In this issue

Surf’s Up: A Roundtable on Empire of Waves
The Dominican Intervention, 50 Years On
SHAFR Book Reviews

And more...
Editor
Andrew L. Johns, Brigham Young University

Consulting Editor
Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University

Production Editor
Julie Rojewski, Michigan State University

Assistant Editor
David Hadley, The Ohio State University

Editorial Advisory Board
Seth Jacobs, Boston College (2013-2015)
Brian C. Etheridge, Georgia Gwinnett College (2014-2016)
Sandra Scanlon, University College Dublin (2015-2017)

Emeritus Editors
Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University (2003-2012)
Nolan Fowler, Tennessee Technological University (1973-1980)
Gerald E. Wheeler, San Jose State College (1969-1973)

Cover Image:

Passport Editorial Office:
Mitchell Lerner
Mershon Center for International Security Studies, 1501 Neil Avenue, Columbus, OH 43201
passport@shafr.org
614-292-1681 (phone)
614-292-2407 (fax)

Passport is published three times per year (April, September, January), by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and is distributed to all members of the Society. Submissions should be sent to the attention of the editor, and are acceptable in all formats, although electronic copy by email to passport@shafr.org is preferred. Submissions should follow the guidelines articulated in the Chicago Manual of Style. Manuscripts accepted for publication will be edited to conform to Passport style, space limitations, and other requirements. The author is responsible for accuracy and for obtaining all permissions necessary for publication. Manuscripts will not be returned. Interested advertisers can find relevant information on the web at: http://www.shafr.org/publications/review/rates, or can contact the editor. The opinions expressed in Passport do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SHAFR, of Brigham Young University, or of The Ohio State University.

The editors of Passport wish to acknowledge the generous financial and institutional support of Brigham Young University, the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, The Ohio State University, and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

© 2015 SHAFR
In This Issue

4 Contributors

5 From the Editor: Book Reviews in SHAFR Publications
   Andrew L. Johns

6 A Roundtable on Scott Laderman, Empire in Waves: A Political History of Surfing
   Barbara J. Keys, Richard Ian Kimball, Dennis Merrill,
   Christine Skwiot, Scott Laderman

14 Public Intellectuals, We Need You!: Four Lessons from Max Ascoli
   for Intellectuals and U.S. Foreign Relations
   Kimber Quinney

22 Eternal Flaming: The Historiography of Kennedy Foreign Policy
   Marc J. Selverstone

31 The Dominican Intervention, 50 Years On
   Alan McPherson

35 Scholars as Teachers: Thoughts on Scholarship in the Classroom
   Molly M. Wood

38 ‘She Did a Lot for Us’: Jean Wilkowski in Zambia
   Andy DeRoche

44 Book Reviews

   Andrew J. Kirkendall on Alan McPherson, The Invaded:
   How Latin Americans and their Allies Fought and Ended
   U.S. Occupations (2014)

   Timothy Naftali on Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and
   the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (2014)

48 Minutes of the January 2015 SHAFR Council Meeting

52 The Diplomatic Pouch

54 Dispatches

55 In Memoriam: Mark Gilderhus
   Kyle Longley

58 In Memoriam: Charles Chatfield
   Molly M. Wood

59 The Last Word: Things I Think
   Andrew L. Johns
Andy DeRoche teaches U.S. foreign relations at Front Range Community College and is a Lecturer in International Affairs at the University of Colorado. He is the author of Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953 to 1998 (2001) and Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador (2003). He is currently working on a book manuscript on U.S.-Zambian relations.

Andrew L. Johns is Associate Professor of History at Brigham Young University and the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies. He is the author of Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War (2010), and the editor of A Companion to Ronald Reagan (2015); Diplomatic Games: Sport, Statecraft, and International Relations since 1945 (2014, with Heather L. Dichter); and The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War (2006, with Kathryn Staller). He is also the editor of Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review.

Barbara J. Keys is Associate Professor of U.S. and International History at the University of Melbourne. She is the author of Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s (2014) and Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (2006). Her current research is on emotions in international history, moral claims-making around international sport, and the role of anti-torture campaigns in global human rights movements since 1945.

Richard Ian Kimball is Associate Professor of History at Brigham Young University. He is the author of Sports in Zion: Mormon Recreation, 1890-1940 (2003) and articles in the Journal of Sport History, Utah Historical Quarterly, and Mid-America. He is currently working on a book that examines the deaths of American athletes and how society “uses” those deaths.

Andrew J. Kirkendall is Professor of History at Texas A&M University. The author of Paulo Freire and the Cold War Politics of Literacy (2010), he is currently at work on a book on the Kennedy brothers and Cold War Latin America.

Scott Laderman is Associate Professor of History at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, where he teaches classes on U.S. foreign relations, the Vietnam War, and American popular culture. He is the author of Empire in Waves: A Political History of Surfing (2014) and Tours of Vietnam: War, Travel Guides, and Memory (2009), as well as the co-editor (with Ed Martini) of Four Decades on: Vietnam, the United States, and the Legacies of the Second Indochina War (2013).

Kyle Longley is Snell Family Dean's Distinguished Professor in the School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies and the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University. He is the author or editor of numerous books and articles, including The Morenci Marines: A Tale of Small Town America and the Vietnam War (2013), which received the New Mexico-Arizona Book Award in History.


Dennis Merrill is a University of Missouri Curator's Professor of History at the University of Missouri- Kansas City and a longtime SHAFR member. His most recent book is Negotiating Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Twentieth Century Latin America (2009). He is also the co-editor, with Thomas G. Paterson, of the widely-adopted two-volume reader, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations (7th ed., 2010). He is currently working on a history of nineteenth century U.S. maritime merchants, tentatively titled, Maritime Merchants and America's Rise in the Globl Place, 1815-1915.

Timothy Naftali is Director of the Talmir Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives at New York University, as well as a Clinical Associate Professor of History and Public Policy at NYU. He is the author of books on international and U.S. foreign policy history, most notably Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (2005); and, with Aleksandr Fursenko, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (1997) and Khrushchev's Cold War (2006). Naftali was the first director of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum (2007-2011), is currently completing a history of the JFK presidency, and has begun, with James Kirchick, a study of gay Washington, D.C.

Kimber Quinney is a full-time Lecturer in the Department of History at California State University, San Marcos, where she also serves as Faculty Liaison for Community Engaged Scholarship in the division of Community Engagement. She holds an M.A. in International Relations from the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.; and a Ph.D. in History from U.C., Santa Barbara. Her research has focused on U.S. foreign policy toward modern Italy, with particular emphasis on American attitudes toward Italy's shifting ideological tides. Her current projects explore the impact of ethnic identity on American foreign relations, and especially the role of prominent Italian Americans in shaping early Cold War policy toward Italy.

Marc J. Selverstone is Associate Professor and Chair of the Presidential Recordings Program at the University of Virginia's Miller Center. He is the editor of A Companion to John F. Kennedy (2014) and the author of Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945-1950 (2009), which won the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize from SHAFR in 2010. He is currently writing a book on planning undertaken during the Kennedy administration for a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

Christine Skwiot is Associate Professor of Humanities and History at Maine Maritime Academy. She is the author of The Purpose of Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Cuba and Hawai‘i (2010).

Molly M. Wood is Professor of History at Wittenberg University. She is currently serving a second term on the SHAFR Teaching Committee.
From the Editor: 
Book Reviews in SHAFR Publications

Andrew L. Johns

As anyone knows who has set foot in the AHA book exhibit, or has received scores of publishing catalogs in the mail, or has undertaken a research project, historians publish a lot of books. We are a book discipline, we are striving to achieve tenure and promotion, and there are an infinite number of compelling and important stories to tell. Unfortunately, however, with the avalanche of high quality books by SHAFR members and of interest to the organization’s membership appearing seemingly every week, only a handful can be reviewed in *Diplomatic History*. There are simply not enough pages in each issue. That is why the editors of *Diplomatic History*, Nick Cullather and Anne Foster, and I are very pleased to announce a change in the way that SHAFR’s publications will now review books.

Beginning with the April 2015 issue, *Passport* will publish approximately three to six stand-alone book reviews in each issue. These reviews will be in addition to the roundtable reviews that we have featured for a number of years and will not compromise or reduce our commitment to any of our other content. *Diplomatic History* will continue, as has historically been its practice, to review a select number of books in each issue as well. The result will be that we will be able to increase dramatically SHAFR’s ability to review books of interest to our colleagues in its two major publications.

We hope that you are as excited about this change as we are.

---

**SHAFR’s Nominating Committee is soliciting nominations for elected positions.**

The 2015 elections will fill the following positions:

- Vice Presidency (1 vacancy)
- Council members (2 vacancies)
- Graduate Student Representative to Council (1 vacancy)
- Nominating Committee (1 vacancy)

Please submit nominations to any member of the Nominating Committee by email no later than **July 10, 2015**. Nominations must include the nominee’s name, email address, institution (if applicable), and a statement of the nominee’s qualifications. We encourage self-nominations. It is helpful to indicate whether you have contacted the nominee about his or her willingness to serve.

Nominating Committee members:

**Kelly J. Shannon** (chair)
Florida Atlantic University
Email: kelly.j.shannon@gmail.com

**Barbara J. Keys**
University of Melbourne
Email: bkeys@unimelb.edu.au

**Andrew L. Johns**
Brigham Young University
Email: andrew_johns@byu.edu
A Roundtable on Scott Laderman, 
Empire in Waves: A Political History of Surfing

Barbara J. Keys, Richard Ian Kimball, Dennis Merrill, Christine Skwiot, Scott Laderman

Sport and American Empire

Barbara J. Keys

It’s a rare historian who finds a way to put a photograph of himself on the cover of his book, but Scott Laderman is there on the cover of Empire in Waves: suited up from head to toe, surfboard in hand, ready to brave the frigid waters of Lake Superior. Laderman has parlayed his love of surfing and his impressive historical skills into what he calls an “international political history” of the sport. Just before this book was published, a trio of prominent sport historians published a comprehensive treatment of the international reach of American sports.1 No doubt these authors now regret that they made no mention of surfing, for Laderman ably shows that it deserves consideration as one of the sporting vehicles through which the United States has exerted power and spread influence.

In some ways surfing flips the standard storyline of sport and empire on its head. Imperialists, as we well know, tried to “civilize” the natives they ruled over, a process that extended to games and recreation, and Laderman’s book describes the nineteenth-century missionaries who “uplifted” Hawaiians by lifting them off their surfboards. But it was not typically the case that the colonizers then adopted those pastimes, as white men did with surfing in the early twentieth century. Unusual, too, is the fact that as Americans sought to make surfing global, some of the most iconic “cultural imperialists” were “natives”: Hawaiians George Freeth and Duke Kahanamoku.

Though more marginal and less influential than baseball or basketball, surfing, too, helps us understand the ways sport intersects with political and cultural power. Surfing hewed to the mythology of apolitical sport, and because it lacked the hypernationalism and the global media attraction of a sport like soccer, its claims to inhabit a separate sphere had a degree of credibility. A kind of earthly spiritualism, a desire to commune with nature, was central to ethos of the modern surfing. Before it morphed into a competitive, commercialized sport, surfing was about transcendence. As one aficionado put it, it was “about escape from the bullshit of the world.”2 But that does not mean that surfers, as they travelled the globe searching for the best waves, were not implicated in the politics they so assiduously disavowed.

Laderman’s two case studies of surfing’s international political entanglements cover Indonesia and South Africa. As his book amply demonstrates, surfers who fell in love with Bali’s breaks knew little and cared less about the country’s occupation of East Timor, but their indifference to the dictator’s repression was not neutral. Their promotion of tourism and surf competitions, their romanticization of Indonesian poverty, and their occasional outright defense of the regime amounted to a form of complicity. Like the International Olympic Committee, which defined its own actions as apolitical and tarred its critics with desecrating the purity of sport, surfers could conceive of their footprint in the world as outside of politics only by redefining the political.

The same was true for most surfers whose infatuation with South Africa’s “perfect waves” overshadowed any discomfort with that country’s brutal racial oppression. The Australian star Midget Farrelly said apartheid was “not worth talking about,” and the Australian editor of Surfing World found the country “very good for [his] soul” (105). The International Olympic Committee, much as it would have preferred to avoid the issue, barred South Africa in the 1960s, and other sport governing bodies began to fall in line in the 1970s. That surfing stayed out of the fray longer no doubt has to do with its more limited membership. Other sports—the Olympic Games, soccer, cricket, rugby—had global, if not always universal, aspirations and hence were buffeted by decolonization in ways that made ignoring racism all but impossible. Eventually even surfing had to take a stance, as Laderman outlines in a chapter aptly titled “When Surfing Discovered It Was Political.” By the late 1980s, most of the world’s top surfers were refusing to compete in South Africa.

The three reviews in this forum are, like the book they assess, perceptive, thoughtful, and elegantly written. The reviewers offer generally glowing assessments of the ways Empire in Waves contributes to a range of debates: the role of nonstate actors in international relations; the intersections among sport, tourism, and politics; popular culture and forms of imperialism; and, not least, the history of surfing. Christine Skwiot calls the book “impressively researched and accessibly written” and “an important contribution to U.S. diplomatic and transnational history to both expand and deepen our understanding of empire and international power.” Richard Ian Kimball praises the book’s insights into global history.

Kimball offers some skepticism about the links the book aims to chart. Its two subjects—surfing and international politics—rarely intersect, he writes. International politics provide “the setting for the surfing,” rather than a point of engagement. After all, surfers did not protest the brutalities of the Suharto regime, and the South African boycotts, when individuals took them up, came very late. To Kimball’s charge that the book should have condemned surfers’ wilful blindness, the author capably responds that his aim was to explain, not to judge.

The reviewers offer generally glowing assessments of the ways Empire in Waves contributes to a range of debates: the role of nonstate actors in international relations; the intersections among sport, tourism, and politics; popular culture and forms of imperialism; and, not least, the history of surfing. Christine Skwiot calls the book “impressively researched and accessibly written” and “an important contribution to U.S. diplomatic and transnational history to both expand and deepen our understanding of empire and international power.” Richard Ian Kimball praises the book’s insights into global history.

Kimball offers some skepticism about the links the book aims to chart. Its two subjects—surfing and international politics—rarely intersect, he writes. International politics provide “the setting for the surfing,” rather than a point of engagement. After all, surfers did not protest the brutalities of the Suharto regime, and the South African boycotts, when individuals took them up, came very late. To Kimball’s charge that the book should have condemned surfers’ wilful blindness, the author capably responds that his aim was to explain, not to judge.

The reviewers offer generally glowing assessments of the ways Empire in Waves contributes to a range of debates: the role of nonstate actors in international relations; the intersections among sport, tourism, and politics; popular culture and forms of imperialism; and, not least, the history of surfing. Christine Skwiot calls the book “impressively researched and accessibly written” and “an important contribution to U.S. diplomatic and transnational history to both expand and deepen our understanding of empire and international power.” Richard Ian Kimball praises the book’s insights into global history.

Kimball offers some skepticism about the links the book aims to chart. Its two subjects—surfing and international politics—rarely intersect, he writes. International politics provide “the setting for the surfing,” rather than a point of engagement. After all, surfers did not protest the brutalities of the Suharto regime, and the South African boycotts, when individuals took them up, came very late. To Kimball’s charge that the book should have condemned surfers’ wilful blindness, the author capably responds that his aim was to explain, not to judge.

The reviewers offer generally glowing assessments of the ways Empire in Waves contributes to a range of debates: the role of nonstate actors in international relations; the intersections among sport, tourism, and politics; popular culture and forms of imperialism; and, not least, the history of surfing. Christine Skwiot calls the book “impressively researched and accessibly written” and “an important contribution to U.S. diplomatic and transnational history to both expand and deepen our understanding of empire and international power.” Richard Ian Kimball praises the book’s insights into global history.

Kimball offers some skepticism about the links the book aims to chart. Its two subjects—surfing and international politics—rarely intersect, he writes. International politics provide “the setting for the surfing,” rather than a point of engagement. After all, surfers did not protest the brutalities of the Suharto regime, and the South African boycotts, when individuals took them up, came very late. To Kimball’s charge that the book should have condemned surfers’ wilful blindness, the author capably responds that his aim was to explain, not to judge.

The reviewers offer generally glowing assessments of the ways Empire in Waves contributes to a range of debates: the role of nonstate actors in international relations; the intersections among sport, tourism, and politics; popular culture and forms of imperialism; and, not least, the history of surfing. Christine Skwiot calls the book “impressively researched and accessibly written” and “an important contribution to U.S. diplomatic and transnational history to both expand and deepen our understanding of empire and international power.” Richard Ian Kimball praises the book’s insights into global history.

Kimball offers some skepticism about the links the book aims to chart. Its two subjects—surfing and international politics—rarely intersect, he writes. International politics provide “the setting for the surfing,” rather than a point of engagement. After all, surfers did not protest the brutalities of the Suharto regime, and the South African boycotts, when individuals took them up, came very late. To Kimball’s charge that the book should have condemned surfers’ wilful blindness, the author capably responds that his aim was to explain, not to judge.

The reviewers offer generally glowing assessments of the ways Empire in Waves contributes to a range of debates: the role of nonstate actors in international relations; the intersections among sport, tourism, and politics; popular culture and forms of imperialism; and, not least, the history of surfing. Christine Skwiot calls the book “impressively researched and accessibly written” and “an important contribution to U.S. diplomatic and transnational history to both expand and deepen our understanding of empire and international power.” Richard Ian Kimball praises the book’s insights into global history.

Kimball offers some skepticism about the links the book aims to chart. Its two subjects—surfing and international politics—rarely intersect, he writes. International politics provide “the setting for the surfing,” rather than a point of engagement. After all, surfers did not protest the brutalities of the Suharto regime, and the South African boycotts, when individuals took them up, came very late. To Kimball’s charge that the book should have condemned surfers’ wilful blindness, the author capably responds that his aim was to explain, not to judge.

The reviewers offer generally glowing assessments of the ways Empire in Waves contributes to a range of debates: the role of nonstate actors in international relations; the intersections among sport, tourism, and politics; popular culture and forms of imperialism; and, not least, the history of surfing. Christine Skwiot calls the book “impressively researched and accessibly written” and “an important contribution to U.S. diplomatic and transnational history to both expand and deepen our understanding of empire and international power.” Richard Ian Kimball praises the book’s insights into global history.
actors are almost all white and that race likely formed an axis of transnational solidarity. Laderman’s response leads us to hope that we will be hearing more from him about these dimensions of surfing history.

Dennis Merrill, though noting that Laderman might have engaged more explicitly with concepts of empire, agrees that the book illuminates how one subculture helped shape a multifaceted American imperium. It fits, he writes, in a growing literature on the “nooks and crannies of U.S. power.” These nooks and crannies may be small, but, as Merrill concludes, they amount to a significant piece of the puzzle of understanding the construction and exercise of power.

Notes:

Review of Scott Laderman, Empire in Waves: A Political History of Surfing

Richard Ian Kimball

The history of surfing is hot right now. From Isaiah Helekunhi Walker’s Waves of Resistance: Surfing and History in Twentieth-Century Hawai’i (Honolulu, 2011) to Timothy J. Cooley’s Surfing about Music (Berkeley, 2014), surf history is widening our understanding of American culture, especially in the Hawaiian Islands and on the West Coast. Scott Laderman’s Empire in Waves expands the history of surfing far beyond the American coastline and examines how “the touristic impulse that is virtually intrinsic to the sport of surfing has inevitably been imbued with political meaning” (5). His narrative focuses on a handful of surfers, primarily from the postwar era, who traveled the world in search of waves and often found themselves in close proximity to Cold War hot spots, revolutions, and the growing power of American corporations. Without question, the book centers on both international relations and surfers, but the two subjects seldom converge. Perhaps the book might have been titled Empires and Waves to reflect the dual storylines that Laderman traces throughout the book.

Laderman, a lifelong surfer who still manages to hit the waves despite living in Duluth, Minnesota, clearly loves the sport and makes a passionate argument for its inclusion in American diplomatic history. He contends that “surfing is not a mindless entertainment but a cultural force born of empire (at least in its modern phase), reliant on Western power, and invested in neoliberal capitalism” (7).

“[I]mpossible to divorce from the political universe in which it originated, spread, and took root,” it expanded across the globe, riding the crest of American empire and power in the postwar world (7). Laderman recognizes, however, that surfing is “ultimately about pleasure. People ride waves,” he contends, “because it is fun. Gliding across the face of a moving mass of water, turning off the top of a folding lip, sticking into a barrel: these feel good” (2). Perhaps not since Samuel Eliot Morison has a historian applied such personal knowledge of the sea to add depth and excitement to historical narrative—and had so much fun doing it.

Pleasure, though, in Laderman’s most transcendent argument, is political, and surfing was no different. In searching for pleasure across the globe, surfers ran into politics at every turn. Like so many wave-loving Forrest Gumps, they ended up in or near many of the world’s danger zones, including Suhrato’s Indonesia, apartheid South Africa, and war-torn Central America. This itinerary enables Laderman to describe the corruption, violence, and dehumanization that prevailed in these areas, even as he marvels at the world-class waves conquered by heroic surfer-travelers. For the most part, however, the brutal regimes and bloodshed merely provide the setting for the surfing, not the context for any sustained involvement by surfers in the political realm, save for a boycott of South African tournaments by a number of professional surfers in the 1980s. Sadly, surfers rarely allowed local and international politics to get in the way of a good ride.

Laderman even admits that they were so focused on the waves that they couldn't see (or didn't care about) what was happening on land. Their concerns, he writes, “generally began and ended at the water’s edge. For them, what happened on land—the national liberation movements of Africa, the counterinsurgency warfare of Central America, the state-sponsored repression of Southeast Asia—was of little serious concern. The waves were all that mattered” (4).

For American surfers, the waves began to matter in the late nineteenth century, when a contingent of Protestant missionaries flocked to the Hawaiian Islands to Christianize the natives. Beyond religious conversion, their imperial project included creating a new labor system and destroying surfing, an ancient leisure pursuit connected with the open display of the body and sexual courtship. These missionaries, writes Laderman, “like the armies of self-styled saviors that people imperial history, saw their charges in racially inferior terms, ascribing to them a barbarity that rings almost otherworldly to twenty-first-century ears. And wave riding was most certainly an element of that savagery” (13).

Surfing’s popularity among native Hawaiians fell as Christianity became widely accepted on the islands. Following the American annexation of Hawaii in 1898, however, capitalism trumped Christianity as a new wave of economic imperialists discovered the beauties of the islands and the lure of the surf. When the Great White Fleet visited in 1908, white entrepreneurs placed dozens of surfboards and outrigger canoes at the navy’s disposal, effectively cementing the relationship between tourism and the military.

Throughout the twentieth century—and especially in the years after World War II—surfing images led a marketing blitz that advertised “the archipelago as an exotic, though safely American, tropical retreat” (17, emphasis in original). From the islands, surfing ambassadors like Duke Kahanamoku and George Freeth spread the sport throughout the Pacific world, from California to Australia and beyond. The once-prohibited sport became a global phenomenon, enticing countless tourists to the islands. The popularity of surfing-based tourism was a clear victory for businessmen and builders, but it remained a mixed blessing for native Hawaiians. While they were able to pursue their traditional pastime, the context and meaning of the sport had been transformed like the beaches of Waikiki, shadowed by high-rise hotels owned by international corporations.

From its birth in Hawaii, surfing grew to global proportions as adventurous surfers relentlessly pursued the next great spot. In fact, they were so focused on the possibilities in the water that they overlooked virtually everything else happening around them. Transfixed by their all-consuming passion, like the surf-crazy Lieutenant Colonel Bill Kilgore (Robert Duvall) in Apocalypse Now, they typically failed to see the revolution for the waves and barely flinched at the destruction surrounding them. The starkest example of ignorant surfers seeking only the bliss of breaking waves occurred in Indonesia during the 1960s.

The Indonesian genocide led by General Suharto coincided with the rising reputation of Indonesian surf spots (especially Bali), but Suharto took little note of the surfers,
The book’s final chapter takes off in an entirely new direction and examines the growing global corporatization of surfing apparel and the surfing lifestyle. The empires in this chapter are corporations such as Quiksilver, Billabong, and Nike. Somewhat mournfully, Laderman charts the movement of surf culture from small, locally owned surf shops run by knowledgeable proprietors to multinational conglomerates more concerned with profits and growth. He describes how “surf shops . . . arose as social places where customers could buy a board, a magazine, a wetsuit, or a bar of wax.” By the 1970s, though, the industry was concentrated in a handful of corporations like Quiksilver, the “world’s largest organic surfwear conglomerate” (139). He feels a palpable loss as surfing’s home base moved from the local board shop to the corporate board room. One can hardly blame Laderman for his nostalgia—who in his right mind would trade a trip to a venerated surf shop for a trip to the mall to purchase a Hollister sweatshirt? In the context of the narrative, however, this chapter appears to have been grafted on as an afterthought. It is not a strong conclusion.

Despite some shortcomings, Empire in Waves offers a first-rate introduction to the possibilities of surf history. Laderman’s writing is smooth, fresh, and a pleasure to read. His love for the surf comes through on nearly every page and propels the reader on a happy journey across the twentieth century. The book’s most enduring contribution, I believe, will be to have shown how world history can be written in an interesting yet sophisticated style. I wish the book contained more information about individual surfers, but following Laderman’s pioneer cohort around the world roiled the globe over the centuries, from the annexation of Hawaii to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. While at times the author’s reach exceeds his grasp as he tries to connect surfing and twentieth-century imperialism, Empire in Waves provides insights into global history in a way that is both meaningful and a joy to read.

**Review of Laderman, Empire in Waves**  
*Dennis Merrill*

Holiday gatherings in my extended family are ritualized according to established customs, the most important of which bans political discussions. So this past Memorial Day I smiled and nodded as relatives of liberty that is generally uninterested in power politics and empire.

Politics, of course, is everywhere. Scott Laderman’s *Empire in Waves: A Political History of Surfing* positions the seemingly innocuous sport of surfing within more than a century’s worth of international politics. This engaging book, written by a longtime practitioner of the sport, speaks to at least two reading audiences—historians of American foreign relations and surfing aficionados. It simultaneously challenges two interrelated myths: first, and the author is explicit about this, that the international surfing subculture is so exceptionally hip that it has inhabited a world apart from politics; second, and this might reflect my reading as much as the author’s intent, that the United States stands out in world history as an exceptional nation, a champion of liberty that is generally uninterested in power politics and empire.

Laderman might have meditated a bit more on the nature of empire, or even provided a definition, but doing so might have tried the patience of non-academic readers. *Empire in Waves* nonetheless depicts a fluid and often informal U.S. imperium rather than a rigidly structured,
territorial empire—less a system than a hegemonic process that replicates America’s own social divisions and inequalities across a densely interconnected world. This is not to say that the modern United States has not at times forcefully redrawn territorial lines. In *Empire of Waves*, the U.S. annexation of Hawai‘i in July 1898 serves as a case in point. But the empire that Laderman portrays typically rested on the nation’s financial clout, its cultural magnetism, its technological prowess, its proliferating military bases, and its alliances with repressive regimes. It might simultaneously command compliance and inspire resistance, generate oppression and stir the consciences of human rights activists, threaten cultural loss and spur mutual appropriation. Surfers not only inhabited this confusing dominion, they joined in shaping it.

The narrative begins with the arrival in Hawai‘i of nineteenth-century Protestant missionaries from the United States. The newcomers took an instant dislike to the island’s inhabitants, who in their judgment displayed far too much bare skin in public places. Scantily clad native men and women showing off surfing skills to one another, as courtship ritual, particularly offended the white workaholics, so they introduced a new way of life based on layers of clothing and the teachings of Jesus. The nasty practice of surfing nearly disappeared, disease ravaged the indigenous population, and deeds to the land conveniently fell into the hands of transplanted U.S. whites. President William McKinley formalized the imperial project through annexation—which the overwhelming majority of native Hawaiians opposed. But the story of surfing and international politics was just getting underway.

While Laderman does not downplay the state as an imperial actor, he is most provocative when he examines the maneuverings of non-state actors. It was South Carolinian Alexander Humé Ford who reinvented surfing as an American sport, not to save souls, but to attract settlers, investors, and tourists to the islands. Ford didn’t want just any kind of settlers and tourists, though—he wanted white ones. A sort of Pacific-obsessed Albert Beveridge, Ford insisted that only Anglo-Saxons possessed the moral fortitude and ingenuity to bring progress to Hawai‘i. He also insisted that no one could ride the waves with greater intelligence and agility than white males. He launched the Outrigger Canoe Club on the beaches of Waikiki in 1909, and proved a tireless publicist for surfing soulmates. The film makes no mention of race or South Africa’s noxious apartheid system; in fact, it portrays South Africa as heaven on earth.

Although *Endless Summer* was filmed in 1963, it was prepared for release as “Freedom Summer” unfolded in Mississippi in 1964 and as Watts exploded in racial violence the following summer. Yet, like an American family on Memorial Day weekend, the summery film tried to steer clear of politics. One of its most remarkable scenes, revisited in *Empire in Waves*, places the two vagabonds on a whites-only beach at Cape St. Francis, South Africa, where they strike up friendships with young white South African surfing soulmates. The film makes no mention of race or South Africa’s noxious apartheid system; in fact, it portrays South Africa as heaven on earth. The State Department was so taken with the story of two freedom-loving hipsters—the cream of an affluent society—that it tried to arrange for a screening of *Endless Summer* at the Moscow Film Festival in 1967 and the Japan World Exposition in 1970. The message it hoped people might carry away could be summarized thus: why be a boring, low-wage Communist and miss out on all the fun?

While *Empire in Waves* exposes Bruce Brown’s omission of race, it does not spend much time on the gender dynamics of surfing culture. Most of the actors who appear in this imperial history are male, but aside from the fact that many expressed a fondness for the female body in a bikini, we learn very little about their attitudes toward women, women’s rights, and sexuality. We are told that in time girls and women—who I presume wielded more historical agency than the fictional Gidget—infiltrated the subculture, but we don’t learn how that happened. The cultural turn in our field has firmly established that empire building is a gendered enterprise, involving men and women alike, within the context of constantly shifting domestic and international power arrangements. It would be interesting, and most likely telling, to discover how these daring young men who rode the waves navigated the second wave of feminism.

Laderman does explain—in brilliant fashion—how the surfing community gradually acquired a political voice. It didn’t come easily. Indeed, the U.S.-backed Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia recruited willing, apolitical
surfers to the wave-rich archipelago to help launch a modern travel industry. As far as much of the international traveling public was concerned, Indonesia registered as one big, hotel-studded Bali rather than as a graveyard for the million-plus who perished in Suharto’s 1965 military coup. Few had heard of the dictator’s brutal attempt to repress the self-determination movement in nearby East Timor.

But the empire that surfers made ultimately proved as fluid as America’s modern, informal empire itself—shaped by privilege and hubris, but also susceptible to moral awakening. In the 1960s, at roughly the same time that Americans started to question the use of napalm against Vietnamese civilians, the main organ of the surfing community, Surfer magazine, began editorializing against the inherent injustice of apartheid in the ocean-side paradise of South Africa. The U.S. government maintained that white South Africa stood as a loyal ally in the struggle against Soviet communism, and for their part, many surfing enthusiasts insisted that the politics of race should not sully their pristine pastime. But slowly, the illusion that violent racial separation should be considered normal eroded.

In 1985, the Australian surfing legend Tom Carroll joined a growing chorus of international critics and announced that he would boycott the South African leg of the world tour. That year, and in the years immediately following, the list of boycotting surfers from the United States and many other nations grew. In the end surfer activists, like their counterparts on college campuses and in corporate board rooms, helped rid the world of at least one odious form of oppression. Since that time, Laderman relates, surf champions have spoken out against the U.S. war on Iraq, the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, and other compelling international issues.

This political awakening does not suggest that the sport of surfing followed a linear path from uninformed apathy to consciousness and redemption. The reality of empire is usually too messy to lend itself to heroic narratives. While some surfers had discovered the political nature of high-profile sport, the surfing subculture infused itself deeply into an increasingly unequal, neo-liberal world economic system. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, beach bums had helped spearhead a multi-billion dollar industry.

The sport’s commodification involved much more than the sale of surfboards. Wet suits, swimsuits, traction pads, sandals, and stylish casual apparel—marketed by corporate biggies like Quicksilver, Patagonia, Nike, Billabong, and Hurley—became objects of desire not just among surfers, but in the much larger market of casual beachgoers and swimming pool bohemians. The dirty little secret buried under a mountain of “surf’in slang” was that more and more of the consumer goodies were churned out by a low-wage international labor force. Laderman does illuminate this gender dynamic. Today, while women textile workers in Bangladesh stitch brand labels onto shirt collars, surfing champions scoop up corporate sponsorships.

Empire in Waves joins a growing literature in our field that investigates the nooks and crannies of U.S. power. We have learned that the U.S. empire has been shaped by many hands: Gilded Age housewives who connected the world through domestic consumption; unskilled laborers transported from the West Indies to the Panama Canal Zone to carve the Culebra Cut; foot soldiers who toiled in the much larger market of casual beachgoers and swimming pool bohemians. The dirty little secret buried under a mountain of “surf’in slang” was that more and more of the consumer goodies were churned out by a low-wage international labor force. Laderman does illuminate this gender dynamic. Today, while women textile workers in Bangladesh stitch brand labels onto shirt collars, surfing champions scoop up corporate sponsorships.

Empire in Waves joins a growing literature in our field that investigates the nooks and crannies of U.S. power. We have learned that the U.S. empire has been shaped by many hands: Gilded Age housewives who connected the world through domestic consumption; unskilled laborers transported from the West Indies to the Panama Canal Zone to carve the Culebra Cut; foot soldiers who encountered voodoo as well as insurgents in U.S.-occupied Haiti; entrepreneurs such as Henry Ford and Edward Filene, who exported the American gospel of mass production and mass consumption.1 Nor were surfers the first icons that the State Department identified as desirable cultural ambassadors. The typically dour John Foster Dulles sent a less pliant cohort of “jazz ambassadors” around the world in the 1950s to whitewash America’s version of apartheid in the Jim Crow South.2 Skeptics might insist that nooks and crannies are small, insignificant spaces that have no place in the serious study of diplomacy. But nooks and crannies matter, because stacked up together they become an integral part of a powerful, often dangerous, international “House of Cards.”

Empire in Waves is an important and impassioned work. Without a trace of fire and brimstone, it reminds the surfing community that it has a history that is inescapably political, and it provides a primer on responsible global citizenship. Without sacrificing disciplinary precision, it asks historians of U.S. diplomatic and transnational history to both expand and deepen our understanding of empire and international power. And it prods both readerships to question the mischievous notion of American exceptionalism. Given its clear and accessible language, largely devoid of either academic or surfing jargon, it should become a popular choice for course adoption. In fact, I’m considering recommending it to my relatives—next Memorial Day.

Notes:

Review of Scott Laderman, Empire in Waves: A Political History of Surfing

Christine Skwiot

Scott Laderman, an avid surfer, professional historian, and human rights activist, addresses the three disparate yet sometimes overlapping communities of which he is a member in Empire in Waves: A Political History of Surfing. My decidedly unscientific survey of surfers’ online reactions to Laderman’s new book suggests that his impressively researched and accessibly written Empire in Waves is already engaging them, as well as activists and academics. In tracing the history of how surfers forged an “international fraternity” whose members long insisted that this cherished pastime was devoid of politics and then came to acknowledge and even act upon the premise that the personal is political, Laderman seeks to ride a recent wave of political consciousness breaking across contemporary surf communities around the world.

Laderman states the premise of his new book clearly: “Surfing is not mindless entertainment but a cultural force born of empire (at least in its modern phase), reliant on Western power, and invested in neoliberal capitalism” (7). He analyzes the interplay among imperial pleasure, politics, and power in five largely self-contained chronological and topical chapters. The first chapter explores “how surfing became American” in the U.S. colonial territory of Hawai’i early in the twentieth century. Although nineteenth-century New England missionaries condemned it for encouraging nudity, gambling, and excessive pleasure among Hawaiians, Hawaiians continued their ancient and beloved pastime of surfing, often by taking it underground. After U.S. annexation in 1898, surfing emerged as a site of colonial contestation between the haole (white) elite and Native Hawaiians. While haole boosters like Alexander Hume Ford promoted surfing to attract white tourists and settlers, demonstrate white superiority, and transform Hawai’i into...
a white settler republic eligible for U.S. statehood, Native Hawaiians used surfing to perpetuate Hawaiian culture, carve out autonomous spaces for themselves, and contest white claims to racial and civilizational superiority. Even as haoles claimed surfing as “American” and sought to introduce it to the world, it was in fact Hawaiians, led by George Freeth and Duke Kahanamoku, who served as the most notable diplomats for their ancestral sport” and popularized surfing in early twentieth-century California, Australia, and New Zealand.

After World War II, surfers took to the waves of the Third World. Most of them were white, male, middle-class, and Australian or American. Laderman explores some of the ways in which these globetrotting surfers and the surf media helped naturalize Washington’s Cold War policies and practices in the Third World, particularly its support for pro-capitalist, right-wing dictatorships. U.S. imperial power helped make “the world safe for discovery” by surfers, who often served as the advance scouts or “shock troops of mass tourism.” A world made safe for discovery by privileged whites on Third World “surfaris” enabled them to build an intimate “international fraternity” whose members largely ignored the fact that their freedom and pleasure depended on the repression of the very “locals” with whom they sought cross-cultural interactions. Laderman explores some of the ways in which these globetrotting surfers and the surf media helped naturalize Washington’s Cold War policies and practices in the Third World, particularly its support for pro-capitalist, right-wing dictatorships. U.S. imperial power helped make “the world safe for discovery” by surfers, who often served as the advance scouts or “shock troops of mass tourism.” A world made safe for discovery by privileged whites on Third World “surfaris” enabled them to build an intimate “international fraternity” whose members largely ignored the fact that their freedom and pleasure depended on the repression of the very “locals” with whom they sought cross-cultural interactions.

Surfers’ complicity in and denial of U.S.-backed state repression and terror unfolded simultaneously in Southeast Asia, as carefree wave riders went on discovering new aquatic frontiers took to the shores abutting the killing fields of Suharto’s Indonesia. A “golden age” of surfing began during Suharto’s campaign in the mid-1960s to exterminate the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its genocidal campaign against the East Timorese in fields of Suharto’s Indonesia. A “golden age” of surfing continued through the Suharto regime’s invasion and occupation of East Timor and its genocidal campaign against the East Timorese in the mid-1970s. It culminated in the establishment of cozy, sometimes corrupt collaborations among the Indonesian military, foreign surfers, and the surf media to expand tourism across the archipelago in the 1980s. Whereas in the 1970s the former U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, Howard Jones, was trying to facilitate the development of surf tourism in Bali, by the 1980s surfers were collaborating with Indonesian military officers in international surf competitions that showcased tourism beyond Bali as economic salvation for ordinary Indonesians.

Surfers, along with surfing writers and film-makers, took deni to new heights in what Amnesty International called the “Asian gulag” of Indonesia: they celebrated the tropical bliss and touristic freedom surfers enjoyed, cast violently terrorized Indonesians as natural pacificists, and romanticized the poverty of locals as a heroic, anti-modern choice. Largely ignoring mass death, imprisonment, and torture, they reserved most of their critical commentary for the conditions they created: crowded, polluted, and unhygienic beaches and villages. The few surfers and surf enthusiasts who acknowledged the genocidal military and political campaigns of the Suharto state generally did so to defend it, constructing narratives “that flipped documented reality on its head” (86). John McLean’s 1990 novel, Island of the Gods, for example, presented the regime as the victim rather than the perpetrator of PKI and East Timorese violence.

It was in the apartheid state of South Africa, Laderman argues, that “surfing discovered it was political.” The 1985 announcement by the reigning world surfing champion, Australian Tom Carroll, that he would boycott the South African leg of the world tour to protest apartheid sent shock waves through the global surf community. While his decision seemed to open a new era in surfing history, Laderman argues that “it in fact culminated a long period of introspection within the broader surf community about what it meant to seek pleasure—indeed, what it meant to achieve ‘freedom,’ as many surfers would have it—in a state characterized by violent racial separation” (91). The 1966 blockbuster surfing film, Endless Summer, continued a tradition of ignoring violent political repression in the countries where it was filmed—including South Africa—and to which it led legions of surfers. But that same year, an article in the U.S.-based Surfer magazine featured a photograph of a young black man on a South African beach, with three white surfers behind him and a caption that read, “Durban’s beaches are segregated[,] so this native youngster can’t join these three surfers . . . for a little fun in the surf” (98). The photograph proved especially explosive. Over the next fourteen months it inspired “the most reader response” in Surfer’s history (99). The majority of readers, led by Americans and South Africans, blasted the magazine for engaging issues that “reeked of politics” (101) and offered support for apartheid. Still, some Americans did write in to condemn it.

The debate among surfers continued for the next two decades. It seems that the majority of surfers who declared themselves apolitical while defending apartheid were American and Australian. This was at the same time that other international athletes and sport federations were organizing boycotts of South Africa. Surfers largely abstained from anti-apartheid politics until Carroll publicly enlisted them in 1985. Others then rapidly followed suit, with twenty-five of the top thirty competitive surfers joining the boycott by 1989. The Association of Surfing Professionals never joined the boycott. But the surfers who did undermined their sport’s “perceived apoliticism” and led “countless young people to begin reckoning with an injustice that they likely would have otherwise ignored” (150).

Reading Empire in Waves demolished the last vestiges of the romanticized view of surfers and surfing that even many jaded students of empire—myself included—managed to retain. For surfers and surfing, as Laderman argues in his chapter on the globalization of this seven-billion-dollar-a-year industry (a figure that excludes surf tourism), indeed epitomize the hippest of the hip, and it is the hip, Thomas Frank shows, that became the official style of late capitalism. No wonder managerial elites, starting in the 1960s, embraced the “almost rebellious” (136) culture of surfers and surfing to sell all manner of apparel, music, and
of racial identification,” Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds argue, that united Anglo-Saxons from the world’s British settler countries in common political cause. This was especially the case at the turn of the twentieth century and then again after each of the two world wars, when anti-colonial and anti-racist actors and movements organized locally, regionally, and globally to struggle for human rights for across lines of race as well as class and gender. Analyzing these continuities could have made Laderman’s arguments about how surfers discovered that the personal is political even more powerful.

It is the purpose of innovative and provocative books to inspire debate, and Scott Laderman deserves the highest praise for writing an engrossing, fast-paced, and informative narrative that academics and activists aspiring to reach popular audiences will find worthy of emulation. *Empire in Waves* makes an important contribution to U.S. transnational history, and it will engross professional historians, human rights activists, undergraduate and graduate students, and actual and armchair surfers alike. If, for one, plan to assign a chapter of it in an undergraduate world history survey because of the passionate debates I am confident it will inspire.

Notes:
3. Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst, 2001).

Author’s Response
Scott Laderman

It is no accident that *Empire in Waves* was published as a post-tenure book. Surfing suffers from an unfortunate reputation as a sport dominated by self-absorbed airheads whose excited utterances, to the extent that they are even comprehensible, prove uproarious to lay ears. Sean Penn’s Jeff Spicoli, the perpetually stoned Southern California surfer in *Fast Times at Ridgemont High* (1982), provides the classic, if fictional, stereotype. The guy who shows up when you Google “funny surfer dude” is, sadly, all too real. So I knew I was approaching a topic that risked easy dismissal. In hindsight, perhaps the subject of my first book, which addressed tourism and memory in postcolonial Vietnam, was not much safer. But the topic of surfing was different. Vietnam at least had a war. How gratifying it has been, therefore, to read these early responses to *Empire in Waves*. I am grateful to Richard Ian Kimball, Dennis Merrill, and Christine Skwiot for their thoughtful and incisive reviews, and I thank Barbara Keys for her introduction and Andy Johns for so generously inviting the roundtable. I remember when I first presented a surfing paper at a SHAFR annual meeting, “I bet that hasn’t happened before,” I thought to myself. I’m pretty sure the same is true of a surfing forum in the pages of *Passport*. I like what it says about the range and confidence of our field.

These are, I feel, difficult reviews to respond to. Given my colleagues’ positive assessments and what seem to me
relatively minor quibbles, I worry that I might appear too nitpicky and defensive in offering a lengthy rebuttal. But the roundtable format of course requires a detailed response. I hope the reviewers will recognize the appreciative and collegial spirit in which I meet my obligation to provide one.

Richard Ian Kimball faults Empire in Waves for being insufficiently condemnatory of surfers turning a blind eye to the repression and terror in Suharto-era Indonesia. Given that the chapter to which he is referring is a critical analysis of surfers’ willful ignorance of the mass atrocities of the mid-1960s, the genocide in East Timor after 1975, and the daily repression that accompanied more than three decades of Suharto’s rule—with some analysis, too, of surfers’ collaboration with the Indonesian authorities in opening up the archipelago to international tourism—I must confess that Kimball’s comment took me aback. What surprised me even more, however, was the statement that I “excuse” this ignorance. It is true that I seek to explain it, citing, most obviously, surfers’ desire to not pollute their spiritual vision of wave-riding by allowing real-world concerns to intrude (64). Perhaps, as Kimball suggests, I should have said more about the reasons for their turning a blind eye. But I am still having trouble figuring out how my explanation became an apology.

Kimball also feels that the book’s final chapter, which traces and analyzes what I call surfing’s industrialization, appears “grafted on as an afterthought.” I respectfully disagree. Surfing emerged as big business in the last decades of the twentieth century. By 2010, Quiksilver, one of the sport’s most visible corporate brands, alone constituted a two-billion-dollar multinational conglomerate with its shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Quiksilver, Billabong, Rip Curl, and other surfwear corporations have sought to shape and ultimately define modern surf culture, working to elevate surfing’s coolness quotient while downplaying its embrace of neoliberalism. At the same time, these homegrown behemoths have faced a growing threat from “nonendemic” corporations—Nike, Target, and others—that have tried to cash in on surfing’s global popularity. How is it, I wonder, that a sport that has become synonymous with freedom can spawn an industry reliant on the exploitation of Third World labor and environmental destruction? I still can think of no more fitting coda to my study than an analysis of this paradox.

Dennis Merrill and Christine Skwiot believe that Empire in Waves could have more fully attended to issues of gender and race. It is not, they concede, that gender and race are absent in the book. They indeed appear throughout its pages. But Merrill and Skwiot do offer a number of fruitful ways in which these might have been explored further. Merrill, for instance, suggests a line of inquiry tied to men’s dominance and women’s marginalization in the sport for much of the twentieth century. “It would be interesting, and most likely telling,” he writes, “to discover how these daring young men who rode the waves navigated the second wave of feminism.” Skwiot, for her part, suggests that I “could have analyzed how the dynamic cultural politics of gender and race shaped Cold War surfing culture and how it dovetailed with and departed from official Cold War politics and policymaking.”

I agree with my colleagues that these other directions could have afforded fascinating insights. With respect to gender, for instance, surfing offers a rich history. Hawaiian women were a regular presence in the water in the nineteenth century and earlier, only to be marginalized as surfing underwent a process of masculinization as the twentieth century unfolded. In recent years, a reversal of this female marginalization has begun—though it is one, as I point out, that remains incomplete (157–8). Professional female surfers are still paid far less than their male counterparts, and there is a tendency in the surf media to focus much too frequently on female surfers’ anatomy rather than their wave-riding talent. Neither of these phenomena is of course unique to surfing.

One of the challenges I faced in writing Empire in Waves was providing a broad history of surfing’s navigation of the nineteenth through the twenty-first centuries without simply replicating some of the more focused studies that have appeared in recent years. Most obviously, I did not want to cover the same terrain addressed by Isaiah Helekunihi Walker in his Waves of Resistance: Surfing and History in Twentieth-Century Hawai‘i (University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011) and Krista Comer in her Surfer Girls in the New World Order (Duke University Press, 2010). Fortunately, because Comer’s work is largely ethnographic and not historical, analyses such as those suggested by my colleagues remain possible. While I did not explore, for example, Merrill’s specific question about second-wave feminism in Empire in Waves, I was sure to copy far more archival material than I could possibly use in the book, including numerous documents on surfing’s gender (and gendered) history, and have already begun working with these. I look forward to presenting them further.

On the issue of race, when Skwiot writes that she thinks I erred “in arguing that surfers and surfing culture likewise ‘ditched’ the transpacific and ‘transatlantic racial solidarity’ they forged in early-twentieth-century Hawai‘i (20),” she appears to have misinterpreted what I meant in the sentence she cited. I was referring specifically to surfing enthusiast and Hawai‘i booster Alexander Hume Ford, whose dispatches evolved from early appeals to Anglo-Saxon racial solidarity to later celebrations of the American capitalist behemoth. I point this out because I agree with Skwiot’s argument that whiteness “seems to have constituted both an enduring glue of twentieth-century surfing communities . . . and a catalyst in the formation of both the ‘international fraternity’ of surfers and what Robert Dean calls the ‘imperial brotherhood’ of liberals in Washington.”

One of the places where whiteness most obviously functioned as a bond among surfers was South Africa, where white Americans and Australians developed deep affinities with their white South African counterparts, sharing waves on segregated beaches, frequenting segregated dining and drinking establishments, and studiously overlooking, if not altogether rationalizing, the oppressive conditions with which black South Africans were forced to contend. To the white South Africans, apartheid was normal. To their overseas brothers (and to a lesser extent sisters) before the mid-1980s, it was, with some notable exceptions, mostly not worth worrying about. Having said that, I think Skwiot is right that Empire in Waves could have more explicitly analyzed the continuities in what she aptly calls the “enduring glue” of whiteness across the twentieth century. I appreciate her constructive criticism.

In closing, I want to thank my colleagues again for their close readings, thoughtful critiques, and generous praise. That Empire in Waves was chosen for a Passport roundtable—and has been so positively received—is a great honor to me.

Note:
1. Scott Laderman, Tours of Vietnam: War, Travel Guides, and Memory (Durham, NC, 2009).
Public Intellectuals, We Need You!: Four Lessons from Max Ascoli for Intellectuals and U.S. Foreign Relations

Kimber Quinney

Even before his election in 2008, President Barack Obama was widely identified as an intellectual. One writer even suggested—half jokingly—that Obama’s undergraduate musings on the poetry of T.S. Eliot were a clear indication that the country was in the hands of a genuine thinker. In 2012 Adam Kirsch addressed those comments on Eliot more seriously, noting that Obama’s “ability to recognize the poetic truth of Eliot’s conservatism, while still embracing the practical truth of liberalism,” provides insight into the “complexity of his mature politics.” He goes on to say, though, that Obama’s “Poetic Politics,” however laudable, are not sufficient in and of themselves to solve the major challenges the administration faces in the twenty-first century. “The vicissitudes of his presidency prove that possessing an ironic, literary mind is not necessarily a help when it comes to day-to-day governing. The big revelation of the Obama presidency, for intellectuals, is that his authenticity and irony have not succeeded in making him a transformative figure—that the quality of the president can’t be directly deduced from the quality of the man.”

Thus, in spite of the president’s reputation for being an intellectual, his administration seems to have been short on the fresh, innovative, and informed ideas necessary for good governance—and sound foreign policy. To be fair, Obama’s foreign policy team has served him well in many respects. The administration can be credited with a number of notable accomplishments, and it has “stayed out of trouble.” Still, it is worth noting that, unlike many foreign policy specialists, the most powerful of Obama’s inner circle are not academics. Of particular interest is that, whereas Obama’s economics brains trust is robust, the foreign policy brain trust is less so. And, as Tevi Troy argues in “Bush, Obama and the Intellectuals,” the president’s inclination to lean on thinkers outside of the administration is strikingly absent. “While there is no shortage of Ph.D.s in [the Obama] administration—most prominently among Peter Orszag’s staff at the Office of Management and Budget,” he notes, “Obama has no liaison to the intellectual world, formal or informal. He has closed down the Office of Strategic Initiatives, and has so far avoided explicit outreach to the academic world (aside from occasional meetings with historians—a longstanding White House tradition).”

Furthermore, Obama has kept a tight hold on the reins of foreign policy. According to the authors of “Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy,” which appeared in the May/June 2012 issue of Foreign Affairs, Obama is neither an out-of-his-depth naïf nor a reactive realist. He has been trying to shape a new liberal global order with the United States still in the lead but sharing more responsibilities and burdens with others where possible or necessary. Surrounding himself with experienced cabinet members who are not personally close to him, along with junior advisers who are close but not experienced, Obama has kept the conceptualization, articulation, and sometimes even implementation of his foreign policy in his own hands. Intelligent, self-confident, ambitious, and aloof, he is more directly responsible for his record than most of his predecessors have been.

It is hard to say whether Obama’s penchant for maintaining the implementation of U.S. foreign policy “in his own hands” will prove beneficial or not for the United States in the long run. But it is certainly worth noting that neither the conceptualization nor the articulation of American foreign policy is as widely shared a task as one might expect. In other words, in spite of the president’s reputation as a thinker, he appears uninterested in taking the time to gather opinions on foreign policy issues, even if he often appears to be taking his time to act on them.

The nation faces a threat from militant, extremist Islamists who wield power through terrorist violence and ideas. Although the president acknowledges that the war against Al Qaeda and against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a “war of ideas,” he is reluctant to deploy his own arsenal of ideas in that war. He has even called on the United Nations to come up with powerful ideas to counter the extremist ideology. Presumably, he is reluctant to share his ideas because he doesn’t have any strikingly new ones. The president and the country need help in this regard. And, given Obama’s political orientation, and the fact that the conservative ideas that propelled his predecessors’ foreign policy drove the United States into quagmires that only fueled Islamic extremism and ambitions, this help should come from the center and the left. Whether the war on ISIL and Al Qaeda will prove to be an ideological war similar to that waged against fascism or communism remains to be seen. But this is a golden opportunity for moderate and liberal thinkers to step forward to provide the administration and the American public with the ideas needed to wage a war against extremism.
Ours is an era that desperately needs, as Todd Gitlin puts it, "an intelligent exchange of ideas." And those ideas can and should come from academics. "Academics no longer possess the privilege of complacency, of choosing to remain cloistered within the walls of the academy, of engaging only with the members of their disciplines," assert the authors of "The Case for Academics as Public Intellectuals." "We must assume our roles as agents of democracy and perform service that promotes the public good." As liberal intellectuals engage in generating ideas about U.S. foreign policy, they could hardly do worse than their conservative counterparts in trying to battle the same foe. And they would do well to heed four lessons from the career of a prominent public intellectual of the early Cold War—Max Ascoli.

Ascoli was a professor of political philosophy and law in Italy until he was forced into exile by Mussolini's Fascist regime in 1928. Three years later, he immigrated to the United States, and in 1939 he became an American citizen. Ascoli devoted his academic career to political philosophy and to the intellectual analysis of fascism, communism, and liberalism from the 1930s through the 1960s. He authored nearly 400 different publications, including books, articles, editorials, and book reviews. Although few people recognize his name today, Ascoli had a tremendous influence on the notion that thinking about U.S. foreign policy was as important as doing U.S. foreign policy. And although he did not use the phrase to describe himself, he was a public intellectual. He was convinced he had an obligation to engage intelligently in the public sphere on domestic and international politics.

In one of his first books written in the United States, *Intelligence in Politics*, Ascoli asserted that "it is one of the main functions of intellectuals to establish hypotheses and patterns which may give meaning to the gamble of life. When basic institutions or traditions appear chaotic or endangered, intellectuals find themselves in the most beleaguered position; in the need for some tentative order, they must incessantly try to stem the tumult of events with their flimsy instruments of expression and of representation." For Ascoli, the war against fascism (and, later, communism) was a war of ideas. And because he was persuaded that the intellectual had a responsibility to weigh in on ideas, he felt compelled not merely to explain the threat that faced the American public, but also to invite debate about the most appropriate response to it. Ascoli serves as a reminder to us that ideas can—and should—be a foundation for constructive American foreign relations, especially in the face of an ideological threat. What follows are four lessons to be learned from Ascoli's life and work.

**Lesson One: The Refugee Scholar**

Max Ascoli (1898-1978) was born into a Jewish family in Ferrara, Italy—the "cradle of Fascism," as Ascoli put it. He immigrated to the United States as a "refugee scholar." Initially awarded a fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation, he was later appointed as a professor of political and social science at the newly created University in Exile at the New School for Social Research. During the interwar years, with the rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany, the New School secured philanthropic support from the Rockefeller Foundation to provide safe haven for academic scholars. The University in Exile ultimately sponsored more than 180 individuals and their families, providing them with visas and jobs. Max Ascoli was among these scholars. In 1940, at the age of 42, he would become Dean of Graduate Faculty at the New School.

What can we learn from Ascoli's experience? The current conflicts in the Middle East and beyond have produced a flood of refugee scholars the like of which has not been seen since World War II. The annual report produced by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack shows that the numbers are staggering and calls for a Security Council debate on the crisis. And of course, academics who become refugees are being targeted precisely because of their ideas. The Institute of International Education, the Scholars at Risk Network, the New School, and other organizations are working to raise awareness of the problem, but no action is being taken by the U.S. government. During and after World War II, refugee scholars coming to the United States contributed to all areas of academic life. Ascoli's experience, and that of so many other refugee scholars, reminds us how important it is to open American borders to refugee scholars, especially those fleeing violence, repression, and intimidation in the Muslim world. They have the potential to articulate a much more democratic Islamic point of view, one that could resonate with U.S. foreign policy objectives.

**Lesson Two: Liberal Democracy and Immigrant America**

Like many public intellectuals, Max Ascoli became a civil servant for a short while, serving as associate director of cultural relations of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) between 1941 and 1942. The agency was created to distribute propaganda—news, films, advertising, and radio broadcasts—in Latin America in order to counter Italian and German Fascist propaganda in the region. This is precisely what Ascoli proposed that the U.S. government do to combat Italian Fascist propaganda in the United States: counter the Fascist disinformation with "education" about democracy aimed at Italian Americans.

Ascoli began his campaign to persuade the U.S. government in 1942, when he published an article in the magazine *Common Ground* called "On the Italian Americans." In this essay, Ascoli insisted that Italian Americans had a role to play in America's war against Mussolini's Fascist Italy. "Now [that] the war situation has made infinitely closer the inter-relation between Italian Americans and Italians in Italy," he wrote, the U.S. government would do well to win over the favor of Italian Americans by launching a public relations campaign to disseminate the harmful effects of Italian Fascism and to persuade them of the merits of American democracy. He proposed that Italian Americans should become "educated" in the American way of democracy. "The aim should be not to force Italian Americans to compulsory sudden Americanization," he argued, "but rather to have them develop an American interpretation of their Italian heritage." In this editorial, which was among the first of his writings to reach a wider American readership, Ascoli was careful to note the U.S. government's oversimplified classification of Italian Americans. In 1942 the Roosevelt administration identified most of them as "enemy aliens," although some, like the members of the Mazzini Society, were considered "anti-Fascist loyalists." Ascoli noted that the vast majority of Italians living in the United States most likely fell into a category between the two extremes: they were, in fact, liberals. It was this robust group of Italian Americans, who may or may not have identified with Italian Fascism at some point in their lives, who needed to be taught the ways of American democracy. "What is asked here," he continued, "is that adequate means may be used to make the American citizens of Italian descent grasp the reality of what America is and what democracy is." To this end, Ascoli proposed that a council on Italian American affairs be established in Washington DC, "with branches in all the main sections of the country where there are large Italian groups" to coordinate with government authorities. Ascoli envisioned this organization acting as a "public relations agency." He also proposed that the federal government establish relief agencies in Italian
American areas of the country, that it take advantage of Italian language radio broadcasts to spread the word about U.S. policy toward Fascist Italy, and that it “act as counsel to Italian American individuals or groups who advance complaints of discrimination.” He emphasized that Italian immigrants could be won over if they could be persuaded “that America’s victory in the war will mean the liberation of Italy . . . . There can be no problem of divided allegiance when the goal is identical.”

Ascoli’s assertion that immigrants had a role to play in shaping U.S. foreign policy suggests that the current administration should consider reorienting its policy message on the Middle East and should make a concerted effort to change attitudes toward Islam and, by extension, toward Muslim Americans. After 9/11, a number of think tanks in Washington DC, held forums and posted blogs addressing the ways in which the U.S. government could work to improve relations with the Muslim American community. In 2011, the Obama administration issued a report entitled “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.”

“Protecting American communities from al-Qa’ida’s hateful ideology,” asserts the president in the report, “is not the work of government alone. Communities—especially Muslim American communities whose children, families and neighbors are being targeted for recruitment by al-Qa’ida—are often positioned to take the lead because they know their communities best.” According to many observers, the report fell far short of its intended strategy, which was to enable the federal government to “help empower American communities [more specifically, Muslim American communities] and their local partners in their grassroots efforts to prevent violent extremism.”

Sherifa Zuhur points out that in the desperate search to identify and cultivate “moderate” Muslims, policymakers have missed the mark. “Unfortunately,” she writes, “mainstream Muslims—large numbers of whom are Islamists—do not fit the prevailing American definition of ‘moderate.’” She goes on to explain that “a person who follows the five pillars of Islam, celebrates Muslim holidays, attends a mosque, eschews alcohol and pork, wears Islamic dress or is bearded, and does not date is simply following basic religious principles. But, in the post 9/11 environment, and probably prior to it, such a person has been treated as being ‘extreme’ when living in Muslim minority countries.” There is still, she notes, a lot of work to do.

Some reporters have been doing their part to promote better understanding of the Muslim community in the United States among both U.S. policymakers and the public and, consequently, a less hostile and better informed attitude toward the Islamic world as a whole. On Meet the Press in January, NBC’s Ayman Mohyeldin reported on the Muslim American experience from Dearborn, Michigan, where one-third of the city’s population is Muslim. He drew a direct connection between American foreign policy and Muslim American communities. “For some,” he said, “radicalization and attacks against the U.S. stems [sic] from anger at American foreign policies and wars in the Middle East. While the overwhelming majority of Muslims have successfully assimilated and integrated into U.S. society, the challenge remains to find individuals who may be on the fringes of the communities and are also alienated.”

Mohyeldin’s assertion that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East can cause radicalism among Muslim communities in the United States provoked controversy, which in itself reveals a failure to appreciate the impact of American foreign policy both at home and abroad. Obviously, American policymakers must pay more attention to understanding the impact that U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East has on a growing number of Muslim Americans. Max Ascoli’s insistence on the important role that Italian Americans could play in the war against fascism reminds us of the power that a nation of immigrants inherently possesses.

Lesson Three: Time to Think

Ascoli lamented what he termed the “scarcity of ideas” in American politics and in U.S. foreign policy, in particular. So, he sought out U.S. foreign policymakers whom he deemed to be the most thoughtful. Ascoli’s relationship to Adolf Berle—before, during, and after World War II—is a case in point. Berle, who was an original member of President Franklin Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust” and was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs in 1938, was himself an intellectual. Ascoli and Berle became personal friends; in fact, Ascoli eventually authored the introduction to Berle’s autobiography, Navigating the Rapids: 1918-1971. Ascoli obviously admired Berle’s intellect, and lauded the Assistant Secretary’s capacity for thought: “At the [U.S. State] Department,” explained Ascoli, “[Berle] was given an exorbitant number of assignments, but mostly of the thinking variety. Thinking, well-articulated thinking, came disturbingly easy to him.”

By 1945, Ascoli was growing more concerned about the threat posed by communism than the threat posed by fascism. In many of his postwar writings, he expressed criticism of the way in which the Allies “took over” governance of Italy through the apparatus of the Allied Military Government. The central weakness of Allied policy, according to Ascoli, did not lie with the Allies’ attitude toward the Italians, but with the lack of knowledge and preparedness that so frequently obstructs foreign policy. There was no “lack of sympathy,” he said, but “there as elsewhere, there was no clear thought-out policy, based on a detailed knowledge . . . . of the problems they had to face and of the responsibilities they had to assume.”

What was missing in Italy, asserted Ascoli, was the recognition that the “time to think” is as important as the “time to act.” In the Italian case, he warned, action preceded “thought-out policy,” and the result was the defeat of one ideological enemy immediately followed by the creation of another. To anyone familiar with U.S. policy in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein, this should sound familiar.

In 1949, Ascoli gained national recognition—and a devoted following—for the Reporter, a magazine committed to the liberal analysis of international relations and filled with what Ascoli described as “responsible journalism.” Ascoli was critical of the American press because it robbed its readers of the necessary time to think. “The American press is unquestionably sick,” he lamented. “The remedy lies in tackling the most dangerous aspects of the illness and in showing that the public is best informed when it is given proven facts and a chance to see them in perspective—a chance to think. If we had not been convinced of this, we never would have bothered to start The Reporter.”

Ascoli was both anti-fascist and anti-communist. His attitudes stemmed from a strong conviction about the power of American ideas and values and about the ability of liberal democracy to weather the exchange of those ideas. Today, no less than when America was battling first fascism and later communism, the public needs the time and opportunity to become better informed about the dangers presented by the country’s ideological enemies so
as to be able to weigh the options available to U.S. foreign policymakers. In short, it is high time that we conduct a very public and very broad debate on how to wage a war of ideas against Islamic extremism.

Lesson Four: On the Responsibilities of the Public Intellectual

For the conformist decade of the 1950s, the Reporter was a highly provocative magazine. It was the first American magazine to devote an entire issue to Joseph McCarthy. Ascoli had strong feelings about the senator and had voiced his opinion to Adolf Berle that McCarthyism looked a lot like fascism.\textsuperscript{27} The Reporter also criticized American policy on matters ranging from the China Lobby to the effects of radioactive fall-out, wiretapping, and the misuse of lie detectors.\textsuperscript{28} Ascoli would engage in intellectual debates with the likes of Walter Lippmann and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and he recruited such contributors as Theodore H. White, Dwight MacDonald, Vladimir Nabokov, Diana Trilling, Henry Kissinger, and Dean Acheson.

The Reporter would be published for nearly twenty years. The Vietnam War—and the dissolution of the Cold War consensus—was largely to blame for Ascoli’s decision to stop publication. The final issue of the Reporter was published in June 1968, shortly after Lyndon B. Johnson (whom Ascoli greatly admired) announced he would not be running for reelection. Ascoli had remained a staunch supporter of Johnson’s Vietnam policies and, in the words of the New York Times, had built a “considerable reputation for his anti-Communist liberal views.”\textsuperscript{29} After closing the Reporter, Ascoli moved to the editorial board at Harper’s magazine, but he would resign less than two months later as a consequence of a clash with Arthur Schlesinger Jr.\textsuperscript{30}

Max Ascoli believed that the responsibility of the public intellectual was not to interfere with the making of policy, but to express ideas for the benefit of policymakers and to create a more informed American electorate. “Intellectuals cannot direct politics in place of politicians,” he reminded his readers in Intelligence in Politics. “What intelligence can do is to act in its own domain, working out patterns and ideas that the men of action may in their own way accept, adapt or reinvent. What intelligence can do is to be aware of the modes and characters of its influence, of the conditions under which it gets lost.”\textsuperscript{31}

Just as Ascoli indelibly strove to provide perspective \textit{vis-à-vis} the American response to the ideological threats of fascism and communism, so too might today’s public intellectuals—especially in the academy—step forward to play a more active role in “working out patterns and ideas” in the current wars we face against an equally formidable ideological threat. Whether the current wars on terrorism will be won with ideas is debatable, to be sure. But the lesson that we can learn from Max Ascoli and other public intellectuals of the early Cold War is that we have a responsibility to debate those ideas, not merely to engage our peers, but to educate the public and to encourage a more thoughtful American foreign policy.

Notes:


4. Ibid.


6. The two most notable exceptions are Human Rights advisor Samantha Power and former Stanford University professor Michael McFaul, now American ambassador to Russia. Ironically, perhaps, the Bush administration, led by a singularly unintellectual president, had numerous conservative intellectuals, although most of them hailed from think tanks rather than from academia.


10. Ibid. Ascoli would engage in intellectual debates with the likes of Walter Lippmann and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and he recruited such contributors as Theodore H. White, Dwight MacDonald, Vladimir Nabokov, Diana Trilling, Henry Kissinger, and Dean Acheson.


14. Ibid.


17. In an editorial for the Reporter, the magazine Ascoli founded in 1949, he explained that “the national and international facts . . . affect the lives of the American people can be gathered, selected, and interpreted with a sense of their causes, inter-relation, which . . . can be reported in the American people can do about them.” Max Ascoli, “Our Fifth Annual,” \textit{Reporter}, April 27, 1954, 12.

18. Originally a bastion of socialism, between February and April 1921, the province of Ferrara and its socialist communes fell to the Fascists. By April 1922, all of Ferrara’s twenty-one socialist communes had been overthrown and replaced by the Fascists; Ferrara became a refuge for Mussolini and for the promotion of Fascism throughout Italy. See Paul Corner, \textit{Fascism in Ferrara: 1915–1925} (Oxford, UK, 1972).
22. “Dr. Max Ascoli Gets Pan-American Post,” *New York Times*, September 29, 1941. Originally called the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics, the OCIAA was an organization established by executive order in 1940 by the Roosevelt administration. Thirty-two-year-old Nelson Rockefeller was appointed by FDR as coordinator of inter-American affairs, and Ascoli worked in his office. On March 23, 1945, the name of the organization was again changed to the Office of Inter-American Affairs. President Harry Truman abolished the agency by executive order in March 1946. 23. Gerald K. Haines, “Under the Eagle’s Wing: The Franklin Roosevelt Administration Forges an American Hemisphere,” *Diplomatic History* 1, 4: 373–88.
25. Ibid., 48.
26. Ibid.
27. Among others are the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (www.ispu.org); the Brookings Institution (www.brookings.edu); and the Council on Foreign Relations (www.cfr.org).
32. A professor of corporate law at Columbia Law School, Berle shared many of Ascoli’s convictions regarding the role of the intellectual in American public life. He is best known for *The Modern Corporation and Private Poverty* (1932), a treatise that continues to be recognized as a classic on the relationship between corporate and political power. In his much lesser known book on the role of ideas in politics, Berle wrote, “In longer vision, men will carry on the work of discovering intellectual tools and philosophic principles, in the hope of enlarging the capacity of generations yet unborn to confront conditions and dangers no dawn has yet revealed.” Adolf A. Berle, *Leaning Against the Dawn* (NY: Twentieth Century Fund, 1969).
40. According to Ascoli, Schlesinger was preparing to publish an article for *Harper’s* on the conflict between traditional liberals and theorists of the New Left—an article that Ascoli himself claimed to have been drafting for the same issue of the magazine. Ibid. 41. Ascoli, *Intelligence in Politics*, 278–79.
The 2015 SHAFR meeting will be held from June 25-27 at the Renaissance Arlington Capital View in Arlington, Virginia, site of the 2013 conference. We hope you will join us there!

The conference will kick off its first session at 11:45 on Thursday, June 25 and run through 5:15 on Saturday, June 27. This year’s program features 95 panels and two afternoon plenary sessions.

The Thursday plenary, “Immigration and Foreign Relations: 50 Years since the Hart-Celler Act,” will be held from 4:15 to 6:00. It will be moderated by Brooke L. Blower (Boston University) and feature contributors Maria Cristina Garcia (Cornell University), Alan M. Kraut (American University), and Donna Gabaccia (University of Toronto). A second plenary session will be held on Friday from 4:15 to 6:00 and highlight “New Frontiers: Environmental History and Foreign Relations.”

Jason M. Colby (University of Victoria) will moderate, and participants are Kate Brown (University of Maryland, Baltimore County), Paul Sutter (University of Colorado at Boulder) and W. Jeffrey Bolster (University of New Hampshire).

The presidential luncheon address, “Inside Every Foreigner: How Americans Understand Others,” will be delivered by SHAFR President Thomas “Tim” Borstelmann, the E. N. and Katherine Thompson Professor of Modern World History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. The keynote luncheon speaker, Brian DeLay, Associate Professor of History at the University of California, Berkeley, will discuss “Dambreaking: Guns, Capitalism, and the Independence of the Americas.” Luncheon tickets will be sold separately at $50 standard or $25 for students, adjunct faculty, and K-12 teachers. Once again, the reduced-price luncheon tickets are available for both Friday and Saturday, but please limit to one per person total.

On Friday evening, June 26, we will return to Top of the Town in Alexandria, a venue that features sweeping views of Washington landmarks across the Potomac River. We hope you will be able to join us for a full meal and complimentary beer/wine/soda bar, as well as mingling and relaxation. Tickets will be $50 standard or $30 for students, adjunct faculty, and K-12 teachers. Top of the Town is located within walking distance of the Rosslyn Metro (blue and orange lines). Roundtrip chartered bus tickets will also be available for separate purchase. Space is limited so plan ahead.

The LEED-certified Renaissance Arlington Capital View is located at 2800 South Potomac Avenue, two miles from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (airport code DCA). There is complimentary hotel shuttle service every 20 minutes between 7 am and 11 pm to DCA and the Crystal City Metro (blue and yellow lines). The stretch of Crystal Drive between the hotel and the Metro features a number of restaurants, bars, and retail establishments (see map on following page), ranging from Good Stuff Eatery or Cosi to McCormick and Schmick’s steakhouse or Jaleo Spanish Tapas & Bar. In the Renaissance Arlington Capital View Lobby, SOCCi Urban Italian Kitchen and Bar serves breakfast, lunch, and dinner, while Espressamente illy Coffee House serves coffee and light fare during the day. A 24-hour fitness center and heated indoor pool are also available on site, and there is complimentary wi-fi access in the lobby.

Conference room rates are $159/night, single or double occupancy, plus tax. The tax rate is currently 10%. Hotel guests will receive complimentary high speed internet access in their rooms. On-site parking is available for the reduced rate of $18 per day self-park or $20/day valet.

Hotel reservations can be made by calling the hotel directly at 703-413-1300 and asking for the SHAFR room block, or by going online to http://bit.ly/1v8GCB4. The deadline for receiving the conference rate is May 27, 2015. The hotel is required to honor the reduced rate until this date OR until all the rooms in the SHAFR block have been booked. Once the block is fully booked, the hotel will offer rooms at its usual rate, if any are available, or may even be completely full. Please make your reservation as early as you can.

Printed program booklets and registration forms will be mailed out to all SHAFR members with a current domestic U.S. address in April. Online registration, including luncheon and social event tickets, will be available in early April. Registration fees for the 2015 conference will be:

$85 standard   $35 adjunct faculty or K-12 teacher   $35 student

Please note that there is a late fee after June 1, 2015.

SHAFR would like to thank the William P. Clements Center for Southwestern Studies at Southern Methodist University for its financial support of the 2015 conference.

For more details about conference arrangements, visit http://shafr.org/conferences/annual/2015-annual-meeting or follow us on Twitter @SHAFRConference. For questions about registration and other conference logistics, please contact Jennifer Walton, the Conference Coordinator, at conference@shafr.org.
### RESTAURANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-39</td>
<td>Jaloo Crystal City</td>
<td>413-8181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-50</td>
<td>King Street Blues</td>
<td>415-BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40</td>
<td>Kona Restaurant Bar Lounge</td>
<td>571-431-7090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-51</td>
<td>McCormick &amp; Schmick's</td>
<td>413-6400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-54</td>
<td>Morton's The Steakhouse</td>
<td>416-1444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-45</td>
<td>Naramita Thai</td>
<td>415-8886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-20</td>
<td>Ruth's Chris Steak House</td>
<td>979-7275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-42</td>
<td>San Antonio Bar &amp; Grill</td>
<td>415-0126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-41</td>
<td>Ted's Montana Grill</td>
<td>416-8337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FOOD SPECIALTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-18</td>
<td>Auntie Anne's Pretzels</td>
<td>413-6408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-24</td>
<td>Au Bon Pain</td>
<td>415-0715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-51</td>
<td>Cafe Jenna</td>
<td>415-0061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-15</td>
<td>Cafe Manna</td>
<td>415-0341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-44</td>
<td>Chick-fil-A</td>
<td>415-7815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-10</td>
<td>Chipotle Mexican Grill</td>
<td>920-8779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-42</td>
<td>Cold Stone Creamery</td>
<td>415-2123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-43</td>
<td>Corner Bakery Cafe</td>
<td>412-0131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>Cosi</td>
<td>521-1504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-26</td>
<td>Deli Works</td>
<td>415-1515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>Dickey's Frozen Custard</td>
<td>419-2700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-25</td>
<td>Dunkin' Donuts</td>
<td>412-8512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-46</td>
<td>Good Stuff Eatery</td>
<td>415-4663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-10</td>
<td>Green Leaf Cafe</td>
<td>414-3788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-23</td>
<td>Larry's Ice Cream &amp; Cookies</td>
<td>418-2100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-31</td>
<td>Lilly Bubble Tea &amp; Smoothie</td>
<td>418-8849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-34</td>
<td>Market Basket &amp; Grocery</td>
<td>412-3770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>Noodles &amp; Company</td>
<td>979-1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-18</td>
<td>The Perfect Pita</td>
<td>412-9440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### JEWELRY & ACCESSORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-5</td>
<td>Gina's Fine Jewelry &amp; Gifts</td>
<td>412-1199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-10</td>
<td>Han Time Center</td>
<td>412-1142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-41</td>
<td>Real Jewellers</td>
<td>413-7117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-7</td>
<td>Time Zone</td>
<td>413-0990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-56</td>
<td>Woman In Motion</td>
<td>415-7992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FASHION

#### Men's Wear

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-44</td>
<td>D.C. Men's Wear</td>
<td>413-3434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-17</td>
<td>Executive Menswear</td>
<td>413-8888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Women's Wear

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-35</td>
<td>Crystal Boutique</td>
<td>415-1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-57</td>
<td>Coqui Boutique</td>
<td>413-5441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-55</td>
<td>Danielle's Boutique</td>
<td>412-1121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-61</td>
<td>Dress Barn</td>
<td>412-6906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-36</td>
<td>Garden Fantasy</td>
<td>415-5006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-28</td>
<td>L.A. Moves</td>
<td>415-0500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-59</td>
<td>Possessions</td>
<td>416-7839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HOTELS

- Americana
- Courtyard By Marriott
- Crowne Plaza
In 1991, thirty years after John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as president, Anna Nelson remarked that it would take “a generation of historians with no memories and no expectations” of JFK to “accurately assess” his national security policies. One might reasonably wonder whether that generation has arrived, as the historiographical battles that Nelson observed continue to mark the writing on Kennedy foreign policy. While the passage of time and the incorporation of new sources and methodologies have softened the edges of this debate, the differences are frequently still sharp, and key elements of the man and his presidency remain contested.

The persistence of these tensions is hardly surprising. The Kennedy image and legacy tap into deeply held beliefs about the United States, its role in the world, and the course of modern American history. From Oliver Stone’s provocative rendition of Kennedy’s presidency and assassination, to Bill Clinton’s invocation of JFK for his own political career, to the use of “lessons” from the Kennedy years for Iraq and Afghanistan, references to JFK and his administration have been recurring features of American political culture. This enduring fascination recently reached new heights, as the fiftieth commemoration of the Kennedy presidency allowed publishers, producers, and pundits to bring forth a wave of books, television shows, and public events on the Kennedy presidency and legacy. Not the least of their reasons for doing so were financial: Kennedy sells.

But scholarly interest was also strong. Academics contributed frequently to this conversation and their treatments of Kennedy added to the enormous body of work on his administration, much of which has been catalogued and analyzed in bibliographies and historiographical essays. These materials have appeared in such volume of late that it would make little sense to offer yet another finely detailed study of the literature. Rather, this essay will survey the research on Kennedy more broadly, identify trends in the writing, and consider new avenues for scholarship.

The first major histories of the administration came from Kennedy insiders. Admiring studies by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Theodore Sorensen formed the core of a “Camelot” school of Kennedy historiography, a literature that praised the wit, charm, and style of JFK and lauded his cool, measured approach to policymaking. This writing would also include Roger Hilsman’s review of Kennedy foreign policy. While JFK had his detractors both during his presidency and in the early years thereafter, the bulk of the commentary skewed toward the reverential.

By the early 1970s, the emergence of a more critical strain of writing had become apparent. This revisionism challenged the view of Kennedy as an inspirational leader and crisis manager par excellence. Detractors argued that Kennedy sought confrontation at the expense of diplomacy, imposed American solutions in the face of local realities, heightened international tensions as much as he defused them, and persisted in trying to win the Cold War. Written against the backdrop of the Vietnam War and searching critiques of American foreign relations, these counter-Camelot narratives would dominate the literature and shape the scholarly understanding of Kennedy for years to come.

By the twentieth anniversary of the Kennedy presidency, the literature was firmly in the grip of the revisionist camp. Although William Leuchtenburg detected no historical consensus in his survey of the writing, he noted a “sense of disappointment” that ran through treatments of Kennedy written by liberals as well as conservatives, and not just after his passing but during his presidency as well. Faulting his policies as well as his style, these writers sensed that Kennedy’s macho approach and media savvy ushered in a new, more dangerous template for presidential action. At the same time, Leuchtenburg discerned an inchoate post-revisionism in this work, referencing Michael Harrington’s observation that “within the context of his political and personal limitations, John F. Kennedy grew enormously.” While the nation had not been transformed by his hand, Harrington noted, it was still “better,” and that “was Kennedy’s modest and magnificent achievement.” Nevertheless, Leuchtenburg wrote, scholars would want to move beyond the parlor game of assigning Kennedy to a particular rung on the presidential rankings ladder; social, cultural, even religious critiques, he suspected, would prove more illuminating. Future commentators would face difficulties, though, as Kennedy had become “part of not history but of myth,” a myth that seemed relatively impervious to scholarly input.

That input would continue to find fault with Kennedy, as historians maintained their assault on the Camelot school. Characteristic of this approach were the influential essays collected in Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, edited by Thomas Paterson in 1989, which offered critical takes on policy around the globe. In turn, Anna Nelson, in her 1991 overview of Kennedy national security policy, found several works treating JFK more as a conventional cold warrior than an innovative reformer. Significantly, those works also considered him to be more similar than not to the presidents who came before as well as after him. Even Kennedy’s progressive initiatives in Latin America and Africa, they noted, were grounded in the logic of East-West competition and guided by traditional assumptions about...
the virtues of the American model. In fact, Nelson argued, a “preoccupation with” Kennedy’s cold warrior policies was obscuring their exceptionalist foundation. This idealistic strain lay at the root of Kennedy’s contemporary appeal, yet a later generation of writers would come to see it as the wellspring of Vietnam. “Disillusionment and frustration with the Kennedy promise” fueled the revisionist turn. As Nelson wrote (and as Leuchtenburg had observed ten years earlier), “there is an undertone of anger at being misled, of succumbing to that vision,” that characterized the first stage of Kennedy revisionism.6 Thomas Reeves’s A Question of Character exemplifies the “God that Failed” sense of betrayal informing these works.

In a similar fashion, Burton Kaufman noted in 1993 that it was the substance of Kennedy’s statesmanship that dominated Kennedy revisionism and that scholars had betrayed informing these works.

In 1993, Burton Kaufman noted in 1993 that it was the substance of Kennedy’s statesmanship that dominated Kennedy revisionism and that scholars had betrayed informing these works. In a similar fashion, Burton Kaufman noted in 1993 that it was the substance of Kennedy’s statesmanship that dominated Kennedy revisionism and that scholars had betrayed informing these works.

As the fortieth anniversary of the Kennedy administration approached in 2001, various Kennedy biographies were in the works—an indicator that JFK would have remained an intriguing figure regardless of current events. But the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, made that a fertile moment for exploring the Kennedy presidency anew, setting up a comparison between the most acute periods of crisis in the Cold War and post-post-Cold War eras.

Critiques came from Kennedy alumni as well as from scholars and pundits, and multiplied as the decade wore on.16 Various observers praised JFK as a president who matured in office, and either hailed moves toward all-out war or decided to withdraw from armed conflict entirely.17 Whether discussions of Kennedy focused on his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin Wall, or Southeast Asia, they were frequently refracted through the more contemporary lenses of South Asia and the Middle East. And it was largely during this period that a new portrait of Kennedy emerged. He was now seen as having a greater capacity for restraint, flexibility, and empathy than earlier leaders, just as the Camelot works had made him out to be. He was, in short, a paragon of presidential timber.

It was in this post-9/11 context that scholars published the awaited crop of Kennedy biographies and studies of the Kennedy presidency. Robert Dallek offered a consensus appraisal of Kennedy foreign policy, chiding JFK for his obsession with Fidel Castro, lauding him for his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and speculating that Kennedy’s emerging approaches to the U.S.S.R. and the war in Vietnam might well have yielded positive results in a second presidential term. Michael O’Brien offered a roughly comparable assessment; he too saw evidence of Kennedy growing in office, though he thought it less clear that such maturation would have led inexorably to a withdrawal from Vietnam. James Giglio, who has devoted much of his career to studying Kennedy, came to a similar conclusion. His interpretive evolution tracks well with the broader scholarly trend, as additional research on his
part, and the flowering of the literature as a whole, gave his revised volume on the Kennedy presidency, which appeared in 2006, a more solidly post-revisionist cast. While commentary during this period often contrasted JFK’s preference for diplomacy and multilateralism with the perceived unilateralism and militarism of President George W. Bush, the lessons of Kennedy’s statesmanship received at least as much play during the presidency of Barack Obama. Advocates for and against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan took sides in the “Battle of the Books,” lining up behind volumes purporting to offer guidelines on how to stay out of wars or to end them altogether. Much of this discussion built upon post-revisionist treatments of Kennedy by Fredrik Logevall and Howard Jones, which highlighted Kennedy’s reluctance to overly militarize the Vietnam conflict and speculated about his intentions there in a second administration. This renewed appreciation for Kennedy was attributable not just to reactions against the invasions in South Asia and the Middle East but to the evolution of scholarship on his administration. New evidence from Kennedy’s White House tapes and national security memoranda was leading scholars to see him as more skeptical of military advice and intervention. And while it remains clear that JFK contributed to the very conflicts his administration confronted, these materials helped to reframe developments in hot spots such as Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam.

While post-revisionism may have been the order of the day, assessments of the writing still clung to a generally revisionist approach. This interpretive slant was evident in various compendiums on the foreign relations literature published in the twenty-first century. The massive American Foreign Relations since 1600 (commonly known as the SHAFR Guide), is one such example. While the number and range of studies in this revised 2003 volume defy easy categorization, that more critical perspective shows through nonetheless. Many of these works note the failures and missteps of the Kennedy team, as well as the disjointed nature of administration policy.

A Companion to American Foreign Relations, published in 2006, offers a more richly annotated bibliography than that found in the SHAFR Guide, though it maintains that more pointed take on the Kennedy administration. Surveying the relevant literature on both Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, excluding those works focusing on Vietnam, Randall Woods finds that both administrations “suffered from a basic contradiction,” as their efforts to promote diversity abroad and ameliorate global conditions were largely trumped by their own staunchly held anti-communist beliefs. Covering an array of subjects—including superpower relations, intelligence, and nuclear issues, regional concerns in Europe and Latin America, and the Cuban and Berlin crises—Woods notes that the Kennedy team could brook no challenges to the status quo without seeing some disadvantage to U.S. interests. Moreover, its obsession with Cuba would distort hemispheric relations, much as America’s expanded effort in Vietnam would distort its relations with the rest of the world. While largely adopting the counter-Camelot perspective, Woods’s summation of Kennedy’s detractors underplays, perhaps, the extent to which scholars have viewed Kennedy as seeking victory in the Cold War.

That more critical view of JFK is evident in the Cambridge History of the Cold War, published in 2010. Presented in analytical chapters that allow for a more interpretive approach than those found in either the SHAFR Guide or A Companion to American Foreign Relations, critiques of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidencies stress the ideological continuities, if not the strategic and tactical consistencies, that ran through each administration. In his piece on Kennedy and Johnson, Frank Costigliola highlights the “Kennedyites” exaggeration of threats to U.S. interests, their unwarranted confidence in America’s ability to reshape local and international realities, and their preference for anti-communist stability when confronted with potentially radical change. Animated by a fierce Wilsonianism, these policymakers exhibited a missionary zeal and hawkish posture that marked them as conventional cold warriors. In a less strident assessment of the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, Robert McMahon nonetheless gravitates toward a similar conclusion. While JFK’s sympathy for Third World nationalism, economic development, and the strategy of “flexible response” suggested a less rigid approach than that of his predecessor, these innovations, McMahon argues, allowed his administration “to prosecute the Cold War with greater vigor.” Indeed, Kennedy thought that his more activist approach was vital, as he perceived the United States to be losing ground to the Soviets worldwide. Whatever modifications he drafted onto the national security bureaucracy and adopted with regard to policy, they were in the service, McMahon argues, of winning the Cold War.

My own volume on Kennedy historiography, A Companion to John F. Kennedy, offers a range of studies that tack toward the revisionist as well as the post-revisionist poles. These pieces survey a literature that has remained vigorous in recent years, likely in anticipation of the fiftieth anniversary commemorations, with significant works of scholarship on virtually all fronts appearing within the last decade. Foremost among them are volumes examining Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam—“Kennedy’s Wars,” as Lawrence Freedman termed them. The Berlin literature has downplayed the personal nature of the duel between Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, with the episode now being integrated more thoroughly into the broader history of the Cold War. Rather than seeing Kennedy as fueling the crisis, scholars have been emphasizing the diplomatic context in which he operated and the demands of alliance diplomacy. Recent literature has been multiarchival and has also explored the roles of non-state actors, domestic politics, and culture. In the end, though, JFK seems to have stood at the center of events, even as Berlin became enmeshed in larger policy matters. And to Andreas Daum, Kennedy appears to have been a generally successful manager of the crisis and the alliance.

The Vietnam literature shares this post-revisionist cast. To Andrew Preston, it reveals that Kennedy “was neither hero nor villain, but human, and that his Vietnam policies were neither far-sighted nor myopic but pragmatic responses to circumstance.” It has not always been thus. Initial accounts, which downplayed Kennedy’s hawkishness or culpability, soon gave way to critical studies emphasizing his commitment to victory and eagerness to fight the decade’s brushfire wars. These works, in turn, have yielded to those portraying Kennedy as a “conflicted warrior,” even as his limited engagement paved the way for Johnson’s ultimate Americanization. Indeed, while JFK increased the U.S. commitment to Vietnam in terms of military aid, advisers, and economic assistance, his precise reasons for doing so remain unclear. Most recently, the literature has emphasized his caution and reluctance, with some scholars seeing Kennedy angling for disengagement from the conflict altogether.

The writing on Laos falls into this post-revisionist category as well. According to Seth Jacobs, historians have generally given Kennedy high marks for his handling of this early challenge in his presidency. Seeing great difficulty in taking on the communist Pathet Lao, Kennedy deflected calls for armed intervention and moved the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. His desire to avoid both escalation and humiliation resulted in an agreement—albeit a shaky one from the start—to create a neutral coalition government. Nevertheless, he continued to push for U.S. advantage and recognized...
that his diplomatic gambit in Laos all but dictated a more belligerent response in Vietnam. In the end, as William Rust has argued, Kennedy tried to avoid the hard choices, seeking the proverbial middle ground that a generation of policymakers had tried to will into being. 

More critical of JFK are those studies that delve into his policy toward Cuba and Latin America. Scholars continue to fault the administration for its broad approach to Fidel Castro and his revolutionary government, from the Bay of Pigs through Operation Mongoose and beyond. While the writing on the missile crisis still grants Kennedy high marks for his performance once engaged, even that praise is less fulsome, for the more we know about those thirteen days in October 1962, the more a peaceful outcome seems to have rested on luck as much as it did skill. Moreover, Kennedy's near obsession with Castro colored his approach to Latin America as a whole, even as he tried to endow U.S. policy with a more constructive approach. Historians have generally given Kennedy his lowest marks for this facet of his foreign policy. His administration failed to accomplish its goal of refashioning hemispheric relationships; instead it maintained the imperialistic approach to the region it had hoped to redress. As would be the case elsewhere, Cold War imperatives trumped progressive change, with policymakers shunning local solutions and strengthening authoritarian leaders. 

Historians have also been critical of Kennedy's handling of European issues. To be sure, scholars have noted the range and difficulty of the challenges Kennedy faced as he sought to encourage greater self-confidence among Europeans while still seeking to retain control over the ultimate direction of continental affairs. Nevertheless, the consensus is that Kennedy failed to create the interlocking relationships of his “Grand Design.” His vision of greater economic and security cooperation crumbled as a result of French assertiveness. But JFK also had to contend with British and West German displeasure, as the failures of Skybolt and the Multilateral Force, and the nettlesome problem of Berlin, exposed the political dimensions of European defense. These developments also highlighted Kennedy’s inability to have Europe shoulder more of that defense burden, a failure that perpetuated the balance-of-payments deficit. 

JFK also had to contend with British and West German displeasure, as the failures of Skybolt, the Multilateral Force, and the nettlesome problem of Berlin, exposed the political dimensions of European defense. These developments also highlighted Kennedy’s inability to have Europe shoulder more of that defense burden, a failure that perpetuated the balance-of-payments deficit. While he hoped to correct that imbalance, and though he largely succeeded in preserving American prosperity in the short term, Kennedy was unable to prevent the broader economic “slide” that would become apparent in the coming years, as Thomas Zeiler observed. Still, while Europe continued to be a drain on American resources, Kennedy bequeathed to Johnson a Europe that was “better disposed to American leadership,” as Andrew Priest frames it, than it had been earlier in his presidency. 

In contrast to the voluminous “crisis scholarship” and work on other regional issues, interest in JFK’s approach to the Middle East was slow to materialize. Yet the oil shocks of the 1970s and the Iranian Revolution, and better access to the relevant documents, drew greater attention to these and related subjects. Much of the writing has focused on Iran and Kennedy’s role in perpetuating the rule of the Shah. But there is also a more wide-ranging literature, addressing developments in Iraq and Kuwait, and examining Kennedy’s approach to Nasser, the Saudis, and the Yemeni civil war. Israeli and Arab concerns are also key elements of this scholarship. Warren Bass, for instance, highlights the administration’s efforts to accommodate both Arab and Israeli needs through military and economic aid, while moving to cement U.S. support for Israel in the process. Scholars were initially sympathetic to Kennedy’s efforts in the region, but more recent work has criticized him for misreading local developments.

As with the writing on the Middle East, the literature on Africa and the non-aligned world has expanded significantly in recent years, even though scholars had long noted Kennedy’s interest in post-colonial states and their position between East and West. The historiography has treated JFK alternately as a visionary pioneer and an orthodox cold warrior, with the analysis now becoming more complex and incorporating the voices of Africans themselves. A more mature post-revisionism is thus beginning to come into focus, as this newer strain of scholarship seeks to evaluate Kennedy’s policy on its own terms. According to Philip Muehlenbeck, JFK showed markedly more interest than Eisenhower in supporting nationalist aspirations on the continent, and he proved more willing than his successors to bet on the Africans. Robert Rakove sees the greater availability of relevant documents and the move toward more sweeping accounts of Kennedy policy as prompting this more measured approach; he recognizes the downside of Kennedy’s modernization policies, but nevertheless finds JFK more “cautious, prudent, and aware” of how limited American power was in the decolonizing world. Yet according to Mark Lawrence, questions still remain as to whether the differences between Kennedy’s and Eisenhower’s policies were “real or merely rhetorical,” as JFK inclined ever more toward Cold War assumptions and American solutions over the course of his administration. Solutions to the problems posed by China were particularly hard to come by. Beijing’s perceived fanaticism and belligerence, which were evident in both its condemnation of Moscow following the Cuban missile crisis and the war it waged on India in the midst of it, indicated to Kennedy that Beijing, rather than Moscow, was the more significant threat over the long term. Adding to his concern was China’s pending acquisition of the bomb—a development so fraught with danger that Kennedy entertained the prospect of a joint U.S.-Soviet strike on China’s nuclear facilities. This proposed coordination highlights not only the emerging détente between Washington and Moscow following October 1962, but Kennedy’s willingness to lean to one side in the Communists’ intramural clash. It is unclear whether Kennedy would have retained that posture in a second term. While aides would eventually push for engaging rather than isolating China, domestic political considerations made Kennedy leery of any move toward accommodation. Nevertheless, as Noam Kochavi relates, Kennedy’s ability to combine the “conventional with the creative” may well have created the context for the opening to China that came within a decade.

Although the chapters offered on these and other developments in A Companion to John F. Kennedy were largely able to address the extant literature on JFK, they could not accommodate the outpouring of additional work timed to the fiftieth anniversary of Kennedy’s assassination. Yet in many respects, these works tracked well within the grooves of existing studies, as scholars, journalists, and pundits offered a surfeit of commentary on Kennedy’s achievements and foibles. The emphasis on the latter was muted, however. Evaluations focused on more positive aspects of JFK’s tenure: his ability to inspire a generation to service; his efforts to recast the public rhetoric of the Cold War; his commitment, albeit tardy, to civil rights legislation; and probably most of all, his skepticism about...
the virtues of armed escalation, tied to an empathy for what adversaries might be thinking and feeling, which together contributed to the modulating of superpower tensions. If not quite Camelot, many nonetheless recalled the era as a time of optimism and opportunity.43

Still, the counter-Camelot ethos was evident. Authors of key works on Kennedy and the presidency scored JFK’s “celebrity” status, judged him a “calculating pragmatist,” and found him “a compartmentalized man, with much to hide, comfortable with secrets and lies.”44 The weight of these and other scholarly interpretations may well be shaping a durable and chastened appraisal of Kennedy among the public at large. For in spite of opinion polls regularly attesting to Kennedy’s popular appeal, journalist Adam Clymer reports that school textbooks are now incorporating these less sympathetic critiques. Having dispensed with their mythologized portraits of a tragic, charismatic hero, they now depict a “deeply flawed” leader “whose oratory outstripped his accomplishments.”45 Even allowing for the recognition of Kennedy’s maturation and improvement while in office—a view that is increasingly in evidence—that more critical strain of writing, whether focused on Kennedy’s personal or political failings, is the image being passed to a new generation. It also remains evident in scholarly “state of the field” surveys aimed at the next generation of undergraduate and graduate students. The Cambridge History essays point in this direction, as does Stephen Rabe’s review of the literature, albeit less markedly, in the revised volume of America in the World.46 Despite efforts at crafting a more nuanced, post-revisionist portrait of Kennedy, the counter-Camelot energy of an earlier era remains strong.47

What has emerged, then, is a literature that remains divided on key elements of Kennedy foreign policy. It has consistently lauded Kennedy for his caution during moments of crisis, when the time frame for decision-making and tests of nerve was a matter of weeks or days. Scholars inevitably point to Kennedy’s handling of the Berlin and Cuban missile crises when they offer praise for his prudence and caution. Nevertheless, in matters which involved longer-term policymaking—even when Kennedy’s strategic approach reflected a desire to accommodate the forces of history, such as the power of nationalism—the perceived demands of short-term needs carried the day. This emphasis on time, then, as Mark White pointed out in his 1998 survey of the literature, remains a valuable way to think about Kennedy’s policymaking. Moving forward, scholars may wish to explore further the exigencies of time and to integrate their effect on policymaking into a compelling, overarching explanation of Kennedy’s foreign policy.

They may wish to go further, though, in an effort to transcend a dialectic that continues to shape the writing. While the literature can certainly accommodate additional orthodox and revisionist studies, and the resource base may yet provide new fodder for the Camelot and counter-Camelot perspectives, we still await a new interpretive model to invigorate the subject. To be sure, methodological innovations have added significantly to the literature. As noted previously, gendered critiques and racial analyses have helped to refresh the ways we think about the New Frontiersmen, and one would expect Kennedy’s White House tapes, along with the digitized versions of FRUS and assorted memoranda available through the National Security Archive or Kennedy Library, to contribute further to studies exploring the influence of this rhetoric and these assumptions.48 But we will likely need to look outside the White House, and outside the United States as well, for new inspiration.49

The prevalence of Kennedy iconography on foreign shores, for instance, whether in the form of street names, statues, or political style, reflects the global reach of the Kennedy imprint. It also highlights the disconnect between the way that Kennedy is seen by many Latin Americans and the way the scholarship has treated him, suggesting that Kennedy’s broader contribution to the politics and culture of friends, adversaries, and neutrals might be worthy of additional study.50 In fact, Kennedy’s reception abroad parallels that of Ronald Reagan, who has generally suffered at the hands of academics at home—a dynamic that hints at the value of comparative work on these two leaders.51 While popular studies and articles exploring their connections appeared during the recent Kennedy commemoration, more nuanced scholarship on these iconic figures, who served as touchstones for their eras, may reveal deeper themes running through modern American history.52

Likewise, more comparative work on other American presidents, especially on those who directly preceded and succeeded Kennedy, may serve as openings for the literature. Several books on Eisenhower, for instance, appeared in recent years, though not in the kind of fevered market commemorating Kennedy.53 Still, their appearance was timely: with the hubris, overreach, and mismanagement of U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan on full display, the sober, realistic, and restrained actions of a more centrist Republican administration offered considerable food for thought. More work on such “continuity scholarship,” exploring the links between Kennedy and Eisenhower, or Kennedy and Johnson, may yield additional insight.

Advances in the study of the presidency itself might further our understanding of Kennedy foreign policy, even as those terms of reference remain problematic. The presidency has long been frowned upon as a satisfactory organizing principle within the academy, and a focus on Kennedy foreign policy seems in tension with a sub-field adopting an ever wider range of vision.54 Nevertheless, related fields are looking to recast presidential study, endowing it with greater analytical rigor and disciplinary relevance. Microhistories, which illuminate their subjects by viewing them against the backdrop of their context, might be helpful in shedding light on the nature of executive power and the limits of presidential action. In this regard, a closer look at the tensions between agency and structure might further clarify Kennedy’s room for maneuver, the basis for his assumptions, and the rationale behind various plans and objectives.

At the same time, the macrohistory of the Kennedy brand in American politics is also ripe for continued exploration. Beyond the plethora of Kennedys who have served in the legislative and executive branches, the uses of JFK as a legitimizing agent have highlighted the roles of analogy and memory in American political culture. Larry Sabato’s The Kennedy Half-Century recently sought to explore this dynamic, charting the ways in which political figures have appropriated elements of the Kennedy style for their own programs and purposes.55 The proximity of Kennedy figures to Barack Obama’s presidential campaigns, policies, and administrations testifies to the perceived value of this connection, as had Bill Clinton’s earlier invocation of the Kennedy mystique.56

For Democrats and liberals, therefore, JFK remains a potent source of inspiration. In fact, it is Kennedy’s liberalism, as David Greenberg has argued, that lies at the heart of his enduring appeal.57 Yet authors and pundits across the political spectrum, including Republicans from Ronald Reagan forward, have made use of the Kennedy name. Some have gone further and tried to claim Kennedy as a conservative icon, referencing his positions on tax cuts, trade expansion, and American power.58 While the focus on Kennedy’s liberal or conservative bona fides may say more about this historical moment than about Kennedy himself, the image of JFK is sufficiently powerful to prompt us to reconsider the many ways in which we live in his shadow.
and live out his legacy.

We remain ambivalent about that legacy. Kennedy was able to keep his powder dry—in Berlin, Cuba, Laos, even, arguably, in Vietnam—when he was being pushed do otherwise. Yet he had amassed so much powder—through provocative action as well as rhetoric—that a catastrophic explosion, if we were to re-run the tape, would now seem the more likely result. Likewise, the good intentions he directed toward Latin America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East would go only so far, leaving to LBJ the task of seeing through projects and policies that were either ill-formed, ill-funded, or ill-considered. Perhaps this discordant image of Kennedy merely reflects his own conflicted approach to the world as he found and would act in it; perhaps in the end, he really was a man playing for time, solving the problems of today, tabling the concerns of tomorrow. It was a practice he knew well, whether managing his mortality, his mistresses, or nuclear missiles. He was indeed a political animal, extremely well versed in the art of the possible.

And we will likely retain our fascination with him, and continue to explore his presidency, his policies, his character, his life—and his afterlife—for years to come.

For Kennedy possessed that rakish quality, in his public as well as his private affairs, that both attracts and repels. The essayist Caitlin Flanagan might have come closest to capturing this persistent allure. Detailing his spectacular improprieties, and his ability to get out of one scrape after another, she writes, “We’re not supposed to like men like that; the ones who put in a boorish performance at it, we loathe. But the ones who can pull it off—God help us.”59 Like him or not, Kennedy remains elusive, though time may be catching up with him.60 As the glow of his fiftieth anniversary recedes from view, we creep closer to that generation of historians who can approach JFK with “no memories and no expectations,” as Anna Nelson put it. In all likelihood, however, its arrival is still some years away.

Notes:
12. Ibid., 14. At the same time, White recognized that Kennedy did think about the Soviets over the long haul. 13. Ibid., 15.

21. For targeted discussion of these conflicts, see Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (Oxford, 2010).


29. For a survey of this literature, see Jeff Woods, “Brushfire Wars,” Kennedy Companion, 436-57. 


33. See, for instance, Mordechai Gazit, President Kennedy’s Policy toward the Arab States and Israel (Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1983); Douglas Little, “From Even-Headed to Empty-Headed: Seeking Order in the Middle East,” Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, 156-77. 

34. For a broader discussion, see Philip Nash, “Nuclear Issues,” Kennedy Companion, 458-77. Significant works include Andreas Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons (Routledge, 2007); Alessandra Cattaneo, “Can Kennedy Survive the Cuban Missile Crisis?” in Kennedy Companion, 209-27. 


47. In addition to the softer revisionist or post-revisionist works cited above, see the literature review in Campbell Craig, “Kennedy’s International Legacy, Fifty Years On,” International Affairs 89 (2013) 6: 1367-78.


50. Rabe, “Cold War Presidents,” 131-33; see also the previously cited JAH roundtable on diplomatic history, as well as Matthew Connelly, et. al., “SHAfR in the World,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review 42 (September 2011), 2: 4-16.


52. Rabe, “Cold War Presidents,” 131-33; see also the previously cited JAH roundtable on diplomatic history, as well as Matthew Connelly, et. al., “SHAfR in the World,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review 42 (September 2011), 2: 4-16.


54. Rabe, “Cold War Presidents,” 131-33; see also the previously cited JAH roundtable on diplomatic history, as well as Matthew Connelly, et. al., “SHAfR in the World,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review 42 (September 2011), 2: 4-16.


56. Rieff, “Cold War Presidents,” 131-33; see also the previously cited JAH roundtable on diplomatic history, as well as Matthew Connelly, et. al., “SHAfR in the World,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review 42 (September 2011), 2: 4-16.


58. Rabe, “Cold War Presidents,” 131-33; see also the previously cited JAH roundtable on diplomatic history, as well as Matthew Connelly, et. al., “SHAfR in the World,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review 42 (September 2011), 2: 4-16.


CALL FOR PROPOSALS TO HOST THE 2016 SHAFR SUMMER INSTITUTE

The SHAFR Summer Institute Oversight Committee welcomes proposals to host the 2016 SHAFR Summer Institute.

The Institute is intended to provide advanced graduate students and junior faculty with the chance to engage in intense discussion with senior scholars on topics and methodologies related to the study of foreign policy and/or international history. It also serves as an opportunity for all participants, senior scholars included, to test ideas and themes related to their own research.

To underwrite the Institute, SHAFR will provide $45,000, which includes a $5,000 stipend for each of the two co-organizers; a small stipend, travel, and room expenses for the participants; and other costs. Organizers are encouraged to seek additional funding, either by subsidies or in-kind support, from their home institutions. Those who wish to host the 2016 Summer Institute at a location outside of the United States and who believe that funds beyond $45,000 would be needed are encouraged to submit a proposal together with a request for supplementary funds.


The Institute can take place in the five days prior to or just following the annual SHAFR conference in June 2016, which will be held in San Diego. The Institute can be held at the host’s home institution or at the SHAFR conference site. The Summer Institute Oversight Committee will work with the organizers of successful proposals to promote the goals of the Summer Institute.

Those interested in applying to host in 2016 should prepare a proposal including (1) the title of the Institute they wish to conduct; (2) a description (no more than three pages) of the themes to be pursued during the Institute and how it will be organized; (3) the preferred audience (grad students, junior faculty, or both); (4) a brief statement of how the substance of the proposed Institute and recruitment of participants will contribute to SHAFR’s commitment to diversity and internationalization; (5) a statement on funding secured from home institutions; and (6) contact information and concise c.v.s of the co-organizers.

Proposals should be sent to shafr@osu.edu by May 15, 2015. Questions can be directed to Peter L. Hahn, Executive Director, at Hahn.29@osu.edu.
Fifty years ago this month, on April 27, 1965, a few unarmed U.S. Marines off the USS Boxer landed in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic, to evacuate some one thousand U.S. citizens and other foreigners in the Hotel Embajador who feared they would be targets in a civil conflict between Dominicans. The following day, a helicopter squadron airlifted a far larger group—530 armed marines—into Santo Domingo to clear the U.S. embassy and evacuate bystanders. By May 1, more marines, in addition to most of the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, were in Santo Domingo, but this time for a different purpose: to keep the two sides from fighting and thus to reinforce the right-wing military, which was losing to a group that President Lyndon Johnson had concluded could be dominated by communists. The U.S. intervention force eventually turned into the Inter-American Peace Force, or IAPF.

One could argue that, for several reasons, the history of the Dominican intervention should be as prominent as that of the 1954 CIA-orchestrated coup against reformist president Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. First, the U.S. contingent was one of the largest forces of regulars ever mobilized in Latin America, and the occupation that followed the landing lasted over a year. Second, the intervention laid bare the flawed intelligence gathering and analytical processes of the Johnson administration when confronted with social revolution and prompted anti-Americanism both in the Dominican Republic and beyond. Third, the intervention impacted the country and the region profoundly: it devastated the Dominican left and showed that the U.S. government was willing to jettison the U.S. Good Neighbor Policy pledge of non-intervention and replace it with a new model of intervention justified ex post facto by a veneer of either diplomatic or military multilateralism. In other words, the causes and consequences of the Dominican intervention revealed major patterns and pivot points in U.S. policy in Latin America and beyond, which remained relevant after the Cold War. Waves of historical scholarship have analyzed the intervention from various angles. Most have seen it as an overreaction on the part of the Johnson administration. The contributions of Dominican historians are rarely analyzed in historiographies of the episode, but they are enormously helpful.

The first of the characteristics of the intervention—its size and duration—is the least controversial and therefore the least examined by historians. But it yields a few lessons about memory and civil-military relations. Most journalists and scholars have underreported the number of U.S. troops involved, citing 20,000 to 23,000 “marines.” It is true that the number of marines, soldiers, and airmen on Dominican soil peaked at 23,850 in mid-May 1965. But if one includes the thirty-eight naval ships positioned offshore and the other navy and air force units close by in the Caribbean—including Group 44.9, the Caribbean Ready Group—the troops guarding the island totaled around 42,000.1 This figure eclipses any mobilization of U.S. forces to Latin America in the twentieth century, including the Punitive Expedition of 1916, the taking of Grenada in 1983, and the Panama invasion of 1989. While the Spanish-American War involved more troops over its many theatres, perhaps only 17,000 troops landed in Cuba. The Mexican-American War also drew more troops, but only 27,000 regulars served. The rest were volunteers. The only more substantial mobilizations were those in Panama and the Caribbean islands during World War II, and they were not sent to confront Latin Americans.

The IAPF was formally established on May 23, 1965. Its commander was General Hugo Alvim of Brazil, and it included 1,130 of Alvim’s compatriots, 250 Hondurans, 184 Paraguayans, 160 Nicaraguans, a few Costa Ricans and Salvadorans, and, as of June 26, 12,400 U.S. forces.2 It remained nominally neutral while U.S. and Organization of American States (OAS) diplomats facilitated discussions between the leftist leader of the Constitutionalist movement, Francisco Caamaño, and his Loyalist opponent, Antonio Imbert. The two agreed in late summer on an interim president and elections in 1966. The last U.S. troops departed after the June 1 vote elevated Joaquín Balaguer to the presidency.

Military analysts of this complicated sequence of events have drawn lessons primarily about civil-military relations, and positive ones to boot. The most important military memoir is that of U.S. Army General Bruce Palmer Jr., commander of the U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic and Alvim’s deputy. Palmer complained rightly in his 1989 tome that writers gave insufficient attention to the U.S. Army and the IAPF by labeling the action a “marine” intervention. He praised the military for its collaboration with and appropriate deference to diplomats, most notably U.S. Ambassador to the OAS Ellsworth Bunker, who led the negotiations. Palmer claimed that Bunker was “clearly in charge” and that the Dominican Republic set “a good example” of productive civil-military relations. He added that because of the U.S. intervention, “the Dominican Republic in a political sense has been a success story for the more than twenty years since.”3 Howard Shaffer, in his biography, also finds that Bunker did a remarkable diplomatic job in finding a provisional Dominican president in the second half of 1965 and then keeping that president alive until the election. He called the Dominican crisis “probably Bunker’s finest diplomatic hour.”4

The most complete military analysis, however, is Lawrence Yates’s Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965–1966, which takes its title from the operation’s formal name. Yates points to some problems with the intervention. The military, for instance, complained that the CIA did not share enough information. It was also “impossible” to tell whether psychological warfare campaigns won the hearts and minds of Dominicans because, among other things, questionnaires were tailored to elicit answers favorable to interviewers, and Dominicans tended to be friendly in private but abusive in public. Generally, U.S. and IAPF soldiers remained frustrated by a long stalemate with no military solution.5

Overall, however, like Palmer, Yates assesses the intervention as “successful” because it prevented a communist takeover of the Dominican government and achieved a political settlement between warring factions.
He cites several facts to support his conclusion: no group intervened in the evacuation, which eventually included 6,500 people; no harm came to foreign nationals; and the corridor surrounding the Colonial Zone, which was manned by the IAPF, allowed 50,000 individuals to cross in and out. Yates agrees with Palmer that the military did a superb job of aiding in negotiations. He also points out that the intervention was notable for adding the term “stability operations” to the U.S. military lexicon.9

There the huzzahs mostly end. More critical appraisals—and the great bulk of studies of the Dominican intervention—have been concerned not so much with the conduct of the invasion force as with the motivations for sending it. After initial evacuations in late April 1965, Lyndon Johnson changed his rationale for keeping U.S. forces on the ground. No longer concerned only with saving American lives, the president made a televised statement on May 2 to the effect that “what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice, very shortly moved and was taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators.”77

Accordingly, U.S. troops established the corridor around the Colonial Zone to encircle the Constitutionalists, who held valuable territory but could not leave Santo Domingo for the interior. The president was correct to the extent that on April 24, a revolt began as a social revolution. Dominican officers calling themselves Constitutionalists overthrew the anti-Bosch government of Donald Reid Cabral. They wanted the return of President Juan Bosch, who was overthrown in 1963. The Constitutionalists soon faced the more powerful Loyalists but were able to keep them out of the city center by holding the bridge over the Ozama River in what Dominicans still consider a heroic battle. Johnson faced the possibility that a Constitutionalist victory might lead to the return of Bosch, whom the Kennedy administration had already assessed as too soft on communism.

In this, Johnson’s most controversial policy decision in Latin America, the dominant question for historians has been, was Johnson correct to send the troops? Johnson claimed to have saved the country from not simply communists but international communists. He cited intelligence reports proving that Cuban-controlled communists had taken over the rebellion. Such a rationale garnered approval both in Congress and among the public. Some reporters and diplomats on the scene backed the Johnson story, and two Dominican Marxists, J. I. Quello and Narciso Isa Conde, revealed late in 1965 that they certainly intended on taking power once the Loyalists were defeated.9

Still, the initial characterizations of the action on the ground by the Johnson administration were wildly off the mark, and the first wave of books about the Dominican intervention, by journalists such as Tad Szulc and Dan Kurzman, debunked exaggerations about mayhem in the street, threats to U.S. citizens, and Cuban influence.8 Non-U.S. journalists witnessing the events were even more critical, and not just of the Johnson decision. Mexico’s Juan Miguel de Mora related several incidents of U.S. brutality. Gregorio Ortega, writing for the Cuban press, denounced “neutrality,” “multilateralism,” and “peacekeeping” as misleading U.S. rhetoric indicative of pop culture conditioning. “Such crude images spring from films about cowboys, gangsters, and Tarzan, of adventures in the far corners of the earth, in which the ‘good guys’ are always the Yankees, and the ‘bad guys’ are the Indians, the natives, those born in the country who fight for the freedom of their peoples.”10

In the decade that followed, historians and scholars abandoned much of this anger and delved more deeply into the question of whether Johnson, regardless of his paranoia, was nevertheless right to fear a communist takeover. Theodore Draper—whose book Walter LaFeber called “the first important account” of the intervention—and Abraham Lowenthal, who interviewed many of the participants, were deeply skeptical.11 But Jerome Slater confronts several of Draper’s claims directly and largely justifies the intervention. He evinces “not the slightest doubt” that the “overwhelming factor” in the advice the U.S. embassy and the State Department gave Johnson to intervene was “that the apparently imminent constitutionalist victory would pose an unacceptable risk of a Communist takeover.”78 He adds that critics ignored “the incontrovertible evidence of a very considerable Communist role among the rank-and-file armed civilians, who soon outnumbered the original military participants by almost four to one.” This statement could easily be misread. It does not claim that communists outnumbered non-communists four to one, but that civilians outnumbered the military. Slater concedes that communist or Castroist groups “never succeeded in getting ‘control’ of the movement.”12

This second wave of scholarship crested when Piero Gleijeses, after interviewing scores of Dominicans, forcefully argued in his first book that the LBJ administration feared not so much direct involvement by Havana or Moscow but the long-term consequences of another Bosch regime, which in its view meant the slow coopting of Bosch reformism by a Fidel Castro-type revolution, alignment with the Soviets, and elimination of U.S. investments and influence.13 Having reviewed all available documents, Gleijeses reiterates his argument in a recent update, but his insight that Dominicans had the most accurate evidence was not picked up by most other historians.14 Meanwhile, Dominicans themselves (and other Latin Americans and Spaniards) continue to produce the most comprehensive collections of narratives, memoirs, photographs, chronologies, and diplomatic documents from all sides of the dispute.15

Additional documents and tape recordings made available in the 1980s and 1990s prompted others to ask precisely where responsibility for the intervention lay in Washington. Eric Thomas Chester gained access to documents from McGeorge Bundy and Arthur Schlesinger, and he places much of the responsibility for the direction of the intervention on Thomas Mann, Johnson’s assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs. From the beginning, Chester shows, Mann intended to put together a provisional, “non-political” government that would avoid social reform and keep the military intact.16

After listening to all the taped White House telephone conversations on the crisis, I reached a similar conclusion, but I add in my article on the intervention that the president bore the greatest responsibility. Afraid of domestic reprisals, he encouraged aides to distort evidence, ignored reasonable skeptics, and grew hostile with the press. Mann certainly did have a solution early on, as the following conversation, barely two days into the crisis, indicated:

JOHNSON: We’re going to have to really set up that government down there and run it and stabilize it some way or other. This Bosch is no good. . . .

MANN: He’s no good at all. . . . If we don’t get a
decent government in there, Mr. President, we get another Bosch. It’s just going to be another sinkhole.

JOHNSON: Well that’s what you ought to do. That’s your problem. You better figure it out.

MANN: . . . . The man to get back, I think, is Balaguer. He’s the one that ran way ahead in the polls.

JOHNSON: Well, try to do it, try to do it.17

Close Johnson aides such as National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tried to discourage the president from overemphasizing CIA reports that eight Dominicans had trained in Cuba. Still, LBJ tended to infer that such men were led by Castro. McNamara explained why the president should not act on that inference:

Well, I think you’ve got a pretty tough job to prove that, Mr. President. As president. The rest of us can say things like that and we don’t have to prove it. But you’ve got a handful of people there [identified Communists in Santo Domingo]. You don’t know that Castro is trying to do anything. You’d have a hard time proving to any group that Castro has done more than train these people.18

I also demonstrate that Johnson was uniquely sensitive to criticism from journalists such as Szulc and Kurzman and was probably as afraid of a Republican takeover of Washington resulting from the crisis as he was of a communist takeover of the Dominican Republic.19 Using biography and psychology in his own analysis, Randall Woods largely agrees.20 Michael Grow makes the broader case that U.S. presidents sent troops to Latin America not so much for security or economic reasons but rather because they feared a loss of international credibility, were wary of domestic political repercussions, and were responding to prodding by Latin American elites.21

There were larger consequences to this inattention to Dominican realities. My first book, Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.–Latin American Relations, used the intervention as a case study of anti-U.S. sentiment in the hemisphere and how it grew to crisis proportions in Washington. I interviewed a score of former participants in the intervention and demonstrated that Dominicans developed an “episodic” anti-Americanism stemming from the pattern of occupation followed by neglect within the U.S. empire and by their own authoritarianism, especially under dictator Rafael Trujillo (1930–1961). The 1965 intervention made anti-yanqui sentiment spike among urban leftists, but such sentiment never spread to the vast countryside and did not persist after the occupation, even though—or because—it was followed by twelve years of repression orchestrated by Balaguer, Trujillo’s former right-hand man, and by his military. Yankee No!, however, also argues that the Johnson administration, from the military to the diplomats, skillfully “contained” Dominican anti-Americanism after understanding its limited scope.22

In 2006, Russell Crandall set out to revise the entire historiography of the intervention by justifying it on several grounds. One was a counterfactual: “what could have transpired had the United States not intervened”? Crandall posits a communist takeover or at least a far bloodier civil war (it is true that U.S./IAPF troops kept the two sides from fighting). But he goes further, asking readers to disregard the facts about marginal communist influence in favor of “the reality that Washington perceived the threat to be serious.”23 Scholars such as Gleijeses would likely respond that historical investigation’s role is partly to question the flaws of ideological perceptions, not to reinforce them. Besides, prominent aides such as Bundy, McNamara, and Bill Moyers urged the president not to justify the invasion on the grounds of international communism.24

A third area of scholarly inquiry has been the consequences of the Dominican intervention. In the short term, it devastated the Dominican left. Elections got the occupation force out of the Dominican Republic a little too easily for many observers. Balaguer, who had been hated a few years earlier, suddenly won the favor of most Dominicans, and Bosch became an outcast. In 1984, Edward Herman and Frank Brodhead argued that the 1966 contest was a “demonstration election” reflecting Johnson’s desire to, as he told the CIA, “get this guy in office down there!”25 But they lacked a smoking gun demonstrating U.S. material support for Balaguer.

That gun appeared in the 2005 Foreign Relations of the United States volume that covered the Dominican Republic from 1964 to 1968. As Stephen Rabe wrote the following year, a memo written by Richard Helms, then acting director of the CIA, made it clear that Johnson ordered him “to devote the necessary personnel and the material resources in the Dominican Republic required to win the presidential election for the candidate favored by the United States Government.”26 In other words, there was clear covert political intervention. It was unsurprising, however, since it was in line with U.S. military strategy. All that remained unknown was how much money and how many men helped Balaguer and whether U.S. support changed the outcome of an already lopsided campaign.

In any event, Dominican leftists were excluded from politics for a dozen years and quarantined in universities. Gleijeses emphasizes in his volume the already existing divisions not only among the communists and between them and the democratic left but also among the democrats. It was, he suggests, one of the main reasons for Bosch’s overthrow in 1963 and his electoral defeat three years later. In a fascinating Diplomatic History article (2013), Patrick Iber reveals that a darling of the anti-communist left, Sacha Volman, was actually a CIA asset. That fact speaks to larger divisions among his comrades, divisions that in turn had tremendous consequences for social democracy in Latin America.27

A number of scholars look at the long-term consequences of the intervention on decision-making and foreign policy in other areas. Slater and others, for instance, explore how the intervention delegitimized the OAS by rendering it subservient to U.S. foreign policy.28 And it is curious how the Dominican experience set a new pattern of sorts for the use of U.S. force. Afterwards—one in Grenada, twice in Haiti, and of course, twice in Iraq—U.S. interventions tended to be multinational affairs, with allies either gathered in advance or assembled post-facto to justify the action to the international community. Such was the result of the Dominican intervention, which broke the Good Neighbor pledge of the 1930s that the United States would no longer send troops against sovereign nations in the hemisphere unless it was threatened. Occupations of Latin America during World War II had obtained the collaboration of Latin American governments in wartime, and CIA operations against Arbenz and at the Bay of Pigs were covert operations that did not need the blessing of the OAS or the United Nations.

On a theoretical level, political scientists, psychologists, linguists, and military analysts have used the intervention as a case study of the deployment of forces, presidential decision-making in crises, international mediation, and the use of symbols and language, often in a comparative framework.29 A fine example of theoretical studies is Leaders Under Stress, a collection of essays on how three presidents behaved during three particular crises. It applies a “psychophysiological” analysis of metrics such as word
length to Johnson’s speeches to measure his stress levels during the Dominican crisis. The most significant finding is that his “vocalizations” registered greater “Z-scores” for his concerns over the safety of U.S. civilians than for those over a possible communist takeover. Thus the Dominican operation has been studied far beyond its impact on the Dominican Republic and even Latin America.

Compared to the 1954 coup in Guatemala, the 1965 Dominican intervention was more substantial, engendered more controversy at the time and perhaps also more among scholars since, and may have had as many consequences for U.S. policymaking. Part of the reason scholars have taken relatively less interest in it probably stems from the fact that it was an overt intervention and so yielded most of its secrets immediately. The ones kept classified for a generation were relatively minor. There was also—as far as we know—no corporate interest in Johnson’s operation has been studied far beyond its impact on the Dominican Republic and even Latin America.

Notes:
15. Danilo Brugal Alfau, Tragedía en Santo Domingo (documentos para la historia) (Santo Domingo, 1966); José Antonio Moreno, El pueblo en armas: revolución en Santo Domingo (Madrid, 1973); Fidelio Desparrad, Historia gráfica de la guerra de abril (Santo Domingo, 1975); Juan Bosch, La República Dominicana: causas de la intervención militar norteamericana de 1965 (Santo Domingo, 1985); Ramón Alberto Ferreras, Guerra Patria: Santo Domingo, 28 de abril de 1965—1ro. de octubre 1966 (Santo Domingo, 1985); Margarita Cordero, Mujeres de abril (Santo Domingo, 1985); Bonaparte Gautreaux Pineyro, El gobierno de Caamaño 1965: (documentos) discurso y decretos (Santo Domingo, 1989); Joaquín Balaguer, Entre la sangre del 30 de mayo y la del 24 de abril (Santo Domingo, 1993); Juan Francisco Martínez Almendar, Abril de 1965: indelible (Santo Domingo, 1988); Secretaría de Estado de las Fuerzas Armadas, Guerra de abril: inevitabilidad de la historia: textos del Seminario sobre la Revolución de 1965 (Santo Domingo, 2002); Víctor Grimaldi, 1965: La invasión norteamericana (Santo Domingo, 2005).
17. Recording of telephone conversation between Johnson and Mann, 26 April 1965, 9:35 a.m., WH6504.05, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.
18. Recording of telephone conversation between McNamara and Johnson, 30 April 1965, 5:05 p.m., WH6504.09, LBJ Library.
Scholars as Teachers: Thoughts on Scholarship in the Classroom

Molly M. Wood

Editor’s note: This essay is the latest in a series sponsored by the SHAFR Teaching Committee dealing with pedagogical issues and related topics, and reflects SHAFR’s continuing commitment to enhancing the teaching of U.S. foreign relations. The Teaching Committee will also sponsor sessions focused on these issues at the 2015 SHAFR conference at the Renaissance Arlington Capital View. AJ

The 2014 Teaching Committee panel at the annual SHAFR conference featured four historians, Terry Anderson, Elizabeth Borgwardt, Mary Dudziak, and Fredrik Logevall, presenting their thoughts on ways in which their own books might be used in the classroom. The purpose of the panel, as I understood it, was to help spark conversations about the ways in which we might more thoughtfully use these four books in particular, and scholarly books in our field more generally, in our classrooms. What follows is a slightly expanded version of the comments I provided at that session.

Coming up with constructive comments for this panel proved to be a less straightforward task than I initially imagined it would be. I quickly realized that not all of these books are appropriate for my undergraduate classes. My comments, therefore, had to be entirely specific to my own experience as a college teacher at a small “liberal arts-plus” university in Ohio, to the particular kinds of students I engage, and to all the other contingencies of class size, curriculum, and departmental and university needs and requirements. In other words, I resisted the temptation to create a more perfect professional world in my mind, where I could teach anything I wanted to well-prepared, highly engaged, hard-working, curious and witty groups of students, clustered in groups of no more than fifteen. Instead, I stuck with reality, and while reality is more challenging, it’s not impossible.

### Bush’s Wars

My comments about Terry Anderson’s book, a history of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan during the George W. Bush presidency, are based on my experience using the book in a class I teach at Wittenberg University called “The Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.” One of the challenges in teaching this course has been selecting reading assignments from a quickly growing but uneven body of literature produced since 9/11. Bush’s Wars is a highly accessible overview (of appropriate length for the undergraduate classroom at 240 pages of text) with a strong thesis. It provides a clear chronological narrative of events from 9/11 through the end of the Bush presidency and includes a brief epilogue on Obama’s first term, as well as additional historical background on Iraq, Afghanistan, and American involvement in both regions. In terms of class structure and assignments, this was the students’ second book; I wanted them to read it early in the semester, right after they had finished the abridged 9/11 Report.

Before the students began reading Bush’s Wars, we had also worked as a class through an analysis of key documents, including Bush’s 2002 and 2003 State of the Union addresses, parts of the administration’s National Security Strategy, parts of the Iraq War Resolution, and a few other important primary sources relevant to Anderson’s narrative of events and analysis of Bush administration decision-making. We focused in particular on the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive strikes so that we could discuss it in some historical perspective before we looked at how Anderson emphasizes it in his text. Asking students to read, discuss, and become familiar with these documents meant that they had a common base of knowledge before reading the book and could therefore more confidently make points about Anderson’s references to and evaluations of the documents.

Over two ninety-minute periods the class worked through a discussion of the book, chapter by chapter, based on a series of questions I had prepared in advance. The students found the two opening sections of the book (“Introduction East” and “Introduction West”) particularly helpful. After working through these sections, they were able to articulate the reasons for the author’s descriptions of Iraq and Afghanistan as, respectively, the “Improbable Country” and the “Graveyard of Empires,” and they even felt comfortable using those descriptions as a sort of shorthand language in the classroom throughout the rest of the semester. “Introduction East” also provided the students with the necessary background and context for discussions about the complex legacy of Western imperialism and the early Cold War in these regions, the development of Arab nationalism, and the role of the United States in both Iraq and Afghanistan up to 1970.

The questions I had given the students ahead of time focused on both content and definitions as well as an understanding and articulation of Anderson’s argument and critique of the Bush administration. Chapter 1, “Bush, bin Laden, and the Pinnacle of World Sympathy,” was especially useful, since the students had just completed their reading of the 9/11 Report. I was able to push them to compare and contrast the two sources—one an official government report and the other a scholarly monograph—in terms of purpose, content, and analysis. I also found chapter 1 helpful in prompting students to think about the ways that fear pervaded American society after 9/11.

In addition to answering previously distributed discussion questions in class, I also picked specific quotes from various parts of the book and asked students to explain what the author was saying and provide appropriate context. From chapter 3, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” for instance, I asked students to explain to the class, after working on the questions in small groups, what the author means when he writes that “the lawlessness meant that Iraqis’ first taste of freedom was chaos” and what implications this state of affairs had for American goals. Ultimately, by the end of chapter 4, I wanted students to be able to answer with some clarity this basic question: How and why, according to Anderson, did the Iraq War become “Bush’s War”? 
Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam

Fredrik Logevall’s Pulitzer Prize-winning account of the French War in Indochina and the origins of American involvement is one of the kind of book I would love to introduce to my students, as an example of exhaustive research and masterful historical writing. But as was noted in our SHAFR panel, the book is, at 714 pages of text, more than undergraduates can be expected to tackle. However, I do believe there are ways in which this book will benefit my students. First of all, reading this book persuaded me to incorporate in my own class on the Vietnam War more on the French War in Indochina as part of and prelude to American involvement in Vietnam. In terms of my own preparation and syllabus construction, this book will help me periodize the twenty-first century more coherently and devise a more global approach to the origins of American involvement in Vietnam. It will also facilitate student understanding that the “Vietnam experience” for Americans was not just “something that happened in the 1960s.”

This class on the Vietnam War is perhaps especially suited for the integration of new scholarly work such as Embers of War, because it is designed as one of several “gateway” courses required for the history major and includes a historical writing and methodology component. So in addition to teaching the historical content of America’s involvement in Vietnam, I am also introducing students to various methods of doing history and to historiography, a concept that is usually new to them. To help them process the idea that historians can have different interpretations of the same historical event, and that these interpretations can change over time, I sometimes use book reviews. Logevall’s book was widely reviewed in the mainstream press, and those reviews are both short and accessible to undergraduates who might have a harder time parsing a review in a scholarly journal. Reading just three sample reviews from the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal exposes students to examples of areas of agreement and key differences in the ways people summarize, interpret, and assess Logevall’s book.5 Discussing those similarities and differences leads us to discuss the purpose of a book review and to make lists for comparative purposes: What did the authors agree or disagree about? Why does that matter?

Another approach, which came up several times during our Q and A at the SHAFR panel, might be to require students to read selected parts of the book rather than the whole thing. For instance, the preface and prologue could be assigned as a way of introducing the concept of Vietnamese nationalism. The prologue opens with Ho Chi Minh trying to attend the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and then provides an overview of French colonial rule, characterized as a “civilizing mission”—an excellent concept to unpack and discuss with the students. Another possible assignment might be chapter 4, “All Men are Created Equal,” for a discussion of Vietnamese independence in 1945, especially in conjunction with primary source material such as Ho Chi Minh’s September 2, 1945 Declaration of Independence speech.6

As I continued to think about how I could steal material shamelessly for my class, I considered the vast number of absorbing and instructive quotes that Logevall includes from both French and Vietminh sources. Some of these quotes help to crystallize the tactics, attitudes, and ideologies of guerilla warfare and provide a preview of similar examples from the war with the Americans. I will cite just two examples that students could sink their teeth into as a way of understanding the mentality of the combatants. First, in 1945 French Commander Philippe Leclerc, who viewed his mission of recovering Indochina for the French after the end of World War II with considerable skepticism, told his aides that “one does not kill ideas with bullets.” Providing students with the appropriate context for the quote—Leclerc’s growing doubt about the reestablishment of the French colonial empire—will help them enter into a discussion of both French and Vietnamese nationalist goals and ideals.

The second quote appears in a 1946 interview between Ho Chi Minh and an American journalist. Ho explained how the Vietnamese would wage war against the French: “It will be a war between an elephant and a tiger. If the tiger ever stands still the elephant will crush him with his mighty tusks. But the tiger does not stand still. He lurks in the jungle by day and emerges only at night.”7 I would ask students to think about what point Ho Chi Minh is making about Vietnamese strategy and tactics and how this perspective helps us understand the American experience in Vietnam two decades later.

War–Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences

How, then, to consider using Mary Dudziak’s provocative book with my undergraduates? Dudziak asks a deceptively simple question: “When is wartime?” The length and accessibility of this book, which uses three main case studies (World War II, the Cold War and the War on Terror) to explore her main question, does make it a candidate for use in survey classes. It could either be assigned in segments or at the end of the semester (as long as the class covers 9/11 and the War on Terror).

What I like most about the book, in terms of its potential use with undergraduates, is the basic question it raises: “What is wartime?” which is especially relevant for students who have grown up during the “War on Terror” in a post 9/11 world. Ideally, after the students have finished reading it, I would initiate a discussion of the book as a whole, beginning with the recent post-9/11 context and then working backwards through the Cold War (as a point of comparison) and then to World War II.

I would challenge the students to think about, and talk about, the basic question posed by the author in the introduction: “How can we end a wartime when war doesn’t come to an end?” And I would push them to wrestle with and debate the argument that “there is a disconnect between the way we imagine wartime, and the practice of American wars.”8 What I believe might be particularly useful in class, especially with first- or second-year undergraduates, is simply to engage with the book in a discussion that revolves around ambiguity—a concept with which many undergraduates are uncomfortable. Simply posing questions for discussion such as “When was World War II?” or “Was the Cold War a War?” (as the author does in the book) is liable to make students uncomfortable or confused or both, because they tend to expect, in history classes, definitive answers about “what happened” and “when it happened.” Pushing through these moments of discomfort, in an atmosphere of shared exploration with peers, can encourage students to challenge themselves to think differently about history and to question “known truths” and may therefore lead to some perspective-altering approaches to academic material.

A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights

Elizabeth Borgwardt’s award-winning 2005 book analyzes the evolution of the idea and ideal of international “human rights” in the context of planning for the post-World War II world. This book has been the most challenging for me to think about in terms of classroom use, purely because of the limited flexibility I have right now in terms of curriculum and course offerings. While

Page 36
the book’s length (300 pages of text) makes it a candidate for upper-level students. I do not currently teach a course for which the book is well suited. However, the book did resonate with me (as a teacher) in numerous ways, and I did come up with some ideas for using parts of it. I focused on chapter 1, “The Ghost of Woodrow Wilson,” which covers the August 1941 Atlantic Charter conference. The chapter (like all the book’s chapters) has fabulous subheadings, sure to provoke conversation among students. For instance, the eminently quotable Winston Churchill remarked before he left England for the conference that “No lover ever studied every whim of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt.” This quote could be used to initiate a discussion and an analysis of the personal relationship between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill as they prepared for and took part in the Atlantic Charter conference. But it could also initiate broader discussions about the language Churchill used, the point he was trying to make about the necessity of understanding Roosevelt, and how he conveyed that necessity using highly gendered language.

I would also consider this chapter an excellent example of compelling historical narrative, a detailed day-by-day, almost minute-by-minute recreation of the events of the conference itself. It therefore provides a number of opportunities to talk with students about exactly how historians write history. It is both a real page-turner (“Wow, what’s going to happen next?”) and an example, for students, of historical writing that makes the voices of the past come alive, the people very real and very human (that is, fallible and sometimes inconsistent), the situation uncertain and even frightening, and the outcome of events unknown. In other words, the author’s skillful writing drives home the point that at the time Roosevelt and Churchill were talking off the coast of Newfoundland, no one knew if Hitler would be defeated, or indeed how or when the war would end. No one knew what was going to happen. This chapter therefore serves the purpose (a theme that could be projected over an entire semester once introduced by a good piece of writing) of asking students how “history” is made by the people who are making it. How do world leaders talk to each other? What do they think of each other? Do they realize they are “making history,” and does that affect their behavior? And ultimately, how do we (the historians) figure any of this out?

The “how do we know” question can also be addressed by talking with students about the author’s fascinating analysis of the Atlantic Charter as a document. The partial transcript, reproduced in the chapter, of FDR’s exchange with reporters about the non-existence of an “original” Atlantic Charter document opens up all sorts of possibilities for students to think about how “history” is recorded and how source material becomes available (or does not become available) to historians. Finally, it occurred to me that working with the students to understand the language of the Atlantic Charter itself, the carefully chosen words, could help them think about America’s place in the postwar world. The author describes the charter as a series of “provisional aspirations,” so it might be worth asking students to think about whether these aspirations were reached in the postwar world, or indeed if they continue to have any relevance in today’s world.

Engaging in this sort of intentional thinking about the application of historical scholarship to the classroom, in this case the undergraduate classroom, has broadened my thinking about the ways I can continue to incorporate important and innovative research and writing into my classes beyond simply assigning a particular book for students to “read and discuss.”

Notes:
1. I wish to thank all four authors for their willingness to participate in this panel, and especially for engaging in a stimulating Q and A with the audience after hearing my comments. I would also like to thank the SHAPE Teaching Committee, and especially Teaching Committee Chair Chester Pach, for organizing the panel. See Terry Anderson, Bush’s Wars (New York, 2011); Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA, 2005); Mary Dudziak, War–Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (New York, 2012); and Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York, 2012).
3. Texts are widely available online: See, for example, the National Archives website for the State of the Union addresses: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html or the website presidentialrhetoric.com. Documents and video are also available online at the George W. Bush Presidential Library website: https://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/. For a documents-based text option, see Robert Brigham, The United States and Iraq Since 1990: A Brief History with Documents (Malden, MA, 2014).
7. Logevall, Embers of War, 119.
8. Ibid., 44.
10. Ibid., 8.
**“She Did a Lot for Us”: Jean Wilkowski in Zambia**

Andy DeRoche

Former Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda remembers Jean Wilkowski, the American ambassador to Zambia from 1972 to 1976, very well. During a 2010 interview he recalled her as an important diplomat who was crucial in the planning for Henry Kissinger’s landmark Lusaka speech in 1976—and he recollected that she liked golf. “We were good friends indeed,” he said. “She did a lot for us.”

By following in the footsteps of important earlier female diplomats, successfully running an embassy as the first American woman ambassador in Africa, and conducting important high-level diplomacy, Wilkowski opened the door for other American women. During her four years in Lusaka, she helped not only to resuscitate bilateral relations between the United States and Zambia, but also to initiate top-level American diplomatic intervention into the southern African region.

This essay is an attempt to continue the efforts of Edward Crapol, who began advocating as far back as the late 1970s for scholars to pay attention to women’s contributions to foreign relations. Katherine Sibley, in her insightful introduction to a 2012 roundtable on gender in Diplomatic History, contended that the work of scholars writing about women has “galvanized the creation of a new subfield in American foreign relations.” In her closing commentary on the same 2012 roundtable, Laura McEnaney perceptively pointed out how far this subfield has progressed since the first Diplomatic History roundtable on gender appeared in 1994. She concluded that “we are past the question of ‘whether?’ and on to the business of ‘how?’ when it comes to understanding gender and sexuality’s relationship to international relations.”

While Sibley, McEnaney, and the other participants in the roundtable made a good case for how far the subfield of gender in U.S. foreign affairs has advanced in general, they did not mention the extremely important contributions that Wilkowski and other women (such as Madeleine Albright, Barbara Lee, Susan Rice, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and Hillary Clinton) made to U.S.-Africa relations since 1972.

Jean Wilkowski was born in 1919 in Rhinelander, Wisconsin. At age ten she moved with her family to Florida, and after graduating from Saint Mary-of-the-Woods College in Indiana in 1941, she found a job teaching journalism at Barry College in Miami. During her two-year stint there she earned a master’s degree. On the advice of a visiting priest, she then went to Washington and applied for a job with the State Department. In 1944 she joined the Foreign Service and headed for the Caribbean to take up her first post as vice consul in Trinidad. After two years in Trinidad, she served for the rest of the 1940s and 1950s in various positions at embassies in Columbia, Italy, France, Chile, and Honduras.

During these early postings in South America and Europe, Wilkowski learned many hard lessons about the realities of life as a female diplomat. When she first arrived in Trinidad, she was immediately taken to a bar and as a “joke” shown a very provocative calendar photo of the famous Latina actress Carmen Miranda. Her first boss, the American consul in Trinidad, treated her with disdain, and the only useful training Wilkowski received there was from the consul’s wife. She fell in love with a U.S. Marine but decided to terminate her relationship with him, partly because she felt they were both too young for marriage, but also because Foreign Service regulations at the time required women (but not men) to resign as soon as they got married. Although Wilkowski’s challenging experiences during her early career did much to prepare her for later success at higher levels, it would be another two decades before she attained an ambassadorship.

In 1972, during her second posting in Rome, Wilkowski received a call from Washington and was informed that the Nixon administration was promoting her to the position of ambassador to Zambia. She would be her the first American woman to command an embassy in Africa. In September the new ambassador arrived in Lusaka. As a demonstration of his disagreement with Nixon’s policies in Southeast Asia, Kaunda kept her waiting for a month before accepting her credentials. In contrast, the new Chinese ambassador, who arrived at the same time she did, was recognized in just three days. In addition to making the new U.S. ambassador wait, Kaunda’s government established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in mid-September and announced that its ambassador in Beijing would be accredited to Hanoi. These were even stronger signals of displeasure with Nixon’s policy in Vietnam.

Working in Lusaka at the nadir of U.S.-Zambia relations, Wilkowski knew she had a challenging assignment. She was determined to be successful, however, and she believed the key would be reviving Kaunda’s faith in the U.S. government, which had been badly damaged by Nixon’s refusal to meet with him in late 1970. “It was my hope we could patch the situation up and make amends,” she recalled. Détente with Kaunda would have to wait nearly a month, though, so in the meantime Ambassador Wilkowski went on “safari in the bathroom and killed a tarantula.”

In late September she was officially acknowledged by Kaunda, who expressed pride that Zambia was receiving the first American woman ambassador in Africa.

Wilkowski’s hopes of improving bilateral relations faced numerous hurdles. Financial matters were in some respects encouraging, especially when compared to later years, when the country was crippled by massive debt and endemic poverty. Ambassador Wilkowski summed up the situation in the early 1970s: “Zambia was in good economic shape then. Copper prices were up and the oil crisis had yet to arrive.” Yet Americans played a very small role in the economy. There was no United States Agency for International Development operation in Lusaka when Wilkowski arrived. There was no Peace Corps program, in part because some Zambian officials thought Peace Corps workers were spies.

She estimated that while there were 2,000 American missionaries in Zambia, there was only “one American businessman in the whole country.” The vast majority of what little American investment existed funded mining operations.

Initially, at least, the problems confronting Wilkowski only seemed to get worse. On 9 January 1973, Ian Smith...
announced that the border between Rhodesia and Zambia would be closed until he received assurances from the government in Lusaka that they were not supporting guerrillas. In a speech the next day, which Wilkowski attended, Kaunda reaffirmed Zambia’s commitment to the liberation struggle in southern Africa. He also discussed Vietnam and “broke down for ten minutes” as he pleaded with the United States to pursue peace in Southeast Asia. Wilkowski remained in the gallery throughout the criticism of her government’s policies, even though the French ambassador encouraged her to walk out. Her decision to stay turned out to be good diplomacy, as relations with Kaunda’s government soon improved. On 23 January Nixon announced on television that “peace with honor” had been achieved.

Coincidently, 23 January was also the first day for the public to view the body of Lyndon Johnson in Austin; he had died the day before at his ranch.

Kaunda called Wilkowski at about 11 a.m. on 24 January and notified her that he would visit the embassy around 5 p.m. to pay his respects to the deceased president and sign the condolence book. She thanked Kaunda and then promptly rushed out to a local store to buy one. By the time the president and fourteen high-ranking officials arrived, the lobby was properly decorated for the occasion, with Johnson’s photo draped in black. Kaunda, herself dressed in black, signed the book and somberly shook the ambassador’s hand. In his brief remarks, he lauded Johnson’s work for the underprivileged. After Kaunda’s remarks, Wilkowski addressed the assembled dignitaries. She praised Johnson for his contributions to the fight for racial equality, and acknowledged the significance of the Vietnam settlement and Americans’ “relief to disengage” from that long conflict. Afterward a Zambian official whispered to her, “That’s just what we wanted to hear.”

The ceremony to honor Johnson on 24 January proved to be a key event in U.S.-Zambia relations. According to Wilkowski, it represented a “decided turning point for the better in official and public relations.”

The following day, Foreign Minister Elijah Mudenda talked with Wilkowski about the escalating conflict in Rhodesia. She told him that the U.S. government was “very much concerned about the closure of the border.” But when Smith offered to open the border on 4 February, Kaunda responded by sealing all posts on the Zambian side. Kaunda took this dramatic step because he believed the cessation of copper shipments on the railroad through Rhodesia would cost the Smith regime approximately $50 million per year. The seriousness of the situation in the area had been apparent to Wilkowski since her arrival in Lusaka. She believed that “it was important that U.S. representatives get to know the leaders of these liberation movements.” But Nixon and Kissinger were not interested, and the only activity related to southern Africa in Washington was in Congress, where efforts to repeal the Byrd amendment were just getting started. Wilkowski was not deterred by the lack of interest at the White House and “kept up a steady drumbeat, recommending to the Department that early contacts were important.”

During a “working supper” with Kaunda at State House on 12 June, Wilkowski referred to the way she had handled a recent shooting of two U.S. tourists as a good example of American diplomatic restraint. She wondered if perhaps the Zambian government could keep her tactfulness in mind and possibly ease up on the criticism of the United States. Kaunda accepted the suggestion “in good spirit” and reminded the ambassador that he never missed a chance to praise Nixon for his positive accomplishments. He reiterated his respect for two Nixon policies: the opening of relations with China and détente with the Soviets. This fruitful discussion, in which serious issues were covered frankly, reflected the generally positive relationship that Wilkowski had with Kaunda. He impressed her as an “astute” and “very skillful” statesman.

In the last few months of 1973, the governments in Washington and Lusaka seemed to be in agreement about key issues such as sanctions against Rhodesia. The stage was set for a real improvement in bilateral relations, and Duke Ellington helped make it happen. On 23 November, the world famous bandleader and his jazz orchestra played a show in front of an enthusiastic capacity crowd at Mulungushi Hall. “Thank heavens for the Duke Ellington visit,” recalled Ambassador Wilkowski. She could barely contain herself in the audience, and accompanied Ellington on the flight to Ndola for another show. The mostly white audience was not as enthusiastic as the crowd in Lusaka, but black fans did mob the Duke at his Ndola hotel.

With a boost from Ellington, the ambassador continued her efforts to get top American officials to make southern Africa a higher priority for nearly another year before seeing results. She finally witnessed some progress in August 1974, when she helped schedule an appointment for the Zambian foreign minister, Vernon Mwaanga, with Secretary of State Kissinger. She hoped this meeting would lay the groundwork for eventual White House talks between Kaunda and Gerald Ford, thus repairing some of the damage done during the Nixon years.

With a boost from Ellington, the ambassador continued her efforts to get top American officials to make southern Africa a higher priority for nearly another year before seeing results. She finally witnessed some progress in August 1974, when she helped schedule an appointment for the Zambian foreign minister, Vernon Mwaanga, with Secretary of State Kissinger. She hoped this meeting would lay the groundwork for eventual White House talks between Kaunda and Gerald Ford, thus repairing some of the damage done during the Nixon years. Mwaanga appreciated the opportunity to build positive relations with the Ford administration, which he thought might lead to “elementary American support for the liberation of Southern Africa.” On Friday, 16 August, Mwaanga met Kissinger and presented his country’s position. In general, the Zambian foreign minister intended to convince his counterpart that the roots of the conflicts in southern Africa were racial, not economic or political. He invited the secretary to visit Lusaka for further talks, and Kissinger agreed “in principle.”

In the spring of 1975 Kaunda was invited to Washington, as Wilkowski had hoped he would be, and she would be there to witness all the drama. From the perspective of Zambian diplomats, a chance for their boss to return to the White House reflected “an unprecedented degree of warmth” in U.S.-Zambia relations. Ambassador Wilkowski had worked hard to help arrange the invitation and viewed it as a chance to help make up for Nixon’s slight. She characterized it as a “good friendship” visit and a chance for Ford and Kissinger to talk with “a heroic father figure and historic independence role model for the liberation leaders in southern Africa.” The secretary of state also saw the invitation as “a sign of respect for one of the pioneers in Africa’s struggle for independence.”

At 3 p.m. on Saturday, 19 April 1975, President Ford welcomed his Zambian counterpart to the Oval Office and asked him for his comments and views on the situation in southern Africa.” Kaunda thanked Ford for the wonderful hospitality and lauded Ambassador Wilkowski for helping ensure that U.S.-Zambia bilateral relations were “very good indeed.” He then added, however, that there were problems in the region. Ford commented that he understood Kaunda
had been working “to resolve the situation.” “I told Secretary Kissinger,” Kaunda replied, that “we need your help.” He hoped the Ford administration could pay closer attention to the area and facilitate a peaceful solution.  

The conversation shifted to the most complicated of the former Portuguese colonies, Angola, where three groups battled for control: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Kaunda summed it up succinctly: “Angola gives us problems.” He explained that the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, had not received much support from Zambia in the past but had recently “emerged as someone who could save the situation.” He also contended that the head of the MPLA, Agostinho Neto, would not accept the FNLA’s leader, Holden Roberto, as the leader of independent Angola, and vice versa. “The only chance we had of putting someone forward to the OAU [Organization of African Unity] with the possibility of acceptance was to suggest that Neto and Roberto should each lead his party and Savimbi would be the compromise leader of all three,” Kaunda said.  

With the spotlight turned onto Savimbi as a possible compromise candidate, Kissinger asked Ambassador Wilkowski if she knew him. She did; they had met for two longs talks. She characterized him as “a very impressive leader and quite solid.” Kaunda seconded Wilkowski’s assessment, explaining that after many years of virtually ignoring Savimbi, the Zambian leadership had changed their minds in late 1974 during his visits to Lusaka. “All of us in UNIP,” Kaunda continued, “were impressed with Savimbi’s sincerity and his honesty of purpose.”  

From the Oval Office, Kaunda returned to Blair House, where he and his wife Betty prepared for a black tie affair at the White House. After dinner Ford stood and praised Kaunda for guiding Zambia to independence, saluting him for his “wisdom in a controversial and difficult world” and for his diplomatic efforts to end conflicts. He added that the United States would attempt to help Kaunda resolve the remaining regional problems in southern Africa. He then mentioned their “wide-ranging” discussions that afternoon, which “covered matters of common interest,” and, noting their mutual love of golf, invited Kaunda for “a little competition on the links” in order to cement their friendship. He concluded by proposing a toast to “continuing excellent relations” between the two nations.  

Kaunda pulled no punches in his lengthy reply. The Zambian government worried greatly about America’s lack of a policy toward southern Africa. While such a posture could mean passivity or neutrality, it could also be “a deliberate act . . . to support the status quo,” which translated into backing for racial oppression. Kaunda had hoped that the United States would cooperate in fostering peace and justice in his part of the world but now instead felt “dismay” because the Americans had “not fulfilled our expectations.” At the very least, he said, they should “desist from direct and indirect support to the minority regimes.” Kaunda ended his speech by again thanking Ford for his hospitality and inviting him to visit Zambia.  

Kaunda’s explosive words reverberated throughout the room. Kissinger’s wife Nancy was “horrified.” She turned to Foreign Minister Mwaanga, who described her later as “almost hysterical,” and demanded to know why the Zambian president had said what he had. “What was that?” she asked. “It was clear what was otherwise a cordial and friendly atmosphere.”  

The “extremely displeased” secretary of state spoke with Ambassador Wilkowski and demanded that she be in his office early the next morning (a Sunday). During their meeting, the “furious” Kissinger essentially accused her of “helping the Zambians draft Kaunda’s offending speech.” She could not believe his tone, which made her feel like a traitor, and suspected that the secretary “suffered from paranoia.”  

Returning to Lusaka, Wilkowski waited for the word of a White House initiative on Angola for three months, until mid-July.  

On 9 July, intense fighting engulfed Angola, and the MPLA quickly took control of Luanda. Kissinger asked the CIA to submit a plan for action, and on 17 July the secretary of state approved Operation IAFEATURE. On 18 July, President Ford gave the go-ahead for the CIA to spend $14 million, primarily to provide support to the FNLA through Zaire; he would authorize an additional $18 million over the next few months. The first $1 million installment was promptly delivered to Joseph Mobutu, the president of Zaire. Mobutu’s troops then spearheaded an FNLA invasion of northern Angola, allowing Holden Roberto to return to his country for the first time in over a decade.  

In late summer, an American official spoke with Kaunda regarding Operation IAFEATURE. John Stockwell, the head of the CIA’s Angola task force, noted that the Zambian president was briefed sometime between 3 and 9 August and that Kaunda’s “cooperation” was “assured.” Stockwell’s account tells us nothing more specific about what met with Kaunda, how detailed the conversation was, or exactly what Kaunda agreed to contribute to the undertaking. According to Kissinger’s interpretation, the Zambian leader’s response to the briefing was “very positive.” Kaunda “agreed to cooperate in support of Savimbi through Zambia.”  

As the civil war raged on, Agostinho Neto declared Angolan independence in Luanda on 11 November. Although a very difficult road lay ahead for the MPLA government, a critical milestone had nonetheless been reached—the last independence ceremony for a former Portuguese colony in Africa. Representative Andrew Young (D-GA), who had been one of the lone voices in Washington decrying American support for Portuguese colonialism in the early 1970s, delivered a speech celebrating “The End of Empire.” Two weeks later Congressman Young took a closer look at the situation in southern Africa when he journeyed to Lusaka with Coretta King, the widow of the late civil rights leader. King and three of her children were hosted by Wilkowski, who worked overtime preparing meals for them. The ambassador believed that such visits by well-known African Americans “helped” her diplomacy somewhat, although “not measurably.”  

On 25 November, Young and Mrs. King dedicated the Martin Luther King Cultural Center, which would be a source of educational opportunities for Zambian students. Siteke Mvale, who was ambassador to the United States, had known the Reverend King and would later serve on the board of the King Center in Atlanta, also participated in the ceremony. He had personally carried the statue of King that would be displayed at the center from Washington. President Kaunda held a reception at State House for Mrs. King, whom he respected as “a great freedom fighter in her own right.” The opportunity to honor her and her late husband, whom he had befriended in 1960, pleased Kaunda. Mrs. King’s “stepping on our soil on her own behalf and Martin’s behalf was something we appreciated greatly.”  

Shifting her focus in 1976 from Angola to Rhodesia, Wilkowski submitted a thorough assessment of the mounting crisis on 5 March. With the rise in violence, the ambassador argued that it was imperative for the United States to intervene diplomatically in support of majority rule. Ian Smith must be convinced that the United States would not help save him if the communist-backed forces launched an all-out attack. Peace talks between Smith and Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), seemed to be at an impasse. Mark Chona, who was Kaunda’s political adviser for foreign relations, had
recently informed her that because of Smith's intransigence, Kaunda had refused to meet with a Rhodesian delegation that Smith tried to send to Lusaka. Wilkowski contended that there was still a "slim chance" for a political solution between Smith and Nkomo, but it would require a strong push from Washington.53

Wilkowski emphasized the need for a new approach from the Ford administration. According to the ambassador, a strong sign of American support for majority rule in Rhodesia was needed to regain Kaunda's confidence: "Kaunda expects from the US some new initiative that will both avert further communist penetration in southern Africa while achieving majority rule without further delay." This was a tall order, to be sure, but she believed that "doing nothing to make our position loud and clear" would engender great "Zambian as well as African disillusionment" with the U.S. government. Perhaps trying to play a bit of hard ball in order to get the secretary of state's attention, Wilkowski claimed that if Washington continued to fixate solely on preventing the spread of communism, she would not be able to get an appointment with Kaunda in the next few days in order to deliver a message Kissinger had recently sent.54

Wilkowski got Kissinger's attention almost immediately. That became crystal clear during his staff meeting, which began at 8 a.m. in Washington on 5 March, the same day she sent the telegram. The secretary of state discussed new developments in foreign policy with his staff. There were twenty-two men in the room, and not one woman. After Charles Robinson, the undersecretary of state for economics, reported on his recent visit to Zaire and a possible major aid package for President Mobutu, Kissinger inquired, "What about Zambia?" Robinson replied that he had not been to Zambia, but noted that Mobutu did ask him to help his neighbor Kaunda. After weighing the possibility of getting some economic aid for Zambia, Kissinger then added that "we also have to do something in the military field." A figure of $10 million in military assistance to Kaunda was considered.55

Kissinger then made the general observation that most State Department officials were "philosophically opposed" to the United States "sending arms to Africa." He cited telegrams coming from embassies in Africa as evidence and singled out the ambassador in Lusaka as an example. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele contended that no requests had been sent from Zambia for military assistance. Kissinger responded: "Oh, no. You had [requests], but she discouraged them," Schaufele attempted to explain that Wilkowski had been sent a message instructing her to do something (evidently to discuss military assistance with Kaunda). Kissinger interrupted him: "But did she do it?" Schaufele admitted that "she hasn't talked to him." The secretary of state then made clear his displeasure with Wilkowski's conduct: "Within 24 hours she's going to do it or she's going to be hung. By tomorrow morning I want a report from her that she has carried out her instructions or I want her here on Monday to explain why she hasn't."56

Kissinger, who was legendary for berating his underlings, wasn't finished showing his staff how upset he was with Wilkowski. "Don't tell me she can't see Kaunda if she wants to. How can it be that she doesn't carry out an instruction that I gave last Sunday?" Schaufele explained that the ambassador had an appointment with the Zambian president but it was cancelled due to Rhodesian issues. Kissinger wasn't convinced. "You don't think," he observed, "if she were to do something he agreed with she'd be in there." After some laughter, a staffer explained that he had sent Wilkowski a follow-up cable along those same lines. Kissinger, still not satisfied, snapped back: "Yes, but it obviously hasn't made much of an impact, has it?" He concluded his rampage by stating that "it's going to be carried out tomorrow morning or I want her here on Monday. I probably want her here anyway." The secretary of state seemed hell-bent on recalling or perhaps even firing Wilkowski. Evidently he changed his mind, because she served out the remainder of her stint. Nevertheless, it suggests sexism at the highest levels of U.S. diplomacy when twenty-two men can laugh about "hanging" a female ambassador.

In early April the secretary of state was ready to initiate a dramatic diplomatic initiative on Rhodesia. Indeed, the itinerary of his first visit to Africa was already being finalized.58 The secretary's time in Lusaka would be the most important part of the trip. Kissinger decided to give his major address outlining a new U.S. policy towards southern Africa in Zambia, because it was the country "most directly affected by the Rhodesian issue."59 There was some consideration of Kissinger speaking in Livingstone, in southern Zambia, but Ambassador Wilkowski argued in favor of Lusaka because more journalists would attend, and the secretary accepted her advice.60

As soon as he arrived, Kissinger held a press conference and praised Kaunda as "one of the most dedicated and respected statesmen in Africa."61 After lunch at State House he delivered his long-awaited address on the new U.S. policy toward southern Africa. "The setting for the speech did not match its intended reach," recalled the secretary. He spoke from a podium at one end of a long table, around
which was a small crowd of about fifty people. The Zambian president introduced the secretary politely but did include a few reminders of past American wrongs. “Kaunda had obviously arranged it,” explained Kissinger, “so that he would not lose too much face if I did not deliver what we had promised.”

With Wilkowski by his side, Kissinger proceeded to give a remarkable speech, which had taken six weeks and seven drafts to finalize.63 He began by explaining that he had undertaken this journey because “the challenges of Africa are the challenges of the modern era.” Events on the continent demonstrated that the era of colonization was over and that the new era would be defined by tasks such as nation-building, peacekeeping, economic development, and the achievement of racial justice. The intention was to create “a humane and progressive world,” he said. He went on to proclaim dramatically that “without peace, racial justice, and growing prosperity in Africa, we cannot speak of a just international order.”64

The secretary reiterated the broad moral underpinnings of his strategic initiative: “I reaffirm the unequivocal commitment of the United States to human rights, as expressed in the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” He also presented a ten-point program in support of the rapid realization of majority rule in Rhodesia.65 President Kaunda, who had been following Kissinger’s words attentively, had tears rolling down his cheeks by the end. “Some of us were emotionally charged when you were speaking,” he told the secretary.66

After dinner that evening, Kaunda called Wilkowski’s home to reiterate his satisfaction with Kissinger’s visit, which he described as “far beyond his expectations.” He offered special thanks for the work she and her staff had done in coordination with Zambian officials to make the visit so successful. Wilkowski was also very pleased with the role she had played. She later singled out Kissinger’s speech as the event that enabled her to judge her Zambian tenure as “one of genuine, professional accomplishment.” Although helping to coordinate the logistics of the visit may have been important, she believed that her frequent messages to Washington over the years advocating a stronger U.S. stance in support of racial equality in southern Africa had contributed to the substance of Kissinger’s pronouncement.67

Wilkowski contended in her autobiography that during her four years in Lusaka, she and the ambassador to Tanzania, Beverly Carter, had transmitted a steady “drum beat” of messages to the State Department calling for greater attention to the part of the globe where they were serving. Wilkowski felt that she and Carter eventually made a difference. She emphasized that Kissinger’s April 1976 speech reflected her efforts and those of other ambassadors in southern Africa, “especially” Carter in Dar es Salaam.68 In his own memoirs, Kissinger also praised Ambassador Carter, who was African-American, although he did not include a single word about Wilkowski.69 Perhaps the “Doctor of Diplomacy” hoped to dissuade critics from calling him a racist but was not as concerned about being labeled a sexist.70

Regardless of this lack of recognition from her boss, however, Wilkowski accomplished much during her tenure. She helped arrange the Kauda/Ford summit and was a key contributor to their Oval Office conversation. She facilitated Kissinger’s first visit to Zambia and insisted that the secretary’s landmark speech be delivered in Lusaka. More generally, she played a major role in rejuvenating U.S.-Zambia relations, and she helped convince Washington to pay closer attention to southern Africa. In part because of her efforts, the Ford administration put Kaunda on the short list of important African leaders. He remained on that list through the 1980s. Wilkowski does not deserve all of the credit (or blame) for these developments, but she certainly helped start the ball rolling.

In addition to conducting traditional diplomacy, such as meeting with Kaunda and developing a good relationship with his top advisors, Wilkowski also facilitated several examples of the cultural component of U.S. relations with Zambia. Among the most important events that she organized or contributed to were the memorial service for Lyndon Johnson, the Duke Ellington concerts, and Coretta King and Andrew Young’s visit to Lusaka, where they opened the Martin King Cultural Center. Finally, Wilkowski’s hard work in Zambia opened important doors for women in the field of foreign affairs. Her commendable record as the first female ambassador in Africa took the important contributions by earlier trailblazers such as Margaret Chase Smith and Frances Bolton another step forward. She paved the way for future female diplomats who would contribute even more to U.S. policies on Africa. Twenty-first-century female U.S. diplomats—and for that matter, anyone concerned about Africa—can look back on the work she did in Zambia and rightly echo Kaunda’s comment about her: “She did a lot for us.”71

Notes:
1. Author’s interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, Zambia, 18 June 2010. My thanks to Gabriel Banda for arranging this meeting, which was also attended by the author’s daughter Ellen, to whom this article is dedicated.
9. Telegram from Wilkowski to the State Department, 15 September 1972, box 2843, folder “Pol 7 Zambia,” RG 59, National Archives at College Park, (hereafter NACP); College Park, MD.
14. Wilkowski interview, 33, FAOHC, GU.
15. Author’s phone interview with Ambassador Jean Wilkowski, 2 June 2008.
16. Wilkowski interview, 33, FAOHC, GU.
18. Telegram from Wilkowski to State, 12 January 1973, box 2843, folder “Pol 15 Zambia,” RG59, NACP.
22. Wilkowski interview, 35–6, FAOHC, GU.
27. Wilkowski interview, 34, FAOHC, GU.
28. Telegram from Wilkowski to State, 14 June 1973, box 2843, folder “Pol 15 Zambia,” RG59, NACP.
29. Author’s phone interview with Wilkowski, 2 June 2008.
31. Jean Wilkowski interview, 23 August 1989, 40, FAOHC, GU.
35. Ibid., 3.
39. Ibid., 3.
41. Memorandum of conversation among Kaunda, Ford et al., 19 April 1975, 4–5, document 01584, KT, DNSA.
43. Ibid., 535–38.
44. Mwaanga, *An Extraordinary Life*, 262.
46. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 809.
54. Ibid.
55. Memo of Kissinger’s staff meeting, 5 March 1976, document 01904, 1–2, 6–7, KT, DNSA.
56. Ibid., 9–10.
57. Ibid., 10–11.
60. Telegram from Wilkowski to the State Department, 18 April 1976, on microfiche, received from the State Department in response to a Freedom of Information Act request (hereafter FOIA 8802541).
65. Ibid., 4–6.
71. Author’s interview with Kaunda, 18 June 2010.

Andrew J. Kirkendall

Alan McPherson’s first book, *Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations*, came out in 2003. Its timing was exquisite, considering the widespread anxiety over the question, “why do they hate us?” With his new book, *The Invaded*, McPherson again seems to be the right historian for the current moment. The general public and U.S. officials may have a waning appetite for the invasions and occupations that have marked U.S. foreign policy since September 11th, but everyone is certainly concerned with understanding how to exit such engagements, and McPherson’s focus on how the United States extricated itself from the Dominican Republic in 1924, from Nicaragua in 1933, and from Haiti in 1934 will attract enormous interest. His book is impressively researched. Anyone who has read the standard or even more recent works on these occupations will profit from reading this book.¹ It belongs in all major research libraries and on all comprehensive examination reading lists for historians of U.S. foreign relations.

The argument in *The Invaded* that will probably provoke the most controversy will be that those who resisted U.S. occupation were primarily inspired not by nationalist feeling but by “concrete, local concerns that were material, power-related, self-protective, or self-promoting” (2). McPherson does a good job of delineating what many of these concerns were and certainly helps complicate our understanding of resistance in these countries. I fear, however, that he relies too heavily upon the U.S. occupiers’ own self-justifying assessments that resistance was self-serving and that nationalism did not exist in these countries. McPherson also carefully analyzes U.S. official efforts to transform these countries’ cultures and political habits so that they would no longer be subject to political instability. Few such efforts were successful; most were just wrong-headed. Certainly McPherson is correct to argue that people in these countries did not want to change in many of the ways that the occupiers wanted them to. Dominicans, for example, continued to bet on their prized fighting birds. On the other hand, Dominicans’ and Nicaraguans’ passion for baseball only grew during the occupations, and their love for the game was seen as a hopeful sign of Americanization. The sport clearly became as much a part of their identities as it did Cubans’. (McPherson misses an opportunity here to explain why Haitians never chose to play baseball.) But the occupiers’ efforts to transform political behavior and attitudes like personalism, extreme partisanship, and the acceptance of political violence were never sufficiently well thought out. And as the occupied themselves frequently pointed out, they could not learn how to govern themselves as long as the occupations continued.

In the end, one is less convinced that the Latin Americans and their allies “fought and ended U. S. occupation.” The evidence that McPherson provides suggests that in most cases the resistance that was offered, Nicaragua’s Augusto Sandino aside, was not particularly impressive. While the author provides much interesting information regarding the occupied’s attempts to gain sympathy abroad, he also demonstrates that foreign interest in removing foreign troops from Nicaragua, for example, peaked in 1928, years before the United States finally decided to leave. It is also clear that Haiti in particular never garnered all that much sympathy, since Latin American and European elites were not less racist than the U.S. occupiers. McPherson also shows that Haitian resistance rose and fell, but certainly peaked many years prior to the departure of the troops, as had been the case in the Dominican Republic.

McPherson’s more compelling argument is that the U.S. public to a certain extent turned against interventionism over the course of the 1920s. (I will leave it to Greg Grandin to address whether *The Nation* magazine, which McPherson cites frequently, is a good guide to public opinion.) One suspects, moreover, that U.S. grand strategy should also be taken more into account here. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover argued that occupations damaged U.S. economic interests (as McPherson demonstrates that it did in these particular cases), and he was certainly determined to change things after his election to the presidency. Evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, Franklin Delano Roosevelt clearly hoped that removing troops from Haiti would help improve Americans’ international standing (particularly in a time of Japanese expansionism). In all three cases, the United States left when it chose to do so.

In the end, U. S. officials may have been disappointed with what they achieved in Central America and the Caribbean, but maybe they should not have been. Building roads certainly made a difference, but it was the creation of institutions like the National Guard in Nicaragua that really helped transform these countries’ political culture and provide stability under one-man and dynastic rule for decades to come. What the opponents of occupation in the Dominican Republic and elsewhere had feared was that it would “transform the state into a permanent far-reaching engine of oppression” (69). Under Rafael Trujillo and Anastasio Somoza, their fears came to pass. For most U.S. policymakers, and for many years, stability in Latin America was enough, for it made it possible for U.S. troops to be deployed wherever stakes were higher.

My criticisms notwithstanding, McPherson’s book
merits close reading, particularly by any policymaker planning an occupation whose stock historical analogies consist only of postwar Germany and Japan.

Note:

Roham Alvandi,

Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2014)

Timothy Naftali

Roham Alvandi’s Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah is a notable contribution to the expanding literature in international history on the role of superpower allies and their clients. Provocative and well sourced, this book is a useful corrective for those who still think that the superpowers controlled the level of instability in the Persian Gulf during the Cold War.

Iranian sources are not plentiful. Nevertheless, Alvandi appears to have come as close as one can right now to providing a 360-degree view of the U.S.-Iranian relationship from the beginning of the Cold War through the fall of the Shah. He makes superb use of the diary of the Shah’s closest advisor, Asadollah Alam. American observers, at least, considered Alam, who had headed the Pahlavi Foundation before becoming the country’s prime minister in the early 1960s and then later court counsel, as the closest thing to a friend that the perpetually suspicious Shah ever had.

The Alam diaries buttress Alvandi’s argument that as the 1960s progressed, the Shah became more self-confident and hungrier in his regional ambitions. This behind-the-scenes view of the royal peacock of Tehran is at its most dramatic in Alvandi’s telling of the Shatt-al-Arab crisis of 1969. Little remarked on in the literature of international affairs, this crisis set the Shah not only against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein but against his own military and Washington, both of which counseled him against brinksmanship over the straits.

Like so many regional disputes in modern international history, the crisis stemmed from a colonial-era agreement that a post-colonial dictator wanted to reverse. The 1937 Tehran Treaty, which the Shah’s father had signed, gave Iraq sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab River. The Shah viewed the treaty as humiliating, since international law traditionally drew riverine borders along the thalweg, or deepest part of a waterway. Tired of Iranian violations of the treaty, Baghdad announced in April 1969 that Tehran had to stop treating the waterway as an international highway and pay tolls. The Shah reacted by abrogating the treaty. As Alvandi shows, the Shah then decided to bluff in order to force Saddam Hussein to back down. Over the objections of his military and calls for restraint from the U.S. State Department, the Shah sent an Iranian military ship down the waterway. With Iraq militarily weaker than Iran, Saddam Hussein then gave in, just as the Shah had predicted he would.

The Shah’s decision to ignore internal and U.S. calls for restraint in 1969 signaled to the Nixon administration that the Shah expected to call the shots in the region. Alvandi describes how over the course of the next twelve months, the Nixon administration began to rethink, in Nixonian terms, the “structure of peace” in the Persian Gulf to reflect this new reality. Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had conceptualized regional stability as resting on two pillars—Saudi Arabia and Iran. According to Alvandi, the Nixon administration, while publicly continuing to pay deference to the twin pillars, was thinking in terms of Iranian primacy in the Gulf by April 1970.

Whereas some might point to larger structural changes (such as the withdrawal of the British), Alvandi ascribes this major American geopolitical shift to the personal relationship between Richard Nixon and the Shah, which stretched back to a 1953 meeting when Nixon was vice president. The case as presented, however, is not open and shut. Even if there were strong ties between the two, should we see their relationship as a sufficient or even a necessary cause of the shift? Moreover, the role of the Shah in Alvandi’s narrative of this shift remains obscure. Recent declassifications from the Nixon Library, I believe, have added to evidence that there was much less Nixonergerism than scholars once thought. See, for example, the Nixon library’s 2011 web exhibit, Memoirs v. Tapes: President Nixon and the December Bombing [http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/exhibits/decebomp/splash.html], which provides some excellent examples of their disagreements.

In the future, scholars will focus more often on where these men disagreed and how that disagreement altered policy. By 1979, Nixon and Kissinger were both great defenders of Pahlavi, but was this the case in 1970?

Indeed Alvandi’s often elegant monograph is a terse reminder that it is time for a real re-evaluation of Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy. It is now a commonplace to say that U.S. foreign policy in that era was stellar and that Henry Kissinger was a foreign policy genius. But is this really true? His missteps and misjudgments—the mismanagement of the Vietnam problem over the course of the first term, the botching of the Chilean situation, the mishandling of the politics of the Middle East through the Yom Kippur War, and the huge investments made in Pakistan and Iran during this period—make one wonder whether Kissinger was so adept at foreign policy. And the one real act of genius, the opening to China, was actually Nixon’s idea.

It is Alvandi’s research on the Kurdish tragedy of the 1970s that both shapes the strongest part of the book and is its greatest contribution to international history. No one comes out of the Kurdish story looking good. The Iranians, Israelis, and Americans all treated the Kurds as useful pawns and each had their own reasons for doing so. The Iranians and the Israelis saw the Kurdish fighters, the Pesh Merga, as an instrument to pressure Saddam Hussein. Jerusalem wanted to prevent an Iraqi attack on Israel, whereas the Shah hoped to coerce Baghdad into replacing the 1937 treaty. The Americans, Alvandi shows persuasively, bumbled into this mess to appease the Shah. There does not appear to have been any U.S. strategic interest in this dirty little war—at least none that Kissinger or Nixon expressed.

U.S. support began during the fateful late spring of 1972. It appears that the Shah exploited a malleable Richard Nixon during the May presidential visit to Tehran to induce U.S. participation in the covert war in Kurdistan already being conducted by Tehran and Jerusalem’s secret services, SAVAK and Mossad. Despite Nixon’s support for his Iranian ally, the US role was never more than marginal. According to Alvandi, at the height of this covert war, in 1974, the United States gave just over $8 million a year in covert aid, whereas Iran was pledging at least $75 million a year. Nevertheless, Washington’s secret involvement had real symbolic value for the Shah and, even more importantly, for the Kurds who knew about it.

The Shah’s cynicism was laid bare in 1975 when he stopped all Iranian support to the Kurds in return for Saddam’s acceptance of a new international border in
the Shatt al-Arab. Despite Israeli pressure to continue the struggle, the United States was only in the war because of the Shah and had no interest in replacing Iran as the Kurds’ principal supplier. Once Tehran and Washington pulled out, Baghdad routed the Kurds. The origins of this disaster do not excuse the White House’s callousness, but everybody was playing with the Kurds, and the Shah was the chief mischief-maker.

If the tragedy of the Kurds in 1975 was not evidence enough of how little the United States actually influenced Iranian actions in the period of the Shah, Alvandi’s discussion of the Shah’s drive for an Iranian bomb seals the argument. Had the Shah been a sensible ruler, the conclusion of the 1975 Algiers agreement with Baghdad, which settled the Shatt al-Arab boundary, should have been the moment for the Shah to look inward and seek some domestic gains. Despite the steady increase in Iran’s enormous oil revenues, domestic institution-building had been frozen since the riots of June 1963 that sent the then little-known Ayatollah Khomeini into exile. Instead, the Shah, who did not fear a Soviet invasion, decided to spend even more money on a military and a nuclear program that he did not need. Although Nixon’s prudent successor, Gerald R. Ford, tried to rein in both the Shah’s military and nuclear delusions, he failed. When the Shah did not get nuclear technology on the terms he expected, he turned to the Europeans.

There is so much that is important and well done about this book that it may seem a little churlish to obsess about the final paragraph of the conclusion. “Through his partnership with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi achieved a level of regional primacy and global influence for Iran that no other Iranian ruler has enjoyed in the modern era.” It would be hard to quibble with that line. It is the one that follows that seems more than debatable. “While some have referred to the ‘flawed genius’ or ‘majestic failure’ of the Shah in light of his overthrow in 1979, perhaps one day he will come to be remembered as the best foreign minister Iran never had” (180).

Given the evidence of vanity, self-delusion, and cynicism that Alvandi presents so powerfully in this book, it is hard to imagine that Iranians would ever have reason to celebrate this discredited dictator. The tragedy for Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the Kurds is that the Shah’s sister shamed him into returning to Tehran from Rome in 1953. How much better off the world would have been had he stayed a wealthy, forgotten man in Italy.
SHAFR published a magisterial, two-volume guide to the literature in the history of American foreign relations in 2003, and updated it with an online version beginning in 2007. Compiled by Robert L. Beisner of American University and thirty-two contributing editors, the Guide contains over 16,000 annotated entries, arranged in 32 chapters in two volumes. The Guide serves as an indispensable work for scholars and students interested in any aspect of foreign relations history.

The Guide was named an OUTSTANDING ACADEMIC TITLE by Choice. In 2014, the SHAFR Council appointed Alan McPherson of Oklahoma State University as Guide editor. Professor McPherson will oversee the production of a revised edition of the Guide that will be published on-line and in paper form. In anticipation of the appearance of that revised work, SHAFR is now selling its remaining inventory of the original hardback, two-volume sets published in 2002.

These two-volume sets are now available to members, non-members, students, and libraries at the deeply discounted price of $20.00 plus shipping and handling. The Guide initially sold at $225 to libraries and $95 to members of SHAFR.

Buy now! at http://shafr.org/publications/american-foreign-relations

Others present: Peter Hahn, David Hadley, Jennifer Boles, Anne Foster, Andrew Johns, Mary Werden.

Business Items

1) Announcements

Borstelmann called the meeting to order at 8:05. He expressed his pleasure at the opportunity to work with the Council, and at the presence today of Vice President Engerman and two past presidents, Bradley and Logevall. He also expressed thanks to Hahn for his work in preparation for the meeting.

2) Resolutions of thanks to retiring Council members

A motion of thanks to Marilyn Young, Carol Chin, Sarah Snyder, Christopher Dietrich, whose Council terms ended on December 31, was introduced by Brigham (seconded by Hoganson) and passed unanimously.

3) Recap of motions passed by email vote since June meeting

Hahn read into the minutes a summary of the three motions approved by correspondence since the June 2014 meeting: approval of the minutes of the June 2014 meeting; approval of a motion clarifying a motion passed by Council in the June 2014 meeting, that SHAFR records stored in Texas A&M Archives should be preserved until an inventory and an assessment were completed; and approval of a three-part motion (a) directing long-term retention of certain classes of SHAFR records, (b) scheduling discussion of a records retention policy for the January 2015 meeting, and (c) authorizing the destruction of certain classes of SHAFR records.

4) Motion to accept 2014 financial report

Hahn presented written and oral reports on the finances in fiscal year 2014, which was only ten months due to the transition from ending the fiscal year in December to ending the fiscal year in October, and a budget for FY 2015 (which began on November 1). Having provided a detailed written report in advance of the meeting, Hahn summarized that SHAFR’s endowment and total assets on October 31 were the highest year-end figures in the Society’s history.

Hahn summarized a financial statement received recently from Oxford University Press. Discussion ensued about data in the publisher’s report earlier received and circulated to Council. Questions were raised about the reported data on sales and circulation and the potential long-term impact on the finances of the Society. Hahn offered to ask these questions when he met with representatives of the press this afternoon and to report back to Council on his findings. It was suggested that Hahn ask the representative if she would be able to attend a Council meeting in 2016 or 2017.

Hahn recommended that on the basis of the overall financial health of the Society that Council should affirm its earlier strategy of using endowment earnings to fund high quality programs whose costs exceeded cash revenues. Engerman asked if there were regular endowment withdrawals; Hahn explained that the long-term practice was to withdraw from the endowment as shortfalls occurred on annual bases and that historically such withdrawals had been infrequent although they occurred in 2013 and 2014.

Brigham requested clarification of SHAFR’s status as a non-profit organization. Hahn explained that SHAFR paid a modest annual federal tax in light of calculations made by the IRS based on Form 990. He noted that Council in 2008 approved a plan to pay the federal tax rather than drastically revise spending patterns. He further noted that a more significant tax was paid in 2014 because of a one-time sell-off of stocks that had earned significant capital gains during the transition of the endowment accounts to TIAA CREF in 2013.

Brigham moved (seconded by Engerman) that the report be accepted; the motion passed unanimously.

5) Report on SHAFR Guide to the Literature

McPherson gave a brief presentation on his initiatives as editor of the SHAFR Guide to the Literature and he requested guidance from Council on next steps. McPherson reported that, following the decision to move away from ABC-CLIO, he had been in discussion with potential publishers. Two proposals have emerged.

The first proposal is from Oxford University Press, and would fit within their Oxford bibliographies series. The Guide would be published online only, and its format would need to be altered significantly to fit their style. McPherson emphasized that significant work would be required to make this alteration. The second proposal is from Brill, which would not require a change of format and would provide for a hard-copy edition; however, further information is required from Brill.

Discussion ensued as the strengths and weaknesses of the two proposals. Questions concerned which option offered the most practical solution, which would provide the greatest public access, and how section editors might be fairly compensated for their work.
McPherson suggested that he further pursue the Brill proposal, examine other options, and report back in June with a goal of a first edition published by 2017. There was general agreement from Council on this point; Borstelmann expressed appreciation for the hard work of McPherson.

6) Archival records retention policy

Hahn presented oral and written reports on the SHAFR archival material formerly located at Texas A&M University. He noted with appreciation the work of Dr. Jessica Wallace for conducting an inventory and assessment of the materials gathered at Ohio State in 2014 from Texas A&M and the former Diplomatic History office in Colorado, and for helping prepare the report.

Hahn reviewed the recommendations he made in the written report pertaining to the Bernath family papers discovered in the materials from Texas A&M and he asked Council for guidance. Hahn recommended the permanent preservation of those files concerning the scholarly career and premature death of Stuart L. Bernath, and correspondence between SHAFR and Gerald Bernath on a range of topics which included the establishment of various funds in honor of Stuart and Myrna Bernath. Hahn recommended that personal bank statements of the Bernath family be destroyed in the interest of privacy and he asked Council to decide between preserving or destroying the will of Myrna Bernath. Brigham moved (Von Eschen seconding) that the personal bank statements should be destroyed, that the will should be held permanently in the SHAFR Business Office, and that the Stuart Bernath file and the Gerald Bernath correspondence should be permanently archived. The motion passed unanimously.

With regard to the permanent preservation of SHAFR archives, Hahn reported that the Ohio State University Library & Archives (OSUL&A) expressed willingness to accept SHAFR archival material for permanent retention. Hahn noted that the OSUL&A would make the records available to the public; and that the Archives has a commitment to preserve materials related to non-profit societies with ties to the university and/or the State of Ohio. Appreciation was expressed for Hahn’s work on this effort. A consensus emerged in favor of depositing SHAFR materials in the OSUL&A.

Hahn then raised questions with two specific parts of the SHAFR collection: manuscripts submitted to Diplomatic History and reader’s reports on those manuscripts; and prize committee deliberations files. Hahn noted that the OSUL&A would not accept the Diplomatic History manuscript submissions, citing space limitations and absence of public interest, but would accept the reader’s reports. Hahn also summarized a proposal to digitize these materials. Council members agreed that digitization would be too costly in light of the value of the materials and that their destruction was justified. It was also agreed that reader’s reports should be preserved in those cases where the referees signed a form indicating their consent with preservation and eventual public access; that those reports would be held in the SHAFR Business Office until 2030 at which time they would be transferred to the Archives; and that all other reader’s reports should be destroyed. Hahn recommended that final reports from prize committees should be archived but that all other materials detailing deliberations should be destroyed. He cited the concern with privacy and the relative dearth of such files since 2002 to justify this recommendation.

Herman-Weber moved (Bradley seconded) that original manuscripts submitted to Diplomatic History should be scheduled for destruction; that reader’s reports accompanied by signed consent forms should be preserved in the Business Office until 2030 and then archived; that prize committee reports should be archived and other prize committee files should be destroyed; and that the SHAFR archive should be established at OSUL&A. The motion passed unanimously.

Hahn indicated that he would work with Dr. Wallace to implement these decisions; and that he would facilitate signature of records retention and deed of gift agreements between Borstelmann and the OSUL&A.

7) Salary Structure

Hadley vacated the meeting room.

Borstelmann proposed that Council replace its past, ad hoc management of compensation for SHAFR’s employees and contractors with a more proactive management process that includes annual review of all salaries and compensation levels, including annual proposals for adjustments based on merit rewards and cost-of-living inflation.

Discussion ensued. Consensus developed that the proposed new process should be adopted immediately; that the president will formulate recommendations for those staff on calendar year appointments for Council consideration at January meetings and recommendations for those staff on July 1-June 30 appointment years for Council consideration at June meetings; that the president will consult with the Ways & Means Committee and relevant SHAFR officers and committee chairs in formulating these recommendations; that the president will include an assessment of any changes and challenges in each staff member’s position; and that this duty will be added to the guide to the office of president. Von Eschen moved (Engerman seconded) adoption of this plan and the motion was approved unanimously.

McPherson vacated the room. Council resolved unanimously that compensation for the Guide editor would be addressed in June 2015. McPherson returned to the room. Council resolved unanimously that compensation for the conference consultant would be addressed in June 2015 and that compensation for the web editor, Passport editor, and assistant director would be evaluated in January 2016. Hahn vacated the room. Council resolved unanimously that compensation for the executive director would be increased immediately to $25,000 per year. Hahn and Hadley returned to the room.

8) Electronic attendance at Council meetings

Hoganson raised the question of whether there should be an option for electronic attendance of Council members in the event an emergency prevented attendance at a meeting. Discussion ensued as to the different options available for electronic communications, the costs that could be incurred, and potential issues per the By-Laws provisions on voting. Council agreed that presidents, on an ad hoc basis, could direct that members unable to attend meetings under emergency circumstances should gain access to meetings (but not
to vote) by electronic means.

9) Initiative to promote philanthropy to SHAFR

Borstelmann noted that many members would welcome an opportunity to contribute to SHAFR and thus he favored facilitating and soliciting donations. He proposed that he would establish an ad hoc committee to consider questions of financial development for the organization and the promotion of life memberships and he asked Council to approve. Consensus emerged than a committee as envisaged by Borstelmann ought to be formed.

10) Memberships status of prize winners

Hahn indicated that prize committee chairs had asked if prizes should be limited to members only. Discussion ensued. It was noted that perhaps the Bernath Lecture Prize should be limited to members only but that book prizes should not. Borstelmann indicated that this item would be further discussed in June.

11) Resolution of congratulations to Regina Greenwell

Hoganson motioned (Engerman seconded) approval of a resolution submitted by William Burr:

Until her retirement on 1 December 2014 Senior Archivist Regina Greenwell has worked at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library for 38 years. Over the years she made a huge difference for SHAFR members by helping to make the LBJ Library one of the most open of the presidential libraries. Starting out as a staff historian, she prepared primary sources for the Library’s oral history program and edited the transcripts. As an archivist, she helped reduce the backlog of classified records; Regina eventually became leader of the Library’s foreign policy team, which oversees all of the Library’s declassification efforts, including systematic and mandatory declassification review, and the Remote Archives Capture (RAC) Project. As part of her work, she provided expert advice to researchers working on the Library’s holdings on the Middle East, Latin America, the United Nations, and national security policy. Moreover, she was co-team leader of the project to process President Johnson’s recorded telephone conversations and started the work to process recordings made by Johnson in the Cabinet Room during 1968. Among the tapes that Regina helped process were the famous conversations, recorded on dictabelt, of LBJ with Senator Richard Russell and national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, in May 1964, when Johnson expressed his doubts about Vietnam (“What does Vietnam mean to me?”). In this and other ways, Regina Greenwell contributed to a qualitatively better understanding of U.S. foreign relations during the 1960s.

The motion passed unanimously.

Reports

12) Passport

Having circulated previously a written report, Johns presented a brief oral report on Passport, noting that the publication was in good shape. Council members expressed appreciation for Johns’s and Mitch Lerner’s service as Passport editors.

13) 2015 Summer Institute

Having circulated previously a written report, Johns reported that 2015 Summer Institute planning was proceeding well, and that applications from potential participants were currently incoming.

14) Summer Institute Oversight Committee

Reporting for the Summer Institute Oversight Committee, Bradley suggested that Summer Institutes should emphasize SHAFR’s commitment to diversity and internationalism; and that future Calls for Proposals to host institutes should allow proposers up to three pages to explain the intellectual framework of their proposal. The issue of whether the SI should cater primarily to graduate students or to young faculty, or to both, was also raised.

Engerman moved (Bradley seconded) that future Calls for Proposals would include a diversity and international component; allow up to three pages to explain the intellectual framework; change the language regarding the participants of the Summer Institute to read “junior faculty and graduate students”; and add notification that SIOC would work with the organizers of successful proposals to promote the goals of the Summer Institute. The motion passed unanimously.

15) Diplomatic History

Foster and Diplomatic History grad assistants Boles and Werden reported on the progress of Diplomatic History since the move of the editorial office to Bloomington. Foster reported that journal operations were smooth, that a third graduate assistant had been hired, and that a style guide was being prepared to promote standardization and accuracy. Foster expressed satisfaction at the level of cooperation between Passport and Diplomatic History, especially in terms of sharing book reviews. Logevall expressed his preference for as many reviews as possible to appear in Diplomatic History; Foster appreciated his view and agreed on the importance of book reviews.

Brigham asked whether Diplomatic History required readers to sign a confidentiality waiver; Foster said they did not and had no plans to add one, unless guided to do so by Council. Hoganson asked whether reader reports were being archived; Foster responded the electronic copies were being kept. Borstelmann thanked Passport and Diplomatic History staffs for their good work, and Foster and Johns for participating in the meeting.

16) 2015 Annual Meeting
Borstelmann reported that all was going well with the preparations for the SHAFR Conference in Summer 2015. He commended the work of Program Committee co-chairs Brooke Blower and Jason Colby in preparing for the conference and referred Council to a written report they submitted in advance of the meeting which included a schedule for sessions.

17) 2016 and 2017 Annual Meetings

Johns, as co-chair of local arrangements, reported that preparations for the 2016 San Diego SHAFR Conference were proceeding well.

Hahn noted under the usual cycle, the 2017 conference would be held in Washington. Council indicated that that cycle should continue, and Hahn indicated that he would work with Borstelmann to find a venue.

Discussion ensued on holding a conference in a non-U.S. location. Hahn mentioned that Council has previously encouraged members to propose overseas locations when calls for proposals for non-Washington conferences were announced. Goedde mentioned that the Membership Committee was exploring European locations. Others noted possible sites in Latin America. Concern was expressed that overseas venues might be cost-prohibitive for many members especially students. It was suggested that SHAFR might need to subsidize travel. It was suggested that the Summer Institute might be held in an international location as a prelude to a full conference being held abroad.

Brigham moved (Bradley seconded) that the 2016 Summer Institute Call for Proposals should be further revised to include specific language about the possibility of an international venue, with a note that such proposals needing more than the allotted $45,000 would be considered further. The motion passed unanimously.

18) Prizes and Fellowships

Hahn made reference to a written report distributed earlier summarizing prizes and fellowships to be awarded at the SHAFR luncheon tomorrow; it was accepted with the thanks of Borstelmann.

19) Teaching Committee

Council was directed to see a written report provided by Chester Pach; it was received with thanks.

20) Announcements and other business

Borstelmann brought the meeting to a close at 12:00PM and thanked all present for their participation.

Respectfully submitted,
Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/dh
1. Professional Notes

Michael Ellzey has been named director of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum for the National Archives and Records Administration.


Jacob Hamblin (Oregon State University) received the AHA's Paul Birdsall Prize for his book, Arming Mother Nature: The Birth of Catastrophic Environmentalism (2013).

2. Recent Books of Interest

Blower, Brooke L. and Mark Philip Bradley, eds. The Familiar Made Strange: American Icons and Artifacts After the Transnational Turn (Cornell, 2015).
Brown, Seyom. Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Obama (Columbia, 2015).
Cammett, Melani and Ishac Diwan. A Political Economy of the Middle East (Westview, 2015).
Denis, Nelson A. War Against All Puerto Ricans: Revolution and Terror in America’s Colony (Nation, 2015).
Feldman, Keith P. A Shadow over Palestine: The Imperial Life of Race in America (Minnesota, 2015).
Gardner, Hall. The Failure to Prevent World War I: The Unexpected Armageddon (Ashgate, 2015).
Gienow-Hecht, Jessica. Music and International History in the Twentieth Century (Berghahn, 2015).
Hiro, Dilip. The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry Between India and Pakistan (Nation, 2015).
Huque, Mahmudul. *From Autonomy to Independence: The United States, Pakistan and the Emergence of Bangladesh* (Vikas, 2014).


James, Leslie, and Elisabeth Leake, eds. *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence* (Bloomsbury, 2015).


Mills, David W. *Cold War in a Cold Land: Fighting Communism on the Northern Plains* (Oklahoma, 2015).


“The William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants are intended to promote scholarly research by untenured college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. and who are working as professional historians. Grants are limited to scholars working on the first research monograph. A limited number of varying amounts (generally up to $2000 each) are awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects.”

This year’s winners are:

**Kevin Y. Kim**, Senior Lecturer, Vanderbilt University (“Worlds Unseen: Henry Wallace’s and Herbert Hoover’s Anti-‘Consensus’ Diplomacies and the Making of Cold War America”)

**Alanna O’Malley**, Assistant Professor of International Studies, Leiden University (“No time for pride or prejudice: Anglo-American Relations and the United Nations during the Congo crisis, 1960-64”)

**Rebecca Herman Weber**, Assistant Professor, Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington (“In Defense of Sovereignty: Labor, Crime, Sex and Nation at U.S. Military Bases in Latin America, 1940-47”)

The 2014-2015 Williams Junior Faculty Research Grant Committee:
*Molly M. Wood (Chair)*
*Christopher Nichols*
*Dustin Walcher*

The Society for Historians for American Foreign Relations established the Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship in 2002 to honor Professor Michael J. Hogan, who edited *Diplomatic History* for more than a decade and championed a broader, more international vision for the scholarship in the field. The Hogan fellowship is intended to promote research in foreign-language sources by graduate students. This year the Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship has been awarded to two very deserving doctoral students.

**George Roberts** is a Ph.D. student at the University of Warwick in Great Britain under the direction of Professor David Anderson. His dissertation project is entitled “The Cold War in Dar es Salaam, 1967-1979,” which he plans to complete in the Fall 2016 semester. It will address the evolution of international politics in Dar es Salaam, the capital of post-independence Tanzania and a “hotbed of Cold War politics.” President Julius Nyerere’s efforts to promote a nonaligned brand of Africanized socialism and to support the liberation of the southern African territories still under white minority rule faced resistance from Western powers as well as suspicion from the Soviet Union given Tanzania’s close relations with China. And Dar es Salaam—the new nation’s cosmopolitan capital and a key port where Soviet and Chinese weapons were dispatched to southern Africa and where intelligence agents from Britain, America, and Portugal teemed—became a nodal point of Cold War politics in Africa. The Hogan Fellowship will allow Mr. Roberts to complete a two-week Portuguese course in Lisbon and a three-week intensive Swahili course in Dar es Salaam. The committee was particularly interested in the project’s multilingual demands and its focus on the African continent—an often-overlooked arena in Cold War international relations.

**Suraya Khan** is a Ph.D. candidate at Rice University under the direction of Professor Ussama Makdisi. Her dissertation project is entitled “Finding Palestine in America: The Impact of the Arab-Israeli Conflict on Arab-American Identity, 1917-1987.” It will investigate the ways in which the issue of Palestine nurtured a spectrum of Arab-American identities and political activism, as Arab-Americans forged their own “foreign relations” by virtue of their enduring connection to the people and places they supposedly left behind. These “immigrant foreign relations” across the three waves of twentieth-century Arab-American migration included both domestic and transnational political mobilizations in the face of Zionist territorial expansion, a pro-Israeli foreign policy in their adopted country, and new immigration policies regulating their movement between the U.S. and the Middle East. The Hogan Fellowship will allow her to enroll at the University of Texas’ Arabic Summer Institute and study both Modern Standard and colloquial Arabic in order to fully utilize both early Arab diaspora newspapers and to conduct interviews with Arab-Americans who have returned to live in the Middle East. The committee was particularly fascinated by how this project promises to unite historiographies on immigration and American foreign relations in order to enrich both.
Recently, I worked on a roundtable panel on the centenaries of American interventions in the Caribbean Basin during World War I for the upcoming 2016 AHA meeting in Atlanta. Of course, Mark Gilderhus was the first person I thought about asking to participate. While I knew he had retired, he remained someone who you could always count on to provide an insightful perspective, especially on issues related to Latin America. Just as I planned to reach out, however, I received the news of Mark’s death from cancer on January 22.

Mark’s passing left a void in the field of U.S. foreign relations. His perceptive monographs and surveys firmly established his reputation as a leader in the field, both as a prominent advocate for studying Latin America and also as someone who did transnational history long before it became fashionable. More importantly, he was a model citizen, helping a legion of graduate students and young professors like myself. He was a great mentor to many, assisting people with creating panels for conferences and the publishing of articles and books. Also, he provided a sympathetic ear or advice on almost anything related to history and life.

Mark also loved SHAFR as much as anyone and was president of the organization in 1996. Anyone attending SHAFR over the last forty years would recognize him, and if they had taken time to talk with Mark, they would remember the conversation as a memorable one. He was the consummate storyteller and genuinely approachable person, a member of a generation of historians in the field who have nurtured so many young scholars and made SHAFR a great organization.

Raised in rural Hayfield, Minnesota, Mark developed several passions early on that most never knew. For example, few people realized that he was a skilled trumpet player. His love of music continued for a lifetime and helped shape the rhythms of his work and life. Mark’s trajectory toward academia was a winding one. His parents were Norwegian immigrants (his father Shorty was a barber). Mistakenly, they guided him toward an education at Gustavus Adolphus College (the Swedish Lutheran Church school) rather than St. Olaf’s (the Norwegian version). That oversight was fortuitous, though, as Gustavus Adolphus sent many students to graduate studies at the University of Nebraska, where Mark matriculated in 1964 to study with David Trask and Michael Meyer. He admitted that education was only a partial explanation for his choice of pursuing a doctorate; he also had a desire to stay in school as long as possible and avoid the draft and the Vietnam conflict.

Mark made a lot of friends at Nebraska, many who tell great stories about their time together. In one case, the spectacular murder trial of Richard Speck unfolded while Mark was in graduate school after Speck killed eight students in Chicago. In a letter to the editor of the Lincoln Journal Star, someone called for outlawing tattoos because Speck had “HATE” painted on his knuckles. Mark immediately responded with a letter calling for tattooing of positive slogans (such as “Born to Raise Wheat” and “Born to Play Football”) on Nebraskans, reasoning that if bad things happened from the act, then good things would as well if the same idea held (tongue-in-cheek, of course). He told readers that he and his comrades in the William Jennings Bryan League would meet at the famous Nebraska’s statue on the state capitol grounds and provide the service to all takers. None showed. As his friends know, he did not suffer fools lightly.

Mark’s great passion beyond history at Nebraska was Husker football. Who cannot remember seeing Mark walking around SHAFR with that old, ratty red Nebraska hat? Because football games provided cheap entertainment, he and others attended them regularly throughout graduate school. He never forgot those days, and through thick and thin supported the Huskers—even while simultaneously cursing them often for their lack of success in the modern era. When he received his terminal diagnosis, one of his last destinations was Lincoln to watch a final game in person.

After some very formative years in Lincoln that included research trips to Mexican archives, Mark completed his Ph.D. in 1968 and headed to Ft. Collins, Colorado along with Nancy, who would be his wonderful wife of forty-seven years. He had secured a tenure-track position at Colorado State University that paid an enormous $9,000 a year—“hardly a princely sum,” he noted! Nevertheless, “in those early years, my wife Nancy and I managed to support ourselves and our young daughters Kirsten and Lesley in a condition of genteel poverty.”

For twenty-nine years, he worked at CSU, where he moved relatively quickly from an assistant to associate to full professor, despite worrying early on that his antiwar activism endangered his position on the largely conservative campus. He eventually became department chair, during which time he made significant strides to diversify the department, adding both women and people of color. It was not always easy, as he admitted in speaking about his relationship with university administrators: “I
thought that expressions of good intentions and goodwill rang true—a delusion later dissipated by thirteen years as a department chair.”

Being a department chair had some perks, one being that he created a budget line for travel to SHAFR “for the purpose of showing CSU’s flag.” From its inception, SHAFR remained one of Mark’s greatest loves. Almost everyone will remember him at conferences, usually not far from his great friend Mark Stoler (dubbed the “Odd Couple” by one friend and the “Marx Brothers” by another). Stoler observed, “Mark loved SHAFR,” so much so that although his wedding anniversary often fell during the annual conference, he rarely chose to miss it. Instead, Nancy often accompanied him.

Upon SHAFR’s formation in 1967, he immediately joined the new organization. He and others marveled at being able to attend a conference where they could talk to others with common interests in U.S. foreign relations. Before SHAFR existed, he stressed, “historians of American foreign relations worked in relative isolation from one another and possessed neither a professional organization nor journal of their own.” Early on, Mark stressed, “the presence of big-name scholars and sometimes high-level diplomatic and military officials instilled a sense of awe.” At one of his first SHAFR conferences, he remembered taking an escalator at the conference hotel. As he descended, he noticed Walter LaFeber and Lloyd Gardner talking to William Appleman Williams at the bottom. He was so excited to see the gathering of such distinguished scholars. In fact, I am not sure he ever lost that exuberance when attending SHAFR conferences, even as he became a senior member of the field. He always loved, “hobnobbing with the very people whose books I had read and admired.”

Over time, Mark would become one of those respected scholars, something the organization ultimately recognized with his election as president of SHAFR in 1996. He would labor tirelessly with Allan Spetter, executive director of the organization, during the year leading up to his time as president and his year in office. He sought to make sure that SHAFR continued its vertical trajectory as a model society with stable finances, more diversity, and vibrant intellectual conferences. He succeeded.

By the late 1970s, Mark had become one of those scholars who junior people like myself would look forward to meeting at the conference, especially with the publication of Diplomacy and Revolution: U.S.-Mexican Relations Under Carranza (1977). It was one of the most influential books in a long line of influential works on the Mexican Revolution by the use of diplomatic recognition and other tools including military force. Driven by a desire “to understand why the United States habitually opposed outbreaks of revolutionary nationalism in the twentieth century,” something obviously pushed into place by his own experiences during the Vietnam War, Mark presented a sophisticated, multi-archival based (American and Mexican) transnational history of the relationship between the United States and Mexico. Long before it became vogue, Mark showed young historians a path toward creating a balanced history that acknowledged the agency of those in foreign lands and the value of foreign archives (and by extension understanding different languages and cultures).

In particular, I remember two books from my undergraduate years that molded me in the mid-1980s. One was Walter LaFeber’s, Inevitable Revolutions, and the other was Mark’s Diplomacy and Revolution. Once I decided to go to graduate school in history instead of mathematics, my teachers started pushing me to better understand historiography. Diplomacy and Revolution was the first book they gave me to approach in such a manner. It was a great introduction, and I remember it not only the ease of writing and very understandable narrative (even for a young undergraduate), but also as a book with a complex thesis that provided a deep understanding of the topic. It shaped my methodological approach to research and writing more than any other book for many years—and it still remains influential to scholars.


Perhaps the least recognized among his works was History and Historians (7th edition, 2009). It is a remarkably written, concise book that I have used in my upper-level undergraduate capstone research courses. As Mark’s great friend since graduate school, Bill Beezley, noted, he was “really a craftsman at writing” who genuinely had a passion for teaching students and dispersing knowledge both in the classroom and through his writing. This book accomplished the latter in an accessible way that challenged students to think about history outside of just learning the facts and introduced them to concepts such as historiography and research methodology. Bill also reminded me that there are subtle and also not so subtle jokes about members of the profession in the book. It was Mark at his best.

Such writing and interest in pedagogy and historiography made Mark an easy choice to lead the first SHAFR Teaching Committee, which was formed when Mark Stoler served as SHAFR president in 2004. He worked with colleagues to collect and distribute syllabi and other pertinent information to assist younger scholars in particular. The committee also began organizing panels at the SHAFR conference to discuss issues related to pedagogy. Mark’s efforts with the Teaching Committee left the organization with a wonderful legacy in this area and constantly reminded us of our primary duty as higher education professors: to educate students.

Mark would publish many other articles and essays in different venues and on a multitude of diverse topics. Some of the most important focused on the historiography of the United States and Latin America. In Michael Hogan’s classic work, America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941, Mark contributed an excellent piece. Others appeared in Diplomatic History and additional forums, always richly detailed with a deep comprehension of the evolution of the field and the literature. Even toward the end of his life, he continued to work, focusing on writing a history of the major wars of the United States in the 20th and 21st centuries. It is a project that remains just a bit unfinished.

Mark loved Ft. Collins, raising a family in the foothills not far from the majestic Rocky Mountains. Yet, his great friend Bill Beezley encouraged him to apply for the Lyndon B. Johnson Chair (ironically in Mark’s view) at Texas Christian University in Fort Worth. He impressed people at TCU and accepted the job when they offered it to him. He really wanted to expand his ability to shape future scholars by working in a well-respected doctoral program, one known for having especially strong Latin Americanists.

At TCU, he continued to focus on undergraduates including many ROTC students who took his Military History survey. But he also jumped into graduate education, serving on a member of a large number of Ph.D. and M.A. committees and chairing many of them. His advisees found a very demanding advisor. One noted, he was “in as far as you were. If it was 10%, then he gave 10%. If it was 110%, he gave 110%.” He never lost his cool and always maintained
a balanced, and even gentle, relationship with his students. Equally as important, he always exuded a confidence of being “so comfortable in his own skin,” setting a good standard for many of them. Mark also was a role model in many ways. One of his Ph.D. students, Dana Cooper, noted how Mark worked to instill in his students a work/life balance, something he maintained with his own family. “Nothing matters if life if you neglect your family,” he told her. Openly, he talked on striving to be a good husband and father as well as a top scholar and teacher. In the end, Mark always saw his students as his fundamental focus. Even as he passed, on his nightstand lay Dana’s new book, Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945. He remained proud of them until the end.

Many others echoed their love for Mark as an advisor and mentor. This went beyond just those students at TCU. Michael Donoghue at Marquette University remembered, “Mark was a terrific SHAFR colleague and scholar who mentored me compassionately when I first got started on my Panama project. He suggested lots of valuable sources and was always so encouraging and brimming with enthusiasm when I faced some tough periods in my research and writing.” When Michael received the position at Marquette after completing doctoral studies at the University of Connecticut, Mark remained, “such a wonderful friend and cheerleader for everything I tried to do. What a tremendous asset and supporter he was for all of us Latin Americanists in SHAFR—to be fair, to everyone in the organization.”

Many have echoed Michael’s praises for Mark as he helped many graduate students and young scholars (and sometimes those like myself who were not that young) and always proved a host of his colleagues, something acknowledged by other giants in the field including George Herring and Tom Paterson. Anyone who visited him in Fort Worth walked away talking about the wonderful meals (and a few libations) and the warm hospitality provided by Mark, the university, and town. His students always appreciated the appearance of such scholars, knowing that all truly respected and genuinely liked Mark on so many levels.

Yet, Mark was more than a scholar, teacher, and mentor. He enjoyed the world around him. From his own trumpet playing days in high school, he sustained his love of music, especially jazz and the blues. Miles Davis remained his favorite, but he loved many other artists. At one AHA in Chicago, Nancy and Mark headed out one night to a blues club. One of Mark’s favorite singers, Gloria Hardiman, was singing. In particular, he loved her song, “Meet Me With Your Black Drawers.” The show started late and lasted until 2:00am. During the show, Mark sat in the front row, enthusiastically following the music. At one point, Hardiman asked him to join her on stage. He proudly exclaimed that he was the best (and maybe only), “Norwegian blues shouter.” And the music always remained at the forefront as Nancy placed a message on the answering machine telling everyone that hopefully “they were out stomping to the blues.”

Many also remember Mark’s sense of humor. Nancy observed that throughout their lives together, even until the end, Mark maintained a “sublime sense of the ridiculous.” During retirement in Fort Collins, each day he read the New York Times and gave a running commentary on the country and its people, often leaving Nancy laughing hard as they shared coffee and breakfast. The dry and insightful humor often reached into his work. At one point in a 2007 Diplomatic History article, he praised SHAFR for not being a “gathering of opinionated and pompous stuffed shirts.” Nor could he could not resist taking a swipe at the current trends in academia. He observed, “postmodernists and other avant-garde thinkers describe our methods as traditionalist, untheoretical, unimaginative, and archive bound.” Nevertheless, he praised diplomatic historians for remaining committed to using the documentary evidence as the best tool available. “Our kind of history assuredly involves imagination but not pure imagination,” he concluded.

His 1997 presidential address showed a similar wit, albeit simultaneously a self-effacing one. In it, he delivered a scathing critique of Samuel Flagg Bemis’s The Latin American Policy of the United States by chastising the nationalist school for its failure to acknowledge economic factors and the agency of the Latin Americans. Toward the end, he noted: “Happily in the present day, many historians working this field are capable of arriving at balanced, nuanced, and accurate forms of understanding.” However, he issued a warning: “Someday our writings may appear to future historians every bit as anachronistic as Bemis’s works on Latin America now seem to us. Trying to do history is a very risky thing.”

In the end, as I have talked to many people about Mark, one major thing has jumped out at me. Mark was a person respected as much a wonderful human being as he was for being a fine scholar. Yes, he was a very skilled practitioner of the historical craft, but an even better father, friend, and mentor. I hope that when I pass, people remember me in the same way: first as a person and then as a scholar. He was a wonderful role model in this area.

Mark will be missed by all of us in the field. He truly loved SHAFR and his colleagues. This summer, SHAFR will hold its annual conference, absent one of the most beloved people in the field. Instead, we will honor his long legacy of service to SHAFR and the academy with a roundtable on Saturday morning. Many of us will seek to fill his huge footsteps to make sure that SHAFR remains as alive and vibrant as it was during the forty years that Mark led and participated in it.

—Kyle Longley

SHAFR and the Gilderhus family invite memorial donations to be made in honor of Mark Gilderhus. Donations should be sent to Professor Peter Hahn, SHAFR Executive Director, Department of History, The Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210.
In Memoriam:

Charles Chatfield
(1935-2015)

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared in the March 2015 issue of Perspectives on History (historians.org/perspectives). AJ

Charles Chatfield, professor emeritus of history at Wittenberg University, died at his home in Springfield, Ohio, on January 15, 2015. He was 80 years old. Born in Philadelphia and raised in Oak Park, Illinois, Chatfield graduated from Monmouth College; he earned his MA and PhD in history at Vanderbilt University, then did postgraduate study at the University of Chicago Divinity School. He was professor of history at Wittenberg University for 38 years, starting in 1961, and held the H. Orth Hirt Chair in history. He directed international education from 1975 to 1983, and with his wife Mary’s help created and directed a study-abroad program, Global Issues and World Churches. He devoted his teaching and scholarship to the history of matters of peace and justice, both national and international; his books and articles helped create a new branch of history: peace history/studies. At the end of the cold war he co-directed a joint Russian-American study of the ideas of peace in Western civilization.


A Danforth Fellow, he also received the Lifetime Achievement Award from the Peace History Society, an honorary doctorate from Monmouth College, and the 2012 Peace Hero Award from the Dayton International Peace Museum, where he also helped establish the Abrams/Chatfield Peace Library. The extensive Charles Chatfield Papers are deposited at the Swarthmore College Peace Library. Locally, he served several church and service organizations. His family writes that “he relished the written word, theater and music, dance and travel, people, flowers, and egregious puns.”

While Chatfield built his reputation as a scholar and historian, he continued to work as an activist, earning the respect and devotion of his colleagues and students. Of his first decade at Wittenberg, in the 1960s, Chatfield remarked in 2013, “It was so exciting, and still is to think on.” Peace studies, he explained, is “a field which attracts people with a real sense of values.” Meanwhile, he created at Wittenberg legendary courses on the Vietnam War and on the craft of history. One of his former colleagues referred to Chatfield as “a warm, kind and tough-minded colleague for whom I had the greatest respect.” One former student deemed himself “lucky to have a college professor that was so passionate about student learning.” He also inspired a generation of graduates from Wittenberg to become teachers. As one wrote, “Dr. Chatfield was brilliant, kind and generous. He taught me how to think and write carefully, and his example helped inspire me to become a teacher.”

A devoted husband, father, and grandfather, Charles Chatfield is survived by his wife, Mary Frances (Poffenberger), and by his son, David Charles, and daughter, Carol Anne (Richard) Holmgren; his sister, Anelise (Bob) Smith; as well as grandchildren, in-laws, and nephews and nieces.

Memorial donations may be sent to the Springfield Peace Center, P.O. Box 571, Springfield, Ohio 45501-0571; Wittenberg University Department of History, P.O. Box 720, Springfield, Ohio 45501; or to Covenant Presbyterian Church, 201 N. Limestone St., Springfield, Ohio 45503, designated for the Mission Outreach Fund.

—Molly M. Wood
The Last Word:
Things I Think

Andrew L. Johns

With apologies to Peter King, here are ten things I think...

1. I think it is about time. The 2016 SHAFR conference will be hosted at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice at the University of San Diego, the first time that the conference will be held on the west coast since Stanford University hosted SHAFR in 1985. Yes, you read that right, 1985—the year that Silverado, Rambo II, and The Breakfast Club came out; Bobby Knight tossed a chair during a college basketball game; Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet premier; and Coke went back to its original formula (feel old yet?). Sure, the biennial trip to the Washington, D.C. area makes sense (well, all except the year we were out in fox country in Chantilly, but I digress), but the reality is that only three times in three decades—1996 in Boulder, 2004 in Austin, and 2006 in Lawrence—and five times overall has SHAFR even ventured west of the Mississippi River. It's not like those of us out west don't enjoy accumulating frequent flier miles every June, but I know that somewhere SHAFR founders and former presidents Tom Bailey (Stanford) and Alex DeConde (UCSB) are smiling. And if SHAFR decided to go to Las Vegas, Maui, or New Orleans over the next few years, that would be OK too.

2. I think that, speaking of the annual meeting, hiring Jennifer Walton as the SHAFR conference czar was one of the best decisions that Council has made in a long time. Jenn does a fantastic job with the venues, activities, and organization of the conferences. How did we get along without her for so long?

3. I think that it is deeply disturbing, rather disheartening, and pretty pathetic that the expression of heterodox opinions (in the discipline specifically and in academia generally) has become increasingly rare. The confluence of the demonization of those with whom we disagree and the reluctance that many have to express themselves honestly because of the fear of reprisal or ostracization results frequently in de facto conformity and a scarceness of thinking otherwise. The lack of tolerance for dissenting or controversial views—whether over scholarly interpretations, socio-political issues, commencement speakers, language used, or even films (the polarized reactions to American Sniper come to mind)—and the marginalization or reflexive dismissal of those who hold them is fundamentally antithetical to both the scholarly ethic and the principle of free speech. We are in danger of becoming—if we are not already there—too sensitive to criticism and too quick to reject opinions, arguments, and ideas with which we take issue. As Dan Rydell said on Sports Night, "Actions are immoral. Opinions are not."

4. I think that every member of SHAFR owes Peter Hahn an enormous thank you. If you have ever sat through a Council meeting, if you have ever had a problem with your subscription to Diplomatic History, if you have ever had a question about anything SHAFR-related, or if you have been a member of SHAFR for more than five minutes, you know what I mean. Kudos to Peter for his even-handed, intelligent, and thoughtful leadership as executive director. Ideally, he should never be allowed to retire, but long before he does step down (sometime in 2045, I hope)...

5. I think that SHAFR should create an annual award to recognize members who have given distinguished service to the organization during their career—perhaps the Mark Gilderhus Award?—and Peter Hahn should be among its first recipients.

6. I think that SHAFR's membership needs to do a better job of governing itself. Although some of the figures are soft due to incomplete ballots and other anomalies, on average only about 311 out of the approximately 1800 members of our organization have voted in elections over the past thirteen years, with a high of 506 in 2011 and a low of 195 in 2005. That is roughly a 17.3% participation rate if you're scoring at home. We can and should be more engaged in decisions that affect the future of our organization by nominating and voting for our colleagues who are willing to serve SHAFR.

7. I think that Council made a great decision to create and continue to support the SHAFR Summer Institute program. I was fortunate to participate in the inaugural version at Ohio State University (sorry, The Ohio State University) in 2008, with Peter Hahn and Bob McMahon directing and eleven other scholars who each had and continue to have a profound influence on my career. Mitch Lerner and I will be directing this year's Institute, and we are really excited about the group of scholars who will be part of the program this June. If you ever have an opportunity to participate in the Institute in any capacity, take advantage of it—you will not regret it.

8. I think, to quote the immortal Sergeant Hultka, that academics frequently need to "lighten up, Francis." Too many of us take life far too seriously, interpret everything through a partisan or ideological lens, look for hidden meanings or sinister intentions when they simply are not there, and find fault where often it does not exist. Life is too short to be offended, miserable, suspicious, or stressed all the time.

9. I think that I am very pleased with the announcement at the beginning of this issue that Passport has begun publishing book reviews. This is an idea that has been kicked around for a couple of years, but finally came to fruition last fall thanks to the enthusiastic support of Nick Cullather and Anne Foster, the co-editors of Diplomatic History. We look forward to being able to highlight more of the terrific scholarship being produced by and of interest to SHAFR's members.

10. I think—no, I know—that I am constantly grateful for and humbled by the unstinting support that Passport continues to receive from SHAFR and its members. I want to thank my editorial and production team—Julie Rokewski, Allison Roth, and Kate Hadley—for helping make every issue a reality. In particular, I want to express my sincere appreciation—and, I know, the gratitude of my predecessor Mitch Lerner—to Dave for his yeoman's work and keen editorial eye on every issue of Passport for the past six years. Dave will be defending his dissertation this summer, and this will be his final issue as assistant editor.

OK, that's much better. Not so many random thoughts bouncing around my head. Now I can get back to the other 37,528 things on my to do list. Or maybe binge watch something on Netflix....