Inside

Rogue Diplomats: Disobedience in American Foreign Policy
The Birthplace of Official Aggression
Wilsonianism: 100 Years Later
...and more!
Passport
THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS REVIEW

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Presidential Message

Andrew Preston

I didn’t sign up for this!” How many times have we heard someone say this since the COVID curtain came down across the world in early 2020? How many times have we thought or said it ourselves? I know I have—a lot. The additional demands the pandemic has placed on our time have been enormous, especially when much of what we’ve had to do is new and requires learning on the fly. The toll is psychologically heavy, as we deal with intermittent lockdowns and the senses of isolation and frustration they bring. Worst of all, many people have had to deal with the effects of contracting COVID, or losing their job, or supporting colleagues, friends, and family who have.

The additional and novel challenges to teaching have a lot to do with the pressures we’re under. So does the effect on our research, from reduced budgets to closed archives to travel restrictions. And, of course, one of the most stressful things of all is dealing with constant uncertainty: is that surface clean? Did someone just use that door handle? Was that just a cough, or was it a COVID cough? How many times can I sanitize my hands before my skin begins to peel off? Uncertainty and volatility are the watchwords of our current moment. Even when there’s good news—I’m writing this in early November, right as news breaks of a possible vaccine—it still raises yet more uncertainty and unpredictability.

Professionally, we deal with these challenges because we have to; they’re part of the job, even if we never signed on for them. But what of the many tasks we do not, strictly speaking, have to do? The tasks we volunteer to do, either from a sense of duty or for the love of a cause, that lie beyond our immediate commitments to our employer or, in terms of research, to ourselves?

I joined SHAFR leadership just over a year ago, and the answer to these questions has renewed my faith in people. That might sound a little naïve, or perhaps unbearably sentimental—a year ago, I probably would have said so myself. But having now witnessed the dedication and hard work, and the endless hours, that SHAFR members have put into the Society during the pandemic is nothing short of inspirational. I’m in awe of just how much Kristin Hoganson and Amy Sayward did to deal with a rapidly shifting crisis, on top of their myriad commitments to their home institutions (not to mention life beyond the campus). I was touched by the good-natured stoicism of Megan Black and Ryan Irwin, the program committee co-chairs for the annual meeting in June. They definitely did not sign up for this. To these people, and to the dozens and dozens more I don’t have space to mention: Thank you.

Compared to standard operating procedures, Megan and Ryan have already spent an inordinate amount of time planning the 2021 conference. This is because SHAFR is trying out a new way to hold a conference. Last June, Council decided on a hybrid format—part in-person, part online—for the annual meeting. At the time, the reasons for doing so were clear and compelling, and a survey of the membership confirmed them. So many people said that even if a vaccine were readily available they probably couldn’t afford to attend the conference in person, because of COVID-related cuts to their personal or institutional resources. Others, and not just those who have an underlying medical condition that puts them at higher risk (I’m in that category myself), are understandably nervous about air travel and large in-person gatherings. And as we discovered from the survey, there are plenty more reasons why members might not want to attend the conference proceedings at the now-familiar Renaissance Hotel in Arlington, VA.

Hybridity shouldn’t mean two parallel tracks that never meet. Instead, we believe a hybrid conference should see the in-person events intersect and interact with the online experience. Although that’s the new frontier of conferencing, I believe it’s unlikely to supplant the in-person gathering entirely once the pandemic has ebbed, and then hopefully disappeared, and we’re studying it as history rather than as current events. I could be wrong, but from the endless hours I’ve spent with colleagues and students on Zoom, FaceTime, Skype, Viber, Webex, Blackboard, Teams…and so on, and on…the benefits of meeting up in person are clearer to me than ever before. Don’t get me wrong, it’s fantastic that we have these virtual platforms to stay connected, and I can see the many ways the new methods, such as Zoom, will be used to do business. But the longing for a return to the Before COVID age is so strong that I doubt our new normal will actually remain normal. Zoom meetings will be held where meeting in person is impractical—that’ll be a net benefit of the pandemic, because those meetings wouldn’t have happened BC—and faraway members can Zoom into a Council or committee meeting they otherwise would have missed. We’ll even be able to wait to be called into Council from our sofa rather than loitering in a hotel corridor at the AHA! But even then, we’ll miss those moments when you’re sitting in the corridor outside a meeting room, a colleague is wandering past, a conversation ensues, ideas are exchanged, and a new relationship is forged. I’m so grateful for the virtual realm, but it just can’t replace the spontaneity, serendipity, and warmth of a friendly chat in the corridor.

So let’s all buckle up for a June conference that is at least partly online, and we’ll take it from there. Whatever happens, though, I am absolutely certain that SHAFR members will be there for each other, and for the Society, come what may—wherever they are.
The incidents chosen—the diplomacy of independence, to implement substantive policy decisions on their own. Relations in which diplomats made and at least attempted the case studies illustrate critical junctures in U.S. foreign policy and they are about the people who managed them. Those men—and they are all men—including John Adams, John Jay, and Benjamin Franklin; Robert Livingston and James Monroe; Nicholas Trist; Walter Hines Page; Joseph P. Kennedy; and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

Although Jacobs holds that the phenomenon of accredited diplomats ignoring instructions and making policy on their own is unique to the United States, the book is not a study of comparative diplomatic practice. Rather, the case studies illustrate critical junctures in U.S. foreign relations in which diplomats made and at least attempted to implement substantive policy decisions on their own. The incidents chosen—the diplomacy of independence, the Louisiana Purchase, negotiations bringing an end to the U.S.-Mexican War, Anglo-American diplomacy surrounding the potential U.S. entry into World War I, then again with respect to World War II, and support for the coup that toppled Ngo Dinh Diem’s government in South Vietnam—were all of considerable importance at the highest levels of the U.S. government. U.S. diplomats weren’t able to ignore their superiors while forging their own paths because the issues they worked on were of secondary or tertiary importance, permitting them to fly under the radar. Rather, in the chosen cases the rogue diplomats made policy, or attempted to, on the leading international questions of the day.

Jacobs suggests that rogue diplomats generally shared important characteristics providing them with the political and psychological space necessary to operate independently. With the notable and extraordinarily entertaining exception of Trist, Jacobs’ diplomats were well-endowed with either wealth or political prominence in their own right; consequently, they did not see themselves as ordinary government functionaries. To the contrary, they saw themselves less as instruments of policy and more as policymakers, engaged in a (sometimes) collaborative enterprise where they necessarily played a leading role. Generally, this is not the approach taken by career foreign service officers who rose through the State Department ranks until they were finally rewarded with an ambassadorship.

In addition to the high quality of the writing, the reviewers appreciate the detailed narratives presented in the case studies. Siekmeier observes that the ambassador “often gets left out of the picture” in foreign relations histories. Jacobs brings the ambassador back in as a major political actor, deserving of serious study. His observation resonates. In my own scholarship, I can think of particular ambassadors who were either colorful, or better connected politically than most. It’s worth considering more seriously the degree to which ambassadorial appointments have made and can make notable differences in foreign policy construction and implementation.

Reviewers also identified important limitations in Jacobs’ work, beginning most notably with the thesis. The notion that U.S. diplomats have been uniquely inclined to disobey orders, and most often experienced success when doing so, is intriguing, but requires further investigation. This is not a slight toward Jacobs—only an acknowledgement that the support he brings to bear in this single volume featuring six case studies can necessarily only serve as the starting point for a larger conversation. As Etheredge explains, “If we want to interrogate Jacobs’ thesis we first need a broader landscape of American diplomatic behavior.
to see, if indeed, there is a proud tradition of disobedience.” These cases could simply be intriguing episodes that are nonetheless outliers even in the U.S. experience, or, as Jacobs suggests, they could point to something more deeply engrained in U.S. diplomatic practice.

The reviewers raise additional critiques. Statler is not fully convinced by some of the case studies, most notably but not exclusively the first on the diplomacy of independence, suggesting that Franklin, Jay, and Adams did not deviate as far from their instructions—at least in their negotiations with France—as Jacobs portrays. She would also like to see the conclusion more fully developed. Statler, Chervinsky, and Siekmeier each ask if it became more difficult in more recent years for diplomats to ignore instructions from Washington. Siekmeier notes that the case studies all center around issues of war and peace. Does it follow that rogue diplomacy was unique to periods before, during, or immediately following armed conflict, involving either the United States directly or the countries with which U.S. diplomats were negotiating? Finally, Siekmeier asks why the cases of unauthorized diplomatic behavior seemed so honorable. Rogue diplomats violated instructions in the service of their conception of the national interest, not their own personal interests. Most suffered no ill effects professionally (Trist and Kennedy were the most notable counterexamples, though for different reasons).

Although Jacobs categorizes each case study as either a success or a failure, Chervinsky suggests that there exists a great deal more grey area. Trist, for instance, may have secured all of the objectives he was handed when dispatched, but that success nonetheless set the stage for the U.S. Civil War. Statler plows similar ground when writing about the Diem case—questioning Jacobs’ conclusion that because Diem was hopelessly in over his head supporting a coup was necessarily in the United States’ best interest. Additionally, Chervinsky asks why it matters that U.S. diplomats have a propensity to go their own way, commenting “I’m not completely sure what that information tells me.”

Ultimately, Rogue Diplomats is a very good book. If you teach, consider assigning it; your students may actually thank you! At a minimum, mine the book for colorful stories easily dropped during lectures, class discussions, and cocktail parties. Etheredge is right; it is nice to see results like this, perhaps it will become less unusual.

Rogue Diplomats are Fun Diplomats

Lindsay M. Chervinsky

In the introduction to Rogue Diplomats, Seth Jacobs explains that he came up with the idea for this book after noticing that his students were always drawn to the stories of rogue diplomats. They sat up straighter in their chairs, booed diplomats who acted in ways that were contrary to the nation’s best interests, and even cheered the spectacular character that is Nicholas Philip Trist (ix). It is easy to understand why Jacobs’ students enjoyed hearing these stories, since the book he wrote about them is equally enjoyable to read. Rogue Diplomats is a serious diplomatic history that contributes to our understanding of the field and U.S. history, but it is also fun—a quality that isn’t always associated with historical scholarship but should be welcome.

Rogue Diplomats offers an overview of American diplomacy from 1778 to the present through six case studies. Taken together, the case studies demonstrate that some American diplomats share a tendency to break the rules or disregard explicit orders from their superiors. This obstreperousness (a word Jacobs utilizes quite effectively) was not shared by diplomats from European, Latin American, or African nations. Rather, defiance is a characteristic that appears to define the American diplomat.

Jacobs starts with the American delegation tasked with negotiating the end of the Revolutionary War. Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay anchor this chapter and offer lively details of disobedience in their correspondence. The Confederation Congress had issued instructions requiring the peace commissioners to “undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their [France’s] knowledge . . . and ultimately to govern yourselves by their advice and opinion” (41). While Franklin, Adams, and Jay differed on their feelings toward France—Franklin adored the French, while Adams and Jay abhorred the diplomatic customs at Versailles and distrusted French motives—they all worked together to flout Congress’s directions. In fact, before Jay and Adams had arrived in Paris, Franklin had already opened secret channels to discuss peace terms with British representatives, away from the prying eyes of the French. The final product of the negotiations between the U.S. and British delegations was an overwhelming success. The Treaty of Paris, officially signed in September 1783,
recognized American independence, secured important access to Atlantic fisheries for American fishermen, and ceded all territory east of the Mississippi River to the United States (71).

While negotiating these terms, Franklin, Jay, and Adams kept their conversations secret from Congress and the French foreign minister, Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes. After the terms of the treaty were released, Vergennes accepted the result as a fait accompli. Some American congressmen objected to the commissioners' betrayal of their French allies, but Congress quickly understood the value offered by the treaty and ratified it. Franklin, Jay, and Adams suffered no consequences for their disobedience and served in additional public offices, thus establishing a precedent that American diplomats could carve their own paths with little punishment (77).

It did not take long for American ministers to use this precedent to their advantage. Ever since the Treaty of Paris granted the United States the territory east of the Mississippi River, Americans had struggled to obtain access to the river. In March 1801, the Jefferson administration learned that Spain had ceded Louisiana territory to France. Spain had granted Americans access to the river in 1795, but most Americans doubted Napoleonic France would be so generous. President Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison tasked Robert Livingston, the new American minister to France, with acquiring access to the river and the critical port of New Orleans. By late 1802, Jefferson was convinced that more ammunition was necessary, and he appointed James Monroe as a special minister. He also authorized about $11.5 million to purchase New Orleans and as much of East and West Florida as possible (101).

Unlike Franklin, Adams, and Jay, who defied their orders outright, Monroe and Livingston just went beyond their stated authority. When Napoleon offered to part with the entire Louisiana territory for $15 million, Monroe and Livingston leapt at the chance to double American territory and secure permanent access to the Mississippi River and the port of New Orleans. They left it to the Jefferson administration and Congress to raise the additional funds and answer the constitutional questions raised by the purchase.

Monroe was so confident that the administration would approve of the deal that he offered a down payment of $2 million before Congress had ratified the treaty (115). He was right. The Louisiana Purchase was widely celebrated, and Congress ratified it within days of convening an emergency session. While Livingston did not receive additional government positions, he did not face any consequences for straying outside the boundaries of his instructions. Monroe went on to serve as secretary of state and president of the United States.

When Napoleon offered to part with the entire Louisiana territory for $15 million, Monroe and Livingston leapt at the chance to double American territory and secure permanent access to the Mississippi River and the port of New Orleans. They left it to the Jefferson administration and Congress to raise the additional funds and answer the constitutional questions raised by the purchase.

The third case study is certainly the most outlandish, and I suspect it is Jacobs' favorite. In 1847, President James K. Polk appointed Nicholas Trist as special envoy to accompany the U.S. Army, under the command of General Winfield Scott, to Mexico City. Polk and Secretary of State James Buchanan instructed Trist to negotiate a treaty to end the war with the following conditions: “Mexico must acknowledge the Rio Grande as the southern boundary of Texas and yield upper California and New Mexican territory to the United States” (129). Polk authorized Trist to offer up to $30 million for this enormous swath of territory.

Ironically, when Trist signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, he obtained every single one of those concessions from the Mexican government for just $15 million. Yet between the time of his appointment and when he was escorted home under armed guard, Trist had alienated all of his friends in the State Department and had been fired by the president—a message he chose to disregard. Thus, although his mission was an unqualified success, Congress ratified the treaty, and Polk received credit for acquiring new territory, Trist did not return home to a hero’s welcome. As Jacobs colorfully narrates, Trist made matters worse by writing screed after screed, causing his remaining supporters to distance themselves and others to question his mental stability. Of all the diplomats in *Rogue Diplomats*, Trist was the only one who suffered significant economic harm and had trouble finding stable employment after his mission.

The next two case studies present an interesting parallel. Both Walter Hines Page and Joseph Kennedy Sr. served as ambassadors to Great Britain on the eve of a world war, both demonstrated the critical importance of the London Embassy to American interests abroad and the Anglo-American relationship, and both incurred the wrath of their presidents over their attitudes toward Germany. Neither Page nor Kennedy held high office after their stints as ambassador, and neither has been treated particularly well by historians. But there is one key difference. Page urged President Woodrow Wilson to enter the war and oppose the German menace, while Kennedy pleaded with President Franklin D. Roosevelt to stay out of the war and appease Nazi Germany.

Page initially approved of Wilson's neutral policy toward the war in Europe. By September 1914, however, he had become convinced that neutrality was immoral. He spent the next several years haranguing Wilson and Secretaries of State William Jennings Bryan and Robert Lansing, insisting that the United States respond with strength to increasing German provocations. Page was particularly outraged at Wilson's tendency to treat Germany and the Allied powers as equally responsible for instigating conflict. He demonstrated his displeasure when he delivered official messages from Wilson to the British government, once adding “I have now read the dispatch, but I do not agree with it; let us consider how it should be answered” (219). While Wilson wanted to fire Page for this insubordination, he feared it would further damage Anglo-American relations and harm his own reputation in Europe. Page finally achieved his goals when the United States declared war on Germany on April 2, 1917. Absolutely spent from his years abroad, he died on December 21, 1918, a little over a month after the war ended.

Jacobs does not have much positive to say about Kennedy’s tenure as ambassador to Great Britain. When Kennedy wasn’t on vacation and away from his post, he was meeting with Nazi officials and Nazi sympathizers, and he pushed both Britain and the United States to appease Hitler. He refused to believe that the Allies could win the war, and Jacobs concludes that he was disappointed that the Royal Air Force served so well in the Battle of Britain (292). FDR demonstrated his own disgust with Kennedy by sending several fact-finding missions to Britain and Europe to report back on the state of the war, indicating that he did not trust his ambassador to supply accurate information. Nonetheless, FDR recognized Kennedy’s significant political clout and kept the ambassador busy abroad until after he won reelection to his third term. Only then did he accept Kennedy’s resignation. Upon returning home, Kennedy quickly tarnished his reputation with anti-Semitic and pro-German rants to newspapers and film studios.
Two decades later, Kennedy’s son was the in White House. He appointed Henry Cabot Lodge II as minister to South Vietnam. From the very beginning of his appointment, Lodge was convinced that Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem was an obstacle to American interests in the region. While in office, he ran a one-man operation in Saigon, refusing to delegate to staff or to work with a team. As a result, Jacobs says, he was largely “responsible for the deposition and assassination of Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu” (305).

Lodge’s relationship with Kennedy and his role in the coup that overthrew Diem are slightly more complex than the outright insubordination of previous rogue diplomats. Lodge saw himself as a policymaker, rather than a tool for diplomacy. As a result, he frequently disobeyed orders and ignored at least five commands from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to meet with Diem. On the other hand, Kennedy sent murky, often contradictory commands about his Vietnamese policy, and he never explicitly ruled against a coup. But the president was horrified when learned of Diem’s assassination, and he quickly urged the State Department to describe the coup “as an expression of national will” (352). Lodge faced no consequences for encouraging extra-legal violence and regime change.

Rogue Diplomats offers a number of really excellent observations about American culture and diplomacy. First, American exceptionalism is baked into the very fabric of the nation and into many of its institutions, and the diplomatic corps is no exception. From the very beginning, Americans distrusted diplomats and saw large armies of foreign ministers as a sign of monarchical corruption—a model they refused to follow. Eighteenth-century American administrations appointed only a few ministers to serve abroad and insisted on relatively short missions for them to ensure that European cities didn’t corrupt their republican virtue. Until the late nineteenth century, Americans expressed disdain for professional, trained diplomats, preferring instead to use amateurs who often didn’t speak the host nation’s language. Congress also refused to provide funds for the lavish entertaining required by diplomacy, forcing ministers to use their own funds while abroad.

This arrangement privileged the white, independently wealthy families that wielded disproportionate power over politics anyway. These diplomats rarely depended on the federal government for income or employment opportunities, so they were more prone to rogue behavior because they could easily shrug off whatever consequences might ensue. Independent means and elite social status also tended to foster an increased sense of self-worth. American diplomats styled themselves as experts—even if their policy recommendations differed from those of the administrations they served. This system differed from that of European nations, which demanded lengthy training and education for their ministers, promoted based on merit, and offered employment to men from diverse backgrounds. As a result, European ministers were much less likely to disregard orders, because their careers depended on good behavior.

While the federal government has adopted foreign service reform that has opened diplomatic careers to more American citizens, many ambassadors are still selected because of large campaign donations or political connections. Additionally, Jacobs acknowledges that the current administration has largely returned to the nineteenth-century disdain for expertise. The Trump administration has also seen frequent rogue behavior, as officials undermine the president’s wishes to protect the United States against his whims.

To be frank, as an early Americanist, I was not expecting to learn much about the Treaty of París and the Louisiana Purchase. I have often taught these subjects and have included both in my own scholarship. The ministers’ disregard for orders or negotiations beyond their authority were a given, and I accepted them as a matter of fact. I assumed that most disobedience stemmed from the delay in correspondence caused by travel across the Atlantic, but I never viewed the ministers’ flexible relationship with the rules as part of a broader cultural trend. I am not yet sure how that realization will affect my future work, but it will be on my mind. That is a sure sign of a useful read.

Although I have many positive take-aways from Rogue Diplomats, I have a few remaining questions and points on which I remained unconvinced. First, the delay in communications between ministers and the seat of government in the United States played such an important role in the first three case studies, often giving the diplomats sufficient wiggle room to reign ignorance. Yet by World War I, technological advances had largely eliminated that delay. I would have liked to see a more explicit discussion of how the telegram and the telephone altered rogue diplomacy.

Second, in the introduction Jacobs tells the reader that he selected case studies in which the diplomats’ rogue behavior benefited the nation—with the one extreme exception of Joseph Kennedy, whose coziness with the Nazis helped no one but Hitler. But history frequently defies categorization as purely good or bad, and that complexity challenges Jacobs’ conclusions in a few chapters. For example, Trist’s victorious negotiations transferred significant—and much-desired—territory to the United States. But as many students and historians of antebellum America know, those new states exacerbated tensions between the North and South and reignited the debate over the expansion of slavery. So how should we account for Trist’s victory likely contributing to the Civil War?

The national “good” secured by Lodge is even more problematic. Jacobs argues that the Vietnam War was not winnable under Diem and that Lodge’s actions “bought Washington time in Vietnam, and perhaps a second chance” (307). While I am not a twentieth-century military historian and thus can’t argue in good faith about American chances for victory under Diem’s rule, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations clearly didn’t take advantage of the second chance. The war in Vietnam was a failure.

Finally, I would have liked a clearer articulation of the full implications of diplomatic rule-breaking. I am convinced that American diplomats have a penchant for rule-breaking that clearly distinguishes our foreign policy process from that of other nations, but I am not completely sure what that information tells me.

Despite these lingering questions, Rogue Diplomats is very accessible and would make an excellent contribution to any U.S. history survey or diplomatic history course. I also really enjoyed reading the book and would encourage more historians to follow Jacobs’ example. He doesn’t take himself or the work too seriously, and his joy in teaching this material and writing this book radiates from the page and makes Rogue Diplomats a pleasure to read.
W hat skills must diplomats have to do their jobs really well? What are a diplomat’s most important duties? It would be hard for any one book to answer those questions, but Seth Jacobs’s excellently researched and well-written book, Rogue Diplomats, does a very good job of grappling with them.

Unfortunately, all too often U.S. foreign relations historians leave U.S. ambassadors out of the picture or do not carefully and closely analyze their terms in office. Perhaps there is an unstated assumption that such diplomats are only carrying out Washington’s orders. It seems most historians of U.S. foreign policy focus their gaze on the bureaucratic process in Washington, D.C., and in foreign capitals; not ruminating much on the actions of ambassadors. Thankfully, Jacobs’s book puts U.S. ambassadors at the center of the story, giving the reader a much fuller picture of how they both carry out and make U.S. foreign policy.

As a way of analyzing Jacobs’s book, I would like to introduce my own humble paradigm for answering the question about what skills great diplomats should have. Basically, they must operate well on three levels. First, they must deal with the day-to-day tug-of-war with “headquarters,” that is, the State Department. In particular, ambassadors must be able to explain clearly to higher-ups that Washington’s vision, or even its policy, cannot be fully implemented in country x for reasons a, b, and c. Of course, politicians are elected if they have a compelling vision and are re-elected if they can convince more than half the voters that they have generally been successful in implementing that vision. But given the realities on the ground, it is nearly always the case that the U.S. goals for country x cannot be fully realized, at least not in the short-to-medium term. Successful diplomats need to be able to articulate to their bosses why U.S. policy can’t be fully implemented at this time in the host nation, even as they continue to implement U.S. policy for that particular country.

Second, diplomats must be able, in subtle ways, to get inside the political space or, more specifically, the political culture of the foreign policy of country x in order to ensure that at least part of Washington’s vision is put in place. Or, in cases where country x is anti-United States, U.S. diplomats have to network enough in the host nation’s political community to contain and, if they’re lucky, minimize the host nation’s attempts to sabotage U.S. policy or to publicly embarrass the United States.

Third, diplomats need to be able to “make the big call” in advance that country x is on the verge of a major upheaval or a major policy change. The United States must be able to pivot quickly and nimbly to dealing with a very different regime or policy. Since predicting the future is extremely difficult, diplomats who flub this third aspect of diplomacy are not generally treated too harshly (by their bosses and by history). Maybe their next posting is not their first choice, but it’s not Siberia either.

Jacobs does an excellent job of discussing how rogue diplomats, by performing one or more of the important duties I outline above, have been successful, sometimes stunningly so. My main criticism of his book has to do with framing. He could have done a better job, either in the introduction to the book or in the first chapters, of laying out what he sees as the key skills of a good diplomat, rogue or not. Had he done so it would have been easier for scholars to evaluate diplomats and assess how well they achieved what was required of them.

Jacobs’s case study method works well for both well-known and lesser-known diplomats. I am impressed that he chose people from the twentieth century as well as previous eras. It seems that some historians of U.S. foreign relations assume that pre-twentieth-century diplomats had the leeway to disobey instructions, but twentieth-century diplomats do not. Jacobs’s book puts the lie to this assumption. Active-duty ambassadors may find that there are lessons to be learned here. In the current U.S. political environment, some U.S. ambassadors may not share the worldviews of their bosses in the executive branch. Are there situations in which they may feel compelled to go rogue, even if it means violating orders from Washington? Put another way, could going rogue better serve U.S. interests in the long run? More on that point later.

With regard to my three-pronged description of the main duties of a diplomat, I think that Jacobs clearly shows that the diplomats he analyzed were very skilled at dealing with the State Department and at recognizing opportunities. That is, they did a good job of explaining what could be implemented of Washington’s vision and what could not; and when they saw significant changes in the host nation’s foreign policy—for example, when England was willing to concede significant territory to the young United States in 1783, or when Napoleon was interested in selling his entire Louisiana holdings to the United States—they seized the moment.

However, Jacobs might have provided more details about how U.S. diplomats managed to “get inside” the political cultures of their host nations. Benjamin Franklin’s success in this regard in France in the 1770s and 1780s is legendary, and Jacobs could have made more of it. Nicholas Trist, in his protracted negotiations with Mexican diplomats, might have picked up enough of the culture of Mexican diplomacy to help himself in his negotiations. Walter Hines Page managed to learn the ways of British cultural diplomacy and probably increased his effectiveness as a diplomat as a result.

Jacobs’s book also considers U.S. domestic politics, which play a crucial role in some of the case studies. Nicholas Trist probably would not have managed to convince President Polk to submit the treaty ending the war between the United States and Mexico in 1848 to the Senate for confirmation if it had not been an election year. Polk knew that the Democratic party’s fortunes rode on whether he could bring the increasingly unpopular Mexican-American War to an end before the election. Jacobs shows how Walter Hines Page’s pro-British stance fell on deaf ears before January 1917 in part because U.S. leaders knew that the public had no stomach for a European war. But Page’s viewpoints became acceptable in Washington once Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare—and President Wilson had been safely re-elected. Page’s ideas may also have helped Wilson build a pro-war consensus. The president could in effect inform his officials that “our ambassador in London has been telling us for quite some time about the importance of supporting Great Britain in the Great War.” Finally, Joseph Kennedy’s anti-war isolationist sentiment in the late 1930s reflected the views of at least half the U.S. public before December 7, 1941.

Jacobs deftly weaves the domestic politics side of the story into his overall narrative. Domestic politics are essential to the story, as some of the rogue diplomats were chosen for domestic political reasons. For example, FDR rewarded Joseph Kennedy with a plum posting for making
large contributions to his campaign. In contrast, President John F. Kennedy clipped the wings of a potential competitor for the presidency (Henry Cabot Lodge) by sending him halfway around the world to preside over a situation in South Vietnam that could blow up in Lodge’s face, to his political detriment.

By way of conclusion, I have three questions. I don’t think it’s fair to “ding” Jacobs for not grappling with these questions, because of page constraints. But since this is a roundtable, I will bring them up anyway.

First, the rogues were, in nearly all cases, operating in a pre-war or wartime situation. That raises a question: were they especially “tuned in” to the issue of how to calibrate the use of force and diplomacy? At the very least, as the war clouds gathered, a potentially rogue diplomat might have concluded that since the stakes were so high, if ever there was a time to go rogue, it would be when the United States was contemplating the use of force.

Second, was it the case in the United States that as the national government slowly became more powerful over time, diplomats had less ability to “go rogue”? It seems reasonable to assume that a more powerful state in Washington, DC, would be more effective over time at reining in diplomats who were tempted to go rogue. The ratio of rogue diplomats relative to all U.S. diplomats overseas was fairly high before 1865. But as we headed into the twentieth century, there were fewer rogue diplomats relative to the total number of U.S. diplomats sent abroad.

Why was that the case? The American state was certainly more powerful in the twentieth century, perhaps intimidating some diplomats into following orders, but the Foreign Service was also more professionalized and thus better able to weed out potential rogues. And it is important to point out that the reach of the state increased with improvements in technology in the late nineteenth century, in particular the telegraph. The telegraph allowed the State Department to keep overseas diplomats on a tighter leash—much to their chagrin.

Third, was it the case that American rogues in nearly all cases ultimately pursuing U.S. interests and not their own? Since Talleyrand plays a role in the second case study, I think it is important to raise a counterfactual question: why did U.S. rogue diplomats not simply pursue their own personal interests, in Talleyrand fashion? After all, as Jacobs points out, in many cases the U.S. diplomats posted overseas saw themselves as policymakers who were equal to their “bosses” in Washington. U.S. diplomats’ egos might have gotten the best of them, and they might have fallen into self-serving behavior. But they did not.

One tantalizing possibility brings me to the issue of American exceptionalism. Maybe the U.S. diplomats saw themselves “in service,” in effect, to a great anti-colonial, republican experiment: the United States of America. Since the United States was the first successful anti-colonial experiment in national self-government, and the first polyglot, physically large country that had a republican form of government, the U.S. diplomats were probably proud to represent that (young) tradition overseas and in all likelihood very much wanted it to succeed. They were “serving” that goal or vision in tandem with serving the U.S. government. I realize this contention works better for U.S. diplomats who served early on in U.S. history, when the U.S. republican experiment was new—and fragile. In addition, it is hard to measure just how devoted U.S. diplomats were to the U.S. republican experiment. Still, I think this is an intriguing idea.

It is obvious that the U.S. government leadership (the “politicals,” in today’s parlance) demands loyalty above all else from its officials. But loyalty to whom, or to what? For most U.S. officials, it’s obvious: the president. But rogue diplomats were “serving” different things: a particular president (presidents, not the State Department, appoint ambassadors) and an idea. As Lincoln said at Gettysburg: the United States is dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. The idea was that that the United States needed to do more than survive; it needed to thrive in order to keep the republican experiment alive.

Did the presidents whom these diplomats served have some sense that their rogue subordinates had this “dual loyalty”? It is very difficult, if not impossible, to say. The diplomats themselves, however, do imply that they thought they had to go against what their superiors told them to do, because they wanted instead to do what they thought was best for the American public. (And considering that the sitting U.S. president has shown little regard for the well-being of the American republican experiment, perhaps this rogue disregard for orders may be a good thing.)

At the end of the day, there is an irony about the word “rogue.” I agree that all of the diplomats analyzed in this study disobeyed policies from Washington, DC. But if a diplomat manages to achieve beneficial results for his country without advising the use of force, that is a plus. Moreover, if a diplomat advocates for what he sees as the careful application of military force to achieve national interests, all the better.

The pre-twentieth-century diplomats analyzed in this study used skillful diplomacy to achieve impressive results. Considering the military weakness of the United States at the time, avoiding the use of force was important. However, once the United States became a major world power, it would make sense for diplomats to counsel the careful use of force (e.g., against Germany in the run-up to World War I) to punish a leader who violated international law. In the late 1930s Joseph Kennedy counselled that the United States should not directly or militarily confront the German war machine because it would be a disaster for the United States. Although his moral obtuseness can and should be criticized, he was counselling for the careful application of U.S. force to achieve U.S. interests.

I admire any historian who can, like Jacobs, do an excellent compare-and-contrast analysis across time and space. Overall, this well-researched book will find—as it should—a wide audience with students, academics, and the general reading public.

For the Greater Good: Six Case Studies on How U.S. Diplomats Changed, Ignored, or Refused Their Orders: a Review of Seth Jacobs, Rogue Diplomats

Kathryn C. Statler

Seth Jacobs provides a welcome argument in Rogue Diplomats, namely, that officials appointed by an administration to represent the country abroad will sometimes take matters into their own hands to ensure the best outcome for the United States. The catch? They do so by deflecting, dismissing, or even disobeying the government’s direct orders.
Jacobs picks six of the most clear-cut examples of this kind of behavior, spanning the years from the nation’s birth to the Kennedy administration. Of particular importance, he says, is that many of these diplomats were amateurs, often wealthy in their own right, or of the opposite political party, all factors making them more likely to challenge orders. As Jacobs writes, “the rich and prominent American lawyers, soldiers, politicians, journalists, educators, or businessmen who lent prestige to an administration by performing important diplomatic duties often concluded that their principal obligation was to their country rather than to the president. They therefore ignored directives that, in their view, ran counter to the national interest” (6).

In his first case study Jacobs examines the diplomatic miracle that John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and John Jay achieved—the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty granting Americans their independence. This case study is probably unique, as the diplomats are beheld both to a divided Congress and to the French government. It is also the study I find most problematic in supporting Jacobs’ overall argument.

Jacobs claims that the Americans blithely ignored the congressional order to consult with the French before coming to terms with the British, as stipulated in the 1778 Franco-American military alliance. He writes that “the diplomats had not consulted Vergennes or any other French official before drawing up and signing preliminary articles of peace; indeed they had not even informed their ally that negotiations toward that end were underway” (25). But the man with the final say over the treaty, French Foreign Minister Comte de Vergennes, opposed a separate peace, not separate negotiations. Indeed, the French were also negotiating privately with the British.

Moreover, both Franklin and Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Joseph-Mathias Gérard de Rayneval kept Vergennes appraised of Adams and Jay’s discussions with the British in the summer of 1782. Vergennes wanted a quick conclusion to the resource-draining war and was eager to disassociate France from its Spanish ally’s claims to Gibraltar. Certainly, the three Americans disobeyed Congress in not telling the French about the early negotiations, but Franklin had Vergennes’ approval for the final treaty, which gave Vergennes everything he wanted—a humiliated Britain slinking out of America, a new trading partner, and diminished British military power.

Jacobs continues to play up Franco-American discord while ignoring the tremendous collaboration that occurred. For example, when discussing France’s defeat and subsequent loss of territory at the end of the Seven Years’ War, Jacobs notes that “no French statesman could forget that the rustics extolled by Lafayette had helped Britain to its greatest victory to date and enabled their then mother country to achieve a position of unprecedented political supremacy at France’s expense” (32). The whole point of diplomacy is to make deals and support allies, compromise with enemies, and forget past grievances. The French were masters at this.

Jacobs also misrepresents American views of their alliance: “So keenly did Americans resent the obligations imposed upon them by the Faustian bargain of 1778 that they did not become party to another formal alliance for a century and a half” (37). But without that Faustian bargain there would be no United States, as American officials at the time were well aware. Thus, in contrast to the other chapters, I submit that the first chapter overplays the rogue nature of the revolutionary diplomats’ behavior—not so much toward Congress, but toward France, the more important player at the time. But Franklin, Adams, and Jay did set a precedent of defying their own government, which made it “likelier that future diplomats would step out of line” (31).

Chapter 2 focuses on Robert Livingston and James Monroe’s purchase of Louisiana. Here much of the discussion about and ultimate purchase of the territory might have less to do with disobeying orders and more to do with the intense rivalry between the two diplomats. Jacobs points out that they viewed themselves less as subordinates and more “as policymakers on a more or less equal footing with the president” (81). Livingston took the lead, trying to persuade Napoleon that he would be much better off ceding New Orleans to the United States. When Napoleon offered up the entire Louisiana territory, and Livingston accepted, Livingston exceeded his instructions as opposed to disobeying them. Jacobs astutely highlights the key moment of Livingston’s midnight negotiations with the French finance minister, François de Barbe-Marbois, which resulted in an actual sticker price for the whole region.

While at first irritated with Livingston’s deal, Monroe quickly understood its significance. He then used the $2 million appropriation from Congress to buy New Orleans as a down payment on the entire territory. So both men were indeed rogue diplomats. The fun of this chapter lies in how well Jacobs captures the rancor Livingston and Monroe displayed toward each other throughout the negotiations, as both sought the glory of achieving such a coup for the United States.

Perhaps the most fascinating and most rogue diplomat in the book is Nicholas Trist. In chapter 3, Jacobs brings to life Trist’s ego, foibles, and outright rejection of Polk’s orders to return to the United States in the middle of negotiations with Mexico to bring to a close the Mexican-American War and execute the greatest land heist in American history. As he labored to bring all parties to an agreement, Trist decided to reject Polk’s direct order to return home on the grounds that Polk simply did not understand events on the ground and how close Trist was to bringing off a massive territorial coup for the United States. For a president who valued loyalty above all else, Trist’s disobedience was unacceptable.

Interestingly, Trist was not a man of independent means, which makes his defiance all the more remarkable. Equally remarkable was his ability to beguile General Winfield Scott, who lent his support to Trist’s efforts. As Jacobs writes, “both [Trist and Scott] were prepared to ignore orders that conflicted with their judgment. Over the next eight months, their increasingly insubordinate course, while not free of blunders and false starts, resulted in Mexico giving up half its territory to the United States for half of what Polk was willing to pay” (148). Ultimately, Trist left Mexico City under armed escort like a criminal and had to struggle to make ends meet for the rest of his life. However, he had pulled off an extraordinary coup: getting the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo signed and thereby adding to the United States some 55 percent of the territory of Mexico.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine two remarkable U.S. ambassadors to the London, Walter Hines Page for WWI and Joseph Kennedy for WWII. I use the word remarkable on purpose, as Page ignores his orders for what he sees as the greater good of salvaging the Anglo-American special relationship by pushing for U.S. entry into WWI; while Kennedy ignores his orders and stretches the Anglo-American relationship to the breaking point to keep the United States out of WWII. Page did not have the deep
Jacobs likens Lodge to Robert Livingston. Both had Cabot Lodge's role in creating the coup that would topple the Nazis. Moreover, Kennedy saw nothing wrong with throwing a wrench into FDR's unprecedented run for WC at Page's feet.

At the other extreme stood Joseph P. Kennedy, FDR's pick for ambassador to London as WWII approached. Kennedy lacked foreign policy experience, which is not always a bad thing, but as Jacobs writes, he was also "intellectually and temperamentally unfit for his new job" (241). As a businessman who viewed the world through dollar-sign lenses and saw all interactions as transactional, Kennedy despised of Britain's chances against German power and thought the British should throw in the towel. He thus misrepresented FDR's positions to the British government, arranged unauthorized meetings with Nazi officials, and kowtowed to the German ambassador to Britain, Herbert von Dirksen, exaggerating both American and British willingness to compromise with the Nazis. Moreover, Kennedy saw nothing wrong with his actions, believing he was impervious to orders coming from his superiors. He is perhaps the most egregious case of a rogue diplomat in the book. In addition to all his other sins, Kennedy disappeared from his post for long periods of time. Jacobs estimates a third of his time as ambassador was spent far from London, which did not endear him to the British government or people.

Kennedy's appeasement provoked an increasingly hostile response from FDR. Still, FDR wanted to keep Kennedy in London, far away from home, to avoid his throwing a wrench into FDR's unprecedented run for a third presidential term. Happily, this time the rogue diplomat was outmaneuvered by the president, which is not true for the other cases in the book. A bit more analysis of why this was so would be most welcome, as it is FDR, not Kennedy, who preserves the greater good by throwing a wrench into FDR's unprecedented run for WC at Page's feet.

Page became increasingly incensed at American neutrality, and Wilson increasingly considered whether it was necessary to replace his ambassador, who was clearly neutral in thought and action. Page remained highly critical of what he considered to be Wilson's mistake in presuming equivalence between Britain and Germany. When the United States finally entered the war Page wrote his son, "I cannot conceal nor can I express my gratification that we are in the war at last. . . . I have accomplished something" (238). And indeed, as Jacobs points out, in the years and decades that followed, the public and many historians laid the blame for U.S. entry into WWI at Page's feet.

Jacobs is persuasive in highlighting how both Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu had become increasingly mentally unstable as the controversy convulsing the streets of Saigon took its toll. He also details Lodge's refusal to respond to Secretary of State Dean Rusk's pleas to meet with Diem in the period leading up to the coup and his misleading comments to South Vietnamese generals about Washington's support of the coup, which was hesitant at best. Lodge's last contact with and comments to Diem remain at least a partial mystery, with various accounts contradicting whether Lodge promised Diem safe passage out of the country or not. What is not in doubt is that ultimately Lodge let the coup play out without U.S. interference, resulting in Diem and Nhu's assassinations on November 2, 1963.

Jacobs seems to suggest here that Lodge made the right call, that Diem was unsalvageable and that the United States could try again with new leadership. Should we therefore agree that Lodge also served the greater good? I struggle a bit with this conclusion. It is hard to think of a single instance where U.S. meddling in the toppling of a government ever worked out well in the long run during the Cold War.

A final word about the conclusion. I loved what there was of it. But Jacobs devotes a mere five pages to wrapping up, and the last few paragraphs are downright abrupt. I was looking for some serious connecting of the dots. To be fair, Jacobs does that periodically throughout the book, but I had expected to see a more thorough analysis here. The book clocks in at 358 pages; perhaps ten of those could have been devoted to analysis at the end. I would like to know if we can draw larger conclusions about certain types of rogue diplomats. Are they most likely to be rogue if they are well off? Is inexperience a factor? Ego? Party affiliation? For me, Trist remains the outlier. How do we explain him?

One of the more interesting avenues to explore would be to look at what happens when the diplomatic corps becomes more professionalized after WWI. Certainly, with the exception of Lodge, no other diplomat sent to Vietnam from 1950 to 1975 sees his vision prevail. Only two of the six case studies examine rogue diplomacy after WWI. A few more examples would have been welcome. Are there simply fewer rogue diplomats after professionalization? For example, I wanted to hear more about William Watts, who gets three sentences in the final paragraph.

Ultimately, what we have is six fascinating, exceedingly well-crafted case studies (almost like chapters in an edited compilation) that needed a longer conclusion to tie all the disparate threads together. To be clear, however, this is a fabulous book, one of the best-written, most engaging books I have ever read in our field. It illuminates key diplomatic moments, advances a clear and persuasive argument about rogue diplomacy, and is downright fun to read.
Rogue Diplomatic Historian

Brian Etheridge

It is a staple question of every academic job interview, and yet it's one that many nervous, sweaty candidates flub: What is the relationship between your research and teaching? To the extent that it has been answered well, almost all respondents address the question by explaining how their research passions and questions inform their teaching. And truth be told, most respondents usually frame their answers by describing how their research findings make their way into their lectures. Rarely does anyone try to show the opposite: how their teaching shapes their research. For the most part this makes sense, because historically, the majority of interviewees have been graduate students or recently minted PhDs, and the vast bulk of their graduate training (again, historically speaking) involved research. They had very little training or experience in teaching.

In Rogue Diplomats, Seth Jacobs shows the value of considering the relationship between teaching and research by illustrating how a reflective teaching practice can lead to a robust and provocative research project. Jacobs is unabashedly proud that this book emerged from his course on American diplomacy at Boston College. (And as someone who has always thought of Jacobs’s presentations at the SHAHR annual meeting as must-see TV—they are often dramatic, entertaining, funny, and yet thought-provoking—I suspect his students at BC are a lucky lot indeed.)

In teaching his class, Jacobs noted that the students perked up during discussions of moments when ambassadors disobeyed orders. As he thought on the matter, he realized that these fits of rebelliousness often redounded to America’s benefit. Ongoing conversations with his students led him to take up a more systematic investigation of this phenomenon, and this investigation in turn generated the thesis of the book. He argues that there is a deeply ingrained culture of disobedience among America’s top diplomatists, a tradition borne of uniquely American factors that sets it apart from the diplomatic practices of other nations.

The origin of Jacobs’ book is somewhat unusual, but using his teaching practice as the inspiration for his research question isn’t the only way in which Jacobs has gone rogue in this book. (And here, in the title of this essay, I use “rogue,” following OED definitions, not to suggest that Jacobs is “dishonest” or “unprincipled,” but rather “unpredictable,” “unmanageable,” and, most especially, “mischievous”.) This book, in both its subject matter and its approach, is resolutely iconoclastic and unapologetically traditional. In his introduction, Jacobs notes the longstanding criticisms of diplomatic history that led to its diminished prestige in a broader field that was rapidly evolving to incorporate more voices (see G.M. Young’s infamous dismissal of the discipline as “the record of what one clerk said to another clerk” [16]). And while he champions the flourishing response that has led to a renaissance of American foreign relations history (a response that he was no small part of), Jacobs gleefully frames his work—with a cheeky grin, one might imagine—in a traditional framework that Samuel Flagg Bemis would have welcomed. (In this hearty defense of old-school diplomatic history, one can almost hear the traditional wing of the discipline cheering him on).

It should come as no surprise to those familiar with Jacobs that he pulls it off with wit and aplomb. What follows is a series of finely drawn and deeply engaging stories about diplomatic insolence. The first three deal with the early period (if we adopt the 1890s as the traditional dividing line). These stories cohere well, as they all involve high-stakes negotiations that determined the eventual shape and contour of the continental United States. Two are peace treaties (the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo), while the other is a negotiated land acquisition (the Louisiana Purchase). All represent the most consequential territorial expansions in American history. And all were cases in which American representatives exceeded or ignored the instructions of their superiors back home to great effect.

The second half of the book is more eclectic. These chapters cover incidents in the twentieth century and deal with American responses to hostility and war abroad. Perhaps reflecting America’s ambivalent attitude to engagement overseas, these stories seem more scattershot. One deals with Walter Hines Page and his tortured efforts to get the United States involved in World War I on behalf of Great Britain. Another addresses Henry Cabot Lodge’s efforts to assert control of Vietnamese policy and overthrow Diem in the 1960s.

The most unusual choice is Joseph Kennedy, who tried to align the United States with Nazi Germany in the lead-up to American involvement in World War II. Like those rogue diplomats treated in the first half of the work, Page and Lodge are praised for their stubbornness and congratulated for the righteousness of their actions. But Kennedy, unsurprisingly and justifiably, comes in for extreme censure. While certainly rogueish, Kennedy’s story doesn’t fit the arc of the others as well.

The vignettes are beautifully told. Even as a committed diplomatic historian, I confess that it is rare to find works in our field that are as irresistible as this one. Jacobs has an eye for the telling quote and writes with a verve and sense of irony that captivates. As one whose prose does not often sparkle, I admire the economy and dexterity of his language. Evocative phrases like “scenery-chewing harangue” (26) and “brave old world of British etiquette” (201) effortlessly enveloped me in the narrative Jacobs was spinning. This book shows a master storyteller at the top of his game. But like any great book, it raises as many questions as it answers. In particular, I found the stories so compelling and the thesis so intriguing that I wanted more. I wanted to know more about the other incidents of insubordination, and if there was indeed enough material to demonstrate the existence of more than just a pattern but a tradition or culture of diplomatic rebelliousness. And this would require (and here the very happy publisher of a dramatic narrative of diplomats gone wild needs to cover his or her ears) the construction of a dataset of diplomatic behavior.

Jacobs mentions episodes such as the negotiations to end America’s Quasi-War with France in 1800, the negotiations over the Treaty of Ghent, ambassadorial misconduct in Mexico and Nicaragua in the nineteenth century, and Josephus Daniels in Mexico in the 1930s, but these don’t help us understand how typical or atypical this kind of behavior is. Where are the diplomats not behaving badly? Where are the dogs, to use Sherlock Holmes’s reasoning, that aren’t barking? Wouldn’t they be significant in trying to discern if there is a unique way of doing American diplomacy? (And here, with the suggestion of a research project conceivably focused on gathering tales of diplomats quietly following orders and behaving appropriately, the very happy publisher covering his/her ears likely starts humming loudly to make it go away).

Thus, if we want to interrogate Jacobs’s thesis we first need a broader landscape of American diplomatic behavior.
to see if there is indeed a proud tradition of disobedience. The second step would be to have a better handle on the diplomatic practices of other nations. Jacobs offers the fantastic quote from a nineteenth-century British official who whined that “we consider ourselves as little more than pens in the hands of the government at home” (7), but he later goes on to acknowledge that diplomats did go rogue in other countries, although not as frequently or as celebrately (14).

In this sense, even though he eschews it forcefully, Jacobs could benefit from an international or comparative perspective to make the case for his fascinating manifestation of American exceptionalism. In his acknowledgments, he points out that a student’s question about other nations’ diplomatic traditions prompted him to put the question to H-Diplo, the listserv of diplomatic historians. He said he received a flood of responses suggesting that American diplomatic practices were indeed unique. In this context, I would argue that establishing America’s rogue diplomatic tradition requires more than just grappling with what one diplomat says to another; it also requires wrestling with what one diplomatic historian said to another. We need to know more about these different traditions.

These questions aimed at contextualizing Jacobs’s absorbing stories are nothing more than an attempt to participate in the ongoing conversation that he has been having with his students about American diplomacy for two decades, a dialogue that has clearly been engaging, enriching, and entertaining. And just as with any great class, I didn’t want it to end. Like his subjects, Jacobs has bucked prevailing approaches in crafting this book; and like the country that his subjects served, we have benefited from his mishief.

**Author’s Response**

**Seth Jacobs**

This is the kind of roundtable scholars yearn for and almost never receive. The reviewers clearly read *Rogue Diplomats* with great care. They are sympathetic to the book’s purposes and astute about where—perhaps—it fails to meet them. They leave their criticisms with fulsome praise. My thanks to all four.

Let me begin with Kathryn Statler’s review, which is so generous that I feel like a charlatan for saying anything beyond “thank you.” Nonetheless, Statler advances a number of objections, most relating to chapter one, and I will try to answer them.

She claims that the 1783 treaty between Britain and the fledging United States “gave [Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes] everything he wanted—a humiliated Britain slinking out of America, a new trading partner, and diminished British military power.” I disagree. The famous mémoire in which Vergennes urged Louis XVI to support the rebelling American colonists spelled out the benefits that the French foreign minister expected to result from American independence: “First, it will diminish the power of England and proportionally raise that of France. Second, it will cause irreparable loss to English trade, while it will considerably extend ours. Third, it presents to us as very advantageous to the rebels, it also bound France—and, by ex Spain to the ranks of Britain’s adversaries, which was advantageous to the rebels, it also bound France—and, by extension, America—to do battle until the Spanish recovered Gibraltar, an unlikely prospect that could have led to years of warfare over a rock on Spain’s south coast possessing no strategic or economic significance for the United States. Small wonder Jay, Adams, and Benjamin Franklin drew up and signed preliminary articles of peace with the British behind French backs!

It is significant, I think, that Americans spent much of the next two decades trying to worm out of their alliance with France. After the French Revolution took an ugly turn in 1793 and Louis XVI was guillotined, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton urged President George Washington to adopt the position that the 1778 treaty was no longer in force. The treaty, Hamilton observed, had been negotiated with the French monarchy under Louis, and both the army and navy exhausted, its citizenry ripe for rebellion. Powerless. France, on the other hand, was bankrupt, its hens. Finally, while George III did lose his important North American colonies, England was not humbled or rendered powerless. France, on the other hand, was bankrupt, its army and navy exhausted, its citizenry ripe for rebellion. American diplomacy succeeded brilliantly in 1783, but French diplomacy did not.

Statler also takes issue with my assertion that Americans “[s]o keenly . . . resent[ed] the obligations imposed upon them by the Faustian bargain of 1778 that they did not become party to another formal alliance for a century and a half” (37). She notes, “Without that Faustian bargain there would be no United States, as American officials at the time were well aware.” True enough. Still, that did not prevent those officials from resenting the 1778 Franco-American treaty, especially its stipulation that “Neither of the two Parties shall conclude either Truce or Peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtain’d.” I believe I demonstrate that key policymakers like John Jay and John Adams were deeply dismayed by that clause, recognizing that, even if the United States succeeded in breaking from Britain and securing independent nationhood, Americans would have to keep fighting until Paris’s aims were achieved. Dismay turned to panic after Charles III of Spain signed the Convention of Aranjuez with his cousin Louis in early 1779. While this treaty added Spain to the ranks of Britain’s adversaries, which was advantageous to the rebels, it also bound France—and, by extension, America—to do battle until the Spanish recovered Gibraltar, an unlikely prospect that could have led to years of warfare over a rock on Spain’s south coast possessing no strategic or economic significance for the United States. Small wonder Jay, Adams, and Benjamin Franklin drew up and signed preliminary articles of peace with the British behind French backs!

Although Washington rejected this argument, it found favor among many Americans, and it became U.S. policy during the Quasi-War of 1798-1800, when the American Congress proclaimed all French treaties null and void. In the deliberations to end that undeclared conflict, the Adams administration agreed to drop financial claims against France for the seizure of American merchant ships if the French would consent to a mutual abrogation of the 1778 treaty. The price tag for the U.S. government’s assumption of the claims of its own citizens was $20 million, a huge sum for the time. “In effect,” Thomas Bailey writes, “America agreed to pay $20 million in alimony in order to secure a divorce from the twenty-two-year-old French marriage of (in) convenience.” And, as I note, there would not be another such diplomatic betrothal for the United States until the early 1940s. Given these facts, I submit that Statler is wrong in her assertion that “Jacobs . . . misrepresents American views of their alliance.”

Statler has fewer problems with chapter two, which deals with the Louisiana Purchase, but she observes, “[Minister to France Robert] Livingston exceeded his instructions as opposed to disobeying them.” (Lindsay Chervinsky says
more or less the same thing; “Unlike Franklin, Adams, and Jay, who outright defied their orders, [Envoy Extraordinary James] Monroe and Livingston just went beyond their stated authority.” I think this is a distinction without a difference. When Secretary of State James Madison gave Livingston his marching orders before the latter’s departure for France in late 1801, he provided the new minister virtually nothing to bargain with. Livingston was not authorized to offer Napoleon Bonaparte’s government money for the territories Washington craved, namely New Orleans and the Floridas, because President Thomas Jefferson was convinced that the threat of an Anglo-American alliance would be sufficient to win the United States’s objectives. The most Livingston could do was promise Napoleon that the Jefferson administration would forgive roughly $3,500,000 in debt owed by Frenchmen to Americans. In light of Napoleon’s extravagant plans for empire in the Old and New Worlds, this scanty recompense seemed a joke.

For Livingston—and, later, Monroe—to move from such modest enticements to offering $15 million for the colossal area from the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains was, I contend, more than a mere exceeding of their orders. As I write, “They had pledged more money than they had been authorized to spend for a province they had not been instructed to purchase” (112). Washington’s territorial demands had been confined to the eastern bank of the Mississippi, and yet the two diplomats agreed to buy New Orleans and a trackless expanse that lay entirely west of that river. (The Floridas were not included in the treaty.) Moreover, they foisted this compact on a president who they knew had long advocated strict construction of the Constitution and who had pledged his administration to a policy of rigid economy. Nowhere in the Constitution was there any provision giving the chief executive the power to buy land, and the Purchase price would increase the national debt, not reduce it. Livingston and Monroe were understandably worried that Jefferson would use a family hit list: Mossadeq, Arbenz, Lumumba, Allende, Sukarno… we can all rattle it off. And it is true that ultimately the United States lost the Vietnam War, and that most historians, as I observe, argue that “America’s military effort would have come a cropper no matter who was in charge in Saigon” (308). Some days I count myself among those historians; other days I am not so certain. But the long-term benefits of Lodge’s insurrectionism are, without question, less manifest than in the case of Livingston and Monroe.

Still, given the political impossibility of an outright American abandonment of South Vietnam in the Kennedy years, I think I am on safe ground in asserting that Lodge “bought Washington time in Vietnam, and perhaps a second chance” (307). The safeguarding “perhaps” is key. There was nothing inevitable about the path America followed in the wake of Diem’s death. John F. Kennedy—and, later, Lyndon Johnson—might have explored a diplomatic settlement with Hanoi more earnestly; General William Westmoreland might have adopted a strategy that relied on village pacification rather than search-and-destroy; American troops might have been permitted the right of “hot pursuit” into Laos and Cambodia before 1970; and the tally of counterfactual scenarios goes on. Vietnam War revisionism is, as we know, a cottage industry. I think I establish, though, that the war was not being won under Diem—that the Viet Cong were gaining in strength and the South Vietnamese Army was plagued by defection and factionalism—and that something new had to be tried. Lodge’s insubordination created the opportunity for that something new. Whether it could have been an approach that led to a less disastrous outcome for South Vietnam and the United States is, of course, speculative and irresolvable.

Finally, Statler finds the conclusion too brief, noting, “I needed at least ten more pages of analysis at the end.” Here I must lay down my arms, because I agree with her. The conclusion is definitely a problem, and if there is a second edition of Rogue Diplomats (fingers crossed) I will address the questions she raises, especially whether there were “simply fewer rogue diplomats after [the] professionalization” of the U.S. foreign service during the 1920s. In a word, no. I discuss the rogue diplomacy of Josephus Daniels, William Wilson, and Andrew Young in the introduction, and I ought to have spent at least a few paragraphs of the conclusion talking about Jimmy Carter, whose special mission to Haiti in 1994 saw him repeatedly defy President Bill Clinton as he brokered a settlement to that nation’s civil war.

Like several of the men I examine—in particular Franklin, Lodge, and Joseph P. Kennedy—Carter enjoyed a measure of celebrity and financial security that left him less beholden to the government he served than the career diplomats of other nations. He therefore felt free to pursue initiatives that no non-American envoy would have attempted, such as ignoring Clinton’s instruction to break off negotiations and remaining in Haiti long after the president’s publicly-proclaimed deadline for an end to the conflict. No diplomatic moves took place in spite of Clinton, not because of him, and it was Carter who, by overstepping his authority, ensured that Washington’s sword remained sheathed and unstained. Had the former president not disobeyed orders, Clinton would have shared the dismal fates of Woodrow Wilson, Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover, who oversaw a long, brutal, unpopular military

Like several of the men I examine—in particular Franklin, Lodge, and Joseph P. Kennedy—Carter enjoyed a measure of celebrity and financial security that left him less beholden to the government he served than the career diplomats of other nations. He therefore felt free to pursue initiatives that no non-American envoy would have attempted, such as ignoring Clinton’s instruction to break off negotiations and remaining in Haiti long after the president’s publicly-proclaimed deadline for an end to the conflict. Clinton, convinced that his administration had exhausted all diplomatic means of relieving Haiti’s torment, ordered the largest U.S. airborne invasion fleet assembled since World War II to occupy the island country and impose peace by force. The planes were already in the sky when Carter reported that ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and rebel general Raoul Cèdras had agreed to a deal whereby Aristide would be reinstalled as president in exchange for amnesty for Cèdras and his followers. Clinton, caught short, called off the invasion. The fleet did a U-turn over the Caribbean and returned to base.

In his memoirs, Clinton boasts of having “restored democracy to Haiti,” exulting that a “combination of dogged diplomacy and imminent force had avoided bloodshed.” These claims are misleading. Haiti under Aristide was no one’s idea of a democracy, although conditions were better than during the civil war. Moreover, the crucial diplomatic moves took place in spite of Clinton, not because of him, and it was Carter who, by overstepping his authority, ensured that Washington’s sword remained sheathed and unstained. Had the former president not disobeyed orders, Clinton would have shared the dismal fates of Woodrow Wilson, Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover, who oversaw a long, brutal, unpopular military
occupation of Haiti that brought little honor to the United States.

Lindsay Chervinsky’s review, like Statler’s, is immensely complimentary but not free of criticism. She would like “a more explicit discussion of how the telegram and telephone altered rogue diplomacy,” observing that “the delay in communications between ministers and the seat of government in the U.S. played . . . an important role in the first three case studies, often giving the diplomats significant wiggle room.” I believe I address this issue in my introduction when I cite Bradford Perkins’s claim that “[p]robably no other Western diplomatic corps has ever been so disobedient” as America’s pre-Civil War ministers. Perkins ascribes this obstreperousness to “the breadth of the Atlantic.” Dispatches took as long as eight weeks to cross the ocean in the days of sail, he argues, and U.S. diplomats frequently did not have time to press their government for fresh instructions if breaking developments called for a new approach. They were therefore compelled to exercise greater freedom of action than would have been the case had communication been more rapid.3

I acknowledge that Perkins has a point, but, in my view, there are two defects in his argument. First, U.S. diplomats continued to flout their orders after the advent of the telegraph, telephone, and even email. Lodge’s ambassadorship in South Vietnam is a useful case study, as thousands of cables flew back and forth between Washington and Saigon in October and early November of 1963, generating a mass of archival documents so voluminous as to intimidate the most Stakhanovite researcher. The fact that JFK and his national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, remained in virtually minute-by-minute contact with their wayward ambassador made no difference. Lodge still hijacked U.S. policy toward the Diem regime.

Second, European ambassadors, ministers, and consuls posted to the United States in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were nowhere near as rebellious as their American counterparts, despite facing the same obstacles of distance and the need for accommodation, as was Page’s ready adjustment to British high life. While Franklin’s mastery of the complex etiquette of Versailles was a sterling example of this cultural accommodation, as was Page’s capacity to converse directly with Diem rather than through an interpreter, the stiff-necked Brahmin made no effort to understand or ingratiate himself into Vietnamese society. (The historian Harry Elmer Barnes, one of Page’s fiercest critics in the interwar years, called the ambassador “more English than the English.”)4 Wallace Ohrt’s underrated biography of Trist notes that Mexican negotiators “trusted him because of his dark, almost Latin looks, his impeccable Spanish, and his unfailing courtesy. One could almost forget that he was a gringo!”5

Chervinsky also challenges my claim that my subjects—with the exception of Joseph Kennedy—benefited the United States by their indiscretion. She correctly notes, “[H]istory frequently defies categorization as purely good or bad.” While Nicholas Trist’s rogue diplomacy in the winter of 1847-1848 may have secured huge swathes of land that enlarged the United States by almost one-third, the treaty he all but single-handedly wrought rekindled the national debate over slavery and helped bring on the Civil War.

While Nicholas Trist’s rogue diplomacy in the winter of 1847-1848 may have secured huge swathes of land that enlarged the United States by almost one-third, the treaty he all but single-handedly wrought rekindled the national debate over slavery and helped bring on the Civil War. I take Chervinsky’s point. None of the diplomatic exploits I examine resulted in an unmixed blessing. While historical record and the fact that scholars can look at the same set of circumstances and arrive at radically different conclusions.

More troubling is Chervinsky’s posing of the “so what” question. “I’m convinced American diplomats have a penchant for rule-breaking that clearly distinguishes our foreign policy from other nations,” she writes, “but I’m not completely sure what that information tells me.” It tells readers a great deal, as James Siekmeier pungently affirms in his incisive and thought-provoking review. Siekmeier notes that “all too often, foreign-relations historians do not systematically analyze U.S. ambassadors posted overseas.” Why? Because “there is an unstated assumption that these diplomats are only carrying out Washington’s orders.” So historians focus on presidents, secretaries of state, national security advisers, and other key figures in the state-side policymaking bureaucracy, while “the ambassador gets left out of the picture.”

Yet, as I demonstrate, U.S. diplomats at pivotal junctures in their nation’s history considered themselves policymakers, not passive conduits executing plans fashioned in the White House or State Department. Although Harry Truman famously had a sign on his Oval Office desk proclaiming “The Buck Stops Here,” that oft-invoked catchphrase was sometimes illusory. The buck did not stop with James K. Polk when Trist drew up and signed his map-changing treaty, any more than it stopped with Woodrow Wilson when Walter Hines Page headed Embassy London. I believe that Rogue Diplomats shines a light on a hitherto-neglected but nonetheless essential part of U.S. statecraft, and that future historians will have to reckon with the role of ambassadors, envoys, and other diplomatic representatives in explaining, to cite my introduction, “why the United States followed the course that it did” (18).

Siekmeier’s three-pronged template for assessing diplomatic effectiveness strikes me as inspired, and I agree with him that my book would have been strengthened by a clearer articulation of what I consider the qualities of a good diplomat. He is correct to observe that I “might have fleshed out a bit more aspect #2—how U.S. diplomats managed to ‘get inside’ the political culture of their host nation.” Certainly, Franklin’s mastery of the complex etiquette of Versailles was a sterling example of this cultural accommodation, as was Page’s capacity to converse directly with Diem rather than through an interpreter, the stiff-necked Brahmin made no effort to understand or ingratiate himself into Vietnamese society. (The historian Harry Elmer Barnes, one of Page’s fiercest critics in the interwar years, called the ambassador “more English than the English.”) Wallace Ohrt’s underrated biography of Trist notes that Mexican negotiators “trusted him because of his dark, almost Latin looks, his impeccable Spanish, and his unfailing courtesy. One could almost forget that he was a gringo!”

The glaring exception when it came to fulfilling “aspect #2” was Lodge. Apart from speaking fluent French, which enabled him to converse directly with Diem rather than through an interpreter, the stiff-necked Brahmin made no attempt to understand or ingratiate himself into Vietnamese life. He had a condescending, frankly racist opinion of the Vietnamese, memorably expressed in his 30 October 1963 cable to Secretary of State Dean Rusk: “My general policy is that the U.S. is trying to bring this medieval country into the 20th century, and that we have made considerable progress in military and economic ways, but to gain victory we must bring them into the 20th century politically.”6 Indeed, it is difficult to name any American diplomat posted to South Vietnam from Dien Bien Phu through the fall of Saigon who displayed interest in Vietnamese culture or history or who treated the Vietnamese as equals. This attitude doubtless contributed to the United States’s defeat.

To be honest, it never occurred to me that, as Siekmeier observes, all of my rogue diplomats were “operating in a prewar or wartime situation.” He is probably right that the urgency of the circumstances caused men like Jay, Livings-
tion, Trist, and Page to step out of line. Had they been representing the United States in time of peace, they might have been more compliant. Certainly, Trist’s correspondence from the field reiterated dozens of times that he was defying Polk’s instructions only because obedience would result in military disaster, with the United States drawn into a long, ugly, inconclusive guerrilla war against the essentially leaderless Mexicans. As he wrote his wife the day he chose to fling down the president’s orders, “Knowing it to be the very last chance, and impressed with the dreadful consequence to our country which cannot fail to attend the loss of that chance, I will make a treaty, if it can be done.” And, of course, it would be hard to top the blood and thunder of Joseph Kennedy’s messages to Washington in the days before Adolf Hitler sent sixty divisions across the Polish border, thereby inaugurating World War II in Europe. Faced with the fact that his rogue diplomacy had failed, that Franklin Roosevelt administration had abandoned appeasement in spite of its ambassador’s numerous warnings, Kennedy wailed over the transatlantic line to a disgusted FDR, “It’s the end of the world, the end of everything.” These diplomats were positive that they alone stood between their nation and catastrophe, and such views likely reinforced their already strong-willed dispositions.

Siekmeier makes another valuable point when he notes that my actors rarely “pursued[d] their own personal interest,” in [Charles Maurice de] Talleyrand-Périgord fashion. “If Franklin, Monroe, Lodge, and the others felt, as I assert, that they were co-equal with presidents and secretaries of state in the crafting of policy, then why did they not, like the Machiavellian French foreign minister, use the opportunity presented by their overseas posting to line their pockets or otherwise benefit themselves rather than their country?” Siekmeier detects an absence of “self-serving narcissism” among the rogue diplomats I analyze and ventures that elevated patriotism might have motivated them, a conviction that they were “in service . . . to a great anti-colonial, republican experiment.” By flouting their superiors’ orders, they were doing what they thought was necessary for “the republican project that was the United States to succeed.” There is something to that hypothesis, especially, as Siekmeier observes, when it comes to the “diplomats early on in U.S. history.” When Henry Laurens, one of the American commissioners who hammered out the peace of 1783, stated that “John Adams & Co. may be hanged” as traitors for violating the Continental Congress’s instructions to consult with Vergennes, Adams serenely replied that if Congress were foolish enough to “get J. A. hanged,” he was “pretty well prepared for this, or to be recalled, or censured, . . . or slandered, just as they please.” He knew he had done what was best for the infant United States. Trist, for his part, was aware that he was cutting his professional throat by ignoring Polk’s recall order, but he did it anyway to spare his country hardship. This behavior is in keeping with the self-denying altruism Siekmeier perceives.

Still, several rogue diplomats had considerably less noble reasons for their actions. Livingston and Monroe each saw their Paris assignments as springboards for high political office (only Monroe was correct in that forecast), and it was an open secret on both sides of the Atlantic that Joseph P. Kennedy hoped to emulate five previous U.S. ambassadors to Great Britain by riding Embassy London into the White House. In addition, Lodge may have been positioning himself to become the Republican nominee for president in 1964, assuming that his high-profile resolution of a seemingly intractable foreign-policy problem would give him the edge over candidates like Barry Goldwater.

Perhaps the most egregious case of an American rogue diplomat acting “in Talleyrand fashion” was that of William Wilson, who, as I note above, plays a role in my introduction. Appointed special envoy to the Vatican by Ronald Reagan in 1981, Wilson did not relinquish his seat on the Pennzoil Petroleum Company’s board of directors, apparently believing that there was no conflict of interest in this arrangement. In 1985, after terrorists bankrolled by Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi carried out attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports and Reagan tried to get the governments of Western Europe to join the United States in imposing sanctions on Libya, Wilson disobeyed a White House travel ban and clandestinely met with Qaddafi in Tripoli. The story broke, and reporters confronted Wilson with questions about the purpose of the meeting. Had the two men discussed business dealings between Libya and Pennzoil? Wilson blandly denied any impropriety, but no one believed him—except his longtime friend Reagan, who refused to reprimand the envoy and stymied Secretary of State George Schultz’s efforts to have him fired. Clearly, one could be a rogue diplomat and an all-around rogue at the same time.

I conclude with Brian Etheridge’s review, one of the kindest I have ever gotten. He calls Rogue Diplomats “a great book” that “demonstrates a master storyteller at the top of his game.” The six case studies, he writes, are “beautifully told, finely drawn and deeply engaging,” and “irresistible.” He puts the book down hungry for more: “[A]s with any great class, I didn’t want it to end.” What author wouldn’t be ecstatic to receive such a notice? I must therefore preface my response to Etheridge’s criticisms with heartfelt gratitude. His review reassures this eternally self-conscious academic that the seven years I spent researching and writing Rogue Diplomats were worth the effort.

Etheridge is correct to point out that my approach to my subject is somewhat unsystematic and even anecdotal. Do I provide “enough material to demonstrate the existence of more than a pattern, but a tradition or culture, of diplomatic rebelliousness”? I believe I do—there are, by my count, twenty-four rogue diplomats identified in my book, and their roguishness spans the entire stretch from Yorktown to TrumpWorld—but I understand the call for greater methodological rigor. While compilation of “a dataset of diplomatic behavior,” which Etheridge recommends, might be pushing things, I could furnish more evidence of America’s overseas representatives stepping out of line, and I could definitely provide readers with a fuller picture of “the diplomatic practices of other nations.” As Etheridge observes, I give a shout-out in my acknowledgements to those scholars who educated me via the invaluable listserv H-Diplo on how French, German, Canadian, Pakistani, and other diplomats have acted, but I do not name those scholars or summarize their tutorials anywhere in Rogue Diplomats. “We need to know more about these different traditions,” Etheridge insists, and I am inclined to agree.

Thus it would have strengthened my book to move beyond the blanket statement. Whereas candidates for diplomatic work in Europe and elsewhere had to pass competitive examinations, entered their countries’ services at the lowest grade, were promoted on a merit basis, and their roguishness spans the entire stretch from Yorktown to TrumpWorld—but I understand the call for greater methodological rigor. While compilation of “a dataset of diplomatic behavior,” which Etheridge recommends, might be pushing things, I could furnish more evidence of America’s overseas representatives stepping out of line, and I could definitely provide readers with a fuller picture of “the diplomatic practices of other nations.” As Etheridge observes, I give a shout-out in my acknowledgements to those scholars who educated me via the invaluable listserv H-Diplo on how French, German, Canadian, Pakistani, and other diplomats have acted, but I do not name those scholars or summarize their tutorials anywhere in Rogue Diplomats. “We need to know more about these different traditions,” Etheridge insists, and I am inclined to agree.

Thus it would have strengthened my book to move beyond the blanket statement. Whereas candidates for diplomatic work in Europe and elsewhere had to pass competitive examinations, entered their countries’ services at the lowest grade, were promoted on a merit basis, and continued practicing statecraft in some capacity until reaching retirement age, American diplomats were, on balance, novices” (5). Although that claim is correct as far as it goes, it cries out for qualification.

For instance, I might have cited Peter Layton’s assertion that Australia reserves nearly all of its top ambassadorships for professional civil servants, and noted that Rogério de
Souza Farias says the same thing about Brazil. Comparable conditions obtain in Poland and the Czech Republic, or so reports Marinko Raos. Israel, Gideon Remez declares, relies almost entirely on career diplomats. So does Turkey, writes Sinan Kuneralp. David Javier Garcia Cantalapiedra affirms that Spain rarely designates nonprofessionals to head its embassies. Sung-Yoon Lee informs me that South Korea’s diplomatic corps includes a few non-foreign-service personnel, but not many political appointees; instead, Seoul tends to tap professors, probably a legacy of Korea’s Confucian culture. According to James Cameron, the United Kingdom used to select amateurs for its important posts—for example, Edward Wood, David Ormsby-Gore, and Peter Jay became ambassadors to the United States on the basis of family or political ties—but this practice stopped in the 1970s. Mark Stout states that, during the Soviet Union’s seventy-year history, Moscow assigned mid- and top-level diplomatic positions almost exclusively to trained professionals. Zambia appoints political candidates, but for a different reason than the United States does; as Andy DeRoche notes, Lusaka designates opposition politicians to get them out of the country. And, Ken Weisbrode reveals, the Philippines chooses almost as many politicians and campaign contributors as the United States to head its embassies—although, of course, Manila does not rival Washington in wealth and power. In all, my H-Diplomato instructors covered over thirty countries, a testament to the admirable degree of collaboration and collegiality in the Society for Historians of Foreign Relations.

Did diplomats from those thirty-plus countries ever go rogue? Very infrequently. I give three instances in my book: British ambassadors David Erskine and Craig Murray and French “inspector of indigenous affairs” for Indochina Francis Garnier. Two others might have been included: Eliahu Sasson, Israel’s ambassador to Italy and “back door” conduit to Turkey, who refused to carry out Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s instructions to explore a secret alliance between Tel Aviv and Ankara in 1956 and thereby short-circuited his career; and Heinrich von Lutzow, Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Italy, who tried to arrest the slide toward war in 1914 and earned a dressing-down from Foreign Minister Leopold von Berchtold. (Sean McMeekin pulls no punches, calling von Lutzow’s disclosure of Vienna’s confidential war plans to a British official “an act of gross insubordination.”) Apart from these men, there just aren’t many cases of non-Americans breaking ranks—and, as I note in the introduction, “non-American governments tend to be much less indulgent of the maverick diplomat’s actions than is Washington.” Whereas Erskine, Murray, Garnier, Sasson, and von Lutzow all suffered professionally for their misconduct, only two of my U.S. rogue diplomats, Trist and Kennedy, sustained any punishment. “The rest either completed their missions undamaged or with reputations enhanced” (14-15). I do not think Etheridge overstates matters when he calls this a “manifestation of American exceptionalism.”

Etheridge would also like me to pay more attention to those U.S. “diplomats quietly following orders and behaving appropriately.” That would certainly be useful as a point of contrast, especially if I were to single out statesmen and -women who, by their conformity to rule, injured American interests. Fortunately, I analyze the career of just such an individual in my third book: J. Graham Parsons, U.S. ambassador to Laos from 1956 to 1958. Parsons’s lack of imagination and obsession with protocol led to a catastrophic situation in which Washington found itself supporting the ruthless, inept rightist Phoumi Nosavan in a three-sided civil war that devastated the Lao capital of Vientiane and alienated most Lao from the so-called free world. Because Parsons refused to buck the Eisenhower administration’s line that neutralism was immoral, he could not recognize that Prince Souvanna Phouma was, as I put it, “that phenomenon the poet Saxon White Kessinger famously declared did not exist: an indispensable man, the only Lao politician acceptable to right, left, and center.”

Despite pleas from area specialists in the United States Operations Mission like the brilliant anthropologist Joel Halpern, Parsons never considered shifting American support from Phoumi to Souvanna. His lectures and memordanda to embassy subordinates read as though ghostwritten by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Nearly two years in Laos left Parsons’s stateside impression of the country intact: that it was a domino, indistinguishable from its neighbors, and that its only salvation lay in rigid anticommunism. No amount of evidence or experience could dent this cold war orthodoxy. Parsons heved to Dulles’s playbook until Washington belatedly summoned him home. He had done irreparable harm to his nation’s image, and he departed Vientiane with his reputation in tatters, but he had the bureaucrat’s excuse—which he was not reluctant to invoke in later years—that he had just followed orders.

I believe I have addressed all of the reviewers’ questions and criticisms. When I asked Andy Johns what length he would set for this author’s response, he graciously gave me carte blanche—a decision he may now regret, as I have no doubt overstayed my welcome. Readers will, I trust, forgive me. My prolixity grows out of appreciativeness. I thank Statler, Chervinsky, Siekmeyer, and Etheridge again for their efforts, insight, and generosity of spirit.

Notes:
7. Wallace Ohrt, Defiant Peacemaker; Nicholas Trist in the Mexican War (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1997), 133.
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Historians of the United States and the world are getting religion, and our understanding of American foreign relations is becoming more rounded and more comprehensive as a result. Religion provides much of the ideological fuel that drives America forward in the world, which is the usual approach historians have taken in examining the religious influence on diplomacy: it has also sometimes provided the actual nuts-and-bolts of diplomacy, intelligence, and military strategy. But historians have not always been able to blend these two approaches. Lauren Turek’s To Bring the Good News to All Nations is thus a landmark because it is both a study of cultural ideology and foreign policy. In tying the two together in clear and compelling ways, based on extensive digging in various archives, Turek sheds a huge amount of new light on America’s mission in the last two decades of the Cold War and beyond.

Turek uses the concept of “evangelical internationalism” to explore the worldview of American Protestants who were both theologically and politically conservative, and how they came to wield enough power that they were able to help shape U.S. foreign policy from the 1970s into the twenty-first century. As the formerly dominant liberal Protestants faded in numbers and authority, and as the nation was gripped by the cultural revolutions of the 1960s, evangelicals became the vanguard of a new era in American Christianity. Evangelicals replaced liberal Protestants abroad, too, as the mainline churches mostly abandoned the mission field. The effects on U.S. foreign relations were lasting and profound.

One of Turek’s main scholarly interventions is to demonstrate how evangelical internationalism did as much to shape the rise of Christian conservatives to cultural and political prominence in the age of Reagan. The conventional understanding of “the rise of the Religious Right” is that it was essentially a domestic story, aside from knee-jerk anti-communism, but Turek illustrates just how central global engagement was to the changing face of American evangelicalism. And though she doesn’t emphasize this as much as she could, another of the book’s significant contributions is to place Protestant evangelicals within a religiously inflected human rights tradition, in which religious liberty was central, that was started by liberal Protestants and conservative Catholics during World War II and reflected in Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms of 1941, the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950.

The reviewers in this roundtable are in agreement that Turek has produced a special book. To Darren Dochuk, it is “crisply written,” “a pleasure to read,” and “a masterful piece of history...that achieves—spectacularly—what it set out to achieve.” Christopher Jones says that Turek “provides important historical perspective” on a little-known but important topic. Kelly Shannon calls To Bring the Good News to All Nations “an impressively researched, well-written, persuasively argued book that makes a significant contribution to the field of U.S. foreign relations history.” And Vanessa Walker praises it as “a thoughtful, lucidly written study in how activist networks are built and exert influence at the nexus of international and domestic politics.”

Walker’s comment hits on how challenging Turek’s task must have been, for she had to engage with, but also complicate, several subfields of both religious history and diplomatic history on multiple levels, including the rise of the Religious Right in the United States, the history of human rights, the crisis and eventual collapse of détente, missiology, the growth of Christianity in the global South, globalization, and the end of the Cold War. In addition, Turek grounds her analysis in three relevant but loosely unconnected cases studies of American diplomacy from the 1970s to the 1990s: support for right-wing anti-communism in Guatemala, the crisis of Soviet communism in the 1980s, and the decline and fall of apartheid in South Africa. But the greater the challenge, the greater the reward, and To Bring the Good News to All Nations delivers. “Turek brings these disparate literatures together in exciting and important new ways,” notes Walker, while other reviewers point out that the book adds to the historiographies of both religious and diplomatic history. Dochuk calls Turek’s work an act of “academic bridge building.” Jones recognizes that readers of this roundtable will likely center To Bring the Good News to All Nations in the literature on the U.S. and the world, but he rightly calls attention to the possibly even greater contribution the book makes to modern American religious history.

As with any ambitious book, the reviewers are filled with praise but also seek more. As Walker puts it, there are many more fascinating questions “that Turek’s work
Review of Lauren Turek, To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations

Darren Dochuk

While reading Lauren Turek’s To Bring the Good News to All Nations, I found myself awed by the vast operations of global evangelicalism that she so brilliantly tracks and explains. I was drawn to this material not just academically, however, but also because of my family history. It is not my usual practice to reference my forebears when evaluating a scholarly text, but Turek’s account resonates with me in a way that justifies this alternative approach.

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Notes:
1. For a brilliant recent example, see Matthew Avery Sutton, Double Crossed: The Missionaries Who Spied for the United States During the Second World War (New York: Basic, 2019).
needed, perhaps, but I offer it as a way to thank Lauren Turek for providing such a richly detailed, generous, and long-overdue analysis (see particularly chapters 2 and 4) of a religious and political phenomenon that animated my childhood. In part because of my inability to follow my forebears’ foreign dialects, but also because of my impatience with talk about the old country, I never fully appreciated the extent to which they believed they were immersed in a global struggle with high-stakes political consequences, a struggle that they approached in life-or-death, good-versus-evil terms. But thanks to Turek’s scholarship, that is no longer the case.

Of course, that is hardly reason to celebrate a book of this magnitude. Speaking now as a historian of modern American evangelicalism and religion and politics, let me get to the heart of the matter and praise this text for what it offers those of us who work in my field(s). I will begin by echoing Melani McAllister’s back-cover blurbs, which rightly describes To Bring the Good News to All Nations as “wonderfully researched,” “utterly convincing,” and quite simply an “impressive achievement.” Wonderfully researched indeed: Turek traveled the globe to gather the sources needed to write an exhaustive book and consulted dozens and dozens of collections on multiple continents.

As exhaustive as the research and the book are, however, at no point does the text exhaust its reader. It is crisply written and a pleasure to read, and the structure of the book is sharp and accessible as well. After opening with three big-picture chapters that chart the rise and development of international Protestant engagement in defense of human and religious rights, Turek shifts to a lower altitude to reveal the workings of evangelical internationalism at the ground level. Her case studies of the Soviet Union, Guatemala, and South Africa add texture and depth to her analysis and contribute to the larger narrative in a book that is smartly layered in its chronology and thematic probes.

Finally, the book’s tone is notable as well. Turek deals with apartheid and dictatorships, structural racism and bloody violence, escalating Cold War tensions and the suppression of post-colonial reform—all of which American evangelicals were engaged in or with between the 1970s and 1990s. These are highly sensitive subjects, which might have led other, less patient historians to offer blank and harsh judgments where evangelicalism was concerned. Yet Turek practices patience and sensitivity at the highest level, always choosing to let a range of black and white evangelicals speak for themselves and to give her subjects the benefit of the doubt.

Her chapter on South Africa and apartheid is a perfect example of that approach. In answer to less forgiving scholars, she writes that “in spite of reductive treatments of the evangelical response to apartheid during the Reagan years that focus exclusively on Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, evangelicals evinced relatively diverse views about how to best confront apartheid” (180). While some championed civil rights and called for an immediate end to apartheid, others only gradually “came to embrace the need for justice as well as for reconciliation and salvation” (180). The fundamentalists of Falwell’s and Robertson’s ilk remained determined to shore up South Africa’s white Cold War order. Mostly, though, evangelicals in the United States and South Africa tried to navigate the knotty political middle in a way that would best allow them to achieve their priority: “global evangelistic mission” (180).

Beyond its appealing structure and style, To Bring the Good News to All Nations is also remarkable as a substantive model of academic bridge-building. Because of her training in U.S. diplomatic history, Turek is able to offer religious historians much that is fresh and new. Thanks to her keen eye for subtle and significant developments in U.S. foreign policy, international engagement, and state-level machinations, she is able to demonstrate how and why evangelical missionary and humanitarian efforts in the 1970s and 1980s assumed such political import.

Much exciting work is being done these days on evangelical humanitarianism in global contexts (in addition to the works of Melani McAllister, see, for instance, recent books by Heather Curtis, David Swartz, and David King), most of which emphasize its impact outside the corridors of political power. In part, this reassessment of modern evangelism seeks to reorient our histories away from sole focus on the religious right and its maneuvers in the domestic sphere. In fact, and as this scholarship shows, when we look abroad to evangelical nonprofit and missionary efforts in Armenia, Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, we see the formation of global networks and worldviews that are sometimes strikingly at odds with the priorities of the American religious right. In some contexts, global evangelicals embraced anti-colonial and anti-racist convictions that led them to challenge prevailing anti-civil rights sentiments on the American right. In others, they embraced critiques of neoliberalism and American corporate hegemony in a way that aligned them with staunch progressives back home in the United States.

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Turek’s book reinforces that broadened view of modern evangelicals while still striving for a balanced picture of their interests. Evangelicals abroad may not have espoused the religious right’s entire platform or worried as much about political activism, but they did remain political and generally conservative. By championing religious freedom and human rights initiatives, they were drawn into transnational networks of state and non-state actors and into lobbying that transcended the concerns of the church. They were also drawn into political alliances that entrenched them in right-wing causes and linked U.S. Republicans to foreign right-leaning dictators (see charismatic evangelicals and the Ríos Montt regime).

In that respect, Turek also has a lot to offer historians of U.S. foreign policy, who are in some regards her primary audience. To Bring the Good News to All Nations positions the author within a growing coterie of diplomatic historians led by Andrew Preston, William Inboden, Andrew Rotter, and others whose scholarship has integrated religious actors, ideas, and institutions in mainstream histories of U.S. foreign policy and international relations. More recently, historians such as Michael Thompson and Mark Edwards have focused on the role of ecumenical ideas and initiatives in the expansion of U.S. humanitarian outreach, liberal internationalism, and programs of economic development.

Turek’s book represents yet another vital step forward in the quest to embed religion in our histories of U.S. policy, politics, and diplomacy. It proves that evangelicals at work in Latin America and Africa and on behalf of persecuted Christians in the Soviet bloc not only oversaw some of the most crucial projects of human rights and religious freedom but also forged a powerful lobby that
shaped political trajectories on foreign terrains and policymaking decisions in Congress. No mere outliers or voices on the margins, evangelicals were in other words at times trendsetters and powerbrokers, whose embrace and politicization of human rights discourse and activism and transnational connections forced Washington elites to take them seriously. Not that Turek overstates evangelical influence, however. As evidenced in her chapter on South Africa, evangelicals did not always succeed at pressing their wishes on Washington. Still, her book should further silence skeptics who downplay religion's substantive role in formal diplomacy.

As with any outstanding book of this sort, one leaves the last page with curiosities and ponderings about the next possible steps in our scholarship. Lauren Turek has created a masterful piece of history here, one that achieves—spectacularly—what it set out to achieve. Yet To Bring the Good News to All Nations also prompts us to think about American (and global) evangelicalism in new ways and to ponder pursuing other avenues of analysis when considering this sprawling religious movement’s impact on modern political life. Turek carves out several possible avenues, but let me point to four, and prompt her to consider and, where relevant or possible, comment on where historians can go next.

The first two of my prompts are related, and they have to do with the relationship between evangels/al evangelicalism and authoritarianism. As highlighted above, Turek always errs on the side of generosity when explaining and evaluating her subjects’ dealings in the global arena. This is an admirable trait, and I want to honor it. At the same time, especially in light of our current political moment (both nationally and globally), I was left wanting a bit more explication (and sharper censure, perhaps) of evangelical affinities for authoritarian regimes (again, see José Ríos Montt of Guatemala), as well as more focus on what ends evangelicals had in mind where more recent American and global politics are concerned.

In its push to save the lost souls of individuals, build voluntary associations, defend religious liberty and the autonomy of churches and institutions, and generally resist Washington’s heavy hand, evangelicalism has usually been deemed an agent of democratization and populist dissent in Latin America (roughly in the nineteenth century, historian Nathan Hatch in the twentieth). Yet what Turek points toward is a tendency for evangelicalism to cozy up to dictators, strongmen who—in a quid pro quo type of arrangement—can ensure their access to the religious marketplace.

One former religious right organizer in the United States once quipped that evangelicals are “monarchists at heart”: as they are in the pews, so they are in politics, in that they act out of enchantment with anointed (masculine, muscular) authority and prefer on practical grounds to deal with fewer decision-makers when attacking their terrain. We see this tendency activated in the book, with evangelical activists such as National Association of Evangelicals’ director Robert P. Dugan Jr. admitting that “evangelical recognition of man’s sinful nature and its consequences compels acceptance of the view that the world political arena is a tough arena where coercive power counts more than good intentions” (101). I would ask Turek, then, simply to reflect further on evangelicalism’s penchant for militaristic, authoritarian leadership and, if relevant, to ponder how she might bring her analysis to bear on current events, during which evangelicals at home and abroad have often been the ones clamoring for a pragmatic and strong-armed political leadership.

Turek’s commendable aim here is to look beyond the familiar religious-right politicking of one sector of American evangelicals in order to better understand the broad canopy of evangelical humanitarianism and global activism. The related query—once again, and perhaps unfairly, drawing us away from Turek’s chronology (1970s–1990s) and into the present—has to do with her subjects’ role in forging the transnational connections and networks that have fueled and supported the rise of a fiercely nationalistic populism of the kind witnessed in the United States and Brazil (and elsewhere in South America and beyond). Turek rightfully stresses the world vision of her evangelical subjects in the 1970s and 1980s; they were, after all, a diverse lot whose shared priority was to bring souls to Christ, not win wars for a particular political group. Yet whether fundamentalist or progressive-leaning, charismatic Pentecostal or Baptist and Presbyterian, by virtue of their work abroad they got swept up in politics and had to choose sides.

Recent and forthcoming work (here I am anticipating the scholarship of Ben Cowan) is extending our knowledge of how the transnational flow of evangelical missionaries, preachers, and laymen and laywomen between the United States and Brazil in the second half of the twentieth century laid the foundation for the current presidency of Jair Bolsonaro. Preaching anti-communism, anti-ecumenism, anti-statism, authoritarianism, and militarism, and assuming the mantle of culture war warriors, evangelicals in the thick of these exchanges provided the energy as well as the institutional structures for such revolutionary postures in both societies. And joining them surprisingly early in this process were conservative Catholics, whose own antipathies towards communism and secularism made them the evangelicals’ natural allies.

Again, Turek’s commendable aim here is to look beyond the familiar religious-right politicking of one sector of American evangelicals in order to better understand the broad canopy of evangelical humanitarianism and global activism. Yet the extent to which she reveals such entanglements in places like Guatemala and maps out evangelicalism’s political commitments begs the question of just how it is that evangelical internationalism paved the way for a global, anti-global right-wing insurgence. Did her evangelical subjects’ attempts to “bring the good news to all nations,” in other words, contribute to a world in which backlash rules?

My final two prompts stem—predictably—from my own personal and scholarly interests. Turek’s analysis makes plenty of room for two pillars of American global expansion: missioners and government, the former serving as pathbreakers, the latter as protector. But in conventional renderings, the military would follow on the heels not just of missionaries but of businessmen when the United States was trying to shore up its influence abroad.

So what of business and businesspeople in all of this? How did the evangelical corporate type factor into evangelicism’s interests and encroachments abroad? Surely they were essential to Doug Coe’s secret fellowship of powerbrokers in Washington, just as they were a core component of evangelicism’s lobbying efforts on behalf of foreign humanitarian causes. But they were also known to be the ones carrying the Bibles into restricted zones, opening up lines of communication between American and global evangelicals, and funding Billy Graham’s ministry and the wider international evangelical community he wanted to help forge through Lausanne and parallel initiatives. And evangelical businessmen, both white and black, were often the ones joining the fight to keep Africa’s and Latin America’s markets and societies free and clear from left-wing reform for their Christian capitalist ventures. How, then, might we add this third pillar to the equation, and in the process further interrogate the motivations, intent, and outcomes of evangelicism’s quest to defend human rights.
and religious freedom and impress itself on global terrains?

Finally, I am curious to hear more about what Lauren Turek’s study can do to open up new avenues for further reflection on the role of immigration and ethnicity in modern American evangelical life (and politics). Here I return to my own family history. For logical reasons, white and black American evangelicals center Turek’s story, especially those who are attached to established denominations, missionary agencies, and parochial/nonprofit ministries and occupy positions of leadership. I would welcome even more inquiry, though, into the multiple ricochets and avenues of exchange that shaped American evangelicalism from the 1970s forward—those that brought Latinos to the United States, for example, and with them additional lines of communication about human rights issues, religious freedom concerns, and political lobbying on national and international fronts.

And how did the desire of my own relatives, tucked away in the Canadian hinterlands, to fight for people of faith in Ukraine draw them into the North American evangelical “mainstream” and by extension inform and even alter that mainstream’s cultural and political agenda in the ages of Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Trump? Put another way, by looking to evangelicalism’s outreach and advocacy abroad, how might we reconsider the ethnic hues and priorities of evangelicalism on our recent domestic terrain? The journey toward personal salvation is, in evangelical discourse, often equated to the immigrant experience of having to remake oneself and find new purpose, meaning, and status in the face of dislocation. How, one might ask in reply, has the immigrant experience reoriented the discourse (political included), mission, and outlook of American evangelicalism in the late modern era?

With that—and with tasty varenyky, holubtsi, borscht, and nalysniki (cheese crepes) on the brain—I will close by once again saying thanks to Lauren Turek for writing such an important book. It is one that historians of American religion, foreign policy, and politics should wrestle with for quite some time.

Review of Lauren Frances Turek. To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations

Christopher Cannon Jones

In July 2020, the Commission on Unalienable Rights released its first report. The commission, established a year earlier under the direction of U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, was tasked with “furnishing[ing] advice to the Secretary for the promotion of individual liberty, human equality, and democracy through U.S. foreign policy.” Among other things, the commission identified “property rights and religious freedom” as “foremost among the unalienable rights that government is established to secure” and that the United States ought to promote in its foreign policy.

The history of how religious freedom came to be central to American understandings of human rights is the subject of Lauren Turek’s new book, To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations. Turek’s book goes a long way toward making sense of the Commission on Unalienable Rights’ report and of the existence of the commission itself. More broadly, it charts the evolution of evangelical thinking about human rights during the final decades of the twentieth century and shows the ways in which conservative Protestants marshalled their burgeoning domestic political power to influence U.S. foreign policy.

Turek argues that American evangelicals in the 1970s and 1980s “evinced an enduring interest in foreign affairs rooted in their commitment to global evangelicalism” and formed an important political lobby that influenced U.S. foreign policy under the Carter and Reagan administrations. She positions her book as a complement and counterpart to much recent work in two seemingly disparate subfields: diplomatic history and American religious history. Readers of Passport will likely see her work as an extension of “the religious turn” in diplomatic history advanced by Andrew Rotter, Melani McAlister, Andrew Preston, and others. Turek adds additional layers to that work, tracing the rise of an evangelical foreign policy lobby in the later years of the Cold War.

Her more important historiographical contribution might be to the subfield of American religious history, where much recent work on religion and politics has focused on the emergence of the Religious Right as a powerful force in domestic politics. But Turek focuses instead “on how foreign missionary work contributed to the creation of an influential evangelical lobby with distinct interests in the trajectory of U.S. foreign relations.” (7). American evangelicals, she insists, were interested not only in social issues at home, but also in foreign policy and human rights abroad.

In tracing the activities of missionaries in Europe, Africa, and Latin America and the transnational ties those activities fostered between American and international evangelicals, Turek joins other recent scholars in locating American religious history beyond the geographical borders of the United States. She examines the role the international evangelical community played in fostering concern about religious oppression in totalitarian states. When combined with the “burgeoning domestic political power of the Christian right” in the 1970s and 80s, this growing international awareness gave rise to a new, distinctly evangelical understanding of human rights and, ultimately, a new Christian foreign policy.

To Bring the Good News to All Nations is relatively short and straightforward. The book has just 188 pages of text and is divided into six chapters. The first three chapters lay the groundwork for the latter three, tracing the global expansion of evangelical Christianity in the mid-to-late twentieth century. The book picks up where David Hollinger’s 2017 Protestants Abroad leaves off, focusing on those evangelicals in the 1960s and 1970s who picked up where more liberal, mainline Protestants left off in postwar America.

As liberal theologians began retreating from the imperialist missions of earlier decades in the face of self-determination and decolonization movements around the globe, conservative evangelicals—“a pluralistic movement” Turek defines as including not only Southern Baptists and the Presbyterian Church of America, but also Pentecostal denominations and other charismatic Christian groups—reaffirmed their commitment to fulfilling Christ’s Great Commission to preach the gospel to every nation. As liberal theologians began retreating from the imperialist missions of earlier decades in the face of self-determination and decolonization movements around the globe, conservative evangelicals—“a pluralistic movement” Turek defines as including not only Southern Baptists and the Presbyterian Church of America, but also Pentecostal denominations and other charismatic Christian groups—reaffirmed their commitment to fulfilling Christ’s Great Commission to preach the gospel to every nation. Though evangelicals sought to continue and expand the global missionary efforts abandoned by mainline Protestants, they also attempted to learn from the critiques leveled at and by their liberal counterparts. To that end, evangelical missionaries planted churches throughout the Global South.
Passport January 2021

A new book by David Turek, *Bringing the Good News to All Nations: The Evangelical Quest for International Religious Liberty* (Oxford University Press), explores how American evangelicals sought to promote religious freedom as an international human right. The book is a valuable contribution to the history of human rights and religious freedom and provides an important perspective on the role of American evangelicals in promoting religious freedom around the world.

Turek's book is grounded in detailed case studies, including cases in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa during the latter half of the twentieth century. The book covers the period from the 1970s to the 2000s, with a focus on the period of the Reagan administration. The book provides a comprehensive overview of the role of American evangelicals in promoting religious freedom, including the creation of international organizations, the use of communications technology, and the influence of political leaders.

The book begins with a discussion of the historical context of religious freedom and human rights in the United States, which provides a foundation for understanding the role of American evangelicals in promoting religious freedom around the world. Turek then provides a detailed analysis of the role of American evangelicals in promoting religious freedom in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, including cases in countries such as Guatemala, Guatemala, and South Africa.

Turek's book is an important contribution to the history of human rights and religious freedom and provides a valuable perspective on the role of American evangelicals in promoting religious freedom around the world. The book is well-written and provides a comprehensive overview of the role of American evangelicals in promoting religious freedom, including the creation of international organizations, the use of communications technology, and the influence of political leaders.

The book is well-researched and provides a comprehensive overview of the role of American evangelicals in promoting religious freedom around the world. The book is an important contribution to the history of human rights and religious freedom and provides a valuable perspective on the role of American evangelicals in promoting religious freedom around the world.

If Turek's book provides important historical perspective on how the vision of religious freedom and foreign policy presented in the report of the Commission on Unalienable Rights came to be, it also leaves some questions unanswered. That Secretary of State Pompeo would embrace and advocate such a view makes sense. Pompeo is a devout member of the Evangelical Presbyterian Church and former deacon and Sunday school teacher. He fits the mold of earlier lobbyists and state officials described in *To Bring the Good News to All Nations*.

What is perhaps more surprising is the involvement of those beyond the bounds of conservative evangelical Protestantism on the Commission. The Commission on Unalienable Rights is headed by Chairperson Mary Ann Glendon, a Roman Catholic Harvard Law professor who briefly served as the United States Ambassador to the Holy See during the final years of George W. Bush's administration. Other members include at least two other Catholics, as well as Jewish, Muslim, and Mormon scholars and activists. Turek's book focuses exclusively on "modern U.S. evangelicals" and leaves unexplored what role, if any, those outside of that group may have played in advancing religious freedom as a central tenet of American foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s.

Several scholars have traced the tenuous ties nurtured by evangelical leaders of the Religious Right with Latter-day Saints and Catholics during this era. Historian Neil Young, for instance, has analyzed the common cause evangelicals found with Mormons and Catholics in opposing communism, denouncing secularism, and advocating against the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, and gay marriage. But these ecumenical coalition-building efforts by leaders of the Religious Right were often undermined by theological disagreement and deeply rooted anti-Mormonism and anti-Catholicism. Mutual distrust and hesitancy to embrace ecumenicalism, then, was balanced alongside a broadly shared social conservativism in the United States.

Were these relationships also nurtured in overseas mission fields and foreign policy lobbying in Washington, DC? Turek offers hints that, at least in Latin America, Catholics were seen as foes of evangelical foreign policy. But what of Latter-day Saints, whose own expansive global growth occurred during the very same period covered in the book? Mormons, like their evangelical counterparts, expanded their missionary efforts and deployed humanitarian aid to Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa during the latter half of the twentieth century. Moreover, several Latter-day Saints served in the
Reagan administration and in the U.S. House and Senate, occupying positions of power and influence in shaping U.S. foreign policy.\(^5\)

How did those evangelicals described in Turek’s book respond to and engage with their Mormon colleagues? Did the competition for converts introduce additional strains, or did the two find common cause in advancing religious freedom both at home and abroad? To raise these questions is not to criticize what Lauren Turek has accomplished in her book. Rather, it is intended to highlight and praise the ground she has laid for future scholars. This is perhaps the signal accomplishment of the book: Turek not only advances what we know about religion and U.S. foreign policy, her research also provokes additional questions and suggests new lines of inquiry about American religion and politics at home and abroad.

Notes:

Review of Lauren Frances Turek, To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations

Kelly J. Shannon

Lauren Turek’s To Bring the Good News to All Nations is a deeply researched and persuasively argued book that makes a significant contribution to our understanding of American evangelicals’ relationship with and influence on U.S. foreign relations since the 1970s. It is also very timely. In July 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that U.S. human rights policy henceforth would prioritize the rights to property and religious freedom—upending decades of American policy and flouting the international community’s more capacious approach to human rights that dates back to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).\(^1\) That Pompeo is an evangelical Christian matters a great deal to how he defines human rights, and Turek’s book explains why.\(^2\)

To Bring the Good News to All Nations traces how American evangelicals’ international evangelizing activities in the late 1960s and 1970s ultimately led to their human rights activism, primarily on behalf of religious freedom, and foreign policy lobbying in the 1980s and beyond. Based on an impressive array of sources, including archives in the United States, Guatemala, and South Africa, the book argues persuasively that “pursuing global evangelism under the banner of human rights enabled U.S. evangelical Christian groups to exercise influence on U.S. foreign relations, including decisions on trade, aid, military assistance, diplomatic exchanges, and bilateral negotiations with allies and adversaries alike. In this way, internationalist evangelical groups transformed society, culture, and politics at home as well as abroad”\(^7\).

While many historians have written about evangelicals’ growing political influence in the United States since the 1970s, Turek breaks new ground by examining that influence through the lens of international affairs to explain exactly how it evolved. She explains that, as mainline Protestant churches stepped back from overseas missionary work in the wake of decolonization, evangelicals took up the missionary mantle. In response to anti-colonial nationalist movements, however, American and European evangelicals who wished to spread their religion developed new strategies so that local churches in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere could play a more central role in global evangelism. They simultaneously embraced communications technology and mass media to connect with “unreached” populations and fellow evangelicals in “hostile” nations, like those of the Eastern bloc.

Through these efforts, evangelicals in the United States and elsewhere created a transnational community of believers with an increasingly cohesive set of core values and a coordinated strategy for proselytizing. According to Turek, the 1974 International Congress on World Evangelization and its resulting Lausanne Covenant—“a set of fourteen principles intended to guide the renewed crusade for world evangelization”—marked the key moment when this global evangelical mission coalesced (25–26).

United by shared principles and equipped with the tools of an increasingly sophisticated transnational media strategy, American evangelicals became increasingly drawn to foreign policy through their participation in global evangelism. Turek argues that communications with fellow evangelicals around the globe taught American evangelicals about the challenges their co-religionists faced in other countries, including persecution in communist countries. Meanwhile, the global human rights movement gained influence in the 1970s, and born-again Christian Jimmy Carter embraced human rights as a centerpiece of his successful 1976 presidential campaign. When President Carter’s human rights policies failed to satisfy American evangelicals, they developed their own, biblically derived definition of human rights, as Turek demonstrates. Evangelicals recognized the utility of human rights rhetoric for their own cause and began to use the language of human rights to form a foreign policy lobby.

As Turek’s book demonstrates, American evangelicals’ approach to human rights differed significantly from that of the mainstream international human rights movement and human rights law. The book could do more to explain how evangelicals’ human rights concepts diverged from the dominant concepts of universal human rights during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet those already familiar with the history of the international human rights movement will recognize in Turek’s analysis that evangelicals’ definition of human rights departed significantly from universalist concepts. The mainstream movement was largely secular and defined human rights as universal, deriving from the simple fact that a person is born human, not from any higher power. Starting with the UDHR in 1948 and continuing with additional international human rights
covenants and legal instruments developed in the 1960s and after, the mainstream international movement embraced a wide array of rights as human rights, ranging from civil and political rights to social, cultural, and economic rights. Neither the UDHR nor international human rights law elevated any single right to a position of primacy.

In contrast, according to Turek, evangelicals developed a Bible-based conception of human rights that asserted that all rights derived from God. To them, the most important human right was the right to religious freedom—not only freedom of conscience, but also freedom to practice religion, which in essence meant evangelicals’ right to proselytize. It was on this self-interested basis that evangelical groups began pushing the U.S. government to focus more forcefully on religious freedom. By the time Ríos Montt became president, such lobbying efforts had become increasingly successful.

The first half of Turek’s book, chapters 1 through 3, traces the development of the global evangelical community, its mission, its media strategies, and its conception of human rights. The second half of the book, chapters 4 through 6, centers on particular foreign policy issues around which American evangelicals mobilized in the 1980s and early 1990s: religious freedom for evangelical Christians in the Soviet bloc, support for an evangelical dictator who took power in Guatemala, and divided evangelical opinion on South African apartheid.

Chapter 4 traces the evangelicals’ campaigns for religious freedom for Christians in the Soviet bloc in the late 1970s and 1980s, which was inspired by the successful Jewish American campaign for the rights of Soviet Jews. As Turek explains, the evangelical lobby not only found receptive policymakers in Congress, the State Department, and Ronald Reagan’s White House, but their efforts also emboldened evangelicals in the Eastern bloc to resist their persecution. When the communist governments of Eastern Europe fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union itself collapsed in 1991, American evangelicals’ earlier foreign policy activism and the communications networks they built in the region laid the groundwork for further evangelizing in Eastern Europe and Russia in the post-Cold War era.

Chapter 5 then takes the reader to Guatemala in the 1980s. This chapter is the one that clearly demonstrates just how much American evangelicals’ definition of human rights diverged from that used by the mainstream international human rights movement. In fact, one might argue that evangelicals’ use of the term “human rights” in this period did not really refer to human rights at all. In this chapter, Turek traces how American evangelicals supported the Reagan administration’s attempts to provide military aid to the Guatemalan dictator, José Efraín Ríos Montt, who seized power in a military coup in 1982.

Congress had blocked military funding to Guatemala in 1977 because of the country’s poor human rights record, and it resisted Reagan’s attempts to reinstate aid to Ríos Montt. His new government committed “rampant human rights abuses” against “leftist political activists, guerrillas, and Mayan civilians,” and his regime was considered a “particularly brutal episode” in Guatemala’s decades of civil conflict (125). While the Reagan administration saw Ríos Montt as a potential Cold War ally, Turek asserts that American evangelicals supported the dictator because he belonged to el Verbo, a “neo-Pentecostal church that missionaries from the Eureka, California-based Gospel Outreach Church had founded in 1976 and continued to direct” (124). Because Ríos Montt offered the global evangelical movement an opportunity to spread the gospel in Central America, American evangelicals hypocritically (this is my word, as Turek is remarkably evenhanded in her analysis) ignored the dictator’s brutal human rights violations and instead, “aided his regime directly through public outreach, fundraising, and congressional lobbying” (126). Fortunately, Congress remained steadfast in its refusal to provide aid to Ríos Montt, and the dictator was overthrown in another coup in 1983.

Turek’s purpose in this chapter is to argue “that connections between evangelicals in the United States and in Guatemala influenced U.S. relations with the Ríos Montt regime and the response of the Guatemalan government to U.S. policies” (126). Despite the author’s intention, what this chapter really does is to illustrate how actors could co-opt the language of human rights in such a way that they actually supported the perpetuation of human rights abuses. By the time Ríos Montt became president, the right—the right to evangelize—truly mattered, and that, coincidentally, was the one that benefitted “their most deeply cherished objectives” (150). This claim allowed them to justify to themselves overlooking or downplaying horrific violence directed against people who were not part of their religious community, but their actions only betray the hollowness of their human rights rhetoric and show how meaningless human rights can become when certain groups co-opt human rights rhetoric for their own ends. The story in Turek’s book may offer a chilling preview of what is to come should Secretary Pompeo’s definition of human rights continue to dominate U.S. foreign policy into the 2020s.

Finally, chapter 6 traces American evangelicals’ divided opinion on the anti-apartheid movement. Some vehemently opposed the movement, while others supported it; but Turek argues that “white U.S. evangelicals in the 1980s on the whole tended to support peaceful efforts to reform or dismantle apartheid, a stance that aligned them with the Reagan administration” (152). They understood apartheid “as a hindrance to their efforts to achieve the Great Commission,” but they also saw the African National Congress (ANC) and anti-apartheid activists as a Marxist threat to South Africa (152). Therefore, they used their connections with South African Baptists and Pentecostals, as well as moderate and conservative anti-communist leaders like Bishop Isaac Mokona, to “provide moral backing to Republican leaders who voted against sanctions” (154). Although this stance ultimately put the evangelicals on the losing side of the sanctions debate, Turek’s chapter does much to illustrate the ways in which American evangelicals used their global religious connections and growing political clout to influence U.S. policy debates over apartheid. These activities formed the basis for continued evangelical policy engagement into the twenty-first century.

In all, To Bring the Good News to All Nations is an impressively researched, well-written, persuasively argued book that makes a significant contribution to the field of U.S. foreign relations history. Turek clearly demonstrates the importance of religion and non-state actors to U.S. foreign relations. She shows, particularly, how religiously oriented Americans engage with the wider world and how lobby groups influence the policymaking process. Turek also demonstrates the shifting, multiple definitions of human rights and how human rights language can be wielded by different groups, sometimes for purposes very much contrary to the spirit of human rights.

Some additional context would have made the book even stronger in a few areas. Analyzing the historical connection between white supremacy and white evangelical Christianity in the United States would have helped to unpack further white American evangelicals’ various stances on the anti-apartheid movement. Similarly, women
and gender are absent from the book. One wonders what role, if any, evangelical women as a distinct group played in the story Turek tells, since they played a significant role in American domestic politics at the time.

It also would be helpful to know how American evangelicals’ approach to human rights compared to other religious groups in the same period. Conservative Muslims in the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, rejected universal human rights and instead declared that human rights derive from God and the Koran. One also wonders how the secular universal human rights movement at the time responded to evangelicals’ human rights campaigns. But these are minor quibbles with what is an excellent book. Turek’s fine analysis has done much to advance the study of global evangelism, the rise of the evangelical foreign policy lobby, and how Americans have dealt with the thorny issue of human rights since the 1970s.

Notes:

Evangelical Internationalism in the Human Rights Moment

Vanessa Walker

The 1970s were a time of change and uncertainty for American society, a time that raised questions about America’s place in the world. Much of the new scholarship on the decade has explored U.S. foreign policy through the tectonic shifts in the international system, from the splintering of the bipolar world and decolonization, to the revolution in global markets and finance, to the human rights revolution. There is also a robust literature on the New Right and on conservative ascendency in U.S. domestic politics in the 1970s and 80s. Lauren Frances Turek brings these disparate literatures together in exciting and important new ways in To Bring the Good News to All Nations, an examination of evangelical internationalism in the 1970s and 1980s.

The same forces that shaped the human rights moment of the 1970s—decolonization and the growing power of the Global South, globalization, and the erosion of a bipolar world order—also led to new evangelical engagement in international affairs. Turek argues that like many Americans, evangelical Christians entered the decades deeply ambivalent about the changes wrought by the tumultuous 1960s. Their anxieties, particularly about reaching the un-proselytized in a rapidly changing world, galvanized a global network of evangelicals dedicated to missionary work. Evangelical Christians were also early to recognized the utility of new human rights language to their international agenda, adopting and transforming it in the 1970s to reflect a conservative worldview.

Evangelical groups increasingly presented freedom of conscience—understood as the freedom to practice and profess one’s religious beliefs—as the foundational human right. Their Christian faith led them to believe that salvation in the name of Jesus Christ was the only real basis for human rights. Thus, the freedom to worship and bear witness was the most urgent and vital aspect of any human rights policy. “When Christian interest groups blended their religious beliefs and conservative political ideology,” Turek writes, “they added their new but powerful voice to the national discourse about U.S. foreign relations” (11). As she argues, evangelical networks influenced U.S. policies on trade, foreign military aid, and bilateral relations in the 1970s and 1980s, and ultimately shaped the United States’ human rights policy to better fit conservative political objectives.

Evangelicals’ growing engagement with international dynamics as a core aspect of their ability to proselytize resulted in a growing attentiveness to U.S. foreign policies among the Christian right. Mobilizing the emergent conservative lobby that took shape in the 1970s, they began to advocate for specific foreign policies that would advance their global mission. Turek reveals how evangelical actors carefully and deliberately cultivated relationships with politically influential co-religionists, encouraging them to develop their own faith networks. Evangelical groups hosted congressional prayer breakfasts, creating ties with and among policymakers and encouraging them in turn to create their own prayer groups and networks with politically influential people.

Congressional leaders then took similar approaches on overseas delegations or in diplomatic meetings, offering to pray together with foreign politicians and arranging for them to join the weekly congressional prayer breakfasts when they visited Washington. Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, after twice attending these breakfasts during visits to Washington, reportedly “started his own prayer breakfast in Ethiopia and appointed a committee ‘to discuss how these links of friendship through the Spirit of Christ can be developed among the leaders of all Africa’” (41). These networks, which encompassed relationships among ordinary believers and political elites around the world, played a critical role in shaping evangelical activism in U.S. foreign policy.

Turek’s work adds an important new dimension to religion’s role in the politics of the New Right in the late Cold War. Scholars often examine the rise of conservative evangelism in U.S. politics as an almost exclusively domestic phenomenon, but Turek convincingly argues that it had a formative global context.

Turek’s work adds an important new dimension in the politics of the New Right in the late Cold War. Scholars often examine the rise of conservative evangelism in U.S. politics as an almost exclusively domestic phenomenon, but Turek convincingly argues that it had a formative global context. She notes that “although domestic issues played a central role in mobilizing the Christian right—and as such, dominate the literature—international and foreign policy concerns also held significance for evangelicals and inspired them to greater involvement in politics” (73).

Turek goes beyond a narrow focus on anti-communism and resistance to detente. Her work reveals that concerns about evangelizing the decolonizing world and individual relationships with co-religionists resulting from missionary networks facilitated a strong internationalist outlook and mobilized grassroots evangelical activism that spurred increasing political engagement by the religious right. By the advent of the Reagan administration, this political engagement had transformed into a coherent and powerful religious lobby that shaped the Republican party’s approach to both domestic cultural issues and foreign relations.

Indeed, Turek’s work powerfully illustrates how global grassroots activism operates simultaneously on a domestic and international level. Adding to a literature
that has focused primarily on left-liberal activism, Turek meticulously traces the threads of interpersonal relationships, institutional collaborations, and technological innovations that served as nodes in a global network. Evangelicals from the United States and Western Europe were attentive to the fact that the locus of global Christianity was moving south and honed their efforts to connect with indigenous co-religionists and developed outreach that sought to mitigate perceptions of cultural chauvinism that had marred evangelizing efforts in the past. This approach, Turek shows, “greatly increased the knowledge about the lives of believers in other nations,” which "encouraged greater evangelical attention to international affairs and the domestic political climates of foreign countries, in as much as they effected [sic] missionary work or the freedom to practice Christianity” (70–71).

Despite their different agendas and motivations, conservative evangelicals’ strategies are remarkably familiar from the more frequently studied left-liberal human rights networks. The relationships between Congress and evangelical networks parallel those among liberal ecumenical organizations during the same period. Groups like the National Council of Churches, Christians and Laity Concerned, the Washington Office on Latin America, and the Friends National Legislative Committee all used global religious networks in similar ways to circulate information, build congressional alliances, and lobby for foreign policies rooted in faith-based visions of a moral foreign policy. Left-liberal religious groups were essential in drafting landmark human rights legislation, including the so-called Harkin Amendment to the 1975 Foreign Aid Act, which linked U.S. economic assistance to the human rights record of the recipient country.

Despite their very different political outlooks, liberal and conservative groups shared similar critiques of U.S. human rights policies and diplomacy. Advocates from both evangelical Christian networks and leftist solidarity networks, for example, were impatient with the quiet diplomacy often used by the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations in advocating on behalf of particular human rights cases. Government officials saw quiet, bilateral talks as effective at gently prodding for the release of specific religious or political prisoners. Advocates distrusted this approach, portraying it as an abandonment of human rights objectives in the face of power politics. That so many of the same debates and obstacles characterized nongovernmental groups’ relations with Congress and presidential administrations regardless of their political alignments shows us the persistent challenges of instrumentalizing human rights in foreign policy. Advocate discontents with human rights policy were not purely partisan, but rather point to deeper dilemmas in the political mobilization of rights language and policy—dilemmas involving consistency, priorities, and strategies.

At its core, this work raises important questions about the relationship between religion and human rights. One of the more compelling threads that Turek reveals is that of evangelical concern with cultural chauvinism in the late Cold War, which echoed broader debates about human rights as cultural imperialism or Western hegemony. This awareness among evangelicals stemmed from the realization that the decolonizing world and the global South were shifting the Christian world southward, and American evangelicals needed new strategies and messages to connect with them. Turek documents how evangelical leaders reflected on the harmful legacies of Western missionaries and the barriers to evangelizing that this legacy posed. Much like the concept of human rights itself, the universality of the Christian gospel was laden with the cultural baggage of centuries of Western domination and colonial rule.

Even with their newfound sensitivity to cultural hegemony and efforts to empower and amplify indigenous voices in their global networks, however, evangelicals’ concern for religious liberty often came at the expense of other essential freedoms and rights. Turek reveals that conservative evangelicals focused their human rights efforts almost exclusively on freedom of conscience, developing a “limited and particularistic perspective on human rights abuses in the Soviet bloc and the Global South, which they used to marshal support for their foreign policy positions” (8). The foundation of evangelical engagement with human rights was their belief that all rights were derived from God. “Evangelicals believed religious liberty—freedom to evangelize—was the core human right because they saw salvation as the basis for human freedom and the truest cure for man’s suffering” (150).

While taking their activism and intentions seriously, Turek conscientiously details the limits of their advocacy based on this premise. She argues, for example, that Guatemalan dictator José Ríos Montt’s Christian faith and anti-communism allowed U.S. evangelicals to imagine him as part of their mission of bringing salvation to the un-proselytized. Yet it also allowed them to turn a blind eye to the gross violations of rights perpetrated by his government, particularly the massacre of the Mayan people. “In their view, defeating communism ensured universal religious freedom; universal religious freedom provided the cornerstone for all other human rights” (187). Thus, their elevation of religious liberty not only subordinated other human rights, it actively supported state violence resulting in brutal human rights violations.

Similarly, in South Africa, Turek details the diversity of perspectives among evangelicals about apartheid. Even as conservative evangelicals increasingly moved against apartheid, they focused their criticism on the racial regime as a hindrance to the Great Commission rather than a basic denial of human dignity and freedom (152). “The evangelistic mission, rather than the pursuit of social justice, defined U.S. evangelical engagement with South Africa between 1970 and 1994.” Turek concludes (180).

The narrow focus of evangelical human rights advocacy raises an important question about when and how to separate human rights from faith-based moralism. Turek herself is cautious in calling these evangelical networks a “human rights movement” or “human rights activism.” She instead emphasizes the utility of human rights language and rhetoric to the conservative Christians at the center of her work. She notes that it was precisely the “fluidity” of human rights “in concept and praxis” in the 1970s that allowed evangelicals to mold it effectively to their purposes as they fashioned a “conservative Christian foreign policy agenda” (10).

Human rights movements are often selective in their concerns and targets—it would be impossible (and ineffective) to focus equally on every rights violation everywhere. The relative importance of different types of rights is a perennial debate among activists and policymakers alike. Further, religious motivations and worldviews are not mutually exclusive to human rights activism or thinking. It is precisely the resonance that the modern language of human rights has with many world religions that gives it legitimacy and coherence in a diverse
Let me first extend my appreciation to the roundtable participants for reading my work and responding to it with such thoughtful, insightful reviews. It is gratifying to have my book discussed by this particular group of scholars, all of whom have made such significant contributions to their fields of expertise. I am especially thankful that each reviewer encapsulated my argument so cogently while also raising a range of thought-provoking questions that speak to the many intersecting thematic threads that connect our areas of research and offering such a wealth of suggestions for the direction that future research might take. Given the breadth of their reviews, most of my comments here will simply attempt to answer some of the questions raised and to point to exciting published work and work-in-progress of relevance to the themes in the book.

First, one of my core goals in researching and writing this book was to demonstrate that evangelical foreign policy engagement mattered, which is to say that it had a discernible influence on U.S. foreign relations. In making this case, I sought to convey a larger message about the potential power of motivated interest group activism as a force for shaping the trajectory of U.S. policies abroad. We may or may not approve of the goals of the activist groups in question or the outcomes of that activism, but we should not discount their ability to impel change.

Although domestic interest groups and amorphous factors such as religion and culture are generally not the sole determinative factor in any given policy (indeed, it is rare that we could identify one single causal factor for any policy or strategy), we should still seek to account for such factors as we study official policymaking and the manner in which these factors can and have shaped foreign relations more broadly. These are the busy intersections of domestic politics and foreign policy that offer so many exciting and vibrant avenues for research.

A second goal was to move beyond studies of evangelicalism that focus primarily on the domestic context or that consider evangelical interests abroad only through a narrow lens. I write about evangelical Christians as an outsider to their faith tradition, and even though I do not share their beliefs, I cannot escape the tremendous influence that evangelical culture and evangelicalism has had in shaping our contemporary political world. Thus it seems crucial to me to try to understand this movement and to take note of which populations within it exercise the most power without downplaying its genuine ideological, theological, racial and ethnic, and gender diversity.

Indeed, work on evangelicalism and evangelical internationalism from Melani McAlister, David Swartz, David Kirkpatrick, Brantley Gasaway, and Anthea Butler reminds us that the movement, both historically and in our present moment, is more complex and varied than our current media-inflected impressions might indicate.1 At the same time, the evidence makes it clear that despite the racial diversity of evangelicalism, especially globally, and despite the role that evangelical women played as activists, the main powerbrokers and opinion leaders in the events that I discuss in the book were predominately (though not exclusively) politically conservative white men.

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Author’s Response

Lauren F. Turek

Let me first extend my appreciation to the roundtable participants for reading my work and responding to it with such thoughtful, insightful reviews. It is gratifying to have my book discussed by this particular group of scholars, all of whom have made such significant contributions to their fields of expertise. I am especially thankful that each reviewer encapsulated my argument so cogently while also raising a range of thought-provoking questions that speak to the many intersecting thematic threads that connect our areas of research and offering such a wealth of suggestions for the direction that future research might take. Given the breadth of their reviews, most of my comments here will simply attempt to answer some of the questions raised and to point to exciting published work and work-in-progress of relevance to the themes in the book.

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Still, by focusing on the changes that decolonization and globalization wrought and on U.S. relations in the Global South, the book does, I hope, shed light on how this demographic slice of evangelicals contended with questions of social justice, race, and imperialism. In so doing, I believe it complements the work I noted above by contributing to scholarship that expands our focus beyond just domestic culture war issues or the foreign policy implications of Christian Zionism.

I would also note that while there are certainly connections that we might draw between the policy preferences of politically conservative white evangelicals in the period I wrote about (the 1970s through the 1990s) and the policy preferences of politically conservative white evangelicals today much has also changed in the intervening decades. It may seem glib to say that, but if we are looking for explanations that more fully account for the share of the white evangelical vote that turned out for Donald Trump in 2016 and 2020, we would do well to consider the recent efflorescence of literature on white supremacy and evangelicalism in the United States, as well as writings on evangelicalism and the culture wars since 1994.

I was also eager for the book to contribute to recent scholarship examining and re-examining the international human rights movement of the 1970s and the human rights policies of the Reagan administration in the 1980s. It is here that I do notice particularly consistent and strong links between the evangelicals whom I discuss in the book and the evangelicals who have occupied positions of power in the Trump administration. The book sets out in part to demonstrate how political conservatives—evangelical and otherwise—fashioned human rights language to pursue their foreign policy agenda. I contend that, starting with the Reagan administration, they managed very effectively to reorient the country’s human rights policies so that they aligned with politically conservative foreign and domestic policy objectives.

Several of the reviewers noted that Trump’s secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, has frequently and explicitly conflated “human rights” with “religious freedom” in his speeches.
and policy statements. Indeed, in its July 2020 draft report, the State Department Commission on Unalienable Rights (which Pompeo established in 2019) asserted that religious liberty, along with property rights, was “foremost among the unalienable rights that government is established to secure.” In discussing the report at a release ceremony, and in other speeches on human rights, Pompeo affirmed this perspective and asserted the primacy of religious liberty, suggesting that he and the commission elevated it above other rights. This is a narrow interpretation of human rights and, as a policy statement, obviously suggests a desire to greatly diminish the range of rights that U.S. foreign policymakers might seek to protect and promote globally. It is also very much in line with the evangelical vision for human rights, also focused primarily on religious liberty, that the evangelical I discuss in my book sought to achieve.

In his review, Christopher Jones makes note of this connection, but he also highlights the involvement of Roman Catholics, as well as Muslims, Jews, and Mormons, on the Commission on Unalienable Rights. He asks about the role members of these other faiths played in this project of promoting religious liberty. Although my book focuses on evangelical activism on this issue, I allude to evangelical collaboration with conservative Catholics and other politically conservative faith-based organizations that advocated for religious freedom as part of a narrow human rights agenda for the United States. The Institute on Religion and Democracy, Puebla Institute, and Freedom House all had either Catholic leadership or prominent Catholics on their boards, and representatives of these organizations often testified in Congress or worked alongside evangelical leaders advocating for religious liberty and against totalitarianism.

These connections grew increasingly important by the late 1990s, when evangelicals joined with these other politically conservative faith groups to lobby for the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act. Allen Hertzke’s Freeing God’s Children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights provides a wonderfully in-depth account of this development." In her review, Kelly Shannon notes that conservative Muslims in the 1980s and 1990s embraced an understanding of human rights that was similar in some ways to evangelical beliefs (in the sense that they viewed rights as granted by God and not the state). I did not come across evidence of evangelicals engaging with Muslim perspectives on this issue, but it certainly is intriguing to me that political and theological conservatives from a diverse range of faith traditions held similar interpretations of human rights—interpretations that, as I note in the book, politically liberal Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, not to mention many secular Americans, rejected.

I also fully agree with Shannon’s comment that the vision for human rights that evangelicals articulated and pursued in countries such as Guatemala offers a “chilling preview” of what we might see if Mike Pompeo or others of his ilk set U.S. policy. Prioritizing religious liberty above all other rights, as Pompeo has advocated, would in effect degrade all other rights and send a signal to abusive regimes that the United States will not intervene to protect or promote other rights.

Shannon also raises incredibly important questions about gender and white supremacy as they relate to evangelicalism. While I do include a number of evangelical women in the book, such as those who testified in Congress as members of advocacy organizations, wrote letters home from their families’ missionary posts, wrote articles in their denominational magazines, and wrote to their elected officials, I do not specifically address evangelical gender roles. Few evangelical women occupied official leadership positions, though the book does show that women were involved in a variety of ways in organizing on the issue of religious liberty and in evangelizing abroad (even if not as pastors or ministers). The history of how evangelical women negotiated the gendered and patriarchal dynamics of their faith at this time in different denominations and different parts of the world is fascinating and complex, and there is much wonderful scholarship on gender, evangelicalism, and domestic politics.

Similarly, while the book does address race and conflicts over racism in evangelicalism, particularly with regard to apartheid South Africa, it does not provide a full contextualization of the relationship and long history between evangelicalism and white supremacy in the United States. There is much writing on this topic as well, including some very recent work that sheds great light on our current moment; and surely there is much more to come, given the role conservative white evangelicals played in electing Donald Trump and in supporting white supremacist policies. Gender and race are both inextricably bound up in the history of evangelicalism, and I am deeply appreciative that Shannon highlights them.

Turning to Darren Dochuk’s review, I will first note that it was particularly gratifying to read about his personal connections with this topic, as it confirms that the trends that I attempt to illuminate in the book were active at the individual and familial level and not just something evangelical elites were discussing. I think Dochuk is very right to point out the penchant that many white U.S. evangelicals have had and do have for authoritarian leadership and to make links between the political and ideological commitments that I describe in the book and the emergence of “a global, anti-global right-wing insurgency” and backlash. Christian nationalism is part of this broader story that I am telling.

Dochuk’s questions about business and businesspeople are also intriguing and important, again, especially in light of our current moment. Pompeo’s version of human rights centers religious liberty and free enterprise as the primary rights. I think there is much room to bring the histories of organizations such as the International Fellowship of Christian Businessmen and the Full Gospel Business Men’s Fellowship International to our understanding and analysis of religion and foreign policy (to say nothing of the gendered language and orientation of such groups!). I also agree that examining immigration and ethnicity in more depth would add tremendously to our understanding of contemporary evangelicalism.

Finally, Vanessa Walker helpfully situates the evangelicals I cover within the much larger context of human rights activist organizations in the 1970s and 1980s. Walker, like Shannon, raises the concern that “a vision of rights can become so narrow and tied to a specific creed or faith that it ceases to advance human rights in any meaningful way,” which is exactly why so many of us have responded to the current direction of the State Department’s human rights orientation with alarm. This is also very much how liberal and secular human rights organizations have framed their opposition to conservative and evangelical human rights language since the 1970s.

Walker closes her review with a series of compelling questions. I would be especially interested to explore how Global South evangelicals “sought to harness human rights for their own political ends” and to see works on the history of religion and human rights that encompass the full spectrum of political orientations and faith traditions.
VARIED ON A THEME

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There is some exciting new work on the former topic, but there are, as all of the reviewers noted, still many avenues for future research.⁹

Again, I extend my great thanks to all of the reviewers for their kind and thoughtful engagement with my book!

Notes:
4. The Institute on Religion and Democracy was mostly composed of politically conservative mainline Protestants in its early days, but it had prominent Catholics on the board as well; Nina Shea, also Catholic, was a key member and leader with Puebla as well as Freedom House.
6. Also, this is not to say that this evidence is not out there, it just is not something I saw in evangelical writing about human rights. I also did not see much evidence of evangelical engagement with Mormons in the period of time under study. However, it is likely there has been more in the past two decades and probable that there is more now, as Mormons have gained increasing visibility and influence in civic life.
9. Kirkpatrick’s *A Gospel for the Poor* comes immediately to mind as an example of how evangelicals in the Global South approached and adopted human rights as a concept.

In the next issue of Passport

Special issue on the jobs crisis in academia, with guest editors Daniel Bessner and Michael Brenes

...and much more
Historians and political scientists have agreed that President Woodrow Wilson sought to create a new world order of liberal internationalism during the peacemaking after World War I but failed in this mission. We have identified his global vision with the Anglo-American political tradition of liberalism and view him as its preeminent advocate. We have also generally acknowledged that the legacy of Wilsonianism continued to influence U.S. foreign policy and, consequently, world history for the next century. Beyond this consensus, however, we have disagreed. Scholars who have studied Wilson and his role in international politics have given various reasons for his failed presidential leadership. Some blame him and the inherent limitations of his ideas. Others criticize the Europeans for adhering to the old diplomacy of military alliances and a balance of power in international relations or suggest that Wilson’s vision of a new world order was too far ahead of its time. We have also given various interpretations of his ideas for global reform after World War I and of whether later generations adhered to his legacy or deviated from it with their own questionable definitions of Wilsonianism.

Historian Timothy Snyder, in The Road to Unfreedom (2018), offers a framework for understanding the history of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries that will help to reevaluate Wilson and Wilsonianism. He observes that two kinds of politics competed against each other, neither of which has provided an authentic history. One is the politics of inevitability; the other is the politics of eternity. He explains that “Americans and Europeans were guided through the new century by a tale about the end of history, by what I will call the politics of inevitability. We have a sense that the future is just more of the present, that the laws of progress are known, that there are no alternatives, and therefore nothing really needs to be done. In the American capitalist version of this story, nature brought the market, which brought democracy, which brought happiness. In the European version, history brought the nation, which learned from war that peace was good, and hence chose integration and prosperity.”

History, however, moved in different directions, increasingly leaving some in Europe and then the United States to adopt the alternative. Snyder observes that the collapse of the politics of inevitability ushers in another experience of time: the politics of eternity. Whereas inevitability promises a better future for everyone, eternity places one nation at the center of a cyclical story of victimhood. Time is no longer a line into the future, but a circle that endlessly returns to the same threats from the past. Within inevitability, no one is responsible because we all know that the enemy is coming no matter what we do. Eternity politicians spread the conviction that government cannot aid society as a whole, but can only guard against threats.

Both of these kinds of politics affirm and depend on the acceptance of false understandings of history. Snyder encourages us to reject both the politics of inevitability and the politics of eternity in favor of the politics of responsibility. In place of their false narratives, we should confront our history. “Inevitability and eternity translate facts into narratives,” he writes.

Those swayed by inevitability see every fact as a blip that does not alter the overall story of progress; those who shift to eternity classify every new event as just one more instance of a timeless threat. Each masquerades as history; each does away with history. Inevitability politicians teach that the specifics of the past are irrelevant, since anything that happens is just grist for the mill of progress. Eternity politicians leap from one moment to another, over decades or centuries, to build a myth of innocence and danger. They imagine cycles of threat in the past, creating an imagined pattern that they realize in the present by producing artificial crises and daily drama.

Snyder warns that the study of history is not easy, but it is essential if we are to escape the false narratives of inevitability and eternity. “To think historically is to accept that the unfamiliar might be significant, and to work to make the unfamiliar the familiar.” He explains that “the only thing that stands between inevitability and eternity is history, as considered and lived by individuals. If we grasp eternity and inevitability as ideas within our own history, we might see what has happened to us and what we might do about it. . . . The virtue of individualism becomes visible in the throes of our moment, but it will abide only if we see history and ourselves within it, and accept our share of responsibility.”

Snyder believes that responsible individuals need to create their own history, which is essential to freedom. “To think historically is to see the limits of structures, the spaces of indeterminacy, the possibilities for freedom.” He concludes by saying that “if we see history as it is, we see our places in it, what we might change, and what we might do better. We halt our thoughtless journey from inevitability to eternity, and exit the road to unfreedom. We begin a politics of responsibility.”

Political scientist John J. Mearsheimer is in substantial agreement with Snyder. In The Great Delusion (2018), he contrasts “liberal dreams and international realities,” and he analyzes how liberalism, nationalism, and realism have
interacted to influence international relations. He views political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s idea of the “end of history” as a prime example of America’s progressive liberalism in the post-Cold War era.

Both Snyder and Mearsheimer see Fukuyama’s argument as deeply flawed and dangerous. In *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), Fukuyama asserts that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the global triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism. The West, and particularly the United States, had won. Wilson’s vision of a new world order had been fulfilled, marking the culmination of what Snyder would call the politics of inevitability and Mearsheimer would describe as America’s pursuit of liberal hegemony.

Fukuyama does say “that there will be setbacks and disappointments in the process of democratization” and that “not every market economy will prosper,” but he stresses that setbacks “should not detract us from the larger pattern that is emerging in world history.” He claims that the “choices that countries face in determining how they will organize themselves politically and economically [have] been diminishing over time.” Although history has witnessed various regimes in the past, he rejoices that “the only form of government that has survived intact to the end of the twentieth century has been liberal democracy.” In other words, the progressive Wilsonian promise had been realized. Liberalism had achieved its inevitable triumph in world history.

Mearsheimer argues, in opposition to Fukuyama, that realism offers a much better guide to international relations than liberalism. Although he affirms liberal values within the United States and other nations, he warns that leaders in liberal democratic states might be tempted to seek to impose their own presumably universal norms on other countries, by military force if necessary. “The principal source of the problem,” he observes, “is that liberalism has an activist mentality woven into its core. The belief that all humans have a set of inalienable rights, and that protecting these rights should override other concerns, creates a powerful incentive for liberal states to intervene when other countries—as they do on a regular basis—violate their citizens’ rights. . . . This logic pushes liberal states to favor using force to turn autocracies into liberal democracies, not only because doing so would ensure that individual rights are never again trampled in those countries, but also because they believe liberal democracies never fight wars with each other.”

Instead of protecting universal human rights and promoting democratic governance, Mearsheimer notes, liberal interventions during the post-Cold War era resulted in illiberal outcomes and produced more wars, not perpetual peace. This use of military force, rather than making the world more democratic, jeopardized freedom and civil rights in the United States. It failed both abroad and at home. “In short,” he concludes, “liberalism is a fool’s guide for powerful states operating on the world stage. It would make eminently good sense for the United States to abandon liberal hegemony, which has served it so poorly, and pursue a more restrained policy abroad. In practice that means American policymakers should embrace realism.”

Political scientist Stephen M. Walt makes a similar critique of America’s post-Cold War “liberal hegemony” in *The Hell of Good Intentions* (2018). Despite the liberal promise of the “evangelical impulse” in U.S. foreign policy—from Wilson’s call to make the world “safe for democracy” to Fukuyama’s idea of the “end of history”—he notes that “efforts to spread U.S. values have not been nearly as effective as its proponents maintain. If anything, overzealous efforts to export America’s ideals have unwittingly subverted them at home and abroad, and the exuberant faith in the superiority of American institutions that prevailed at the end of the Cold War had given way to dark doubts about these same institutions by 2016.” In other words, the false promise of the politics of inevitability helped usher in the politics of eternity.

As a realist, Mearsheimer emphasizes the importance of focusing on the balance of power in international politics. He observes that all states seek to ensure their survival by gaining and preserving their relative power in the world. Along with other liberal democracies, the United States operates in this realistic way despite its leaders’ use of liberal rhetoric to justify their behavior.

As a realist, Mearsheimer emphasizes the importance of focusing on the balance of power in international politics. He observes that all states seek to ensure their survival by gaining and preserving their relative power in the world. Along with other liberal democracies, the United States operates in this realistic way despite its leaders’ use of liberal rhetoric to justify their behavior.
good description of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s diplomacy and values, but most realists never advocated the sort of amoral or immoral statecraft he practiced. Unlike him, classical realists such as theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, journalist Walter Lippmann, diplomat-historian George F. Kennan, and political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau did not worship power, although they emphasized its centrality in international politics. Not devoid of ethics, their versions of realism are substantially different from the characterizations of it by more recent non-realist theorists.14 Political scientists and historians who have criticized realism in recent years have all too often overlooked its ethical foundations. They would probably be surprised to know that during the postwar occupation of Japan, Norman A. Graebner taught educational courses on American democracy to Japanese adults—at their request. He clearly understood the values of liberal democracy, and in this way, he was promoting democracy abroad. But as a realist historian, he recognized the importance of restraint in seeking to impose it on other countries by military force.15

As one of Graebner’s students, I owe much to him and to classical realists. The distortion of the definition of realism by non-realist theorists has enabled them to reaffirm the Wilsonian legacy of liberal internationalism without directly confronting the realist critique by him or others, including myself.16 I have benefited from what I learned from classical realists, and especially from Graebner; yet my interpretations of Wilson and Wilsonianism differ from theirs in fundamental ways. I emphasized the profound influence of Wilson’s Christian religion and white racism on his worldview and, consequently, on his diplomacy before most realists (and other scholars) did. Fortunately, historians and political scientists have increasingly recognized these religious and racial factors in the president’s foreign policy and legacy.17

More than most political scientists, Tony Smith has examined in depth Wilson’s ideas and statecraft and the legacy of Wilsonianism. He offers mostly favorable interpretations of the president and of his enduring vision of a new world order. In America’s Mission (1994), Smith rejoices that by the end of the Cold War there was a bipartisan consensus in the United States regarding “the essential tenets of liberal democratic internationalism, or what might be called Wilsonianism: the conviction that American national interests could best be pursued by promoting democracy worldwide.” He goes on to explore “the origins and the consequences of the central ambition of American foreign policy during the twentieth century: in Woodrow Wilson’s words, ‘to make the world safe for democracy.’” By pursuing this mission, he thinks, the United States has played a major role in shaping international history.18

Smith criticizes realism, which he regards as “the dominant school of international relations theory,” for underestimating the contribution that America’s promotion of liberal internationalism made to U.S. interests in the world. Yet he affirms the realist emphasis on restraint in the use of military force, wanting to combine this prudent advice with the Wilsonian approach to international relations. “Liberal democratic internationalists should understand that democracy cannot be foisted on a world that is unready for it,” he writes, “just as realists should grasp that the Wilsonian effort to provide stable, modern, democratic government to foreign peoples may well serve American security.”19

In the end, Smith cautions against either excessive optimism or excessive pessimism about the Wilsonian promise of a new world order. “Given the vital American security interests served by the expansion of democracy worldwide, Wilsonianism will continue to serve as a principal guide for policy. Yet given the established character of other peoples and the obvious limits on American power, Wilsonianism will not everywhere be a relevant framework for action.”20 Unlike Francis Fukuyama, Smith does not believe that the world has reached the “end of history,” but he nevertheless thinks it is moving progressively in the right direction, thanks to the Wilsonian legacy in U.S. foreign policy.

What Smith heralds as the American promise of liberal democratic internationalism during the 1990s turned into Washington’s bid for world supremacy after 9/11. He regrets his own contribution to this betrayal of Wilson’s legacy. The bipartisan consensus in favor of protecting human rights and promoting democracy abroad, which he had touted, provided some intellectual legitimacy for the Bush Doctrine, which justified America’s military intervention in Iraq in 2003. Combining the rhetoric of liberals with the agenda of neconservatives, President George W. Bush won their support for his imperial war. He transformed Wilsonianism into a bid for global hegemony.21

“The definition of megalomania well suits the Bush Doctrine,” Smith laments. “Its delusion of omnipotence rested on its belief that America enjoyed both military primacy and a blueprint for world order thanks to its global experiences fostering ‘free market democracies.’”22 And because a brutal war was launched on the terms of this doctrine, a conflict that has benefited no one involved in it and is far from ended, the stated grounds for war have shown themselves to be pathological as well.” Smith had not anticipated his own complicity in this transformation of Wilsonianism.22

Contrary to the realists’ advice, Bush’s Iraq war of “liberal imperialism” required the abandonment of restraint in the use of military force. Bush was aided by liberals who had justified military intervention to protect human rights and promote democracy abroad. “Realism, then, was the opponent the liberals of the 1990s set out to slay.” Non-realist theorists succeeded at that task, at least in their own judgment, but with what Smith sees as a tragic end for Wilson’s legacy. Consequently, “a progressive ideology born of an anti-imperialist concern to spread liberal democracy so as to enhance the prospects of ‘perpetual peace’ had joined forces with an imperialist enterprise that made perpetual war more likely. Just as fascism and communism had met their historical limits, so now too has liberal democratic internationalism.” Becoming pro-war hawks, many liberals had made, as Smith puts it in the title of his book on the Bush Doctrine, A Pact with the Devil (2007).23

Timothy Snyder would later explain this historic transition: progressive advocates of the politics of inevitability facilitated the transition to the politics of eternity. By offering a false Wilsonian promise to make the world safe for democracy, they actually helped move the United States down the road to unfreedom. Wilson had done the same thing during World War I. While promising to save Western civilization and liberal democracy, he sought political unity at home by repressing the civil liberties of dissenters, coercing American citizens in other ways to support the war, and denying racial democracy to African Americans. His illiberal politics culminated in the postwar Red Scare.24

Despite the tragic outcome of Bush’s war and the resulting crisis of liberal democratic internationalism, Smith did not lose his faith in Wilsonianism as he defines it. In Why Wilson Matters (2017), he calls for the restoration of “liberal realism” or “realistic liberalism” in U.S. foreign policy. He echoes the plea of Francis Fukuyama, who
belatedly acknowledges the folly of the Bush Doctrine and suggests that “what we need . . . is a more realistic Wilsonianism that matches means to ends in dealing with other societies.”

Smith wants to revive what he calls “Wilson's Wilsonianism.” He downplays the influence of the president's Christian religion on his global mission, which he sees as far less of a moral crusade than the neo-Wilsonianism of the recent past and far more prudent in practice. He recognizes that Wilson favored “progressive imperialism” through the use of military force to fulfill the White Man's Burden, but he sees that as more benign than Bush's “liberal imperialism.” “The problem with the neo-Wilsonians,” Smith argues, is that they had taken on a universal mission that knew no boundaries. Lacking restraint, their self-righteous imperialism had launched a clash of civilizations, whose eventual intensity they then attributed not to their own actions but to the character of their adversaries, whose opposition to liberal values and institutions only served to strengthen their conviction that pushing the liberal agenda was the only way to move forward.

In Smith's view, Wilson did not make that mistake. “Like the neo-Wilsonians, Wilson was an idealist whose sense of history led him to work for progressive change. But unlike his intellectual great-grandchildren, he was a realist as well, for he had learned from history, and his own efforts to influence it, of the difficulties inherent in democratic nation- and state-building.” Smith thus seeks to revive Wilson's liberal internationalism.

In The Crisis of American Foreign Policy (2009), four distinguished scholars, including Smith, analyze Wilsonianism in the twenty-first century at the end of Bush's presidency. They disagree about whether Bush's failure resulted from adherence to or a departure from the Wilsonian tradition, and they differ about its true character. In the introduction to the volume, political scientist G. John Ikenberry notes that “Woodrow Wilson's vision embodied impulses toward both liberal internationalism and liberal imperialism (or liberal interventionism), an awkward and problematic duality that persists today within the liberal tradition.” Thus, he observes, “the debate is not simply the question of whether Bush is a Wilsonian—it is about the future of liberal internationalism.”

Ikenberry thought that liberal internationalism had a future if understood correctly, so he went on to give a more complete answer in Liberal Leviathan (2011). There he explains that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had updated Wilson's vision and had thereby enabled the United States to become a global hegemon after World War II. “Defined in terms of the provision of security, wealth creation, and social advancement, this liberal hegemonic order has been, arguably at least, the most successful order in world history,” he writes. “Like Wilson's version, it would be a one-world system in which the major powers would cooperate to enforce the peace. . . . The ultimate outcome was more Western-centered, multilayered, and deeply institutionalized than originally anticipated, and it brought the United States into direct political and economic management of the system. . . . The updated Wilsonian vision of liberal order turned into true liberal hegemonic order.”

As Ikenberry argues in After Victory (2001), this new world order after World War II depended on adding realism to liberalism. In this comparative study of peacemaking in 1815, 1919, 1945, and 1989, he emphasizes the importance of both traditions in international politics. Enduring peace required a postwar strategic balance among the victorious and defeated great powers. Unfortunately, Wilson's peacemaking after World War I eschewed a balance of power and military alliances and thus contrasted negatively with the more successful diplomacy after the Napoleonic Wars, World War II, and the Cold War. Ikenberry attributes the president's failure to his lack of realism. By avoiding this error, later generations of American policymakers, along with Europeans, were able to create a peaceful world order of liberal internationalism.

In his chapter in The Crisis of American Foreign Policy, historian Thomas J. Knock makes it clear that he does not think Wilson's successors in the White House implemented his liberal vision of a new world order in any way. While Ikenberry sees Bush's foreign policy after 9/11 as the negative side of Wilsonianism, Knock regards the conservative Bush as not at all like the progressive Wilson. In To End All Wars (1992), he argues that Wilson originated his vision of “progressive internationalism” during World War I and created a broad coalition of liberals and socialists to support it. “The ultimate objective of Wilson and the progressive internationalists was a lasting peace that would accommodate change and advance democratic institutions and social and economic justice; and a just peace was dependent on the synchronous proliferation of political democracy and social and economic justice around the world.”

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Wilson succeeded in writing his vision into the Covenant for the League of Nations, but he failed to secure the U.S. Senate's approval of the Versailles Treaty that included it. Wilson's quest for a new world order thus ended without an enduring legacy. In the current crisis of American foreign policy, he sees the advice set forth by Robert S. McNamara and James Blight in Wilson's Ghost (2001) as the way to construct an authentic Wilsonian legacy.

The former secretary of defense and the political scientist also emphasize multilateralism. They think Wilson's ghost—like Jacob Marley's in Charles Dickens's A Christmas Carol—was calling out to them with a message about reducing the risk of conflict, killing, and catastrophe in the twenty-first century. Rather than being wary of anyone who sees ghosts, Knock welcomes their advice for a new world order. “With respect to disarmament, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution, Wilson’s Ghost remains the only study of its kind, to date, devoted exclusively to exploring the relevance of authentic Wilsonian internationalism for the twenty-first century.” He recommends the revival of “what one might call ‘Wilsonian Wilsonianism.’”

Unlike Knock, Tony Smith emphasizes the similarities between Bush's and Wilson's foreign policies. In his chapter of The Crisis of American Foreign Policy, he blames contemporary Wilsonians for contributing to the Bush Doctrine, which justified American imperialism in the Middle East. Liberal internationalists (including Smith himself) had helped lay the intellectual foundation for Bush's conservative foreign policy. Bush coopted their liberal ideas of democratic peace theory and humanitarian intervention in his rationale for the global war on terrorism after 9/11. “Here was the quintessential expression of the Wilsonian dream: that war could be replaced by peace if the peoples of the world came to agreement on how rightly to govern themselves.”

Unfortunately, however, the Iraq war's tragic consequences discredited Wilsonianism. “Because many leading Democratic intellectuals became as committed to the invasion of Iraq as the neoconservatives ever were, the
In Wilson's words, both domestic and international politics required "common counsel" to achieve progress. "More than anything except the events of the Great War itself," Throntveit observes, "this strain of pragmatist internationalism determined the course of Wilson's presidency, dovetailing with his domestic thinking, clarifying the lessons of his early diplomacy, and providing both a theoretical underpinning and an influential constituency to support his own burgeoning internationalism."38

Throntveit recognizes that Wilson failed to create his new world order after World War I, yet he still believes the president had promoted the right vision. "This was the contribution of the pragmatist progressives to twentieth-century internationalism: the notion that the old model of sovereignty was deadly inefficient, and even uncertain experiments in pooling sovereignty were preferable." The key to overcoming the dangers of nationalism was a new diplomacy of international common counsel. "Throughout 1918," Throntveit explains, "Wilson and his close advisers expanded the Fourteen Points into a pragmatist program for global governance, one just radical enough to be practical—or at least to seem so to tens of millions worldwide who had borne the burden of nationalist rivalry and political opposition far too long." It would require the partial surrender of national sovereignty. "The integrity of the League, and the future peace of the United States, demanded that the country's government and people respect the common counsel of the world."39

Unfortunately, in Throntveit's view, Wilson did not practice this kind of diplomacy during the peacemaking in 1919. Even more unfortunate was the "absolutist turn" he took at home, telling the Senate that the Versailles Treaty "undermines the government and people respect the common counsel of the world."40 Refusing to compromise with Republican senators, he sacrificed the promise of pragmatic Wilsonianism, as Throntveit understands it.

But if the president did not engage in common counsel during the peacemaking after World War I, did he ever really adopt the pragmatist ideas that Throntveit attributes to his internationalism? Power Without Victory does not give a convincing answer to this question. Wilson's supposed abandonment of pragmatism during the peacemaking was not the only time he failed to keep his apparent promises. He was skillful at convincing others that he accepted their ideas—including American peace activists seeking to end the war, African Americans seeking racial democracy in Jim Crow America, and anticolonial nationalists seeking self-determination in the non-Western world—until they were disillusioned by his practices.41

Historians and political scientists have recognized that the world has not reached the "end of history" during the past century. Most of us have not shared Wilson's belief in the politics of inevitability. Viewing contingency in history, we acknowledged the difficulty of implementing Wilsonianism, however understood, in international politics. In view of Wilson's inability to create a new antiwar movement has been weak and the appeal of the kind of thinking one finds in the Bush Doctrine seems likely to endure," writes Smith. "Viewed from this perspective, Wilsonianism is in crisis—the dimension of the defeat in Iraq makes any other conclusion impossible to sustain. Yet given its resonance with American interests and values, its tenets may well endure in modified form to guide this country in world affairs."34

Political scientist Anne-Marie Slaughter sharply disagrees with Smith and denounces him for apparently losing faith in Wilsonianism. In her chapter in The Crisis of American Foreign Policy, she charges that he incorrectly interpreted and thus falsely blamed Wilson's legacy for contributing to Bush's foreign policy. "In fact," she asserts, "liberal internationalism today, true to its Wilsonian origins, differs from the Bush Doctrine on multiple dimensions." Still looking forward to "a genuinely Wilsonian moment," she remains hopeful about finding liberal democratic solutions for the problems in international politics. "Wilsonianism, properly adapted and updated, offers a far better guide to meeting these challenges in the twenty-first century." She contrasts Wilson's multilateralism with Bush's unilateralism. She also defends democratic peace theorists and advocates of humanitarian intervention, denying that they were at all responsible for Bush's Iraq war. A liberal hawk herself, Slaughter does admit some errors in judgment. "Smith is right to say that many strong supporters of the responsibility to protect, including me, saw Saddam Hussein through the lens of his horrific human rights violations, a view that in turn may have led us to be more willing to believe that he had nuclear or biological weapons without carefully scrutinizing the available evidence. We were wrong." Slaughter had succumbed to the temptation that John Mearsheimer identified at the core of liberalism. Yet she insists that liberal internationalists like herself who adhered to the Wilsonian tradition were not responsible for contributing to Bush's military crusade in the Middle East. "Liberal internationalists do believe in American leadership, but not in supremacy or hegemony," she writes. "We must find ways to work together to achieve Wilson's vision: a world made safe for democracy, prosperity, knowledge, beauty, and human flourishing."36

Historian Trygve Throntveit offers a unique perspective on America's internationalist experiment after World War I in Power Without Victory (2017). He claims that "Wilson was not a 'Wilsonian,' as that term has come to be understood. He did not seek to stamp American-style democracy on other peoples. Rather, he had something simultaneously more radical and more practical in mind: the gradual development of a global system of governance to maintain justice and facilitate peaceful change." Rejecting realism as a false interpretation of or guide to international relations, Throntveit argues that Wilson derived his plan for the League of Nations from American pragmatism. Even liberal internationalists who supported him often failed to grasp his vision of "the possibility of a supranational authority bringing order to the interstate system" to overcome international anarchy. "Wilson's pragmatist League was never tested; we know only that a very different League did fail and that its very different successor is greatly impaired by the recalcitrance of its strongest members." What later generations called Wilsonianism did not match his radical, yet practical, vision for a new world order.37

Throntveit traces Wilson's ideas to the philosopher William James, whose pragmatism influenced liberal progressives in the early twentieth century. A pragmatic style of politics allowed for historical contingency. Thus, he notes, "true democracy, as James understood it, implies a contingent kind of progress, its standards subject to revision and achieved through trial and error." Pragmatists in the Jamesian tradition applied this insight to international relations during World War I. In Wilson's words, both domestic and international politics required "common counsel" to achieve progress. "More than anything except the events of the Great War itself," Slaughter observes, "this strain of pragmatist internationalism determined the course of Wilson's presidency, dovetailing with his domestic thinking, clarifying the lessons of his early diplomacy, and providing both a theoretical underpinning and an influential constituency to support his own burgeoning internationalism."38
world order in the peacemaking after World War I, some scholars developed and others later affirmed realism as an alternative to his liberal internationalism. Even some liberal internationalists incorporated realist insights into their interpretations.

The scholars who have most admired Wilson generally admitted that he was at least partly responsible for his own failure. Yet they continued to hold out the hope that his original vision of Wilsonianism might be revived as a guide to international relations in place of the neo-Wilsonianism that so obviously contributed to catastrophic consequences in the early twenty-first century. Unfortunately, ideas associated with his legacy helped the Bush Doctrine justify the unwinnable wars that continued throughout the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.

The failure of military intervention to promote human rights and liberal democracy in the Middle East also undermined the progressive belief in the politics of inevitability and helped usher in the politics of eternity, seen most clearly in Donald J. Trump's presidency. Imperial crusades abroad produced illiberal outcomes at home that threatened freedom and democracy in the United States. Let us hope that we can adopt the politics of responsibility. Doing so will require us to confront our history and to avoid the false promise of a new world order, whether identified with Wilson's Wilsonianism or some other ideology.

Notes:
1. Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York, 2018), 7.
2. Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 8.
3. Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 8–9.
4. Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 19, 35.
5. Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 112, 281.
8. Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 19.
9. Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 20.
31. Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992), 57.
32. Ikenberry et al., Crisis of American Foreign Policy, 28, 31.
33. Ikenberry et al., Crisis of American Foreign Policy, 54–55.
34. Ikenberry et al., Crisis of American Foreign Policy, 57.
35. Ikenberry et al., Crisis of American Foreign Policy, 91–92.
36. Ikenberry et al., Crisis of American Foreign Policy, 109, 111, 117.
38. Throntveit, Power Without Victory, 31, 125.
40. Throntveit, Power Without Victory, 288.
The Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association invites submissions for the 2021 Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award.

The prize honors Tonous Hanna and Warda Paulis, who immigrated to the United States from Syria in 1900, married in 1906, and became U.S. citizens along with their children in 1919. Tony and Warda Johns, as they became known, emphasized the importance of education, hard work, and philanthropy to their children and grandchildren, and had a deep and abiding love for their adopted country and its history. These values—shared by so many other immigrants to the United States—profoundly shaped the lives of their descendants. In celebration of these ideals and in recognition of Tony and Warda’s continuing influence on their family, the Johns family created this endowment in the hope that Tony and Warda’s legacy will be felt and appreciated by the PCB-AHA community and that the award will encourage and recognize excellent historical scholarship.

The Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award will recognize the outstanding book (monograph or edited volume) in the history of U.S. foreign relations, immigration history, or military history by an author or editor residing in the PCB-AHA membership region.

Copies of books submitted for consideration for the award should be sent directly to each of the three members of the prize committee by February 15, 2021. More information is available at https://www.pcbaha.org/tonousandwardajohnsfamilybookaward.

Questions about the award or inquiries regarding donations to the endowment should be directed to Michael Green, PCB-AHA executive director, at michael.green@unlv.edu.

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association was organized in 1903 to serve members of the American Historical Association living in the western United States and the western provinces of Canada. With over 4000 members, it is one of the largest professional historical organizations in the United States.
A Review of Robert B. Zoellick, America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

George Herring

A merica in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy was written by a practitioner of U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy, most likely with current events in mind and possibly with other practitioners as well as general readers as the intended audience.

Author Robert Zoellick in many ways epitomizes the foreign policy “establishment” that originated with Elihu Root, a statesman he much admires. He has a Harvard law degree and a degree from the Kennedy School. He served in the Reagan administration and under both Bushes. His career focus has been on economic matters, and from 2007–2012 he was president of the World Bank. He is a staunch advocate of free trade, which, from Henry Clay to NAFTA and beyond, he zealously promotes in these pages. He was a signer of the Project for the New American Century, a 1993 neoconservative manifesto. He has served on the board of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Aspen Institute Study Group.

America in the World barely scratches the surface of the vast literature now available in our field. Zoellick relies mainly on secondary sources. His rendering of the particular topic he is writing about usually draws on one or two books, mainly biographies of individuals or studies of specific events or issues. He cites but one article from Diplomatic History, and it was written by Francis Bator, an adviser to President Lyndon Johnson. He does not engage the issues we historians have wrestled with, nor does he acknowledge the new approaches to the field pioneered in recent years.

I don’t envy anyone bold (or foolish) enough to take on a project of this magnitude. Zoellick makes it manageable by being selective in whom and what he writes about. This is not a comprehensive history, as the title might suggest. (It won’t work in the classroom as a substitute for From Colony to Superpower!) There is little discussion of the Mexican-American War, for example, and no mention of the contemporaneous Oregon crisis. The author omits altogether the post-Civil War Gilded Age in which—awkwardly, to be sure—the United States began to embrace the status of world power. There is scant discussion of the 1898 conflict with Spain or the Philippine War that sprang from it. Zoellick assesses critically and at some length Woodrow Wilson’s management of U.S. neutrality from 1914 to 1917 and America’s eventual entry into World War I, but he does little with the Versailles Treaty or Wilson’s brainchild, the League of Nations. Amazingly, he devotes little attention to World War II. For all practical purposes, the book ends in 1991, with but ten pages devoted to the twenty-first century.

What Zoellick seeks to do—and it produces some interesting results—is to link diplomats and important political figures with the foreign policy principles that guided them and the methods they used in ways that might be instructive for today. He uses Alexander Hamilton, for example, to demonstrate the essentiality of national economic strength for diplomatic success. He looks to rivals and subsequent partners John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay for their positions on free trade and to Adams the hardnosed realist for his eloquent warning against involvement in crusades for liberty in Latin America and Greece. Abraham Lincoln and William H. Seward get high marks for their practical idealism in the Civil War, especially for sticking to their guiding principle that the nation could wage only one war at a time. Zoellick also seeks to refurbish the reputation of Secretary of State John Hay for the Open Door policy that had little impact in China at the time, he admits, but became a key element of America’s global policies.

The list of twentieth-century figures deemed worthy of emulation (and there are more Republicans than Democrats) is predictable, with some notable exceptions. Theodore Roosevelt wins plaudits for the skillful diplomacy that helped end the Russo-Japanese War and earned him a Nobel Peace Prize. By contrast, Zoellick criticizes Woodrow Wilson’s failure to mediate an end to World War I, a result, he concludes, of Wilson’s deficiencies in the “practical work of the politics of diplomacy.” 

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In the eyes of many historians, FDR ranks among the best of America’s twentieth-century diplomats for his savvy in leading a reluctant nation into the world conflagration, and especially for his management of the Grand Alliance. Zoellick dismisses Roosevelt by all but ignoring him, praising his alliance diplomacy in a few words but quickly adding that he had “only vague plans for the peace” and claiming that he “believed that his personal charm could overcome most difficulties,” an old chestnut not taken seriously by historians (241).

Not surprisingly, Zoellick lauds the Truman administration’s response to the post-World War II conflict with the Soviet Union. Harry Truman and his advisers, including, perhaps surprisingly, Houston cotton merchant (and free trader!) Will Clayton, get high marks for creating the network of economic and political commitments that
made up the postwar alliance system. But the author highlights lesser-known figures such as Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Michigan Republican and former isolationist, whose conversion to Cold War internationalism is representative of the shift in the country at large and who played a key role in founding the United Nations and gaining congressional approval of the Marshall Plan and NATO. Even more intriguing is the essay on scientist Vannevar Bush, whose work in this era highlights the linkage between government and an emerging scientific community in pursuit of national power—and, Zoellick claims—freedom. Bush, in his words, was the “scientific godfather for an American diplomacy that leverages perpetual technological change” (314). Strangely, the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy earns no mention at all. Focusing on the Berlin-Cuba crises of 1961–1963, the author praises John F. Kennedy’s skill as a crisis manager, although he ascribes to this president what he calls a typically American overeagerness for a settlement. Predictably, Lyndon Johnson is sharply criticized for his escalation of the Vietnam War in 1964–1965, a policy, the author rightly claims, that was driven more by domestic politics than by grand strategy. He is especially critical of national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, who, instead of presenting the president a range of options, “sat in the cockpit of a plane on autopilot toward war.” (362)

Among the more interesting chapters—and the most revealing of the author’s point of view—are those dealing with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and with Ronald Reagan. Zoellick seems awed by “Dr. Kissinger,” as he calls the scholar-diplomat upon first introducing him. (48) His chapter focuses on the historic opening to China, an event Nixon himself likened to “going to the moon.” (363) The author lauds this president as a diplomatic risk-taker who “played for large diplomatic stakes” and hails both men as “master diplomatic craftsmen.” (367-369) He praises their skill in managing the opening to China, especially Kissinger’s verbal wizardry in writing his way around the potentially explosive Taiwan issue. Their success in China helped the United States regain the initiative in world affairs and seal détente with the USSR.

While hailing the two men’s success in China, Zoellick also takes issue with their “realist” approach to foreign policy. He labels them “masters of realpolitik” and admits that their China policy helped “graft realpolitik on the American tree.” (369) But by viewing the world through the prism of power politics, he insists, they were blinded to the potency of America’s ideals and to the nation’s uncanny ability to bounce back from failure and defeat. Hence, in seeking détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China, they made more concessions than they need have.

Zoellick overstates Nixon’s and more especially Kissinger’s commitment to a realist foreign policy and, beyond China, their skill as diplomats. The American Bismarck, as he has been called, was no more than an “episodic” and “occasional” realist, according to political scientist Michael Desch. His urge to be close to power while he was in academia drove him to take foreign policy positions at odds with realist principles. Once in power, he often departed from realist diplomacy. Desch labels Kissinger a “macht politician” who sought to gain as much power as possible and use it as often as he could.1 His mishandling of the Vietnam negotiations certainly did not reflect a realpolitik approach; nor did the administration’s misbegotten intervention in Chile, which the author does not mention. In neither of these cases was realism or skill much in evidence.

Casting Nixon and Kissinger as “realists” makes them the perfect foil for the author’s hero, Ronald Reagan. The former actor was, in Zoellick’s words, a “revivalist” who reinvigorated a nation supposedly in decline and reinforced its foreign policy with the ideals of freedom and democracy. (390) Reagan rejected Nixon and Kissinger’s acquiescence in détente with the USSR. Upon taking office, he set out to destabilize the Soviet system. He aimed not just to win the Cold War but to convert the enemy to his own ideology. He seized the moral high ground for the United States with his emphasis on free markets and personal freedom, unleashed the nation’s economic potential, and built up its military strength. He was also a skillful politician, a “master of setting policy directions and mobilizing support” as well as a practical man, a shrewd patient negotiator, firmly committed to achieving his major goals. (400) Zoellick edges close to, if he does not fully embrace, the triumphalist view that Reagan’s hard line anti-communist rhetoric and military buildup forced concessions from the Soviet Union and ultimately brought about its downfall. Reagan alone among all the people discussed in the book seems to meet the author’s criteria for success, as he is a perfect blend of idealism and pragmatism.

Here, as elsewhere, the highly selective approach to who and what is discussed leaves one-dimensional impressions. Reagan’s anti-Soviet bluster, along with his massive military buildup, in fact came close to triggering a nuclear war in 1983, a frightening reality that helped moderate his own views toward the “Evil Empire.” His profound fear of nuclear war and growing empathy with Russia and the Russians drove him toward negotiations. Fortuitously, he found in Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev a kindred spirit in terms of negotiations on nuclear weaponry. But if Reagan seized the moment in relations with the USSR, his foreign policy elsewhere was a mess. The author concedes that his administration “stumbled badly” in the Middle East. The same could be said for its bungling interventionism in Central America and for the foolhardy imbroglio that was Iran-Contra, a venture that might have gotten the president impeached.

America in the World has its merits. It is nicely put together and quite readable. It can enlighten non-specialist readers on this nation’s rich tradition in foreign policy and diplomacy, its remarkable successes in those areas and their centrality to its survival in the early years and its ultimate emergence as the global power. From Hamilton to Reagan, the book acquaints readers with some of the giants in American diplomatic history and highlights the importance of lesser known persons such as Elihu Root, Cordell Hull, and Vannevar Bush. It also identifies some of the basic principles that have guided the United States in world affairs, especially the compulsions of commerce and the idea of a special American mission. Perhaps most important, it seeks to learn from history and reminds us of the importance of knowing our history to understand and address the problems that confront us today.

See from the perspective of a specialist who has grappled with similar challenges, the book also has its flaws. In diplomacy, as in life, we can learn as much from failures as from success, but there is scant mention of failure in the pages of this generally upbeat book. Zoellick briefly analyzes the decisions for going to war in Vietnam, but he says little about the war itself or its impact in the United States and Vietnam. He gently chides the George W. Bush administration for its lack of skepticism regarding the intelligence on Iraq’s nuclear weapon program and for its slapdash planning for the post-invasion occupation. But
he says nothing about the decision for war itself and its disastrous consequences for Iraq, the Middle East, and the United States.

The history in places seems at least a tad facile, its conclusions sometimes drawn on the basis of sparse evidence and little historical context. Teddy Roosevelt and Charles Evans Hughes deserve credit for their diplomatic successes, to be sure. But they had the advantage of dealing with nations weary of war. Wilson is scored for his lack of practical skills, but the task Zoellick would have had him accomplish was likely beyond the reach of the most brilliant diplomatist. There are some striking omissions. Diplomats like Townsend Harris and Dwight Morrow, who achieved major successes in Japan and Mexico, respectively, by cultivating a studied empathy for the people they were dealing with and who could teach us much about the art of diplomacy, do not appear in these pages.

Most important, the author’s selective choice of persons and topics to write about gives a benign, even anodyne cast to his assessment of American diplomacy and foreign policy. The words “empire” and “imperialism,” at least as they apply to the United States, will not be found in the book. William Appleman Williams, who revolutionized the writing of U.S. diplomatic history, is summarily dismissed for his “neo-Marxist economic determinism.” (111) Following the older model of U.S. foreign relations, Zoellick makes no mention of dealings with American Indians, the Mexican land grab is noted only in passing, and scant attention is devoted to U.S. interventionism in Cuba and Central America. U.S. Cold War policies are generally given approbation, but some of their less attractive byproducts are not discussed.

This book appears to have been a labor of love (very important in finishing a project of this scope). It also seems to be a reaction against Donald Trump’s “America First” approach to the world and was probably conceived with the idea of influencing a foreign policy debate that should be occurring now—but is not. Unfortunately, Zoellick’s prescriptions for today are muted and indeed elusive. He properly deplores Trump’s “narrowly defined nationalism.” (461) He also rejects “European-style realism” in favor of a “pragmatic American realism—drawing on both the republican and power principles of John Quincy Adams, and updated to meet today’s circumstances” (453). The United States, he concludes, must sustain “the inherited system of economics and security,” resuscitate and adapt the alliances established after World War II, and, above all, abide by the “deepest traditions” of U.S. diplomacy: “to advance America’s ideas.” This nation, he concludes, “does not exist just to be another listing in the UN directory” (461). The “to advance America’s ideas” is what raises red flags. The author never really says how this is to be done. Can the nation best accomplish it, as Adams himself once observed, “by the benignant sympathy of her example?” If that is the case, we have a lot of work to do here at home. But what Zoellick seems to be proposing sounds enough like the post 9/11 global interventionism of the sort favored by neo-conservatives and the so-called “liberal hegemonists” to make us wary. Even if such an approach was desirable—a dubious proposition at best—it would not be feasible because of the dramatic changes that have taken place in the international system and the United States since the turn of the century.

Notes:
A View from Overseas: The Pacific Northwest—The Birthplace of Border Official Aggression

Hidetaka Hirota

Editor’s note: The following essay is part of the occasional Passport series, “The View from Overseas,” which features short commentaries written by scholars from outside the United States.

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Last summer, the city of Portland, Oregon, occupied the headlines of many news outlets when federal forces were deployed in the city to assist local police in suppressing protesters opposing anti-black violence. While the aggressive actions of militarized federal law enforcement officers against protesters provoked outrage, scholars quickly pointed out that many of these officers belonged to a Border Patrol unit of United States Customs and Border Protection, an agency within the Department of Homeland Security. As these border officials arrested and detained protesters, Acting Homeland Security Secretary Chad Wolf defended his agency’s actions.

Many observers correctly placed the official violence in Portland within the context of a long history of abusive and overzealous behaviors by agents of the Border Patrol. This is a history that dates back to the agency’s foundation in the 1920s. Others also correctly pointed to the inhumane treatment of immigrants by untrained officers at the U.S.-Mexico border as the precedent for law enforcers’ violence in Portland in 2020.

What was often overlooked in these observations, however, is that the Pacific Northwest was the birthplace of border official aggression. It originally emerged in response to Asian immigration to the region at the turn of the twentieth century. Shortly after federal immigration policy was introduced in the late nineteenth century, the Pacific Northwest became the principal site of immigration law enforcement action against Asians—first the Chinese and later the Japanese, Koreans, and Indians.

Although at the time no law categorically excluded Japanese immigrants as a group, he randomly arrested Japanese people whom he suspected of illegal entry and put them into local jails.

On one occasion, Beach forcibly confiscated a train ticket from an authorized Japanese immigrant who was returning from Vancouver. Because he was convinced that the man had entered the United States unlawfully—a conviction grounded solely in racism—the man was forced to walk a hundred miles to Seattle. Beach also arrested a Japanese student three times on the assumption that he was Chinese and therefore qualified for removal under the Chinese exclusion laws.

Beach was so determined to work for “the prevention of the influx of Japs” that he ignored regulations and went to Vancouver, British Columbia, to arrest a party of Japanese migrants on Canadian soil. He was propelled by a firm belief that the effective restriction of Japanese immigration would require more vigorous preventive actions than
formal law enforcement procedures like inspection and exclusion at the time of arrival in the United States. Beach's misconduct ultimately led to death of a Japanese immigrant. In June 1900, he raided a Japanese lodging house in Fairhaven, Washington, because he suspected that its owner, H. Makino, was "aiding and abetting the influx of Japs." After examining thirty-seven residents, he arrested Kashichi Fujii, a forty-five-year-old laborer from Japan, and put him in the city jail in New Whatcom on the false grounds that he had unlawfully entered the United States. Fujii, however, was a legal immigrant with a valid passport.

After reviewing Fujii's documents, Deputy Collector Robert Knox advised the jail officer of the illegality of the arrest and imprisonment. Consequently, the officer released Fujii. Furious about Fujii's release, Beach rearrested him on the following day and put him back in jail. Witnesses testified that Fujii was "greatly frightened by the manner in which he was treated" by Beach.

Two days later Fujii died of heart failure, which, the inspecting doctor confirmed, was caused by "mental worry and trouble for being imprisoned." An investigation by the Treasury Department, where the Bureau of Immigration was housed, discovered that Beach was "in an intoxicated condition during all of the times mentioned." Knox, who was at the jail at the time of Fujii's imprisonment, testified that when Fujii's Japanese friend demanded his release, Beach threatened him with "very insulting language," saying that he would be "the next victim." The illegal arrest and death of Fujii prompted the Japanese consul at Tacoma, Washington, to file a formal accusation against Beach. In his response, Beach's local supervisor told the consul that the only way to account for Beach's actions would be to say that he was "being overzealous in his duties." In fact, however, Beach's supervisor had learned of his employee's "excessive use of liquor" before Fujii's death, and he even suggested that Beach was addicted to "opium or some other drug." He brought Beach's problems to the attention of the Commissioner-General of Immigration in Washington, DC. Regarding Beach's drunkenness, the supervisor noted that Beach was "in this condition more than he is sober," and he admitted that "this man Beach is beyond redemption on account of his habits." Nevertheless, while expressing concerns about Beach's substance abuse, the Bureau of Immigration continued to keep him in the field.

While the combination of overzealousness and drunkenness made Beach's record stand out, immigration officials in Washington State routinely RAIDed Asian immigrants' residences in border towns. In patrolling the borders and arresting immigrants suspected of unauthorized entry, the officers also resorted to aggressive actions. An agent of the immigration bureau who investigated law enforcement in the Pacific Northwest in the early twentieth century identified a "tendency" in local officials' operations "to allow personal prejudice to become too apparent," noting that "some officers have gotten into trouble by enforcing the laws strictly."

Pacific Northwest officials' styles of law enforcement, which emerged in the formative era of federal border control, prefigured the aggressive and abusive practices of Border Patrol agents in later periods. Grass-roots anti-Asian violence by white residents in the Pacific Northwest at the turn of the twentieth century is relatively well known to historians. Scenes of Portland last summer, however, are reminders of the Pacific Northwest's past as an area of intense law enforcement characterized by immigration officials' racist determinations and coercive actions, as well as private violence. This history, in turn, reminds us that border officials' misconduct was hardly limited to the U.S.-Mexico border. It represents a broader problem that has been a feature of federal border policing across the nation from its early years.

Notes:
2. Henry C. Beach to F. D. Huestis, May 24, 1900, Inspectors-Chinese Immigration, Letters Received from Subports and Inspectors, Box 107, Records of U.S. Customs Service (RG 36), Puget Sound Collection District, National Archives and Records Administration, Seattle [Hereafter, RG 36 NARA-Seattle].
3. Henry C. Beach to F. D. Huestis, June 11, 1900, Inspectors-Chinese Immigration, Letters Received from Subports and Inspectors, Box 107, RG 36 NARA-Seattle.
4. K. Nabeshima to John Hay, July 7, 1900, Notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department of State, 1858-1906, Microfilm 163, Roll 6, Vol. 6, General Records of the Department of State (RG 59) [Hereafter RG 59 Microfilm].
5. J. F. Cross to Legation of Japan, June 16, 1900, RG 59 Microfilm; F. D. Huestis to T. V. Powderly, October 30, 1900, Letters Sent to the Bureau of Immigration, Box 58, RG 36 NARA-Seattle; F. D. Huestis to T. V. Powderly, July 20, 1900, Letters Sent to the Bureau of Immigration, Box 58, RG 36 NARA-Seattle.
6. F. D. Huestis to S. Hayashi, June 15, 1900, RG 59 Microfilm.
7. F. D. Huestis to T. V. Powderly, May 19, 1900, Letters Sent to the Bureau of Immigration, Box 58, RG 36 NARA-Seattle; F. D. Huestis to T. V. Powderly, April 28, 1900, Letters Sent to the Bureau of Immigration, Box 58, RG 36 NARA-Seattle.
8. Inspector Marcus Braun Report on Immigration Matters, 51630/44D, Box 115, Entry 9, Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (RG 85), National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC.
SHAFR Task Force on Advocacy

SHAFR has a new Task Force on Advocacy, with a mission to alert and mobilize members when our interests are threatened. Recent events have demonstrated the vital importance of working collectively to defend and advance SHAFR’s mission, including repeated cuts in the budget of the National Archives, the destruction of whole classes of historically important records, the failure to release any new FRUS volumes in 2020, and the end of automatic declassification at the CIA and presidential libraries.

On October 23, the Task Force held a public (Zoom) meeting with Dr. Stephen Kidd, Executive Director of the National Humanities Alliance, and Patrice McDermott, Director of Government Information Watch. About 25 SHAFR members attended, and we had a wide-ranging conversation about problems with record keeping and archival budgets, strategies for advocacy, and potential coalitions that can be formed with other historical and scholarly societies, transparency groups, and media outlets. Representatives from SHAFR’s Committee on Public Engagement and Historical Documentation Committee were also in attendance to discuss their work on related issues.

The Task Force has established a Google Group for interested SHAFR members who would like to receive news and alerts about its work – and to take action when there is need and opportunity. If you would like to join, please write to Michael Flynn (mgflynn97@gmail.com) the task force coordinator.

Finally, as a new task force, we are very open to suggestions from you. You can reach out to any of us individually if you have ideas about issues that SHAFR members may want to know about and act on.

Sincerely,

Matt Connelly, Chair, Columbia University (mjc96@columbia.edu)
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Yael Schacher, Refugees International (yael@refugeesinternational.org)
Born and raised on Long Island in New York, I wanted to be a costume designer until at Purchase College I met Jean Herskovits, a remarkable Oxford-trained historian of Africa. I asked her, “wait, women can be historians?” to which she smiled and encouraged me to do so. After my master’s at NYU, I moved to California, taught high school history, and raised two terrific sons. Jean passed away in 2019, which reminded me how much I owed her. I was grateful I had reached out to her when I completed my PhD at UC Davis in 2010, two years before my goal of “a doctorate by age 50.” I’m a full professor at California State University, Fresno, where I teach many undergraduate and graduate courses. My first book, Executing the Rosenbergs: Death and Diplomacy in a Cold War World, came out with OUP in 2016. My next project is a history of the video game industry. I take time to play a bit of Animal Crossing every day, and I live with four cats: Nessy, Woodward, Bernstein, and Hope.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?
Community, Groundhog Day, Galavant, Stranger than Fiction, The Good Place, Wag the Dog, Sports Night, Wall-E

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?
At my first SHAFR luncheon, Marilyn Young sat down next to me, read my name tag and seeing that I taught at Fresno State, began to grill me about why we weren’t producing Hmong historians. I told her that we were working on it but that we only offer a terminal master’s degree. She passionately argued that I could do better. It was quite nerve-wracking.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
Eleanor Roosevelt, Julia Child, Roy Cohn*

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
$500 million: Pay off debt/mortgage and then employ a team of brilliant scholars to help me figure out what to do with the rest.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
Nat King Cole, REM, Squeeze, Queen, Billy Joel, The Shins, One Direction, and Talking Heads.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?
1 - survive a global pandemic
2 - learn to juggle
3 - sip espresso at a café on the Seine
4 - become a grandmother
5 - *throw a glass of wine in Roy Cohn’s face

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
A Lego sculptor
Ken Osgood

I sometimes tell my students that I research “spies and lies,” which hints at my interest in propaganda and intelligence. My first book, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad, blended cultural, political, and diplomatic histories. Its central themes animate much of my historical work: the connection between international and domestic affairs, and the role of image and persuasion in shaping political culture and foreign relations. I’ve also co-edited four books, with volumes on the Cold War after Stalin’s death, international public diplomacy, and how presidents “sell” war. The fourth volume, published shortly after Obama was elected, is strangely relevant today: a study of the connection between civil rights, the presidency, and the conservative moment. I’m now writing a history of the Crusade for Freedom, a decades long propaganda campaign organized by CIA and directed at the American public, for which I’ve received fellowship support from Harvard and the NEH. I’ve taught or held fellowships at Florida Atlantic University, Williams College, Ohio State, University College Dublin, U.C. San Diego, and, currently, Colorado School of Mines. As a teacher, my top priority is to inspire students to love history as I do - and to give them tools to make sense of the world around them.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

The Naked Gun, Naked Gun 2 ½, Naked Gun 33 1/3.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

Trigger Warning: The story that follows evokes images you cannot unsee, even if you don’t actually see them.

I don’t easily get embarrassed, but early in my career an incident in one of my classes left me red-faced and speechless. I was as an assistant professor at Florida Atlantic University, where retirees from Boca Raton regularly audited my classes. For extra money, I also taught a few “lifelong learning” classes in which all of my students hailed from The Greatest Generation. More than three hundred retirees sat in a giant auditorium for one of my lifelong courses on U.S. Foreign Relations, though perhaps a quarter of them used the mid-point of my class for a mid-day nap.

After the second of my three lectures on the Vietnam War, the youngest man in the class, perhaps the only student in his sixties, approached me. “You’re going to talk about Nixon next week, right?” he asked, with much enthusiasm. I told him yes, of course. He followed up by asking if I would talk about the opening to China. “I was part of that,” he said. “I have some pictures and stories I would love to share.” What a great opportunity, I commented sincerely, and I encouraged him to share his recollections at the end of the next lecture.

When the time came the following week, I invited him to the podium. I think I described him as a “special” guest, who had “great” memories to share related to Nixon’s historic visit to China. He bounded on the large stage in the auditorium. He hooked his computer to the A/V system, which projected his PowerPoint onto a massive screen the size of a small movie theater. I took a seat in the front row, next to a tiny elderly woman with bright white hair in her eighth decade.

My guest began by displaying a stock photo of Nixon and Kissinger in China. He explained that he was a Navy physician who was part of the advance team that prepared for Nixon’s visit. How interesting, I thought, not knowing where this was all going to go. Nothing could have possibly prepared me for this next slide. He clicked the mouse on his laptop and the image changed. The entire screen – some fifty-feet wide – was filled with a picture of a man’s bare buttocks. My mouth dropped. The eyes of the elderly woman next to me bulged out of her face. I froze.

The doctor noted that Nixon’s advance team came down with a mysterious affliction. He pointed to the ring-shaped rash on the derriere. Then he clicked the next slide. More gluteal images on the big screen. Then another picture, far worse than the first two. I stood up and awkwardly pleaded for an end to the images. I may have urged for him to get to the point.

He then explained that he was a dermatologist. One morning, the White House urgently summoned him to assess the mysterious illness plaguing members of the advance team – the posterior rashes he had too graphically introduced to my class of retirees. After some research, my guest concluded that the Chinese must have finished the toilet seats with a derivative of sumac, the cause of the rash. His proud contribution to our nation’s history, as he related it, was to advise the president and his team to be sure to line toilet seats with paper before sitting.

The most important lesson I learned that day, however, was neither medical nor historical. Always preview the slides of guest speakers.
3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

I’ve been lucky to meet some famous historical figures – Helen Thomas, Daniel Ellsberg, a dozen or so former members of the Eisenhower administration, and Jimmy Carter (briefly, on an airplane). But my most interesting conversations have always been with unknown “ordinary” people who made history in their own ways: the teacher in South Florida who was the first African-American to desegregate our local high school; the Vietnam veteran who struggled with PTSD and never spoke to anyone about his experience until I invited him to my class; the daughter of a physics professor who led the 1971 burglary of an FBI field office in Media, Pennsylvania – hauling away thousands of secret documents that led to the discovery of the bureau’s COINTELPRO program. Those were the conversations that changed me.

So if a genie magically appeared and offered me a chance to dine with three historical figures, I think I’d make a wild card request. I’d ask the genie to select three people of conscience, three individuals who made a difference in some small way, three who are not well known but should be, and invite them to my house for dinner. I’ll cook up something splendid, open a few bottles of wine, and just listen.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

If current trends continue, I reckon that’s about how much I’ll need to send my kids to college.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

I’d invite Johnny Clegg, who many years ago started the first interracial music group in apartheid South Africa. Many of his inspirational songs speak to the cause of human rights and racial justice. So I’d ask him to play every one of his songs, and to narrate the experiences and values that inspired him to write them. And I’d have him play as close to the White House as we could manage, with the volume turned up to eleven.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

1. Live in mountains surrounded by trails, aspens, and pine trees. Check.
2. Great job teaching interesting students. Check.
3. Live in Ireland for a year, enjoying fresh pints of Guinness. Check.
4. See Mt. Everest. Check.
5. Meet the love of my life, settle down, and have great kids. Check.

That’s my bucket list, and I’m sticking to it.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

When I was a kid I wanted to be a forest ranger. For a long time, I cooked in high-end restaurants. Both seem like alternative life paths.
I earned my Ph.D. under the direction of Dr. Lien-Hang Nguyen in 2015. My interests in war and society took me to West Point where I learned to love the Hudson Valley and Digital Humanities. I came to the University of South Florida as a Digital Teaching Fellow in the English Department before settling to my current position in the Library’s Special Collections department. I’m happy to have found a career where I can combine my passions for digital pedagogy and history, while sharing my knowledge as a researcher.

My book about soldier-civilian sexual encounters during the Vietnam War will be out with Cornell University Press in 2021. I have a chapter on contemporary military sexual assault policies set for publication in Managing Sex in the U.S. Military, forthcoming from University of Nebraska Press.

During COVID, I’ve enjoyed working from home with my husband and our two-year old daughter, Beth. We used to travel a lot with her, and are looking forward to showing her historic sites again after the pandemic. Our dog, an eleven year old rescue named Franklin, is thrilled to have a toddler to feed him table scraps all day.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?


2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

Parking at West Point involved parking by the banks of the Hudson, crossing a training field, and taking a grated stairway up the side of the cliff to get to the building. On my first day, my mentor told me where to park and met me at the lot. On the walk up, my heels sank in the mud across the field and then got stuck in the grate halfway up. I had to stop and wrestle my shoe free all while trying to make casual conversation. Needless to say, I changed my shoes in the office for the rest of my time there.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Josephine Baker to listen to the amazing stories she must have from her trailblazing life, Eliza Hamilton to hear her side of the story, and Trưng Trắc to see what it was like ruling over Vietnam in the first century and to tell her about her legacy.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

I’d first do the responsible thing and pay off my student loans, put enough money away to cover my daughter for life, and then take my family and knock all the travel off my bucket list. When I get back, I’d settle into a very old house near the Hudson River, and look for an archival job in the city.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?


6. What are five things on your bucket list?

1. Run a marathon. 2. Put two feet on Antarctica. 3. Ride every ride in Walt Disney World. 4. Hike in the Canadian Rockies. 5. Learn to play more than one song on piano (Frère Jacques will only take me so far).

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I almost went to Medical School, so I would probably have stuck with something in the medical field if I hadn’t been convinced to go into History by the fascinating lectures of Dr. David Courtwright years ago. I’ve also always thought I’d make a good travel agent. You get to help people prepare for some of their happiest memories, and research cool destinations all day.
Giles Scott-Smith

I trained in IR up to PhD but then migrated to History due to a growing weariness with the abstract theoretical debates of the IR world. I was more interested in real people and what they thought and did, and not whether someone was a reductionist or a reifier (although that was fun for a while). I have focused on the ‘cultural cold war’ from a range of research perspectives, and now feel comfortable under the heading of ‘new diplomatic history’, which broadly covers a re-evaluation of the actors, identities, sites, networks etc of the diplomatic milieu through history. Its basically the analytical nous of diplomatic studies mixed with the archival depth of diplomatic history. Our new venture, Diplomatica: A Journal of Diplomacy and Society, was set up to show some of the results of this. Upcoming publications: A chapter on ‘Networks’ in the Cambridge History of the European Union, a journal special issue on ‘Translation and the Cold War’, and an edited collection on life-writing entitled Unhingeing the National Framework.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

Movies is a hard one. I’ve become a fan of Christopher Nolan and how he plays around with time, from the backward plot of Memento to the layered dream sequence of Inception and the multiple perspectives on the same event in Dunkirk. He should definitely make a Bond movie at some point.

TV shows is easier. I love comedy - stand-up, slapstick, satire - and there is nothing to match the brutal, below-the-belt relentlessness of the political satire The Thick of It written by Armando Iannucci, who also successfully turned it into an Iraq war-era movie, In The Loop. Compared to the sheer stressed-out verbal violence of actor Peter Capaldi’s Blair-era spin doctor creation, Malcolm Tucker, everyone else are purely amateurs.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

The failed job applications in the past. Too many to recall without a stiff whiskey and a blast of the Ramones.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Lee Harvey Oswald, Sirhan Sirhan, and James Earl Ray. A bit bleak, perhaps, but I think we all know the questions we’d want to ask.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Put it all on red.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

I became a Jimi Hendrix convert at 15 and have never recovered. But Hendrix was unable to fulfill all of his creative ambition, and one potential collaboration that never came together, sadly, was between him and Miles Davis (who actually attended Hendrix’s funeral in 1970). To set up a Hendrix-Davis double-act on stage would be enough.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

Despite (or because of) being an emigré from the British Isles, I have a shortlist of weirdly, wonderfully symbolic places that I simply must visit eventually. Holy Island, Tintagel, Dungeness and Portmeirion have already been covered. The Spurn on the Humber River is next, and then Eilean Donan. This is enough to keep me happy already.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

Last year I participated in a kind of academic ‘leadership skills’ course that began with the eight of us involved being asked what we would do if we could choose another career. I went first and came out with something along the lines of nature conservation and ‘saving the turtles’ under the assumption that we all shared the same scepticism about our profession. Instead, everyone after me simply said they loved being academics and wouldn’t consider anything else. I felt a little foolish, and realized they were right. Being an academic is a special privilege - yes we’re overworked and often stressed out and overwhelmed by bureaucracy etc but at the end of the day we do what we love, which is write (hopefully) interesting stuff and teach the next generations something useful. You can’t beat that.
1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

Dr. Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worry and Love the Bomb
Indochine
The Purple Plain
The American President/Dave
Crash Landing on You/Mr. Sunshine (I have become hooked on
Korean Dramas during the pandemic)
Big Bang Theory
Star Trek: The Next Generation (and the movies with a shoutout to
Discovery)
Friday Night Lights (the movie and the series as it a semi-biographical
approach to my early life)

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-
producing professional moment?

I gave my first paper at SHAFR in 1992 in College Park on the U.S. role in the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948. When
the questions came, it surprised me that I received so many (and several very difficult ones) from two prominent
senior members of the field (one quite distinguished). It made me think I had failed because of the barrage.
However, afterward George Herring informed me that it related to one of them (a very prickly independent historian)
often poking the other over disagreements that they had on interpreting U.S. policy in the region. I was relieved that
it wasn’t necessarily me, but I have not forgotten that one from nearly thirty years ago.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

The three historical figures would be as follows (in no particular order).

Dietrich Bonhoeffer and John Wesley- I have always been fascinated by both and read extensively on Bonhoeffer
(and his own writings) on the resistance to the Nazis versus many of his fellow Lutherans in Germany who supported
Hitler. This has seemed even more important in the past four years. As for Wesley, the father of modern Methodism,
I always wanted to understand the shift to reaching out to the poor and trying to lift up the less fortunate rather than
following the easier route of simply being a traditional Anglican minister of the time. He was an early leader of a form
of social gospel movement, and I always wanted to probe deeper into why. I would welcome the theological and
real-world discussions of the two, hopefully over a long evening dinner

Gregory Peck- He has always been one of my favorite actors as I love his portrayals in so many movies including one
that I listed above, The Purple Plain, but some of my favorites include To Kill a Mockingbird, 12 O’Clock High, On the
Beach, Moby Dick, Horatio Hornblower, Duel in the Sun, and Pork Chop Hill. I would love to talk about the golden
era of Hollywood in the 1940s and 1950s and the actors and actresses with whom he worked. Finally, I would love to
explore his political activism including his opposition to the Vietnam War and support of civil rights.

Barbara Jordan- I have always been fascinated with her and would love to sit down and talk to her about the obstacles
that she overcame to reach a position of power. I think conversations on race relations of Texas and the country at the
time would be fascinating, but also about her role in the Watergate hearings. To me, she is one of the most complex
and interesting figures in modern American politics.

4. **What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?**

If I won $500 million in the lottery, the first thing I would do is buy a beach house in Newport or Huntington Beach, a mountain home in Ouray, Colorado, and a 100-acre ranch in the Hill Country southwest of Austin. I would take my family on some great vacations including the first one to Fiji and then Australia and New Zealand (my oldest loves it there) and then a grand tour of Europe. I would semi-retire but keep teaching at Chapman (when I wanted) and of course continue researching and writing.

The vast majority of the money would go to helping the homeless (my wife’s passion) and creating scholarships for first generation student seeking to better themselves and their families (my passion). I would also endow a couple of positions in the fields of foreign relations and war and society at Angelo State (naming one for Shirley Eoff), Texas Tech (naming one for Ron Milam), and the University of Kentucky (naming one for George Herring).

Finally, I would purchase Torchy's Tacos, Texican Mexican, and Franklin's BBQ franchises and put them in southern California. Living here, I need these restaurants in my life.

5. **You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?**

If I had an unlimited budget for bands and a time machine to organize a music festival, I would invite the following bands and solo acts. First, the opening act will be Ride the Panda with a special solo by drummer Jason Parker. My other choices would be: “The Chicks,” “Green Day,” “REM,” “Neil Young, The “Boss,” Madonna, John Fogerty, Pharrell Williams, Migos, Cardi B (no Kid Rock or Ted Nugent) [I am sure you see a theme developing]. I would ask Stephen Colbert to host.

6. **What are five things on your bucket list?**

What are five things on my bucket list.

Visit Machu Pichu

Doing week-long bike ride through the Alps (I may need a motorized bike for that one)

Have a full pass for watching all of the Olympic track and field events for the remainder of my life

Spending consecutive summers writing in a chalet on a beautiful Swiss lake or a beach house in Costa Rica (preferably Playa Tamarindo)

Riding all the major rollercoasters in the world

7. **What would you be doing if you were not an academic?**

If not an academic, I would be a college track and field coach (or maybe a political cartoonist if I had any artistic skills). I love the sport that focuses on individuals and their improvement while also having a team component.
I was born in Duluth, Minnesota, during the Ford administration, at the same hospital as Bob Dylan (albeit 34 years later). Growing up outside of Superior, Wisconsin, I preferred reading; pouring over old photographs, magazines, and letters; and listening to my grandparents’ stories. All four grandparents had a deep interest in history and politics, which clearly made a lasting impression on their granddaughter. At the University of Nebraska (M.A. 1999, Ph.D. 2003), my concentration was U.S. foreign policy, culminating in a dissertation on Lyndon Johnson and P.L. 480. The dissertation led to an article published in Diplomatic History in 2007 and a monograph published by the University of Missouri Press in 2009. I’ve written about agriculture and food aid more generally in the Encyclopedia of the Cold War and Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History. This spring, Agricultural History will publish my article on the Carter administration’s food aid and human rights policy. Thanks to Scott Kaufman and Katie Sibley, I have expanded my research and writing to include first ladies; I have a chapter on Rosalynn Carter’s diplomatic role in Katie’s edited book forthcoming from The University Press of Kansas. The Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State has been my institutional home since September 2003. I have compiled or co-compiled 8 volumes in the Foreign Relations series (with another three in progress), and I serve currently as the Assistant to the General Editor, responsible for reviewing FRUS volumes and managing records access issues. My husband Phil Myers, toddler son, and I live in Alexandria, Virginia. When I am not compiling or reading FRUS, you can find me chasing said toddler, knitting, baking, or gardening.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?  
Movies: Dr. Strangelove, Dr. Zhivago, The Candidate, All the President’s Men, The Blues Brothers, and The Muppet Movie  
TV: Sesame Street (1970s and early 1980s), Law and Order (the Jerry Orbach-Sam Waterston era), The Rachel Maddow Show, West Wing, and Saturday Night Live (the Phil Hartman-Jan Hooks-Nora Dunn-Dana Carvey-Jon Lovitz era). My brother and I were especially taken by a 1992 SNL election special that featured several clips of Dan Aykroyd impersonating both Nixon and Carter. And we were probably the only kids in our school who watched the Mark Russell comedy specials on PBS and understood the references. This might partially explain why I’m a professional historian and he is a middle school social studies teacher.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment? 
In terms of anxiety, I’d rank my dissertation defense and my first SHAFR presentation in 2004 right up there. I think that the first time presenting at a major conference is usually nerve-wracking, combine this with presenting a paper on Lyndon Johnson at a conference held on the premises of the LBJ Library and you have heightened levels of stress.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?  
Barbara Jordan, John Lennon, and Jim Henson, in order to discuss the politics, music, and Muppets of the 1960s and 1970s. I might throw Hubert Humphrey in there as well, although no one would get a word in edgewise.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?  
Endow scholarships and fellowships and contribute to the professional organizations and other institutions dedicated to the humanitarian causes I care about. The toddler will start college in 2036, so I would set aside some of the funds for tuition.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?  
My parents are of the Baby Boom generation, so I grew up listening to the rock, soul, and folk music of the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these musicians—including Stevie Wonder, Judy Collins, Ritchie Havens, Lena Horne, Buffy Saint-Marie, and James Taylor—also performed on Sesame Street, thus reinforcing my appreciation for them. I would include them and many others and have The Beatles bring it all together. And for the accordion and or song parody fans out there, I’d showcase Myron Floren and Weird Al Yankovic.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?  
I gave up playing the flute, piccolo, and piano when I graduated from high school, so I would like to return to those. I would also like to find more time for international travel and volunteer work.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?  
Either law or politics, professions that are a big stretch for an introvert.

* The views expressed in this essay are the author’s own and not necessarily those of the United States Department of State or the United States Government.

The committee—headed by Susan Carruthers and including Nancy Mitchell, Paul Thomas Chamberlain, and Jussi Hanhimaki—commended Immerwahr’s bold remapping of U.S. history. By directing readers’ attention to those non-contiguous territories variously claimed for, and kept attenuated from, the United States, Immerwahr artfully makes peripheries central to the story of U.S. imperialism—and empire central to hitherto truncated national narratives. *How to Hide an Empire* is ambitiously conceived and deeply researched, drawing on impressive original research. Its author has mined archives in Manila, Alaska, and Hawaii as well as the National Archives, various presidential libraries and an array of other repositories. Immerwahr’s prose is striking for its accessibility, directness, and verve. *How to Hide an Empire* is an immersive and gripping read. The author not only makes U.S. history “greater” again, he does so in a way that speaks compellingly to diverse audiences. The book has already won the attention and admiration of critics and readers within and beyond academia. Immerwahr thus does more than make a provocative case that we must expand the boundaries of national cartography. He provides a model for scholars who strive to extend the reach and resonance of our field.

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize Committee—Tehila Sasson, Daniel Bessner and Melani McAlister—is pleased to announce that Bathsheba Demuth (Brown University) is this year’s recipient of the Bernath Article Prize. Demuth’s article, entitled “The Walrus and the Bureaucrat: Energy, Ecology, and Making the State in the Russian and American Arctic, 1870–1950,” appeared in the April 2019 issue of the *American Historical Review*. This deeply researched and creatively conceived article uses the case of the Pacific walrus to argue that in the first half of the twentieth century, the environmental conditions of the Bering Strait challenged both the American and Russian states. Demuth follows the story of how the opposed ideological projects of the two countries—one devoted to free markets and the other to communal labor—both aimed to increase production and, in doing so, to make capitalist citizens of indigenous Alaskan Yupik and Inupiat and to make communist citizens of indigenous Chukotkan Chukchi and Yupik. In making this comparison, Demuth utilizes an expansive source base to denaturalize the
story of American exceptionalism. Her article offers novel contributions to the history of capitalism, indigenous history, and the Cold War. Her work also pushes historians of U.S. foreign relations to attend to the role animals and the natural environment play in international affairs as well as what it means to write the history of U.S. foreign relations from borderlands.

In addition, the Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize Committee makes two honorable mentions. The first honorable mention goes to Simon Toner’s article “‘The Paradise of the Latrine’: American Toilet-Building and the Continuities of Colonial and Postcolonial Development,” published in 2019 in Modern American History. Toner’s fascinating and innovative article traces the story of a counter-insurgency, development project in South Vietnam to build sanitary latrines, embedding this story in a deeper imperial history. The article reconceptualizes the U.S.-South Vietnamese relationship, demonstrating how development aid was forged in collaboration with local elites rather than being passively imposed on South Vietnam.

The second honorable mention goes to Cindy Ewing’s article “The Colombo Powers: Crafting Diplomacy in the Third World and Launching Afro-Asia at Bandung,” published in 2019 in Cold War History. Ewing’s beautifully researched article recovers the history of the Colombo Powers as a distinct moment within the history of postcolonial internationalism. It shows that the Colombo Powers sought to create a pan-Asian, regional coalition that would protect Asian interests in the international arena during the Cold War, significantly deepening and enriching the scholarly conversation about the investments and strategies of states in the Global South.

Together, these three articles offer novel paths forward for the historiography of U.S. foreign relations, and we are happy to bestow these honors upon them.

Congratulations!
Recent Books of Interest

Aronova, Elena. Scientific History: Experiments in History and Politics from the Bolshevik Revolution to the End of the Cold War. (Chicago, 2021).


Bustamante, Michael J. Cuban Memory Wars: Retrospective Politics in Revolution and Exile. (UNC, 2021).


Cowen, Benjamin A. Moral Majorities across the Americas: Brazil, the United States, and the Creation of the Religious Right. (UNC, 2021).


Margry, Peter Jan, ed. Cold War Mary: Ideologies, Politics, and Marian Devotional Culture. (Cornell, 2021).


Osterrmann, Christian F. *Between Containment and Rollback: The United States and The Cold War in Germany.* (Stanford, 2021).


Shepherd, Frederick M. *The Politics of Transnational Actors in Latin America.* (Routledge, 2021).


Welsh, Michael. *Big Bend National Park: Mexico, the United States, and a Borderland Ecosystem.* (Nevada, 2021).


CALL FOR PAPERS
Deadline: June 15, 2021

The War and Society Program at Chapman University invites submissions for the best papers in the field of War and Society (broadly defined to include themes such as race and the military, foreign relations, the home front, soldiers’ stories, memory and commemoration, and other related topics) written between August 2020 and May 2021 by either undergraduate or masters-level students. Papers may focus on the U.S. experience or global perspectives.

The prize selection committee, which includes national and international scholars, will give preference to those papers that employ substantial primary research along with multidisciplinary approaches.

Two Categories:

THE UNDERGRADUATE PAPER PRIZE: Submission should come as a PDF, no more than 20 pages (exclusive of endnotes) with a short letter of support (no more than one page) from a faculty member who supervised the paper.

THE GRADUATE PAPER PRIZE FOR MA STUDENTS: Submission should be journal article length not to exceed 30 pages (exclusive of endnotes) with a short letter of support (no more than one page) from a faculty member who supervised the paper.

The prize in each category is one award of $1000, with a subsequent prize for honorable mention of $250 each in each category.

For more info and to send in submissions:
Contact Dr. Kyle Longley
longley@chapman.edu
In Memoriam: Thomas J. McCormick (1933-2020)

Thomas Joseph McCormick, a distinguished scholar and teacher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison since his arrival as a faculty member in 1970, died in Madison on July 25, 2020. He was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, on March 6, 1933. In high school, Tom became a noted athlete and musician (saxophone), while also finding the necessary time to spend with his future wife, Jeri. In 1956 they embarked on a remarkable 65-year-long marriage. She became a poet, published in the United States and Ireland. Later in 1956, Tom accepted the advice of his high school counselor, Ralph Nieman, and entered the Ph.D. program at the University of Wisconsin.

That year was the final year of teaching for Fred Harvey Harrington, who was on his way to becoming the president of the university. Harrington’s seminar of 18 met in the Memorial Library, across the street from the Memorial Union—the closest place for lunch and the occasional ping pong match. Tom had never played that game in college, but he was a quick learner—soon too quick for any challenger. In seminar, Tom began to develop his dissertation on U.S. policy toward China in the 1890s, a policy that climaxed with the Open Door Notes. The second year of graduate school saw something of an earthquake on the UW campus with the arrival of William Appleman Williams, Harrington’s former graduate student, and a World War II navy veteran. Tom decided to remain under Harrington’s guidance, but learned to know Williams quite well as a teaching assistant and by having late afternoon coffee with Williams and several of his students. Like Harrington, Williams presented the history of American expansion from colony to empire as an ongoing process involving leaders with a sophisticated understanding of the political and economic realities confronting the nation. Both of these men had a significant impact on McCormick’s development as a historian—as it did on other members of the seminars over succeeding years.

At the time, Williams was finishing The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, a pioneering volume that viewed the Open Door policy as the key to U.S. policy from the 1890s down to the 1950s. It later was chosen as one of the hundred best books in English published in the twentieth century. Tom learned from, and contributed to, Williams’s work. In 1960, he received his Ph.D., and during the decade taught at Ohio University and the University of Pittsburgh, where he published his first book, China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901. That led to his appointment at Madison in 1970. As evidenced in his initial book, Tom had a special ability to combine the granular and the aggregate in the space of a single paragraph. That talent also marked his final volume, America’s Half-Century: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War (1987, 2nd edition, 1995). The two books formed superb bookends to Tom’s evolving theses about the origins and ending of the so-called “American Century,” made famous in Henry Luce’s book of that name in 1941. China Market played a large role in replacing the commonly accepted interpretation of how the Open Door Notes originated. The preceding view of the 1950s had largely been that U.S. expansion into the Far East was an unforeseen consequence of the War of 1898. McCormick demonstrated that, instead, American expansion had been directed by officials who understood from bitter experience that the new industrial revolution produced a glut of goods that had resulted in economic panics and depressions in each of the post-Civil War decades until the country nearly exploded in the 1893-1896 panic. As McCormick concluded after reviewing business journals, “The Panic of 1893 and the ‘awakening of China’—economic need and apparent opportunity—these were the propellants for America’s expansion across the Pacific.” How to do this was the question for policymakers, not whether to go abroad. Grover Cleveland had hoped to resolve the problem of methodology “with the Open Door Policy, but one with a laissez-faire twist; one without the insular imperialism and governmental involvement that was to mark the Open Door Policy of William McKinley and John Hay.”

His readers would also become aware of the key word in that title, Quest, and the irony it conveyed, because it
was a quest McCormick demonstrated that would never be fulfilled. The question of whether the United States had greatness thrust upon it—the prevailing consensus view at the time China Market was published, or undertook imperial ventures simply because it had the power to do so in order to satisfy transient impulses—was effectively settled by McCormick's step-by-step analysis of how the decisions were made not to stop with controlling only Manila as an entrepot for the China market, but to annex the entire archipelago. It was the only way that the United States could be sure that one of the European continental powers did not seek to replace Spain. McCormick demonstrated the point that the United States was not in the grip of an imperial frenzy by the way that American policymakers turned down Spanish offers to cede as well "all the Carolines and all the Marianas in exchange for open door status for Spain in Cuba and Puerto Rico."

With the Philippine question "settled" for the time being, the next big question was the danger that China would be effectively partitioned off by the European powers after the Boxer Rebellion. The American response to this threat were the Open Door Notes calling on all the powers to respect Chinese territorial integrity. Subsequent events found the United States still hoping the China market, but to annex the entire archipelago. It was the only way that the United States could be sure that one of the European continental powers did not seek to replace Spain. McCormick demonstrated the point that the United States was not in the grip of an imperial frenzy by the way that American policymakers turned down Spanish offers to cede as well "all the Carolines and all the Marianas in exchange for open door status for Spain in Cuba and Puerto Rico."

In 1961, Ernest May of Harvard had published a well-received foreign policy analysis of the 1890s that employed a mostly orthodox interpretation of the era. His later review of Tom's quite different interpretation was generous and accurate: "Impressive," and "a significant contribution to ultimate understanding of an important and complex series of events." The same could be said of Tom's other book-end volume, America's Half-Century. Once again, the title was in part an ironic comment, this time on the title of Luce's widely read 1941 book. The irony did not end there. After a panoramic look at the Cold War years, and the Reagan administration's quest to "repeal the laws of history and perpetuate American hegemony ad infinitum" with words and deeds reminiscent of Britain's desperate effort at the end of the nineteenth century, the United States found itself in a quandary. "The Reagan militarization program created problems for the administration's economic goal of reviving the profitability of American industry and its ability to hold its own in both domestic and foreign markets." Military spending became more and more central to "prosperity" as America entered an era of perpetual war for perpetual peace. In the short run, the "new" Social Darwinism of the Reagan years, military spending, plus deregulation for the rest of the economy, produced large-scale benefits—but largely for certain segments of the population, notably white citizens of the middle class, although that would soon become upper-middle class while leaving the rest to scramble for what was left.

Drawing notably from Immanuel Wallerstein's world system theory, Tom saw Luce's "century" become a "half-century" as the United States paid a heavy price for the Vietnam war and the rise of challenges in Japan, China, and Western Europe. This perspective allowed him to avoid "the end of history" mania that characterized too many American views of the world after the collapse of communism in 1989-1991. To understand what was happening, Tom suggested that the nation-state provided a too small perspective and allowed only limited understanding.

Besides these two bookends on the rise and fall of the American Century, Tom offered other perspectives that reinforced his thesis. He co-authored The Creation of the American Empire (1973), a textbook that appeared just as U.S. foreign policies entered a new and more challenging phase during the final months of the Vietnam War. In 1990, Tom co-authored, with General William Westmoreland, Senator George McGovern, and Edward Luttwak, The Vietnam War: Four Perspectives. He also contributed to, and co-edited, Behind the Throne; Servants of Power to Imperial Presidents, 1898-1968 (1994). Written by scholars who had worked with Harrington, and dedicated to him, the essays examined a "new breed of government officials whose first loyalties were to the Chief Executive, not the bureaucracy or the public." Tom lived to see a climax of this development.

Like that of all other good scholars, Tom McCormick's work built as well on the work of others, Fred Harrington and William Appleman Williams at Wisconsin, but also that of Samuel P. Hays at Pittsburgh, and still many others he recognized in his detailed essays on sources. He was open in argument to all points of view. His command of the literature was little short of phenomenal—and not only in his discipline, but in related sciences as well. One never came away from a discussion with him without learning a great deal about the latest thinking on a multitude of topics, whether world systems analysis or the Green Bay Packers.

Tom's reputation as a gifted lecturer spread overseas as well as at home. He was appointed Distinguished Fulbright Lecturer at University College, Dublin (1993-1994). Tom and Jeri returned several times to Dublin where he gave popular lectures and Jeri joined a circle of published poets. In Japan, the McCormicks were hosted by one of Tom's outstanding Ph.D. students, Takeshi Matsuda.

Besides Jeri, Tom is survived by a son, Michael, two daughters, Elin Malliet and Amy Kittleson, and three granddaughters, Rachel McCormick, Erin McCormick, and Abigail Kittleson. We were most fortunate to have known him for so many years as a cherished friend from graduate school and those first discussions just outside the Wisconsin Historical Society. Perhaps Yeats—a fellow Irishman—said it best: "Think where man's glory most begins and ends, and say my glory was I had such friends." Tom was such a friend.

Lloyd Gardner, Rutgers University
Walter LaFeber, Cornell University
Amy Kaplan, 1953-2020, was the Edward W. Kane professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania, the past-president of the American Studies Association, and a renowned interdisciplinary scholar of U.S. culture and empire. She was the author of three single-authored books, a widely-influential anthology, and dozens of academic articles and general audience essays, on everything from the discourse of “homeland security” to the anti-imperialism of Mark Twain. She was the recipient of numerous awards, including fellowships from the Institute for Advanced Study and the NEH. And she was a fierce intellectual presence, a generous mentor, and an extraordinary scholar.

Kaplan was a border-crossing thinker. Her work focused on the United States in the world, but the borders she crossed were intellectual and disciplinary rather than national. Starting in the 1990s, Kaplan began to ask questions about culture and American empire—specifically about the role of U.S. culture in shaping the moral geographies of the powerful. One of the first generation of Americanists to take imperial culture seriously, she was influenced by Edward Said, as well as the work done by a range of postcolonial scholars such as Inderpal Grewal, Lisa Lowe, Ali Behdad, and Paul Gilroy, who were unpacking the work that culture does in contexts of European colonialism, imperialism, and expansionist power.

Kaplan co-edited the groundbreaking 1993 collection, *The Cultures of United States Imperialism*, with Donald Pease. The book had an impact that few anthologies can claim, reshaping the fields of U.S. cultural studies, American Studies, and, eventually, the history of the United States in the world. Kaplan’s now classic introduction to the volume spoke powerfully of “the absence of culture from the history of U.S. imperialism; the absence of empire from the study of American culture; and the absence of the United States from the postcolonial study of imperialism” (11). That telling description soon came to serve as an agenda, as U.S. historians, historians of empire, American Studies scholars, and those from postcolonial studies, literature, and cultural studies began to produce rich and diverse analyses of the cultural politics of U.S. empire.

Kaplan certainly was not alone in taking up the project. The very fact that *Cultures of United States Imperialism* was such a massive volume (672 pages) was an indication its time had come. Essays by scholars such as Donna Haraway, Vincente L. Rafael, Kevin Gaines, Myra Jehlan, Walter Benn Michaels, and Vincente M. Diaz made clear how much work there already was to draw on—and how urgently the questions were in Americanist scholars’ thinking. Perhaps it was the end of the Cold War and the spectacle of the 1990-91 Gulf War that brought U.S. academics back to the kinds of questions that William Appleman Williams had raised decades before: what does “empire as a way of life” look like, culturally and politically, for a nation built on denial of its own imperial logics?

Speaking personally, I can say that I was already well aware of Kaplan’s work as a graduate student in the early 1990s. Her first book—a sophisticated, careful study of realism in American literature—would come out in 1992, but it was an essay published in *American Literary History* in 1990, on empire and masculinity in popular novels of the 1890s, that had captured the attention of those of us in American Studies at Brown. I remember sitting at a bar on Thayer Street in Providence talking animatedly about what it would mean to “read for empire.” That conversation must have been happening at a lot of bars in college towns, because in the decade after the publication of *Cultures of US Imperialism*, there would be tsunami of work on U.S. empire and transnational cultural formation: Penny von Eschen’s *Race Against Empire* (1997); Kristin Hoganson’s *Fighting for American Manhood* (1998); Vincente Rafael’s *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History*, Laura Wexler’s *Tender Violence*, and Andrew Rottier’s *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India*—all published in 2000; Mary Renda’s *Taking Haiti* and my own *Epic Encounters* in 2001; Christina Klein’s *Cold War Orientalism* and Laura Brigg’s *Reproducing Empire*: *Race, Sex, Science and US Imperialism* in Puerto Rico in 2003; and Nikhil Singh’s *Black is a Country* in 2004, among many others. It wasn’t necessarily that Kaplan’s work directly inspired all of these projects, but both her individually-authored writings and the crystallizing work of the anthology were remarkably influential, giving name and shape to a diverse set of investments and projects, and creating a conversation that included people trained in parts of the humanities that rarely engaged each other—for example, diplomatic history and cultural studies, to name just two.

Kaplan herself entered this field with her remarkable, agenda-setting second monograph, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of US Culture*, published in 2002. In this, Kaplan offered detailed and compelling readings of how the logics of empire had been constructed for domestic consumption, created through fiction, journalism,
and early film. The book was perhaps best known for its attention to the ways race and gender shaped the intersection of nationalist imaginaries and expansionist power. Kaplan's arguments about the intersection of the domestic and the "foreign" were encapsulated in her wry phrase, "manifest domesticity"—vividly marking not only the ways in which women were mobilized into empire, but the (highly enabling) misdirection at the heart of the ideology of separate spheres. There was, Kaplan insisted, a deep interdependence of home and empire that was far more than a division of the ideological work of social reproduction. 

Kaplan wrote, "Women's true sphere", Kaplan wrote, "was in fact a mobile and mobilizing outpost the transformed conquered foreign lands into the domestic sphere of family and nation" (25). Kaplan was not the first feminist to notice how, while women were recruited into imperialism, but she brought home the ways in which gender was a useful category of analysis for those who cared about the history of U.S. expansion.

But Kaplan's argument was also methodological; she insisted that our analyses of U.S. power should not assume its coherence or its solidity over time. The book was published during the early days of the U.S. war in Iraq, and it seemed to speak presciently to a moment when "empire" was very much at hand. Whether or not we would call empire by its name, and take as our task the challenge of seeing how broad and deep it went—these were the questions Kaplan raised.

Yet she was in some sense disentangling herself from Said's argument in Orientalism, that the heterogenous expressions of imperial logic were powerful precisely because of their "knit-together strength"—the ways they undergirded each other through citation, repetition, and timely reworkings. Nikhil Singh's review in American Quarterly captured the stakes of the "anarchy" in Kaplan's title. "Anarchy is thus the specter that haunts the imperial fantasy of a historically advancing, smooth, and ordered world. It reflects the ways in which modern imperialism remains uniquely dependent upon, and in fact is constituted by and reconstitutes, the very figures of disorder—violence, tyranny, customary power, racial difference, patriarchy—that it proposes to subordinate, once and for all, to the 'rule of law.'

A nation bent on expansion even as it anxiously policed difference, a gendered logic of home that was mobilized for conquest, a cacophony of voices that insisted the United States was not an empire while mobilizing for American hegemony: these were not just ironies or hypocrisies; they were the structure itself.

The year after Anarchy of Empire was released, Amy was elected president of the American Studies Association. This made sense, given Kaplan's reputation as a scholar and a mentor to younger scholars, but it was also a statement. At the height of the Iraq war, the ASA chose a person who had made analysis of empire the heart of her work. Her presidential speech in 2004, published in American Quarterly, made good on the promise of her election. The essay was innovative, political, and deeply influential in the analysis of the locations of U.S. expansion. "Where is Guantánamo?" asked about that liminal space of a U.S. base, housed in another country, a Cold War remnant now repurposed for the War on Terror. "Guantánamo lies at the heart of the American Empire, a dominion at once rooted in specific locales and dispersed unevenly all over the world." Kaplan wrote, launching an essay that closely analyzed questions of sovereignty, exploring how the "legal black hole" of Guantánamo was shaped by a long history of U.S. military intervention in the Caribbean and the ways that the U.S. government both claimed and denied its control over its most notorious carceral encampment.

It was somewhere during this time that Amy and I became friends. She had been a generous, demanding outside reader for the manuscript of Epic Encounters, and I was an admiring young professor. But we soon got to know each other as colleagues and friends. Mostly, that happened in Beirut. Starting in about 2005, Amy and I were both for several years on the International Board for the Center for American Studies and Research (CASAR) at the American University of Beirut. We went to the bi-annual conferences that during those years were one of the most exciting intellectual sites for American Studies scholars from the Middle East, the United States, and Europe with an interest in empire. At one of those conference, the CASAR staff organized a tour of southern Lebanon, which had been heavily bombed in Israel's 2006 invasion. I didn't go (I was doing interviews for my second book), but Amy and I had dinner after. She was deeply shaken by the trip, seeing—not for the first time, but newly—the devastating impact of Israel's military power in the region.

That tour was part of the process of Amy's beginning to work on her most personal, most difficult book, the one that would become Our American Israel. Writing it meant not only distancing herself from the liberal Zionism of her younger life, but a willingness to do so in detail and publicly. As she turned her critical eye to the history of the American embrace of Israel, she was determined to analyze that history not just as the particular preoccupation of American Jews, or American evangelicals, but as a broader story about the cultural narratives that made so many people "come to feel that the bond between the United States and Israel was historically inevitable, morally right, and a matter of common sense." Kaplan's argument was careful but unsparing: there has been a history of myth-making in which Israel is figured as the "invincible victim"—a nation marked as perpetually in danger but militarily masterful. The win/win model draws on the love affair that Americans tend to have with action-movie ready military power and well-executed violence, as well as the ideological and moral force that can accrue to those who are seen as victims.

For me, the most powerful chapter in the book is the one on the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, since it was there, Kaplan argues, that Israel's image as righteous underdog began to unravel. The images of the siege of Beirut and the destruction of the city shocked American audiences. "This is not the Israel we have seen in the past," commented John Chancellor of NBC News. It was not, although not because Israel had not already been involved in destroying the homes and lives of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. But this was a television war, and although Israel's allies pushed back hard, it set the stage for a slow (very slow) change in views. By the time of the first intifada in 1987, there was a sense of change afoot. The U.S. conversation on Israel, Palestine, and US policy has moved fitfully and in limited ways, but it has moved, and Kaplan's book helps us understand both how that alliance evolved and how hard it has been to challenge.

This was a hard book for Amy to write, and one she did not publish without anxiety. Her public stances in favor of the BDS movement had already led to a number of personal attacks, and she expected that the book would lead to more of the same. That happened some, but not in the ways she feared. Instead, Our American Israel book was widely reviewed not only in academic journals but in general audience publications, with positive, often glowing assessments in the left and liberal media the Nation, Mondoweiss—but also in less expected places like Foreign Affairs, the (UK) Spectator, the New York Review of Books. The conservative-leaning Jerusalem Post reviewed the book with far less enthusiasm, as did a number of conservative and/or pro-Israel websites, but it was striking that so many outlets did not feel they could ignore the book. That mattered.

Our American Israel was published in October 2018, 70 years after Israel's founding—and just a few months after Amy was diagnosed with brain cancer. Her first and only book talk was hosted by the University of Pennsylvania,
where a number of colleagues from Penn and beyond talked about the book's contributions. Amy had just been through surgery, but she came, listened, and spoke briefly. For the next two years, she struggled with her illness and the difficulties of treatment, surrounded by her family and friends. She was happy to know that her last book was having an impact, and she followed politics closely until the final months of her life, protesting against Trump or police violence when she could.

Amy's vision of politics was anti-imperialist, anti-racist, and feminist; she lived that through her writings and also through her engagement with her students and colleagues. Unlike some star academics, she did all of the hard work of being an academic with seriousness: reading dissertation chapters closely, writing recommendation letters, writing manuscript reviews, serving as department chair. One of her former graduate students, Phillip Maciak, described her as “brilliant, unsparing, unindulgent reader.” Indeed. Many scholars’ research and writing are far better as a result of her engagement, her willingness to support the intellectual work of her students and colleagues. But even for those who never met her, Kaplan's ethical commitment to her scholarship and to the politics that informed and inflected it have served, and will continue to serve, as a model for students, scholars, and activists alike.

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