sides of
the Pacific used migration policy to modulate Sino-U.S.
relations, from the chaos of the Second World War to the
drama of Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China
in 1972. Drawing upon extensive multilingual research in
American, Chinese, and British archives, she persuasively
argues that migration policy represented “a useful venue
for trying out new policy approaches, reacting to changing
events, or making symbolic gestures” (6–7), all in the
context of the fraught and evolving relationship between
the United States, the Republic of China, and the People’s
Republic of China.

The Diplomacy of Migration is all the more impressive because most scholars of migration quite reasonably limit
themselves to one category of analysis, be it immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, students, dissidents, or diasporic
communities. In contrast, Oyen scrutinizes them all
through the same tripartite lens of Sino-American
diplomacy. Embracing recent trends in both the history of
American foreign relations and the history of migration, she
skillfully moves between the domestic and international
machinations of state actors and the transnational activities
of migrants themselves, who exercised their own agency
with varying degrees of success. As Oyen contends,
“revealing state-to-state communication, conflict, and
collusion over migration issues is important, but the lived
experience of the policies, not to mention the ability of
migrants to have disproportionate impact on foreign
relations . . . means that the experience as subjects of policies
is important as well” (8). To that end, she integrates her
analysis of “traditional” diplomatic history sources—State
Department and Foreign Ministry records, presidential
files, congressional materials—with oral histories, official
and unofficial migrant testimonies, and the records of
transnational and community activists.

It is no easy task to manage so many perspectives
across thirty tumultuous years, but Oyen expertly
untangles this complex and complicated history, adopting
a three-part schema that follows a loosely chronological
trajectory. Part 1 focuses on the ways in which American
and Chinese officials both directly and indirectly managed
their relations through adjustments to American migration
policies during the Second World War and the ensuing
Chinese Civil War. Chinese Americans also contended with
conflicting expectations about their contributions and
allegiances during both conflicts. Chapter 1 reveals
the importance of Kuomintang (KMT) officials, Chinese
sailors, and overseas Chinese in the American decision
to repeal Chinese exclusion in 1943 and in concomitant
negotiations to relinquish embarrassing Anglo-American
claims of extraterritoriality in China.

Moving beyond challenges to these longstanding indignities,
chapter 2 examines KMT concerns regarding the quality and treatment
of Chinese in the United States and the reaction of Chinese Americans
to expectations of wartime service, despite the denial of full American
citizenship rights. Oyen also explores the variously voluntary or coerced
financial contributions of Chinese Americans to both Nationalist and
Communist coffers during the war and their efforts to ensure that essential
networks of remittance continued to function despite the pressures of
war. As global conflict gave way to civil war, the convolutions of
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The second part of the book, like the first, is notable for its attention to an unusual range of perspectives and interests. It examines the opportunities and pressures that faced Chinese dissidents, immigrants, and refugees in the early years of the Cold War, both in Asia and the United States. Across three discursively rich chapters, Oyen unravels the often capricious policies that were inflicted upon Chinese migrants by the ROC, PRC, and U.S. governments. Chapter 4 illustrates the American pivot away from finessing strains in the wartime alliance to apprehension about potential subversion among Chinese immigrants in the United States. Cold War national security concerns added new urgency to existing anxieties and increased the resolve of the ROC government to oversee the quality of Chinese emigrants. Much as that chapter focuses largely on diplomatic relations, chapter 5 highlights the transnational dimension of migration diplomacy during the early Cold War, primarily through the lens of family finances. Oyen carefully traces the ongoing politics of transpacific remittances, which attracted the competing intrigues of three governments as well as individual Chinese families on both sides of the Pacific. The final chapter in this section explores simultaneous efforts to deal with the flow
of refugees from the PRC in the early 1950s. While the United States government actively encouraged defections across the newly drawn “bamboo curtain,” the responsible agencies proved unwilling to resettle escapees in American communities. They therefore did little to alleviate a growing refugee crisis in Hong Kong, a crisis that was exacerbated by the onerous identification requirements imposed by the ROC and American governments.

The final section of the book considers the role of migration policy in ameliorating relations between the United States and the PRC. Ambassadorial-level talks began during the 1954 Geneva Conference endeavored to extricate Americans trapped on the mainland following the Communist victory in 1949, while also seeking a mutually acceptable formula for the repatriation of those Chinese who wished to leave the United States. These talks were encumbered by the American refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the PRC government and by security concerns on both sides, but they remained important because, in Oyen’s rendering, they constituted a relatively safe avenue for tentative American overtures to the PRC and vice versa (214).

Once again, however, Chinese and American migrants found themselves hostage to the political whims of their host countries. ROC officials did not just impassively observe these negotiations. Keen to avoid becoming a dumping ground for Chinese deportees, Nationalist authorities bristled at the perceived legitimacy that ambassadorial talks bestowed upon the PRC. ROC anxiety intensified during the 1960s, as a growing Taiwanese independence movement strained American relations with the Nationalist government. As Oyen demonstrates in chapter 8, radicalized Taiwanese students clustered around American universities, creating centers of transnational activism that threatened to undermine both KMT control of their homeland and American support for the Nationalist regime. Subsequent attempts by the ROC to deny passport renewals for suspected dissidents in the United States often met with ambivalence from State Department officials, which seemed to signal an end to steadfast American support for ROC claims to primacy. Their anxieties proved prescient during Nixon’s first term, as the United States government gradually relaxed travel controls before the president’s policy of rapprochement with the PRC. Oyen describes that situation in the conclusion.

This is a deeply researched and tightly argued book, and I offer the following observations primarily as grist for conversation. Throughout the book, Oyen depicts migration policy as a secondary or lower-level issue, which Chinese and American policymakers used to safely broach or elide more difficult issues. This characterization derives from the attitudes of American and Chinese officials, and she contends that it was the purported triviality of migration policy that made it such as useful tool of diplomacy. I find this to be a compelling argument. At the same time, however, I sometimes found myself wondering whether this characterization inadvertently downplays the broader significance of migration policy in this case. For example, the Magnuson Act’s repeal of Chinese exclusion may not have engendered equality for Chinese Americans—as the Nationalist government hoped it would—nor did it necessarily enhance the prestige of the United States in China—as American supporters argued it would (39). In the longer term, however, repeal undoubtedly marked a major symbolic shift in Americans’ relationship with Chinese Americans and with China and Asia more broadly.3

The same might be said in regard to the issues surrounding postwar population displacement discussed in chapter 3. Over a million displaced Chinese and half a billion dollars hardly seem like low stakes, especially in the context of a four-year civil war that would ultimately transform China, Asia, and the global Cold War (71–2).

Oyen is of course aware of these broader significances, but it seems paradoxical to accept policymakers’ attenuation of the issue in a book that so carefully excavates the ongoing importance of migration policy. Put differently, did these diplomats in fact underestimate how significant seemingly minor shifts and concessions in migration policy could actually be?

I raise this question as somebody who also works at the confluence of diplomacy and migration, and I am particularly enthusiastic about this book’s successful blend of those fields. As Oyen points out, recent years have seen a number of studies along these lines, and we now have something approaching a critical mass of new scholarship that illustrates the many ways in which the politics of migration, bordering, and international relations intersect (7–8). Arguably, the majority of this recent work has come from those who identify primarily as scholars of migration.4 Of course, such distinctions are increasingly outmoded in an academic atmosphere that favors synergy and the collapse of boundaries between subfields, but the relationship between migration and diplomacy has not received nearly the same level of attention from students of American foreign relations as other allegedly “second order” concerns in the past twenty years—such as sports, music, movies, the export of consumer goods, etc.

Whether “Scholars Formerly Known as Diplomatic Historians” have some special insight into the relationship between power, the state, and international relations remains an open and contentious question.5 Nevertheless, it stands to reason that readers of this newsletter do ask questions that are different from those asked by some of our counterparts in other subfields—or at least, they answer the same questions differently. Oyen’s work therefore suggests that we should continue to mine the seams between diplomacy and migration in search of other relationships that were conditioned by American policies of mobility or immobility. How, for example, did the diplomacy of migration influence the relationship between the United States and the newly created states of eastern and central Europe after 1919? How did Czech, Polish, or Bulgarian migrants and their newly independent governments attempt to moderate American quota restrictions in the midst of prosperity, global depression, and then Cold War? Oyen’s work suggests that there are as many open questions as there were American consular agents wielding the authority to issue entry visas. Keen to avoid becoming a dumping ground for European deportees, American governments attempt to moderate American quota restrictions in the midst of prosperity, global depression, and then Cold War. Oyen’s work suggests that there are as many open questions as there were American consular agents wielding the authority to issue entry visas.

Indeed, there are elements of an even more capacious story within The Diplomacy of Migration itself. The British government and its colonies—especially Hong Kong—were in and out of the narrative, although British interests, politics, and motives are not always fully explicated (with the exception of Hong Kong in chapter 6). Similarly, the role of overseas Chinese in the British Empire seems to be of importance (65), and Oyen also hints at the ways in which other migrant communities seized the opportunity to ameliorate their treatment in the United States against the backdrop of war and Cold War. We see, for example, South Asians pushing for greater consideration in the aftermath of the Magnuson Act (38). I certainly do not expect Oyen to account for the actions of another complex and wide-ranging empire, let alone its self-governing dominions and colonies, but her work does suggest avenues for further research or synthesis.

Regardless of these nitpickings, The Diplomacy of Migration ranges widely, deeply, and innovatively across the history of Sino-American relations during the war-ravaged middle decades of the twentieth century. This is traditional diplomatic history, preoccupied with the highest levels of diplomacy and with essential questions of Cold War international politics. Yet it is also emblematic of the most inventive new approaches to our field: a mixture of diplomatic and transnational history, rooted
in multiarchival and multilingual research that reaches into the domestic politics of multiple countries as well. Oyen’s emphasis on migration as a facet of U.S.-ROC-PRC diplomacy, along with her comfortable transitions between domestic, international, and transnational levels of analysis, makes the familiar unfamiliar and yields countless new insights into the workings of Sino-American diplomacy. Just as important, Oyen illustrates the significance of migration policy to American foreign relations. That insight alone, I think, deserves greater consideration in our classrooms, our research, and our nation’s politics.

Notes:


Madelyne Y. Hsu

From the outset, The Diplomacy of Migration is positioned to make critical interventions in several disciplines by bridging the foreign ministry archives of three Pacific nations to examine a topic that scholarship has neglected, according to Gordon Chang, since World War II.1 Oyen is first and foremost an international historian who explores the contestations, compromises, and competing agendas that involved Chinese migrants, their range of activities, and their impact during the particularly complex Cold War era. The attending issues were negotiated between the United States and the competing agendas of two Chinas—Taiwan under Nationalist rule and China under communist control. Oyen brings to this ambitious project prodigious research and high-level bilingual skills, while demonstrating an acute awareness of nuances of strategic positioning and inequalities of power. She argues that migration was not a high-priority item for the United States, and yet, as a low-stakes issues involving matters such as prisoner exchanges, required negotiations that later laid the groundwork for communications on more significant matters.

Oyen’s three-pronged research approach enables a wide-ranging comparison of differences between sending and receiving nations in their goals and priorities for international migrants. Her illuminating contribution highlights for U.S. audiences the importance of international migrants to their originating states. Homeland states sought to maintain relations by encouraging ties such as remittances, expertise and investment, and dual citizenship, with its accompanying obligations of loyalty and support. Home countries also sought to boost their international status by negotiating for greater respect for and protesting discrimination against their subjects overseas. Such causes presented legitimizing claims for global attention and regard for a weak nation such as China. While the United States treated migration primarily as a matter of national security and effective enforcement of laws regarding control of its borders, both the Nationalist and communist Chinese governments treated migration as an opportunity to project their authority abroad by advocating for more egalitarian treatment of ethnic Chinese overseas in immigration and citizenship laws. Indeed, Oyen begins the book with a World War II vignette about successful Nationalist efforts to change U.S. policies that singled out Chinese seamen by denying them shore leave.

The Diplomacy of Migration astutely observes that negotiations on the improvement of Chinese migrant rights and protections in the United States were driven not so much by concern for the well-being of those most directly affected—Chinese Americans and Chinese migrants—but by the desire of both the Nationalist and communist governments to gain international status and thereby extract the greatest possible national advantage from the diaspora of ethnic Chinese. In their competition for legitimacy, they courted gestures of respect to enhance their standing in the international order and sought affirmations of loyalty and political and financial support from Chinese overseas. Their priorities often sacrificed the well-being of Chinese overseas for token acknowledgements of equality for China. The 1943 Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act, for example, did little to improve actual conditions for immigration or family reunification. Technically, the act placed China on the same immigration basis as other nations: all were assigned quotas derived from past U.S. Census data and allocated on the basis of national origins. However, the annual quota for the Chinese was a mere 105. The act’s greatest impact on Chinese Americans stemmed from its granting of the right to citizenship by naturalization, an important symbolic gesture acknowledging the racial equality of Chinese. The Repeal Act was followed by a succession of policy shifts developed by the White House, some congressional reformers, and the U.S. Department of State. Those shifts revealed that the weaker nation, Nationalist China (later Taiwan), was able to influence U.S. immigration policy over the course of the Cold War. In this, Oyen’s detailed monograph nicely complements the sweeping study of twenty-two American nations, Calling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigration Policy in the Americas, by David Scott FitzGerald and David Cook-Martin, which argues that ostensibly democratic powers such as the United States and Canada were relatively late in removing overt racial discrimination from their immigration and citizenship laws.2 When they finally did, it was at least in part the result of concerted pressure from less powerful neighbors in the Americas which worked in coalition through international organizations and conferences to elevate their own status by pressing for the end of racial discrimination as an international standard. Oyen demonstrates the ways in which the Nationalist government on Taiwan contributed to this global shift and to the
remaking of international relations systems, which were transformed through decolonization, the growing clout of emerging postcolonial nations, and the institutionalization of international governing and coalitional organizations such as the United Nations and the Bandung Conference.

Oyen's attention to international contexts and national prerogatives puts *The Diplomacy of Migration* somewhat at odds with traditional trajectories of Asian American studies scholarship. Although Oyen has consulted the relevant literature and provides significant contexts that critically complicate the field, international history considerations have only recently made inroads with the work of scholars such as Naoko Shibusawa, Judy Wu, and myself.5 Despite the recent popularity of transnational and hemispheric approaches, Asian American studies has been primarily concerned with the project of claiming belonging for its subjects in the United States, thereby excising the kinds of migrants who operated at the interstices between nations, while emphasizing the agency and subjectivity of those claiming Asian American identities. By drawing attention to the roles played by Chinese migrants in international relations, Oyen showcases individuals who have often fallen beyond the purview of Asian American studies, such as seamen, students, refugees, deportees, and U.S. citizens in China whose actions and fluid positionalities nonetheless intersect meaningfully with the circuits shaping more circumscribed conceptions of Chinese American lives.

*The Diplomacy of Migration* foregrounds the policies and programs enacted by government entities that attempted to impose restrictions and structure onto the activities of Chinese migrants, with incomplete yet distorting impacts. In contrast, Asian American studies scholars have emphasized the agencies of individuals and their networks, which resisted discriminatory measures enacted by the U.S. government; at the same time, they have also downplayed the efforts of Asian governments to act on behalf of subjects overseas, recognizing that diplomatic negotiations were not driven by civil rights concerns but usually prioritized national objectives over migrant lives. Asian American studies scholars have long been attentive to the symbolic nature of the reforms enacted by the Repeal Act as a product of these dynamics.

Nonetheless, Oyen's monograph provides important insights for Asian American studies by fleshing out the institutional and individual ambiguity and ambivalence attending the status of Chinese Americans. Under the principle of *jus sanguinis*, or citizenship by ancestry, the Nationalist government continued to claim Chinese overseas, even if they were born abroad, as citizens who required its protection but also owed loyalties and contributions. The Sino-Japanese conflicts of the 1930s magnified expectations of Chinese overseas and spurred increased campaigning among them. Such campaigns met with considerable success in the United States. Outreach programs and advocacy were standard components of twentieth-century Chinese government institutions and were expressed in the way schools were organized and textbooks were written, in the distribution of newspapers, in the recruitment of remittances, in overseas branches of political parties, and in efforts to impose political orthodoxies, which became particularly coercive in the context of the Cold War.

Oyen effectively explicates the competing efforts of both Nationalist and communist Chinese to maintain and develop the loyalties of Chinese overseas. She also notes that the U.S. government accepted and even encouraged such outreach to ethnic Chinese living or even born in the United States, and she depicts the many ways in which Chinese migrants and Chinese Americans themselves sought protections and greater rights by appealing to both Chinese and American political systems. They adapted strategies that changed with the times and with the shifting success of their claims on different governments. Through the lens of international relations, the practical implications of Chinese transnationalism in the United States and the negotiations necessitated by dual citizenship, diasporic belonging, and liminal status in the United States are brought into high relief; such matters were tools not just of governments, but of migrants as well. During the Cold War, the United States gained ascendancy over both incarnations of China as the nation providing greater options and protections for Chinese American subjects.

Although not of central concern to Oyen's chief arguments, the changing dynamics of national belonging for Chinese Americans over the course of the Cold War is steadily tracked through telling details. The balance of the Chinese American population shifted toward those holding U.S. citizenship, whether by birth or by recently acquired rights to naturalization, which amplified the impact of Chinese American efforts to influence U.S. politicians and relevant government bureaucracies. Leaders such as Lim P. Lee, the first Chinese American postmaster-general in San Francisco, gained visibility by working with local mainline Democratic and Republican party organizations. They gave voice to the perspectives of an increasingly active Chinese American voting bloc. Ethnic communities mobilized for greater visibility and contributed to the intensifying civil rights movement, claiming more egalitarian access to social services, employment and educational opportunities, the ending of residential and other forms of segregation, and greater political representation.

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As the author of a recently published monograph that also discusses Chinese migrations to the United States during the Cold War, I differ from Oyen on various points of emphasis or interpretation. Such differences are of course inevitable when scholars begin with different intellectual questions and work from only partially overlapping archival materials. I had hoped that Oyen would draw upon her work in Chinese archives to address more expansively a topic foregrounded in my book: the deployment of international education and the circulation of students as a form of foreign relations outreach that expanded after World War II. The United States not only welcomed growing numbers of foreign students but also provided significant financial support for Nationalist Taiwan to compete with the PRC for the loyalties of diasporic Chinese American efforts to influence U.S. politicians and relevant government bureaucracies. Leaders such as Lim P. Lee, the first Chinese American postmaster-general in San Francisco, gained visibility by working with local mainline Democratic and Republican party organizations. They gave voice to the perspectives of an increasingly active Chinese American voting bloc. Ethnic communities mobilized for greater visibility and contributed to the intensifying civil rights movement, claiming more egalitarian access to social services, employment and educational opportunities, the ending of residential and other forms of segregation, and greater political representation.
through the provision of higher education opportunities. U.S. involvement in the expansion of educational facilities in Taiwan references the much longer history of American engagement with the Nationalists during their governance of the Chinese mainland starting in the late 1920s. U.S. missionaries were heavily involved in shaping modern educational institutions in China; they sought to shape the outlook and values of China’s modernizing elite. In that project they were supported by the U.S. government, perhaps most visibly in the form of remissions of Boxer Indemnity funds and in the encouragement of international student and technical trainee exchanges. Many of the diplomats who represented the Nationalists were in fact U.S.-educated, and used their American experiences to enhance their abilities to influence the United States. Despite the intimate alliance that such long-standing connections connoted and the high profile of the China Lobby, a succession of presidents and many State Department bureaucrats were more skeptical of Chiang Kai-shek than Oyen allows. Many of them covertly hoped for a “Third Force” alternative during the 1950s and began cultivating ties to Taiwan independence activists at least as early as the mid-1960s. These differences do not seriously undermine the overall thrust of Oyen’s arguments, but they complicate the dynamics of U.S.-Nationalist interplay that she otherwise so capably explicates.

The Diplomacy of Migration will richly reward readers in the fields discussed in this review, but it also merits the attention of scholars of East Asia, twentieth-century world history, and transnational American studies. Its multiarchival accomplishments mark a significant advance in the field of transpacific international history.

Notes:

Review of The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.–Chinese Relations in the Cold War

Priscilla Roberts

Meredith Oyen’s stimulating study is an ambitious effort to weave together into a coherent narrative framework several seemingly disparate threads: American policies on Chinese migration into the United States; U.S. government treatment and expectations of Chinese Americans; and the input of both the Chinese American community and the Nationalist government of the Republic of China (ROC) (in its successive incarnations from World War II to the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War) into U.S. policies. Topics covered include the end of formal U.S. and British extraterritorial privileges in China during World War II; the repeal—at least nominally—of the exclusion of additional Chinese immigrants; the admission of refugees and other Chinese migrants, including students and political activists, to the United States; and the repatriation of Americans detained in mainland China and of Chinese in the United States who wished to move to the People’s Republic (PRC). Oyen also examines efforts to minimize leftist views and influence among Chinese Americans; attempts to control financial remittances by Chinese Americans to family members on the mainland and to manage the flow of information among families divided by the bamboo curtain; and ROC efforts to bar pro-Taiwan independence advocates from the United States and discourage political activism on American soil by those who slipped through the net.

Several governments were involved in these interchanges, including the United States (where different branches of the bureaucracy were often at odds with each other), the ROC, and the PRC, plus the British government in London and the supposedly subordinate but at times decidedly independent-minded colonial government in British-administered Hong Kong. From the mid-1940s onward, the United Nations and its affiliates, especially the United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency (UNRRA) and its successor, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, also had multiple parts to play. Whether or not the hundreds of thousands of Chinese who crossed over into Hong Kong after 1949 were refugees or simply migrants was an issue with loaded political implications, in terms of both their eligibility for UN aid and their potential resettlement, as well as the status of Taiwan. Also problematic was the question of Taiwan’s standing at the UN as the sole legitimate government of China, a position increasingly in jeopardy by the early 1960s, compromised not just by growing momentum in favor of mainland membership, but potentially by the developing Taiwan independence movement. And beyond all these competing official bureaucracies, ordinary people had their own agendas: to bring family members to the United States; to migrate to better circumstances; to maintain contacts with and send funds to family members across the political divide; to make their own political voices heard; and in some cases, to return to the mainland and help to build a new China.

Oyen attempts to bring together all these stories in a volume crammed with fascinating details. The title is not entirely accurate, however. The book begins in the early 1940s, during World War II, with the culmination of Chinese efforts (dating back at least to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference) to dismantle both Western extraterritoriality and to stop the exclusion of Chinese immigrants from the United States. Those efforts were part of China’s quest for equality with other international powers. Unless one accepts claims that in Asia the Cold War was effectively over in 1972, when President Richard Nixon visited mainland China and the United States and the People’s Republic concluded the Shanghai Communiqué, effectively agreeing to defer the subject of Taiwan, the book covers only the relatively early Cold War, up to the early 1970s.

Within this time frame, the primary focus remains firmly on Nationalist efforts to influence U.S. policies towards Chinese migration and determine the sympathies, outlook, makeup, and actions of the Chinese American community. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PRC are by no means completely missing, but—probably because of the relative paucity of sources as well as the rather limited contacts between the mainland and the United States during these years—they are less prominent than the Kuomintang (KMT) and the ROC. Oyen is indeed somewhat the prisoner of her sources. She has done an impressive job of mining archives and other materials in mainland China, Taiwan, the United States, and Britain, including the notoriously temperamental Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives in Beijing. Overall, though, mainland materials on the PRC are probably underrepresented in this volume, which therefore focuses more intensively on the relationship between the ROC and the United States, with the British administration in Hong Kong playing a significant supporting role.

Oyen is perceptive in setting Nationalist Chinese dealings with the Chinese American community in the
broader context of ROC policies toward all overseas Chinese. The Nationalist government took an extremely proprietary attitude toward overseas Chinese, and in 1923 formally sought to destroy itself the protector of all Chinese, including those living beyond China’s borders, and to persuade overseas Chinese to identify their interests with those of the KMT. Remittances to families, donations, and investments from the huaqiao, Chinese residing temporarily or permanently outside China, were vitally important to the country. Overseas Chinese had indeed been the financial mainstays of Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the ROC, in his protracted campaigns to overthrow the Qing dynasty. Though the 102,554 Chinese living in the United States made up only about 1.13 percent of the nine million Chinese living outside China in the early 1940s, they were among the wealthiest. With U.S. immigration restrictions and the Chinese Exclusion Acts denying many the opportunity to bring their absent wives and children to the United States, the funds they sent back to China provided essential economic support to substantial swaths of south China, especially in Guangdong province.

More than any other historian to date, Oyen demonstrates just how extensive were the Nationalist government’s efforts to back the interests of the Chinese American community—a mere 0.08 percent of the U.S. population—within the United States. These efforts were part of a broader outreach program. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) was established in 1926 to combat the discrimination and other difficulties the Chinese encountered in many different nations. The United States was particularly significant to the commission’s efforts, in that other countries, as Oyen notes, tended to follow the American lead. The United States was “the first to enact formal exclusion laws . . . and the first to repeal them” (48).

Nationalist officials did not restrict themselves to championing the cases of individual Chinese who faced immigration-related problems with various U.S. authorities. They also sought to affect general American policies toward Chinese immigrants, ensuring, for example, that ethnic Chinese drafted for U.S. military service would be entitled to full American citizenship. Chinese students who had come to the United States for educational purposes were, however, generally able to obtain exemptions, although in 1944 at least one well-connected young Chinese man, Yanglung Tong, son of the ROC’s vice minister of information, who had been studying chemistry but subsequently took on a well-paid business position, found himself obliged to leave the United States to avoid military induction.

During World War II Nationalist officials campaigned discreetly for the repeal of U.S. legislation specifically excluding Chinese immigrants from the United States. Intended as a symbolic gesture of equality towards a wartime ally rather than a substantive change in policy, the measure reversing exclusion was carefully crafted to ensure that only an extremely limited number of Chinese—an annual quota of 105 to 107—could enter the United States. Finally passed by Congress in December 1943, this bill also permitted the naturalization of Chinese resident aliens, who had up to that time been denied the possibility of U.S. citizenship. It set a precedent for subsequent legislation granting limited immigration rights to other Asian national groups, including Indians and Filipinos.

Even though the repeal of Chinese exclusion still permitted very few new Chinese migrants to move to the United States, it opened the door. Between 1945 and 1950, five thousand Chinese women entered the United States as wives and fiancées of Chinese American servicemen. Apparently, over three-quarters of these women were longtime spouses rather than genuine war brides. The 1946 Chinese Alien Wives of American Citizens Act permitted all naturalized Chinese Americans to bring to their wives, prompting a further influx of women. With most migration halted during World War II, a backlog of Chinese claiming American citizenship because of birth in the United States or being the child of a U.S. citizen had also developed. Many Chinese who entered the United States for training as students or scholars in the later 1940s stayed on after 1949 rather than returning to the mainland. And in the 1950s, the United States accepted several thousand additional Chinese immigrants, some through special refugee quotas, others as the result of private bills in Congress. A further 15,000 Chinese refugees arrived during the 1960s.

Throughout the 1940s, the Nationalist government supported the removal of restrictions on Chinese migration to the United States, especially for wives and families. Along with this objective, however, came an ever-growing determination to ensure that the Chinese American community should be reliably pro-Nationalist rather than pro-Communist in outlook. In the 1930s and perhaps even more in the 1940s, with war and then civil war convulsing China, the KMT sought to tap the funds of the Chinese American community, marketing war bonds and setting up aid and relief programs for Chinese refugees. In part because their average incomes were generally greater than those of ethnic Chinese in South and Southeast Asia, Chinese living in North America, Australia, and Britain were particularly generous contributors to such efforts. Fraud and unwarranted pressure to make financial donations were by no means absent from these efforts, which were generally spearheaded by the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association or other native place or clan organizations based in the United States.

During the 1940s, competition between the KMT and the CCP for the loyalties, funds, and support of the Chinese American community and of Chinese students living temporarily in the United States became increasingly fierce. The two sides engaged in rival membership drives, and both tried to win over influential Americans within and beyond government circles. Increasingly, the brutal political Nationalist/Communist competition led the KMT to try to dominate the outlook and makeup of the Chinese American community and purge or discredit any dissenters. As Oyen rightly points out, the China Lobby dated back to wartime alliances between KMT officials and American politicians. In Chinatowns in major cities, where the great majority of Chinese Americans were concentrated, the wealthier elites tended to favor the KMT, whereas the rank and file of workers were more sympathetic to the Communists. In 1945, as civil war loomed in China, numerous Chinese students and workers wrote to President Truman, asking him to end U.S. assistance for the Nationalists and to refrain from intervention in the conflict in China.

After the Communist victory in mainland China, battles for Chinese American support continued unabated. One means whereby the ROC government attempted to influence Chinese American opinion within the United States during the late 1940s and 1950s was ensuring that additional Chinese admitted to the United States or Taiwan—either as students or under immigrant refugee programs—were carefully pre-screened for political suitability by KMT authorities. Although would-be Chinese immigrants often showed considerable ingenuity in evading these demanding and time-consuming controls, which were so protracted that they blocked many applications, they did represent a considerable hurdle for many Chinese wishing to move permanently to the United States. So too did the almost reflexive determination of U.S. consular officials and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to find reasons for denying immigrant, refugee, or student visas to Chinese applicants. That pattern was so well entrenched by the mid-twentieth century that it could often withstand pressure from congressmen, senators, and the State Department.
Encouraging family structures more in line with American middle class mores than the pre-World War II bachelor society that characterized most Chinatowns was apparently part of the KMT strategy to remodel the Chinese American community in ways that would promote pro-Nationalist sympathies. Families were also, of course, facilitated by the new U.S. immigration provisions that made it far easier for Chinese American men to bring in their wives, in many cases from unions of long standing. As Madeline Hsu has also demonstrated, respectable and well-qualified professional families, appropriately self-supporting and capitalist in outlook, who would be able to prosper in the United States and thus reflect credit on the Chinese, became the refugees of choice for admission to the United States. U.S. refugee organizations, especially the Aid Refugees Chinese Intellectuals (ARCI), which had financial backing from the U.S. government and the China Lobby, gave priority to educated, middle-class Chinese families with skills that would make them welcome in their new home. The hope was that they would reinforce relatively conservative elements within the Chinese American community while demonstrating that they epitomized the best kind of immigrant: hard-working, thrifty, and self-reliant, with substantial business acumen and educational attainments. The new image of the Chinese as ideal citizens who embraced traditional American values was, Hsu argues, a turning point in the re-branding of Chinese Americans as a “model minority.” Their image was transformed in part by selection processes both deliberate and unwitting.1

With the Chinese American community divided and McCarthyism at its height in the United States, those suspected of leftist sympathies were liable to be characterized as subversives. There were strong and apparently justified suspicions that on occasion KMT sympathizers were liable to be directed to the FBI, while the INS and the police were more likely to receive allegations of immigration or financial fraud. However, such maneuvers did not by any means succeed in eliminating pro-PRC elements. And regardless of their political outlook, many if not most Chinese Americans still had family members on the mainland whose safety and well-being was of great importance to them. Others had family in Taiwan, and a good number had relatives in both the mainland and Taiwan and sometimes also in Hong Kong. Transnational families were not necessarily prepared to accept Cold War divisions as a given. Nor at times, it seems, was the new PRC, which sought to draw on the loyalties and talents—not to mention funds—of overseas Chinese, including those in the United States. One strength of Oyen’s study is its demonstration of the determination of individuals to pursue their own objectives, often manipulating or disregarding the agendas of the various official bureaucracies with which they were entangled.

Oyen tells enough of the story of the Chinese communists’ efforts to win support in the United States to make one wish for more details. For most of the 1940s, as she makes clear, the CCP was raising funds in the United States. As the decade wore on, a significant number of Chinese Americans who were disillusioned by corruption and incompetence among the Nationalists began to believe that the Communists represented the last best hope for their country. At least some Chinese who came to the United States in the late 1930s and early 1940s to work temporarily on projects for the Institute of Pacific Relations were undisclosed CCP members. Among them were the economist Ch’i Chao-ting (Ji Chaoting), who was an adviser to the Nationalist Bank of China during the 1940s and remained behind on the mainland in 1949, and Chen Han-seng (Chen Hansheng), a radical expert on land reform who spent extended periods in the United States during the late 1930s and early 1940s, in part to avoid KMT persecution.2 How many other Communist sleepers found at least a temporary North American berth in these years is still far from clear. Ironically, when they returned to the mainland, such undercover operatives often discovered that their years working in the enemy camp left them somewhat ideologically suspect among their comrades.

The travails of Chinese on the mainland—especially when these involved the relations of Chinese Americans—were emphatic themes in much Cold War propaganda produced by both the Nationalist government on Taiwan and the United States. Refugees from the mainland often contributed substantially to these efforts, and many found work helping to produce various forms of anti-communist propaganda. When such reports appeared well founded, support for the PRC dwindled in the Chinese American community, and remittances to family members still on the mainland declined. One of the more fascinating episodes in Oyen’s work is the description of how the mainland government in the early 1950s encouraged Chinese who had family members abroad to write letters to them, extolling the virtues of the new China, begging them to return, and often asking for money. (There are certain ironic resemblances to the letter-writing campaign undertaken by Italian Americans in the late 1940s at the behest of the U.S. government and the Catholic Church to persuade their relatives in Italy to support the Marshall Plan and vote against the Communists in upcoming elections.)

Once China entered the Korean War, the United States banned all transfers of funds to China. But with the help of banks based in Hong Kong, these restrictions could often be evaded. Some Chinese, believing their relatives were making these pleas under duress, refused to dispatch requested funds. Apparently, some families even devised stratagems to insert ingenious coded messages within their communications to deceive PRC supervisors-cum-censors.

In the first half of the 1950s, evidence that PRC officials were exploiting or even threatening mainland Chinese with overseas relatives in order to run something close to extortion or protection rackets seriously damaged China’s image among overseas Chinese. Yet some Chinese Americans remained determined to send funds to family members on the mainland, even if they knew the benefits to those relatives would be indirect. And for patriotic or commercial reasons, some—like other overseas Chinese—may have wished to reap the benefits of trading with or investing in China.

Efforts to facilitate such financial transfers were at least the ostensible reason for perhaps the most spectacular anti-radical episode involving Chinese Americans: the prosecution of the China Daily News. The publishers of this left-leaning New York newspaper carried advertisements by Hong Kong-based Chinese banks offering to transmit funds to mainland China. While most Chinese American newspapers were pro-Nationalist in outlook, the News...
often picked up and published stories favorable to the PRC, and its editorialists were generally anti-Nationalist. As Oyen explains, the journal drew the FBI’s attention in mid-1950 with articles explaining that it was not illegal for Chinese Americans to purchase bonds issued by China. Efforts by other pro-Nationalist Chinese American newspapers to close down the *News* by refusing to allow newsstands that sold it to carry their own publications proved ineffective, as the *News*’ editors appealed successfully for funds across North America. In 1952, federal courts brought fifty-three charges—most later dropped—against the newspaper’s editors for aiding PRC extortion efforts by running these bank advertisements. The case dragged on for three years, but contributions from Chinese donors around the United States covered not just the expenses of keeping the newspaper operational, but the legal costs and fines paid by the defendants. Despite Nationalist efforts to influence the views and makeup of the Chinese American community, its ranks remained deeply divided, with significant backing for both Chinas.

The two final chapters of Oyen’s book are perhaps the most fascinating. One deals with negotiations between mainland China and the United States throughout the 1950s and 1960s over the return of each other’s nationals. Oyen describes how—with a hiatus of several years during the Korean War—the U.S. government was willing, albeit reluctantly, to permit enthusiastic and patriotic Chinese students and professionals to return to the mainland to assist in building China. One early returnee, Ji Chaozhu, made his way back to Beijing in 1951 after abandoning his studies at Harvard University. Apparently he slipped through immigration controls that were prompted by the Korean War and were haphazardly imposed by mid-1950 on any Chinese trying to get back to the mainland.® Several groups of China-bound students and scientists were detained in Hawaii and Japan during the early Korean War and eventually forced to return to the continental United States. By October 1951, the U.S. government was printing announcements in Chinese-language newspapers that Chinese studying science in the United States would not be allowed to return to the mainland.® The 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act formally endorsed this practice, allowing the United States to prevent the departure of aliens should this be “prejudicial to the interests of the United States.”

Oyen notes that Chinese students and scholars who had come to the United States for educational reasons ultimately decided to remain. But this was not true of all. Detaining Chinese who identified strongly with the new mainland regime indefinitely while denying entry to many of the thousands of Chinese refugees who might have wished to enter the country was scarcely a defensible position, and even something of an international embarrassment for U.S. foreign policy. Once the Korean War ended, the United States relaxed its stance and at the 1954 Geneva Conference opened ambassadorial-level talks with mainland officials that continued for almost two decades. Repatriating nationals trapped in each other’s countries was the first and usually the only item on the agenda.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the United States government arranged for the repatriation of groups of Chinese students and sympathizers who wished to return to the People’s Republic. In the absence of a PRC representative office in the United States, the Indian Embassy in Washington helped to handle the logistics in the 1950s and acted as a conduit for Chinese funds for those who needed help with travel expenses. A few unwilling Chinese deportees from the United States, often individuals who had violated immigration regulations or overstayed short-term visas, were usually included in each group. Once back in the mainland, many of the latter claimed—how justifiably is unclear—to have been leftist victims of U.S. political persecution. They provided useful grist for the PRC propaganda mill.

Most returnees went via Hong Kong. They were part of a continuing traffic in people, goods, and cash that Hong Kong, as an intermediate territory between two different Chinas and two different Cold War camps, did much to facilitate. It would be interesting to know more about this cohort: not just who they were, but what befell them after they went back. Mainland officials encouraged *huagiao* to put their abilities and funds at the disposal of New China, but many almost certainly fell under suspicion of being American or Nationalist spies and may well have suffered grievously in the repeated purges that culminated in the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976.

The Nationalists objected strongly though unavailingly to the ambassadorial talks between the United States and the PRC, viewing them as the opening gambit in a process that would ultimately lead to the opening of full diplomatic relations between the two nations, with Taiwan relegated to the sidelines or even abandoned completely. But American officials had to consider the interests of their own citizens. In 1953, the PRC still held over fifty Americans: missionaries, journalists, businessmen, servicemen and others captured on Chinese territory. Some were serving jail sentences, while others were simply denied entry permits. Ensuring their return was a high priority for the United States. For the Chinese, releasing selected American detainees was one of the few remaining ways that mainland officials could use to signal an improvement in relations. Oyen goes so far as to suggest that throughout the 1960s mainland China deliberately retained custody of a few American prisoners—mostlly servicemen captured while trespassing in Chinese airspace—in order to have a pretext for continuing the ambassadorial talks, thereby keeping channels of communication open with the United States.

On one subject, ironically, the KMT and the Chinese government in Beijing were in total agreement. Both deplored the possibility of a “two Chinas” policy, or worse still, a separatist movement whereby Taiwan would declare itself independent of the mainland. The separatist movement arose among indigenous Taiwanese, who felt no real identification with the mainland and resented the KMT for their brutal suppression of dissent. The ROC authorities made sedulous efforts to screen students from Taiwan who wished to study in the United States in order to ensure that they were ideologically committed to a one-China and anti-Beijing outlook. Yet once in the United States, a significant number began to espouse the cause of Taiwanese independence. Intrusive efforts by ROC embassy personnel in the United States to police, spy on, and intimidate Taiwan students enrolled in U.S. universities—using heavy-handed methods resembling those allegedly employed by the current PRC government to control its own students abroad—proved ineffective in checking the developing movement.

Oyen’s final chapter deals with ROC efforts to prevent the entrance of prominent pro-Taiwan independence activists to the United States. In the early 1960s, the administration of John F. Kennedy acquiesced to ROC demands that a top Taiwan independence activist be denied entry to the United States. In 1970, by contrast, President Richard Nixon’s administration issued Peng Ming-min, an independence advocate who had escaped Taiwan for Sweden with the assistance of American missionaries, a visa to work at the University of Michigan, where he remained for many years. In making this decision, U.S. officials were motivated not primarily by sympathy for the Taiwan independence movement, which they consistently underestimated, but by the wish to avoid the international embarrassment of excluding a well-known and respected scholar with many friends in the United States.

One wonders what, if anything, the mainland Chinese
government knew of U.S. maneuverings to admit Peng Ming-min. A few months later, during the October 1971 UN debate after which the General Assembly voted to transfer the seat and permanent Security Council membership reserved for China from the ROC to the PRC, Taiwan independence activists demonstrated outside the UN building in New York for a separate Taiwan, an entity that would not be part of China. Such a prospect was just as much anathema to the PRC as it was to the island’s KMT government. As Chi-Kwan Mark has recently shown, in contemporaneous negotiations with Great Britain over upgrading the level of their diplomatic representation in Beijing and London to full embassy (as opposed to mission) status, the major sticking point for the Chinese was the precise wording of Britain’s position on the status of Taiwan from the early 1940s to the early 1970s, and new and provocative insights into sources, insights into policies and squelch opposition to them. The story was far from over by 1971, where Oyen’s study largely ends. For many years, the pro-ROC/Taiwan lobby would continue as one of the best-financed on Capitol Hill. It uses all the weapons at its command to maintain its influence within the U.S. Congress and the governmental apparatus. Its rambunctious and often unwelcome efforts to control the Chinese American community would likewise persist. Oyen does not, for example, mention the 1984 murder in Daly City, California, of the Chinese American journalist Henry Liu, a naturalized American citizen who had written a highly unflattering biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, son and heir to Chiang Kai-shek, and who had written a highly unflattering biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, son and heir to Chiang Kai-shek, and was reputedly shot on the orders of the ROC government. Ultimately, Oyen’s book—in some respects a collection of extremely stimulating essays, each of which suggests further wide-ranging research avenues for inquiry—leaves the reader wanting to know far more. Rare indeed is the book that opens so many vistas that suggest more possibilities for an entire research agenda. In terms of sources, insights into what were at every level the convoluted, untidy, and often inconsistent politics of Chinese American migration from the early 1940s to the early 1970s, and new and provocative approaches, it is a tour de force. But it is only a beginning.

In the United States, a pro-PRC Chinese American community clearly managed to survive all the tempests of the late 1940s and 1950s. Were its members battered and bloodied, or did most keep their heads beneath the parapet until the political climate changed? What role did those Chinese students and others who returned to the PRC from the United States play in the normalization of relations that was in progress from the 1970s onward? And in the conduct of overall PRC policies at different stages? What did Chinese Americans—and others in the Chinese diaspora—contribute financially to China’s economic modernization from the early 1970s onward? And what earlier relations did their extended networks enjoy with the mainland? Even more broadly, what kind of networks—political, economic, intellectual, professional, personal—linked both Taiwan and the mainland with the United States, and how far back did their antecedents reach? Which mainland Chinese were allowed abroad in the 1970s and 1980s, and what did they do? When, for both Taiwan and the mainland, did the task of supervising all these transnational interchanges become so massive as to be unfeasible? One could also raise a host of questions as to the part played in these assorted encounters by the enclave of Hong Kong, an anomalous territory run on often idiosyncratic rules that served as a locus for exchanges and transfers across Cold War and Chinese Civil War boundaries. Sources for many such studies are becoming increasingly available.

One might go on indefinitely. The scope for parallel studies focusing on China’s relations with countries beyond the United States is massive, as are opportunities to explore whether other transnational diasporic communities had a comparable impact on the international scene. That remarkable scholar Nancy Bernkopf Tucker was exemplary in combining richly detailed archival research with broader insights and thoughtful arguments that illuminated entire landscapes deserving future exploration. In this elegant and provocative volume, Meredith Oyen, one of Tucker’s last students, is ably continuing the tradition her mentor helped to pioneer.

Notes:
3. Ji Chaozhu would have a distinguished career in China’s Foreign Ministry, even though, like almost all returnees, he would repeatedly be subjected to accusations that he was ideologically suspect, charges supported by the fact that another brother in the family opted for Taiwan over the mainland. Ji Chaozhu, The Man on Mao’s Right: From Harvard Yard to Tiananmen Square, My Life Inside China’s Foreign Ministry (New York, 2008).
4. At the Panmunjom Korean War armistice talks, Ji Chaozhu interpreted for the Chinese, while a Harvard classmate who had remained in the United States did the same for the American delegation. Apparently neither exchanged a word with the other directly.
5. Personal communication, Betty Peh-Ti Wei, January 2016.

Review of Meredith Oyen, The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War

Eileen P. Scully

The Diplomacy of Migration charts a new and intriguing pathway crisscrossing foreign relations history and transnational migration history. More than an internationalized diplomatic history, the book is a sweeping, “human-centered” account featuring public and private diplomacy, transnational networks and organizations, and “the lived experience” of migrants, who sought in myriad ways to shape and navigate the contours and vicissitudes of global migration politics (8). Oyen focuses on the period 1945–1972. This chronology is intentional and inventive, in that it combines events and markers quite often kept apart on different timelines constructed for histories of Chinese immigration, on the one hand, and U.S.-China relations, on the other.

Oyen succeeds marvelously in showing that throughout these decades, “migration diplomacy was built into the foundation of the alliance between Nationalist China and the United States” (246). Migration diplomacy is defined as “the process of using migration policy for diplomatic ends” (4). Three distinct patterns of migration diplomacy emerged over time: In some cases, “migration policy and
practice became a direct tool of foreign policy used to signal positive and negative developments in the bilateral relationships, as well as potential changes in the offing.

In other instances, “migration diplomacy was employed more indirectly by both the United States and China as a form of public diplomacy” (5). Migration diplomacy also “served a more complex purpose in attempting to remake the Chinese American community in ways that both the U.S. and ROC governments sought” (5).

The power of Oyen’s chronological and conceptual reframing is evident throughout the book. For example, the 1943 repeal of U.S. Chinese Exclusion Laws is familiar ground, but Oyen uses a wider lens on the subject. We see that there were multiple, interlocking exclusions covering immigration, naturalization, bans on shore leave for Chinese sailors in U.S. ports, and prejudicial handling of wartime draft exemption requests by Chinese students in the United States. The racist contempt animating this matrix of exclusions was made all the more outrageous by the privileged status of U.S. nationals living in China.

Oyen also breaks new ground with her nuanced argument that Nationalist China’s migration diplomacy included a sophisticated “strategy of non-visible intervention” (36). Whereas other scholars note “the omission of Chinese American voices from the formal repeal campaign,” Oyen detects “a much more profound pattern of influence . . . that is consistent with the Chinese government’s stated aims in its overseas Chinese policies” (24, 16). This more subtle strategy was in play during the drafting process for treaties ending extraterritoriality. Nationalist officials used opportunities to comment on drafts to push front and center the language of equality, reciprocity, respect, and wartime cooperation. In addition, taking a lesson from Japan’s failed lobbying campaign in the 1920s against Asian exclusion, Nationalist officials and Chinese American organizations made effective use of low-key, indirect and informal channels to cultivate support for exclusion repeal.

Oyen also brings more fully into view the importance of state-to-people relations as well as state-to-state negotiations (248). The ROC, the PRC, and the United States each used migration policies to create, transform, coopt, and mobilize Chinese communities in the United States. These various projects helped create the idealized picture of Chinese as the “model minority” and in the longer run dynamically reconfigured the nature and demographics of Chinese communities in America. Oyen is thoroughly familiar with relevant work by leading migration scholars, and she enriches that literature by showing persuasively the decisive impact of Nationalist China’s emigration procedures and ambitious efforts to micro-manage the Chinese diaspora.

Oyen’s portrayal of U.S. migration diplomacy is even-handed, but the dismal details seem to lead to inescapable conclusions. In general, U.S. migration diplomacy reinforced an historic “habit of treating all matters relating to immigration as purely domestic in nature” and an enduring conviction that immigration law is subservient to national security (76). Ostensible concessions (such as exclusion repeal and ending extraterritoriality) were later revealed as symbolic gestures. Across the decades after World War II, U.S. migration diplomacy involved the opportunistic use of low-risk, high-reward issues or situations to manage official narratives and generate prestige. In typical style, when mainland refugees surged into Hong Kong after 1949, the United States saw “a human tragedy that it could also use to further its public diplomacy in Asia” (156). Earnest-looking efforts to make immigration quotas more equitable were undone by the adversarial orientation of immigration procedures, bureaucratic bickering, and reflexive suspicions toward Chinese who arrived bearing documents.

Oyen resists the tendency among transnationalists to romanticize migration, sojourners, and diaspora. Still, she makes a strong case for migrant self-efficacy and “agency.” In her telling, “migrants became pawns of unruly governments at times, but they also created their own brand of ‘people’s diplomacy’ that affected how the governments understood each other and signaled changing goals and ideas, while permitting the migrants themselves to navigate Cold War politics to their own benefit” (6).

Examples of migrant “agency” abound in Oyen’s exploration of early Cold War efforts by the PRC, the ROC, and the United States to exploit—each for different reasons—Chinese diaspora connections and “transnational family finances,” remittances in particular (129). In the process, American Chinese communities “became subjects of larger governmental experiments with how to make these transnational families serve the foreign policy goals of the Cold War. Despite this, it was the migrants’ choices themselves—in this case, what money to send, and where to send it—that created powerful connections between domestic law and foreign policy” (153). Governments “quickly discovered that they could not control how migrant communities reacted to it. As a result, the migrants themselves drove policy as much as any bureaucrats” (130).

Further illustrations of individual efficacy and resistance emerge in Oyen’s discussion of mass desertions among Chinese seamen as they arrived in U.S. ports on British ships during and after World War II. Perhaps anticipating readers’ doubts about the character and motives of these Chinese seamen, Oyen explains that “it was not that Chinese sailors working Allied merchant ships were unconcerned about the war, China, or their own reputation. Instead, they were protesting inequality. Unfortunately, they chose to do so in a way that managed to threaten the entire Allied war effort in Europe” (2). As this quotation suggests, Oyen is scrupulously fair-minded and careful to acknowledge the limits of her sources. Perhaps I do her an injustice in suggesting that these very commendable virtues occasionally give readers a sense of slipping and sliding in ambiguities.

For example, the book begins with the mass desertion of 177 Chinese seamen from the RMS Empress of Scotland when it anchored in New York in February 1943. Why did these men desert? To protest the U.S. practice of denying shore leave to Chinese sailors. As Oyen explains a few paragraphs later, however, a deal granting shore leave to Chinese seamen had been reached many months earlier. Indeed, the 177 men from the Empress of Scotland had apparently used shore leave to desert. So why did these mass desertions persist beyond the change in shore leave policy? Oyen concedes that these “desertions can be read a number of ways, though the motivation seemed inevitably to start with unequal treatment for Chinese (and other non-European) sailors, including unequal wages and benefits as well as racism expressed by on-board leadership” (19). Why did these mass desertions persist well into the 1950s? Apparently because “the seamen’s reasons for deserting (shipboard mismanagement, unequal wage scales, and,
admittedly, a desire to immigrate but no way to get a visa) had not fundamentally changed in the period since the war ended” (116).

The feeling of slipping and sliding resurfaces in Oyen’s discussion of a 1946 letter to Harry Truman from two Chinese seamen chastising the president for policies that prolonged the Chinese Civil War. The letter is on file at the Truman Presidential Library. Did the two Chinese sailors actually write it? True, “[t]he volume of letters and their shared message raises questions about an organized campaign, though it certainly could have been a very informal one.” In any case, letters of this sort “served as a reminder . . . that not every Chinese national in the United States was eager to see the United States take action to help Chiang Kai-shek stay in power” (95).

Envisioning migrant “agency” in action, Oyen writes, “[n]o amount of policy planning, of congressional debates, of bureaucratic organization, or daily paper pushing could force individual migrants to act in ways against their own interests. As a result, migrants created the policy positions as much as they were affected by them” (7). How might we unpack the persistent pursuit of self-interest in this migration context? As we make the turn into transnational histories, it may be timely and useful to draw inspiration from the work of social historians already well practiced in inferring intention from action and detecting “everyday forms of resistance.”

_Migration Diplomacy_ is richly conceived and meticulously researched, well up to the famously high standards of Oyen’s (and my) mentor, the late Nancy Bernkopf Tucker. It is worth noting that the U.S. Congress is fast catching up with diligent historians of Chinese migration and Sino-American relations. On October 6, 2011, senators unanimously approved Resolution 201 “Expressing the Regret of the Senate for the Passage of Discriminatory Laws against the Chinese in America, including the Chinese Exclusion Act.” A little over a year later, a similar resolution emerged from the House of Representatives.³

Notes:

Author’s response
Meredith Oyen

Just a few years ago, I took part in a SHAFR panel on the subject of migration, the Chinese diaspora, and the Cold War. We four panelists significantly outnumbered the audience of two (one of whom politely excused herself halfway through the panel, having just come to see a friend). Often it has been difficult to frame migration issues in ways that mattered to foreign relations scholars and just as challenging to frame bilateral diplomacy in ways that merited consideration by immigration historians. Thankfully, we seem to be moving out of that era, in no small part because of the efforts and scholarship of the members of this forum. For this reason (among others), I am delighted and grateful to have these scholars, whose work I admire, read and engage my work. The comments and critiques they offer raise important issues and ideas.

In _The Diplomacy of Migration_, I argue that all three governments under consideration—the United States, the Republic of China, and the People’s Republic of China—used the relatively low-stakes nature of migration policies to manage greater concerns in their foreign relations. As Pricilla Roberts notes, the core relationship studied in the book is that of the United States and the Republic of China. The decision to focus on that relationship was driven partly by availability of sources (as she surmises), but also by design. Between the 1940s and 1970s, Nationalist China was China, per U.S. recognition. Many recent Cold War studies of Sino-American relations understandably privilege the mainland, but migration diplomacy in these years reveals much more about U.S. relations with the Nationalists. After 1972, the increase in direct travel between the Chinese mainland and the United States drastically shifted this dynamic.

David Atkinson quite fairly asks if my categorization of migration diplomacy as low risk or of low-level importance is belied by the attention that all three governments ultimately committed to it. Migrations and the policies that governed them appeared low risk in the context of Cold War fears of nuclear proliferation and annihilation and spreading communism that legitimately seized American and Chinese officials. I agree that policymakers invariably underestimated the importance of their actions on migration, but it was that very misapprehension of these issues that made them safe ground for experimentation and signaling larger intentions. So it was not that migration diplomacy itself was ultimately of low importance; it was the contemporary perception of it as such that made it so valuable for pursuing foreign policy goals.

The discrepancy between thought and action on the importance attributed to migration is what also leads directly to what Eileen Scully calls the “slipping and sliding ambiguities” that emerge between migrants’ intentions, officials’ actions, and policymakers’ goals. For example, the motivations behind the actions of the Chinese seamen in deserting their ships during World War II and long after the war ended proved myriad. Chinese seamen often deserted en masse, but it would be wrong to assume that every member of the group did so for the same reasons. And in any event, the causes of the desertions were far less important for my purposes than the impact they had both on the war effort and in forcing the governments into new agreements with each other. British, Chinese, and American policies developed in response to the desertions proved more reactionary than well crafted, and they were applied unevenly.¹ Ambiguities can thus be found not only in the varied motivations of migrants acting in their own self-interest, but also in the varied interpretation and application of policies and laws by mid-level bureaucrats and officials pursuing their own career goals and embracing their own political perspectives and beliefs. These variables make migration diplomacy uniquely dynamic, because there are individuals acting in their own self-interest at every juncture: making policies, applying them, adhering to or evading them. In contrast, once made the object of a new agreement, ICBMs at least do not slip from their moorings of their own accord.

The contingent nature of migrations and migration policies meant that perhaps the greatest challenge I encountered in the long journey to complete this book was coming up with some sort of criteria for what to include and what to exclude. As both David Atkinson and Madeline Hsu note, these criteria were guided by my experience as a historian of foreign relations rather than of migration or Asian American history. The questions posed by these fields can be quite different, especially with respect to post-WWII Asian migrations, when restrictions on naturalization had ceased and the prospect of permanent settlement in the United States became more desirable.
I began with an overly ambitious goal—to demonstrate migration’s great importance to foreign policy—and for years that was my only real argument. There were a few problems with this approach, not the least of which was that my early research really had no limiting principle: everything could be connected to migration in one way or another. Just how important is the distinction between an expat, a foreign exchange student, and an immigrant if all three end up creating and building a permanent life in a foreign country and becoming part of the same larger community? How much does the existence of a global diaspora of Chinese matter to the narrower bilateral relationship between China and the United States? And then, of course, in the mid-twentieth century, does it even make sense to think of Sino-American relations as bilateral, given the Chinese societies in Hong Kong and Taiwan? The resulting book was my attempt to broaden the subject beyond the too-narrowly conceived notion of “immigrants” while still excluding some migrations as necessarily outside the scope of the project. The choices I had to make meant that some topics that merit additional research did not make their way into the book.

One of the greatest excisions ended up being the larger Cold War story of American efforts to cultivate the support of the greater Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. The State Department pursued this project with great energy in the 1950s. Included in it, as Madeline Hsu notes, was a robust program to develop the educational facilities of “Free China” to make them competitive with those on the mainland. The American program for overseas Chinese education attracted no less an advocate than Vice President Richard Nixon, who discovered the Chinese diaspora on a trip through Southeast Asia in 1953 and became convinced that this population would be the key to containing communism in the region. My decision to limit discussion of students and educational exchange to movements between Taiwan, Hong Kong and/or mainland China and the United States, thereby separating them out from diasporic Chinese students from Southeast Asia, is one I made by necessity, but I think it is worth discussing.

From the perspective of the foreign policy of the Republic of China, ethnic Chinese residents in the United States were citizens of China, regardless of their status as American citizens. At the same time, the Kuomintang’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission viewed Chinese students and residents in the United States and Chinese in Thailand from a global perspective and considered them all assets to be exploited in the battle against communism and for the survival of the Nationalist government. That the United States actively engaged in this project in cooperation with the Republic of China government in Asia, while often claiming an exception from diaspora status for its own Chinese American population, reveals a difference in perspective and priorities that would put American and Nationalist Chinese foreign policy goals at cross purposes in Southeast Asia by the 1960s. That said, the larger context of American and Chinese efforts directed at ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia is important to this story and is itself the subject of an extensive secondary literature. Ultimately I felt there was no way to do it justice in the constrained space of this project. Some of my research on the overseas Chinese program, including the educational efforts, has been published elsewhere.3

Similarly, I believe ending the discussion in 1972 was the right choice for this book for two reasons: the Sino-American picture changed drastically in the aftermath of the Nixon visit, and it was necessary to complete the project. But doing so left many unanswered questions (along with new directions for future projects). After 1972, migrations expanded significantly: diasporic Chinese returned to China from abroad; new student exchanges took place; there was new migration from China to the United States; and rapidly increasing numbers of Americans traveled to China. And as the status of the Nationalist Government changed in the face of growing de-recognition, KMT agents abroad acted in increasingly desperate ways. The Taiwan Independence Movement (as Madeline Hsu notes) has earlier roots than I was able to engage and then also expanded in both size and scope in the 1970s, taking at times a violent turn. It should really be the subject of an entirely new study.

Likewise, the rise of an Asian American movement meant the relationship between Chinese Americans and both Chinese governments was profoundly different from what it was in the early postwar years, when U.S. citizenship was less widespread. So 1972 is more an important transition point than a stopping point, and as Priscilla Roberts notes, a great deal of research remains to be done on the years since.

Many big projects spur new questions and a need for more research, which is one of the reasons they are so easy to start and so difficult to finish. I am left with only the desire to express once again my gratitude to the reviewers in this forum for raising so many good questions, which I hope will fuel new scholarly work (and well-received SHAFR panels) in the future.

Notes:

The American program for overseas Chinese education attracted no less an advocate than Vice President Richard Nixon, who discovered the Chinese diaspora on a trip through Southeast Asia in 1953 and became convinced that this population would be the key to containing communism in the region. My decision to limit discussion of students and educational exchange to movements between Taiwan, Hong Kong and/or mainland China and the United States, thereby separating them out from diasporic Chinese students from Southeast Asia, is one I made by necessity, but I think it is worth discussing.
In the first edition of Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, Michael Hogan remarked upon the curious absence of scholarly study of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in the historiography of the Cold War. At the time, that gap could be explained in part by the lack of available declassified records, but scholars may also have hesitated to rank Cold War public diplomacy alongside the conflict’s more conventional themes and topics such as nuclear arms or superpower interventions. Over the last two decades, however, historians have answered Hogan’s challenge and established the centrality of public diplomacy to American foreign relations.

The rise of public diplomacy during the apogee of the Cold War resulted, not unlike the space race, from a somewhat accidental confluence of strategic competition, technological innovation, ideological imperatives, and historical timing. Although some forms of public diplomacy have existed since the time of the pharaohs, beginning in the 1920s the development of mass media technologies, mass-mobilization politics centered on national-state power, and belief in the malleability of human consciousness fed its rise and spread. Yet the deliberate and diverse exercise of public diplomacy—conventionally defined as a government’s efforts to influence foreign opinion in ways that serve its strategic interests—was central not only to American diplomacy. Though it was part and parcel of an American view of the Cold War as a total conflict with both material and moral dimensions, actors with widely divergent ideologies deployed public diplomacy with comparable energy if not always with equivalent scope. Just as the scholarly understanding of the Cold War itself has left its bipolar origins behind and gone global, so too has public diplomacy come to be understood in its proper, larger context in postwar international history.

Public diplomacy—a species of what political scientists call soft power—has historically frustrated both its practitioners and its students. Its scope and nature can be tricky to define. The label itself is a relatively late invention and was meant to be something of a catchall for a range of outreach activities. It can be found in American diplomatic documents dating back to the eighteenth century, but its modern usage dates back only to the 1960s. It encompasses an assortment of techniques and time frames. On the short-term end of the spectrum lies mass-media output in print and audiovisual mediums, reporting or spinning contemporary events, crises, and subjects. Longer-term activities, often but not always on a smaller scale, include personal and cultural exchanges such as the Fulbright program. The concept of public diplomacy evolved during these years, in keeping with the range of activities it entailed, none of which fit perfectly with its title and some of which remained in tension within it. Pre-1965 records use the term “Information Operations [or] Activities,” whose various dimensions are labeled “Propaganda,” “Political [or] Psychological Warfare,” and “Cultural Diplomacy.”

The last of these categories contained some of the more famous instances of Cold War outreach, such as the tours of jazz ambassadors like Louis Armstrong and the Nixon-Khrushchev kitchen debate in Moscow at the 1959 American National Exhibition. The kitchen debate points up the often subtle distinction between public and cultural diplomacy, as it deployed “cultural” goods to score ideological points before a mass audience. As Heonik Kwon puts it, “material goods readily available in American society . . . were powerful rhetorical devices for selling American political ideals overseas.” Although cultural diplomacy is on occasion treated as a synonym for public diplomacy, it is better thought of as a subset of it. It falls within the latter’s compass and is usually aimed at generating goodwill rather than winning a strategic point or a news cycle. Cultural diplomacy generally uses different tactics and time frames, presents different (and often quite nuanced) content via a softer approach, and has different impacts than does the broader entity of public diplomacy. Frequently, as Penny Von Eschen’s excellent Satchmo Blows Up the World shows, these activities did not in the end make the point or create the consequence that Washington sought.

The evolving terminology hints at the struggles that U.S. public diplomacy experienced during its formative years. Its activities included covert operations, journalism, media productions, and Madison Avenue-style marketing. Some of these efforts appeared in the colors of propaganda: black (disinformation, often disseminated by secret agents and bearing false or no attribution); white (official, attributed output in a journalistic vein); and gray (blurring lines and combining elements of the first two). By the late 1950s Washington had more or less solved the tensions inherent in public diplomacy, even as prominent figures like Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remained skeptical. Yet despite strong presidential support from Eisenhower and Kennedy, for the first decade and a half of the Cold War public diplomacy was marginalized within national security decision-making. Its practitioners were seen as propagandists and pitch-men rather than as grand strategists or policy specialists.

Even Dulles and his fellow skeptics concurred on the basic rationale for postwar public diplomacy, however. The recent world war had mobilized whole societies; a new era in mass-media communications had begun; and the combination meant that the world’s publics would likely play a bigger, and arguably different, role in world affairs. As Robert Sherwood, the American playwright and wartime propagandist, put it in 1943, “We think today in terms of peoples rather than nations.” Contact with those peoples could not supplant traditional diplomacy, but at a minimum it was an important supplement to postwar interstate relations.

Still, the skeptics’ doubts were not unfounded. Public diplomacy had a permanent problem, one daunting enough that many questioned the wisdom of bothering to undertake such diplomacy at all. Simply put, there was a chasm between word and deed—between spin and policy.
Convincing audiences abroad of American friendliness, worthiness, and benevolence could be an arduous task if U.S. realities or policies suggested the opposite. Even when the divergence could be massaged and rationalized, a permanent question rode on the tails of the permanent problem: was any persuasion actually going on?

Assessing whether public diplomacy was accomplishing the goals its architects set out for it is as difficult for scholars now as it was for public diplomats back then. Their mission was for hearts and minds, but it was the stomachs and eyeballs problem that vexed the USIA no end. Gauging the spread of American consumer culture overseas by counting soda bottles and Elvis records sold was relatively straightforward. A devilishly harder task was to confirm a heart won or a mind converted. Kennedy’s USIA Director Edward R. Murrow observed during his tenure that “no cash register rings when a man changes his mind.” Ironically, at the time he spoke, the agency’s capacities for audience research were at their most comprehensive and fine-grained. But an indisputable answer to public diplomacy’s permanent question—“Is it working?”—eluded officials then as it does historians today.

The difficulty of gauging success or failure is borne out in the contributions of both groups to the scholarly literature on public diplomacy. Prior to the last two decades, practitioners of and specialists in media/communications studies gave the subject closer attention than did historians. Veteran public and cultural diplomats such as Wilson Dizard and Richard Arndt published accounts combining insider insights with big-picture assessments and prescriptions. These labors of love varied in scholarly and archival rigor, but they offered a valuable perspective on a topic that historians then generally overlooked. The early wave of communications studies analyses by Robert Elder, Leo Bogart, John Henderson, Martin Medhurst, and Jarol Manheim tended to draw from contemporary open or public sources rather than primary archival ones; most of those were not yet open, and those that were open were in a somewhat chaotic state. Most of these scholars questioned the effectiveness of the U.S. propaganda onslaught abroad, though some saw it as both malevolent and powerful.

The opening—and reorganization, given their state of pronounced disarray at the time—of the records of the USIA at the U.S. National Archives coincided with a burst of interest among historians in propaganda and public diplomacy beginning in the later 1990s. Walter Hitchon’s Parting the Curtain, Scott’s War, Gregory Mitrovich’s Undermining the Kremlin, Jessica Gienow-Hecht’s Transmission Impossible, Arch Puddington’s Broadcasting Freedom, Gary Rawnsley’s Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s, and Shawn Parry-Giles’s The Rhettoricial Presidency were among the notable works marking the rise in scholarly interest around the turn of the millennium. The kitchen debate, the psychological dimension of U.S. propaganda and subversion, the cultural reconstruction of postwar Germany, and the linguistic and conceptual evolution of the conflict held prominent places in these analyses. Much of this wave in the literature concentrated on the bipolar ideological struggle, with particular attention to the strategic impact—or, more often, the lack thereof—of the messages that the United States was sending to its Western European allies and across the Iron Curtain. These works made it clear just how difficult it was for American officials to measure public diplomacy’s effectiveness, and they tended to be understandably critical of Washington’s at times rosy self-assessments. They also revealed the unmistakable if haphazard growth of public diplomacy as a key Cold War concern for Washington.

This concern became especially acute after the newly inaugurated Eisenhower administration launched the USIA in 1953. Eisenhower championed the new agency as an integral part of “total Cold War” (as the title of Kenneth Osgood’s outstanding monograph has it). Having seen the power and importance of information operations during the liberation of Western Europe, Ike believed that they would play no less of a role in the Cold War, whose psychological aspect was as crucial as its strategic, geopolitical, or military-nuclear ones. His administration’s approach to foreign affairs thus put a premium on propaganda.

Osgood demonstrates how comprehensively this interest infused Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy, including at some Global South sites that previous studies had tended either to overlook or to fold into accounts of bilateral relations. Osgood notes, moreover, the significance not just of where these stories were told but what stories were told. Particular campaigns such as “Atoms For Peace” and “People’s Capitalism” receive sustained attention, but broader themes—democracy, race, family, gender, and the “American Way”—come to the fore at around the same time. Laura Belmonte’s Selling the American Way, in particular, focuses on these themes and on the ways in which USIA campaigns on these issues tied U.S. public diplomacy into intellectual knots. Presenting a picture of good intentions and gradual progress on race while Soviet and European public diplomacy highlighted newsreels of Jim Crow violence was a delicate task, to put it mildly. Although Belmonte extends her survey into the George W. Bush years, its principal contribution is to add depth and detail to the picture of U.S. public diplomacy as the USIA found its legs in the first phase of the Cold War.

Nicholas Cull’s The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1943–1989, which follows the agency from that phase to beyond the end of the superpower standoff, marks a milestone in the literature. Comprehensive in breadth and depth, Cull’s book builds upon the wave of scholarship and upon exhaustive archival work to investigate the agency and policy history of the USIA and of the practice of public diplomacy, its evolution within the national-security apparatus, and the shifts in conceptualization and technique among practitioners across nearly five decades. Less concerned with judging public diplomacy’s effectiveness than with changes in its organization and practice, Cull notes that one of the signal lessons public diplomats gleaned from their work was the importance of “listening” to their audiences. Early in the Cold War, public diplomats had concentrated on the tasks of broadcasting and disseminating their messages, which were handed down from Washington. In the 1950s, they received greater latitude to develop and tailor messages out in the field, often in tandem with local allies and employees, and were charged with tracking messages once sent. This task naturally led to “listening” to foreign audiences in order to gauge response and receptivity, which became a USIA priority even as the agency’s ability to prove that its outreach was succeeding remained limited.

Cull follows the decline of the USIA in Washington after its apogee under Eisenhower and Kennedy, as a series of blows—Vietnam, Watergate, presidential inattention, and, above all, growing doubts about the U.S. ability to persuade skeptical, vocal audiences abroad—left it a shadow of its former self. It was absorbed into the State Department in 1999. But even this periodization included a “zombie decade” after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as the end of the Cold War removed the USIA’s central raison d’être. An arc traced in Cull’s sequel, The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989–2001.

However, the emphasis on the Cold War as the default periodization of the “age of public diplomacy” can be deceptive, and some of the most interesting new directions the literature has taken rethink its timeline, its targets, and the responses it elicited. Justin Hart’s vital contribution, Empire of Ideas, reorients the Cold War focus in the study
of public diplomacy towards an earlier, formative phase that he identifies in inter-American relations of the 1930s, which were galvanized during World War II and expanded after it. In the continuing organizational churn of the war and its immediate aftermath, Hart finds that the officials charged with promoting the American image abroad, who were drawn disproportionately from the world of letters, believed strongly and sincerely in the importance and urgency of their task, even though it sometimes raised uncomfortable questions about the nature of the America they were meant to promote. In particular, Hart finds, the rise of postwar nationalism in Asia and later elsewhere clashed with Washington's pro-European stance during and just after World War II. Tracing the story up to the USIA's founding, Hart disputes the timeline conjoining U.S. public diplomacy and the Cold War. Like Frank Ninkovich in *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, he locates the genesis of the story in U.S. outreach to Latin America, which served as a testing ground, both conceptually and logistically, for the USIA's worldwide deployment of a positive American image. Though it overstates the organizational coherence and competence of pre-USIA American public diplomacy, the book shows convincingly that the importance of winning the battle for foreign opinion began before the Cold War.\(^{12}\)

Nevertheless, it was the Cold War that brought public diplomacy to its fullest fruition—and, crucially, not only on the American side—and produced its most important legacies. Two historiographical developments, nicely dovetailing with each other, show this to be the case. The first follows Osgood's lead to diverse parts of the non-European world and involves attention to particular USIA campaigns on politically sensitive issues of race, decolonization, and development. Undergirding most of these was the growing USIA realization that non-European populations were simply less interested in the Cold War than in the above issues. It was unequivocally the case, as USIA personnel discovered through "listening" to decolonizing peoples, that Cold War issues carried less weight in the Global South. For a number of reasons that concept was difficult for Global North officials to grasp. As new research by scholars such as Ryan Irwin and Hannah Higgin shows, American outreach in Africa often fell upon uninterested ears, as Africans prioritized regional issues relating to race, decolonization, and apartheid over the nuclear and strategic crises of the Cold War.\(^{12}\)

The second development is the first crest of what will in all likelihood be a scholarly wave of area-studies interest in the subject of public diplomacy. Over time, the USIA became increasingly aware that there were more voices in play than just American and Soviet ones. Mao's China and the departing European powers also contributed, sometimes expansively so, to the conversation. By the time the French Empire formally dissolved, the French Foreign Ministry was devoting nearly forty percent of its budget to media outreach overseas, and as late as 1958 the British overseas-information service was still four times as large as the USIA. Around this time, China intensified both its output and its message, claiming, as the Sino-Soviet split deepened, that Mao's model of radical societal transformation was the more relevant for Global South activists than the "essentially European" Soviet model.

Yet the most significant aspect of the story is not Chinese assertiveness but rather Global South ("Third World") intervention in the fray. As recent research by Tanvi Madan, Frank Gerits, Jeffrey Ahlman, and others shows, newly independent actors such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Kwame Nkrumah joined the global melee as soon as circumstances permitted them to pick up a microphone and broadcast their messages.\(^{13}\) Before the USIA had marked its tenth anniversary, the Global South, and Africa in particular, had become a "new Babel of voices," in the words of one contemporary analyst. East and West competed to help the jelling Third World build its own communications infrastructure, which these actors then used to launch public diplomacy campaigns of their own. As Jeffrey Byrne argues in the case of late- and post-colonial Algeria, the message of a self-confident, autonomous Third World matched the moment and the medium and joined—indeed, enabled—the global conversation about the post-imperial future. Far from the passive recipients and puppets of the Global North's imagination, actors in the Global South responded to the Cold War campaign for their hearts and minds by adding their voices to it.

The appeal of doing so is apparent in retrospect. Building public diplomacy apparatuses allowed a Nehru, Nasser, or Nkrumah to fuse the intellectual currents—anticolonialism and nonalignment, to name two—already pulsing through their countries to the relevant items from the superpowers' information campaigns and to project their own replies and rebuttals. Outreach campaigns in audiovisual and print media and interpersonal/intercultural exchange acted as a prestige multiplier. Many of the new states prioritized public diplomacy even though they often lacked the means to address other, arguably more urgent domestic needs. Like other markers of postcolonial sovereignty—a new flag, a seat at the United Nations, an Olympic team, or a national airline—such campaigns asserted arrival on the world stage. These campaigns enabled ambitious leaders to boost their domestic and regional profiles and agendas and to compete for primacy against one another. In particular places and moments, we see that the USIA or its communist counterparts, although those two together produced a greater worldwide total in terms of volume. By 1960, the two superpowers' public diplomacy, along with that of their respective allies, faced competition from a half-dozen or more non-European voices at virtually any given Global South location.

This enthusiastic embrace of public diplomacy by parties North and South offers one answer to the permanent question and shows the way to promising avenues for future research in the topic. It suggests that, despite the absence of proof that public diplomacy could attain the desired strategic results, Global South leaders gambled that it could at least as much as leaders in Washington and Moscow. All parties, that is, conducted themselves as if public diplomacy was important, effective, and worthwhile, creating a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy regarding the crucial worldwide battlefront of "hearts and minds."
Just as Arne Westad’s magnum opus The Global Cold War wove threads of ideology and intervention into a tapestry portraying the wider world beyond Europe, so too do international and transnational lenses on public diplomacy reveal a fuller picture of the postwar era. As new actors joined the stage, their contributions to the world conversation reshaped it. Hearing Radio Cairo in Tanganyika or Cuba’s La Prensa broadcasts in Algeria generated dialogues in response. The consequences are clearer in hindsight than they were at the time. While USIA officials sought ways to measure the foreign reception of their messages and the impact they had, the larger results of the cacophonous world conversation were the nurturing and sometimes conjoining of diasporic circuits, the cultivation of the international plane as an asset for new-state actors, the state action of the Global South, and the fostering of the “Third World” as an imagined community and geopolitical entity. Future research in foreign archives and languages will be needed to flesh out this decidedly multipolar story. Of particular interest would be subjects that lend themselves to “information loops” of mutual influence, as Daniel Immerwahr has shown to be the case with community development, for example. The further integration of political science and media/communications studies literatures into our monographs might enrich the ways in which our actors themselves understood soft power and its potential to alter regional and global norms regarding, among other things, “mental maps,” identity, sovereignty, and human rights.

If the Cold War began as a bipolar confrontation, it nonetheless evolved into a multipolar conversation. Conceiving of the conflict thus does not relieve the suffering of those around the Global South, where the local experience of the Cold War turned violent and bloody. It does, however, accommodate the clashing Global North and Global South perspectives on the geopolitical, existential, and, indeed, philosophical stakes. It acknowledges the active participation of both hemispheres in the discussion via external outreach to a crowded forum, and it reveals how that larger collective of both actors and audiences redefined the terms of the postwar era.

Notes:
1. The interplay of the terms “political,” “psychological,” and “information” warfare is especially instructive; to an extent it was due to their representation of clashing bureaucratic responsibilities. See Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS, 2006), 7–9; and Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Soverior the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956 (Ithaca, NY, 2000). 59. It was not until the 1960s that “public diplomacy” came into wide use, although Nicholas Cull notes that the term was around long before the 1965 coinage of its present sense. See Nicholas Cull, “‘Public Diplomacy’ Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase,” http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/060418_public_diplomacy_before_gullion_the_evolution_of_a_phrase.


5. See Victoria DeGrazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA, 2005); Reinhold Wagnleiter and Elaine Tyler May, eds., “Here, There, and Everywhere”: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture (Salzburg, 2000); and Rob Kroes, If You’ve Seen One, You’ve Seen The Mall (Champaign, IL, 1996).


8. Osgood, Total Cold War; Kenneth Osgood and Brian Etheridge, eds., The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History (Boston, 2010); Laura Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia, 2008), A number of other notable works in this vein have been published in the last decade, many by political scientists and former practitioners: Michael J. Waller, Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare (Washington, 2009); Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, eds., Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy (New York, 2010); Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts (Lanham, 2012); Alvin A. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation: How Lies, Videotape, and the USIA Won the Cold War, (New York, 2012); Martha Bayles, Through a Screen Darkly: Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America’s Image Abroad (New Haven, 2015).


The 2016 SHAFR meeting will be held **23-25 June 2016** at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice (KIPJ) on the University of San Diego campus in San Diego, California.

SHAFR is excited to be returning to the west coast and to hold its annual conference on the gorgeous campus of the University of San Diego. This year we will continue with the eight panels per session schedule introduced in 2015, which will allow us to accommodate two plenary sessions and finish earlier each evening.

The conference starts on Thursday, June 23, with the first panels beginning at 11:45am. The plenary session—featuring Mike Davis, Professor Emeritus of Creative Writing at the University of California, Riverside—will start at 4:15pm. Professor Davis is the author of more than 20 books, from the award-winning City of Quartz to transnational studies of neoliberalism, immigration policy, and the politics of disease. The welcome reception, open to all conference registrants, will follow from 6:00-7:30 pm.

SHAFR president David Engerman, Ottilie Springer Professor of History at Brandeis University, will deliver his presidential address at the Friday luncheon. Robin Kelley, Distinguished Professor of History and Gary B. Nash Endowed Chair in United States History at the University of California, Los Angeles, will deliver the 2016 keynote address at the Saturday luncheon. Professor Kelley—an acclaimed author of numerous books on U.S. social, political, cultural, and intellectual history and on the African diaspora—will speak on the life and work of Grace Halsell, a white journalist and activist who sometimes assumed different racial and ethnic identities to highlight transnational inequities.

This year’s Friday evening social event will be held at the San Diego Natural History Museum, a setting which features stunning views of the famous Balboa Park and the San Diego skyline. Tickets will include a full dinner and open beer, wine, and soft drink bar, and cost $50 standard or $30 for students, adjunct faculty, or K-12 teachers. Roundtrip chartered bus tickets will also be available for purchase. And special this year: we will offer free walking tours of Balboa Park guided by local experts beginning at 5:30pm. Space will be limited, so plan ahead!

The Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice (KIPJ), home to the Kroc School of Peace Studies, is an elegant Spanish Renaissance style conference and meeting venue located on the southwest bluff of the USD campus. Lush gardens and terraces with spectacular views of San Diego’s Mission Bay and the Pacific Ocean surround the building. Wireless internet service will be available throughout the building. Coffee, drinks, and light fare are available during conference hours at the on-site La Paloma café. There are also multiple dining options at the University Center, a 7-minute walk or 2-minute tram ride from the building. Parking on campus is free.
Room blocks have been reserved at two hotels in the historic Old Town district of San Diego, both of which are just a 5-minute complimentary shuttle ride away from the KIPJ. Shuttles will operate throughout the day during the conference. The Best Western PLUS Hacienda Hotel, located at 4041 Harney Street, is a 3-Diamond property located in the heart of Old Town. There is complimentary hotel shuttle service from 7:00am to 10:00pm to San Diego International Airport and to the Amtrak station. The Old Town Tequila Factory Restaurant on the premises serves Mexican and American cuisine, and Jack and Giulio’s Restaurant for Italian cuisine is just steps away. Exercise facilities, a cocktail bar, and an outdoor heated pool are also available; complimentary wi-fi is available in all public areas; and guests have will free wi-fi service their rooms as well. Conference room rates are $135/night, single or double occupancy, plus taxes and fees. Parking is $15/day. The deadline for receiving the conference rate is **May 22, 2016**. Hotel reservations for the Best Western can be made by calling 619-298-4707 and asking for the USD—SHAFR 2016 group rate.

A room block has also been reserved at the Courtyard San Diego Old Town located at 2435 Jefferson Street. The Courtyard offers a complimentary airport shuttle and free wi-fi throughout the property. The Bistro is open for breakfast and dinner serving gourmet fare, grab-n-go meals, and a Starbucks espresso bar. A 24-hour market features snacks, beverages, toiletries, and more. Guests can enjoy the fitness center and the outdoor heated pool and spa. Conference room rates are $189/night, single or double occupancy, plus tax. Parking is $17/day. The deadline for receiving the conference rate is **May 23, 2016**. To book a room for the Courtyard, call 619-260-8500 and mention the SHAFR 2016 group.

Please note that the hotels are required to honor the reduced rates until their respective dates OR until all the rooms in the SHAFR blocks have been booked. Once the blocks are fully booked, the hotels will offer room at their usual rates, if any are available, or may even be completely full. Please make your reservation as early as you can.

Printed program booklets and registration forms will be mailed out to all SHAFR members with a current domestic U.S. address in mid-April. Online registration will be available in mid-April as well.

For more details about conference arrangements, visit the conference website at [http://shafr.org/conferences/annual/2016-annual-meeting](http://shafr.org/conferences/annual/2016-annual-meeting), or follow us on Twitter @SHAFRConference. For questions about registration and other conference logistics, please contact Julie Laut, Conference Coordinator, at conference@shafr.org.
Diplomacy, the humorist Will Rogers once quipped, is “the art of saying ‘nice doggie’ until you can find a rock.”

But really, why wait that long? Talking before striking seems a painfully misguided sequence to a growing segment of the American electorate, for whom hesitation in deployment of force when confronted by an international quandary reveals nothing less than abject weakness. Asked in February 2016 what three questions he would put to his national security team on his first day in office, Republican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump briskly replied: “what do we want to do, when do we want to do it, and how hard do we want to hit.”

He did not use the word persuade. He did not say convince. Nothing akin to negotiate, convey, or convert emanated from his mouth. Rather, American national security policy as Trump defined it in that clarion moment meant defining the nation’s strategic needs, and then choosing the moment to deploy force. Why talk when we can take? And the crowd cheered. So too when fellow candidate Ben Carson vowed to take “take all that from them [the Islamic State],” referring to their oil fields in Iraq. “We could do that, I believe, fairly easily,” he said, forgetting just how “easy” occupation had been after 2003. In a similar vein, Marco Rubio pledged “there would never be any discussion” over foreign affairs in his White House. Discussion merely lets our “enemies know we are weak.”

Asked for his own three national security priorities, Jeb Bush found energy to list four: “I would restore the military, training, teaching, and deployment of the increasingly lost American empire seems determined to do as so many empires in the past—to use force to retain what it can no longer sustain—empire seems determined to do as so many empires in the past—to use force to retain what it can no longer sustain—empire seems determined to do as so many empires in the past—to use force to retain what it can no longer sustain—empire seems determined to do as so many empires in the past—to use force to retain what it can no longer sustain.”

Notes:
3. NBC, Meet the Press, January 17, 2016.
5. Ibid.


Robert K. Brigham

Thirty years after the publication of Ernest May and Richard Neustadt’s Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (1986), Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri, both of the University of Texas, have revisited the idea of a usable past for policymakers in Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: Cases in Successful Diplomacy. This edited volume is the result of an ongoing effort at the Lyndon B.
Johnson School of Public Affairs to “reinvent diplomacy.” Rather than focus on past failures, the project focuses on diplomatic success in the post-World War II world. The goal is to “provide a new body of scholarship, helping current leaders to understand the practice of diplomacy” (xiii). Using a big-tent definition of diplomacy that includes “a very broad set of activities by which political leaders, senior foreign policy officials, staff members of the foreign policy agencies, diplomats, and negotiators conceive of, develop, and implement foreign policy” (4), Hutchings and Suri have assembled nine scholarly case studies to help illuminate what successful diplomacy looks like. The result is a path-breaking book that has the potential to stimulate the kind of questioning that could help policymakers during the decision-making process.

The editors do not believe that history offers policymakers clear lessons or immutable truths to fashion current diplomacy. Instead, they argue that doing a million little things right in a diplomatic context can increase policy options, and that is ultimately the real purpose of statecraft. Even when faced with overwhelming odds, skillful diplomats can partner with others to change the course and nature of a problem by thinking and acting creatively. In short, today’s stubborn problem is tomorrow’s opportunity. Few studies have taken this approach to diplomacy, and the contributors to this volume should be commended for helping us take this journey.

The nine case studies in Foreign Policy Breakthroughs lead to specific and valuable conclusions. Stephen Porter’s essay on the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration’s (UNRRA) postwar humanitarian effort and Galia Golan’s piece on Camp David clearly show that successful diplomacy begins with the recognition of past failures. In richly told histories, Porter and Golan conclude that skilled policymakers turned early troubles into justification for additional creative initiatives. UNRRA had some trouble delivering postwar aid, but ultimately it played a major role in expanding global civil society and forging alliances responsible for future humanitarian relief efforts. Golan argues that the Camp David Accords did not solve all of the regional problems facing Israel and Egypt, but the agreement did provide the diplomatic architecture for ongoing negotiations between Israel and its adversaries. Sometimes providing long-term structures for future negotiations is a useful first step. What follows is not necessarily a reflection of the success of the initial agreement. In both cases, complex policy environments forced officials to make choices that played a major role in establishing new frameworks for potential success, even if the fundamental issues of the conflict were not settled completely.

One of the keys to diplomatic success, according to the case studies, is sound strategic planning and the willingness and ability to reconsider and re-evaluate long-held positions. Diplomacy is the art of compromise, and the goal of total victory on all points is neither helpful nor possible. Hutchings’s essay on the end of the Cold War clearly shows that the George H. W. Bush administration faced a serious challenge because the pace of events threatened to create rival paths forward within the national security bureaucracy. There was also considerable political pressure from Bush’s own party to dance on the grave of the Soviet Union and publicly cast Moscow into the dustbin of history. Instead of succumbing to these pressures, Bush used his then-considerable political clout to unite the military and civilian sides of the Pentagon and other agencies in support of a coherent national security strategy that focused on revising Cold War policy toward the Soviet Union. Bush accepted the political risks necessary to move forward around a prudent strategy that emphasized patience and reform over hostility.

Bush’s ability to see a different future and his willingness to engage the process personally was absolutely essential to a peaceful transition from strained Cold War relations between Washington and Moscow. This kind of sustained leadership is often missing in diplomacy, according to Hutchings, and it is one of the essential elements of success. So too is empathy. Bush’s sensitivity to the needs of his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, led to a peaceful transition, from the Cold War. Most of the case studies conclude that empathy is an often-overlooked quality in a political leader and in negotiating teams. Bush’s prudence and caution ultimately played a role in his political defeat in 1992, but many scholars and policymakers still applaud his handling of the end of the Cold War.

Jonathan Hunt believes that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a “living testament to how multilateral diplomacy can yield common rules that buttress collective security by authorizing international institutions to enforce them through regulation, consultation, economic sanction, and legitimate compulsion” (92). The key to the success of the NPT was that those charged with the negotiations used incremental steps to build trust in the process and increase the size of the communities involved in the negotiations. Though the NPT had mixed results, it did keep the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons relatively constant and well below John F. Kennedy’s dire prediction of between twenty and twenty-five nuclear states.

Increasing the circle of participants was also a key ingredient of success at the 1955 Bandung Conference of non-aligned nations, according to Christopher Lee. Key southern world delegates met to discuss their futures in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation and trust. The negotiations over the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its counterpart in the Pacific, ably analyzed in the volume by Rafael Fernandez de Castro and Beatriz Leycegui, also involved key domestic and international players.

Hunt’s and Lee’s essays touch on another main theme in the volume: the need to play two-level games in negotiations. Serious negotiations often have multiple constituents and audiences. In the case of the NPT and Bandung, there was a domestic as well as an international component to the discussions. The negotiations over the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its counterpart in the Pacific, ably analyzed in the volume by Rafael Fernandez de Castro and Beatriz Leycegui, also involved key domestic and international players.

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One of the keys to diplomatic success, according to the case studies, is sound strategic planning and the willingness and ability to reconsider and re-evaluate long-held positions. Diplomacy is the art of compromise, and the goal of total victory on all points is neither helpful nor possible. Hutchings’s essay on the end of the Cold War clearly shows that the George H. W. Bush administration faced a serious challenge because the pace of events threatened to create rival paths forward within the national security bureaucracy. There was also considerable political pressure from Bush’s own party to dance on the grave of the Soviet Union and publicly cast Moscow into the dustbin of history. Instead of succumbing to these pressures, Bush used his then-considerable political clout to unite the military and civilian sides of the Pentagon and other agencies in support of a coherent national security strategy that focused on revising Cold War policy toward the Soviet Union. Bush accepted the political risks necessary to move forward around a prudent strategy that emphasized patience and reform over hostility.

Bush’s ability to see a different future and his willingness to engage the process personally was absolutely essential to a peaceful transition from strained Cold War relations between Washington and Moscow. This kind of sustained leadership is often missing in diplomacy, according to Hutchings, and it is one of the essential elements of success. So too is empathy. Bush’s sensitivity to the needs of his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, led to a peaceful transition, from the Cold War. Most of the case studies conclude that empathy is an often-overlooked quality in a political leader and in negotiating teams. Bush’s prudence and caution ultimately played a role in his political defeat in 1992, but many scholars and policymakers still applaud his handling of the end of the Cold War.

Jonathan Hunt believes that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a “living testament to how multilateral diplomacy can yield common rules that buttress collective security by authorizing international institutions to enforce them through regulation, consultation, economic sanction, and legitimate compulsion” (92). The key to the success of the NPT was that those charged with the negotiations used incremental steps to build trust in the process and increase the size of the communities involved in the negotiations. Though the NPT had mixed results, it did keep the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons relatively constant and well below John F. Kennedy’s dire prediction of between twenty and twenty-five nuclear states.

Increasing the circle of participants was also a key ingredient of success at the 1955 Bandung Conference of non-aligned nations, according to Christopher Lee. Key southern world delegates met to discuss their futures in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation and trust. The negotiations over the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its counterpart in the Pacific, ably analyzed in the volume by Rafael Fernandez de Castro and Beatriz Leycegui, also involved key domestic and international players.

Hunt’s and Lee’s essays touch on another main theme in the volume: the need to play two-level games in negotiations. Serious negotiations often have multiple constituents and audiences. In the case of the NPT and Bandung, there was a domestic as well as an international component to the discussions. The negotiations over the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its counterpart in the Pacific, ably analyzed in the volume by Rafael Fernandez de Castro and Beatriz Leycegui, also involved key domestic and international players.
One of the important lessons from this valuable collection of case studies is that successful diplomacy “does not replace other foreign policy tools; it increases the constructive options for their use” (266). In other words, new and often successful diplomatic initiatives can come from intractable conflicts and seemingly impossible roadblocks. Mark Dawson’s essay on the European Union as a community of law describes such an unexpected success, as does Paula Newberg’s examination of development and humanitarianism in Taliban-era Afghanistan. In both essays, serious problems confronted policymakers as they struggled to find a way forward. The creation of the European Union was the unlikely triumph of a process that saw individuals defending short-term national interests and dreamers thinking and arguing about a long-term project of European unity. Painstaking negotiations produced elements of success. In Afghanistan, the rise of the Taliban was seen by many as a defeat for the West, but Newberg suggests that even in this poor diplomatic environment the international community did begin to “clarify the intersections of policy and process, and the close relationships between rights, aid, and, ultimately, diplomacy” (250). In some cases, the international community (if there is such a thing) can learn as much from failure as it can from success.

Ultimately, this volume concludes that creating options through skilled diplomacy is the real definition of success. Jeremi Suri’s excellent essay on rapprochement between the United States and China drives this point home. Suri argues that the Vietnam War and other southern world crises created a siege mentality in Washington and that Henry Kissinger’s diplomacy multiplied Nixon’s options, allowing the president to turn the tide of international conflict toward American interests. Kissinger accepted the reality of the difficult situation the United States faced in Vietnam, but he also used the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam to secure major new partners abroad, thereby assuring continued American influence in the region. Furthermore, by reaching out to China, the Nixon administration reoriented U.S. power and solidified U.S. prestige, even after the withdrawal from Vietnam. Suri’s essay is especially poignant because it emphasizes the importance of changing the geometry when a conflict seems too intractable. Suri’s treatment of rapprochement is superb, illustrating perfectly how leadership, flexibility, and patience mattered.

Sadly, Kissinger and Nixon were not always as prudent and wise as they were in developing a new relationship with China. This volume underscores the idea that the effort to increase power and influence through innovative partnerships and strategies rather than unilateral acts of force are keys to successful diplomacy. The case studies in this splendid volume highlight policymakers who take action to increase options. For Kissinger and Nixon, however, action was often as important as the objective. It now seems clear that they often favored action over inaction to show resolve, toughness, credibility, and reliability. In some cases, as in China, action changed the fundamental nature of an important relationship and helped end U.S. participation in an unpopular war. However, some of Kissinger and Nixon’s other action-oriented policies—toward Laos, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Chile, for example—did not fare as well. The gratuitous violence engendered by many of the administration’s actions limited future options, and as this excellent volume attests, no policymaker wants that.

*Foreign Policy Breakthroughs* is a unique collection of case studies that promises to change the nature of the conversation on successful diplomacy and perhaps even offer a path forward for those interested in using history to help formulate a more effective foreign policy. The LBJ School of Public Affairs and its long-term project to reinvent diplomacy can serve as an incubator for these new ideas in much the same way that the congressionally funded and bipartisan U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) has helped stimulate breakthrough ideas on ending deadly conflict. For years, USIP has supported the work of Christine Bell, Chester Crocker, William Dixon, Jacob Bercovitch, John Paul Lederach, Lee Feinstein, and a host of others interested in developing best practices for peace negotiations. USIP research clearly shows that when these best practices are followed in peace talks, the likelihood of a sustainable agreement increases dramatically.

What is most remarkable about USIP’s work is the strong partnerships it has developed and nurtured. Scholars, practitioners, grass roots organizations, and governmental agencies all participate in USIP activities. Perhaps the LBJ School can partner with scholars, the State Department, the Office of the Historian of the State Department, and other institutions to help develop a similar blueprint for success in other areas of diplomacy and foreign policy. This useful volume is a good step in that direction.

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**Review of Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri, eds., *Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: Cases in Successful Diplomacy***

William Michael Schmidli

What is diplomacy? What skills make a patent diplomat? And how should up-and-coming diplomats learn the craft? In this thought-provoking collection of essays, Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri bring an urgency to these questions, reflecting their sense that effective diplomacy is an increasingly rare commodity in the world. Indeed, the book begins with a gloomy assessment of diplomacy in the twenty-first century. Although we live in an age of unprecedented “political, economic, and social pressures,” the editors warn that “there seems to be a global deficit in strategic responses to these challenges—at the very time that such action is most urgently needed” (1).

The problem is particularly acute for the United States. It is in part an issue of prioritization and resource allocation: American diplomats get short shrift compared to their counterparts in uniform. Hutchings and Suri note that in 2008, for example, the Defense Department’s $750 billion budget was more than twenty-four times as large as that of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development combined. The result is a “deficient diplomatic corps—underfunded, minimally trained, and frequently overwhelmed by the breadth and scope of the problems the country faces throughout the world” (2).

But Hutchings and Suri also argue that the study of diplomacy itself needs a total overhaul. Defining diplomacy broadly as a “set of activities by which political leaders, senior foreign policy officials, staff members of the foreign policy agencies, diplomats, and negotiators conceive of, develop, and implement foreign policy,” the editors emphasize that the study of diplomacy is lacking in both the academic and professional arenas. In American universities, “diplomacy hardly exists as a serious field of inquiry or as an academic course of study.” Even in foreign service institutes and academies of diplomacy, language and area-studies training takes top billing, while diplomacy is “undervalued, underanalyzed, and undersourced” (4).

Hutchings and Suri envision Foreign Policy Breakthroughs as the first step in the process of “reinventing diplomacy”—an effort to make the field of “diplomacy, strategy, and statecraft . . . more comprehensive in scope, better informed by history, and more global in outlook” (5). The ten chapters in *Foreign Policy Breakthroughs*, written by a mix of scholars
Lee cogently argues that the Bandung conference symbolizes a key transitional moment from populist forms of transnationalism to the mainstream international diplomacy of sovereign nation-states. Political communities in Asia and Africa that were once without representation quickly gained recognition during the era of decolonization, with Bandung highlighting this transformation (54).

Focusing on the competing agendas of key participants, as well as the nascent non-aligned movement, Lee’s chapter will be of interest to students of Western imperialism, decolonization, and South-South relations. Yet the specific lessons he offers for contemporary diplomats, which focus on international conferences as an “indispensable aspect of international diplomacy,” seem rather thin. While it is no doubt accurate that conferences “must be understood as important occasions for networking and building social capital, thus helping to ensure successful diplomacy in the future,” one hopes that aspiring diplomats-in-training will find deeper lessons embedded in his chapter.

In some of the essays, the focus on statecraft comes at the expense of a broader historical analysis. Rafael Fernández de Castro and Beatriz Leycegui’s chapter, for example, examines the role of Mexican presidents Carlos Salinas and Felipe Calderón in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations and President Enrique Peña Nieto’s role in negotiating the Pacific Alliance, a new free trade pact including Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. The authors argue that NAFTA marked a “sea change” in U.S.-Mexico relations, and, taken together, the two trade pacts have enhanced Mexican trade and economic relations and burnished Mexico’s foreign policy and international prestige. In both cases, the authors argue convincingly that Mexican leaders skillfully played the domestic side of a two-level game, which is a concept coined by political scientist Robert Putnam to describe the imperative placed upon diplomats to simultaneously reconcile domestic and international constituencies. Regarding NAFTA, for example, the authors contend that President Salinas transformed his negotiating weakness—that is, not having domestic constituencies that would limit his negotiation capacities—into a strength for his negotiations. Instead of ignoring the Mexican Congress and the private sector due to their relative lack of strength, President Salinas recruited them, especially the business sector, as an integral part of the negotiation team (213).

Fernández and Leycegui’s chapter on two-level games underscores an axiomatic component of successful diplomacy. Yet the first part of Hutchings and Suri’s effort to reinvent diplomacy, the chapter raises difficult questions regarding the curriculum that up-and-coming diplomats should undertake. Fernández and Leycegui present NAFTA and the Pacific Alliance as logical stepping stones in a globalization process that has proven highly beneficial to Mexico. A U.S. foreign relations historian, however, might take a more critical approach, situating the trade pact discussions within a deeper analysis of the ideology underlying the emergence and dissemination of neoliberal economic ideas in the late twentieth century. Like Fernández and Leycegui, the historian might examine top-level Mexican policymakers, lobbying firms, think tanks, and business organizations, but rather than focusing on diplomacy as part of the globalization process, the historian might analyze these actors in the context of globalization as an elite-driven project, privileging profit maximization and corporate elitism and cutting across national, international, and transnational arenas. The two analyses would be markedly different. In terms of reinventing diplomacy, which of these approaches would be more useful to a future diplomat?

Similar questions arise in Paula R. Newberg’s analysis of the international assistance community’s engagement with the Taliban in 1990s Afghanistan. Illuminating and “practitioners,” analyze a disparate collection of diplomatic case studies since 1945. Underscoring the focus on statecraft, most chapters conclude with a discussion of what the case study teaches about successful diplomacy, which, in the final chapter, Hutchings and Suri distill into nine “common themes” of effective diplomacy.

Foreign Policy Breakthroughs contains numerous excellent essays. Stephen R. Porter’s analysis of the operations of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), for example, nicely advances the editors’ overarching goal of drawing contemporary lessons in diplomacy from historical case studies. Porter deftly blends an analysis of the multilateral diplomacy that led to UNRRA’s founding with specific points for future diplomats. The points are basic; one cites the importance of “learning from past relief operations” and “early planning,” for example. But Porter avoids being simplistic by embedding them in the historical contingencies of his case study. Similarly, Jonathan Hunt’s chapter on negotiating the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and Galia Golan’s analysis of Sadat, Begin, and the Camp David process are well-crafted studies that extrapolate useful diplomatic lessons.

Perhaps the strongest essay in the collection is Robert Hutchings’s analysis of the George H. W. Bush administration’s policy toward Eastern Europe during the final months of the Cold War. Hutchings draws out the contingency that shaped American decision-making, emphasizing the difficult choices American policymakers faced at key junctures and how events on the ground repeatedly made carefully calibrated plans obsolete. Hutchings’s essay is a model for weaving together historical analysis and principles of statecraft for future diplomats. After assessing the Bush administration’s role in the creation of the “Two-Plus Four” forum for negotiating German unification, for example, Hutchings shifts to the diplomatic lesson. “For policymakers, the crucial test is how they react to unexpected events: whether the responses are haphazard or episodic, or take place within a larger strategic framework,” he writes. “Achieving the latter requires planning as a continual, ongoing process, with a disciplined willingness to discard plans in the face of new and unforeseen developments” (158).

If Hutchings’s essay shows the value of history for contemporary statecraft, other essays in Foreign Policy Breakthroughs reveal that drawing clear-cut diplomatic lessons from complex historical case studies is no easy task. Mark Ellwood’s eye-popping chapter, for example, argues that the European Union’s “ability to legally institutionalize diplomatic conflicts” played a key role in the success of European integration. Through both the design of economic integration and the criteria for the EU’s enlargement, EU leaders have sought to embed core political projects in abstract rules and procedures, overseen by non-majoritarian institutions,” Dawson writes. “These institutions have played a crucial role in moving processes of transnational integration forward in circumstances wherein political leadership has failed or political dialogue would likely increase rather than diffuse interstate conflict” (193). In terms of thinking about diplomacy, Dawson’s argument is provocatively inclusive. It illuminates the role of actors such as the Court of Justice that are not traditionally accorded a diplomatic role. But by the same token, the particularities of the EU case study make it difficult to draw upon for general principles of statecraft for future diplomats.

Similarly, in his examination of the 1955 Asian-African Conference, widely known as the Bandung conference, Christopher J. Lee argues that the gathering “achieved limited practical success in the short term, yet . . . great symbolic success in the long term” (49). Framing the conference as a bridge between early twentieth-century social movements and post-1945 global diplomacy,
the challenges humanitarian actors faced in post-Cold War Afghanistan, Newberg skillfully addresses the international level (“How does a failed state formulate foreign policy?” she asks, for example) and the local level, where tense discussions over whether and in what capacity female aid workers could attend meetings with Taliban leaders, for example, created “maximum discomfort among external interlocutors who had worked alongside affected communities for years” (236). Newberg’s chapter will no doubt prove useful for future diplomats working in post-conflict environments, where, as in Afghanistan, “every decision—where to de-mine, whom to feed, how and where to plant crops, when and where tribal migrants could graze, whom to bribe and how to negotiate, how to protect workers from imprisonment and villages from ransack—raised difficult questions that typified the intersections of relief and development, humanitarianism and human rights, and political convenience and political intractability” (237).

But does Newberg’s chapter stand up to Hutchings and Suri’s call for the study of diplomacy to be “better informed by history”? While her analysis expertly identifies the challenges of international aid to war-torn Afghanistan, she approaches the issue primarily as a technical one: how to assess the needs of “problematic places under conditions of complex humanitarian, development, political, and foreign policy threats; how to craft missions and mandates that can address those analyses; and how to analyze human rights in ways that could protect society and contribute to overall analysis” (249). This is different from the way in which the first wave of human rights historians approached the issue of human rights over the past decade or so. For historians, illuminating how human rights are rooted in political contestations—and dispelling teleological thinking and triumphalist narratives about human rights—has taken center stage. This blossoming historiography is less interested in making contemporary human rights advocacy or humanitarian aid more effective and more focused on understanding why human rights emerged, in the words of Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman, as the “doxa of our time, belonging among those convictions of our society that are tacitly presumed to be self-evident truths and that define the space of the conceivable and utterable.”1 While the questions these scholars raise are not incompatible with Newberg’s analysis, they nonetheless underscore the challenge of integrating the diverse perspectives of practitioners and historians on issues like human rights into a coherent curriculum for future diplomats.

The emphasis in Foreign Policy Breakthroughs is on case studies that illustrate successful diplomacy: Jeremi Suri’s tightly written chapter, for example, illuminates Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s defining role in shifting relations with China “in less time than it takes most universities to launch a new academic program” (104). Suri highlights Nixon and Kissinger’s careful signaling to Chinese leaders in the lead-up to Kissinger’s visit in 1971 and their strategic flexibility in the face of a rapidly changing international environment. Nixon and Kissinger deserve credit, Suri argues, “for conceiving and implementing a major diplomatic breakthrough that contributed to the security and prosperity of the United States.” Emphasizing that they forced this change onto a largely reluctant U.S. government, Suri concludes that, “strong leadership matters for diplomatic effectiveness” (105).

Suri’s argument is clear and convincing. But the chapter raises difficult questions regarding what the curriculum for up-and-coming diplomats should entail. I can imagine some of my SHAFR colleagues cringing, for example, at the implications for contemporary statecraft of Suri’s observation that Nixon and Kissinger’s diplomatic success stemmed in part from their emphasis on secrecy and centralization of power (115). More to the point, in isolation from other aspects of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy, the China case study makes Nixon and Kissinger appear to be master statesmen. But drawing in the broader U.S. foreign policy landscape during the Nixon years—the muck and mire of American support for dictatorships throughout Latin America, the delayed American exit from Vietnam, support for Suharto of Indonesia, and so forth—makes an assessment of Nixon and Kissinger as statesmen much more challenging and would certainly complicate the lessons for future diplomats.

That reservation leads to a broader conceptual question that runs through the chapters in Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: in order to most effectively reinvent diplomacy, should the emphasis be solely on successful cases studies? Hutchings and Suri strike a dismissive tone regarding studies of unsuccessful diplomacy: “There are, of course, many assessments of diplomatic failure—every failure attracts critics, who, like vultures, peck away at the vulnerable remains of human frailty.” This is an odd statement. Wouldn’t the lessons of diplomatic failures be useful for diplomats seeking to avoid similar mistakes? Perhaps part of the answer lies in Hutchings and Suri’s narrow definition of success: “Political leaders set objectives for their diplomats (or other foreign policy officials); if those objectives are achieved, the diplomacy can be judged successful, quite apart from the ultimate consequences of the actions undertaken” (14). While this definition does avoid a confusing conflation of short-term diplomacy with long-term outcomes, most historians seeking to analyze causal connections would find it uncomfortably confining. According to this definition one could argue, for example, that the U.S.-backed overthrow of Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 was a significant diplomatic success (in that the Eisenhower administration’s objective of ousting Arbenz was achieved), eliding the long-term instability that the coup d’état set in motion.

To be sure, teaching future foreign policymakers how to perform day-to-day diplomacy is essential. Hutchings and Suri are correct to argue that expecting diplomats to “learn on the job” is inadequate, and the editors’ principles of diplomacy in the conclusion of Foreign Policy Breakthroughs, such as “diplomacy requires a careful mix of secrecy and openness,” and “statesmen need to see the objective of diplomacy not as victory, but as compromise,” will no doubt prove useful to diplomats-in-training. But truly reinventing United States diplomacy in order to overcome the challenges of the twenty-first century will require a deep and sustained engagement with the contributions of foreign relations historians. Much of this rich body of scholarship eschews a focus on successes in order to most effectively engage the deeper complexities of America’s engagement with the world. One can only hope that future generations of diplomats will study the principles of statecraft and

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America's many contributions to the contemporary world but will also grapple with more troubled legacies, such as American imperialism, militarism, exceptionalism, market fetishism, and racialized and gendered thinking.

Note:

Reinventing Diplomacy?

William I. Hitchcock

In the introduction to this collection of case studies of “successful diplomacy,” Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri argue that the art of diplomacy—an art that U.S. leaders of earlier generations once used with great skill to construct and sustain a stable international order—has withered. In our current epoch of global disorder, the editors believe, diplomats and national political leaders have revealed a glaring “deficit” (1) of creativity and imagination as they devise global solutions to the problems of world governance. Without adequate training and proper study of the past to act as a guide, policymakers have let the craft of compromise, deal-making, and relationship-building lapse. The book suggests that one way to brighten this dark age of diplomacy is to provide policymakers and students in policy schools with historical case studies of successful diplomacy. By examining moments when diplomacy triumphed, the editors hope to inspire students and educate contemporary leaders in how to “reinvent diplomacy” for our time (xiii).

Let us start by examining the premise. Is diplomacy dead? One occasionally hears that claim, and in the introduction to the book, the editors identify both climate change and nuclear proliferation as areas in which “diplomatic capability appears most lacking.” Recent developments belie that argument, however. In December 2015, some 190 nations agreed on a plan to regulate the emissions of greenhouse gases. Yes, it was a long and painstaking process, and it was an incomplete one. But is that not the very nature of diplomacy? Similarly, in July 2015, six major nations and the European Union signed a deal with Iran to ensure that Iran will not build or acquire nuclear weapons. The deal is controversial, and certainly its success remains in question. But even these aspects of that complex agreement make the past look pale by comparison. The editors believe, diplomats and national political leaders of earlier generations once used with great skill to construct and sustain a stable international order—has withered. In our current epoch of global disorder, the editors believe, diplomats and national political leaders have revealed a glaring “deficit” (1) of creativity and imagination as they devise global solutions to the problems of world governance. Without adequate training and proper study of the past to act as a guide, policymakers have let the craft of compromise, deal-making, and relationship-building lapse. The book suggests that one way to brighten this dark age of diplomacy is to provide policymakers and students in policy schools with historical case studies of successful diplomacy. By examining moments when diplomacy triumphed, the editors hope to inspire students and educate contemporary leaders in how to “reinvent diplomacy” for our time (xiii).

In addition to these achievements, one might also point to the diplomacy that helped craft a global response to the financial meltdown of 2009; the 2010 START Treaty with Russia; the Trans-Pacific Partnership that joined twelve Pacific Rim nations in a deal to reduce trade barriers; and the 2015 diplomatic opening to Cuba, which was the result of eighteen months of secret U.S.-Cuban contacts brokered by the Vatican. We can debate the merits and demerits of such initiatives, but certainly they could not have happened without diplomacy. If, as the editors argue, the 9/11 attacks opened a period in which U.S. foreign policy was “underanalyzed and overmilitarized” (2), it would seem that the art of the diplomatic deal has made a robust comeback.

If the editors somewhat overstate the death of the diplomatic arts, they are surely right to say that we do not teach “diplomacy” as such very well. Diplomatic historians train students to analyze the origins and sometimes the resolutions of international crises, as well as the conduct of grand strategy. But we probably focus too much on presidential and elite decision-making than on the actual work that diplomats do in crafting deals, stewarding relationships, and finding pathways to compromise. Much of that work is unglamorous and slow and tends to get sidelined in survey classes in favor of crisis management—or crisis mis-management. This book has identified an important blind spot in our vision. In the interest of improving our ability to teach diplomacy to students and future diplomats, the book provides ten historical case studies that illuminate examples of successful diplomacy.

The cases the editors have selected are presented in thoughtful and well-crafted individual essays by scholars who really know their material. Professors, policymakers and students alike will find much here to reward a careful reading. Even so, I came away feeling that the cases gathered here, as interesting as they are individually, did not have enough power to fulfill the ambitions of the editors to “reinvent diplomacy” for our current tumultuous age.

For example, the book opens with an essay on the diplomacy that launched the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) during the Second World War. No doubt UNRRA was a surprising success: in the midst of the world’s most disruptive war, and before the UN and other postwar institutions had been established, UNRRA provided humanitarian aid to millions of displaced persons and refugees both in Europe and Asia. The story of UNRRA is not very well known, and this lucid chapter by Stephen R. Porter offers a concise history. But what is its direct relevance today? How can the UNRRA story help diplomats facing humanitarian challenges now? The essay posits a few lessons, such as the need to plan ahead, to learn from previous examples, to work together with the great powers, and so on; but these sensible if somewhat obvious conclusions seem unlikely to surprise today’s diplomats.

Likewise, the fascinating portrait of the 1955 Bandung Conference, composed of twenty-nine Asian and African nations, provides a welcome short history. Christopher J. Lee reminds us how significant Bandung was to contemporary observers because it placed Third World leaders on a global stage and heralded a new role for the nations of the emerging “global South.” Lee argues that while the Bandung Conference did not accomplish a great deal by itself, its power was symbolic and ideological: it put the world on notice that the newly independent nations aimed to transform world affairs. Again, this is fresh and original work. But what lessons does the case carry for today’s diplomats? Those appear rather commonsensical: that conferences are symbolic, that they lead to networking, and that they provide a global stage for leaders.

Jeremi Suri’s own chapter is a brief, lucid summary of the Nixon-Kissinger diplomatic breakthrough with China in the early 1970s. Using his detailed knowledge of the period and of U.S. diplomacy, Suri makes a strong case that the overtures to China offer a classic case of successful,
leader-driven diplomacy. Nixon and Kissinger knew what they wanted, had the strategic vision to see an opportunity, and propelled a reluctant bureaucracy to adapt to the new policy, which marked a major shift in U.S. thinking. No doubt, the case should be carefully studied in policy schools for the light it sheds on the diplomatic process.

However, it is not clear what lessons would-be diplomats or students should draw from the case. Suri applauds the secrecy of the China overture; he admires the way Nixon and Kissinger “forced change on a resistant policy bureaucracy and a reluctant public” (104), and he accepts the need of leaders to deploy “secrecy, manipulation and prevarication” to achieve these sorts of breakthroughs. “Strong leadership,” he writes, “matters for diplomatic effectiveness” (105). That is surely true, but are secrecy, manipulation, and bullying the bureaucracy the best methods to use when executing a diplomatic initiative? The earlier generation of diplomats that Suri cites as successful, from Kennan and Acheson to Marshall and Lovett, were able to inspire their colleagues and use the talent of the people around them rather than cut them out of the loop. Some discussion of the costs of such methods would have made this chapter even more useful.

This point—the need to use the bureaucracy rather than bulldoze it—is actually made most pointedly by Suri’s co-editor, Robert Hutchings. In a very good summary of the diplomacy behind the end of the Cold War, Hutchings—who is himself an experienced practitioner of the diplomatic craft—argues that leaders must “condition and mobilize the foreign policy bureaucracy” in order to achieve success. “Foreign policy is conducted and implemented by hundreds if not thousands of officials, and effective diplomacy calls for coherence among the foreign policy agencies, consistency in diplomatic signaling, and careful consideration of policy options beginning well below the level of senior policymakers” (153). Hutchings makes the case for a process-centered, strategic and patient approach to major diplomatic initiatives. Hailing the team assembled by George H.W. Bush for its ability to adapt and improvise in the face of constantly changing events in Eastern Europe in 1989, he asserts that such nimbleness was only the result of a great deal of preliminary planning, debate, and strategic design that occurred across the administration from the moment Bush took office. Unlike Suri, Hutchings believes “it is a mistake to conceive of diplomacy as being defined by diplomatic virtuosity alone” (167). This tension between the co-editors’ essays might make for a good classroom discussion about the appropriate strategies to adopt in diplomacy.

The Suri and Hutchings essays stand out because they focus on classic case studies that clearly demand our attention. Similarly, Galia Golan’s excellent chapter on the diplomacy behind the Camp David Accords of 1978 between Israel and Egypt illuminates the high-stakes gamble that Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin and Jimmy Carter took as they looked for a diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East. Golan highlights the absolutely central role that personal diplomacy at the highest level played in this case, citing Carter’s intensive preparation and personal commitment, Sadat’s sensitivity to the need for reconciliation and public gestures, and Begin’s willingness to compromise by giving up Sinai in pursuit of a separate peace with Egypt. All these factors paved the way to a breakthrough. Personal engagement and political will do not always lead to diplomatic success, but they are prerequisites nonetheless. An equally sensible chapter on the diplomacy within the European Union adds an additional model for students and policymakers to discuss, while chapters on Mexico’s NAFTA diplomacy and global humanitarian diplomacy in Afghanistan round out the collection.

This book is animated by a superb idea: to use the case study method to illuminate the inner workings of diplomacy, especially successful diplomacy, so students and policymakers can learn how to face complex global challenges more confidently. We need books like this, prepared by scholars and practitioners who have a sophisticated understanding of the practice of diplomacy.

My principal criticism is the one usually made of edited collections: the chapters, excellent as they are individually, do not align very well as a group. The introduction and conclusion by Suri and Hutchings provide excellent insights, but the chapters tend to describe the significance of a given outcome—UNRRA was important, Bandung mattered, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 shaped international relations, etc.—without providing a consistent set of metrics across each case study. If this case method is to be useful in any applied sense, the cases must be joined by a common methodology, a common vocabulary, and some uniform system to evaluate each example. Had each chapter followed a similar organization from the start—addressing leadership, strategic planning, the ability to adapt to the unexpected, the place of individuals versus long-term structures, the stewardship of global networks, and so on—then we could actually begin to develop a typology of successful diplomacy and apply these insights to our own times.

At once a how-to book for foreign policy officials and a guidebook for average citizens who want to understand the diplomatic process better, the book has a lot to offer. The essays in it show breakthroughs that were achieved in a wide array of contexts, including crisis management, economic accords, the de-escalation of confrontations that could easily have turned bloody, and efforts to get the world community to focus on pressing but often ignored problems.


James F. Siekmeier

“Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.” Or so John Kennedy said when the U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion failed, greatly embarrassing not only Kennedy but the United States. Analogously, as Robert Hutchings and Jeremy Suri note in the introduction to this insightful collection of essays, diplomatic failures are reported on much more extensively than diplomatic breakthroughs. And the twenty-four-hour news cycle, churning away on hundreds of cable TV channels, is a beast that demands more and more to report on, so diplomatic failures today are seized upon by the media and excruciatingly analyzed and re-analyzed. Even before the onset of this twenty-four-hour news cycle, during the Cold War, when two ideologically opposed and nuclear-armed blocs went at it around the world and a victory for one side would automatically spell doom for the other, diplomatic failures were high-stakes (and thus high-profile) affairs.

However, this obsessive concern with diplomatic failure has arguably caused observers to neglect the less sexy topic of diplomatic success (and its more interesting close cousin, successful diplomacy). Therefore, neither diplomats nor informed and concerned citizens know much about how diplomatic success comes about. Hence this book, and the importance of its contributions.

At once a how-to book for foreign policy officials and a guidebook for average citizens who want to understand
the diplomatic process better, the book has a lot to offer. The essays in it show breakthroughs that were achieved in a wide array of contexts, including crisis management, economic accords, the de-escalation of confrontations that could easily have turned bloody, and efforts to get the world community to focus on pressing but often ignored problems. Not only can we peek behind the curtain to understand how successful diplomacy comes to be; armed with this historical knowledge, we can better evaluate the successes and failures of our diplomats today. For example, Jonathan Hunt's essay on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty gives the reader a good sense of the historical context for the recent Iran nuclear negotiations, why they were so arduous, and how they could have easily broken down at a number of different points in the process. At the end of the day, an informed public needs to understand (especially in an election year) the winding, arduous, and messy process that produces diplomatic breakthroughs. Theoretically, the public can then elect leaders who are more likely to engage in successful diplomacy.

I do have a few reservations about the book. A key theme in the study of the diplomatic process is the important intersection between structure and the agency of diplomats. In their introduction the editors briefly note that “a focus on diplomats leads to an inflation of their agency and a downplaying of structural factors; a focus on systemic forces tends to encourage retrospective determinism, whereupon individual agency accounts for little more than ‘residual variance’” (15). However, it is clear that the authors of the essays in the book are more interested in the agency of diplomats than structural factors. In nearly all of the case studies, the actions of diplomats are carefully analyzed, but structural factors remain in the background. Moreover, the intersection of agency and structure remains largely unanalyzed in the book.

One way the authors could have analyzed the intersection of structure and agency would have been to discuss what the most significant barriers are that diplomats must surmount or steer clear of in pursuing successful diplomacy. For example, are economic conflicts easier to resolve than ideological conflicts? Or is it the reverse? Directly addressing the issue of ideological conflict would also have been illuminating for readers. In the conclusion, for instance, Hutchings and Suri state that empathy was key to the opening to China. Specifically, Nixon and Kissinger realized that Western (and Japanese) imperialism had wreaked havoc on China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; therefore they bent over backwards to assure the Chinese that the United States in the Gorbachev era, went a step further than Eisenhower, who only cautioned against the undue power of this complex. Arbatov placed the blame for extending the Cold War for two decades squarely on U.S. leaders who exaggerated threats to the United States in order to keep themselves firmly in power. In 1989, as the Cold War was unraveling, Arbatov asserted that the Cold War was “a living corpse. It died some time in the 1960s and has been kept alive by political injections of myths and fantasies about the Soviet threat.” He could have added that until the Gorbachev era, Soviet leaders (and their military advisors) also kept the Cold War alive with “myths and fantasies” about the U.S. threat. Leaders have an incentive to sustain such “myths and fantasies” to rally their people behind them. And of course, powerful interest groups—such as militaries—have an incentive to maintain “myths and fantasies” in order to preserve their large budgets and their prestige. Such interests can prevent successful diplomacy, year after year.

This is an enlightening and refreshing book. It aims high, attempting to analyze a complicated, multifaceted process by using case studies from around the world, and certainly it cannot address every question about the achievement of successful diplomatic policy in one volume. But analyzing the process of successful diplomacy is something that few observers try to do systematically, and these essays do a good job of it. The book is also a timely one, largely because U.S. foreign relations have been far too reliant on military force and development aid and less likely to turn to diplomacy—particularly since 9/11. Hutchings and Suri conclude that both the U.S. public and the world community have decided that subtlety and creativity is now more imperative than ever in the formulation of U.S. foreign relations. As they note in the introduction, if we fail to learn from successful diplomacy, we will have a higher rate of “creeping militarization” that will lead to a closing-off of diplomatic creativity, options, and actions, thereby reducing the military confrontation more likely (2). This book will prove insightful reading for experts and laypersons alike—for anyone, in short, who seeks to find ways of avoiding increased military confrontation.

Note:
1. “Soviet Reformer Georgi Arbatov Explains the ‘New Thinking’...
Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri’s edited volume *Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: Cases in Successful Diplomacy* makes the case for why diplomacy is so important. As the title suggests, it highlights diplomatic successes, but it also examines the conditions under which diplomacy can succeed and focuses on particular instances in which it broke through stasis and stalemate with a vision of a different future. In addition, Suri and Hutchings consider why diplomacy is very nearly a lost art, given short shrift in study and in practice; and they offer a plan for how to recover it and elevate it to a place of prominence both in the academy and in American statecraft. Their book is a self-consciously audacious endeavor.

As they write in the introduction, their goal is nothing less than the reinvention of diplomacy.

Suri, a scholar, and Hutchings, a practitioner, are an ideal pair to undertake this endeavor. Suri holds the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin and is one of the leading experts on American foreign policy and international history. Hutchings currently teaches national security at the University of Texas at Austin, where he also served as dean of the LBJ School of Public Affairs from 2010 to 2015. His diplomatic career included service as director for European affairs at the National Security Council, special advisor to the secretary of state with the rank of ambassador, and chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council. He and Suri jointly wrote the introduction and conclusion to this volume, which is shaped by their academic and real-world expertise.

Suri and Hutchings believe that in theory and in practice, contemporary diplomacy is a marginalized field. They argue that American foreign policy suffers from a Cold War legacy that privileges reflexive militarization over creative diplomacy. Further, they contend that this warping of the traditional tools of statecraft has coincided with, and perhaps been the cause of, a decline in the practice of diplomacy. Finally, they argue that the lack of robust, useful, and practical scholarship on diplomacy—particularly cases of successful diplomacy—contributes to the diminished focus on diplomacy in both the academy and in the real world of statecraft. Diplomacy is of singular importance, they conclude, but diplomats today need more and better training.

The need to reinvent diplomacy by first reinventing diplomatic training is one of the major themes of this book. Unlike economists, lawyers, military officers, and even academics, diplomats do not have to master an agreed-upon body of work prior to becoming diplomatic practitioners. As Suri and Hutchings observe, diplomatic training, even in formalized and accredited MA programs, is inconsistent.

Suri and Hutchings usefully pushed the authors of individual chapter to sum up the lessons for diplomacy that each particular case reveals. What emerges is lessons so obvious that they bear stating only because, as Suri and Hutchings assert, we might otherwise lose sight of them because of a winner-take-all political culture that denigrates compromise and an academy that promotes specialization over broad-ranging training.

There is nothing that could be called a curriculum in this field,” they write. Instruction “is mostly confined to foreign language and area studies training, with a thin veneer of ‘how to’ training for junior diplomats.” As a result, most professional diplomats—or those policymakers tasked with conceiving and conducting foreign policy—“are expected to learn ‘on the job’” (4). While this might sound reasonable, the editors ask their readers to contrast it with the regular and career-long professional training the military receives. Suri and Hutchings are clearly not satisfied with this current state of affairs, and they note that this book is part of a larger project to develop a better way to equip future diplomats with the knowledge and skills to thrive in the broader world of statecraft.

The editors’ intention is to make the study of diplomacy more serious and more thoughtful. By examining case studies of several different occasions on which diplomatic breakthroughs occurred, the authors are trying to encourage diplomats to think more broadly, be more creative, and gain a better understanding of the difference between diplomatic success and successful diplomacy. The case studies are all postwar. Some involve the United States, while others do not. The only criteria the editors used was diplomatic success. Every chapter asks what behaviors, what habits, and what frames of reference were more likely to produce desired outcomes.

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The first lesson is that diplomatic success arises from ensuring that we do not separate things that should not be separated. For example, the editors argue that secrecy and openness both have their place in diplomacy, contending that while obsessive secrecy is counterproductive, so too is elevating to dogma the Wilsonian notion of open covenants arrived at openly. Leaders need venues to creatively test the limits of the possible. Often this testing means going beyond where they, their bureaucracies, and the national mood are and moving to where they could be.

The editors also note that diplomacy and war are intertwined. Nearly all the work of the classical strategic theorists is grounded in the logic that diplomacy gains its leverage from the threat of violence and that strength works best when paired with and tempered by diplomacy. As the nineteenth-century Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz noted, “War is the continuation of politics with the addition of other means.” Unfortunately, most modern observers incorrectly translate and therefore misunderstand this singular phrase, reducing war to the continuation of politics “by other means.” Arguing over a preposition might seem petty, but as Naval War College professor James Holmes has pointed out, the implications of that preposition are large. He writes that “pursuing political objectives ‘with’ other means connotes adding a new implement—namely armed force—to a mix of diplomatic, economic, and informational implements rather than dropping them to pick up the sword. War operates under a distinctive martial grammar, in other words, but the logic of policy remains in charge even after combat is joined.”

However, Clausewitzian mistranslations notwithstanding, in the modern era, war and diplomacy are of-
ten understood and conveyed as opposing impulses that inhabit separate realms. That is a mistaken and indeed dangerous conceptualization that removes coercive power from diplomacy in any circumstance short of war and delinks political objectives from military actions during hostilities. It also assumes that there is a clear line that separates war from peace. From eastern Ukraine to the South China Sea, reality has proven much more complicated. The mingling of the military and the political is especially problematic in competitive “grey zone” interactions defined by “ambiguity about the nature of conflict, opacity of the parties involved or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.”

The other major lesson that Suri and Hutchings present is the need for all parties to win. Diplomacy, they write, is not premised on achieving unconditional surrender. For a negotiation to become a successful act of diplomacy, all parties concerned must have a stake in the outcome and must buy into the solution. Successful diplomacy requires antagonistic parties to agree that what they have negotiated is in their interests. Also reminiscent of Clausewitz, this principle is about perception as much as reality, because while one party can attempt to impose its will on an antagonist, the decision to submit or continue resistance resides with the antagonist. The odds of success are of course raised if one, both, or several parties to a dispute compromise. As the book suggests, this is a particularly hard lesson for Americans to learn. Specifically, victory, understood in the total sense, cannot become the goal of diplomacy. Rather, the objective is to achieve a deal in which all players feel as if their country or their cause has been well served.

The chapters in this book are broad-ranging, covering the diplomacy behind the creation of the European Union, the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nixon and Kissinger’s opening to China, and American efforts at the end of the Cold War. As with any edited volume, the quality, structure, and organization of the different chapters vary. But as several of the best essays make clear, successful diplomacy emerges when structure and agency combine in productive ways. That correlation can be seen especially clearly in Suri’s chapter, “From Isolation to Engagement: American Diplomacy and the Opening to China, 1969–1972.”

Examining American and Chinese motivations, Suri finds that foreign policy breakthroughs occurred when the principal actors found new ways to communicate and meet and when diplomatic entrepreneurs were willing to begin by working in secret. In this study in particular, leadership also mattered enormously. Absent the driving vision and force of Nixon, Kissinger, Mao, and Zhou Enlai, stasis and the status quo would likely have continued.

This collection of essays raises a number of useful questions. First is one about selection. Overall, and true to its title, this edited volume focuses on positive and successful foreign policy, notably instances in which an impasse yielded to forward progress through the intervention of successful diplomacy. As the editors correctly note, so efforts at the end of the Cold War. As with any edited volume, the quality, structure, and organization of the different chapters vary. But as several of the best essays make clear, successful diplomacy emerges when structure and agency combine in productive ways. That correlation can be seen especially clearly in Suri’s chapter, “From Isolation to Engagement: American Diplomacy and the Opening to China, 1969–1972.”

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The question of selection leads to a second, related issue. Suri and Hutchings write that diplomacy demands a common language. They point to the Congress System of nineteenth-century Europe as a model for states pursuing “their traditional ambitions” while still respecting “the legitimate interests of other states” and “preserv[ing] cooperative relations” (8). But how does successful diplomacy take place when a revisionist state is one of the participants? As Henry Kissinger asked in his very first book—an intensive study of the diplomacy following the upheavals of the Napoleonic Wars that set the parameters for that Congress System of the nineteenth century—how can statesmen recognize the limits of diplomacy when dealing with a revolutionary power? “In such cases,” Kissinger wrote, “it is not the adjustment of differences within a given system which will be at issue, but the system itself.” Kissinger concluded that “diplomacy, the art of restraining the exercise of power, cannot function in such an environment. . . . Diplomats can still meet but they cannot persuade, for they have ceased to speak the same language.”

The question of how a statesman comes to grips with revisionist powers is not discussed in this volume, but is well worth contemplating, and might perhaps usefully be taken up in the authors’ next book.

A third question this volume raises relates to the conduct of diplomacy for both an international and a domestic audience. For diplomacy to be successful, it clearly needs to succeed for different audiences, but does this need to happen simultaneously, or can it happen sequentially? And what happens when those messages contradict each other? Of course the answer varies, but I found myself wondering about these questions as I read.

Finally, Suri and Hutchings write that “successful diplomacy demands disciplined and coherent government, in which the various foreign policy departments and their agents’ operate within a common strategic framework” (16). Such a statement sounds both practical and obvious, yet it also sounds almost impossibly rare in modern democratic government. If nothing else, this collection underscores the benefit of periodic policy reviews as a tool to embolden the bureaucracy to think new thoughts and to go beyond the operational aspects of diplomacy. Successful diplomacy requires imagining relationships that have not yet come into being. Whether that act of imagination requires vision or persistence in greater degree is an elusive yet quite important question.

Notes:

Response to Roundtable Reviewers of Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: Cases in Successful Diplomacy

Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri

The last year has witnessed a series of dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs, including a 190-nation agreement to limit global atmospheric pollution, a seven-party deal to curtail Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and, for the first time in more than fifty years, an opening of relations between the governments of Cuba and the United States. Even hawkish skeptics of diplomacy have found themselves caught up in the euphoria created by these breakthroughs. Texas Governor Greg Abbott—one of the most outspoken critics of President Barack Obama’s alleged “weakness” on immigration, national security, and American leadership—was one of the first officials to rush into Cuba and begin negotiating business deals for his constituents. When successfully pursued, diplomacy has a
magnetic quality, attracting the attention of the very people who most demean its potential in the abstract.

One of the main purposes of our book is to make the successful practice of diplomacy concrete for diverse readers, including scholars, practitioners, students, and other interested citizens. The chapters in our book address a series of interrelated questions: What does successful diplomacy look like? How have different kinds of diplomats pursued it? What can we learn for the unique foreign policy challenges of our own time?

Our book seeks to offer coherent but non-uniform answers to these questions by focusing on a collection of diverse and important cases. The goal is not to give diplomats a checklist but to offer them a series of insights, drawn from a close reading of history, to contemplate as they do their work. We do not seek to advocate one specific diplomatic project, or even one nation’s interests, but instead hope to stimulate a renaissance of creative thinking about how powerful international actors can temper the frequent over-militarization of policy with more thoughtful and well-prepared diplomatic activities. Even in a period of new breakthroughs, the scholarly attention paid to diplomacy still falls far short of the attention devoted to military, economic, and cultural affairs; and the preparation our diplomats receive is confined mainly to episodic and unstructured on-the-job learning. Ironically, diplomatic and international historians often neglect the absolutely crucial day-to-day work of diplomats.

We are very pleased to see agreement on the need for more study of diplomacy, broadly defined, from the distinguished reviewers of our book. We are grateful for their insights, and we agree that this book is just a beginning. There are many other important cases to examine and many additional issues to interrogate—including the “structural” barriers that James Siekmeyer discusses and the complex relationship between diplomacy and other less diplomatic activities, as emphasized in the case of Nixon and Kissinger by both Robert Brigham and William Schmidli. William Hitchcock is also correct to identify the tensions among the chapters in the conceptualization of various issues, including secrecy, bureaucracy, and planning.

Charles Edel raises the important question of how statesmen can deal successfully with revisionist powers, and he wonders whether modern democratic government has made disciplined and coherent policy nearly impossible. We believe that revisionist powers are still subject to diplomacy, and we continue to hope that democracies can generate policy coherence, but both domains require better-trained diplomatic leaders. At the very least, the successful diplomats of the twenty-first century will need a stronger historical background in their endeavor, and that is what we hope to provide, in part. Although our book is clearly not the last word, we are happy to see how it has already helped to deepen the discussion.

The reviewers raise questions about how we define “success.” Brigham and Hitchcock ask about larger negative patterns of diplomatic behavior, especially in the administration of Richard Nixon. Schmidli asks why we do not examine “failures,” and he implies a “triumphal” bias in our analyses. These questions highlight one of our key points: that assessing outcomes alone is insufficient for determining diplomatic success or failure. Our book seeks to avoid simple retrospective judgments and examine how the men and women who worked between societies built new connections, planted new seeds of cooperation, and negotiated arrangements that tempered the use of other more coercive forms of power. Each of the book’s chapters is about success, not because the outcomes were perfect, but because the diplomats expanded options and improved the possibilities for stability and peace.

Diplomacy is the art of compromise, and its ethics center on the willingness to reach out, negotiate, and create win-wins for key actors. That is the consistent narrative of every chapter, despite wide differences in the subjects. Some diplomats, (like Kissinger and Sadat) are flamboyant and secretive; others (including Begin and Baker) are understated and managerial. Success is not about a particular style or a specific program. The cases in our book show how different forms of diplomatic behavior have brought diverse groups together to widen the range of the possible and enhance the possibilities for multiple actors.

Success is rare because this work is so difficult. (Diplomatic agreements only look obvious or easy in retrospect.) Distrust and the presumption of the worst, in friends or adversaries, are the most common causes of failed diplomacy. International actors who are dissatisfied with the status quo, sometimes for legitimate reasons, also frequently oppose peaceful diplomacy. These are the “revisionist powers” Edel discusses so effectively in his review. In addition, our book’s cases highlight how domestic audiences—political opponents, interested groups, and self-serving opinion-leaders—often penalize diplomats and pressure elected officials to favor ultimatums over compromise. Diplomacy is indeed a “two-level game.” Our current electoral season should remind us how hard it is to sell diplomacy at home, especially in the United States.

This latter point is the motivation not only for our book, but also for our warning against the all-too-common denigration of diplomatic “failures” when we do not get what we want. That attitude, found in politicians and sometimes in scholars, contributes to the discrediting of diplomacy itself. We agree that new research on diplomatic failures would be a welcome contribution to the debate, and we would hope that such analyses would distinguish between the inherent structure of the geopolitical situation on the one hand, and the actions of statesmen and diplomats on the other—as we have tried to do in our book. Examining diplomatic failures in the context of their time, while remaining mindful of the policy limits diplomats faced, may help us see the small successes achieved in negotiations, even when the larger political framework was flawed.

Diplomacy that makes both good and bad policy decisions better is a noble calling, even if the results do not always look better. We need more work to understand how diplomacy can reach its real potential in different circumstances. We also need to redouble our efforts to remind students and leaders that diplomacy has value and requires consistent nurturing. We sincerely thank the reviewers for their contributions to this worthy endeavor in “reinventing diplomacy.” We hope our book will inspire many future efforts at diplomatic reinvention, beginning, of course, with more serious histories.
Researching Through the Back Door: Field Notes from East of the Iron Curtain

Simon Miles

When I set out to research my dissertation, “Engaging the ‘Evil Empire’: U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Second Cold War,” most people’s questions pertained to documentary access. Would I be able to see enough relevant materials from the early 1980s in the U.S. archives? What about my plans to tell the Soviet side of the story? As Russia’s relationship with the West deteriorated, would the archives in Vladimir Putin’s Russia really be open and accessible to a U.S.-based researcher?

The first question I could easily address. The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library has been, for the most part, forthcoming and extremely valuable, as has the George Bush Presidential Library (though much remains classified in Bush’s vice presidential records). Materials held at the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter Presidential Libraries, the Library of Congress, the Hoover Institution, and the National Archives and Records Administration have enabled me to develop a more comprehensive treatment of U.S. policy. The second question, regarding sources east of the Iron Curtain, posed a greater problem. While I could comb through U.S. archival finding aids online to assess the feasibility of such a project, Soviet archives are less transparent. The only way to know for sure is to go and see firsthand.

Having recently done just that, it bears mentioning at the outset that most of my fears were inflated. When I was asked to write this piece, I had conducted extremely fruitful research in Prague and Berlin and was preparing to leave for Russia. In Moscow, it quickly became clear that materials on the early 1980s (and much more) are in fact available. Records of the Politburo and Central Committee secretariats and the personal papers of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko are accessible at the national contemporary history archive, the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Novoĭ Epochnoi Istoriĭ (RGANI). Though much remains closed, especially in the Brezhnev fond, secretariat papers are open into the 1970s and access is expanding steadily. The Andropov and Chernenko personal fonds include, for example, memoranda of conversation of their meetings with foreign leaders ranging from George Bush to Fidel Castro.

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Bezpečnostních Složek (ABS) in Prague. That augured well for the broader feasibility of my research. Before departing, I decided that I would judge my success by the extent to which I could access the official mind of the Kremlin through documents: papers written by the Soviets and transmitted to Warsaw Pact members, records of briefings by and conversations with Soviet officials regarding the Cold War, and documentation on the proceedings of Warsaw Pact meetings. By this measure, four weeks in East German archives and two in Czechoslovak archives proved extraordinarily fruitful. I also gained far deeper insight into the role of the Soviet satellite states themselves, particularly interested in the fonds of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. In short, valuable research in Russia can be done, and archival access is expanding rather than contracting.

When I planned my research, however, I did not know that this would be the case. My concerns, though not fully founded, forced me to consider how I might access Soviet documentation to produce as close to a 360° view of the so-called “Second Cold War” as possible without necessarily relying on Soviet documents in Russian repositories. I had to think about the Cold War not just as a competition between states—the United States and the Soviet Union—but also as a competition between systems—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. While NATO could claim some degree of equality among member states, there was no question as to who called the shots in the Warsaw Pact. Exercising control over another country’s foreign policy, however, was not automatic; it required meetings, briefings, and the flow of information from core to periphery in general. For the Soviet Union to shape the foreign policy of Warsaw Pact states, it had to share its views on foreign policy and the international system. In fact, a large quantity of this material, written by Soviet policymakers, is available in repositories across Eastern Europe, primarily in states that have made dramatic transitions to democratic governments that prioritize transparency and access to information, especially pertaining to their communist pasts.

I chose to explore East German and Czechoslovak repositories in part because of my language abilities, but also because of the relative importance of the two nations within the Warsaw Pact. Bothbordered West Germany and played an especially important role in the economy of the Soviet bloc. East Germany was the most hard-won of the Kremlin’s satellite states and was central to Moscow’s Cold War outlook. Both countries had also passed laws to create institutions for the purpose of archiving and disseminating records pertaining to their communist-era intelligence services—the Bundesbeauftragte für die Stasi-Unterlagen (BStU) in Berlin and the Archiv Bezpečnostních Složek (ABS) in Prague. That augured well for the broader feasibility of my research. Before departing, I decided that I would judge my success by the extent to which I could access the official mind of the Kremlin through documents: papers written by the Soviets and transmitted to Warsaw Pact members, records of briefings by and conversations with Soviet officials regarding the Cold War, and documentation on the proceedings of Warsaw Pact meetings. By this measure, four weeks in East German archives and two in Czechoslovak archives proved extraordinarily fruitful. I also gained far deeper insight into the role of the Soviet satellite states themselves,
One particularly exciting find for me was a collection of memoranda of conversation between the U.S. ambassador to West Germany, Arthur F. Burns, and the Soviet ambassadors to East Germany who were his counterparts—memoranda that were drafted by the Soviets and then communicated in translation to East Berlin. Under the terms of the settlement on Berlin, the U.S. ambassador to West Germany and the Soviet ambassador to East Germany met from time to time to discuss the city’s peculiar situation, focusing primarily on air corridors, overland traffic, and the like. Indeed, all memoranda of conversation explained the meetings as taking place in Burns’s “capacity as head of the [U.S.] military administration in West Berlin.” At their first meeting, on 19 October 1981, Burns told Ambassador Pyotr Abrassimov that a “new team” had taken charge of U.S. foreign policy, and he hoped they could turn over a new leaf and move the tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations away from distrust. He had been sent by Reagan as ambassador explicitly to use this forum as a means not only of dealing with issues relating to the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, but also to solve problems in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Abrassimov responded in kind, sharing his hope that the recent talks between U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and his Soviet counterpart, Andrey Gromyko, would be the first step in reinvigorated U.S.-Soviet talks. He looked forward to discussing a wide range of issues in the bilateral relationship and the Cold War as a whole with Burns. These meetings continued in spite of (or perhaps because of) crises in U.S.-Soviet relations, such as the downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 on 1 September 1983. The Cold War did not end at a conference table in Berlin, but the ongoing, institutionalized back-channel dialogue between the United States and Soviet ambassadors is nevertheless instructive. It explains, at least in part, what Reagan meant when he intimated to his friend, California real estate developer Paul Trousdale, that the United States had “more contact with the Soviets than anyone is aware of” during his first term. The meetings provided a forum for two senior, well-connected policymakers to speak—surprisingly frankly—about superpower relations and international stability without public scrutiny and therefore the need for posturing.

Elsewhere in Berlin, the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA) holds the records of the German foreign ministry—both East and West—during the Cold War. Here one can find records of briefings held by Soviet diplomats around the world for their Warsaw Pact counterparts. Briefings in Washington, for example, dealt with superpower relations, whereas those among representatives to African countries focused on promoting communist ideology and modernization. These documents contain invaluable information on Moscow’s view of the Cold War. At the aforementioned BStU, a government agency charged with maintaining the archives of the Stasi, records are almost completely open and shed light on internal surveillance, intelligence gathering in the United States, and East German coordination with the Soviet KGB.

Further afield, in Freiburg im Breisgau, the Militärarchiv (MA) holds the records of both Germanies’ ministries of defense. Of particular value to scholars of the Cold War, the MA holds documents relating to East Germany’s involvement in the Warsaw Pact, including preparatory materials for its meetings of leaders and defense ministers and the minutes thereof. It also sheds light on Eastern Bloc perceptions of (and intelligence on) NATO strategy, military planning, and operations. In Berlin and Freiburg, therefore, researchers whose primary interest is not necessarily East Germany can nevertheless find a wealth of information pertaining to the Cold War as a whole with relatively unfettered access.

Czechoslovak documents, all of which are housed in Prague, also have a great deal of information on the Cold War. Two archives stand out for their relevance and exceptional openness. First, the aforementioned ABS holds the completely unclassified records of the Czechoslovak internal and external intelligence agency, the Státní Bezpečnost (StB). A significant proportion of these materials are digitized, particularly the raw intelligence reports of StB agents in the United States and Western Europe. More complete intelligence reports, similar to U.S. National Intelligence Estimates, are available in hard copy at the ABS reading room in central Prague. These materials include, as in the BStU, important information on cooperation with the KGB, such as the intelligence alert of the early 1980s, Operation RyaN (Raketno- Yadernoe Napadenie, or “nuclear missile attack”), which aimed to detect initial evidence of a U.S. nuclear first strike.

Second, the foreign ministry papers at the Archiv Ministerstva Zahraničních Věcí (AMZV) rival the East German foreign ministry papers for their level of insight into Soviet thinking on the Cold War. The AMZV’s collections are easy to work in and impeccably catalogue. (Some of these documents can also be found at the comparatively less rewarding Národní Archiv in the outskirts of Prague.) AMZV documents show, for example, that the idea of a Second Cold War ushered in by Ronald Reagan needs to be reevaluated. In fact, most in the Eastern Bloc saw Carter’s presidency as already having turned a corner towards right-wing jingoism and militarism. The foreign ministry saw the latter half of 1979 as marked by a “further departure from the politics of peaceful coexistence” on Carter’s part. Soon after the 1980 election, observers warned against expecting “dramatic” changes with the advent of the new Reagan administration, predicting that he would simply continue Carter’s anti-Soviet policies. Soviet diplomats, who admitted they knew little about Reagan as a statesman, told their Czechoslovak counterparts that the Kremlin would give Reagan the benefit of the doubt. Moscow attributed his more aggressive statements regarding the Soviet Union and on foreign policy in general to the “frenzied election campaign.” As one Czechoslovak diplomat put it, “Reagan in the White House,” one Czechoslovak diplomat predicted.
“will be different from Reagan on the campaign trail.”\textsuperscript{16}

There are, of course, problems with this approach of archival triangulation beyond the potential financial obstacles and the linguistic barriers. In terms of the records themselves, these materials are not necessarily a substitute for Soviet documents, which are less accessible but, as I mention at the outset, by no means off-limits to researchers. The Kremlin did not send everything to its allies, though it certainly did transfer a great deal of valuable documentation, and those documents sent to East Berlin, Prague, and elsewhere do reflect a selection bias on the part of the Soviet Union of which historians need to be aware. In addition, as Reagan administration Soviet specialist John Lenczowski puts it, “the Soviets use words in ways that have different meanings than those we adopt for the same words.”\textsuperscript{17} What Stephen Kotkin famously terms “speaking Bolshevik” presents historians working in intra-party documents with a unique challenge; they must separate pro forma pablum from meaningful commentary on the activities of the Eastern Bloc or perceptions of the West.\textsuperscript{18} Ultimately, though, these challenges are the same ones that all historians face, requiring us to interrogate our sources with rigor.

Working in the former Warsaw Pact state archives is, despite these challenges, worth the effort. Here I have given two examples of some important information that I would not have found if I had worked solely in U.S. and Russian archives. The central idea I convey here—of thinking about networks and relationships as sources of information—is applicable not only to the Warsaw Pact. I have used the same approach to greatly expand my understanding of U.S. foreign policy when relying on British, Canadian, French, and West German archival materials.\textsuperscript{19} Rather than focusing only on policies and perceptions in Washington and Moscow, I have been able to explore how countries closely allied with the United States and the USSR—often the best analysts of the superpowers’ foreign policies—perceived the evolution of the Cold War during the early 1980s. These seemingly indirect research methods help to globalize our understanding of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet relationship and the Cold War as a whole. Eastern Europe is home to a wealth of valuable, accessible documentation on all aspects of the Cold War—documents that remain underutilized in the historiography of U.S. foreign relations.

Notes:
1. I am grateful to Mark Lawrence, Susan Colbourn, and the participants in a seminar at the William P. Clements Jr. Center for National Security for their valuable input, as well as to the archivists in the Czech Republic, Germany, and Russia who made my research there so rewarding and enjoyable.
2. These guides are searchable at http://www.statearchive.ru/383, though in my experience there can be discrepancies between results of searches conducted externally and those done on the archives’ computers (there is one at nearly every seat in the reading room). See also http://guides.rusarchives.ru/browse/browse.html for a straightforward list of fonds at GARF.
3. ARAN’s finding aids are available online and searchable at http://isaran.ru/?q=ru/fund&ida=1.
5. The SAPMO’s finding aids are all online at http://www.argus.bstu.bundesarchiv.de.
8. The PA/AA is also one of the few German archives at which researchers are permitted to take photographs.
9. Some BStU documents have been published online by the archive, such as a collection on Stasi-KGB cooperation, available at http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/MfS-Dokumente/MfS-KGB/_node.html. Some of these documents have been translated by the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/forecasting-nuclear-war.
10. The holdings of the MA (as well as other archives within the purview of the Bundesarchiv) can be searched both by keyword and more traditional finding aids using the Invenio system at https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/basys2-invenio/login.xhtml. There are in fact several versions of Invenio in existence, and searches conducted on the Bundesarchiv’s intranet (i.e., using the computers in the archive) are much more fruitful than those done remotely. There is a plan to merge these two systems in the future.
19. On the value of Canadian records, see Greg Donaghy, “The View from Ottawa: Researching U.S. Foreign Policy in Canada,” Passport (Dec. 2005), at https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/30064/Passport%20December%202005.pdf?sequence=3. Some of the logistical specifics Donaghy mentions have changed in the intervening decade, but the basic message that Ottawa is a worthwhile (and cost-effective) place to research U.S. foreign relations stands.
The Water’s Edge from a Distant Shore: The Transnational Turn, Domestic Politics, and U.S. Foreign Relations

David L. Prentice

Editor’s note: This essay was originally scheduled to appear in the January 2016 issue of Passport as part of a roundtable on domestic politics and foreign policy. Due to errors in the production of the issue, the essay was inadvertently omitted from the roundtable. In addition to appearing here, the essay will be added to the roundtable in the online version of the January 2016 issue, which should be available on SHAFR.org in May 2016. Passport apologizes to Dr. Prentice for the error. AJ

Andrew Johnstone’s essay, “Before the Water’s Edge,” reminds historians that the cultural and transnational turns have provided historians with a richer understanding of the sources, context, and impact of U.S. foreign relations both at home and abroad. But these methodological innovations, as Johnstone points out, have overlooked the role of domestic politics in the origins and execution of American foreign relations. In particular, the transnational turn deliberately sought to look beyond internal economic and political determinants of U.S. foreign policy.

I believe the continued internationalization of our field need not preclude domestic politics. Rather, it may in fact reveal the prominence of U.S. political considerations in foreign policy calculations both within the United States and abroad. In looking through international sources, I have found that foreign diplomats, government officials, and their public audiences weighed the influence of the U.S. domestic front and found it a significant—and at times determinative—factor in shaping America’s role in the world.

Thanks in large part to the discipline’s cultural and transnational turns, diplomatic history has undergone a revival in recent years even as studies of the political aspects of U.S. foreign policy have fallen by the wayside. The cultural turn delivered fresh insights into the construction of personal and collective identities as well as the motivations behind individual behavior. By transcending the nation-state, transnational scholarship has excelled at placing U.S. foreign relations in its global context and connecting American actors to broader movements and ideas. As the subfield adopted these approaches and the wider discipline became interested in global narratives, I discovered the primacy of U.S. domestic politics in shaping America’s role in the world. As Jussi Hanhimäki has noted, “There is a tendency as we search for new perspectives to ignore the old ones.”

In particular, Hanhimäki argues that a generation of transnational historians risks losing sight of “the significance—at times, the primacy—of domestic politics in the making of American and other countries’ foreign policy.” In numerous forums, other notable scholars have called for returning domestic politics to prominence in the hierarchy of things historians consider. The plea is not to distill every foreign policy decision down to politics but to reconsider its utility alongside culture and transnationalism. Of course, if domestic motivations better explain American foreign relations, why conduct multi-archival research to study the water’s edge on distant shores?

International research and perspectives can shed new light on old tales. Part of the initial impetus for adding foreign research was to test Washington’s views, assumptions, and decisions against those of the rest of the world. Yet this internationalization may also prove a means to test historians’ assumptions, since most (and perhaps all) foreign archives have significant holdings devoted to U.S. politics and American political culture. In a recent American Historical Review forum, Matthew Pratt Guterl observed that viewing sources and moments from a “transnational dimension” can produce “an ‘a-ha!’ intervention, dramatically altering the telling of a well-rehearsed story.” I have found this to be true.

I discovered the primacy of U.S. domestic politics in the Public Records Office in Kew. I was looking to establish the international and strategic context of America’s contingent decision to get out of the Vietnam War; what I found were innumerable British memos and cables on the importance of domestic politics and Congress in shaping, if not defining, that decision. I found the same emphasis in other foreign archives and sources. Although Americans may be loath to admit that politics does not stop at the water’s edge, foreign policymakers have no trouble here. Of course, if their observations and analysis ended here, this internationalization might be little better than the old scholarship that was castigated for being little more than “what one clerk said to another.” But their interest and their political reporting did not stop there.

To be clear, American politics matters to people and policymakers worldwide. As Fredrik Logevall has rightly argued, “The United States is not merely one power among many and has not been for a very long time.” Other nations appreciate this power imbalance, recognize that America’s internal politics can greatly change U.S. foreign policy, and can gear their foreign policies to anticipated shifts in U.S. public opinion and politics. As Hanhimäki puts it, “Since the beginning of the Cold War, American domestic politics have become international politics.” Episodes like the McCarthyism of the 1950s gravely worried U.S. allies, and elections have the potential to dramatically change America’s role in the world. In a journal issue devoted to U.S. internationalism and isolationism, Simon Rofe notes that when new presidents are elected, people abroad typically ask if they will “turn inward and focus on domestic priorities, or will they embrace the United States’ role in the world?” In that same issue, Andrew Johnstone makes it very clear that the internationalism/internationalism dichotomy provided...
an overly simplistic view of U.S. foreign relations but that it remains the predominant narrative in the popular mind. Borrowing Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher’s phrase, I would argue that it remains predominant in the “official mind” as well.10

In looking at and ranking the determinants of U.S. foreign relations, policymakers worldwide placed partisanship and the American political context near the top. During the Cold War, there were frequent fears that the U.S. electorate would shift back towards interwar isolationism. Isolationism was a simplistic Cold War specter and a politically useful accusation, yet foreign officials took it seriously and paid more attention to U.S. politics because of it.

Indeed, internationalization can not only determine how foreign actors perceive American politics and its bearing on U.S. foreign relations, it can also reveal how they sought to shape U.S. politics and policy. In particular, election years were opportunities for U.S. allies and enemies to gauge the political and foreign policy winds and, at times, attempt to harness them for their own interests. As President Lyndon Johnson lamented of foreign actors and the presidential candidates in 1968, “Everybody is trading on y’all’s campaigning and foreign policy.” This lobbying was especially common during those elections when U.S. foreign policy or internationalism appeared to be in transition. The 1968 election was one such election; it saw the Vietnamese and Soviets trying to sway administration policy and the candidates’ campaign positions, while other nations simply sought to follow events and hoped for the best.

Beyond election cycles, U.S. politics can have at least three other international ramifications. First, foreign governments often perceive America’s political travails as being indicative of an incipient shift in U.S. foreign policy and so begin altering their grand strategies accordingly. Julian Zelizer notes that the magnitude of President Richard Nixon’s political and congressional support necessitated Cold War retrenchment and détente.11 Watching and interpreting American politics, U.S. allies began changing their policies well before Nixon’s inauguration. Second, world leaders, particularly those heading key allies like France and Britain, recognize that their rhetoric and positions can have political effects in America and may repress their doubts about U.S. foreign policy when they recognize that presidents face difficult political situations at home. Again, the 1960s is instructive. Charles de Gaulle’s criticisms of Lyndon Johnson’s policies emboldened LBJ’s domestic critics, whereas Britain’s Harold Wilson muted his criticism of the Vietnam War to avoid doing the same. Finally, foreign leaders understand that partisan debates in the United States can affect not only their national security but their political standing as well. A state visit to the United States or a presidential trip abroad may provide a political boost, while political opponents may use American politics and foreign policies against incumbents. Moreover, the surprise foreign policy breakthrough intended to shore up a president’s political position can shock foreign allies and create political embarrassment for them. U.S. policymakers seldom consider such repercussions. As Jason Parker noted in 2011, “We historians should be mindful of how ‘politics’ ebbs and flows in multiple directions over and across the water’s edge.”12

In short, historians interested in the role of U.S. politics in foreign policy and open to conducting multi-archival, international research should seek out and consider those boxes in foreign archives devoted to U.S. politics. Once declassified, innocuous-sounding folders like “U.S. Political—Congress” can reveal fascinating stories of the “intermestic.”13 When, without any U.S. prodding, the Australian government in 1970 exhorted its embassies abroad not to entertain congressional fact-finding missions lest these “itinerant scavengers” find political ammunition to use against the White House and challenge American Cold War internationalism (and hence Australia’s national security), we have evidence of U.S. politics washing up overseas.

Looking at the water’s edge from a distant shore may help historians understand what the “United States in the world” means at home and abroad. A foreign vantage point may enable us to better grasp the contingency, the political coalitions, the partisanship, and the policies that limit and shape U.S. foreign relations. In moments of transition, American engagement can convey frailty and contingency rather than the confident diffidence or triumphalism that Americans like to think they project. Such a perspective will certainly help scholars and students of U.S. foreign relations appreciate how American politics is interpreted, received, and acted upon by the world. International research confirms this is not a passive process. Bodies of water are not obstacles but conduits.

Notes:
4. Ibid.
8. For a contemporary perspective on U.S. global leadership that also discusses the role of domestic politics, see Andrew Johnstone, “A View from Overseas: Drift, Not Mastery,” Passport 42, no. 3 (January 2012): 17–18.
13. The term “intermestic” goes back to at least the 1970s (see John M. Cooney, ed., Congressional Studies: The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, Foreign Affairs 55, no. 2 [January 1977]: 306–24), but scholars interested in the role of domestic politics have found it useful (see Melvin Small, Democracy & Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994 [Baltimore, 1996], 148). Campbell and Craig define “intermestic” as “the international-domestic, whereby the two are dynamically intertwined” (America’s Cold War, 10).
was introduced to the practice of having students use popular films as primary sources at the University of Wisconsin in the 1970s, as a teaching assistant for Professor Paul Glad’s course on U.S. History since 1917. At a time when physical proximity to tangible materials was much more necessary than it is today, we had some remarkable resources to work with readily at hand. Sometime during the 1960s the Wisconsin Historical Society had acquired the United Artists collection, which contained all films released by Warner Brothers, RKO, and Monogram studios from 1930 to 1950.1 Glad had designed his course to exploit this treasure trove by showing full-length feature films during special evening sessions, films such as I Was a Fugitive from a Chain Gang (1932), Dawn Patrol (1938), Mildred Pierce (1945), and Pride of the Marines (1945). Right away I was especially interested in Pride as a substantive pedagogical tool, and that interest deepened over the years. At the Naval Academy I deployed it chiefly in my sophomore research seminar on the early Cold War.2

In November 1942, on Veterans Day, The New York Times published a story about one man’s heroism during a battle on Guadalcanal three months earlier, when badly wounded Private Albert A. Schmid manned a machine gun and killed some two hundred Japanese soldiers while helping the Marines repulse an enemy attack.3 Roger Butterfield followed up with a March 1943 Life magazine story about Schmid and his struggle with blindness and subsequently turned the article into a book published the next year: Al Schmid: Marine.4 Hollywood picked up the story from there. Pride was produced during 1944–45 and released as the war was ending.

I avoid telling my students much about this film before showing them portions of it. I do reveal that it was released in August 1945; that it is based on the real-life story of Al Schmid, a steelworker from Philadelphia who joined the Marines soon after Pearl Harbor and was blinded in combat on Guadalcanal, where his heroism earned him the Navy Cross; and that it stars one of the most widely acclaimed actors of the mid-twentieth century—John Garfield. It is a two-hour film, so I usually show them just a sample of perhaps 25–30 minutes. I urge students to consider this film as another kind of primary document and to ask themselves as they watch it, “What’s the message here? What are the key scenes, the most important lines? What evidence am I seeing or hearing to suggest this film was made when it was?” And I strongly suggest that they take notes.

**Opening.** The first voice we hear, for more than a minute, belongs to John Garfield as Al Schmid, while the camera pans the city from above before focusing on the places Al mentions:

*This is Philadelphia, 1941. Everybody’s got a hometown; this one’s mine. My name is Schmid, Al Schmid, maybe you’ve heard of me, maybe not. Anyhow, one way or another, what I’ve got to tell you starts here, in Philly.*

None of these things meant a whole lot to me then; when you grow up with something, you kind of take it for granted. And the reason you’re seeing these places now is just because this is where my story begins.

But it could have begun anywhere. It could have begun in your hometown, maybe. And what happened to me might have happened to you.

With this introduction Garfield establishes Schmid’s credentials as a typical American, a regular guy. And the remaining two hours provide an allegory, in which Schmid is Everyman and the journey he takes is the journey his country takes, from fierce self-reliance, self-centeredness, and ignorance of matters international and societal to a greater awareness of the larger environment.5

**News of Pearl Harbor.** Al and his sweetheart Ruth (played by Eleanor Parker) are having Sunday dinner with friends on December 7, when a preliminary announcement comes over the radio that Pearl Harbor is being attacked. Neither couple knows where it is, though their host is sure of its location:

*Host*

Oh, it’s down the Jersey coast near Atlantic City someplace.

*Ruth*

It can’t be, the Japs are bombing it.

Al dismisses the announcement as “just one of those ‘men from Mars’ programs.”6 When the announcer comes back on the air to confirm
the news and announce that the United States is effectively at war with Japan, the hosts’ 13-year-old daughter asks, “Are you going to be a soldier, Al?” He replies, “Nah, I’m going to Canada and shoot bears.”

**Blindness.** But Al joins the Marines instead, is blinded on Guadalcanal, and begins a months-long hospital stay. Some of the most affecting scenes in the film take place in the San Diego Naval Hospital. When Al’s bandages are removed from his eyes, he can’t accept the fact that he has been blinded. When handed a braille card, he reacts angrily. “This is for blind people . . . I don’t want any of this stuff, I want to stand on my own.”

**Hopes and Fears.** One of the longest and richest scenes occurs in the hospital’s recreation room during a bull session, as Al and seven or eight other wounded Marines share their hopes and fears about the postwar world facing them.

**Bill**

“Twice in his life my old man got his name in the papers; the first time in 1917, he was the first to enlist in Milwaukee; and the second time in 1930, he was the first vet to sell unemployed apples. . . .

**Lee Diamond** (Al’s buddy and machine-gunnner on Guadalcanal; played by Dane Clark)

C’mon, climb out of your foxholes. You think nobody’s learned anything since 1930? You think everyone’s had their eyes shut and their brains in cold storage? . . .

**Bill**

I’m scared. I wasn’t half as scared on the Canal. If a man came along, anybody, and told me I’d have a decent job for the rest of my life, I’d get down on my knees and wash his feet.

**Veteran #2**

Well, I’m not scared.

**Veteran #3**

You talk like a guy with dough in the bank. You ask me what I want out of life? I’m not an ambitious guy, thirty bucks a week, enough to take my girl out on a Saturday night, a ball game on Sunday. That’s about all I ask. Or is that too much?

**Veteran #2**

You’re a cinch. Things are different now, the whole country has its eyes open; it won’t be like 1930 again.

**Veteran #3**

That’s pretty music, but I don’t understand the words.

**Veteran #2**

What about the GI Bill of Rights? I’m going to college on that. They guarantee your old job back, Bill. . . .

**Bill**

Do they? . . . My old boss wrote me, “I’m in a new business and your old job just ain’t”; there’s nothing in the GI Bill of Rights to cover that. You can’t get your job back if it doesn’t exist.

**Veteran #2**

Yeah, that’s got to be considered.

**Bill**

Considered? . . . How about them considering this silver plate in my head? How long did we get to consider when they said ‘Hit the beach’ at Guadalcanal; they said ‘Go’ and we went? That’s OK; well, I want some considering now. I’ve got a wife and I want to support her. The doc says I can never do heavy work again, ever. Well, I want to work. . . . How do I know anybody will ever want me?

**Veteran #4**

Yeah, when I get back to El Centro I’ll probably find some Mexican’s got my job.

The camera shifts to one of their fellow Marines in B Company, a wheelchair-bound Mexican who has been listening to the conversation off to the side and now wheels away.

**Lee**

You dumb coot! He’s got more foxhole time than you’ve got in the Marine Corps. . . .

**Veteran #3**

So maybe we’ll even have prosperity for two years after the war while we catch up on things. . . . But what happens after two years? . . .

**Al (smiling)**

A bonus march.

**Lee**

No sir. You guys think that because you did the front-line fighting you can take a free ride on the country for the rest of your lives? No sir. . . . I fought for me, for the right to live in the USA. And when I get back to civilian life if I don’t like the way things are going, okay, it’s my country, I’ll stand on my own two legs and I’ll holler. If there’s enough of us hollering, we’ll go places, check? . . .

**Veteran #2**

I’m going to be a lawyer. Who says in ten years I won’t be a congressman? I’m
going into politics with both feet. And if I have anything to say about it my kid isn't going to land on any beachhead, and if any old windbag tries to sell me on the idea of shipping oil to Japan, or doing business with any new Hitler, he'd better start ducking.

**Bill**

OK, Junior, I'll check that... I'll put a little handwriting on the wall for you... and whoever's running the country better read it, too: no apples, no bonus marches. Now paste that in your hat, Congressman.

**Lee**

("America the Beautiful" playing in the background)

One happy afternoon when God was feeling good, he sat down and thought of a rich, beautiful country, and he named it the USA. . . . Don't tell me we can't make it work in peace like we do in war. Don't tell me we can't pull together. Don't you see it, Al?

**Al**

I don't see none of those things. (He stumbles away.)

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**On the train.** After a few months of convalescence, Al and Lee are sent east by train to their hometowns shortly before Christmas, where each is to receive the Navy Cross for valor, Al in Philadelphia and Lee in Brooklyn. A contemporary movie reviewer described Al in this scene as being engulfed by "pride, bitterness, fury, self-pity, despair."7

**Lee**

Al, look; in a war somebody gets it, and you're it. Don't you think I'd crawl on my hands and knees to a doctor if he could take an eye out of my head and put it in yours? But he can't. . . . Believe me, you ain't been a sucker. There ain't a guy who's been killed or disabled in this war who's been a sucker. . . . Everybody's got problems. . . .

**Al**

What problems have you got? You're in one piece, ain't you? . . . When you go for a job there ain't nobody gonna say "We've got no use for ex-heroes like you."9

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**Final Scene.** Al and Ruth are leaving the Philadelphia Navy Yard after the Navy Cross ceremony. They get into a cab, and the cabbie asks, "Where to, folks?" With a smile on his face and his arm around Ruth, Al provides the last word: "Home." The music swells, an amalgamation of the "Marines' Hymn" and "America the Beautiful," as the camera fades from the happy couple and focuses on Independence Hall. As the music's last note sounds, "THE END" is superimposed over the Marine Corps' official insignia—the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor.

**HUAC and the "Hollywood Ten"**

_Pride_ is an intelligent film, and it enjoyed an overwhelmingly positive reception. The Marine Corps arranged banquets in twenty-eight American cities, where it was shown to Guadalcanal veterans and local officials. The State Department used short-wave radio to broadcast the story to foreign countries, touting it as "an example of the American way of life."78 The movie reviewer for _The New York Times_ provided an especially glowing review, which began:

> The vital and delicate subject of the rehabilitation of wounded men—a subject which has broad implications to civilians as well as service men today—is treated with uncommon compassion, understanding and dignity, as well as with absorbing human interest. . . . Albert Maltz took the journalistic accounts of Schmid's experience and translated them into a solid, credible drama, composed of taut situation and dialogue. . . . His ear for the current idiom . . . is eminently indicated in some of the best talk we've heard on the screen. And Delmer Daves directed the document—for a document it actually is—with brilliant pictorial realism and emotional sympathy.

Even Henry Luce's _Time_ magazine took only a passing shot at the film for serving as "a rostrum for liberal polemics," while strongly praising its "compelling doggedness and honesty." The review went on to call _Pride_ "exciting—because the screen is so unaccustomed to plain talk—to see and hear the angry discussion of postwar prospects." And _Collier's Year Book_ likewise noted that "the real theme of the picture was the adjustment to a postwar world by returning war veterans," and the reviewer praised it for having "performed a public service in making civilians understand the problem."79

But not everyone was a fan. In 1947, after the Republican sweep of the congressional elections in 1946, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) launched an investigation of the movie industry. Eventually it cited ten writers, producers and directors—the Hollywood Ten—for contempt for refusing to cooperate with the committee and answer questions about their membership in the Communist Party. According to Ian Hamilton, HUAC focused on three movies in particular: _Pride of the Marines_, _Wilson_ (1944), and one of the most popular films of 1946 (it won seven Oscars, including Best Picture), _The Best Years of Our Lives_.11 Apparently, a majority of the committee deemed all three of these works overly critical of American economic or political life, and unlike the _Time_ reviewer they were in no mood to give _Pride_ a pass as "a rostrum for liberal polemics."

Consequently, an additional advantage in using this film as a teaching tool is the opportunity it offers to segue into an investigation of HUAC and the Hollywood Ten episode as a precursor to the antics of Senator Joseph McCarthy, which began three years later. Since _Pride_ is such an obviously patriotic work, students are surprised when they learn that its screenwriter, Albert Maltz, was one of the ten men who were hauled before Congress, accused of anti-American and pro-communist sympathies, and as a result served time in prison and were blacklisted in Hollywood.
for more than a decade. (The one Oscar nomination that the film received was for Maltz’s screenplay.)

But perhaps the movie was a subversive film at the time, as it sought to draw attention to America’s recent economic and foreign policy history. In the process, it seemed to be advocating the sort of interventionist state that for decades would be a defining characteristic of post-World War II American liberalism. It is not Robert Taft’s small-town or rural America that is portrayed here on the home front, but instead an urban, industrial world.

In 1945 Pride of the Marines connected its audiences with three sets of issues that are again very much with us seventy years later: returning veterans, particularly the disabled, and society’s response to them; our nation’s role in the world; and the nature of America’s political economy. There seems to be relatively little dissent these days about the need to provide care for veterans, especially wounded vets, at least among attentive segments of the public. Not so for the other two issues involving the role of the national government at home and abroad.

Notes:
1. For an introduction to this collection, see http://wcftr.commarts. wisc.edu/about/history.
2. Ronald Briley has also advocated teaching with “Hollywood films that have tried to address the fears and aspirations of the American citizenry, while also attempting to turn a profit,” Reel History and the Cold War, OAH Magazine of History (Winter 1994): 19.
12. Gerber erroneously awards the Oscar to Maltz for Pride, 21. Five years later, Maltz’s screenplay for the highly acclaimed Broken Arrow (1950) was also nominated for an Oscar. But because Maltz was blacklisted by then, his friend Michael Blankfort fronted for him. Blankfort was publicly recognized as the author for forty years. “Mending Broken Arrow,” Los Angeles Times, June 29, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-29/entertainment/ca-1195_1_broken-arrow.
13. For a succinct characterization of Taft’s America, see Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After (New York, 1960), 54. Teachers might wish to have their students learn more about Al Schmid’s postwar life. Gerber’s account of Al’s “resistance to rehabilitation” and his difficult relations with other wounded veterans, including foxhole mate Lee Diamond, stands in marked contrast to the film’s portrayal. Gerber, “In Search of Al Schmid,” 13 and esp. 30–32.

The Early Cold War on Film
Matt Loayza

Using historical films as primary source materials in the teaching of U.S. foreign relations is an effective way of engaging students and prompting them to think critically about what they watch as well as what they read. Anyone interested in thought-provoking films that can pique student interest in the early Cold War (1945–1962) and help them grasp the issues and public fears related to this era might consider the 1954 science fiction film Them! and the 1962 political thriller The Manchurian Candidate.

By the time my students begin to study the Cold War, they have already worked with a variety of primary source materials, such as newspaper articles, advertisements, official government correspondence, and personal letters. When introducing students to using films as historical texts, it is helpful to begin by reminding students to analyze the film clip rather than simply watch it. I explain that historians don’t look to Hollywood films for accurate historical accounts, but rather for clues and insights about the assumptions, concerns, hopes, and fears expressed in a particular time period. I encourage them to consider the message that the screenwriter and/or director wants to present and the assumptions built into the narrative (i.e., how the story is told).

Them! and The Manchurian Candidate both reflect popular fears that emerged during the early Cold War, and both films can help students better grasp the extent to which the Soviet threat came to permeate American society. Prior to using these films, I found that students, even those who possessed an exceptionally keen grasp of the competing economic systems, ideals, and interests of the two superpowers, and had read the likes of George Kennan and Paul Nitze tended to dismiss the Soviets as the next in a long line of historical “bad guys.” What was missing, I concluded, was adequate attention to how Cold War narratives reached the public and how the public consumed these messages.

The first film I use in class is the 1954 science fiction/horror classic Them! Before screening it, I give students an introductory lecture on the Cold War and have them read contemporary perspectives on U.S.-Soviet Relations (usually George Kennan’s 1946 “Long Telegram” and Ambassador Nikolai Novikov’s 1946 telegram to Moscow). I also assign Life magazine’s June 1948 article “The Reds Have a Standard Plan for Taking Over A New Country.” When we discuss these readings in class, students usually begin by comparing the Kennan and Novikov articles. Later, when I ask them how the analysis of the Soviet threat presented in the June 1948 issue of Life measures up to Kennan’s analysis, there is general agreement that Life conveyed a more exaggerated, dire sense of an immediate threat than did Kennan. The Life article helps students understand that Cold War precepts were not simply conveyed in trickle-
down fashion from statesman to layman. It also provides a solid foundation for exploring how popular culture (in this case, Hollywood films) conveyed and/or reflected popular fears about the Cold War conflict.

In the backstory of THEM! it is revealed that the Trinity test has caused the ants of New Mexico to mutate into giant carnivorous insects. In order to meet the threat, FBI agent Bob Graham (played by James Arness) joins forces with an elderly scientist, Dr. Harold Medford (Edmund Gwenn), and his young daughter, Dr. Pat Medford (Joan Weldon). Before showing the first clip from THEM!, I explain that upon discovering the murdering ants, the elder Dr. Medford is sent to Washington DC to brief top policymakers on the nature of this new and frightening threat. I ask students to take note of Dr. Medford’s presentation, which succinctly describes the killer ants in just under two minutes (clearly not a history professor!). Of particular interest is his description of the ants as “savage,” “ruthless,” “chronic aggressors” who use “slave laborers” and show “instinct and talent for industry and social organization.” THEM!’s fictional ants clearly possess the same characteristics that the Life magazine article attributed to Soviet communists.

After revealing the nature of the threat to humanity, the narrative establishes that collaboration between the state and the scientific community will be necessary to defeat the ant hordes. This is made explicit in a clip in which Bob Graham leads a mission to destroy an ant nest. After dispatching the insects with machine guns and poison gas, the soldiers look to the elderly Dr. Medford to confirm the success of their mission. Although Medford did not participate directly in the nest attack, their deference to his judgment indicates that he is the expert and architect of the plan.

Although THEM! presents the central conflict in stark and uncompromising terms, it offers more ambiguous depictions of gender roles. The only major female character, Pat Medford, certainly fulfills the role of a “damsel in distress,” but the plot does include scenes that portray her as an assertive, progressive woman confident in her abilities and her potential to contribute. This is evident in the scene that follows the nest attack. As the men relax on the edge of the battlefield and celebrate their success, Dr. Pat Medford comes striding into the scene, disturbing the all-male space. Although she has to this point shown that her fashion preferences lean toward the traditional (think skirts, hats, and purses), she now appears in attire more suitable for hunting giant insects than for a trip to the local ice cream parlor. Her appearance clearly causes consternation among the men, leading Bob to declare that the site is “no place for you or any other woman.” Pat convincingly responds that her scientific knowledge makes her presence not simply beneficial, but indeed essential to the success of the mission. Having lost the debate, Bob nevertheless looks to the elder Medford for paternal advice and addresses him as “my colleague and avert them” and the Chinese spy, Dr. Yen Lo (Khigh Dhiegh) so that they can discuss the two “bad guys” after the film.

The film clip quickly establishes that the two men are not equals. Although Ziltov is one of the most powerful Soviet agents on the East Coast, he defers to Yen Lo and repeatedly refers to him by his title, “Doctor.” Yen Lo, on the other hand, appears to view his Soviet counterpart as more suppliant than his colleague and addresses him as “my dear Ziltov.” In addition to possessing a higher rank, Yen Lo also appears to take greater pleasure in his work; he approaches espionage and mind-control with far greater relish than Ziltov. When Ziltov elaborates upon the details of the hospital’s cover story and operations, he boasts that it was one a very limited number of Soviet spy operations in the United States that “actually showed a profit at the end of the last fiscal year.” Yen Lo responds with a mock warning to his comrade about the “highly infectious” nature of the “virus of capitalism,” quipping that “soon you’ll be lending money out at interest!” When Ziltov fails to show proper appreciation for the joke, Yen Lo advises his comrade to “try to cultivate a sense of humor” in order to “lighten the burdens of the day.” He sets the example: after declaring that Shaw’s conditioning has produced an efficient, “entirely police-proof” killer, Yen Lo adds that Shaw’s “brain has not only been washed, as they say, it has been dry-cleaned.” Students remark upon how Ziltov’s joyless, nervous demeanor contrasts with Yen Lo’s delight in causing mayhem.

In the next scene, Ziltov and Yen Lo argue about whether or not Shaw is ready to be turned over to his American operator. Ziltov appears to be highly agitated. He paces beside Shaw’s bed, and a close-up highlights the beads of sweat that appear on his face as he begs Yen Lo to test Shaw’s capabilities. Yen Lo, who is seated on the example, historians can use the film in general education survey courses as part of a broader discussion of the Red Scare and the early Cold War.

The Manchurian Candidate begins with a depiction of the Korean War in 1952. A U.S. Army platoon is betrayed by its Korean guide, captured by enemy (presumably Soviet) troops, and spirited away to Manchuria by helicopter. There, under the direction of Dr. Yen Lo, the men are subjected to communist brainwashing that leads to the deaths of two of the squad members. The rest are given false memories so they cannot recall the experience. They are then taken back to the field. They return home believing (erroneously) that they survived battle thanks only to the brave deeds of Staff Sgt. Raymond Shaw, who receives a hero’s welcome upon his return stateside. However, Shaw’s Manchurian conditioning has turned him into a “sleeper agent” who, when awakened by the display of the queen of diamonds playing card, turns into a robot-like assassin.

By incorporating the Korean War and the Red Scare into the narrative, the plot effectively depicts the fears common to the early Cold War: that average Americans were becoming increasingly vulnerable to hidden forces that sought to manipulate individuals by advancing hidden agendas.

About half an hour into the film, the plot takes an interesting and entertaining turn in back-to-back scenes that feature Raymond Shaw’s Russian and Chinese handlers. The clever communists circulate the ruse that Shaw has been injured in a car accident and taken to a hospital. The hospital is actually a safe house where the communists plan to observe Shaw and determine the success of his brainwashing. Prior to starting the clip, I ask students to compare and contrast the portrayal of the Soviet agent Ziltov (Albert Paulsen) and the Chinese spy, Dr. Yen Lo (Khigh Dhiegh) so that they can discuss the two “bad guys” after the film.

The film clip quickly establishes that the two men are not equals. Although Ziltov is one of the most powerful Soviet agents on the East Coast, he defers to Yen Lo and repeatedly refers to him by his title, “Doctor.” Yen Lo, on the other hand, appears to view his Soviet counterpart as more suppliant than his colleague and addresses him as “my dear Ziltov.” In addition to possessing a higher rank, Yen Lo also appears to take greater pleasure in his work; he approaches espionage and mind-control with far greater relish than Ziltov. When Ziltov elaborates upon the details of the hospital’s cover story and operations, he boasts that it was one a very limited number of Soviet spy operations in the United States that “actually showed a profit at the end of the last fiscal year.” Yen Lo responds with a mock warning to his comrade about the “highly infectious” nature of the “virus of capitalism,” quipping that “soon you’ll be lending money out at interest!” When Ziltov fails to show proper appreciation for the joke, Yen Lo advises his comrade to “try to cultivate a sense of humor” in order to “lighten the burdens of the day.” He sets the example: after declaring that Shaw’s conditioning has produced an efficient, “entirely police-proof” killer, Yen Lo adds that Shaw’s “brain has not only been washed, as they say, it has been dry-cleaned.” Students remark upon how Ziltov’s joyless, nervous demeanor contrasts with Yen Lo’s delight in causing mayhem.

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other side of Shaw’s bed, is preoccupied with some origami (note the conflating of Japanese and Chinese culture) and appears to be mildly bored. Although neither man shows any reluctance to commit murder, Yen Lo takes a more casual attitude toward killing. Tiring of the discussion, he advises Zilkov to have Shaw kill one of his own people if he really wants to test the American before turning him over. Zilkov replies that the Russian operation is short-staffed as it is. In exasperation, he demands that Yen Lo suggest a suitable victim. Yen Lo laughs heartily and reminds his colleague to conduct himself “with humor, my dear Zilkov, always with a little humor.”

These scenes enable us to discuss how racial stereotypes influenced Hollywood’s portrayal of the communist enemy. The two characters are polar opposites and provide opportunities to analyze how Hollywood perpetuated cultural and racial images such as those embodied in the late nineteenth-century stereotype of the “Yellow Peril.” The plot distinguishes Yen Lo from both the Russians (he refers condescendingly to the Soviet Union as a “young country,”) and the Americans (he boasts that Shaw, when his brainwashing is complete, has been purged of the “uniquely American qualities of guilt and fear”), making it clear that his cunning, sophisticated brand of evil stems more from his Asian origins than his communist ideology. As an updated version of the early twentieth-century literary villain Fu Manchu, Yen Lo can be discussed both in association with enduring negative stereotypes of Asians that predate the Cold War by decades.8

Subsequent questions as to why the characters are portrayed so differently provide an opportunity to introduce how the Chinese indoctrination of U.S. POWs in Korea, translated by contemporary observers as “brainwashing,” prompted CIA Director Allen Dulles to issue reports warning of communist efforts to wage “brain warfare” and led academics to invent terms such as “menticide” to refer to methods devised by the Chinese communists to realize the “robotization of man.”9 The film effectively drew upon recent history, along with longstanding ethnic stereotypes, to construct a formidable and convincing villain in Yen Lo.10 Viewed in this context, The Manchurian Candidate is a valuable supplementary source for explaining that the Cold War was not simply the preserve of statesmen and politicians, but rather had a significant impact on everyday life that found expression in multiple areas of American culture.

Popular films can enrich student understanding of a wide number of topics. Like other primary sources, they can provide compelling and challenging material for students to analyze and discuss. Used as texts, they can provide students opportunities to analyze how Hollywood perpetrated cultural and racial images such as those embodied in the late nineteenth-century stereotype of the “Yellow Peril.” The plot distinguishes Yen Lo from both the Russians (he refers condescendingly to the Soviet Union as a “young country,”) and the Americans (he boasts that Shaw, when his brainwashing is complete, has been purged of the “uniquely American qualities of guilt and fear”), making it clear that his cunning, sophisticated brand of evil stems more from his Asian origins than his communist ideology. As an updated version of the early twentieth-century literary villain Fu Manchu, Yen Lo can be discussed both in association with enduring negative stereotypes of Asians that predate the Cold War by decades.8

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Notes:
4. Them!
8. See chap. 6 of William F. Wu, The Yellow Peril: Chinese Americans in American Fiction, 1900-1940 (Hamden, CT, 1982).
10. On the emergence of Fu Manchu as a significant character in American popular culture, see Wu, The Yellow Peril, especially chap. 6.

Teaching the Early 1980s Cold War with Popular Film
Molly M. Wood

A
n elevator door opens, far underground. Two men exit and punch a code into a digital pad, which slowly opens a thick steel door. The previous two-man shift leaves the control room, and the new team enters. Each man takes a separate chair in front of a bank of computer monitors. They chat amiably as they punch buttons and work through their protocol. Suddenly an alarm sounds, followed by an anonymous voice giving them a code, which they each copy down. The men know exactly what to do. They have practiced this exact scenario hundreds of times, so their movements are confident and business-like. They reach for identical red boxes, unlock them, and remove envelopes. The launch codes in them match. They then enter those codes into their computers. The computers respond: “Launch order confirmed.” They realize that this is not a drill, and the younger officer says, quietly, “Holy shit.”

The countdown begins. “T minus sixty,” the disembodied voice says. The officer in charge says, “O.K. let’s do it.” They each insert a launch key into a separate lock and turn it to “set.” At this point, we see the first slight hesitation from the senior officer. His junior prompts him: “Sir?” They both proceed with the manual enabling of missiles by flipping a series of switches. But while the younger officer, Phelps, continues flipping switches, the senior officer, Larsen, starts mumbling “This has got to be a mistake” and reaches for his phone. Meanwhile, the other officer has proceeded to enable all ten missiles. No one answers the phone. Larsen shouts at Phelps, “Get me the wing command post.” “That’s not the correct procedure, Captain,” Phelps replies. “Try SAC headquarters,” Larsen responds, sounding increasingly desperate. “That’s not the correct procedure,” comes the response. “Screw the procedure,” Larsen yells. “I want someone on the goddamn phone before I kill twenty million people!”

Finally, Phelps grabs his phone. Again, no one answers. “I got nothing here,” he says. “They might’ve been knocked out already.” “All right,” Larson replies, “on my mark to launch.” And the countdown resumes at T minus twelve. At T minus five, Larson removes his hand from the key that he must turn in order to launch the missiles. “Sir, we have a launch order,” Phelps says. “Put your hand on the key, sir!” The countdown reaches zero. Larson stares at the key, murmuring unintelligibly. Meanwhile, Phelps has taken out his sidearm and is pointing it at Larson’s head. “Sir, we
are at launch. Turn your key,” Phelps commands. Larson continues to murmur, saying “I’m sorry. I’m so sorry.” And once again Phelps says, as he clicks the safety off his weapon, “Turn your key, sir.” The scene ends abruptly.1

This fictional scenario occurs at the beginning of the 1983 film War Games. It was, of course, an elaborate drill, intended to push the men to the very brink and make sure they would follow through with their orders even if they really believed they would be launching the missiles. The clip effectively illustrates human resistance to killing twenty million people with the flip of a switch. The scene also provides the context for the overall premise of the film: the misguided belief that tasking a supercomputer, instead of a human being, with the “decision” to launch missiles would result in a “fool-proof” system. In War Games, a teenage computer hacker thinks he is playing a new computer strategy game called “Global Thermonuclear War,” but instead he has initiated a real “war game” that will result in a nuclear first strike. The opening scene also serves as one way of introducing a discussion about Cold War fears and anxieties—in this case, the heightened fears of nuclear war with the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. While we in the classroom are accustomed to teaching about “what happened” during the Cold War from a variety of perspectives, it remains particularly challenging to help students understand, analyze and interpret the very real emotions, namely fear and anxiety, associated with the Cold War.

After they watch this film clip, the students are given additional context to help them understand the heightened level of fear and anxiety about possible nuclear war with the Soviet Union in President Ronald Reagan’s first term. We discuss events from the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to Reagan’s infamous March 1983 speech condemning the Soviet Union as an “evil empire”2 and his announcement, two weeks later, of the Strategic Defense Initiative, a far-fetched proposal to build a defensive shield that would protect the United States from incoming Soviet missiles.

Two primary sources, the first volume of Reagan’s published diary and his 1990 memoir, An American Life, have also proved very useful for supplementing discussions about these years, particularly 1983.3 For example, in a diary entry from March 7, 1983, Reagan wrote about his preparation for the speech on the Strategic Defense Initiative: “I’m going to take our case to the people only this time we are declassifying some of our reports on the Soviets and can tell the people a few frightening facts.”4 I ask students why Reagan would be so intent on providing “frightening facts” to the American public and what impact those facts might have. Later in March, the president made further preparations for the speech and explained that he did “a lot of re-writing,” much of which “was to change bureaucratic talk into people talk.”5 I want to know how the students interpret this statement. What do they believe Reagan meant by “people talk” versus “bureaucratic talk” and what might this reveal to us about Reagan’s reputation as “the Great Communicator”?

Later that year Reagan also wrote, in his diary and memoirs, about the news that the Soviet Union had shot down a Korean passenger plane. Echoing the words from his speech in March, he declared that “if the Free World needed any more evidence in the summer of 1983 that it was facing an evil empire [my italics], we got it the night of August 31 when a Russian military plane cold-bloodedly shot down a Korean airliner, Flight 007, murdering 269 innocent passengers, including a U.S. congressman and sixty other Americans.”6

If, as some people had speculated, the Soviet pilots simply mistook the airliner for a military plane, what kind of imagination did it take to think of a Soviet military man with his finger close to a nuclear push button making an even more tragic mistake? If mistakes could be made by a fighter pilot, what about a similar miscalculation by the commander of a military launch crew? Yet, if somebody made that kind of mistake—or a madman got possession of a nuclear missile—we were defenseless against it. Once a nuclear missile was launched, no one could recall it, and until we got something like the Strategic Defense Initiative system in operation, the world was helpless against nuclear missiles.7

Reagan then drew further connections between the KAL incident and the film The Day After, which he had seen at a private screening. I show students the “attack segment” (approximately six minutes) from this made-for-television movie, which first aired publicly on November 20, 1983.8 The clip begins with a control room sequence showing military personnel on the phone confirming a “massive attack against the U.S.,” with “over three hundred missiles inbound.” The next scene depicts Kansas City, Missouri. Air raid sirens blast as people run, panicked, through the streets to take shelter. A long-distance shot of Kansas City is followed by a blast of blinding light and the iconic mushroom cloud. Scenes of horror and mayhem flash by quickly for the next three minutes. Another mushroom cloud. People stampeding. Buildings being blown apart. Roaring fires. And snapshots of individuals and groups of people transformed in a split second into eerie images of skeletons and then nothing, to illustrate the instantaneous obliteration of all of those within a certain radius of each blast. The only sounds are of wind, explosions, roaring fire and screams. Even though the production values of the film are dated, students are usually fairly shocked by the graphic depiction of a nuclear holocaust. I explain to them that the film, and especially the sequence they viewed, relied partly on declassified government footage of early nuclear tests.

Reagan watched the film at Camp David on October 10, more than a month before its scheduled air date. In his memoir, he excerpted part of his diary entry from that same night: “It is powerfully done . . . It’s very effective and left me greatly depressed. . . . My own reaction: we have to do all we can to have a deterrent and to see there is never a nuclear war.”9

The KAL flight had drifted off course into Soviet airspace. But the Soviets had been tracking an American spy plane earlier, and while that plane had already returned to its base on one of the Aleutian Islands, there was some understandable confusion about which plane was now in Soviet airspace. After considerable hesitation, the Soviets finally gave the order to “destroy target.”10 American
leaders, Reagan included, reacted with intense anger and had an initial urge to respond strongly, based on the spotty raw intelligence that was available in the immediate aftermath of the incident. However, clearer heads prevailed in the U.S. intelligence agencies, where it was decided that the incident was surely a terrible mistake. Later that same month, the CIA concluded in a report for the White House that the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was “pervasively bleak.” David Hoffman, in his book The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy, describes “a wave of fear about nuclear war” in the fall of 1983 that “gripped both the Soviet Union and the United States.” 61

As we discuss the ubiquitous nature of popular culture, students can begin to see the films of this era as rich primary source material for understanding the contemporary mood of the American public. Yet another example of such material is the 1984 cult favorite Red Dawn, which graphically portrayed a sudden Soviet attack on the United States and the small band of high school students who wage a guerilla war against the invaders. By showing just the two-minute trailer for the movie, I can raise additional themes with students, including the meaning of an attack on the “American heartland,” the appeal of grass-roots action, and guerilla warfare-style resistance to an overt attack; I can then contrast those themes with the theme of preventing an accidental war.

Popular culture in a variety of forms, especially film, has pervaded the lives of most Americans, making it an effective tool for gaining a greater understanding of the emotional content of the Cold War era. Understanding what fears and anxieties people felt and how those feelings were expressed in cultural forms is not only part of the historian’s task, but also part of the work of classroom teaching.

I steal shamelessly from Teaching History with Film and Television—the fantastic pamphlet that John O’Connor, the dean of teaching history through motion pictures, put together for the AHA almost thirty years ago. Even though this pamphlet is quite dense, I actually assign the first half of it to my students at the beginning of the course, because it gives them the tools they will need to approach every film we watch.

Notes:
1. War Games, directed by John Badham (1983; MGM/UA Entertainment Co.).
5. Ibid., 209.
6. Ibid., 273; and Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York, 1990), 582.
8. The Day After, directed by Nicolas Meyer (1983; American Broadcasting Company). The attack segment and the entire movie are both available on YouTube.
11. Ibid., 89.

Teaching with Popular Films

Justin Hart

I will be offering something of an unorthodox commentary here because I come at the issue of teaching with popular films from a perspective that is somewhat different from that of the other participants in the SHAHR roundtable. Several years ago I designed a course, which I have since taught frequently, entitled U.S. Foreign Relations through Film. I teach it in a three-hour format and typically show an hour or so of each film—mostly Hollywood features, but also some fairly high-profile documentaries. Readers should thus be aware that I speak as someone who has the luxury of being able to introduce long clips of historical films and to structure every single discussion in a given semester around the viewing and analysis of motion pictures.

I have taught U.S. Foreign Relations through Film in two different ways. Originally I presented a tour of twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations, starting with a unit on World War I, then moving to a unit on World War II, the Cold War, and Vietnam, before closing with a brief segment on post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy in which I introduced the debate over Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11. Over time, though, I had a harder and harder time getting students to connect with Fahrenheit 9/11. Moreover, I wanted a new challenge. I was and continue to be struck by the sheer quantity of important and revealing films made about post-9/11 foreign policy in the last thirteen years, but picking just one of them to cover in the last day or two of class seemed thoroughly inadequate. I therefore redesigned the class in the fall of 2013 as a survey of post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy through film. On balance I am glad that I did. It has been an interesting experience, albeit one that has not been without its difficulties.

Although I used almost entirely different content for the two versions of the course, I tried to keep the methodology the same as much as possible. My approach encompasses the way that each of our contributors has addressed the theme of this roundtable—“teaching with popular films as primary sources”—but analyzing films as primary sources is only one of the techniques that I use. In teaching this course, I steal shamelessly from Teaching History with Film and Television—the fantastic pamphlet that John O’Connor, the dean of teaching history through motion pictures, put together for the AHA almost thirty years ago. Even though this pamphlet is quite dense, I actually assign the first half of it to my students at the beginning of the course, because it gives them the tools they will need to approach every film we watch.

O’Connor describes four different frameworks for teaching history through the analysis of what he refers to as “moving image documents,” a classification that includes feature films, but also documentaries, television, and even fragmentary footage like the Zaprudder footage of the Kennedy assassination. Those frameworks include analyzing moving image documents as (1) representations of history, (2) evidence of social and cultural history, (3) evidence of historical fact, and (4) evidence for the history of film and television. Of these, the first and second are the
ones we discuss most in my class, although we occasionally get into the issues of moving image documents as depictions of historical fact and as evidence for the history of film. (We do not cover television in my course.)

In discussing O’Connor, I begin by talking about what questions we might ask if we use these categories to analyze a motion picture document. I emphasize that the kind of questions asked determines whether the motion picture document is being treated as a primary source or a secondary source, since many films can function in either capacity depending on how they are analyzed. The first category (film as a representation of history) probably provides the best examples of the way films can function as either primary or secondary sources. This category is basically an exercise in explicating a film’s interpretation of history and the historical events it depicts. For example, *Pride of the Marines*, which was made during World War II, is an interpretation of the soldier’s/veteran’s experience in that war. It is thus a primary source that reflects at least one way that experience was interpreted at the time.

*The Manchurian Candidate*, on the other hand, can function as either a primary source or a secondary source, depending on the questions one asks of it. It can be treated as a secondary source on McCarthyism and the return of Korean War veterans, produced almost a decade after McCarthy’s fall; or it can be viewed as a primary source to help us understand the climate of the Kennedy years, long after McCarthy was discredited. What is important for the students to understand is that, whether viewed as a primary or a secondary source, *The Manchurian Candidate* reflects the very common attitude during the late 1950s and early 1960s that the principal problem with McCarthy was not his warnings about communist subversion, but the fact that the cartoonish lengths to which he took his crusade actually undermined legitimate anti-communism. In other words, it is important to explain to students why this film was not and in fact almost certainly could not have been made a decade earlier.

I actually start my class with *Birth of a Nation*, even though it is not a foreign policy film, to make the same points, functions as both an historical interpretation of Reconstruction—a secondary source from the perspective of fifty years after the end of the Civil War—and a primary source reflecting the social and cultural attitudes of the Progressive Era in which it was made. The same can be said, of course, for works of history, so it is perhaps useful to think of analyzing a motion picture’s interpretation of history as an exercise in historiography.

That brings us to the second category—films that provide evidence for social and cultural history—which is the one most closely connected to the kind of analysis my colleagues in this forum are doing in their classes. The virtue of this category, which includes films that we will typically but not always treat as primary sources, is that the film doesn’t even have to be about foreign policy to reflect foreign policy attitudes. Of the films mentioned here by my colleagues, *Them!* is probably the best example of a film that functions in this capacity, since it offers us a crystal-clear expression of Cold War anxieties without actually addressing particular Cold War issues (save for the atomic test in the movie, which is introduced primarily to jumpstart the science-fiction plot and is not dealt with on its own terms). In my class, I use *Invasion of the Body Snatchers*, which is even further removed from the concerns of the Cold War proper, to serve the same purpose. It is probably worth pointing out here that sci-fi pictures are particularly good vehicles for teaching how films can convey social and cultural history, even when they do not contain any obvious representation of historical events. In my post-9/11 class, I have used both *District 9* and *28 Weeks Later* in this way, to varying effect.

Before moving on, I also want to discuss the films Molly Wood uses from the 1980s, which straddle the divide between addressing historical issues explicitly and doing so obliquely. Each one reflects in its own way generalized Reagan-era anxieties about the coming of World War III, although I would also argue that *Red Dawn* and *The Day After* actually take a position on Reagan’s more confrontational stance toward communism in the early 1980s. (*Red Dawn* endorses it, whereas *The Day After* questions it.) *War Games*, meanwhile, is a broader critique of the entire logic of mutual assured destruction.

Let me conclude by offering a few reflections on what I have learned teaching a film course using this methodology. Readers will probably not be surprised that it is difficult to get students to think historiographically about feature films and even harder to get them to think in those terms about most documentaries. Although students are not opposed to analyzing films, they are most comfortable with engaging issues of historical fact, and they enjoy films that are straightforward—films that appear to be “just the facts”—more than films that make a complicated ideological statement. (For example, of the Vietnam films, they prefer *We Were Soldiers to The Deer Hunter* or *Apocalypse Now*; in the post-9/11 class, their favorite film is usually the HBO series *Generation Kill*.) They also tend to resist course readings that offer a complicated analysis of a film, and it is a struggle to get them to move beyond accuracy when assessing a film’s contribution to the study of history in their writing assignments. In the end, I always feel as if I have at least some success in convincing students to come around to my methodology. However, there is no question that, even at the end of the course, many students still think that the most useful films for understanding history are the ones that adhere most closely to literal presentations of historical events, cast in the terms of widely accepted historical narratives.

Also unsurprising is the fact that students are particularly resistant to analyzing contemporary films about contemporary events as primary sources to hunt for clues about the social and cultural history of our own time. In other words, it is one thing to look back and see how a World War II-era film about World War II, such as *Pride of the Marines*, reflects what we now understand to be a jaundiced view; it is another thing entirely to get them to think historically about events within their own lifetime and accept that fifty years from now, most everyone will look back at *Zero Dark Thirty* or *American Sniper* and see films that are more useful for understanding the time period in which they were made rather than the events they depict.

I have struggled, twice now, to get students to think critically about whether *Zero Dark Thirty* justifies torture. I was surprised to find that I had more success with *American Sniper*, which I taught for the first time in the summer of 2015. Although I expected that I would strike out in trying to get students to view that film as anything other than a slightly embellished version of “the way it really was” rather than a twenty-first-century version of *Sergeant York*, they were willing to engage the politics of the film more than I expected.

*American Sniper* is probably the best example of a film that can be treated as a secondary source for understanding the climate of the Kennedy years, long after McCarthy was discredited. What is important is that we do not cover television in my course.)
than I expected. I suspect that was in part because I had an unusually thoughtful group of students that term, but in addition I had carefully assembled a packet of readings that evaluated *American Sniper* from a variety of different perspectives. There was an article that referred to the film as a “dishonest whitewash” and another that referred to critics of the film as “ninnies.” There were also several articles that reflected impartially on how the film stoked the “culture wars” and how it blurred ideological lines, and there were articles about and from veterans talking about whether *American Sniper* represented the war as they knew it. At the end I included several articles addressing campus controversies at the University of North Carolina and the University of Michigan about screening the film absent a rejoinder or critical forum conveying the Iraqi perspective. The lesson here is that the best way to get students to consider different interpretations of a particular film is to introduce them to a diverse set of readings that make different arguments about the film.

In the end, despite some of my difficulties in getting students to consider films—especially contemporary films—from a historiographical perspective, I have never been sorry for making the effort. I still think the use of films is an effective way to get students to ask the kinds of questions they are generally reluctant to ask of historical works—to think analytically about the ideological content of the material they are consuming. Indeed, I would have to say that I have had much greater success in using films to teach undergraduates methods of critical thinking than I have had trying to get them to think historiographically about the books and articles they read.

*Passport* invites members of SHAFR to submit brief proposals for potential historiographical articles, pedagogical essays, and commentary/opinion pieces for the “Last Word” column. Proposals should be sent to Andrew_Johns@byu.edu.
The Snowden Reader, edited by David P. Fidler, offers an early effort to contextualize the debates about national security, electronic surveillance, and individual privacy prompted by Edward Snowden’s disclosure of thousands of National Security Agency documents beginning in June 2013. The volume brings together scholarly essays based on a September 2013 conference at Indiana University with a wealth of primary source material to analyze the legal, moral, and political issues raised by the Snowden case.

Those of us who like to incorporate contemporary debates and events into historical studies of state power often struggle to assemble relevant material to illuminate the contours of a debate and the deeper issues at stake. This volume addresses that need handily with almost two hundred and fifty pages of thoughtfully selected and edited documents representing a spectrum of opinions and issues. The section entitled “Unconstitutional Abuse of Power or Legitimate and Necessary Security Measures?” for example, includes the leaked document from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that ordered Verizon to submit its daily telephone and data records to the NSA. This is paired with the official government reaction from General Counsel Robert S. Litt, as well as congressional debates regarding proposed legislation to restrict the collection of American telephone metadata en masse. These documents together provide a clear articulation of competing arguments for scholars and students to analyze and debate. Other sections engage the role of U.S. corporations in surveillance, U.S. foreign espionage, and U.S. policy on cyber operations and include excerpts from legal challenges to the NSA surveillance programs, reports from U.S. governmental advisory and oversight bodies, and reactions to U.S. programs and proposed legislation by international governing organizations.

The volume also contains essays from the September 2013 conference that gave rise to the volume. One of the strongest essays is editor David P. Fidler’s measured examination of the damage done to U.S. interests by the Snowden affair. Fidler, however, does not simply dwell on the damaging effects of the act of disclosing previously classified policies and material, but ably calls into question the government actions revealed by the disclosure and judges them to be complicit in this damage. That is, the government’s own actions, not Snowden’s, are the root cause of the damage to U.S. interests. Some of these essays feel a bit preliminary or thin on historical context, no doubt an unavoidable result of their having been written less than six months after news of the affair first broke.

The volume also could have done more to contextualize and analyze Snowden himself as an active figure in the controversy provoked by his disclosures. Although the introduction and many of the essays eschew the “hero-traitor” narrative and focus instead on the larger debates prompted by his disclosures, his agency and intention is implicit throughout the volume, with phrasing like “Snowden introduced,” “as Snowden intended,” and “he made us direct participants” (3–4). The essays take Snowden’s framing of his actions largely for granted and allow him to define his intentions and motivations. As Fidler notes, Snowden has been a “consequential figure in explaining his actions, engaging his detractors, and attracting supporters around the world.” That is all the more reason to bring a discerning analysis to his framing of the issues involved and his own role in them (9). The exception to this tendency is William E. Scheuerman’s essay, which offers a passionate defense for viewing Snowden through the lens of civil disobedience.

The Scheuerman essay and the volume as a whole would have been well served by a complementary essay arguing the opposite opinion. Indeed, the primary documents present government positions, as well as criticisms of Snowden’s decision to disclose the classified materials as he did; but this position is largely missing from the analytical essays. Essays offering a critical defense of government positions would be helpful in laying out contours of debate for use in a classroom setting. Although many who are inclined to read this volume will likely be sympathetic to Snowden’s choices and accept his reasoning, as a teaching instrument this volume would have benefited from the inclusion of one or two essays that engaged with the counterarguments made by defenders of data-gathering programs inside and outside government.

None of these criticisms, however, are meant to suggest that these essays presume to be the final word on the Snowden case and the issues it raises; clearly the authors were engaging with a critical event that is still unfolding. As the foreword by Sumit Ganguly notes, the contributors to this volume are “acutely aware that the story is not finished.” Although it is unlikely this volume will provide any definitive conclusions on the meaning and significance of this case in the long run, it is a useful tool for initiating a scholarly conversation inside and outside the classroom about national security, privacy, and individual agency in the cyberage.


Vanessa Walker
In *Jimmy Carter and the Middle East*, historian Daniel Strieff illustrates the importance of domestic politics and public opinion to President Carter’s diplomatic initiatives in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He argues that domestic politics played a role in the president’s tactics and timing as he pursued Middle East peace. In particular, Strieff explores the major domestic political actors to which Carter and his advisors responded, including the news media, public opinion polls, Congress, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. Throughout the book, Strieff judiciously notes that domestic politics did not lead to the peaceful outcome between both sides. The key factors were each state’s strategic concerns and the larger geopolitical realities of the late 1970s.

The author develops a related argument about how the high-level attention that Carter gave the Arab-Israeli conflict magnified the domestic political consequences of his actions and brought additional scrutiny from the news media, opinion-makers, lobbying groups, and the general public. As a former journalist who worked for NBC News, Strieff brings unique insight to his study’s focus on the effects of domestic politics and public opinion on Carter’s decision-making. For instance, he explains that presidential involvement prompted White House reporters to cover Carter’s work on the Middle East rather than foreign correspondents, who typically covered negotiations carried out at the ministerial level.

Strieff tackles his subject chronologically over eight chapters and devotes much of his coverage to the lead-up to the Camp David Accords. Carter preferred to practice open diplomacy instead of the secret diplomacy of the Nixon-Kissinger years, so he frequently offered public comments on foreign policy issues. However, his ill-considered extemporaneous remarks about Israel’s “defensible borders” and a “Palestinian homeland” agitated Israelis and Arab leaders as well as American supporters of Israel. One journalist characterized Carter’s open diplomacy as an “open mouth policy.” Strieff argues that the president’s campaign for public support of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement in the first months of his presidency only constrained the political possibilities for future negotiations.

One of the most unique episodes Strieff captures in the book is that of “Cronkite diplomacy.” On November 14, 1977, CBS news anchor Walter Cronkite conducted separate interviews with Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Anwar Sadat. He used those sessions to have Begin issue an invitation for Sadat to visit Jerusalem and to give Sadat an opportunity to accept the invitation. For the evening news, CBS edited the interviews to make it appear as if they had occurred one right after the other rather than being conducted hours apart. The impact was dramatic: Cronkite was able to reveal to the public that Sadat might be the first Arab leader to visit Israel. Strieff then capably demonstrates how “Cronkite diplomacy” embarrassed the Carter administration. Critics attributed this diplomatic breakthrough to the work of a news anchor rather than the nation’s president and were quick to lampoon the president’s ineptitude.

In a departure from scholars’ usual focus on Camp David as the centerpiece of Carter’s work in the Middle East, Strieff dedicates only a chapter apiece to the summit itself and the shuttle diplomacy that resulted in the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. In his discussion of Camp David, the author devotes most of his attention to Carter’s effort to control leaks from the negotiations by keeping the press away from the compound.

Strieff demonstrates the strongest link between domestic politics and foreign policy in his discussion of the Palestinian autonomy negotiations specified by the Camp David Accords. Carter backed away from these talks as he prepared for his 1980 re-election battle. He relinquished the personal involvement that characterized much of his work on the Middle East and delegated the negotiations to a special envoy: former Democratic National Committee Chairman Robert Strauss, an American Jew from Texas. Strieff notes that the selection was more about cultivating domestic political support for the president than anything else; Strauss knew little about issues in the Middle East and was severely lacking in tact. Clearly Carter hoped to rebuild support for his campaign, especially among American Jews, by creating distance between himself and the controversial discussions surrounding the Palestinians. When Strauss returned to the United States to chair Carter’s re-election campaign, the president appointed the more experienced negotiator Sol Linowitz as his successor. However, even as the president personally disengaged from the autonomy negotiations to concentrate on his re-election and on freeing the hostages, Strauss’s missteps, UN Ambassador Andrew Young’s controversial meeting with a Palestine Liberation Organization representative, and the media’s obsessive focus on the Iranian hostage crisis hampered Linowitz’s work.

*Jimmy Carter and the Middle East* is a valuable contribution to the literature on the Carter administration. It makes a consistent case about how political considerations can shape the possibilities of foreign policy and how high-level congressional fight over an arms package to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia is another example of Strieff highlighting a less well-known episode in Carter’s Middle East foreign policy. According to the author, Carter spent a lot of time securing the passage of this arms package to demonstrate his “toughness” to Capitol Hill lawmakers, the American public, pro-Israel lobbyists, and the governments of Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. In the process, he expended more political capital than the issue merited to prove a political point. Moreover, his short-term victory on the arms package helped further mobilize pro-Israel forces in the United States against attempts to put pressure on their ally, a development that hindered Carter’s long-term goals in the region.

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*Jimmy Carter and the Middle East* is a valuable contribution to the literature on the Carter administration. It makes a consistent case about how political considerations can shape the possibilities of foreign policy and how high-level
presidential involvement elevates the domestic political stakes of foreign policy. It is well researched, combining work in newspapers, congressional hearings, memoirs, interviews, and manuscript collections in the United States, Great Britain, Israel, and Lebanon. Strieff also does a good job of qualifying his arguments to avoid overstating his case. However, his most significant insights stem from his discussion of the Carter administration’s relationship with the news media and its effect on the peace process. That analysis is a testament to his ability to incorporate lessons learned from his background in journalism into his historical research.

Review of Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary during the Cold War (Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2015)

Michael V. Paulauskas

A
after a distinguished career as a diplomat, Raymond L. Garthoff published two critical studies of Soviet-American relations during the 1970s and 1980s: Détente and Confrontation (1985, revised and expanded in 1994) and The Great Transition (1994). These massive books, which continue to serve as important starting points for studying diplomacy in the late Cold War, emphasized that mutual distrust among top leaders and an inability to understand each other’s motives and actions exacerbated the conflict between the United States and the USSR. In the far slimmer Soviet Leaders and Intelligence, Garthoff returns to this theme, arguing that an important cause of this lack of understanding can be found in the failure of Soviet intelligence agencies to provide an accurate assessment of American behavior.

Garthoff’s thesis is built around three main points. First, he argues that the ideological prism through which Soviet agents produced and interpreted intelligence emphasized that the United States was the “main adversary” of global communism; and he contends that this assumption distorted American actions in Soviet intelligence reports, creating substantial room for misunderstanding. As he puts it, “The adversarial image trumped reality” (97). Second, he maintains that “intelligence fared poorly in competition with other influences and sources of information,” particularly the impressions developed by top Soviet leaders in their visits to the United States and their interactions with top American officials (ix). Third, he questions the competency of the Soviet foreign intelligence apparatus. Even when greater resources and manpower were dedicated to intelligence in the mid-1970s, Soviet field agents still could not produce reliable information on the attitudes and plans of top American leaders. At times, he notes, Soviet agents in the United States even cited the Communist Party USA as “authoritative commentators on the American scene” (41). Moreover, there were insufficient analysts in Soviet intelligence agencies, meaning that while operatives on the ground could collect substantial amounts of data, competent voices were not put into place to interpret it. For these reasons, Soviet leaders distrusted intelligence reports, sometimes with good cause, since intelligence officials occasionally altered or omitted information in order to manipulate the Soviet leadership.

Soviet Leaders and Intelligence is organized chronologically. It begins with an essay on the ideological conflict behind the origins of the Cold War that is designed to buttress Garthoff’s claim that ideology clouded the ability of Soviet intelligence agents to comprehend American actions. Focusing on Joseph Stalin, Garthoff discusses the development of the foreign intelligence apparatus after World War II but emphasizes that the Soviet dictator ignored reports that did not conform to his established views on the United States. Next, Garthoff explains Nikita Khrushchev’s initiative for “peaceful coexistence” as an “ideologically sanctioned recognition of realism in the nuclear age” (20). The advent of large atomic arsenals and the sobering effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis persuaded Khrushchev to back away from bellicose ideological warfare and embrace an initiative to lessen tensions. Like Stalin, however, Khrushchev relied less on intelligence reports to shape his views than on personal experiences, such as his visit to the United States in 1959.

The strongest sections of the book deal with the final three decades of Soviet history, where Garthoff revisits familiar ground. He suggests that despite dedicating additional resources to intelligence in order to better understand and influence American policymakers during détente, Brezhnev and the rest of the Soviet leadership continued to rely on the personal impressions of their American counterparts that they developed at summit meetings to assess American aims and actions. In exploring the collapse of détente, Garthoff demonstrates that the enduring image of the “main adversary” in the minds of Soviet and American officials prevented a true rapprochement. He effectively utilizes the 1983 “war scare” to outline the ways in which intelligence initiatives such as VRYaN in the USSR and Team B in the United States increased tensions. Garthoff assigns Gorbachev the central role in ending the Cold War, as a central component of his “new thinking” was eliminating the specter of the “main adversary” from Soviet ideology. Soviet intelligence officers largely resisted this initiative, however. As Garthoff puts it, “The KGB could not basically reform” (84). Lastly, Garthoff argues in the conclusion that recent Russian-American tensions do not constitute a resuscitated Cold War, as there is no longer a clear ideological conflict between the two countries.

As with other books on Cold War intelligence, Garthoff’s is restricted to what can be gleaned from the limited sources available to scholars. Since a significant amount of his evidence is drawn from memoirs composed by former intelligence officers after the end of the Cold War, his book could have benefited from a more direct discussion of the problematic nature of these types of sources. Furthermore, while Garthoff indicates in the conclusion that both sides dealt with the distortions in intelligence that came with the “perceived need for an adversary” (97), he does not perform the corresponding analysis for American intelligence. Given his emphasis on the failures of both superpowers to build trust, a more exhaustive comparative approach might have been fruitful.

Finally, there are places in the book where additional evidence is required to support contentious claims. For instance, in discussing the collapse of détente, Garthoff asserts that the KGB was “generally skeptical” of Soviet support for national liberation movements in the Third World and that its views on these issues “were neither sought [by Soviet leaders] nor, when cautiously advanced, given attention” (57). Active KGB involvement in Third World conflicts has received substantial attention in recent years from historians such as Odd Arne Westad, Jeremy Friedman, and Christopher Andrew, yet the footnote associated with this controversial argument cites only Détente and Confrontation as a source for general information on Soviet military interventions in the Third World.

Despite these criticisms, Soviet Leaders and Intelligence represents a useful addendum to Garthoff’s previous work on how misunderstandings and distrust prevented the superpowers from accurately assessing their adversaries’ attitudes and actions. The book’s clear prose, brevity, and appendices listing Soviet leaders, heads of intelligence agencies, and Soviet-American summits make it suitable for undergraduate audiences. Historians who have utilized Garthoff’s other books in their research will find that it is a helpful companion piece.
Schuessler’s conclusions. There certainly was room for commitment of U.S. combat forces, would have affected in which there was no prolonged debate prior to the War. One can only wonder how including Korea, a war major conflicts of that time period—the Spanish-American of domestic opposition” at the time of the decision to fight. He then decided to analyze wars that had “different levels conflicts involving the United States since it achieved Vietnam War, and the Iraq War. Why he chose these three studies. He examines the U.S. entry into World War II, the war will produce discontent mainly because of its results. More common, he maintains, is spinning—the use of exaggerated rhetoric—or concealment. He focuses on two forms of deception—blameshifting, or transferring responsibility for the beginning of hostilities to an adversary; and overselling, or consciously inflating threats to persuade the public that war is necessary. Schuessler finds that there is more blameshifting when the domestic opposition to a war is powerful. Overselling occurs when there are widespread public doubts that a threat is sufficiently dangerous to justify war. Of course, any form of deception, from blatant lies to concealing vital information, carries political risks. Schuessler maintains, though, that the public judges presidents more sternly on the results of their policies than on the means they use to justify them. Victory will usually insulate a president from most criticisms about maneuvering the nation into war. A failed war will produce discontent mainly because of its results.

Schuessler derives these conclusions from three case studies. He examines the U.S. entry into World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War. Why he chose these three conflicts—and only these three—is by no means clear. He explains that he selected them from all the international conflicts involving the United States since it achieved great-power status at the end of the nineteenth century. He then decided to analyze wars that had “different levels of domestic opposition” at the time of the decision to fight. That criterion by no means precluded any of the other major conflicts of that time period—the Spanish-American War, World War I, the Korean War, and the Persian Gulf War. One can only wonder how including Korea, a war in which there was no prolonged debate prior to the commitment of U.S. combat forces, would have affected Schuessler’s conclusions. There certainly was room for additional case studies, as the entire volume contains only 126 pages of narrative.

In the first case study, Schuessler tells the familiar story of President Franklin D. Roosevelt maneuvering around anti-interventionists in Congress and advocacy groups such as the America First Committee to increase U.S. aid to Great Britain and deepen U.S. involvement in an undeclared naval war against Nazi Germany in 1941, all the while proclaiming that he was taking steps to insulate the United States from hostilities. Like many historians, Schuessler emphasizes FDR’s deceptive rhetoric, which aimed at obscuring “the belligerent drift of U.S. policy” (39). However, he also makes more serious allegations, insisting that the president schemed to get the United States into the war through the “back door” in the Pacific. He recognizes that by dredging up another version of a discredited conspiracy theory, he is challenging the conclusions of practically every major historian who has studied the U.S. entry into World War II in recent years. Yet he still maintains that “a nuanced reading of the evidence” shows “if there was a strategy underpinning Roosevelt’s actions in the latter half of 1941, it was almost certainly” to provoke a showdown with Japan that would lead to a declaration of war (56). Schuessler concludes that FDR got what he wanted—“overwhelming” public support for U.S. entry into the war—but at the cost of a Pacific war that complicated the administration’s Europe-first strategy (57).

The second case study provides a brisk and engaging overview of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s use of stealth and indirection to avoid criticism of the decision to commit U.S. forces to combat in Vietnam. The author points out the familiar landmarks on the road to war in 1964–65, including the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, the attack on the U.S. military installation at Pleiku, and LBJ’s notorious news conference of 28 July 1965, in which he asserted that he had made “no change in policy whatsoever” even while he was announcing troop increases that Americanized the war (78). Schuessler argues that LBJ faced “a milder version” of the domestic political difficulties that confronted FDR a quarter century earlier. “He understood,” the author explains, “that whatever domestic support he enjoyed was brittle and could quickly evaporate in the event that the costs and risks of war were highlighted” (60). As a result, Johnson sought to shift the responsibility for escalation to the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front, while trying to prevent an open debate in Congress about his Vietnam policies.

Schuessler gives only passing attention to how the president’s determination to secure congressional enactment of ambitious and expensive Great Society legislation contributed to his deceptive Vietnam rhetoric. He does note, however, that LBJ worried about Congress. If forced to choose, a majority would probably favor guns over butter. Schuessler also says little about how Johnson’s fears that escalation would lead to deadlock or even defeat affected his tortuous path to war. “There ain’t no daylight in Vietnam,” LBJ famously remarked as he sent the first U.S. combat troops off to war in March 1965.11 Still, Schuessler reaches the persuasive if familiar conclusion that Johnson never overcame the burden of his Vietnam credibility gap.

In the last case study, Schuessler analyzes how President George W. Bush engaged in “blatant overselling” to muster sufficient congressional and public support for war against Iraq (93). For Schuessler, a critical question is why the “marketplace of ideas”—the vigorous debate that should flourish in mature democracies during decisions for war—did so little to challenge Bush’s use of intelligence of dubious value to connect Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda and to inflate the dangers of the Iraqi nuclear program.
to inflate the dangers of the Iraqi nuclear program (6). The answer, according to the author, is that leading Democrats, like most of the civilian officials in the Bush administration, expected a quick military victory. Had they anticipated a protracted and costly struggle, they would have been more likely to challenge the president. Like the presidents in the other two case studies, Bush achieved short-term success but eventually paid a political price. It is curious, though, that in assessing the legacies of deceit, Schuessler fails to mention Bush’s reelection in 2004 and points only to Republican losses in the elections of 2006 and 2008.

A reader can hardly miss Schuessler’s main points. He explains the arguments he will make, elaborates upon them, and then summarizes them, sometimes with annoying repetition. For example, one sentence—“Johnson felt he had no choice but to expand the U.S. presence in Vietnam to contain communism”—appears in the introduction (5), the chapter on Vietnam (60), and the conclusion (119).

The language may be repetitious and the case studies may cover familiar ground, but Schuessler uses the latter to make unexpected, provocative, and controversial judgments. He finds that American democracy was no deterrent to deception but instead encouraged presidents to manipulate domestic audiences. The marketplace of ideas was sufficiently powerful to require leaders to make a persuasive case for war, he writes, but it “rarely lives up to its full potential as a deterrent to deception” (123). Critics might decry the corrosive effects of deception in public policy debates because such mendacity has the potential to diminish popular trust in government and eventually generates blowback. Yet Schuessler believes that deception, per se, is not necessarily bad, since public or congressional opinion may stand in the way of international policies, including war, that protect vital interests. “The safest conclusion,” he contends, “is that the effects of deception on foreign policy are conditional; they depend on whether war is justified in a particular case” (124). In short, Schuessler seems to be advancing a version of the age-old argument that the ends justify the means. For anybody who has been paying even casual attention to the current political campaign, that conclusion may be more than a little unsettling.

Note:
SHAFR Council Meeting Minutes
Friday, January 7, 2016 – 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.
Hilton Atlanta, Room 205; Atlanta, GA


Others Present: Nick Cullather, Kyle Longley, Amy Sayward, Jennie Epp, Patricia Thomas, Cassie Thompson

Business Items

1) Announcements

Engerman called the meeting to order at 8:05 and especially welcomed those new to the Council: Amanda Demmer, Amy Greenberg, Mary Dudziak (as Vice President), Amy Sayward (as Executive Director), and Jennie Epp (as Assistant Director).

Engerman then proposed a resolution of thanks to retiring Council members, Kristin Hoganson, Michael Sherry, Rebecca Herman, and Tom Zeiler for their service and dedication to SHAFR. The motion was submitted by Brigham, seconded by McPherson, and passed unanimously.

2) Recap of motions passed by e-mail since June meeting

Sayward read into the minutes a summary of the five motions passed by e-mail since the June 2015 meeting:

- approval of the June 2015 SHAFR minutes;
- the July 2015 appointment of Julie Laut as Conference Consultant;
- the July 2015 appointment of Amy Sayward as Executive Director;
- the September 2015 motion to thank Peter Hahn for his service; and
- the October 2015 motion to approve and list SHAFR as an individual signatory to the statement on human research promulgated by the Oral History Association.

All motions passed unanimously by the Council.

3) Summary of Financial Reports

Sayward provided an oral summary of a written report, circulated before the meeting, on the 2015 fiscal year. She pointed out that future financial reports on the endowment will include greater detail differentiating between stock market trends and withdrawals in any given year. She explained that there were extraordinary expenses during the fiscal year caused by the recent executive director transition that will not recur. Borstelmann moved to accept the report, Brigham seconded, and the motion passed unanimously.

Additionally, on the advice of Peter Hahn, Von Eschen proposed a motion for a financial review of SHAFR’s records, which was seconded by Borstelmann and passed unanimously.

4) SHAFR’s newsletter

Sayward presented a proposal to digitize back issues of SHAFR’s newsletter before Passport became part of the SHAFR website. As part of the digital repository at Middle Tennessee State University, the newsletter could be made available online, included in the SHAFR website, and made searchable. Brigham made a motion to budget $1,200-$1,500 for this process, Greenberg seconded it, and it passed unanimously.

Additionally, Greenberg moved that Council thank Mitch Lerner for his service as consulting editor of Passport; the motion was seconded by Brigham and passed unanimously.

5) Social Media Presence for SHAFR

After discussion about SHAFR’s social media presence, Goedde moved to charge Dudziak with a review of the organization’s presence; Von Eschen seconded the motion, and it was approved unanimously.

6) History of Latin America and the World as Part of SHAFR

Longley and McPherson offered a summary of work-to-date on creating a “Latin America and the World” group as part of SHAFR to better integrate Latin American history, scholars, and scholarship within SHAFR by improving communi-
cation, fostering community, and pursuing initiatives that would draw these scholars more fully into SHAFR. Longley suggested a SHAFR breakfast might be a good first step toward these goals. Council members thanked Longley for his efforts thus far and endorsed the efforts of this group to promote the study of Latin America and the World through SHAFR channels – for instance, the website, Passport, and the conference program.

7) Reports on Diplomatic History

Cullather presented an oral report that highlighted the staff’s continuing work on the quality of articles (which includes an online repository of archival citation formats) and the new “Colloquy” feature.

Thomas and Thompson from Oxford University Press summarized how Diplomatic History has done for the fiscal year. Production is going well and previous type-setting and proofreading problems have been reduced dramatically. Individual subscriptions from libraries have declined, but subscriptions through library consortia are on the rise. Council members requested information from Oxford about the financial impact of this trend. Thomas also reported that online traffic and downloads are up about 20%.

8) SHAFR Guide

McPherson briefly discussed the contract negotiations with Brill, which went well. Anticipated online publication date is 2017, and updates will be staggered every six months to generate new content. Council thanked him for his continuing efforts on the Guide.

9) Summer Institutes 2016 and 2017

Council reviewed the final report from the 2015 Summer Institute. It examined an initial report on the organization of the upcoming 2016 Institute and reiterated its commitment to summer institutes that reflect the diversity of SHAFR as a whole.

10) Upcoming SHAFR Annual Meetings

Preparations for upcoming SHAFR meeting in June 2016 in San Diego are in progress and moving smoothly, with excellent turnout expected based on submissions to the Program Committee. Thanks to a long-term contract with the Arlington Renaissance, the venue and hotel rooms have been secured at a good rate for the 2017 and 2019 meetings.

11) Development Committee Update

Engerman summarized the report, which shows an impressive success through the Leaders’ Fund initiative. Discussion about future directions will be pursued at the June meeting.

12) Adjournment

Brigham made a motion for adjournment, Borstelmann seconded, the motion passed unanimously, and the SHAFR January Council concluded at 11:35 a.m.

Respectfully submitted 18 January 2016
Amy L. Sayward, Executive Director
ALS/jee
Professional Notes

Jessica Gienow-Hecht is Chair of the Department of History at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin.

Geoffrey Smith, Professor Emeritus, Queen’s University, received the Lifetime Achievement Award from the Peace History Society (photo, right). The award is given every two years to a member who has “contributed outstanding scholarship and exemplary service to peace history.”

Recent Books of Interest


Bozo, Frederic, Andreas Rodder, and Mary Elise Sarotte, eds. German Unification: An International History (Routledge, 2016).

Burton, Antoinette, and Dane Kennedy, eds. How Empire Shaped Us (Bloomsbury, 2016).


Harrison, Robert T. *Britain in the Middle East: 1619-1971* (Bloomsbury, 2016).


Müller, Miriam. *A Spectre is Haunting Arabia: How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen* (Columbia, 2016).


