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Carol Chin is Associate Professor of History and Principal of Woodsworth College at the University of Toronto. Her research and teaching interests are in late nineteenth through twentieth century American foreign relations, specializing in U.S.-East Asian relations and the intersection of national identity with concepts of empire, culture, and gender. She is the author of *Modernity and National Identity in the United States and East Asia, 1895-1919* (2010).

Emily Conroy-Krutz is Associate Professor of History at Michigan State University. She is the author of *Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic* (2015). Her writings on religion, reform, empire, and gender can be found in the *Journal of the Early Republic*, *Early American Studies*, *Diplomatic History*, *H-Diplo*, *Journal of American History*, *Washington Post*, and several edited volumes. She is currently at work on *Missionary Diplomacy: Religion and American Foreign Relations in the Nineteenth Century*, as well as an edited volume on empire in the early American Republic.

Susan Ferber is an executive editor for American and world history at Oxford University Press in New York. Books she has edited have won numerous prizes, including the National Book Award, Pulitzer Prizes, Bancroft Prizes, and a Los Angeles Times Book Prize. In addition to speaking regularly about publishing at universities and scholarly conferences, she shared some of her thoughts on editing scholarly work in *What Editors Do* (2018).

Justin Hart is Associate Professor of History at Texas Tech University, where he is also Senior Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Conflict. He is the author of *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (2013) and several articles and book chapters on U.S. public diplomacy and the cultural dimensions of U.S. foreign relations. He completed his Ph.D. in History at Rutgers University. His current project is a history of the failed campaign for Universal Military Training in the United States.


Kristy Ironside is Assistant Professor of Russian History at McGill University. She is currently finishing her first book, tentatively titled, *A Full-Value Ruble: The Promise of Prosperity in the Postwar Soviet Union, 1945-1964*, which looks at the Soviet government’s attempts to strengthen the ruble and use money toward the intertwined projects of postwar reconstruction and communist advance. She is also beginning a second monograph on the Soviet Union and international copyright.

Autumn Lass is Assistant Professor of History at Wayland Baptist University. She specializes in U.S. foreign relations and Cold War propaganda and public diplomacy. She is currently working on a book manuscript, “Far from Being Propaganda”: The Office of Public Affairs, Truth-Telling, and Domestic Propaganda during the Truman Administration.
Kyle Longley is Snell Family Dean's Distinguished Professor of History and Political Science at Arizona State University. He is the author and editor of nine books, including *In the Eagle’s Shadow: The United States and Latin America* (2002); *The Enduring Legacy: Leadership and National Security Affairs during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan* (2017, with Brad Coleman); *LBJ’s 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval* (2018); and *In Harm’s Way: A History of the American Military Experience* (2019; with Gene Smith and David Coffey).

Henry Richard Maar III is a modern U.S. historian with interests in the Cold War and peace activism. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 2015 and was subsequently the Agnese N. Haury postdoctoral fellow at NYU. His book on the Nuclear Freeze movement is forthcoming with Cornell University Press.

Rósa Magnúsdóttir is Associate Professor of History at Aarhus University in Denmark. She is the author of *Enemy Number One: The United States of America in Soviet Ideology and Propaganda, 1945-1959* (2018), and her most recent book is a volume co-edited with Óscar J. Martín García, *Machineries of Persuasion: European Soft Power and Public Diplomacy during the Cold War* (2019).


Simon Miles is Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Slavic and Eurasian Studies at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy. He teaches and researches U.S. grand strategy, nuclear weapons, and Cold War international history. He is the author of *Engaging the Evil Empire: U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1980-1985*, which is forthcoming from Cornell University Press. His next monograph, *On Guard for Peace and Socialism: The Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991*, will be an international history of the Cold War-era military alliance.

David Snyder is Faculty Principal of the Carolina International House and Clinical Associate Professor of History and Global Studies at the University of South Carolina. His most recent publication, co-edited with Giles Scott-Smith and Alessandro Brogi, is *The Legacy of J. William Fulbright: Policy, Power, and Ideology* (2019). He is currently completing a manuscript, *The Dutch Encounter with the American Century: Modernization and the Origins of Clientelism in The Netherlands, 1945-1958*.

Alistair Somerville is a graduate fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. He is also the producer and host of *The Europe Desk*, a podcast about European and transatlantic affairs from the BMW Center for German and European Studies.


Denise J. Youngblood is Professor of History Emerita at the University of Vermont, where she taught Russian and East European history for nearly three decades. She has written extensively on Russian and Soviet cinema from 1908 to the present, including seven books and numerous articles and film reviews. Her most recent research has focused on the cultural Cold War: *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (2010, with Tony Shaw); *Bondarchuk’s War and Peace: Russian Literary Classic to Soviet Cinematic Epic* (2014); and “Cold War Sport, Film, and Propaganda: A Comparative Analysis of the Superpowers,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* (2017, with Tony Shaw).
The winter holiday season is for me a time of gratitude. Relieved though I may be to finish grading, each letter entered into the registrar’s ledger is also a farewell that reminds me how much I have learned from my students. After shutting the door on another semester and heading out across the dark and empty quad, I turn my attention to end-of-the-year charitable donations, time with friends and family, and books that I don’t have time to read in the frenetic height of the semester. It is time to catch up on Diplomatic History and to finish prepping for the January Council meeting; time to anticipate the annual awards luncheon, the Stuart L. Bernath Lecture, and the SHAFR reception at the AHA. As the calendar advances another year, I am grateful for meaningful work as a U.S. foreign relations historian and for SHAFR for supporting this work and connecting me with others who recognize its urgency and value.

Since SHAFR relies heavily on the volunteer labor of its members, I would like to dedicate my first column as SHAFR president to those who have given considerable time, energy, and thought to SHAFR over the past year, starting with my predecessor, Barbara Keys. Ara worked tirelessly on behalf of SHAFR during her term, appointing a task force on conference conduct; rolling out the new code of conduct; creating ad hoc committees on ethics and branding and the job crisis in academia; conducting (in collaboration with the Membership Committee) a survey of lapsed members; helping Matt Connelly (SHAFR’s representative to the National Coalition for History) and Richard Immerman (chair of SHAFR’s Historical Documentation Committee) arrange a meeting with AHA, OAH, National Coalition for History, and other stakeholders on concerning National Archive issues; and presiding over the annual conference.

Under her leadership, SHAFR signed on to a case brought by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington against the current administration to enforce adherence to the recordkeeping requirements of the Presidential Records Act. As part of her commitment to transparency and open communication, she organized a “State of SHAFR” panel at the Arlington conference. She also brought her management talents to bear on in-house matters such as orientation materials for new Council members and annual reviews for salaried non-editorial staff.

What makes this record of service all the more remarkable is that Ara packed it all into a ten-month term. Realizing that the president-elect needs to get hopping on SHAFR business well before the January Council meeting, she proposed the By-law change that shifted the vice presidential and presidential terms to a November 1 to October 31 calendar. Ara broke a significant organizational ceiling by serving as the first SHAFR president based outside the United States, and her outside-the-United States perspective proved valuable in discussions of matters such as Gold Open Access publishing. It is my good fortune, as well as SHAFR’s, that she will continue to serve on Council, along with her two immediate predecessors, Mary Dudziak and Peter Hahn.

I’d like to thank the terrific slate of candidates in the recent election for their willingness to serve SHAFR in elected office and to extend my warmest congratulations to the newly elected members of the SHAFR leadership team: Vice President/President-Elect Andrew Preston and Council members Kyle Longley, Lauren Turek, and Karine Walther. They will join continuing Council members Adriane Lentz-Smith, Lien-Hang Nguyen, Andrew Johns, Kelly Shannon, Brian McNamara, and Vivien Chang to set SHAFR policy and provide oversight of SHAFR’s affairs. The Council continues to be supported by Executive Director Amy Sayward, who shoulders the day-to-day work of SHAFR. Conference Coordinator Amandá Bündy, IT Director George Fujii, Passport editor Andrew Johns, and Diplomatic History editors Anne Foster and Petra Goedde also perform indispensable work for SHAFR. Hats off to all of you!

Among the many committee chairs and members who are generously donating time and talents this year to SHAFR are conference co-chairs Gretchen Heefner and Julia Irwin and their 2020 Conference Committee: Megan Black, Andrew Buchanan, Jeffrey Byrne, Emily Conroy-Krutz, Konstantine Dierks, Rebecca Herman Weber, Humberto García-Muñiz, Molly Geidel, Daniel Immerwahr, Kevin Kim, Jeannette Jones, Stephen Macekura, David Milne, Corinna Unger, Ngoei Wen-Qing, and Ronald Williams II. They have been busy reading proposals and hope to finalize the program by February.

As a reminder, the conference will be held in New Orleans from Thursday June 18 to Saturday June 20 at the Westin New Orleans Canal Place. The opening night plenary on the Second World War will be held at the World War II Museum, just blocks from the conference hotel. The Friday plenary on the Caribbean world will anchor the Friday plenary on the Caribbean world will anchor
conference theme, “Gulfs, Seas, Oceans, Empires,” chosen to mark New Orleans’ historical place as a port city and center of exchange.

The Local Arrangements Committee (Günter Bischof, Jana Lipman, Heather Stur, and Chad Parker) has also been prepping for June. In addition to arranging for the World War II Museum event, they have been identifying restaurants to recommend, researching tour possibilities, and securing sponsorships for catered and other events.

The 2020 conference will be proceeded by a Summer Institute on “Women in the World,” that will help SHAFR commemorate the centennial of the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. Institute participants will reflect on issues such as gender, race, empire, and decolonization; the construction and maintenance of feminist spaces and practices within patriarchal systems and discourses; racialized spaces and policies; methods of navigating the binaries of gender and of nationalism/internationalism; and the interactions between discourses and practices of human rights and women’s rights.

Along with the Institute, there will be another pre-conference gathering this June: a second book workshop. This initiative is aimed at mid-career scholars who are researching and writing their second book and who would like to receive feedback on their work. Participants will be part of a group of four peers; they will give comments to others and receive feedback themselves. They will also have the opportunity to speak to a mentor. Ilaria Scaglia and her colleagues on the Women’s Committee have taken the initiative to organize this event, which is not limited to women. If you are interested in applying, please check the announcement in this issue of Passport and SHAFR e-blasts for details.

One of the tasks that will occupy my presidency is refreshing our website as we also upgrade the underlying platform. In preparation for this work, I have commissioned an ad hoc committee to assess SHAFR’s communications across various platforms. Another task is to follow through on the suggestion made at the “State of SHAFR” panel last June to create more of an institutional structure for public outreach efforts. I would welcome your thoughts on these and other SHAFR endeavors.

As an organization that relies heavily on volunteer labor, SHAFR is what we make it. Whether newbie or old timer, regardless of the particular chronological, geographical, and thematic interests that brought you to SHAFR, there is a place for you in our organization. If you would like to become more involved through committee service, please fill out the form on the “volunteer” page of our website.

As the new year dawns wherever you may be, I hope you will join me in gratitude for those who have made SHAFR what it is today. Even better, help pay our debt forward by reaching out to potential members (perhaps through a gift membership for a student or by spreading word of our annual conference) and visiting the “donate” page on the SHAFR website. Development Committee chair Melani McAlister would welcome the opportunity to speak to members interested in supporting SHAFR’s ongoing and future endeavors.

It is a treat to be part of the lively, curious, intrepid, principled, and globally aware community that is SHAFR. Thank you for making SHAFR such a wonderful professional home.

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2019 SHAFR Election Results

President          Kristin Hoganson,  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Vice President    Andrew Preston,  Clare College, University of Cambridge
Council           Kyle Longley,  Arizona State University
Council           Lauren Turek,  Trinity University
Council           Karine Walther,  Georgetown University at Qatar
Nominating Committee  Kathy Rasmussen,  Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State

In addition, the three referenda to amend the SHAFR By-Laws to change the start date of the SHAFR presidency to November 1; to change the title of the vice president to vice president/president-elect; and to remove the limit of the size of the Program Committee to five members were all approved by the membership.

Thank you to the 47.9% of SHAFR members who voted in the election this year.
A Roundtable on Daniel Immerwahr,  
How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States

Carol Chin, Thomas Bender, Emily Conroy-Krutz, David Milne, Odd Arne Westad, and  
Daniel Immerwahr

Introduction to the Roundtable on Daniel Immerwahr,  
How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States

Carol Chin

Daniel Immerwahr’s How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States is a remarkable book. It’s not often that a book changes the way we think about something as fundamental as the nature of the United States—or rather, the non-states of America. Immerwahr brilliantly (and entertainingly) illuminates the ways in which the United States has consistently hidden, obfuscated, and ignored the existence of its extensive territorial possessions. For instance, at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, most Americans had no idea that the Philippines, Guam, and other strange places were part of the United States. Yet these territories accounted for about 12% of the population and about one-fifth of the land mass of the United States (110), while Manila at the time was the sixth largest city in the United States (210). Instead, most people carried in their heads what he calls the “logo map” of the United States—the shape of the 48 continental states, with the possible addition of Alaska and Hawaii. In 2017, the governors of Guam, threatened by North Korea, and Puerto Rico, in the wake of Hurricane Maria, had to remind the mainland public (and the U.S. government?) that their populations are American citizens on American soil (392). (Every April 15 I’m struck by the fact that the inhabitants of Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Marianas, and the rest send their tax returns to the same IRS processing center as those of us who are U.S. citizens living in foreign countries.)

The book is too richly detailed to attempt a comprehensive summary, but among my favorite episodes are the Filipino architect Juan Arellano, who designed iconic buildings in Manila in the style of the Columbian Exposition’s White City (chapter 8); the standardization of screw threads and stop signs to American specifications (chapter 18); the comic-opera defense of the Great Swan islands (a lot of beer was involved); and the U.S. government’s announcement that it was annexing a handful of Pacific guano islands, forgetting that it already owned them (chapter 20). In addition to these and other highlights, How to Hide an Empire has accomplished something else: it has made me actually look forward to teaching the U.S. foreign relations survey next time around. Assigning the book would mean completely revamping the way I teach the course, but I can’t wait to see what my Canadian students make of it.

All of the reviewers praise the scope and ambition of the book. Thomas Bender calls it “a tour de force,” citing the author’s “elaboration of both the ideas and practice of empire” while being attentive to “the voices of the colonized as well as the colonizers.” The book, he says, represents “a history of imperialism at a global scale,” combining intellectual history and a kind of military history that is “less about war than the management of colonial people and their response. Most important, he gets very close to the human meaning of empire.” For Emily Conroy-Krutz, “one of the greatest achievements of the book is Immerwahr’s ability to use territory to link nineteenth and twentieth century histories of American empire.” This theme “comes pretty close to giving us a clear narrative through-line across the chronological breaks that have for so long seemed disruptive.” David Milne agrees with the author’s own characterization that the “book’s main contribution . . . is perspectival, seeing a familiar history differently.” Many of the chapters, Milne points out, cover more or less familiar ground, but taken as “the sum of its parts,” Immerwahr’s approach “opens multiple vistas,” often in surprising ways. Odd Arne Westad particularly appreciates Immerwahr’s depiction of American empire as similar to European empires in its original uses of power but very different in its post-imperial transformation. Westad praises Immerwahr’s treatment of “the never fully resolved ideological contradictions of a U.S. empire,” revealing the economic, racial and strategic reasons for America’s state of denial about its territories.

Our reviewers are also impressed by the readability of the book and the author’s success in making it accessible to a general audience without losing scholarly credibility, as well as his lively storytelling and beautifully readable prose.

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and he celebrates Immerwahr’s achievement in producing a critical history that the general public can, and will, read. When the reviewers point out omissions and shortcomings, they do so almost apologetically, referring to their criticisms as “nitpicking” (Conroy-Krutz) or “quibbles” in a “fine book” (Westad). Bender feels that the anti-Imperialists get short shrift, suggesting that a more detailed treatment of their arguments “would help understanding what happened and what did not happen.” Conroy-Krutz finds it “peculiar” that a book focused on territory gives so little space to the nineteenth century. She would like to see more attention to such themes as settler colonialism within the American continent (Wisconsin and Deseret as contrasting case studies); the role of religion and missionaries in “shaping the potential Americanness (or not) of the settlers” in these territories; and more of the “cultural and economic definition of empire” applied to the earlier period as well as the twentieth century. Westad wishes for “more comparison with other empires” (Britain, France, Russia, and China); a deeper analysis of America’s treatment of Native Americans and African-American slaves as foundational to its conception of colonized peoples; and even “a more through discussion of U.S. capitalism.”

In response to the reviewers, Immerwahr acknowledges that he had to make choices about how much space to devote to certain subjects and themes. By his telling, the American empire was a much huger enterprise than most of us usually think of it, and for the book to give due weight to territorial expansion in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries, draw comparisons to other empires, and include a more expansive treatment of the evolution of capitalism, among other topics, would have made it unwieldy, to say the least. (Indeed, for a 400-plus page book of history to achieve the status of “crossover hit” and appear in airport bookstalls is already a coup; at 600 or 800 pages, that probably wouldn’t have happened. I, for one, rarely have that much space left in my carry-on.) More interesting than mere length, however, is the author’s explanation of the narrative choices he made. Unlike with a scholarly monograph, where it is necessary to include all the evidence needed to support an argument, in this case Immerwahr was more concerned with narrative, plot, and character. Before telling of the destruction of Manila, he says he needed to bring the city to life, to make the readers “care about it.” In this he has succeeded brilliantly. Not only Manila, but the guano islands, the Aleutians, and all the other territories and outposts become vivid characters in a dramatic tale. The reader not only cares about these places and their inhabitants but comes to deeply appreciate their importance to the formation and continuance of American empire. In Immerwahr’s finely crafted narrative, the formerly hidden empire is rendered unforgettable.

**Review of Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States**

**Thomas Bender**

Daniel Immerwahr’s *How to Hide an Empire* is a tour de force. It is also deeply researched, expansive (as in global), and written in prose that is at once conversational and precise. Immerwahr makes a fresh and rich argument about making of the American empire to the 1960s. His book might be considered at once a new approach and a culmination of the historical studies of the American empire going back to William Appleman Williams’s *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959) and the work of Walter LaFeber, Lloyd Gardner, and Appleman’s other students at Wisconsin in the 1960s and 1970s. Immerwahr’s book is effectively global, and, equally important, he has richly populated its stories and perspectives with actors from both the imperial establishment and the colonized populations. He draws his readers deeply into the aspirations and actions of both the conquerors and the colonized people in the collapsing Spanish Empire who aspired to independence and democracy. They had hoped the Americans, who had thrown off a colonial power, would support or at least allow their aspiration. Instead, the Americans re-conquered them. Immerwahr addresses other territories, but he focuses on the largest acquisition, with the richer history: the Spanish Empire, which was remade into an American empire.

For some time, historians of imperialism have sought to address the lives and politics of colonized people caught in a lopsided balance of rights, even of visibility, within an empire. To date I have not seen anyone so able as Immerwahr do that in such detail while operating on a global scale. For some time, historians of imperialism have sought to address the lives and politics of colonized people caught in a lopsided balance of rights, even of visibility, within an empire. To date I have not seen anyone so able as Immerwahr do that in such detail while operating on a global scale. For example, in a chapter entitled “Doctors Without Borders,” he gives a blow-by-blow account of the Rockefeller Foundation’s campaign to banish hookworm in Puerto Rico and the American South. That linkage was unwelcome to southern leaders, but he notes that many Puerto Ricans were also uneasy at being identified as having an unhygienic culture.

Immerwahr also tracks the search for reliable modes of combating human health disasters associated with social poverty, and he looks closely at the work of administrators on the ground, both good and irresponsible, as well as those in the higher echelons of the imperial organization. As he details numerous sites, he elaborates their transnational or global histories over the course of as much as a century.

The only recent book in American history that works on this scale and achieves such an expansive framing, richness of detail, and inclusion of a wide spectrum of voices is Steven Hahn’s history of the nineteenth-century United States, *A Nation Without Borders: The United States and Its World in an Age of Civil Wars, 1830–1910* (2016). Both historians focus on a vast number of individual actors within a broad context. Immerwahr ranges widely but also dives deeply into incidents without losing context. He captures the perspectives of the military and the colonials both on the ground as well as at the heart of the empire. Like Hahn, he also captures many of the sentiments of the oppressed—potential leaders and ordinary people alike—under American rule. Both writers provide broad structure for highly detailed experiences and voices representing all
aspects of society and politics.

Immerwahr begins in the nineteenth century, when settlers were sweeping across the continent and displacing the native peoples. In time those peoples would be removed from their historical lands and sent to reservations. The expansionist ambition was present from the beginning of the new nation, and it had a devastating impact not only on Native Americans but also on Africans, whose enslavement was vastly expanded. Americans continually sought more space. That search was not wholly westering; antebellum southerners looked to the Caribbean as well. Though it is mostly forgotten, Thomas Jefferson even launched a campaign to capture eastern Canada. The Canadians do remember it. It is a holiday.

By midcentury, the idea of “manifest destiny” had been articulated in the United States Magazine and Democratic Review. The United States, it said, had a “manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by providence” (35). Notably, the Native Americans and Mexicans were airbrushed away, and expansion went to the Southwest and California by way of war with Mexico. In the 1860s, William Seward, Lincoln’s secretary of state, purchased Alaska, a venture that was characterized by many as his “Folly.” But I believe that Seward had commerce, not territory, on his mind. He understood that Alaska’s Aleutian Islands pointed to the east, not the arctic, and the purchase brought the United States closer to the northern islands of Japan for purposes of trade, not empire.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan published his classic, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890). Frederick Jackson Turner may have proclaimed that the frontier was “closed” in his famous address of 1893, but Mahan had already declared that “the seas were open” (63). Theodore Roosevelt grasped the implications of Turner’s thesis and realized that it sharpened the significance of Mahan’s argument for expanding American power—and empire.

A Supreme Court ruling on the Guano Islands Act (1856) established a precedent and a constitutional foundation for oceanic imperialism. The ruling in the case legitimized ownership of a territory of the United States not contiguous with the continent. These islands off the coast of Peru were valuable for their bird droppings, which were a rich fertilizer. It was literally a “shitty” foundation for imperialism.

Some of the leaders of the Philippine revolt against Spanish colonization, including revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo, welcomed the American navy. They assumed that the Americans would help secure their emergent republic and never imagined they would impose their imperium in place of that of the Spanish. After all, the Americans were at war with Spain, not the Philippines. They soon discovered that the Americans planned to make their country part of the United States—yet Filipinos would not be citizens. Cubans also hoped that the Americans would liberate them from Spain. But since the middle of the nineteenth century, southern American planters, among others, had been eager to take over Cuba. Eventually, Cubans and Puerto Ricans both saw their republican aspirations crushed. The United States destroyed the republican hopes of peoples in the Caribbean as well as the Pacific.

There was no concept of interior American space in the Constitution, and certainly nothing about colonies. But the Guano Island Act enabled owning offshore territory, and in 1901 the Supreme Court determined, by way of a convoluted phrase, that Puerto Rico was “foreign to the United States in a domestic case” (85). Recent events suggest that this phrase may still be operative in the White House and perhaps the Congress. The Filipinos inhabited the American Philippines, but they were never able to claim citizenship, and independence was a long time coming.

Mark Twain proposed making a small addition to the Constitution: “Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed white men” (95). Woodrow Wilson, like his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, was opposed to the colonization of the Philippines, calling it an “inexcusable blunder.” Those words prompted a Manila newspaper to call him a “modern Moses.” Though a racist and a segregationist, as president he did extend “rights,” if not citizenship, to inhabitants of the territories (115).

The special achievement of Immerwahr’s book is the elaboration of both the idea and practice of empire. Even more novel is the richness of detail he musters in his accounts of colonized peoples and in his rendition of their opinions.

The special achievement of Immerwahr’s book is the elaboration of both the idea and practice of empire. Even more novel is the richness of detail he musters in his accounts of colonized peoples and in his rendition of their opinions.
empire. His writing is wonderfully full, sharp, sometimes amusing, and often attuned to a fine moral compass. Surprisingly, his achievement is built upon massive research that seems to have been done entirely in printed primary and secondary sources. I did not notice any reference to manuscripts. I make this statement simply to remark upon just how much can be accomplished with the vast body of printed materials available. Working with such sources, Immerwahr achieves both enormous breadth and rich detail; and he enables us to hear a great number of individual voices—voices of Americans and colonials, civilians and military.

Immerwahr is a gifted storyteller as well as a scholar. For all its bulk, the book is not wordy. His prose is clean, and he provides the voices of a vast array of speakers, both imperialists and colonized, who represent a wide range of social circumstances and voices. His literary sensibility never flags.

In the end, his book is about more than the empire. It is also about the way the United States went imperial without fully acknowledging it—hence the title of the book. The brilliant image on the book’s dust jacket immediately evokes the concept of a hidden empire. It shows an outline of the continental United States covering the empire. Around the edges of the continent little projections of land stick out, and they all have labels: Guam, Swan Islands, Thule Air Base, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guantánamo, Philippines, Bikini Atoll, Saipan, Alaska, Puerto Rico, Hawai’i. Empire could not be wholly hidden.

The anti-imperialist movement surely noticed it. Americans generally have not and probably still do not think of their country as an empire. They may know the facts of it, but until the Vietnam War the notion of empire had little resonance in American politics. Yet long ago, President McKinley, to his credit, did realize what was at stake. He famously revealed that he had struggled late into the night with the question of whether or not to take possession of the Spanish empire—Cuba and the Philippines. He knew there were arguments against empire, but they did not win him over.

In this book, Immerwahr may underplay the anti-imperialists. Of course, they failed. Losers do not do well in history. Yet for more than reasons than just balance I would have liked to have seen the same kind of rich narrative and insight accorded to them that was given to the imperialists. Immerwahr notes some well-known figures in the anti-imperialism movement, including such diverse figures as Andrew Carnegie, Mark Twain, Nicholas Murray Butler, and William Jennings Bryan. But they (and others) warrant more than a summary disposition. More about the arguments and reach of the opposition would help us to appraise the strength of anti-imperialism as well as the issues of empire raised by the proponents of empire. The content of the full arguments and the responses to their arguments would help us understand what happened and what did not happen.

Happily, Immerwahr also addresses the rare American imperial administrators who were more thoughtful and committed to rights and democracy. They tried to make the situation better for the colonial populations. And that counts. Most notable for his commitment to justice within imperialism was Ernest Gruening of Alaska, who later became governor of Alaska and then a United States senator. As an imperial administrator, he worked hard to bring a sense of justice to his work within the empire in both the Philippines and Cuba. His liberal, even radical views lasted into the 1960s, when he was a strong anti-imperial democrat. I met him as an undergraduate after one his speeches opposing the Vietnam War. He impressed me then, and I am pleased now to see his earlier humane and serious imperial career outlined in this book.

Notes:
2. Yet I must note some annoyance about the system used to reference the documentation. There are no numbered footnotes. Instead, all quotes can be found by page and a word or phrase quoted at the end of the book. This form of notation is not unique to this book, but for me, at least, the numbered system is vastly clearer and more efficient for both the reader and, presumably, the author. I hope this practice does not become more common.

Review of Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States

Emily Conroy-Krutz

Ten years ago, Al Franken drew a state-by-state map of the United States at the Minnesota State Fair.1 I remember laughing with a group of grad school friends at the time, as we tried and failed to do this ourselves. (My husband, who can also do this trick, still maintains that this is not a skill that should overawe Americanists, but I, who decidedly cannot, remain impressed.) The most talented among us could do a decent job of the outer borders, at least. State-by-state was a bit of a mess, though, and could only be decently approximated once we had that general outline to guide us.

That basic shape was what Daniel Immerwahr (via Benedict Anderson) calls the “logo map” of the United States. It is the familiar shape of the lower forty-eight, maybe with Alaska and Hawaii over to the side as insets. It is also, as Immerwahr sets out to explain in How to Hide an Empire, only a partial map of the United States. To really map the United States, you would need to include all its territorial claims. His 1941 map of this “Greater United States” includes Guam, American Samoa, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (9). I bet Franken can’t draw that freehand.

Immerwahr sets out to tell us the history of this Greater United States. Generalist approaches to U.S. history can struggle to fit the governance of the islands in the intervening years into their narratives. Even as we have an abundance of excellent histories of the Philippines and other U.S. territories, those stories are more likely to be set aside, assumed to be of interest primarily to specialists. It is this status quo that Immerwahr sets out to address.

For all its bulk, the book is not wordy. His prose is clean, amusing, and often attuned to a fine moral compass. It is this status quo that Immerwahr sets out to address. Generalist approaches to U.S. history can struggle to fit the governance of the islands in the intervening years into their narratives. Even as we have an abundance of excellent histories of the Philippines and other U.S. territories, those stories are more likely to be set aside, assumed to be of interest primarily to specialists. It is this status quo that Immerwahr sets out to address.
draws you in to learn more. I was hooked by the story in the introduction about a group of seventh-grade students from Kalamazoo who looked up Hawaii in their classroom atlas after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Finding that Hawaii was marked as foreign, they wrote to Rand McNally to request more information about the islands. How was an attack on Pearl Harbor an attack on the United States if the islands were foreign space? Disagreeing with the publisher’s reply that Hawaii was “not an integral part of this country,” the girls forwarded their correspondence to the Department of the Interior. Yes, the department confirmed, Hawaii was part of the United States (12).

In addition to plucky seventh-graders, the book will introduce you to Daniel Burnham and the architects of Manila’s colonial buildings, Bailey Ashford and the history of American colonial medicine, Emilio Aguinaldo and Manuel Quezon and the Philippine independence movement, Herbert Hoover and the quest for standardization, and, perhaps most unexpectedly, the Beatles. If you are curious about how Immerwahr connects the Beatles to a history of American empire, I direct your attention to chapter 21.

One of Immerwahr’s greatest achievements in the book is his use of territory to link nineteenth- and twentieth-century histories of American empire. He manages, in under four hundred pages, to take readers through a survey of American empire that begins with Daniel Boone and ends with drone warfare. Territory alone cannot tell the full story of American empire across these years, of course, but in Immerwahr’s skillful hands it comes pretty close to giving us a clear narrative through-line across chronological breaks that have for so long seemed disruptive. With this approach, 1898 is an important year, but not an unprecedented one. The United States, after all, has been seizing territory from its very beginnings. It was imperial at birth and throughout its development.

Immerwahr divides this story into three acts: westward territorial expansion in the nineteenth century; the annexation of overseas territory in the later nineteenth century; and finally, the giving up of large amounts of territory after the Second World War in response to both resistance movements and technological changes that made large territorial claims unnecessary. Throughout, he focuses on American empire and its opponents, and he is attentive to stories on the ground. His look at colonial governance allows readers to understand the ways in which the territories were of major significance to the story of the United States throughout these years, even if distance allowed many Americans to conveniently forget this fact.

Although the book works to connect the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it leans heavily on the later twentieth century. If you were to divide the book between its nineteenth- and twentieth-century portions, you would have just shy of a quarter of the book to read before hitting the turn of the century; by the time you are halfway done, you would be well into the Second World War. This is not atypical of overviews of U.S. foreign relations, but it seems peculiar for a study of territorial empire. Territory is very much a nineteenth-century story.

Daniel Boone and Oklahoma are the stand-ins here for U.S. territorial empire within what would become the lower forty-eight. Indian removal, such an essential part of any discussion of American empire in the nineteenth century, is told through the creation of Indian country and the way white settlement shrank it to fit within the current state of Oklahoma. As Immerwahr rightly points out, the Trail of Tears was “notorious, but it wasn’t anomalous” (38). Multiple removals worked to send Native Americans into what was called Indian country. As white settlers continued to migrate and demand this land for themselves, still more stages of removal resulted in the continued diminishing of territory. By the end of the 1870s, some thirty-two tribes had been moved into the new Indian country.

This is the story of American settler colonialism, though Immerwahr doesn’t employ that language. Instead, he uses the work of Laura Ingalls Wilder and a comparison between the writing of Lynn Riggs and Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein to provide an emotional gut punch that drives home an interpretation of Oklahoma’s eventual statehood as a key point in American imperial history. You may never hear the music from Oklahoma! in the same way again.

The Oklahoma focus, though, suggests some missed opportunities for further engagement in the nineteenth century. I would have been excited to see Immerwahr engage the work of Bethel Saler on Wisconsin’s status shift from territory to state as a key example of American state-building via settler colonialism. The Mexican War, too, is a topic that ought to have received more attention here. After all, the Mexican cession brought hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory to the United States, all of which went through years of territorial governance before becoming states. If Texas and California had attained statehood by 1850, the others (Nevada, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona) had years—even decades—of territorial status ahead.

The Utah Territory is of particular interest here, given the complex histories of religion and race that it introduces. The Mormons who migrated to Utah in the 1840s were, after all, heading out of the United States and into Mexico to escape religious persecution, ended up fighting with the United States against Mexico, and finally attempted to establish a new state. The initial plan for the statehood of Deseret after the Mexican War (which was rejected) and the eventual acceptance of Utah into statehood only after the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints ended its endorsement of plural marriage decades later is a key part of the story of U.S. territorial governance as empire. Religion, so important to that story, is generally missing as a category of analysis in the book, which might be fine were it not for the key role missionaries played in helping to govern many of these territories Immerwahr is concerned with. They might not be on the guano islands, but they are an essential part of the story of the United States in the Philippines and Oklahoma.

Some later chapters stray from this emphasis on territory, introducing a more cultural and economic definition of American imperialism as the value of territory becomes less important to global power. In these chapters, Immerwahr discusses screw threads, industrial standardization, and the spread of the English language as key parts of the story of America’s global dominance in the late twentieth century. These elements can feel like an awkward fit for the book’s earlier territorial emphasis (not least because of the importance of the British, alongside the Americans, to the linguistic story). The inclusion of these chapters raises the question of what the book would have looked like if Immerwahr had included this more cultural and economic definition of empire earlier. In addition to screw threads, readers might learn about the colonization movement to Liberia, American missionaries around the world, or filibusters to Central and South America, to name just a few of the less territorial topics that historians of nineteenth-century American empire have been working on.

These comments feel a bit like nit-picking for a book
that is so wide in scope and tells its stories with such care and energy. It speaks to the breadth and ambition of the book that a reader can be left wanting more. Synthesis and survey texts present formidable difficulties when we expand our geography and chronology.

How do you tell a history of the Greater United States that takes all of these diverse narratives into account? Synthesis is always hard, as we are confronted with the persistent question of what we need to leave out in order to create a comprehensible through-narrative. If this has been a hard task for generations of survey teachers and writers of textbooks who have largely omitted the territories and their people from America’s story (with a few key exceptions), it gets still harder when we attempt to include the full geographic scope of the United States.

Scholars of the colonial and early national period who have embraced the Omohundro Institute’s call for the study of a “Vast Early America” have explored these questions as well.4 Alan Taylor’s American Colonies is a recent classic that early Americanist might think of as a model for this approach.5 Taylor’s goal seems similar to Immerwahr’s: to help a general readership understand the breadth and diversity of American history by including new voices and new geography and confronting the importance of empire to the United States. For the colonial and revolutionary era, this means including the full continent and the Caribbean; for Immerwahr’s nineteenth- and twentieth-century story, it means including transcontinental and global territorial claims.

This is an exciting time for the history of American empire, with historians of all eras, from the founding of the United States to the war on terror, engaging with the meaning, chronology, shape, and nature of American empire. Hopefully, with a book like How to Hide an Empire, more readers will now know to look out for similar studies. As Immerwahr points out in his introduction, “the problem isn’t a lack of knowledge.” Many historians are out there doing the work. The problem has been, rather, how the popular imagination has categorized what counts as “American” history. The story of American empire isn’t just a story for specialists, after all. In writing such an accessible, entertaining, and thought-provoking book, Immerwahr has given us a narrative history of the Greater United States that can only generate more discussion, debate, and future research.

Notes:
1. See the video here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h0-FYyuvRK.

How to Write Popular History

David Milne

Daniel Immerwahr’s How to Hide an Empire is a rare thing in our field: a genuine crossover hit. It has been reviewed widely and glowingly in high-profile venues like the New York Times and the New Republic, and one can find copies—at a reasonable price—for a lengthy hardback in Barnes and Noble and even in airport bookshops. How has Immerwahr achieved this feat? Surely, reaching a substantial general audience must have required a perilous degree of simplification. Does the book’s commercial success not make it likely that How to Hide an Empire—for all its heft—is lightweight?

Not a bit of it. I can’t remember a book in our field that I enjoyed reading as much as How to Hide an Empire. Immerwahr is a gifted storyteller and he writes in crisp, jargon-free prose. His anecdotes are rich, and the book contains so much variety that reading (and reviewing) it never felt dutiful. But I also learned so much. At book’s end my head swam with new information and insight. Immerwahr demonstrates that there need be no scholarly opportunity cost in writing accessibly for a trade press. This book will be read to illuminating effect by academic historian and layperson alike.

Which is not to say that the book’s originality stems from insights gleaned from deep archival research (although there is plenty of that too). As Immerwahr himself writes, “this book’s main contribution is not archival, bringing to light some never-before-seen document. It’s perspectival, seeing a familiar history differently” (16). Thousands of books, he notes, have been published on the U.S. overseas territories. If you were to assign each of How to Hide an Empire’s constituent chapters to a historian with a corresponding specialism, it is certain that they would find the terrain familiar. What matters here, though, is the sum of the parts.

Immerwahr writes with great verve; one can tell that he took great pleasure in composing this book. His “perspectival” history of America’s hidden empire opens multiple vistas and demonstrates that empire is many different things: from the hurried acquisition of the guano islands in the Pacific in the nineteenth century to the standardization of screw heads in the twentieth. The book segues from the inexplicable absence of Puerto Rican nationalist Pedro Albizu Campos from mainstream history books to the geopolitical revolution wrought by rapid advances in synthetic chemistry: “Take the world’s most advanced economy, cut it off from tropical trade, and send it into overdrive—it was the perfect recipe for a synthetic revolution” (273). Immerwahr observes perceptively that synthetics were an “empire-killing technology,” because the United States could create within its borders those raw materials it had previously acquired through means fair and foul. Synthetics did not kill empire, of course, but they forced it to shape-shift into today’s “pointillist empire” of some eight hundred military bases across the world. By comparison, Russia has nine and Britain and France’s combined total is thirteen. This is a history that compels and often surprises.

A sweeping and accessible book such as this will always attract critics armed with detailed bibliographies. In his long review of Immerwahr’s Bernath-length précis for How to Hide an Empire, Paul Kramer took exception to his distinction between “mainstream history,” which has neglected the history of the U.S. territories, and academic history, which has not. “What exactly is going on with Immerwahr’s use of the term ‘mainstream,’” Kramer asks, “Who is on the outside of ‘mainstream’ history and why doesn’t their scholarship really count?”

It is not so much that academic scholarship doesn’t count, it’s that it isn’t widely read. This matters less when you have skilled historians such as Immerwahr synthesizing this vital academic work for general readers. But if you don’t, then we as a profession have a problem. Without innovative specialist academic research, quality mainstream history atrophies. But if credentialed historians—even if few in number—don’t take on the task of writing mainstream history, then we can hardly complain when the history sections of bookshops are dominated by the works of charlatans.
Daniel Immerwahr has written a first-rate book on how U.S. colonies (now known as territories) have been consistently removed from view in American history and politics. In revealing the process of removal, as well as its causes and origins, Immerwahr provides an essential corrective to U.S. international history: the U.S. empire is not just informal—through global economic and military hegemony—but formal, too, in ways that are both similar to and different from those that characterize past empires. It includes disenfranchisements and expulsions, defense and development, just like European colonial empires. But it was transformed, much more successfully than those of the Europeans, along the lines of U.S.-led globalization. The territories became steppingstones for the maintenance of U.S. global power, while remaining remarkably obscure to most Americans (who would have real difficulty figuring out what a “U.S. territory” even is, at least if I am to judge by the stumbles of my students).

Immerwahr is excellent on the never-fully-resolved ideological contradictions of a U.S. empire: how can a republic, born through anti-colonial resistance, itself obtain overseas possessions through forms of colonial control? The answer is, of course, mainly through denial: engaging in full-scale colonization while publicly disowning that any such act is taking place. But Immerwahr is far too fine a historian to stop there. In what could have become a fairly familiar jeremiad over U.S. perfidy, he tweaks out underlying motives, be they economic, racial, or strategic. By the end of the book, the reader will be familiar with how it is possible to engage repeatedly in imperial construction projects while happily hurrying away from their consequences.

Another strength of Immerwahr’s book is how careful he is with showing the chronological development of U.S. empire and, particularly, how fundamentally it changed over time. Before 1945, the U.S. empire was visible in much the same way European colonies were visible. The Philippines was a major colony, and the fact that it had been promised independence did not make it essentially different from European colonies (some of which had also received such vague promises). What really made U.S. colonialism different was how, during the Cold War, Washington moved from imperial control to a variety of forms of incorporation, ranging from independence with continued economic and military supremacy (the Philippines) to encompassment (Hawai‘i, Alaska) to renewed colonial status (Puerto Rico) and to “baselandia” (Immerwahr’s wonderful term for places like Guam and Guantanamo). It is this constant ability to employ and conceal foreign territorial possessions that sets the current U.S. empire apart, as Immerwahr shows in the final part of his text.

I have very few quibbles with this fine book, but I do have some. I would have liked to see more comparisons with other empires. There is much that can be learned about the U.S. empire by looking at it from without, as Charles Maier, among others, has argued. This is true not just for juxtapositions with European empires, such as Britain and France, but also—and perhaps even more so—for juxtapositions with Russia and China: large, contiguous, transcontinental empires with a multiplicity of ethnic groups, where elites in the twentieth century still wanted their countries to be seen as nation-states, not empires. China today claims that it does not have “overseas possessions,” though some people in Hong Kong would beg to disagree. What it undoubtedly has (and is trying to hide) are continental possessions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, in which its policies range from those similar to U.S. assimilation projects against Native Americans to those used to control and surveil populations in U.S. territories today.

It would also have been useful to see a bit more about the roots that late nineteenth- and twentieth-century U.S. policies have in the deeper past. The displacement policies used against Native Americans are mentioned, but in no great depth, and the treatment of enslaved African Americans as an internal colony is underdeveloped as an antecedent for policies overseas. There is, I think, much explanatory value in these early cases, although I understand why Immerwahr decided to focus on the twentieth century and beyond.

I very much like Immerwahr’s emphasis on the rise of communication networks and standardization, but it would have been useful to have had a more thorough discussion of U.S. capitalism, especially as it changed towards the end of the twentieth century. Since some of these changes are essential to Immerwahr’s main analysis of where we are today, it would have been helpful if he had told us more about them, especially the globalization of financial capital and its consequences for both the United States and its foreign territories. One key issue would be the degree to which the U.S. empire has outlived any meaningful economic purpose and exists simply for reasons of military strategy and power projection.

Immerwahr has written a fun book on how to hide an empire. No mean feat! Though the narrative does go astray from time to time, and the author’s knack for anecdotes can be a bit exhausting (the point, just give me the point!), on most occasions Immerwahr’s ability to tell stories serves his purpose. Overall, this is a terrific contribution to the literature on U.S. expansionism and territorial control. And the big point does come across very clearly: the United States has an empire, though it remains well hidden.

What How to Hide an Empire Hides

Daniel Immerwahr

I was thrilled to learn that Passport would be convening a roundtable on How to Hide an Empire. And I was intimidated when I learned the identities of the knights seated around it. Thomas Bender, Emily Conroy-Krutz,
David Milne, and Odd Arne Westad—this is a positively Arthurian grouping. I am greatly honored by it, and I am grateful to Andrew Johns for arranging it.

I am also relieved that the roundtablists largely approved of the book. Even so, they identified topics about which I should have said more—topics that are, as it were, hidden by How to Hide an Empire. These include settler colonialism, the relationship between slavery and empire, religion, anti-imperialism, financial globalization, and rival empires. Before addressing them, I should say how I chose what to put in the book and what to leave out.

As David Milne explains, this is a crossover book, aimed at the airport bookstore as much as the university library. Milne, who also writes crossover books (as do Bender and Westad), gives a good justification for this. My sense is that while democratic values generally guide our research, we scholars can be far less inviting in our prose, frequently writing in ways that confound even graduate students. A progressive politics of knowledge production is too often paired with a Reanogeics of knowledge distribution, whereby we write esoterically and then expect that our findings will somehow “trickle down” to the public.

I am not proposing that all of us write trade books all the time. But some of us should write them some of the time, and this topic struck me as an especially good candidate. As I seek to show, territorial empire is a central part of the United States’ past, despite its general absence from the shelves at Barnes & Noble. So, from the start, I wrote this book with a general audience in mind. That meant eschewing jargon, of course. But my literary agent, Edward Orloff, and my editor, Alex Stár, taught me that there are differences between general-interest and specialist history beyond the level of the sentence. Paragraphing, affect, and chapter structure matter, too. Most of all, I came to appreciate larger narrative concerns. In short: plot.

When I was writing a monograph, questions of what to include boiled down to what the analysis required. In writing How to Hide an Empire, I also asked what the narrative needed. For example, I wanted a chapter on World War II in the Pacific, particularly the leveling of Manila in 1945. But for that to work, my readers had to know something of that city, to care about it. That strongly encouraged me, in making my “colonies as laboratories” argument, to use the story of how Daniel Burnham planned Manila. Having seen some of those buildings go up, my readers could feel the loss when the same buildings were destroyed. In writing How to Hide an Empire, I prioritized such connections and chose my topics with narrative implications in mind. Such fascinating episodes as the Mormon campaign for the state of Deseret fell by the wayside for this reason. Conroy-Kutz wishes I had discussed Deseret, and part of me wishes I had, too. But I am reassured by Milne’s sense that the resulting narrative, for all its Deseret-sized gaps, succeeds in inviting the reader into the rich world of U.S. imperial history.

None of this is an excuse for ignoring worthy subjects, but it is an explanation of why my book doesn’t attempt to cover all relevant facets of territorial empire, as it might have had I written it only for specialists. I am thus glad for the chance to briefly address some omissions and underemphasized topics (though, in a meta-omission, I won’t discuss here all the holes the reviewers have found).

Emily Conroy-Kutz notes a pronounced chronological imbalance in my account. Nineteenth-century settler colonialism gets only two of my twenty-two chapters, as compared to at least three (and arguably six) chapters about the Second World War. “This is not atypical of overviews of U.S. foreign relations,” Conroy-Kutz writes, “but it seems peculiar for a study of territorial empire. Territory is very much a nineteenth-century story.”

She is right. I had set out to write about overseas territory, and I was particularly interested in carrying the story past 1898 and the Philippine War. But I soon concluded that I would need to say something about territorial empire within the contiguous United States, too. I had two options. I could give continental empire and overseas empire each their due weight, which would mean adding a lot about the nineteenth century. Or I could do what many U.S. foreign relations specialists do, which is to treat Indigenous dispossession as a quick prelude to empire abroad.

Feeling that I had far more to say about overseas empire (my research specialty) and that the nineteenth-century material would already be somewhat familiar to my readers, I chose the second option. But Conroy-Kutz’s point deserves underscoring: to tell the tale in full, you would have to say much more about the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than I do. And this relates to another important point, which is that the story of North American territorial empire doesn’t end in the nineteenth century. There are 573 federally recognized tribal nations in the country today. More attention to nineteenth-century territorial empire would not only restore chronological balance, it would also enrich the ensuing story by forcing a greater recognition of the persistence and evolution of Native sovereignty in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Odd Arne Westad would also have liked to see more on the nineteenth-century roots of overseas empire. Here, he mentions not only Native Americans but also African Americans. How did the capture and enslavement of an “internal colony” of black laborers serve as an “antecedent” for later imperial policies? It is a powerful question. Historians haven’t yet settled on an answer to it.

Nevertheless, I’ll take a stab. Slavery and the subsequent subordination of African Americans hummed in the background of all imperial policy. U.S. leaders had white supremacy in mind when shaping the borders of the country and governing colonized peoples within it, and their commitment to white supremacy derived in large part from their thought about black/white relations. They often mapped attitudes about African Americans onto colonial subjects, sometimes quite transparently.

However, that mapping was never perfect, because there were fundamental differences between the “internal colony” (a stark numerical minority of African Americans living in close proximity to whites) and the external ones (large majorities of colonized subjects and generally very few mainlanders on the ground). White leaders had come to grips with the presence of both blacks and Indians on the North American continent and had different models for thinking about each. I suspect that overseas colonial subjects got swept under the rug so often because they didn’t fit easily into either category.

Finally, Thomas Bender suggests that I may have underplayed the role of anti-imperialists. A recent edited collection by Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton, Empire’s Twin, supports Bender’s point about the enduring importance of anti-imperialism in U.S. history. Just because they “failed,” Bender writes, doesn’t mean that anti-imperialists don’t deserve place of pride in the narrative.

I would go further than that. I think we can identify some anti-imperialist successes of lasting consequence. One occurred in the nineteenth century, when opponents of expansion, largely seeking to protect white supremacy, blocked a number of attempted annexations for fear of letting too many nonwhites into the country. Another took
place during the Philippine War, when such critics as Mark Twain publicized the war’s atrocities so loudly as to force even diehard imperialists like Teddy Roosevelt into retreat. The post–World War II turn away from colonial empire, which resulted in independence for the Philippines and statehood for Hawai‘i and Alaska, can also be counted as an anti-imperialist success. The irony is that opposition to colonial empire, felt in the United States as well as throughout the Global South, helped push the United States toward a less intensive but more extensive form of territorial empire: the maintenance of hundreds of small military bases around the planet.

Bender ends by recalling his encounter with a key anti-imperialist, Senator Ernest Gruening, who served as the first head of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions in the Interior Department. After a long and varied career that put him at the center of U.S. territorial politics for decades, Gruening became a vocal opponent of the Vietnam War. Bender met him after one of Gruening’s antiwar speeches, and the senator impressed him as just and humane.

I will close with a similar story, which will give a sense of how much these reviews—from scholars I deeply admire—mean to me. When I was an undergraduate, I had my first exposure to colonial history through an architecture class, where I wrote a paper about architectural imperialism in Hawai‘i. My professor suggested I seek out a historian working at a nearby university who might have something to say about these matters. I did, and that historian gave me a speech about the vital importance—ethical and intellectual—of seeing the United States as part of global history. I was transfixed; I felt as if I had just received marching orders. Though I am sure the historian forgot about it soon afterward, it was in retrospect the single most consequential conversation of my professional life, and the origin moment of this book.

That historian? Thomas Bender.

Notes:
2. Not only did U.S. leaders view colonial subjects differently from African Americans and Native Americans, they viewed colonized peoples as themselves a heterogeneous collection. Lanny Thompson makes this case well in Imperial Archipelago: Representation and Rule in the Insular Territories under U.S. Dominion after 1898 (Honolulu, HI, 2010).

In the next issue of Passport:
*A roundtable on Jennifer Miller’s Cold War Democracy
* Teaching Sport and Foreign Relations
* A roundtable on Lucy Salyer’s Under the Starry Flag

and much more!
A Roundtable on
Rósa Magnúsdóttir,
Enemy Number One: The United States of America in Soviet Ideology and Propaganda, 1945-1959

David Snyder, Denise J. Youngblood, Simon Miles, Kristy Ironside, Autumn Lass, and
Rósa Magnúsdóttir

Introduction to the Roundtable on Rósa Magnúsdóttir’s
Enemy Number One

David Snyder

Like the little dog Toto, Rósa Magnúsdóttir’s Enemy Number One: The United States of America in Soviet Ideology and Propaganda, 1945-1959, offers readers a peek behind the curtain of Cold War-era Soviet ideological production. Most reviewers in this roundtable concur that Magnúsdóttir offers valuable insight into the making of Soviet ideology during the early Cold War, especially for non-specialists needing an introduction to Soviet ideological machinery in this period. For Kristy Ironside, Magnúsdóttir offers a “nuanced portrayal of Soviet propaganda-making.” Autumn Lass judges the book an “excellent addition” to the historiography. Simon Miles asserts that “Enemy Number One is a valuable contribution to the historiography of the Cold War.” I concur with these judgments, yet like that earlier Technicolor view behind the curtain, there may be cause to question what is revealed.

Magnúsdóttir examines the manufacture and dissemination of Soviet propaganda, and undoubtedly she does map out the larger political and ideological terrain in which Soviet propaganda bureaucracies and agencies worked. She demonstrates that historical developments inside (especially Stalin’s death) and outside that bureaucracy impacted the development of Soviet ideology and hence of Soviet propaganda. This is a view of the propaganda factory, if you will, and a sense of the political conditions under which such propaganda was made. So far so good, and much of this material is very useful. Magnúsdóttir observes, for example, that the Soviets always distinguished a more complicated America than the Americans made of the Soviet Union: there were good, working-class Americans, but they were exploited by the greedy American bourgeoisie.

Some of our reviewers observe, however, that Magnúsdóttir’s analytical rigor wavers when the examination shifts away from the making of propaganda to the equally important deployment of that propaganda. It’s never exactly clear whether Magnúsdóttir understands the audience for this work to be internal Soviet citizens whose allegiance to the regime required constant propaganda support, or the external world of Soviet allies and western enemies. Miles, for example, observes how Magnúsdóttir “illustrate[s] how the Soviet authorities presented the United States to the public,” but the ambiguity he recapitulates is there is telling: which public? the American public? the Soviet public? allied or antagonist publics?

Magnúsdóttir might have addressed the ambiguity by forthrightly confining her examination to the internal histories of propaganda-making agencies, the propaganda factory, if you will. Yet she cannot avoid glances at the receiving end, whether tracking internal propaganda initiatives such as the censoring for Soviet political audiences of the magazine Amerika or the Voice of America, or examining aspects of Soviet public diplomacy such as the World Youth Festival of 1957; an entire chapter is devoted to “Soviet-American Cultural Encounters in Late Stalinism.” But these forays are not sustained, leaving both sides of her audience-level analyses at half-measure: the famed “Peace Offensive” of the early 1950s, for example, locked in mortal ideological conflict with the USA’s own “Campaign of Truth,” is not mentioned. No analysis of the visit of the Bolshoi ballet, very little of the 1959 Moscow Exhibition, no Van Cliburn, no Kitchen Debate. Soviet authorities censoring of American media within the USSR is hardly an account of Soviet public diplomacy to the Americans, and vice versa.

Thus both accounts of Soviet propaganda at the receiving end are under-developed, especially so with regard to Soviet public diplomacy abroad. The same shifting contingencies that produced ideological change within the propaganda factories are not examined with respect to strategies of public diplomacy, including technological challenges, media analysis, the dialectical engagement with American propaganda in the same period, and broader geopolitical/historical concerns. Ironside agrees when she expresses surprise “not to see any reflection on the fact that the Soviet government faced particular challenges in controlling images of the Soviet Union in the United States because of the more diffuse nature of information distribution channels in a capitalist economy.” A bigger book may have been able to interweave these two fronts into a compelling account of Soviet ideology writ large but at a sprightly 159 pages of text, this book is not that one.

Our reviewers raised the same concern about the analysis of the receiving end when it comes to internal
Soviet audiences, Denise Youngblood above all. Because the audience dimension of Magnúsdóttir’s communicative axis—all communication requires more than one interlocutor, after all—remains obscured, and hence passive, she does not direct sustained analytical attention to who was reading the magazines or seeing the films or attending the exhibitions produced by the propaganda apparatus. Because of this, as Youngblood contends, “Enemy Number One consistently underestimates the degree and extent of the resistance to anti-American propaganda” among the general Soviet population, and certainly within certain intellectual precincts. “In short,” Youngblood contends, “propaganda is an exceptionally tricky subject that requires multifaceted analysis, not just of the message itself and the historical context that generated it, but also of the medium that communicated it and the audience that received it.”

In her rejoinder to this roundtable, Magnúsdóttir extends the essential confusion. She writes that her book “is ultimately about the process of cultural production, not the cultural products that the Soviet state turned out.” Fair enough. But communication is always an axial proposition, requiring at least two (and in this case, many more) interlocutors to complete the circuit. Magnúsdóttir insists her focus is on the U.S. by which she means the image of the U.S. *within* Soviet ideology and propaganda. Yet she also wants it the other way, insisting that her book looks “behind the scenes of cultural diplomacy,” which indicates that she believes she is investigating some aspect of Soviet foreign public diplomacy. Her comparison to Laura Belmonte’s *Selling the American Way*, which she incorrectly summarizes as demonstrating how American officials “promoted the American way of life” in the United States illustrates the conceptual confusion in play here. Belmonte’s foundational study, of course, examines the production of American propaganda, as does Magnúsdóttir. But Belmonte is clear that the intended audience for such propaganda is a foreign — admittedly friendly -- audience. Hers is not a study of central state political propaganda directed at its own citizens, as Magnúsdóttir’s is sometimes — though not always.

Magnúsdóttir concludes her rejoinder by observing that her book examines the difficulties of producing propaganda that “navigate[d] the cultural output and control[led] the message at the same time.” This, I wish to emphasize, seems exactly spot on, and picking up from Belmonte, points to what I hope is a future thread in all work on Cold War-era (and beyond) cultural diplomacy: how did officials wrestle, at the granular level, with the cultural output that existed and occurred beyond their direct control? This is an especially pressing question in U.S. public diplomacy studies, and one that has yet to find its fullest treatment. We need more sense of *competition*: the competitions between state propaganda agencies and their counterparts in other countries, and also between those agencies and the private realms of cultural production in their respective countries.

Ironside concurs here, noting how Magnúsdóttir missed the chance to view Soviet and U.S. propagandists locked in battle with each other over, for example, the Pasternak affair.

If she has not quite produced a careful analysis of how Soviet propaganda was mediated to its respective audiences, or the technologies employed, of the different contingencies it faced, and how it may have been received by very different audiences, Magnúsdóttir nevertheless offers a solid introduction to the study of Soviet ideology, the contingencies it faced, and lays down a solid foundation for further analyses. Miles concludes that “[w]hat emerges from this portrayal is, above all, a clear image of just how insecure the Soviet Union’s leadership was about their position in the world — and particularly, relative to the United States” and on that there is full agreement. Yet it should not be forgotten that the creation of propaganda is a multi-faceted undertaking with profoundly deep layers of care and consideration taken at the point of manufacture. Propagandists can never control, however, the effects of their creations in the wild, as they contend with prevailing patterns of cultural understanding at home and abroad, competing propaganda agendas, multi-faceted political audiences, and unexpected political challenges. “Propaganda,” Denise Youngblood astutely reminds, “can never be taken at face value.”


Denise J. Youngblood

*Enemy Number One* is the first scholarly study to attempt a systematic examination of the ideological underpinnings of Soviet cultural policies vis-à-vis the United States during the Cold War. Condensing research from Russian archives (mainly the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, but also the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art) and targeted reading of the secondary literature into a scant 159 pages of text, *Enemy Number One* shows some of the ways the Soviet state attempted to convince its citizens that the United States was no longer a friend and ally of the USSR, but rather its bitterest enemy.

Rósa Magnúsdóttir hews closely to her thesis. Where other scholars might revel in the paradoxes inherent in this subject and probe into their complexities, she stays on point—and therein is the central problem of her book. This is a subject that cries out for a more expansive, less hierarchical approach, one that is not so rigorously bounded by its very limited time period and intense focus on the official message. *Enemy Number One* marks a return to “history from above,” an approach long absent from Soviet history.

The book is divided into two parts. The first covers the early postwar era, to Stalin’s death; the second deals with the first years of Khrushchev’s erratic reign and ends abruptly in 1959, on the eve of Khrushchev’s first visit to the United States. It is not surprising that part I is the more successful of the two, given that the ideological line on the United States was most rigorously maintained in the late 1940s. Magnúsdóttir argues that Stalin planned for the possibility of a reversal in U.S. relations as World War II was ending, even before Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in 1946, and she provides compelling evidence that supports what most scholars have long assumed. As a description of the “new” anti-Americanism and how it evolved in the late 1940s, her book offers interesting information on how Soviet ideologues operated. However, when the focus shifts to the application of these ideas in the cultural arena, the book is less convincing, because the author sidesteps what for me is the central question of her research: what evidence do we have that Soviet citizens actually believed any of this?

Magnúsdóttir is quite right to point out that a renewed emphasis on anti-American propaganda played a role in various postwar propaganda campaigns intended to combat “Western” and “bourgeois” influences in Soviet culture, of which Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov’s concerted attack on “formalism” in Soviet literature (1946–48, dubbed the *zdhanovshchina*), and the anti-Semitic “anti-cosmopolitan” campaign (1949) are the best known. Because of the high degree of negative propaganda intrinsic to these campaigns, it is all too easy to minimize the importance of their positive components. Yes, they were directed against foreigners and foreign influences in culture, but they
were also for an “authentic” Russian culture that proudly asserted its dominance in the arts and sciences. Stalin had long understood how to exploit the arts, especially cinema, to disseminate the state’s messages, and a spate of “biopics” exaggerating Russian achievements were released, like Gerbert Rappoport’s 1949 film Alexander Popov, which gives the lion’s share of credit for the invention of the radio to Popov, rather than to Marconi. Bloviated Great Russian nationalism, introduced in the mid-1930s, reached its heights at this time as a counterweight to perceived U.S. dominance.

Magnúsdóttir avoids messy complications by limiting her discussion of this period to negative propaganda—in particular, the specifically anti-American Cold War films of the late Stalin period. In my view, which is based on decades of research in Soviet cultural history (with a specific focus on American influences), “good Americans” were essential characters in early Soviet Cold War films. Documents we consulted in Gosfilmofond, the state film archive, clearly reveal how the “artistic councils” in the Ministry of Cinematography operated at this time. Film bureaucrats were invariably sharply critical when they judged the depiction of Americans to be too one-dimensional or unsympathetic. These ideological watchdogs were not at all concerned about “bourgeois” principles of fairness, but they were very concerned that Soviet moviegoers should find the American characters believable. They recognized that relentlessly negative attacks on Americans were unlikely to convince audiences, because sympathy for American culture ran deep in Soviet educated society even before the wartime alliance, despite sporadic attempts to suppress it.

In my view, which is based on decades of research in Soviet cultural history (with a specific focus on American influences), Enemy Number One consistently underestimates the degree and extent of the resistance to anti-American propaganda, privileging anti-American observations from officials (who wanted to keep their jobs) and writers (like Ilia Erenburg) widely judged to have sold their souls to the regime long before. In fact, fascination with American culture, dubbed “Americanitis” (amerikanskshchina), persisted from the 1920s to the end of the regime.

Magnúsdóttir does acknowledge the influence of American culture in the 1920s, briefly citing work by Alan Ball (Imagining America) and the late Richard Stites (Russian Popular Culture), but more extensive reading in the rich trove of material on New Economic Policy culture might have persuaded her that that “Americanitis” was deeply rooted. To name only a few examples, my book Movies for the Masses devotes a chapter to this phenomenon; and pro-Americanism is central to S. Frederick Starr’s classic study of Soviet jazz Red and Hot and especially to Marina L. Levitina’s “Russian Americans” in Soviet Film, which traces the phenomenon well into the 1930s. Instead, Magnúsdóttir relies on Dmitry Shlapentokh and Vladimir Shlapentokh’s biased and ill-informed Soviet Cinematography, 1918–1991. Even Ilya Ilf and Evgenii Petrov’s funny, tongue-in-cheek account of their road trip across the United States in the mid-1930s (Single-Story America (Odnoetazhnaia Amerika)) is marshaled as evidence of “disappointment” with America.

Because so many Soviet citizens were already fascinated by American culture, it wasn’t hard for them to accept the United States as an ally in World War II. It was, on the other hand, hard for them to reverse course—hence the care with which the state handled anti-American film propaganda after the war. Making it even harder was the ubiquity of the popular “trophy films” captured from the Germans, many of them American films from the 1930s. Magnúsdóttir does mention this, pointing to the popularity of Johnny Weissmuller’s Tarzan films, but she seems unfamiliar with the research underscoring the importance of the trophy films to the cultural Cold War. Articles like Sergei Kaptarev’s “Illusionary Spoils” and Claire Knight’s “Stalin’s Trophy Films, 1947–52” and “Enemy Films on Soviet Screens” make it clear that the trophy films were much more than a footnote to the repertory.

By the time of Stalin’s death, therefore, the preconditions for Khrushchev’s cultural thaw and his tentative efforts to moderate official anti-Americanism had been laid out. This is the subject of the second half of Enemy Number One. This half is less tightly focused than the first, which is not surprising, given that everyone at the top was trying to figure out how to operate without Stalin, how to survive the increasingly dangerous competition with the United States, and how to manage the client states in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev’s personal volatility and inability to hew a steady course did not help.

After Stalin’s death, a great deal of effort was expended on person-to-person contacts with Americans (and other Westerners), which rarely yielded the desired results, at least not until the first cultural exchange agreement was signed in 1958. The Soviet government hoped to generate favorable publicity in the United States by inviting well-known Americans—novelist John Steinbeck was one—who weren’t necessarily Soviet sympathizers but at the same time weren’t too hostile to the USSR to tour the country (carefully shepherded, of course). But only ten years after the war, despite massive rebuilding (without Marshall Plan funds), the Soviet Union was still too drab to impress Americans, and even after McCarthyism ended, few Americans dared to admire the Soviet Union too much.

Magnúsdóttir also describes the trips that Soviet bureaucrats and a few Soviet artists made to the United States in the 1950s. It was hoped that these “cultural diplomats” could establish friendly networks among Americans, but those who were deemed politically reliable enough to be allowed to travel to the United States were generally too rigid and dull to make a positive impression on Americans (a fact I can confirm from my own contacts with official Soviet visitors in the 1970s and 1980s). Finally, the author devotes considerable effort to describing the impact of the International Youth Festival held in Moscow in 1957, which attracted some 30,000 attendees. Although the festival did indeed mark a point of no return in opening Soviet culture to foreign influences, it has already received significant scholarly attention, and there is nothing particularly new in this account.

I was really surprised to see Van Cliburn receive only four words in part 2, with no mention of his sensational...
victory at the First International Tchaikovsky Piano Competition in 1958. Cliburn cannot be considered as merely one of the many American artists who performed in the USSR in the 1950s, certainly not in a book about Soviet attitudes toward Americans. The Tchaikovsky Competition dominated Moscow’s public life for nearly two months. This was the moment when all pretense of official anti-Americanism collapsed: the young Texan was enthusiastically embraced by Muscovites—and music lovers throughout the USSR—as "our Van, our Cliburn." Khrushchev inadvertently scored a major victory in the cultural Cold War by simply bowing to the will not only of head judge Emil Gilels, but also of the ordinary citizens who crowded the auditorium whenever Cliburn was playing. The U.S. State Department was caught flatfooted, so sure were they that the contest was rigged.

The Cliburn story is a terrific tale that could have been the centerpiece of the second half of Enemy Number One. It is also the subject of an excellent book, Stuart Isacoff’s When the World Stopped to Listen, which is not cited (although a lesser book on the subject is), perhaps because this manuscript had already been delivered to the publisher. Nevertheless, the event deserves in-depth treatment here, especially since it might have led the author to a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between anti-American propaganda and alleged Soviet anti-American sentiments.

I began reading Enemy Number One willing to be convinced that it is time to re-inject a dose of politics into Soviet cultural history. Obviously, I remain a skeptic. My skepticism is informed not only by my forty-five years of studying Soviet popular culture and Soviet-American cultural relations, but also by my lived experience as a participant-observer in the Cold War, which was the backdrop for more than half my life. I grew up in a small town near Louisville, Kentucky (and the gold reserves at Fort Knox), and I have vivid memories of American anti-Soviet propaganda (think Atomic Café). At least once a week in elementary school, we watched sinister anti-Soviet films, many of them dark tales of Soviet children reporting on their parents to the secret police. My own parents were vigorously anti-communist; I spent the Cuban Missile Crisis in our family’s bomb shelter, a concrete bunker fully stocked with weapons as well as food and water. If Magnúsdóttir is right about the impact of negative propaganda during the Cold War, I should have become a fire-breathing Cold Warrior. Instead, I got in trouble at school for challenging the silly films and scaring the other children by mocking the "duck and cover" drills. And of course, I eventually became a Soviet historian. When I traveled to the USSR for the first time in 1978–79 as a doctoral student participating in the official exchange program administered in the U.S. by the International Research & Exchanges Board and in the USSR by the Ministry of Higher Education, I wasn’t surprised to find a similar skepticism about the propaganda war coming from virtually every Soviet citizen I met, including the dean of foreign students at the All-Union State Institute of Cinematography in Moscow, who was almost certainly a KGB officer. Nor was I surprised that my Soviet friends were completely uninterested in reading the copies of Amerika that I brought them from the U.S. embassy or listening to the VOA or RFE/RL (instead of the BBC). As they said, smiling, "We have our own propaganda; we don’t need yours."

My purpose in recounting these personal anecdotes is to emphasize that propaganda can never be taken at face value. Magnúsdóttir mentions early on that we have no way of knowing for certain how anti-American propaganda affected Soviet citizens. That is true, but informed conjectures are certainly possible. For example, with films, we can understand something (although certainly not everything) about audience preferences by looking at attendance figures. Trophy films almost always outsold domestic films (not because people were particularly "pro-American," but because the films were novel and exotic). Spy films outsold biopics (not because audiences were "anti-American," but because the films were fast-paced and entertaining and usually offered a glimpse of Western lifestyles). Soviet audiences never attended heavy-handed propaganda films willingly; the authorities were so attuned to this fact of Soviet life that they would occasionally fix attendance figures for certain films by forcing attendance through the workers’ clubs. In short, propaganda is an exceptionally complex subject that requires multifaceted analysis, not just of the message itself and the ideological and political contexts that generated it, but also of the cultural and social contexts, especially the media that communicated it and the audiences that received it.

Notes:
1. Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds (Lawrence, KS, 2010).


Simon Miles

In the spring of 1945, Red Army soldiers advancing westward and their U.S. counterparts headed east met on the banks of the Elbe River on the outskirts of Berlin. It was, by all accounts, a joyous occasion. The soldiers embraced, just as their leaders had at great-power summits, in recognition of their shared effort in defeating Nazi Germany. But this flush of good feeling was not to last. Within a few short years, Soviet propagandists, under orders from their superiors in the Kremlin and above all from Joseph Stalin, recast the United States from wartime friend and ally to the sworn enemy of the Soviet Union and its people.

Rósa Magnúsdóttir’s Enemy Number One traces the shifts in U.S.-Soviet relations during the early Cold War through the lens of propaganda. The Cold War story she tells is above all a cultural one, where who had the upper hand was much more dependent on soft-power considerations like magazines and press tours than hard-power considerations like missile throw weights and tank divisions lined up opposite one another in the Fulda Gap. Her protagonists are “ideological workers” and their political overlords, who used propaganda to rally the Soviet people around the Kremlin leadership and against a common enemy in the United States (3). Covering the period from 1945 to 1959,
Magnúsdóttir chronicles how Soviet propagandists cast the United States—and how they fought off challengers to that dominant narrative—during the late Stalinist period of hostility and the beginning of Nikita Khrushchev’s tenure, when new cultural contacts emerged from his policy of “peaceful coexistence” and, most famously, his trip to the United States in September 1959.

Magnúsdóttir draws on a wide range of archival sources from Soviet repositories in order to tell the story of how Soviet officialdom depicted the United States. Government documents pertaining to culture from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union work alongside, for example, the records of the Soviet Writers’ Union to illustrate how the Soviet authorities presented the United States to the public. Importantly, she also brings to bear sources that illuminate, at least in broad strokes, how the Soviet public viewed the United States. This is a challenge and bound to sacrifice granularity for broad generalization, but Magnúsdóttir’s use, in particular, of the judicial files of people convicted of being too pro-American and then rehabilitated and the letters of Soviet citizens to Khrushchev before his trip to the United States offers valuable insight into perceptions in the Soviet Union.

What emerges from this portrayal is, above all, a clear image of just how insecure the Soviet Union’s leadership was about their country’s position relative to the world and particularly to the United States. The Cold War was, after all, not just a competition between two states, even extraordinarily powerful ones; it was a contest between two fundamentally incompatible definitions of modernity and legitimacy, two systems of organizing states and the international order. That insecurity, particularly vis-à-vis the United States, was an issue whose seriousness U.S. policymakers at the time clearly did not fully appreciate, and it is an important thread running through the book.

Magnúsdóttir shows that having an enemy suited the Kremlin’s leadership and remained a constant in Soviet propaganda during the Cold War. In the past, these stark contrasts between, for example, Reds and Whites in the Civil War, peasants and kulaks in the collectivization campaigns, and, above all, Soviets and Nazis during World War II, had been valuable sources of both cohesion and motivation. Enemy Number One shows how, despite the waxing and waning of the Cold War itself, the U.S. enemy was a useful tool for the Soviet leadership, and one they deftly and comfortably employed. For example, the warmth of Khrushchev’s tour of the United States gave way to a renewed focus on U.S. aggression following the downing of Francis Gary Powers’s U-2 spy plane in Soviet airspace. The Kremlin could portray even the storied meeting on the Elbe as too little, too late from the United States, as the Soviet Union had already done the heavy lifting in winning World War II by beating back Hitler’s armies.

At the beginning of the Cold War, however, not all in the United States were the enemy. Rather, like good Marxists, Soviet propagandists saw a class struggle playing out within the rival superpower. There were, they maintained, two Americas: a progressive “second America” friendly to the Soviet Union made up of some communists and fellow-travelers, to be sure, but also a great many ordinary citizens, whom the Wall Street or Washington warmongers suppressed and led into conflict with Moscow (17). This dichotomy mapped particularly well onto the very real racism faced by African Americans in the United States.

In the past, the Soviet Union had been open even to the ideas of the arch-capitalists Henry Ford and Fredrick Winslow Taylor, but by the 1940s there was little room in the Soviet discourse for these one-time icons. The Soviet Union’s propagandists had their work cut out for them in the immediate aftermath of World War II, however; depicting the United States as a crumbling capitalist relic was hard to do when all around them, American-made cars drove on the streets and workers toiled in factories filled with American machinery. Try as they might to suppress the fact of a wartime U.S.-Soviet alliance and silence the memory thereof, these constant material reminders were a major obstacle.

The Kremlin’s solution was censorship. The U.S.-sponsored journal Amerika may have been guaranteed circulation in a 1944 treaty between Washington and Moscow, but the authorities made sure it was hard to come by and persecuted those found to have been reading this ostensibly legal source of information. The Voice of America, the U.S.-backed news and culture radio network, was eventually jammed in cities. At this early stage of the Cold War, even interest in the United States was unacceptable to the government. But that interest, as much to do with curiosity about the wider world as dissatisfaction with Soviet socialism, proved impossible to extinguish. Curious Soviet citizens did not always like what they saw, be it the racism African Americans faced in their daily lives or the witch-hunts of Joseph McCarthy, but during the early Cold War, U.S. propaganda seemed to be winning.

Cultural contacts, except for those minutely stage-managed by the Kremlin, were forbidden. And even those did not always redound to the Soviet Union’s benefit. When John Steinbeck visited the Soviet Union in 1947, the Kremlin believed he could be persuaded of the merits of the communist system, even if he had dismissed the American Communist Party as “stupid” (69). But the account he produced of his journey from Potemkin town to Potemkin factory throughout the Soviet Union did not resonate with audiences in the United States, especially those members of emigré communities who knew the dark reality behind Moscow’s façade.

The death of Stalin and Khrushchev’s rise to power play a pivotal role in Magnúsdóttir’s narrative. With a new general secretary came a new approach to the United States and, when that proved impossible, ensuring that they might to suppress the fact of American machinery. Try as they might to suppress the fact of a wartime U.S.-Soviet alliance and silence the memory thereof, these constant material reminders were a major obstacle.

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The death of Stalin and Khrushchev’s rise to power play a pivotal role in Magnúsdóttir’s narrative. With a new general secretary came a new approach to the United States in the strategy of peaceful coexistence—which included a reevaluation of propaganda tactics. In the aftermath of the Geneva summit between Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States in July 1955, space opened up for contacts between a select few in sectors ranging from literature to agriculture—a particular interest of Khrushchev’s. Fittingly, some of the first U.S.-Soviet encounters were on the Elbe, where groups of veterans from both sides commemorated the ten-year anniversary of the meeting that signified the end of World War II. Participants looked back on 1945 with fondness and wondered why now, a decade later, the two superpowers were so hostile.

Opening itself up to the West opened the Soviet Union up to new criticisms, however, beginning with the low
the special sense, it was an abject failure. The propaganda state, but Magnúsdóttir shows that, in many senses, it was an abject failure. The exception to this policy, of course, was Khrushchev himself, whose rollicking tour of the country inaugurated a new era in U.S.-Soviet contacts, managed though they remained.

Magnúsdóttir’s is not a Soviet propaganda success story. The Kremlin failed utterly to convey a compelling story about the successes and potential of Soviet socialism to audiences in the United States (and beyond). Part of the problem was one of style. Images of massive military parades full of tanks lumbering across Red Square conjured up visions of Armageddon in the minds of most Americans, not of a utopian socialist future. Viewers in the United States friendly to the Soviet Union warned Moscow of its shortcomings, advising that snapshots of everyday Soviet life, particularly home life and leisure time, would have more traction with audiences in the West. “Showing,” for an American audience, “works better than telling,” they advised, but none of the proposed changes were ever made (79). The problem was also one of substance. Soviet propaganda grew increasingly out of touch with the realities of life in the United States, as those who crafted it enjoyed only limited access to sources on the United States on which to base their work. After 1955, that access expanded, but they never succeeded in turning their factually correct analysis of the problems in racial and economic inequality in the United States into effective propaganda tools. The Soviet Union is now thought of as the quintessential Cold War enemy (25). Indeed, this occurred against the backdrop of the “Zhdanovshchina,” or period of anti-cosmopolitan cultural isolationism (named after one of Stalin’s leading ideologists), in which patriotism was the order of the day. Magnúsdóttir points out that this Soviet patriotism “could not coexist with any form of sympathy for the West, especially not for the United States” (19).

That said, not all Americans were demonized, or certainly not equally. If in the United States the Soviet Union tended to be conflated with “the Russians” as a monolithic group, Americans were divided into two groups as it related to its number one enemy” (12).

Chapter 1 looks at how the Soviet party-state designed and implemented its anti-American campaign in the early years of the Cold War. As Magnúsdóttir emphasizes, members of the Soviet creative intelligentsia and the Communist Party played a key role here (18). Anti-Americanism was nothing new in Soviet culture, and some anti-American works from the interwar period were even revived at this time, such as Maxim Gorky’s account of his visit to America in 1906 (29–32). What was new was the extent to which the party managed authors’ and artists’ anti-American cultural production (25). Indeed, this occurred among the Russian intelligentsia, in which patriotism was the order of the day. Magnúsdóttir shows that, in many senses, it was an abject failure.

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compatriots, while “good” Americans were usually those who were favorably disposed toward the Soviet Union, but also normal people who were misled and manipulated by the “bad” Americans (17). These themes were present, often in a crude and exaggerated way, in books, plays, and movies produced by the Soviet intelligentsia, but also in the work of so-called progressive American writers whose work was deemed fit for Soviet consumption (34). Well-known and critically acclaimed writers like Upton Sinclair and John Steinbeck were published and widely read. However, as Magnúsdóttir emphasizes, not all could be considered prominent or high-quality writers and “most of the American authors whose works were printed in the Soviet Union were accepted only because they criticized American culture and politics in a way that was satisfactory to the Soviet authorities”—in other words, because they dealt with American social, economic, and racial issues in a strongly critical way (35–36).

The second chapter deals with American propaganda directed at Soviet audiences, focusing on the Voice of America (VOA) and the glossy magazine Amerika, and Soviet authorities’ reactions to these vehicles for American influence. The Soviet government jammed the former and impeded the circulation of the latter. These efforts demonstrate, Magnúsdóttir argues, “how far Soviet authorities were willing to go in order to keep their ideological domination and control interest in the American enemy” (39). That included repressing and arresting individuals who listened to VOA broadcasts or were found with copies of Amerika in their possession.

The remainder of this chapter deals with ordinary Soviet citizens’ reception of American propaganda. Magnúsdóttir points out that the Soviet government carefully monitored interest in America through reports on the popular mood (svodki) and notes that “no other foreign country receives as much mention in the svodki of the postwar years” (48). These svodki demonstrated “a fear of the supposed impact of rumors and alternative sources of information in the Soviet Union” (47). A second source that Magnúsdóttir uses for evaluating Soviet reception of American propaganda is the rehabilitation case files for individuals convicted of anti-Soviet activities in this period (49–50). The repressed individuals in her sample often compared the Soviet Union unfavorably to America, whether that was in terms of its military strength, the availability of consumer goods, or political freedoms, often on the basis of information they had gleaned from VOA broadcasts (50–56).

Chapter 3 looks at Soviet efforts to “tell the truth” about Soviet socialism abroad through the efforts of quasi-independent—but in reality state-directed—cultural organizations like the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and intermediaries like journalists. The period also saw some foreign fellow travelers and other American guests visit the Soviet Union. They sought to impress these visitors—John Steinbeck was one—with carefully staged experiences of life in the Soviet Union.

But opportunities for meaningful cultural exchange deteriorated rapidly in the 1950s with the onset of McCarthyism in America (59). Against this backdrop, this chapter charts a growing recognition among Soviet cultural officials that their traditional methods for promoting a positive image of the Soviet Union abroad, namely through front organizations, no longer worked in this hostile environment. Soviet delegations received a frosty reception in the United States before effectively being kicked out. Even much-anticipated propaganda events like Steinbeck’s visit did not help to promote a positive view of the Soviet Union in America. Because Steinbeck did not produce a glowing account of Soviet life, authorities ultimately concluded that his visit “had done more harm than good” (73).

Chapter 4 looks at the revival of Soviet-American cultural relations, the relaxation of Soviet attitudes toward foreign culture, and the start of the policy of peaceful coexistence under Khrushchev. Patriotic and anti-American themes persisted, but they were less pronounced during this period (82). Trips by official Soviet delegations resumed, and participants reported friendlier encounters, sentiments that were conveyed in their published writings about their travels. It became possible, for the first time since the interwar period, to express positive sentiments about America and its technological advances. At the urging of on-the-ground intermediaries, Soviet propaganda in this period shifted its focus to ordinary people and the joys of Soviet life and began to involve more interpersonal methods (80). At the same time, many Soviet cultural intermediaries continued to express anxiety that Soviet propaganda techniques were outdated and, in many cases, they were not “telling the truth” but simply “preaching to the converted”—that is, to fellow travelers and not to ordinary Americans (93).

The fifth chapter looks at Soviet-American cultural relations after the pivotal moment of the Twentieth Party Congress and Khrushchev’s secret speech condemning Stalin. During this time, the creative intelligentsia became less fearful in its dealings with central authorities in comparison to the Stalin years, but the government still exerted tight control over information about America, allowing the magazine Amerika to circulate once again, but still jamming VOA broadcasts. Khrushchev sought to show off Soviet accomplishments to America, notably through the 1957 World Festival of Youth and Students—though, as Magnúsdóttir notes in passing, the United States did not acknowledge the festival as a venue for the competition between them (112). Although she does not mention it here, the festival was organized by a leftwing youth association and it was primarily leftist youth who attended. Although her account of the festival provides broader context on the Khrushchev-era fears about youth becoming infatuated with foreign cultures during a period in which, as she rightfully points out, repression was not abandoned, it fits somewhat awkwardly into the topic of the confrontation between communism and capitalism and Soviet-American cultural relations as a result.

The sixth and last chapter looks at the years 1958–1959, in the immediate wake of the signing of the Soviet-American cultural agreement, a period in which cultural exchange and in-person visits were increasingly promoted but Soviet citizens were still expected to draw the “correct” conclusions about America. Soviet authorities had high hopes that the official cultural exchange agreement would provide better information and allow it to fight America better on its own turf. However, this proved not to be the case. If American audiences remained largely uninterested in Soviet messages, Soviet citizens, in Magnúsdóttir’s portrayal, grew dangerously interested in America. The year 1959 proved a turning point, for it was then that both countries held national exhibits and Khrushchev visited America. Magnúsdóttir portrays the American National Exhibit (ANE) as causing great anxiety for the Soviet government with its depiction of lavish consumerism, pointing out that many Soviet citizens were caught stealing.
items from its displays (135). Finally, chapter 6 looks at Khrushchev’s September 1959 visit to America and the relatively open public discussion it prompted about the state of Soviet-American relations. Many Soviets wrote Khrushchev to wish him a successful trip, often expressing their desires for peace and their belief that, if the American people could just see what life was really like in the Soviet Union, they would stop fearing them. That belief shows how deeply Soviet propaganda messages about America had penetrated citizens’ thinking about the enemy, according to Magnúsdóttir (149–50).

The strengths of *Enemy Number One* lie in its reconstruction of the Soviet institutional apparatus that designed and implemented the Soviet anti-American campaign. Magnúsdóttir offers a nuanced portrayal of this propaganda-making, focusing on middle-level authorities and intermediaries who, unlike their superiors in Moscow, were intimately aware of how ineffective their approach was with American audiences. She portrays the primary obstacle to their efforts as American indifference to their message. This seems highly plausible, however, I was surprised not to see any reflection on the fact that the Soviet government faced particular challenges in controlling images of the Soviet Union in the United States because of the more diffuse nature of information distribution channels in a capitalist economy. Since the media and the book-publishing industry, and cultural production more broadly, were under direct state control in the Soviet Union, it could dictate the content and distribution of ideas in a way that was politically uncontrollable and practically difficult in America. Many of the fellow travelers Magnúsdóttir discusses were effectively useless as propaganda vehicles for the Soviet Union not only because they were second-rate writers who did not enjoy large audiences in America, but also because their works were either blacklisted or rejected by mainstream commercial publishers, a fact that is, problematically, never mentioned here.

The book also reaches fairly unnuanced conclusions about Soviet citizens’ reception of the image of America that Soviet authorities constructed and promoted, as well as the image that American propaganda directed at them. Despite the regime’s efforts to counter American propaganda, limit American influence, and repress those who spoke positively about America, “no amount of Soviet propaganda could cover up the fact that the Soviet Union could not match American images of plenty,” Magnúsdóttir concludes (152). This failing is shown most explicitly in the section dealing with the American National Exhibition (ANE), an event that Magnúsdóttir argues “confirmed to both the Soviet leadership and people that the United States provided comforts and goods that the Soviet people could only dream of” (136–37).

This view of the ANE, it should be noted, is at odds with Susan E. Reid’s detailed analysis of visitors’ responses, which is not cited here, and which shows they had a much more ambivalent reaction. According to Reid, the most common response Soviet citizens expressed in their written comments in guestbooks provided at the event was “disappointment.” Soviet citizens were also highly skilled at reading around propaganda content. As Eleonory Gilburd has shown, the Western books that Soviet citizens were increasingly exposed to during Khrushchev’s thaw, which were chosen for translation in large part because of their ideologically useful narratives about America, were often transformed by Soviet readers into “books about us.” Citizens appreciated American authors like Ernest Hemingway and J. D. Salinger for the “sincerity” that they found lacking in Soviet literature. Magnúsdóttir’s book is thus less revealing in its examination of popular opinion about America than it is in its examination of Soviet authorities’ anxieties about the effect of American propaganda upon popular opinion.

*Enemy Number One* is primarily a story about Soviet-American cultural relations through Soviet eyes, but a more balanced approach would have been welcome at certain points. For example, when discussing Soviet publishing practices, Magnúsdóttir cites Melville J. Ruggles, the vice president of the Council of Library Resources in the United States, who, when he visited the Soviet Union in 1961, criticized it for “scrap[ing] the bottom of the barrel. . . . The American literature [the Soviet citizen] is given opportunity to read conveys to him little notion of how we think, of how we live, of our true virtues or of our true faults” (35). Ruggles’s criticism is a mirror image of the Soviet government’s criticism of America, which it accused of publishing and promoting only negative “anti-Soviet” accounts that did not “tell the truth” about life in the Soviet Union.

The furor that could arise over the promotion of “anti-Soviet” material is perhaps best exemplified by the controversy surrounding *Doctor Zhivago*, which Boris Pasternak published abroad after struggling to do so at home. It topped the *New York Times* bestseller chart in 1958, but at home it was savagely criticized for its purported “anti-Soviet” content and ultimately banned. The “Pasternak affair,” in which the CIA aggressively promoted *Doctor Zhivago* after it sensed the story’s great value as a weapon in the ideological battle with the Soviet Union, is curiously absent from Magnúsdóttir’s book, though it would have helped to round out the picture of how both sides deployed the strategy of mobilizing domestic critics against the other.

The book ends in 1959 with Khrushchev’s visit to America, which, according to Magnúsdóttir, was the high point of the policy of peaceful co-existence. This choice works well to maintain the core binary of the text, which counters Stalin’s aggressive anti-Americanism and cultural isolationism with Khrushchev’s softer policies of interpersonal contact and expanding cultural relations. But one is left with the nagging feeling that a lot more needed to be said about what came next, which is dealt with only fleetingly in the epilogue. In that final section of the book, the author mentions the Soviet downing of the American U-2 spy plane in 1960 and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, both of which occurred under Khrushchev’s tenure, saying that, although these events strained Soviet-American relations, “some of the beneficial results of 1959 could not be reversed,” particularly in the arena of international law and in the 1960s generation, which “did not know America but believed in her” (154).

Other questions need further attention. How did coming to the brink of nuclear warfare influence the Soviets’ construction of the American enemy, for example? And although it occurs slightly after Khrushchev’s tenure, and could be considered well beyond the scope of the book, America’s entry into the Vietnam war is not mentioned here, though it would make its way onto countless Soviet propaganda posters. In general, American imperialism—and the role it played in Soviet constructions of “enemy number one”—is given short shrift, aside from a discussion of the way it stirred up fears about the outbreak of another war.

This succinct book nevertheless succeeds in charting
the most significant moments in early Cold War cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and, as such, it will be of great value in the classroom when teaching the Cold War and cultural diplomacy. It explains the genesis of some of the most enduring images that each nation produced of its adversary during the formative years of their confrontation.

Notes:
2. This is essentially the same argument made by Walter Hixson. See Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 212–13, 231.
5. Ibid., 104.


**Autumn Lass**

*Enemy Number One* offers an in-depth look at the challenges the Soviet Union faced in waging ideological and cultural warfare against the United States. In particular, Rósa Magnúsdóttir examines the ideological messages of Soviet propaganda under Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. She argues that under Stalin, Soviet propaganda became preoccupied with anti-Americanism. However, by the time Khrushchev replaced Stalin, the anti-Americanism campaign with a push to celebrate Soviet accomplishments and support peaceful coexistence, it was too late to make significant headway with the Soviet people and too difficult to overcome the paradoxical image of the United States in Soviet propaganda. Ultimately, she contends that new leadership was one of the most important influencers of change in Soviet propaganda.

Magnúsdóttir’s use of archives is impressive. Drawing upon sources such as official reports and papers, judicial records, personal records and letters, and travelogues, she gives voice to the often-overlooked bureaucrats who crafted Soviet propaganda and brings to life their fears and concerns while demonstrating their tireless efforts to control the Soviet people’s perceptions of the United States and the Soviet Union (11). However, she also acknowledges that trying to understand how successful these bureaucrats were in shaping the minds of Soviet citizens is difficult, and she attempts to do so only in limited ways throughout the monograph.

The monograph is well organized and easy to follow. It is divided into two parts. The first focuses on Stalin’s anti-Americanism campaigns and the second on Khrushchev’s attempts to promote peaceful coexistence. Within these sections, Magnúsdóttir’s chapters move chronologically through each leader’s regime and highlight the strategies and struggles they both faced with their ideological campaigns against the United States. Throughout the book, the author provides explanations for key terminology and bureaucratic organizations to assist the reader in keeping track of all the different concepts and offices referenced.

There are two major themes that run through the book. The first is the duality of the American image within the Soviet Union. Magnúsdóttir connects this duality back to prewar portrayals of the United States in Soviet messages and argues that between the years 1890 and 1941, the United States was seen as “a model in technological and agricultural progress and as well as an example of everything gone wrong in terms of racial, social, and economic equality” (7). She also contends that these ideas “coexisted in the Soviet consciousness” throughout the Cold War (7).

This dichotomy was complicated even further by the Soviet-American alliance during the Second World War. World War II increased the influence and presence of America in the Soviet Union. For example, the Soviet people saw an increase in American technology and goods. These goods were a “symbol of another world, off limits and unattainable but nevertheless appealing” (9). The United States came to represent both progress and corruption in the Soviet Union. This two-sided America plagued Soviet information officials throughout both the Stalin and Khrushchev years.

The second major theme Magnúsdóttir explores is the balancing act Soviet ideological and cultural officials had to perform in creating their propaganda. During the Stalin years, maintaining a balance between anti-Americanism and Soviet celebration was difficult. Khrushchev’s regime found promoting peace while still being anti-Western just as hard. Both approaches were further complicated by Soviet citizens’ increased exposure to the outside world.

In part one, Magnúsdóttir focuses solely on Stalin’s anti-Americanism in Soviet propaganda. The anti-American ideology was used to label the United States as “enemy number one” and to ensure that Soviet citizens believed in the superiority of the Soviet Union (18). Magnúsdóttir argues that these campaigns were coordinated from the top down, because Stalin wanted to control not only the message but also the Soviet intelligentsia, some of whom worked in the information offices that were responsible for creating the message. This approach put incredible strain on information personnel, because they knew the anti-American messages they created would be sent out to be approved at the highest level.

While anti-Westernism was always present in Russian history, Magnúsdóttir asserts that it became more intense and extreme under Stalin. His anti-Americanism meant that Soviet patriotism “could not coexist with any form of sympathy for the West, especially not the United States” (19). To ensure that this level of anti-Americanism spread throughout the Soviet Union, Soviet propaganda and anti-American ideology became completely entrenched in everyday life. Messages of anti-Americanism could be found throughout print media, cultural activities, and the arts, including theater, film, and literature.

Magnúsdóttir also examines how Soviet anti-American campaigns featured “progressive” American writers who were critical of the United States. She argues that American racism—and the attendant status of African Americans—was the example most often used to depict the United States negatively by both American and Soviet writers. However, Magnúsdóttir claims that because of the continued presence of American technology within the country, the lingering memories of positive portrayals of American industry and agriculture, and increased impressions of American prosperity, it was not easy to promote anti-Americanism in the Soviet Union (37). Therefore, the Agitation and Propaganda Department (Agitprop) worked tirelessly to control all information about the United States so that Soviet citizens would develop the “correct” view of that country.

In chapter 2, Magnúsdóttir examines how Soviet information offices attempted to handle American propaganda efforts like the Voice of America. She argues that “campaigns against American sources of information
and the accusations of anti-Soviet behavior represent the state’s unrelenting but ultimately unsuccessful efforts at preventing Soviet citizens from making independent analysis of the outside world and domestic realities” (57). While it is incredibly difficult to assess the complete impact of U.S. propaganda within the Soviet Union, the author contends that the mere belief that it was working was enough to send the Kremlin and Agitprop into overdrive.

Magnúsdóttir then explores cultural interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the later Stalin years. Chapter 3 is the most compelling of her chapters on Stalin’s propaganda. She displays perfectly the struggles of organization, message, and implementation under Stalin’s tight control of cultural and propaganda agencies. She maintains that “Soviet authorities found themselves under siege on all fronts: they were not reaching American audiences on American soil, they did not fully succeed in controlling the effects of American propaganda in the Soviet Union, and their most high-profile visit in the period, the Steinbeck-Capa trip, proved counterproductive in advancing the Soviet propaganda mission abroad” (73). Soviet officials faced an uphill battle with public diplomacy and cultural encounters, as they did with other propaganda efforts during the Stalin years, because messages of anti-Americanism were not going to work on American audiences, and the growing strength of American propaganda in the Soviet Union limited the success of Soviet messages at home (59, 73).

Throughout the chapter, Magnúsdóttir examines the roles of a variety of agencies meant to control and develop cultural interactions, such as the Soviet All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF). She focuses particularly on how VOKS managed the majority of the Soviet Union’s cultural diplomacy efforts during the Stalin years.

VOKS’s main mission was to “facilitate and develop” interactions between the Soviet Union and foreign institutions, public organizations, and individuals/group involved in academia (60). It also sponsored visits to the Soviet Union by important foreign cultural figures. All the interactions controlled or created by VOKS were meant to showcase the best of the Soviet Union and socialism. Magnúsdóttir also explores how VOKS attempted to manage the effects of McCarthyism and anti-Soviet propaganda within the United States by sending representatives to the United States “to tell the truth about the Soviet Union” (65). Even with these attempts, she argues, Soviet cultural diplomacy in the United States was rendered powerless because of the repressive nature of McCarthyism (68–69).

Magnúsdóttir contends that the main problems with Soviet cultural propaganda—like McCarthyism and flawed messages about the Soviet Union within Soviet propaganda—were outside the control of VOKS. She concludes that Stalin’s Soviet Union was not ready to welcome close inspection by foreign visitors, nor was it able to successfully counter American messages about the USSR. Ultimately, she argues, the strains of anti-Americanism and hostility toward the West doomed Soviet-American cultural relations during the Stalin years (74).

After inspecting anti-Americanism under Stalin, Magnúsdóttir explores how Khrushchev attempted to spread a message of peaceful coexistence and change the image of the Soviet Union internationally. To do this, she claims, Khrushchev tried to become the peaceful middleman between the socialists and anti-Soviets and also worked to improve Soviet relations with former colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (78). Under Khrushchev’s leadership, Soviet officials worked hard to “remove themselves from the ill-informed and distrustful Stalinist view of the American enemy” (79). Slowly, Khrushchev’s efforts led to an improved relationship between the two countries.

While peaceful coexistence did allow for more positive Soviet-American encounters, Soviet officials were still concerned about their citizens becoming too “infatuated” with the West. Therefore, information officers under Khrushchev had to balance their initiatives very carefully. While they were supposed to promote peaceful coexistence between the two countries, they were also expected to be critical of the United States and its system. According to Magnúsdóttir, these expectations were incredibly difficult to satisfy (99). She highlights these problems in her fifth chapter.

The difficulty for Khrushchev’s propaganda was that peaceful coexistence emphasized openness and accessibility, while the Kremlin maintained its commitment to controlling how Soviet citizens thought and how much access they had to the outside world (101). Magnúsdóttir contends that the creative departments within the cultural bureaucracy were now freer to make improvements and contributions to Soviet information-making. However, she argues that while Khrushchev’s thaw was a popular change to some within the Soviet system, others were very resistant to its messages. She shows how difficult it was for cultural and information offices to “accommodate the ideological rigor that still dominated Soviet life with the new openness and the increased exposure to the outside world that followed” (100).

Magnúsdóttir believes that these paradoxical goals can be seen in both cultural bureaucracy programs and the Soviet legal system. To illustrate the problems such goals posed during the Khrushchev years, she examines Soviet domestic life, the Voice of America and the American magazine Amerika under Khrushchev’s Soviet Union, and the 1957 World Youth Festival. Her take on the World Youth Festival is very persuasive. She argues that the festival, which was meant to promote the Soviet system to the world, instead only increased interest in other cultures and highlighted the stark differences between the Soviet Union and other countries (119). One of the mistakes made by Soviet leaders, she concludes, “was to allow interest in America to become a threat to its politics and reforms” (120). She contends that Khrushchev’s promises of reform and his admissions about the Soviet Union’s inadequacies were tempered by his administration’s continued efforts to control interest in the United States (120–21).

Magnúsdóttir ends her study with an examination of the possibilities of peaceful coexistence. She points to the years 1958 and 1959 as turning points for the Soviet relationship with the United States and argues that because Khrushchev’s more nuanced approach to the Cold War afforded him the opportunity to improve relations with the United States, and both Soviet officials and the Soviet people favored peaceful coexistence, he could work to remove the fear of impending war while simultaneously trying to restore people’s belief in the Soviet system (123).
These efforts allowed for increased introspection and revaluations of organizations, ideology, and information. Magnúsdóttir also examines the positive changes VOKS made in its cultural exchanges, such as increased Soviet-American encounters.

Magnúsdóttir argues that 1959 was the turning point for Soviet-American relations. The two countries exchanged national exhibitions, and Khrushchev visited the United States. She maintains that Khrushchev’s rhetoric during these years “signaled to Soviet people that it was now acceptable to reflect on their own personal experiences with Americans . . . and to give advice to the development of Soviet-American relations” (141). She closes with a reflection on what could have been, if not for the U-2 spy plane incident and the Cuban Missile Crisis. These events destroyed the growing relationship between the two superpowers. Ultimately, while peaceful coexistence did not last, Khrushchev’s messages deeply altered Soviets’ perceptions of their nation and its place in the world.

Magnúsdóttir provides a fresh look into early Cold War propaganda. She examines the importance of Soviet ideology to propaganda-making and focuses our attention on the internal organization of the Soviet cultural bureaucracy. Enemy Number One is an excellent addition to the historiography, because it provides a close examination of the attempts of the Soviet Union to craft its ideological campaigns and shows how these campaigns faced difficulties not just because of American propaganda but also because of the Soviets’ own inconsistent messages and approaches.

The author is at her best when she examines the inner workings of the Soviet propaganda machine. She highlights the information struggles within the Soviet Union and demonstrates that information campaigns under both Stalin and Khrushchev had significant internal weaknesses but also faced powerful outside pressures. When this book is paired with works on American Cold War propaganda, it is easy to see how both countries faced similar sorts of problems in message creation, message implementation, and influence control. Enemy Number One is an excellent study for Cold War historians, especially those who study public diplomacy and propaganda.

Author’s Response
Rósa Magnúsdóttir

This project has been with me for a long time. It started as a dissertation, but as often happens it was shelved for a while as I settled into an academic career in a new country. The final book benefited from the distance but as the historiography about the cultural Cold War continued to grow at a fast pace, I became more and more convinced that it was important to tell this intriguing story. As a Russianist and a Cold War historian, I am therefore delighted that Enemy Number One should receive this attention in Passport, as it was always my hope to contribute to both Soviet and Cold War historiographies. I would like to thank Andrew Johns for organizing this roundtable and the four esteemed scholars—Kristy Ironside, Autumn Lass, Simon Miles, and Denise Youngblood—for reading and critically engaging with my book.

In writing this book, my goal was to tell the story of a state that mobilized culture as an instrument of policy. The main protagonists of this story are the political and cultural bureaucrats who contributed to this ongoing process, which changed quite dramatically in the period under investigation. Indeed, one of the main arguments of Enemy Number One is that these internal discussions changed over time, with the transition from Stalin to Khrushchev marked by a shift from top-down anti-Americanism to the revival of peaceful coexistence as an official strategy. Enemy Number One is ultimately about the process of cultural production, not the cultural products that the Soviet state turned out.

With a focus on the United States of America and the cultural Cold War, it was difficult for me to sidestep the concept of ideology. Here, David Brandenberger’s assertion that “ideology is best addressed from three perspectives relating to its production, projection, and popular reception” framed my analysis.1 As my archival work unfolded, I began to see the fluidity of ideology, as Soviet “ideological workers” navigated the dialogic relationship between production, projection, and popular reception, continually reviewing all elements in order to adapt the means and methods of Soviet propaganda to the Kremlin’s shifting political mores. Enemy Number One looks behind the scenes of cultural diplomacy to show the inhibiting conditions and the atmosphere of fear and paranoia that “ideological workers” had to navigate while also trying to think creatively about the circular ideological process. I concur with the reviewers that we need to know more about the Soviet reception of propaganda. Indeed, as a graduate student interested in Cold War propaganda and cultural diplomacy, my most pressing question going into my project was “what did the Soviet people really think about the United States of America?” And I agree with Denise Youngblood that “informed conjectures” about how Soviet propaganda affected Soviet citizens are possible. For every instance of top-down propaganda that Enemy Number One explores, I offer evidence of how people shrugged it off, mocked it, or offered a counter narrative. These efforts notwithstanding, and as most Soviet historians would acknowledge, there are few primary sources that allow us to make direct claims about public opinion in the authoritarian framework of the Soviet Union.

When I first started reading the rehabilitation review files in the Russian State Archives, I thought I had found the kind of evidence that could demonstrate that Soviet citizens did not accept the state’s anti-American narrative. The files revealed the stories of those accused of praising the United States, consuming American culture, or interacting with Americans. Soon I understood, however, that the nature of these sources was complicated, and that they shared some of the political and epistemological problems of the svodki (reports on the “moods of the population”), which I also read with great interest for how they demonstrated the Soviet state’s near obsession with the United States.2

Instead of getting stuck in binary paradigms about the Soviet subject versus the state, however, I focused on what these rich sources could actually demonstrate. They evidence the Soviet state’s anxiety about what it deemed to be inappropriate views of the United States. The same can be said for all the state’s efforts to control and contain American propaganda, such as the journal Amerika and the radio broadcasts of the Voice of America; they point to relentless fears and efforts to control popular opinion in the Soviet Union.

At the book’s core is an attentiveness to change over time. Youngblood is right about her Soviet friends being uninterested in American propaganda in the late 1970s, but that was twenty years after the period under consideration in Enemy Number One. In the late 1940s and 1950s, Soviet authorities rightly thought that some Soviet citizens were interested in American propaganda. And like Youngblood’s friends in the 1970s who recognized that it was all propaganda, I argue a similar, if more nuanced point, based on a reading of the archival records. Access to alternative sources of information in that earlier era allowed many Soviet people to question and critically engage with both Soviet propaganda and the outside world in ways that otherwise were inconceivable.
It is a delicate balancing act to analyze both the structure of Soviet propaganda and the reception of these efforts, as Autumn Lass and Simon Miles both acknowledge. Indeed, Miles rightly grasps the concern that grips the top-level bureaucracy and is unmistakable in the archival record. The Soviet authorities feared that access to alternative sources of information would create doubts about the system. The varied reactions I cite also show that Soviet citizens could and did hold both pro-Soviet and pro-American views simultaneously or sequentially, making it impossible to characterize Soviet audiences as monolithic in their reaction to state propaganda. It has generally served me well as a historian to acknowledge that our human subjects are multidimensional and, as Jan Plamper states, “can think many different things at the same time, say many different things that contradict one another over short periods of time, and act in many different ways that contradict one another.”

The latter half of 1959 saw the culmination of these tropes about the American ally-turned-enemy. The letters written to Khrushchev about the American National Exhibit confirmed to both the Soviet leadership and people that the United States provided comforts and goods that the Soviet people could only dream of” (136–37). My intention here was to summarize a variety of attitudes (both positive and negative) about the summer of 1959 as they unfolded in the context of Khrushchev’s openness about the wartime alliance.

It was no easy task to try to make an original contribution to a crowded field, to make historiographical choices about what went into the book, and to distill the story so that it had focus, but also sufficient context. As I noted in the beginning, I had hoped that this book would reach beyond the Soviet field in which I was trained to find an audience of Cold War historians as well. I was therefore pleased to see Lass say that *Enemy Number One* pairs well with works on American Cold War propaganda.

Historians of American foreign relations will of course be familiar with works such as Laura Belmonte’s *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War*, which covers the same time period as *Enemy Number One* and tells the inside story of how the U.S. government promoted “the American way of life” in the United States. *Enemy Number One* offers a counternarrative, arguing that in order to preserve and promote a Soviet “way of life,” images of America had to be controlled and contained. It also offers anyone who is interested in Soviet cultural diplomacy or cultural relations with foreign countries a view of the inside workings of the Soviet cultural bureaucracy, the insecurities of cultural bureaucrats, and, ultimately, their lack of achievements.

I want to finish by again thanking my reviewers for allowing me to reflect upon some of the main themes of my book. *Enemy Number One* is not a story of successful propaganda, as Miles and Lass acknowledge; it is a story of how, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Soviet authorities took a formerly ally, turned it into its primary adversary, and waged an ideological Cold War, both at home and abroad. Because of the recent wartime alliance, this was not an easy task. The Soviet people were not easily convinced, and the cultural bureaucracy found it difficult to navigate the cultural output and control the message at the same time.

Notes:

3. Ibid., 73.
The “national interest,” Joseph Nye has observed, “is a slippery concept, used to describe as well as prescribe foreign policy.” Part holy grail, part trump card, the national interest is at once something that foreign policy professionals seek to divine, yet also wield as a justification for their preferred policy choices. “In a democracy,” Nye claims, “the national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world.” But who gets to decide what those shared priorities are? The self-described realists of the mid-twentieth century, who placed the pursuit of the national interest at the heart of their analyses of power politics, had an answer to that question: they did. As Hans J. Morgenthau put it, the average American citizen might be too “unsophisticated” and “uninformed” to articulate a coherent vision of foreign policy, but “responsible statesmen can guide him by awakening his latent understanding of the national interest.”

Writing a decade and a half earlier, in the depths of the Great Depression, Charles Austin Beard came up with a different answer. Throughout the course of American history, he argued, competing economic factions inside the United States waged a perpetual battle to lay claim to acting on behalf of the nation’s true interest in the world. After devoting almost nine hundred pages over two volumes to the subject—first with The Open Door at Home in 1934, then with The Open Door at Home in 1935—Beard acknowledged that he “was tempted to conclude that the conception was simply a telling formula which politicians and private interests employed whenever they wished to accomplish any particular designs in the field of foreign affairs.”

Ultimately, though, Beard was too much of a utopian not to try to improve upon the existing definitions of the national interest, the shortcomings of which he blamed for landing the United States in the existential crisis it faced during the 1930s. Yet, given the limitations of the solutions that he proposed, one wonders whether he might have been better served to stop with the question prompted by volume one of his study: is there any such thing as the “national interest” that exists outside of, or above and beyond, the continual democratic struggle to define the nation’s posture toward the world?

Of Beard’s two volumes, The Open Door at Home has generally received more favorable attention than The Idea of National Interest. In his landmark study The Progressive Historians, Richard Hofstadter, though generally dismissive of most of Beard’s foreign policy writings, warned readers not to “underestimate” The Open Door at Home, whereas he pronounced The Idea of National Interest “intolerably dull.” More recently, David Milne labeled The Idea of National Interest “the most ostensibly Rankean book Beard ever wrote” (a charge that would have made Beard’s blood boil) and “a dry reading experience so challenging to the reader’s forbearance as to make it positively un-Beardian.”

Moreover, it was The Open Door at Home that William Appleman Williams famously took as his point of departure for The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, which followed Beard in criticizing U.S. foreign policy for focusing upon the acquisition of external markets for U.S. surpluses. “Exporting the social question,” Williams’s student Thomas McCormick called it, in his study of industrialists’ late nineteenth-century obsession with the great China market as an alternative to the redistribution of wealth inside the United States. Both Williams and his students accepted as an article of faith Beard’s argument in The Open Door at Home that “an efficient distribution of wealth within the United States would largely eliminate the unbalance between capital extension and consumption . . . and reduce the pressures of the outward thrusts—thrusts which engender rivalries abroad.”

And yet, I would argue, it is The Idea of National Interest that proves the more useful text for interpreting the history of U.S. foreign relations and conceptualizing our present conditions. In many ways, it represents a visionary, almost post-modern analysis of the evolution of U.S. foreign policy over the first 150 years of the nation, accented by thoughtful reflections on the coming of post-industrial society. The most important thing that Beard accomplished in this volume is suggested by the title itself: he treats the “national interest” as an idea with a history of its own, not some trans-historic category with universal meaning. “Although employed as if it were a fixed principle, somewhat like the law of gravitation,” Beard wrote near the beginning of the book, “the idea of national interest is, relatively speaking, a newcomer among the formulas of diplomacy and international morality.”

Indeed, the idea of “national interest” evolved alongside the rise of democratic nation states, reflecting “the increase in influence of popular political control” and the notion that government policies should in some sense reflect the will of the governed. Beard could have left it there, which is essentially how many today, such as Joseph Nye, see the concept of national interest. However, in an effort that was consistent with his broader historical agenda of locating the economic forces at the root of political dynamics, he dug deeper, arguing that the formulation of “national interest” spoke more than anything else to the question of “for whose benefit is diplomacy carried on and whose will is to determine the policy and exercise the greatest control.”

The answer that Beard provided to this question is, for the most part, less valuable than his exploration of the question itself. According to The Idea of National Interest, all of U.S. foreign policy could be reduced to a struggle between the policy priorities of, broadly speaking, industrialists and agriculturalists, or, to put it in the terms of the ideological divide that stretched back to the Founders, Hamiltonians versus Jeffersonians. In a further reduction, Beard treated the Democratic Party from Jefferson to Wilson as the monolithic mouthpiece of the agriculturalists, while lumping together Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans as unwavering advocates for industry. The agriculturalists, he suggested, wanted land for farming above all else and therefore supported continental (Continued on page 32)
This year’s conference will explore the above theme, inspired by New Orleans’ historic place as a port city and center of Caribbean exchange.

**Program**

We will host our Welcome Reception at the National World War II Museum, ranked as one of the top destinations in New Orleans. The reception will feature this year’s plenary session, “New Perspectives on World War II.” Chaired by Frank Costigliola, the panel will include Marc Gallicchio, Michaela Hoenicke-Moore, Rebecca Herman, Harvey Neptune, and Rob Citino. Jana Lipman will chair a Caribbean Presidential Roundtable featuring Devyn Benson, Adam Ewing, Julia Gaffield, Peter James Hudson, and Marixa Lasso. The Friday luncheon will include a conversation on archival matters, moderated by Richard Immerman. Kristin Hoganson will deliver the Presidential Address at the Saturday luncheon. The Dale Center for the Study of War and Society at the University of Southern Mississippi will host a Jobs Workshop. Organized excursions will include tours of the French Quarter and the Whitney Plantation.

**Registration**

Online registration for the conference and ticketed events will be available in early April.

For hotel booking, follow this link: https://www.marriott.com/event-reservations/reservation-link.mi?id=1571689105993&key=GRP&app=resvlink.

For more information, check our website: https://shafr.org/conferences/annual/shafr-2020-annual-meeting

Follow us on Twitter: @SHAFRconference

Contact: Amanda Bundy, Conference Coordinator, conference@shafr.org
THE TONOUS AND WARDA JOHNS FAMILY BOOK AWARD

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association invites submissions for the 2020 **Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award**.

The prize honors Tonous Hanna and Warda Paulis, who immigrated to the United States from Syria in 1900, married in 1906, and became U.S. citizens along with their children in 1919. Tony and Warda Johns, as they became known, emphasized the importance of education, hard work, and philanthropy to their children and grandchildren, and had a deep and abiding love for their adopted country and its history. These values—shared by so many other immigrants to the United States—profoundly shaped the lives of their descendants. In celebration of these ideals and in recognition of Tony and Warda’s continuing influence on their family, the Johns family created this endowment in the hope that Tony and Warda’s legacy will be felt and appreciated by the PCB-AHA community and that the award will encourage and recognize excellent historical scholarship.

The **Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award** recognizes the outstanding book (monograph or edited volume) in the history of U.S. foreign relations, immigration history, or military history by an author or editor residing in the PCB-AHA membership region.

Copies of books submitted for consideration for the award should be sent directly to each of the three members of the prize committee–Jason Parker, Texas A&M University; Jeremi Suri, University of Texas at Austin; and Yong Chen, University of California, Irvine—by **February 15, 2020**. More information is available at https://www.pcbaha.org/tonousandwardajohnsfamilybookaward.

Questions about the award or inquiries regarding donations to the endowment should be directed to Michael Green, PCB-AHA executive director, at michael.green@unlv.edu.

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association was organized in 1903 to serve members of the American Historical Association living in the western United States and the western provinces of Canada. With over 4000 members, it is one of the largest professional historical organizations in the United States.
expansion and low tariffs to promote the export of staple crops, while opposing overseas expansion and the subjugation of foreign peoples. (Apparently, Native Americans did not figure into this equation.)

The industrialists, on the other hand, opposed continental expansion for extending slavery but embraced overseas expansion for providing a cheap source of labor and raw materials for U.S. factories. At the same time, industrialists favored the selective use of high tariffs to maximize the competitiveness of American manufactured goods. From the Louisiana Purchase to the Civil War, the nation largely pursued the course of the agriculturalists; from the end of the Civil War to World War I, the industrialists held sway; and then things started to get messy. Woodrow Wilson, as a Democrat, favored low tariffs and opposed overseas colonization, but he also called (in Beard’s rendering) for the United States to elevate the national interest above those of the nation.

The Republicans of the 1920s proved equally problematic. Although they resumed after the Wilsonian interregnum the “dollar diplomacy” of the Taft years—which Beard described as “the diplomacy of economic promotion restrained here and there by political considerations”—they proved considerably less aggressive in promoting overseas empire than Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, or arguably even Wilson. FDR, just over a year into his first term, presented the greatest interpretive challenge of all. He seemed willing—to Beard’s delight—to nationalize the domestic economy in a way that no previous U.S. president had ever attempted, but he made no similar effort to upend the assumptions behind U.S. foreign policy. Volume one thus ends on a note of uncertainty buoyed by cautious optimism: “The two inherited conceptions of national interest are in process of fusion and dissolution. A new conception, with a positive core and nebulous implications, is rising out of the past and is awaiting formulation at the hands of a statesman as competent and powerful as Hamilton or Jefferson.”

Much like Beard’s legendary book on the Constitution, The Idea of National Interest can easily be criticized for an overly schematic and mechanistic approach to its subject. To do so, however, misses the essential point at the heart of his analysis: the national interest is never a static entity, but is constantly evolving, constantly contested, and constantly reflects competing interests—economic or otherwise—within the domestic political sphere. Beard explained the importance of probing beneath the surface of comfortable platitudes in this way:

Both types of expansion—for land and for trade—represented and reflected a conflict of interests within the United States. At no time was there anything approaching a united front, except after the country had become involved in war...each type of expansion associated with itself a certain philosophy carrying with it international implications...both reflect deep divisions of domestic politics and interests and are affected by the oscillations and movements of economic power within the country. Neither stands out as a transcendent commitment of the nation beyond the reach of controversy and diversity of opinion.

Most importantly of all, Beard insisted that we remember that “public policies...are not abstractions. They are not manufactured in the Department of State by phantoms.” It is critical, in other words, to ask who is putting forward any given definition of the national interest, who is making policy within that framework, and to what end. One can only imagine how infuriated Beard would have been by the triumph of the realist conceit of the rational statesman, coldly calculating the nation’s interests in the world and then calmly charting a course of action, almost like Moses receiving the Ten Commandments from God and then bringing them down the mountain to share with his benighted followers.

Beard was also ahead of his time in anticipating the ways that science, technology, and the global economy were combining to shrink the world and modify U.S. foreign relations. The United States, he noted, was now shipping not just finished products abroad, but production techniques and managerial skills. Foreign direct investment had altered the nature of the American “stake” in other countries. And conceptions of the national interest had yet to catch up. “Technology and science, which are merely at the beginning of their voyage of discovery,” he wrote, “are inescapably international in their operations...[T]his new and revolutionary element in international economic relations, like the general body of knowledge and ideas which is today spread rapidly and widely throughout the world, utterly ignores state boundaries.”

Foreshadowing Henry Luce’s argument in his famous “American Century” article, Beard noted that U.S. dominance in mechanized mass production meant that “in the spread of modern industrialization to the underdeveloped regions of the world, it is the American industrial process, and consequently a large portion of American products, which are drawn upon and copied rather than the type originally developed in Europe.” U.S. thinking had yet to catch up to these transformative developments in the global political economy, but Beard argued that “scientific management and its logical outcome, planned economy, whether state or corporate are operating forces of immense potentiality destined to make the theory of national interest in the ‘natural’ course of trade look almost as unreal as the Ptolemaic conception of the physical universe.”

The primary consequence of this transformation of America’s role in the world, Beard argued, was the collapsing of boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs: “The conditions of modern life are increasingly lifting matters forcibly out of a sphere naively declared to be ‘purely domestic’ and casting them into the wider arena of international affairs.” Mass communications meant that “news of [domestic happenings] is carried by telegraph, cable, wireless, and press to the corners of the earth, affecting the diplomatic attitudes and policies of other nations.”

The issue that brought this realization home more than any other, of course, was the Great Depression and the attendant ascent of radical ideologies across Europe. And it is almost impossible to overstate how much of Beard’s anxiety about the inadequacy of present conceptualizations of the national interest stemmed from his desire to help his country think its way out of the present catastrophe. The predicament in which the nations of the earth are now floundering is a crisis in thought as well as economy,” Beard wrote in the opening sentence of volume two. However, instead of following through on the implication of his more visionary observations, which suggested that perhaps the very concept of a clearly identifiable “national interest” had become antiquated, he dug in to fight a noble but ultimately
shortsighted battle to turn back the tide of history.

In *The Open Door at Home*, Beard eagerly embraced the monumental challenge of trying to develop his own “ideal conception of national interest”—a workable alternative, “free from gross contradictions and unattainable ambitions,” that would avoid the “ruinous crisis in economy” that had resulted from previous patterns of thought. His diagnosis of the current dilemma is not surprising to anyone familiar with volume one: in order to alleviate the economic surpluses generated by abundant natural resources, a seemingly endless supply of cheap labor, and scientific and technological innovation, the United States had since the end of the Civil War relentlessly pursued an “open door” for trade—either agricultural or industrial—structuring an entire society around the principle that the solution to domestic economic instability was to be found in perpetual commercial expansion. This logic, he argued, had led the nation into a ruinous course of imperialism and a destructive belief that a massive navy and merchant marine were needed to facilitate American trade abroad, at the point of a gun if necessary. He called for redirecting the “open door” toward the domestic economy and proposed a redistribution of wealth at home so that most manufacturing surpluses could be purchased and consumed by Americans, thus alleviating the need for overseas markets.

In order to build an intellectual rationale for this preferred policy outcome, Beard attempted to create a rigorous, social-scientific definition of the national interest that supported his vision. He broke the concept down into its two component parts—nation and interest—and evaluated each category individually. Even if we concede that it is easier to tear down someone else’s framework than to construct one’s own, it must be said that Beard’s effort in this regard creates more questions than answers and contains some fairly troubling assumptions.

Undeniably, one of the most disturbing trends in conceptions of nationalism in the mid-1930s was the greater and greater emphasis upon racial definitions of the nation, and Beard began by (ostensibly) rejecting this mode of analysis. Citing “contemporary knowledge of anthropology,” he argued that when “the so-called physical characteristics of the so-called European race” were examined in detail, “the tenability of race as a particularity simply disappears.”

As for existing colonial possessions in Puerto Rico and the Philippines, they should be cut loose and their people excluded from the United States, through the enforcement of existing immigration restrictions that did not apply as long as those places were U.S. territories.

Although he acknowledged the historic role of immigration in building the United States, Beard’s principal objection to the draconian immigration restrictions of the early 1920s was not that they were imposed, but that they were not applied equally across the board, so as to accommodate industrialists who sought to draw cheap labor from Latin America. Overall, he proposed freezing the ethnic and racial mixture of the nation at 1920 levels and then using that as the baseline for defining the “nation” and the national interest moving forward. Invoking the specter of the “fecundity of Orientals,” Beard argued that if America’s doors were thrown open, particularly on the Pacific coast, the population of the United States would number three to four hundred million within fifty years. This prediction led him to ask, provocatively: “Could an American nation, with three or four hundred millions of all races and colors, govern itself, be sure of efficient cooperation among its members, maintain an organized economy capable of sustaining such members? . . . If anything is known, if reason is not a complete delusion, if the facts amassed by science and empiricism are not delusions also, then the answer is a negative, an emphatic negative.”

So far, so good, but instead of celebrating racial pluralism as a strength in the United States, Beard called for “safeguards against increasing sharp color distinctions in racial composition.” The United States, he said, “has enough distinctions of this character now, and is unable to resolve them without great friction and moral injury to all parties concerned.” Even if white people were solely to blame for this friction—and he suggested that they might be—“these antagonisms do exist, and certainly no national or humane interest can be served by intensifying and augmenting them.”

As a diagnosis of the causes of international conflict and an indictment of the assumptions behind the American empire, Beard’s analysis has much to recommend it; as a program for action, it falls short. In addition to writing a single national organ under the State Department” that would ensure that all trade served the interests of the majority of Americans instead of a capitalist elite. Most importantly of all, “the innumerable diplomacy conflicts over private rights, concessions and trade opportunities, which constitute the irritating substance of diplomacy, will be automatically curtailed.” What could serve the security interests of the nation more than eliminating the principal source of war—economic competition?

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of the national interest could simply be imposed on the United States using the extraordinary emergency powers FDR asserted in the course of implementing the New Deal (powers that Beard defended as being consistent with the Constitution). Displaying a remarkable faith in the benevolence of the experts appointed to carry out his vision, Beard suggested that “all industry” in the United States could be “planned and controlled with reference to the national security and standard of life.” How that could be accomplished while maintaining America’s founding principle of the supremacy of society over the state went unexplored.

All told, Charles Beard’s two volumes on the national interest represent the most comprehensive deconstruction (and attempted reconstruction) of that idea in all of American historiography. The great genius of Beard’s work is to show how a concept that is too often treated as a self-evident truth, accessible only to elite pundits, policymakers, and politicians, is actually constituted through political struggle. Beard thus performed the invaluable service of de-mystifying and secularizing the idea—a lesson that was too quickly dismissed and forgotten during his time, and one we would do well to remember today. Ironically, where Beard fell short—particularly in The Open Door at Home—was in failing to heed his own insight about the way in which the national interest is historically constructed. In the end, there is no such thing as a national interest that transcends the continual struggle to define and re-define it.

Notes:
1. The title nods in the direction of a long-ago piece by William Appleman Williams, “A Note on Charles Austin Beard’s Search for a General Theory of Causation,” The American Historical Review 62 (October 1956): 59–80. My thanks to Lloyd Gardner for making the connection to the Williams article and for more general comments on a draft of this article.
8. Ibid., 21, 14.
9. Ibid., 112.
10. Ibid., 552–53.
11. Ibid., 84–88
12. Ibid., 112.
13. Ibid., 161.
15. Ibid., 315, 312–13.
17. Ibid., vi.
18. Ibid., 185, 187.
22. Ibid., 210–14, 224.
23. Ibid., 232, 269–70.
24. Ibid., chapter 13.
25. Ibid., 283.
26. My thinking on this point is indebted to the arguments of James Livingston. See, for example, Pragmatism, Feminism, and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2001), 111.
Arguably, the slogan for Nancy Reagan's anti-drug campaign—"Just Say No"—has a catchiness that will never be matched by “Just Say Yes.” (Shonda Rhimes’s “The Year of Yes” probably went unnoticed by most SHAFR members.) However, in honor of two of my favorite authors, historians we lost far too soon, I would like to make a case for just saying yes—in this case, to writing manuscript reviews. Both Peggy Pascoe and Marilyn Young showed through their reviewing the long-lasting effects of taking on this usually anonymous, under-compensated, and time-consuming hidden labor of academia. And in doing so, the impact of their knowledge has rippled out far beyond their students and will carry on long after they have retired.

This issue of Passport coincides with a very hectic time of year, and you may be glancing at it as you struggle to meet deadlines for writing letters of recommendation, fend off your chair’s requests, and berate yourself for not finishing up and sending off your own overdue manuscript. So a generic email from an editorial assistant whose name you do not recognize asking you to read 536 pages of someone else’s manuscript may seem like an easy no. On the other hand, you may have put this Passport in your pile to read and let it get yellow and dog-eared. But even then, this essay is not going to be outdated.

Think back to early feedback you got on an article or book manuscript. Did you dread receiving the reports? Pray that they just recommended some cosmetic changes? Feel relief at an error spotted? Get energized and sit right down to begin rethinking your intro? Now think about how many years you spent poring over that research and writing. And the person who gave the tough-love reports. Oh, you don’t know the identity of that person, but you have always guessed it was X and wanted to offer your thanks?

That is the kind of influence you can be on someone else. That is the kind of job you can and should do, perhaps for a first-time author but equally, if not more invaluably, for someone writing a subsequent book. You are not doing it for a friend, with an expectation of reciprocation, or primarily for the payment, but because you have a unique ability to look at this topic and help someone else improve an extended piece of writing.

It starts with saying yes to an editorial assistant (or in some cases, an editor).

There are many different elements that make a reader’s report valuable for a press, and a terrific article has been published analyzing one scholar’s reports.¹ You have probably received a letter outlining some questions the press would like your review to cover. If you haven’t received this, you can ask for guidance. For those of you who are wondering what an editor looks for, not just for the publishing decision-making process, but for the author, here are some tips on how to approach the review.

Evaluate the book the author wants to write, not the book you would have written on this topic.

1. Evaluate the book the author wants to write, not the book you would have written on this topic.
2. Recognize what the author has accomplished at the beginning of the review. Even if there are major flaws, you can still find something positive to say, even if it is about the promise of the topic (rather than the author’s execution of it). Remember—this is something the author has spent years of his/her life working on.
3. Start a page-by-page list of questions from the beginning. In this start-and-stop world, you are not going to read this in a compact enough period to remember your thoughts all the way through.
4. Can you locate the central argument and the author’s premise throughout the chapters? Or, if this is just a proposal, is the argument clearly built and supported?
5. Where is the writing overlong or your engagement flagging? Keep track of those pages.
6. Where is the author over stating or understating insights?
7. Make notes on things you are enthusiastic about, not just criticisms.
8. Are there pieces of this manuscript that just don’t fit and would be better off published in a different form?
9. Is the author’s expression of his/her ideas overly complicated? Can you comprehend them easily enough?
10. Is this manuscript primarily engaging with debates among scholars on the topic and apt to lose readers who are not part of this conversation? Is it using sources in new ways and offering insights that will move the conversation forward?
11. Does the overall length of the manuscript seem commensurate with the topic?
12. Can you realistically see yourself reading this book if you were not being paid to do so? What revisions would you suggest be made that would lead you to say yes to that question?
13. What advice does the author most need to hear that friendly colleagues would not give?
14. What papers/manuscripts in progress/books from other sub-disciplines would this author benefit from knowing about?
15. Have you written anything that could be perceived as jokey/sarcastic but may not be taken that way by the author?
16. Have you offered a paragraph of praise that the author and publisher can clearly identify (even if you are not recommending publication at this time)?
17. Did you give some specific examples of general critiques you have made throughout the MS? It is helpful to have some concrete examples of what you are saying in a broad sense, so that the author can clearly identify some of the problematic areas/constructions.
18. Highlight errors without taking the author to task. We all make mistakes, and it is better for an author to know about these, but you don’t need to embarrass him/her.

Susan Ferber
19. Think hard about the audience the work is intended for and what advice you are giving for a work that is primarily monographic or that is intended for non-specialists. A work meant to be read by students or general readers may not offer as much archival material or may not take up historiographical issues on the page, with key works/authors cited. In other words, review the project for the audience for whom it is intended, even if your level of knowledge is greater than that of those readers. Think about your students, if it is a book for the classroom. If you are unsure about the audience, ask the editor what he/she envisions.

20. If asked about adoption, can you give an honest response about what book you would substitute on your undergraduate syllabus for this title when it is published?

21. Be professional and gracious. Remember that the person reading this has poured much of himself/herself into this project and will take whatever the report says with excitement, trepidation, perhaps fear. By thanking the author for the opportunity to read this work, you are reinforcing the idea that it has been valuable to you in some way to see it at an early stage and to participate in this scholarly dialogue.

A review such as this is most likely a critical step in the author’s career, be it a first book for tenure or a subsequent book for promotion. If you cannot deliver the review, because of a personal or unexpected situation, let the press know immediately. Then the editor can decide to seek another review right away. If you know you will be more than a week late, it is courteous to let the person who commissioned the review know. It is better to just 'fess up about being late and give an estimate about when you think you can finish. Promising “just a few more days” repeatedly is unhelpful, since we deliver that message to the author, who is also on tenterhooks.

If it is a competitive situation—that is, if more than one press is reviewing—then timeliness really matters. An editor may not be able to move ahead to make an internal decision or bring a project to a faculty board if reviews are not in hand. There are different variations on flexibility, depending on the press. But if the delay is causing a holdup, a partial review, with more detailed comments to come later, can help the editor to move ahead. It is worth asking if you can send a partial review if you are running late and time is of the essence in decision-making. If you have made comments/mark-ups on the manuscript pages and not had time to transcribe them for the detailed line comments, you can ask the editor if these might be helpful to the author. They are not a substitute for the written summary review, but they may save you some time and enable the author to benefit from the discrete questions you had throughout the chapters.

Presses review manuscripts in single-blind fashion—that is, the author’s identity is known to you but yours is not known to the author unless you decide you want it to be. The press should be guaranteeing your anonymity, unless you decide otherwise. This is your choice. It may be that you don’t know the writer and are not sure how a very critical review may be taken. It may be that you would like the author to know that he/she can get in contact with you to continue the conversation.

If you have not been told that your review will be kept anonymous, then it is a good idea to ask the person who has invited you to review.

There are no doubt many times when your own work is pressing, and reviewing someone else’s new work may seem like just one more burden. But stepping back from the chapter you have been struggling with and looking at someone else’s prose may highlight a way you can overcome a writing hurdle of your own. That is, there may be something to be gained from taking on a review, even when you are struggling to finish your own project.

There will always be a reason to say no to reviewing—and if you must, please know that editors take your recommendations for suitable reviewers seriously and are grateful for these; this is not a throw-away question when an editor asks who else might make a suitable reader. However, I hope after reading this piece you might think twice and just say yes the next time a press invites you to engage with a fresh new piece of historical writing, whether you know the author or not.

Note:
Call for Papers:

2020 UCSB/GWU/LSE International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War

The Center for Cold War Studies and International History (CCWS) of the University of California at Santa Barbara, the George Washington University Cold War Group (GW CW), and the LSE IDEAS Cold War Studies Project (CWSP) of the London School of Economics and Political Science are pleased to announce their 2020 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War, to take place at the University of California, Santa Barbara, from April 30 to May 2, 2020.

The conference is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to present papers and receive critical feedback from peers and experts in the field. We encourage submissions by graduate students working on any aspect of the Cold War, broadly defined. Of particular interest are papers that employ newly available primary sources or nontraditional methodologies. To be considered, each prospective participant should submit a two-page proposal and a brief academic c.v. (in Word or PDF format) to Salim Yaqub at syaqub@history.ucsb.edu by Friday, January 24, 2020. Notification of acceptance will occur by Friday, February 21. Successful applicants will be expected to email their papers (no longer than 25 pages) by Friday, March 27. The author of the strongest paper will be awarded the Saki Ruth Dockrill Memorial Prize of £100 to be spent on books in any form. The winner will also have an opportunity to publish his or her article in the journal Cold War History. For further information, please contact Salim Yaqub at the aforementioned email address.

Students should not apply to the conference unless they are prepared, if admitted, to attend the conference for its full substantive duration. The event will begin with a welcoming reception at 6 pm on Thursday, April 30, and continue until the early evening of Saturday, May 2. If travel schedules necessitate missing the Thursday evening reception, this is permissible. But student participants must be present all day Friday and Saturday.

The chairs and commentators of the conference sessions will be prominent faculty members from UCSB, GWU, LSE, and elsewhere. UCSB will cover the accommodation costs of admitted student participants for the duration of the conference, but students will need to cover the costs of their travel to Santa Barbara.

In 2003, UCSB and GWU first joined their separate spring conferences, and two years later LSE became a co-sponsor. The three cold war centers now hold a jointly sponsored conference each year, alternating among the three campuses. For more information on our three programs, you may visit their respective Web sites:

http://www.history.ucsb.edu/ccws/ for CCWS
https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu/programs/gw-cold-war-group/ for GWCW
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/Projects/CWSP/cwsp.aspx for CWSP
Historians, our students—are keen to learn from and engage with audiences, including local and national media outlets, important theme of the workshop was that diverse publics and communities, policymakers gathered at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University on the eve of the 2019 SHAFR conference to discuss a subject from which historians of American foreign relations—and others in the field—have often shied away from: how to engage the public effectively. But which public do we aim to target? What types of engagement do we mean to practice? How can historians contribute meaningfully to debates in the public sphere? During the opening discussions, historians were quick to ask these questions and to point to the difficulties of public engagement. Following several hours of panels and rich discussions, however, there was a clear sense of new confidence going forward. As the workshop conveners reiterated, historians can acquire and hone the writing, podcasting, and presentation skills used in publications with a broad audience. An equally important theme of the workshop was that diverse public audiences, including local and national media outlets, university communities, policymakers or, lest we forget, our students—are keen to learn from and engage with historians.

Engaging publics and communities

Before we can consider the tools of public engagement, it is important to assess the ethos and practices underlying engagement and the reasons why historians choose to engage beyond the academic world. The first panel, titled “Historians as Publicly and Community-Engaged Scholars,” focused on this dilemma, and addressed the limits to reaching the publics we wish to engage, and the extent to which we construct publics as much as we find them. In her talk, Nicole Hemmer (an editor of the Washington Post’s “Made by History” section and the host of the podcast Past Present) wove together both the possibilities and the perils of writing op-eds, appearing on television, or running a history podcast. She highlighted that these media can be enormously helpful ways to bring academic research to wider audiences. She also noted that economic insecurity often drives younger, mostly untenured academics to pursue additional writing and editing because they can present new income streams. Others noted that not all such media or publication outlets compensate writers for their efforts. However, there is a positive story to tell here too, as a slow shift emerges in the academy to give scholars credit for their work as editors, podcasters, or op-ed contributors. Hemmer noted that in some cases departments are willing to give course releases to faculty for editing duties. Historians must also consider the philosophical questions which underpin public engagement. Panelists emphasized that historians of foreign policy must engage the public differently from the way, for example, political scientists have traditionally done so. Historians tell themselves they should not be in the business of making predictions.

Panelists emphasized that historians of foreign policy must engage the public differently from the way, for example, political scientists have traditionally done so. Historians tell themselves they should not be in the business of making predictions. From here the greatest areas of debate emerged, particularly regarding the ways historians can find their place in these public conversations. Panelists emphasized that historians of foreign policy must engage the public differently from the way, for example, political scientists have traditionally done so. Historians tell themselves they should not be in the business of making predictions. “It’s not what we’re trained for,” said Jacqueline Whitt, Associate Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, but we must also try to be bolder. But if you agree to any media appearances, the interviewer will invariably ask you to make a prediction, so “prepare for that question,” said Erick Langer, Professor of History at Georgetown University. Ultimately, historians can provide nuance to public debates around all matter of subjects, from abortion debates, to claims of “concentration camps” on the southern border, argued Mark Jacobson, Professor of History at Amherst College. At the end of Jacobson’s panel presentation, he highlighted the role of history departments in building a more systematic approach to evaluating public engagement as part of a historian’s career progression. He encouraged participants to consider where they publish and what their audience will be, and urged universities to consider whether long-form pieces in The Atlantic, The Conversation, or think tank publications could count towards tenure. “Twitter does not equal tenure,” he concluded, but tweeting research and gathering instant feedback on writing is a great way to improve as a scholar while engaging new audiences.

Another panelist, Sarah Nelson, Ph.D. candidate in History and Comparative Media Analysis and Practice (a dual program at Vanderbilt University), noted that graduate students experience the push to engage publicly very differently from tenured faculty. If graduate students share ideas too widely early in their career, whether at conferences or in non-academic publications, they risk others stealing their ideas and the credit. She reminded the audience that scholars at different stages of their careers see different challenges and opportunities in engaging online, and do not necessarily benefit from this type of engagement in the same ways. In order to avoid unproductive engagement,
Sarah warned against falling into the trap of the “hot-take” culture we find online. Twitter and Facebook value bold rhetoric and extreme content, not the subtle musings of scholars. This leads to a lack of depth and nuance in online discussions. Historians, whether as early career scholars or established academics, should see their “value-added” in these discussions as providing a refined and historically-minded contribution, rather than contributing to the confrontations of online fora.

Historians must consider whether our primary aim is to target and converse further with audiences who already engage with historical narratives and debates (through “Made by History,” for example), or whether we want to reach entirely new groups and engage with local news or syndicated publications to help historical writing reach entirely new groups of people. If we are to succeed as publicly and community engaged scholars, we must look beyond the echo chambers of academic Twitter to other more widely-used platforms (including Instagram), and to the communities where history is not a regular feature of people’s media diet. We must be intentional in the publics we try to reach, and the ways in which we reach them.

In deciding which publics to focus attention on, historians must also consider our own students, as Mills Kelly, Director of the Center for History and New Media at George Mason University, explained in his lunchtime talk. He is an expert on teaching history in the digital age, and gave a number of fascinating insights into the need to think carefully about the tools we use to engage students from diverse backgrounds. This may be as simple as using black and white text on PowerPoint slides to aide accessibility for students with visual impairments, or as comprehensive as reconsidering the ways in which universities structure teaching around large survey courses in students’ first and second years. Citing a survey from the early 1900s, Kelly argued that smaller groups are much more effective in the early part of a student’s career, whereas large survey courses work better after the student has gained a grounding in specific topics and has had a chance to discuss them with their peers. Such an approach would mean reconsidering the way most universities teach history, but it is the professor’s task to think critically about the pedagogical approaches used to engage students.

Above all, he emphasized the importance of active learning for students of all ages and the need to give them the opportunity to learn by experimenting using different forms of projects, whether through the creation of digital archives, websites or podcast projects. Kelly’s own project, Appalachian Trail Histories, created alongside undergraduate students, is an excellent example. By engaging students through practical experiences, they learn more from each other, and by focusing on primary source materials they develop the historian’s craft.

Engaging the media

Understanding the assumptions underpinning public engagement is not enough, however. To engage successfully, particularly in the media, there are a number of concrete steps to follow. The second panel, “Historians and the Media,” addressed engagement strategies. Faiza Ahmed from the TV network TRT World, which is based in Istanbul, pointed again to social media, but as a way for television and radio producers to find historians and invite them to give expert commentary on their shows. “Add more information to your Twitter bio,” she reminded participants, respond to direct messages as quickly as possible, and do not be too skeptical of honest TV broadcasters, because they want their experts to look good on the air! Kyla Sommers, editor of History News Network (HNN) reminded us that sites like HNN are a good platform to send pieces that historians have published in other places, because they aggregate research and articles.

Carly Goodman asserted that we should reject the notion of the “general” public altogether, and instead segment our audiences. This forces us to consider the forms of engagement which can reach the intended public and have the most impact. Goodman represented a significant success story in terms of media engagement since the 2017 workshop, in which she was also a panelist: she has published twelve op-ed pieces since then, and became an editor of “Made by History.” Moreover, in the weeks after the 2019 SHAFR Conference, workshop participant Todd Bennett, Associate Professor of History at East Carolina University, published in that column, and Harvard Belfer Center’s Applied History Project featured his piece as an “Article of the Week.”

In order to write effectively, Goodman and Vanessa Lide, from the editorial team at Washington Post’s political science analysis section, the “Monkey Cage,” provided some tips for writers looking to succeed on these platforms:

- Read the instructions and submission guidelines carefully, and work with the editor, not against them, throughout the process.
- Your pitch should contain a clear introduction of who you are, and your main argument, accompanied by two or three main points.
- Do not try to make multiple arguments. A simple, clear argument is best, because you only have ten seconds to grab someone’s attention.
- Focus on 3-5 key takeaways.
- Do not use the same linguistic framing of an argument you are trying to counter. For example, if you want to dispel myths about the dangers of immigration, for example, do not use the language of ‘floods’ or ‘waves’ of migrants, as that simply repeats the myth you want to dispel.
- Use punchy phrasing and avoid clichés.
- Use active voice, short sentences, and cut out technical jargon.
- Give context for your arguments and embed hyperlinks in your work (using Ctrl/Command-K) rather than using footnotes.
- Not everything you publish needs to be an “op-ed”.

Consider when and why you are trying to publish a piece. Are you trying to respond directly to an evolving story from an academic perspective? Or are you writing a timely piece based on an ongoing issue or an anniversary?

Engaging policymakers

A particularly rich element to the conversation came from hosting the workshop in Washington, D.C., and the conversations this facilitated with experienced policymakers. Former foreign affairs practitioners shared their expertise as both consumers of historical analysis and historical thinkers themselves. Historians cannot take a purely academic approach when trying to engage a busy policy-maker with only a short time to digest materials and reach a decision, noted a former U.S. ambassador. He argued that in situations such as the recent debates around the anniversary and commemorations of the Armenia genocide, for example, a historian’s perspective, worded in the correct way, can be invaluable for diplomats. In the spirit of bringing historians and policymakers closer together, Christian Östermann, Director of the History and Public Policy Program at the Wilson Center, highlighted the role of fellowship programs such as those at the Center in bringing historians close to decision-makers in Washington.

Framing, is, of course, an enormous part of historians’ approach to public engagement. Historians must think...
carefully about the different cultures of each public they are targeting, and the differing approaches this might entail, noted Ostermann. If your goal is to sell books on your existing research, you might take a different approach to someone trying to influence foreign policy decision makers, for example. Ostermann reminded us not to forget to “write good books,” because those in the policy sphere are more likely to read an accessible book than search for a journal article on a subject of interest.

The policy discussions culminated in a keynote conversation between workshop co-chair Kelly McFarland and Derek Chollet, senior advisor for security and defense policy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States and former senior Obama administration official. Given his experience in various parts of the federal government, and as a student of history himself, he emphasized the role of historical mindedness in problem solving. An important takeaway from Chollet’s and others’ observations was the unique ways in which historians are trained to ask questions and conduct research. Historians can and should do more than simply make analogies to past events, but there are ways to draw effective historical parallels which enable decision makers to be more effective, Chollet argued.

As Chollet explained, his career began assisting statesmen like former Secretary of State James Baker with their memoirs. This raised a crucial point about the difference between history and memory, especially when the statesmen involved had experienced momentous events themselves during their careers. These men often understood historical moments, such as the Vietnam War, differently from historians, who had a broader sense of the facts and viewed events with some historical distance. Richard Holbrooke, for example, whose final post was as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan under Barack Obama, was a good example of this tendency within the State Department. According to Chollet, Holbrooke viewed Afghanistan through the lens of his Vietnam experience, but this worldview simply did not resonate with Obama.

The generational shift and different conceptions of history and memory mean that more formal attempts to frame discussions. In the realm of public policy and media discourse, historians can do more than simply draw historical comparisons. In terms of framing, the ways in which historians might engage differently from political scientists or economists and approach was a common theme. But historians’ voices need to be represented in ongoing political and policy debates, and we should feel that the media outlets dominated by other academics are also the right place for historians to enter the discussion and provide much needed perspectives. However, educational institutions and the broader historical profession must continue to consider the ethos and practices underpinning all forms of public engagement, and work to ensure that the work of younger scholars and other non-tenured historians receives recognition.

From the need for more historians to become Wikipedia editors (especially women!) to developing a more public facing personal social media persona, participants’ conclusions included a number of practical steps that historians can put into practice straight away.

During and immediately following the workshop, participants shared outlets through which historians can engage the public through their writing. Historians interested in publishing more widely may wish to consult the list of publication outlets compiled based on the workshop’s findings.7

In the spirit of public engagement, Passport readers can join the conversation on Twitter using the hashtags #twitterstorians and #historiansengage.

Notes:
1. Since the workshop, Hemmer has joined the Obama Presidency Oral History Project at Columbia University, a project which shows the ways historians can shape debates around contemporary issues. https://obamaoralhistory.columbia.edu/
3. ‘Twitterstorians’ (historians who use Twitter) can read Jacqueline’s thread of the whole workshop here: https://twitter.com/notabattlechick/status/114363560347385856
I am Director of the University Honors Program and Professor of History at Kennesaw State University. I’ve been in university-wide administration now for over a dozen years, across four different institutions. In all of my positions in all of these places, I’ve been interested in developing significant learning experiences for undergraduate students. I like to think my passion for this kind of work comes from the unique perspective and training that we gain as historians. Broadly interested in phenomena but unconstrained by theories or systems, we are able to work with and learn from other disciplines.

In my own work, I have written on the intersection of foreign relations and culture, with a primary focus on the ways that nation-states try to tell their stories to peoples to facilitate their foreign policy objectives, a practice commonly known as public diplomacy.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

Over the last few years, I’ve obsessed over a number of movies and shows. Some of these obsessions were less than healthy.

Sherlock (obsession reached peak between Season 2 and Season 3)
Game of Thrones (seasons 7 and 8 cured that obsession)
Jason Bourne movies (if I’m out of town and find one of these on TBS and TNT in the hotel in the evening, I’ll watch the whole darn thing)
Ozark (just a guilty pleasure)
Hogan’s Heroes (absolutely fell in love with the show while doing research on it)

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

My most nerve-wracking moment was teaching my first large lecture section. I was terrified. It galled me to think that the next fifty minutes were all up to me, that nobody was going to step in and save me. It also unnerved me to think that 150 pairs of eyes were judging everything I said. Even worse, it appeared that some of them were taking down what I was saying like it was gospel truth. That experience helped me realize the profound power we have as teachers. Over time, I also realized that I over-estimated my own importance—many of them weren’t paying attention at all.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Abraham Lincoln, because who wouldn’t want to share a meal with the person who saved the Republic? Plus, I know he would be funny as all get-out. Hannah Arendt, because I deeply admire her ability to analyze and develop models for understanding political phenomena. In my own research, I was able to appreciate how influential her thinking was on her contemporaries. I would be especially eager to hear what she would make of our contemporary situation. She would be fascinating.

I don’t know if I’d consider him an historical figure, but I would enjoy breaking bread with Tony de Mello, an Indian Jesuit, whose teachings were censured by the Catholic Church after his untimely death in the late 1980s. A friend of mine in Baltimore gave me one of his books, saying it was the one book he would need if stranded on a desert island. I’ve revisited his writings several times since, puzzling over some of his insights, but always coming away with the feeling that he grasped something which continues to elude me.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

One thing I can tell you I wouldn’t do: I wouldn’t quit working. I’ve seen firsthand how retiring early can be detrimental to your health and sense of purpose. I would use some of the money to endow college and travel funds for my kids (and their kids, if they have any). Money they can blow through; experiences, on the other hand, can be truly priceless.

I would donate some to issues that have affected those I care about: research on Parkinson’s disease and other related diseases; mental health services for adolescents and college students; and efforts to raise awareness and empathy for diverse perspectives. Just to name a few.

And I would buy a 2020 Tesla Model X. Maybe one for my wife too.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

I’m a radio guy by nature, so I haven’t really been into particular bands. But there are a few artists I’ve been drawn to through the years.

From my youth, I’d have to say that the Police, the Cars, and the Beastie Boys constantly delivered, so much so that I still intentionally listen to them. Several years ago, Ken Burns’s series helped me understand and appreciate the profound impact that jazz had on modern music, and a music professor friend of mine recommended Miles Davis’s Kind of Blue as a sort of primer. Although I’ve delved into the work of other musicians, Davis is the artist I still keep coming back to. Finally, my new commute is a little longer than it used to be, and so I’ve been listening to Sirius XM’s Chill to help me, well, chill as I battle Atlanta traffic. Nora En Pure has emerged as a favorite.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

See the Grand Canyon (doable, but not done)
Explore barbecuing practices around the world (probably not realistic, so I’ll continue to make regional claims based on my limited American perspective)

Hike the Appalachian Trail (still a very distant dream)
Finish this ambitious project on historical thinking (still distant, but not quite as distant)

I’m going to cheat here and my last thing is something I would like to see before I die, but that I have no control over: Atlanta Falcons redeem themselves from the most horrific Super Bowl loss ever and win the Lombardi trophy.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

Again, I’m going to cheat and assume that I could be whatever I want, regardless of my actual talent. Hands down it would pitching for the Atlanta Braves.
Hello! I’m Sarah, a PhD candidate in history and a joint-PhD candidate in Comparative Media Analysis and Practice at Vanderbilt University—though these days, I live in Washington, DC. I was born in Texas and lived for a few short years in South Carolina; but soon after my seventh birthday, my family moved from the southeastern US to South East Asia. We lived in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, for fifteen years, and at 18 I moved back to the States for college. I didn’t always intend to become a historian; in fact, I originally majored in Music Education, intending to teach high school choir. After just one semester in music school, though, I realized that I was far more passionate about the elective courses I was taking in Spanish and history than in music theory or piano—so I promptly ditched my music major, joined the university honors program, picked up a history and Spanish double-major, and the desire to apply to graduate programs in history soon followed. Most recently, my work on the history of international media and telecom governance, and the politics of information regulation in empire and decolonization, has been published in The Conversation.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

At some point in my early grad school years I stumbled upon British comedy—since then, most of my television rotation has been populated with British stand-up, quiz & panel shows, sitcoms, and dramas. I watch and re-watch shows like 8 Out of 10 Cats Does Countdown, Would I Lie to You, The Big Fat Quiz Show, Taskmaster, Catastrophe, Fleabag, Derry Girls, and of course, The Great British Bake-Off.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

There’s no anxiety quite like the prolonged, year-long anxiety of comprehensive exams. It was hard, but I wouldn’t take it back—it turned out to be one of the most intellectually enriching years of my professional life so far.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

I’ve always found this question fascinating, because it’s never been clear to me how these “guests” would respond to being plucked out of the past and find themselves, suddenly, under the power of someone in the 21st century (an IRB violation if ever there was one!). Not to mention the potential for “butterfly effect” problems—so, at the risk of a no-fun answer, I think I’d prefer that people stay in the past!

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Because I grew up overseas and all of my family still lives abroad (my parents now live in Vietnam and my sister lives in Saudi Arabia), it can be hard to find the time and resources for us to see each other regularly. It would be great to have a small fund for travel so that we could spend more time together. Beyond that, I’m not interested in wealth that exceeds my basic needs; I would pass it along to organizations working and lobbying to expand public services where they are currently lacking, especially in the south; providing stable housing, extending public transportation, low-cost health services, etc.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

This question makes me realize that I’ve actually never been to a music festival (which is perhaps odd, seeing as I lived in “Music City” for so many years)! If it were up to me, I would probably convert the music festival into a “musicals festival,” setting up dozens of sound stages and theaters where original Broadway and off-Broadway casts would perform my favorite musicals and musicals I’ve always wanted to see, but haven’t (i.e. The Last Five Years; A Chorus Line; the Wiz; The Last Five Years; The 25th Annual Putnam County Spelling Bee; In the Heights; Dear Evan Hansen; Spring Awakening; Company, The Color Purple; The Band’s Visit; Hamilton—I still haven’t seen or listened through it!—and so many others).

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

I don’t keep up a life-long bucket list; but currently on the short-term wish list docket are going to a karaoke night; organizing a Harry Potter trivia night with some friends; and learning to make puff pastry, profiteroles, and linguini. Long-term, though, I do have a dream of fixing up a 1968 Serro Scotty camper trailer that belonged to my great-grandparents. It’s currently sitting in the barn on my grandmother’s farm; I’m itching to re-build it from the inside out and use it to go on a cross-country road trip.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

If I weren’t an academic, I think I would do one of two things. I’d either try to open up my own independent craft/book shop and take custom orders for crochet and woodworking/DIY projects, or I would work toward entering podcast journalism and production. I love working with my hands and I’m an avid crocheter—my DC knitting group has been a lifeline while I write my dissertation!—and I’m also passionate about investigative journalism and evocative, non-fiction storytelling.

Sarah Nelson
My research focuses on Cold War international history, with an emphasis on the roles of culture and religion. I first became interested in history as a college freshman, when my early-U.S. history lecture class turned out to be much less boring than I expected it to be. An upper division class on the Vietnam War in literature and film inspired me to pursue a PhD in U.S. foreign relations, and my doctoral advisor Fred Logevall’s sage advice led to my decision to learn Vietnamese and study the conflict from the inside out. Since publishing my first book, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam (Cornell University Press, 2013), I have shifted gears considerably to work on an international history of Kenyan running. I teach at Williams College and live in Bennington, VT with my husband, daughter, and two cats. You can find me out running at ridiculous hours of the day.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

   Dr. Strangelove, Dirty Dancing, The Goonies, Criminal Minds, Beverly Hills 90201 (the original), Luther, Pretty in Pink, Parenthood (the tv show), The Princess Bride

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking, anxiety-producing professional moment?

   As a grad student, I was slated to present at the Association for Asian Studies conference for the first time. Shortly after I arrived in Boston my back went out, badly; we’re talking about “somebody’s holding a hot iron to your spinal cord, so don’t even think about trying to move” bad. I had been battling back problems for a while, so I came armed with a bottle of Vicodin. I took one before staggering over the conference venue for my panel. I made it! But I’m kind of a lightweight and I was totally out of it. I remember announcing at the beginning of my presentation that I was on Vicodin, just to explain away any weird behavior. I don’t remember much else about the panel, aside from the kindness exhibited by my fellow panelists and the audience.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be, and why?

   This is a nearly impossible question to answer! I would love to chat with George Orwell, to ask what he thinks of today’s world. Ngo Dinh Diem would have to be on my list, because I’d like to see if I can understand him better in person. After that I’m honestly grasping at straws, so I’m going to go with Luke Perry, because my 13-year-old self would be thrilled.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

   I would set aside a decent chunk to ensure my family’s financial security, start a community development trust fund for my hometown, and earmark the rest to support clean energy and other projects aimed at mitigating climate change.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

   First, I will tell the entity that selected me for this honor that they’ve made a terrible mistake, and they should find somebody more into music and festivals than I am to select the lineup. If they still insist on my participation, I’ll invite Otis Redding, Mumford and Sons, Regina Spektor, and Justin Timberlake.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

   Honestly, I don’t have a bucket list because I try to make things happen if I really want to do them. My life has been full of adventures and opportunities, and I’m always looking for new ones. What I really want is to live a meaningful life, watch my daughter grow up happy and healthy, and someday be able to enjoy retirement with my husband…but that’s not exactly a bucket list.

7. What would you be doing If you were not an academic?

   Assuming I had the requisite talent, I would be a novelist or involved somehow with sports medicine.
I direct SMU’s Center for Presidential History, and wanted to be an historian since the age of five. It’s what I read. It also seemed relevant. A red-diaper baby raised by politically-inspired educators, first in Philadelphia and then in Omaha, I have the unfortunate fate of rooting on the Phillies and the Huskers. Wisconsin and Cornell too. Apparently I like the color red, which perhaps subconsciously contributed to my decision to weather (pun intended) upstate New York for college, where Walter LaFeber took me on as, I believe this is true, his last undergraduate honors student. Walt ran my college days. “God called,” the message board would read in my pre-voice mail undergraduate apartment. He passed me to Tom McCormick, who in time handed me to Richard Immerman at Temple. The first taught me history; the second to think; the third to care. Everyone should have such mentors.

Every truly devoted historian should also marry another. Katherine Carte’s influence has mattered most of all since well before I said yes to her proposal, and history has centered our lives since. Together we’ve produced two kids, two tenure cases, three mortgages, fourteen books, going on twenty years in Texas, and a whole lot of frequent flyer miles.

Like Omaha and Philly, SHAFR will always be home, but I find myself increasingly drawn to understanding and explaining our own Trumpian age. I recently co-wrote Impeachment: An American History. Unlike every other book I’ve worked on, no one ever asks why. Still drawn to the end of the Cold War after publishing my international history of its climax, When the World Seemed New, I am currently writing its domestic counterpart: a narrative history of the 1992 election.

I also make the world’s best matzo ball soup. Just sayin.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?
1. Babe. Really. I tear up every time the farmer says “that’ll do pig. That’ll do.” Reminds me of my father. Have fun analyzing that!  
2. The West Wing. I tear up every time I think of a president who could spell POTUS.  
4. I recently purchased the MLB package, thinking I needed relief from the constant anxiety of current affairs. Only too late did I realize that as a Phillies fan, this was no refuge.  
5. Taegukgi. Stop what you are doing and see this movie.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking, anxiety-producing professional moment?
Aside from any job talk ever? Presenting my very first paper at my very first SHAFR with my undergraduate advisor, my graduate adviser, and my parents in the audience, as Daniel Rodgers gently but firmly explained to everyone why everything I’d just said was wrong. In retrospect, he was right.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be, and why?
I’ve never understood why anyone would invite a corpse to dinner. Seems a recipe for dull conversation and poor appetite. But if required to invite the dead, I’d choose Napoleon Bonaparte and Golda Meir, with Barack Obama on board lest those still consuming oxygen be outnumbered. I’d humbly let Maier note that my soup bests hers; get Napoleon’s reaction to England’s current construction of economic barriers between itself and Europe; and just ask Obama “what the heck happened?” Over paprikash and red cabbage we’d weigh the needs of state security versus the aspirations of the individual, and mock anyone who thinks Moby Dick worth reading. My real hero, Eleanor Roosevelt, would show up with a bundt cake for dessert, lemon, which would go nicely with the 16yo Lagavulin. Not that I’ve thought this out or anything…..

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
I want it said at my funeral that I not only played the lottery, but was GENUINELY SURPRISED every time I didn’t win. And when eventually I do? I have an enemies list.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
Why would I need anyone other than Springsteen?

6. What are five things on your bucket list?
1. Visit French Polynesia, Australia, and New Zealand.  
2. Have dinner at the White House (but...not for a while).  
3. Have my kids someday say “you aren’t so bad.”

7. What would you be doing If you were not an academic?
Other jobs:  
1. Football coach.  
2. International tv journalist  
3. Foreign service.  
4. Host a cooking show. But never a chef; have spent way too much time waiting tables and in professional kitchens to ever want to work that hard.
I’m a postdoc at SMU’s Center for Presidential History. I grew up in a military family and moved a lot as a kid. I was shy but had a vivid imagination and reading was my escape. Historical fiction was often the genre of choice, sparking my interest in history. My research explores U.S. food aid in Germany during the early Cold War. It combines my personal interest in the intersection of culture and politics with my family history: my grandparents were German immigrants whose childhood was marked by the war and occupation. It also reflects my passion for all things food. I love learning the history of regional foods and drinks, enjoy cake decorating, spend hours scouring the internet for the best hidden food gems when visiting a new city, and have an insatiable sweet tooth. The Cheesecake Factory’s decision to remove the cheesecake/carrot cake hybrid from their menu broke my heart.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

*Mad Men, The Golden Girls, Archer.* Favorite movies: *The Breakfast Club, Tremors, Pulp Fiction, Rear Window*

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking, anxiety-producing professional moment?

When teaching in Germany, I was told that ‘c.t.’ listed after the start time for a class meant 15 minutes past the hour. For whatever reason I misremembered this detail as 30 minutes past. So, I started my 8:00c.t. lecture at 8:30 in the morning instead of 8:15. It wasn’t until the 3rd class that a student finally spoke up. I was mortified.

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be, and why?

If it was a potluck and I wanted a scrumptious meal, I’d invite Julia Child, Alfredo di Lelio (creator of the buttery fettucine alfredo we all know and love), and Ignacio Anaya (the man who served army wives the first plate of nachos). If conversation was the focus, I’d gather Julius Caesar, Machiavelli, and Teddy Roosevelt.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

First, I’d pay off all my student loans and the loans of my family and close friends, renovate my mother’s kitchen, and restore a big old home near the coast in New England. Next, I’d open a Flammkuchen Haus in Asbury Park. It would be wildly successful and lead to several additional locations in the tristate area, maybe even a franchise. I’d use the money from said franchise to pursue philanthropic endeavors: create scholarships, save historic buildings from demolition, and fund animal rescues.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

I don’t need a music festival. I do need a private audience with a young Elvis Presley.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

My bucket list includes a weekend in an ice hotel to see the northern lights, learning to play chess, hiking Kilimanjaro, and visiting every national park and historic site in the system so I can collect all the stamps for my NPS passport.

7. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

In another life, I’d try my best to become an astronaut. Or I’d work as a tour guide for Rick Steves.
History is in the family DNA. I was given a vocational preference test in grammar school. History teacher was the test outcome. In 4th grade, I sent my piggybank money to save Gettysburg from commercial development. My wife, Genice, majored in history at Oregon and earned an M.A. in history at UConn. Her honors thesis was on the Hitler Youth. Our daughter, Elizabeth, was the National Champion of History Day. She won the same History Award that I did at Hamilton College. Elizabeth received a M.Phil in Caribbean History at the University of the West Indies. Granddaughter Emma (photo) is destined to major in history.

I studied with the inspirational Tom Paterson and A. William Hoglund, who was a Merle Curti student. Curti studied with Frederick Jackson Turner. “Mr. Frontier” is an intellectual great-grandfather.

I have written or edited twelve books, with the latest being on Henry Kissinger (Cornell). I am currently working on the dramatic events in the Norman village of Graignes from 6-16 June 1944 (Passport, April 2019).

I have had a glorious time as a historian, having taught or lectured in twenty countries, with full-year stints in Finland and Ireland and lengthy assignments in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

The Wire, The Americans, House of Cards, Luther, Narcos, Deutschland 83, Generation War. Generally, I like shows that have a historical basis. The recently released Chernobyl is excellent and terrifying.

I am a film buff. I would have to list 1,001 of my favorites. But let me mention the campy To Have and Have Not (1944). This is the film in which the middle-aged Bogart meets the seventeen-year-old Bacall. This is the film in which Bacall teaches Bogart (known as “Steve”) how to whistle. This being a scholarly journal I will not repeat the precise instructions Bacall gave to the Steve character. In any case—some connections. My mother went to high-school in NYC with Bacall. The Bacall-Bogart offspring, Steve Bogart, attended the University of Hartford, my first full-time teaching job.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking, anxiety-producing professional moment?

This happened in the mid-1970s, when I was writing my dissertation. I supported myself by substitute teaching. I worked every day, because I was apparently the only person in Connecticut brave enough to teach 8th and 9th graders. I am a veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and used Drill Instructor tactics to keep the young teens in line.

One day I got a job being a gym teacher at an elementary school. My first class was with the kinders. I went into my D.I. act. The next thing I noticed they were all crying. OMG! Well, I recovered by having a group hug with the 5-year-olds. We thereafter had a splendid time playing “kick the tomato.”

3. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be, and why?

I have edited two readers on American slavery and have always taught courses on slavery. I want to have a family dinner with four guests: Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s eldest daughter, Martha Jefferson Randolph, Sally Hemings, and Madison Hemings. This would be a difficult dinner. The questions I would ask are hard but obvious. I have always been struck by the bitter memory of Madison Hemings, who in 1873 recalled how Jefferson played with Martha’s children at Monticello but ignored his son, Madison.

4. What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

With the $500 million, I would endow chairs in U.S. foreign relations at 500 universities/colleges. The study and teaching of international history is under assault. SHAFR members need to stay united.

5. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

My wife and I have ecumenical tastes in music and we go to all types of concerts. Being 1960s people, we would want the Stones and Aretha on one stage. On another stage, we would have Bob Dylan and Joan Baez.

We have a 2nd home in the town of Lindale, East Texas. We would ask Miranda Lambert, the pride of Lindale, to represent Country. We saw the Dixie Chicks, when they were just starting out, for $3 in Dallas. They will make a comeback at out festival and tell us what they really think of “W” and his war in Iraq.

The grand finale will be offered by the Dallas Symphony Orchestra conducted by Jaap Van Sweden. They will play Beethoven’s 7th (the 2nd movement is about Napoleon) and Shostakovich’s 10th Symphony (the 2nd movement is about Stalin). Our soloist is Stephen Hough who will play Rachmaninoff’s sublime 3rd Piano Concerto.

6. What are five things on your bucket list?

1. Shoot my age in golf. I am 71. I have come close a couple of times.
2. Score a ticket to enter the Sistine Chapel and see Michelangelo’s ceiling.
3. Visit the Taj Mahal.
4. Learn how to Tango. Whenever I am in Buenos Aires, I go to Tango clubs. President Obama’s greatest feat was when he did a reasonable facsimile of the Tango with the great Tango dancer, Moya, in Buenos Aires in March 2016.
5. Parachute out of a C-47 airplane. My father, S/Sgt. Rene E. Rabe, did it 22 times, including combat jumps into Normandy on 6 June 1944 and over the Rhine River into Germany on 24 March 1945. This will be last on my bucket list, as I suspect I will break my ankles, dislocate my knees, and throw out my back when I hit the ground.

7. What would you be doing If you were not an academic?

I would own the Boston Red Sox. Mitch Lerner will be our manager. I see Mitch as a Casey Stengel-like figure. The press will love bantering with Mitch. We are going to break the glass-ceiling in professional sports by having a front office consisting of Laura Belmonte, Carol Chin, Catherine Forslund, Katie Sibley, and Molly Wood. The added bonus is that all of them have the authority to tell Mitch what he is doing wrong on the baseball field.

My best buddy, Doug Little, and his wife Pat, Genice, and I will sit in seats atop the “Monster” at Fenway Park. Pat Little and I will be the happiest people in America.
Book Review

Editor’s note: The stand-alone book review section in Passport will go on indefinite hiatus after the January 2020 issue. Questions about this change should be addressed to the editor at andrew_johns@byu.edu. AJ


Henry Richard Maar III


Dietl’s work is a direct challenge to James Graham Wilson’s The Triumph of Improvisation (Ithaca, NY, 2015). Whereas Wilson argues that the end of the Cold War was due to the adaptability and improvisation of President Ronald Reagan, President George H.W. Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz, and Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, Dietl sets out to demonstrate that U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1980s, and the subsequent end of the Cold War, were due not to improvisation but to a deliberate effort by Presidents Reagan and Bush, who set out to reunify the European continent and cocreate a bipolar world with the Soviet Union.

At the center of this grand vision was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or “Star Wars,” as critics dubbed it), although Dietl suggests that SDI was a “mere component of a US grand design to jointly develop a new world order,” the program was “the long-sought solution” to the denuclearization of global security. SDI would allow the United States to “liberate itself from the shackles of Alliance politics” with the “cocreation of truly revolutionary collective security architecture” (18–20). To the ire of its NATO allies, the United States pursued SDI as part of its plan for a U.S.-Soviet “global directorate or condominium” (xiii).

Although SDI would eventually be placed in “cold storage,” and President Bush would alter Reagan’s vision by pursuing a “New Atlanticism” that “revitalized Alliance concerns and the role of nuclear deterrence” (xvi), the United States nevertheless continued to pursue, with Russian cooperation, a solution to nuclear deterrence. The grand vision of a bipolar world would falter only with the reunification of Germany. Reunification turned Europe into an “anchor [sic] of stability and instability.” The reunification of Germany, Dietl concludes, “stabilized a unified Europe and destabilized the remnants of bipolarity” (144).

Dietl does a wonderful job of outlining what he sees as missing in the vast historiography on the end of the Cold War. He rejects the older Reagan victory school, which posited that the United States won the Cold War through Reagan’s defense buildup. It was not the “West” that won the Cold War, Dietl asserts, but the superpowers. Dietl does credit the Western alliance with winning the “cold peace.” Here Dietl is making a distinction between the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which he sees as two different events.

In making that distinction, Dietl revisits and revises Beth Fischer’s Reagan Reversal thesis. Whereas Fischer notes a shift in Reagan following 1983’s Able Archer near nuclear catastrophe and ABC television’s primetime drama about a nuclear attack, The Day After, Dietl suggests that the real reversal began with the shift at the office of the secretary of state, from Alexander Haig Jr. to George Shultz. The latter “eased the formulation of a grand strategy that guided Ronald Reagan’s arms control negotiations and superpower summity” (xiv). Thus, for Dietl, the second Cold War begins to thaw in 1983, well before Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost initiatives.

Although The Strategic Defense Initiative is short, at under 150 pages for the body of the text, it manages to pack a punch because of the depth of its research. Dietl takes readers deep into the U.S. National Archives, the British National Archives, the Federal Foreign Office Archives of Germany, and the presidential libraries of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, as well as collections from the Library of Congress and several collections within Germany. He also cites published sources from FRUS, the National Security Archive, the Wilson Center, and the Congressional Record. This exhaustive research is reflected in the book’s extensive bibliography, which provides a clear path for other scholars working on this period and subject matter.

Dietl’s narrative offers a top-down, hierarchical explanation for the end of the Cold War. Although not a work of the Reagan Victory School, the book is driven by Reagan and his vision of a nuclear-free world, protected by a defense shield, with Gorbachev appearing more of a punch because of the depth of its research. Dietl takes readers deep into the U.S. National Archives, the British National Archives, the Federal Foreign Office Archives of Germany, and the presidential libraries of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, as well as collections from the Library of Congress and several collections within Germany. He also cites published sources from FRUS, the National Security Archive, the Wilson Center, and the Congressional Record. This exhaustive research is reflected in the book’s extensive bibliography, which provides a clear path for other scholars working on this period and subject matter.

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Thus, throughout the Strategic Defense Initiative, readers will find no discussion of any linkage of SDI with the antinuclear movements in the United States and Western Europe, and no discussion of the program’s relationship to domestic politics or domestic political considerations in the United States, Europe, or the Soviet Union. Moreover, Dietl does not address the feasibility of SDI, dismissing those aspects as “of secondary importance for diplomacy” (xiii). A reader of Dietl’s book with no foreknowledge of the program could walk away thinking SDI was a legitimate or workable defense program, rather than the “great pork barrel in the sky,” as President Carter’s former chief SALT negotiator and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Paul Warnke suggested. Likewise, motivations for the development of SDI that might compete with Reagan’s global zero vision are never given real consideration.

Furthermore, Dietl makes several debatable claims throughout the monograph. For instance, he is dismissive of the hostile rhetoric that marked Reagan’s first few years in office, noting a lack of anti-Soviet resolve in the verbatim record of meetings. He also shares the view that “Reagan was no ‘cold warrior’” and that there was “no elemental...
confrontation between ‘virtue and wickedness’” existing within his mind (140).

While Dietl is correct to suggest that Reagan’s private views differed from his often-hostile public anti-Communist crusader persona, he is too dismissive of the significance of Reagan’s rhetoric. Domestically, such hostile rhetoric certainly played a large role in frightening and galvanizing the American public, while globally it led the Soviet leadership to view Reagan with “unrelenting suspicion,” as Soviet historian Vlad Zubok writes. Moreover, Reagan’s hostile rhetoric may have been a contributing factor in the near confrontation over the Able Archer exercise.3

In addition, Dietl doubts that Reagan’s hawkish policies either ended or prolonged the Cold War (136). But it can be argued that Reagan’s overtly hostile rhetoric, in combination with the drive for perceived first-strike weapons such as the MX, did in fact prolong the Cold War. Georgi Arbatov suggests that many within the Politburo came to view Reagan with “hostility and genuine indignation.”4 Whether the outcome of the Cold War would have been different under a second Carter term is likewise questionable, but there is no doubt that whatever the merits of Reagan’s quiet diplomacy, in the first Reagan term, U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated before they improved.

The Strategic Defense Initiative is a dense work, and readers not already familiar with the nuclear lexicon may find themselves wondering what constitutes an air-breathing system or a boost-phase intercept and may have to remind themselves of the difference between MRV and MIRV. Thankfully, Dietl offers a glossary that clearly explains the various weapons programs, reports, and acronyms he cites and uses throughout the book.

What will hold Dietl’s work back from a larger audience, however, is the writing, which often comes across as stiff and lacking flow. Dietl routinely relies on the passive voice, and that makes it hard to know exactly who is saying what or even to find Dietl’s own voice within the narrative. It also becomes difficult to understand what is being said when Dietl is summarizing the viewpoints of the Reagan administration or the Soviets.

Because of its density, this work will have a very limited audience. However, although I disagree with Dietl on several fronts, his research makes a significant contribution to the field, and scholars of the Reagan years and of the late Cold War should consult this work.

Notes:

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**Call for Applications: SHAFR Second Book Workshop**

SHAFR welcomes applications for participants in a one-day second book workshop scheduled to take place on June 17, 2020—right before the SHAFR Annual Meeting in New Orleans. This initiative is aimed at mid-career scholars who are researching/writing their second book and who would like to have a productive environment in which to receive feedback on their work. Participants will be part of a group of four peers; they will give comments to others and receive feedback themselves. They will also have the opportunity to speak to a mentor.

Selection process: The screening committee (formed by three members of the Women in SHAFR committee plus two other experienced SHAFR scholars) will select twelve participants in a two-stage process. In the first stage, they will select potential participants based on the excellence of their work in terms of originality, rigor, and significance. In the second stage, they will rank the applicants who have passed the first round depending on their belonging to a “priority group” (see below).

**Timeline:**

**March 1, 2020** (* two weeks after acceptance to the SHAFR Annual Meeting will have been confirmed): initial proposals due.

Participants are asked to submit a curriculum vitae, a two-page project summary, and a draft chapter, introduction, or book proposal, together with a one-page explanation of why this experience would be helpful/what they expect to achieve through it, as well as an optional statement in which they can indicate if they belong to a “priority group”:

- Members of underrepresented groups (in terms of gender, race, class, and accessibility)
- People with high teaching and administrative loads
- People who lack a conducive research and mentoring environment

**March 27, 2020:** notifications sent to accepted participants.
The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation to the Department of State (HAC) has two principal responsibilities: 1) to oversee the preparation and timely publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series by the department’s Office of the Historian (OH); and 2) to monitor the declassification and release of State Department records.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-138 [105 Stat. 647, codified in relevant part at 22 U.S.C. § 4351 et seq.]) mandates these responsibilities. Known popularly as the Foreign Relations statute, it calls for publishing a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of United States foreign relations no later than 30 years after the events that they document. The statute also requires the HAC to review the “State Department’s declassification procedures” and “all guidelines used in declassification, including those guidelines provided to the National Archives and Records Administration [NARA].”

While 2018 produced notable successes, it presented challenges that threaten the continued progress that the HAC has reported over the past several years. Throughout 2018 the pace of the reviews of FRUS volumes submitted to the interagency review process was disappointing. Although the underfunding and understaffing that pervades both the interagency process and NARA contributed significantly to this problem, the performance of the Department of Defense (DoD) was especially unacceptable. Further, owing to the hiring freeze, OH operated without a director for all of 2018, and it was unable to fill four vacant FTE historian positions.

Exacerbating these phenomena, the unprecedented decision of the State Department’s leadership in the final month of 2017 to reject OH’s request to renew three HAC members and request nominees potentially to replace all other members unsettled the HAC and OH and diverted the time and energy of both. Not until June 2018 was a resolution reached by which State and the HAC agreed that three of the current members would be replaced, the remaining six would be replaced over the next two years, and a system of three-year terms and regular rotations would be established. A fourth member, Robert McMahon, resigned to protest State’s initial decision. Because State did not select replacements until the week prior to the August meeting, none of them had received security clearances by the meeting in December. Discussions of FRUS issues were thereby impaired.

**Publications of the Foreign Relations Series**

Compiling the multiplicity of records necessary to document an administration’s foreign relations, culling from them the limited number that can be managed in one volume while still providing a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary history, steering the draft volume through the interagency declassification review process and then editing it for publication, poses a demanding and time-consuming challenge. OH still managed to publish 6 FRUS volumes in 2018. Although a decline from the number of volumes published over the previous three years (8, 8, and 10, a rate of publication that meets the goal OH calculates is necessary to achieve the 30-year timeline for publication mandated by the Foreign Relations statute), publishing 6 volumes despite the challenges OH confronted is impressive. The titles of the volumes are:

5. *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

The publication of the first of the three volumes that will cover the War in Afghanistan from 1977-1988 warrants particular attention because it may turn out to be an anomaly. The HAC is delighted with this publication. Still, because so many of the compiled volumes in the Reagan subseries include documents on intelligence operations and parallel sensitive information, the HAC fears that they will encounter severe declassification problems that will significantly delay their publication. Further, intelligence issues were integral to the foreign relations of subsequent administrations as well, this concern extends to the publication of future subseries.

No less notable than OH’s managing to publish 6 volumes in 2018 despite the obstacles, under the leadership of Joseph Wicentowski it completed its 10-year project to digitize and post online at history.state.gov all 512 back catalogue FRUS volumes dating back to the series’ origin in 1861. Each volume is fully-searchable and downloadable in multiple formats. Notwithstanding the difficulties, OH now plans to digitize all the microfiche supplements.

**The Challenge of the 30-Year Requirement**

Despite the prodigious efforts of OH’s compilers, reviewers, and technical editors, and its relentless and creative efforts to gain approval from the interagency process to declassify documents, the office is unlikely to maintain in 2019 and beyond the record-breaking rate of FRUS publication that it produced over the previous six years, when it published on average some 8 volumes a year. As a result, rather than closing the gap to reaching the 30-year timeline, as mandated by the Foreign Relations statute, that gap will almost certainly widen.
In large part the problem inheres in the explosion of documents which the statute requires that OH’s historians locate among the multiple departments, agencies, and executive offices that contribute to the foreign relations process. Since the Reagan years, an increasing number of these documents concern sensitive intelligence information. The time required to declassify these documents is frequently prolonged—considerably—because in most cases diverse agencies and departments hold an “equity” (interest or concern) in the document and therefore are entitled to approve or deny its release in part or full. Further, because the same declassification offices in many agencies are responsible for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requests as well as FRUS systematic reviews and declassification, and FOIA/MDR requests require time-sensitive responses, in many instances they receive priority over FRUS’s requirements. For a volume such as the one on the Iran Hostage Crisis, moreover, intractable legal issues can cause indefinite delays.

The rigor and vigor of the reviews conducted by the State Department’s Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS) should serve as a model for other agencies and departments. In 2018 OH referred 3 more volumes to IPS than it did in 2017—a total of 9. IPS provided responses to 7 of these volumes, and did so on average in less than 75 days—far faster than any other agency. Moreover, the quality of the reviews was exemplary.

But once again the Department of Defense in 2018 performed so negligently and so egregiously violated the requirements mandated by the Foreign Relations statute that it more than offset the commendable efforts of the other agencies and departments. The statute requires all departments and agencies to conduct a declassification review of a FRUS compilation submitted by OH within 120 days of receipt and to respond to any appeals of the first review within another 60 days. Should a department or agency judge it must withhold a record from declassification in order to protect national security information that remains sensitive, it must make an effort to redact the text for the purpose of making it releasable. Adhering to the mandated timelines for completing these tasks is vital to OH’s ability to maintain the rate of publication required to approach the 30-year timeline.

To address the challenges posed by DoD, the leadership of OH met in 2018 with staff members from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the DOSPR, and the Joint Staff. Modest improvements resulted. But the HAC strongly believes that only the dedication of more resources to its review processes will enable DoD to meet its statutory responsibilities. It believes equally strongly that DoD must follow the path mapped out by the Central Intelligence Agency by prioritizing FRUS declassification and detailing an OH historian to DoD to help coordinate declassification of FRUS documents. Perhaps even more vital, DoD should adopt the structures innovated by both the CIA and Department of State and establish a centralized FRUS declassification coordination team in which it vests some declassification authority and responsibilities. These documents are frequently prolonged—considerably—because in most cases diverse agencies and departments hold an “equity” (interest or concern) in the document and therefore are entitled to approve or deny its release in part or full. Further, because the same declassification offices in many agencies are responsible for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requests as well as FRUS systematic reviews and declassification, and FOIA/MDR requests require time-sensitive responses, in many instances they receive priority over FRUS’s requirements. For a volume such as the one on the Iran Hostage Crisis, moreover, intractable legal issues can cause indefinite delays.

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By all but disregarding the mandated deadlines for its reviews and conducting these reviews so poorly as to require appeals and re-reviews, the Department of Defense crippled OH’s ability to publish FRUS volumes. DoD is primarily culpable for the decline to 6 published volumes in 2018 and the projected publication of only 2 volumes in 2019. To illustrate, in the last month of 2017 DoD finally responded to 10 outstanding FRUS referrals, which had been under review an average of 429 days—more than 300 days beyond the statutory deadline. It denied in full a total of 589 historically significant documents referred to it by OH, an unprecedented number that reflected an inadequate understanding of the declassification guidelines, and it made no effort to redact any of them. In 2018 DoD revised its responses to only 6 of those volumes, but only 3 of these revised responses satisfied the statute’s standard for publication. And it failed to revise at all its responses to 4 of the volumes. Forging ahead in its effort to close the gap on the 30-year timeline, OH referred 6 more volumes to DoD in 2018, adding to its backlog. (The HAC learned at its August 2018 meeting that DoD had missed the statutory deadline on all the referrals it was currently reviewing, approximately 621 documents, by an average of 625 days.) To its credit, DoD subsequently accelerated the pace of its reviews, and the quality of them is somewhat better. But it has made no progress in proposing redactions that will allow for the release of text that will enable the HAC to certify that a volume, notwithstanding the information that is withheld from declassification, is “thorough, accurate, and reliable.”

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In this regard the HAC must highlight that after some stumbles in 2016 and 2017, the CIA in 2018 again demonstrated its commitment to partnering with OH for the purpose of publishing “thorough, accurate, and reliable” FRUS volumes. In contrast to DoD, the CIA years ago established a Historical Programs Staff to coordinate FRUS reviews. Recent reorganizations and changes in personnel has improved the staff’s productivity. OH referred to CIA 10 new volumes during the calendar year. CIA returned final responses to 6 of them within the mandated timeline, and dialogue between it and OH on the others continues. Moreover, it resumed its participation in High Level Panel (HLP) decision-making, a coordinated interagency process institutionalized for the purpose of evaluating information on historical covert actions for publication in FRUS. After a 3-year hiatus, in 2018, CIA evaluated or reconsidered 5 HLP cases. Yet troubling signs remain. The CIA’s Historical Review Panel (HRP) advises the CIA on declassifying intelligence information vital to FRUS. The HAC is, therefore, concerned that the director did not convene a meeting of the HRP in 2018. Previously, the panel met twice annually since its formal establishment in the 1995.
The Review, Transfer, and Processing of Department of State Records

The HAC monitored the review and transfer of State Department records by State’s Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS) and their accession and processing at NARA.

The HAC congratulates the staffs of IPS and NARA’s National Declassification Center (NDC) for their progress. The NDC continues to process hundreds of thousands of pages, and benefiting from the interagency cooperation it promotes, its withholding rate is approximately 8%. It also reduced its FOIA backlog by about 10% and reports that its Index-on-Demand program was again very successful. Despite continued resource and personnel challenges and an ongoing reorganization effort, IPS likewise met its goals with regard its systematic review of records, its disposal of new FOIA and MDR requests, and reducing the FOIA and MDR backlog. The number of these requests continues to escalate, however, taxing time and resources. Moreover, insufficient funding, the lack of an appropriate secure space, and inadequate technology has incapacitated IPS’s reviews of central file P- and N-reels from the 1980 on, the quality of which is rapidly deteriorating. IPS has not yet identified a solution other than to “pass the buck” by transferring the reels to NARA for handling. The implications are worrisome, IPS reports that 2018 was the tipping point when the dominance of paper records passed to electronic records.

The HAC is not sanguine about the capacity of IPS and NARA to manage records in the electronic age that is now upon us. The explosion in the volume of documents that characterizes contemporary government; the duplication of those documents across departments and agencies; the replacement of paper records with electronic ones, including audio and video files; and more had led to increased reliance on Artificial Intelligence and attendant technological efficiencies.

The HAC received briefings on plans to exploit technologies to store records, review and sort them, digitize unprocessed paper records, etc. But its questions about implementation have gone largely unanswered. Both IPS and NARA appear to be relying on technologies that have not been proven effective. Nor has it received evidence that the present level of appropriations and acquisition is sufficient. The result may well be shortcuts—the elimination or degradation finding aids, for example—and the postponement, possibly indefinitely, of public access to records.

Current initiatives for managing presidential libraries reinforce these concerns. NARA’s plans to move classified documents from all of the Presidential Libraries to NARA II in order to consolidate declassification may complicate FRUS compilers access to them. The Obama Foundation’s decision to house all presidential records at NARA II is likewise cause for concern. The HAC judges such decisions as driven by budgetary considerations that could prove costly to future researchers and call into question NARA’s historic mission.

Recommendations:

· DoD should establish a centralized FRUS declassification coordination team which can more effectively meet DoD’s mandate for the timely review and release of historically significant information that no longer needs to remain classified.

· NARA and IPS should publish plans to transition to technologically-driven records management and append detailed budgets and feasibility studies. IPS, for example, should provide a public explanation of how, with the new technology and cloud-based architecture, records will be declassified and transferred to NARA, NARA should explain how it plans to accession and make available these materials, and both should provide estimates of the costs.

· NARA should publish a detailed implementation strategy for consolidating all classified documents from the Presidential Libraries in NARA II that allows for public comments, includes a time schedule, and assures access by FRUS compilers.

Minutes for the HAC meetings are at https://history.state.gov/about/hac/meeting-notes.

Richard H. Immerman, Chair (American Historical Association)
Laura Belmonte (Organization of American Historians)
Mary L. Dudziak (American Society of International Law)
David Engerman (Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations—beginning September 2018)
William Inboden (At Large—beginning September 2018)
Adrian Lentz-Smith (At Large—beginning September 2018)
James McAllister (American Political Science Association—through September 2018)
Robert McMahon (Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations—through June 2018)
Trudy Huskamp Peterson (Society of American Archivists)
Daryl Press (American Political Science Association—beginning September 2018)
Susan Perdue (At Large)
Katherine A. S. Sibley (At Large—through September 2018)
Thomas Zeiler (At Large—through September 2018)
Professional Notes

**Brian Etheridge** has accepted a new position as Professor of History and Director of the University Honors Program at Kennesaw State University.

**Mark Atwood Lawrence**, Associate Professor of History at the University of Texas, Austin, has been named Director of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library.

**Odd Arne Westad** joined the faculty at Yale University and the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs as Elihu Professor of History and Global Affairs.

Recent Books of Interest


Fischer, Beth A. *The Myth of Triumphantalism: Rethinking President Reagan’s Cold War Legacy.* (Kentucky, 2019).


Fu, Poshek and Man-Fung Yip, eds. *The Cold War and Asian Cinemas.* (Routledge, 2019).


Gill, Timothy M. *The Future of U.S. Empire in the Americas: The Trump Administration and Beyond.* (Routledge, 2020).


Lüthi, Lorenz. *Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe*. (Cambridge, 2020)


Moran, Katherine D. *The Imperial Church: Catholic Founding Fathers and United States Empire*. (Cornell, 2020).


Marilyn Blatt Young Fellowship

As my fellowship year draws to a close, I am pleased to submit this Final Report to the SHAFR Council. During the term of the Marilyn Blatt Young Fellowship, I completed drafts of the three remaining chapters of my dissertation on public health and race-making in colonial Hawai‘i. All that is left now is to revise and defend. Much of the past year’s work followed closely from the plan I had set out in my original prospectus. One chapter shows how white officials’ reactions to epidemics of cholera and bubonic plague in the 1890s helped to position Honolulu’s Asian inhabitants as suspected vectors for foreign pathogens. Another examines the administration of the leper settlement at Kalaupapa, with a particular emphasis on conflict between different groups of white elites over questions of indigenous Hawaiians’ sexual morality. My last planned chapter—on the Leahi Home for Incurables, a hospital established by Hawai‘i’s territorial government in 1901 for the treatment of tuberculosis patients—I could not execute as intended, owing to the paucity of available records. The racial demographics of this institution were much more representative of the islands than were those of the Kalaupapa settlement and I had hoped this other, under-researched institution would provide a useful point of comparison. I am particularly thankful that the support I received from SHAFR allowed me the opportunity and time away from other obligations to fashion a new framework for this chapter and to track down additional sources in order to look more broadly at the anti-tuberculosis campaigns of the 1910s, particularly as they unfolded in the islands’ rural districts. In closing, I remain forever grateful for the support—both financial and intellectual—of my colleagues at SHAFR.

Sincerely,
Caleb Hardner
Doctoral Candidate, UIC Department of History
In Memoriam: Waldo Heinrichs (1925-2019)

Waldo Heinrichs passed away on July 3 in Springfield, Massachusetts. Waldo, a long-time member of SHAFR, was a historian of American foreign relations and military history specializing in American-East Asian relations. He earned a B.A. from Harvard in 1949, a B.A. from Oxford in 1951, and a Ph.D. from Harvard in 1960. During his career, he taught at Johns Hopkins University, the University of Tennessee, University of Illinois, and Temple University. He retired from teaching in 1995 as the Dwight E. Stanford Professor of History at San Diego State University.

Waldo once wrote that “circumstances and trial and error, more than deliberate choice,” led him to history as a profession and the type of history he wrote. The son of a Y.M.C.A. administrator, Waldo spent the first ten years of his life in the British empire in Calcutta, Lahore, and Jerusalem. His mother was from a prosperous family that had migrated to Honolulu from New York in the 1860s. In 1935, his father joined the faculty of Middlebury College in Vermont and the family settled there. It was in Middlebury, he later wrote, that he became fully American, yet American culture was something learned, not absorbed. His childhood outside the U.S. as a “pint-sized pukka sahib,” and his trips to Hawaii by steamer contributed to a detached view of his home country and a global perspective that would inform his view of history.

Waldo subsequently graduated from Phillips Exeter Academy and entered Harvard University. His education was interrupted by the war and he entered the Army in 1943. Waldo subsequently became an antitank gunner in the 86th division, one of the last two division sent to Europe at the height of the Battle of the Bulge. After the war, he completed his education at Harvard and took a degree in History at Oxford. After a brief stint in the foreign service and another in advertising, he returned to Harvard for his Ph.D. in 1957. His first book, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (1966) won the Allen Nevin’s Prize, which is awarded by the Society of American Historians to the best-written doctoral dissertation on a significant subject in American history.

During the next two decades, Waldo’s involvement with the Committee on American-East Asian Relations, which was started by John King Fairbank and directed in turns by Dorothy Borg, and Warren Cohen and Akira Iriye, provided the encouragement for series of experimental essays and articles. He also co-edited with Dorothy Borg, Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950 (1980). During this period, his interest in a broad survey of U.S.-East Asian relations evolved into a search for the cause of American diplomatic rigidity in dealing with Japan before Pearl Harbor. The result, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (1988) was hailed as “The best synthesis we have of U.S. diplomatic and military history immediately before Pearl Harbor.”

Upon his retirement, two of his former students, Jonathan Utley and Marc Gallicchio published a collection of Waldo’s essays as Diplomacy and Force: America’s Road to War, 1931-1941. The introduction, an autobiographical essay titled “Looking Back: Personal Narrative and the Writing of History” gracefully illustrates the interplay of personal experience, professional trends, and contemporary events in the shaping of his scholarship. Warren Cohen said of Diplomacy and Force, “Waldo Heinrichs writes as elegantly as anyone in the profession, with a warmth of generosity of spirit that few can match….This book and especially his introductory essay should be required reading for all students.”

His students were fortunate to experience that warmth and generosity of spirit at a personal level. Waldo wore his impressive accomplishments lightly. He challenged his students but was supportive and readily available for them. Like all good teachers, Waldo did not confine his teaching to the classroom. He was known to surprise his graduate students with phone calls on the weekend to praise a draft he had just read and encourage them on. At Temple, in addition to teaching in his specialty, he energized the department’s new dissertation colloquium and managed the department’s portfolio system with great care, occasionally buttonholing colleagues to see if they would mind rewriting an awkward sentence or two in a student’s letter of recommendation. He was, one long-time colleague recalls, “one of the stand-up folks … one of the better angels, someone you could depend upon in a crunch, a man of values and strength, solid judgment and even temper.”

In retirement, Waldo began work on a study of the end of World War II in the Pacific, which he envisioned as a bookend to Threshold of War. As the project grew in scope, he enlisted the assistance of Marc Gallicchio. The finished

Waldo once wrote that he found traditional diplomatic history, the story of what one clerk wrote to another, dull and unimaginative. For much of his career, he sought to rectify that situation by employing various social science methodologies to expand the interpretive possibilities of diplomatic history. He learned from Dorothy Borg that “Diplomacy – dealing with the other – was a deeply human experience, reflecting reason and emotion, imagination and blindness, caution and risk. Above all, it was a story of human engagement in the shadow of power, never entirely predictable, nor quite reconstructible, nor obviously intelligible. … [but] it was an experience that history could go far to recapture.”

Waldo Heinrichs is survived by his wife, Dr. Audrey S. Heinrichs, two sisters, Mary Garner and Shirin Bird, four sons (Peter, Timothy, Richard, and Mark), eleven grandchildren, and four great grandchildren.
In Memoriam: Jean-Donald Miller (1946-2019)

Don Miller died in Washington, D.C., November 15, 2019, after a long and successful career as an historian and international-affairs specialist for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). He always urged students to embrace liberal arts and bilingual education and to consider employment outside the historical profession. Don took a deep and fervent interest in matters French, from food to riots, showering his friends with informative e-mails and sometimes irreverent commentaries and political cartoons. Witty and knowledgeable, Don’s smile warmed his friends in lively conversation. His stories of world travel enlightened us—and made us envious.

Don was born April 3, 1946, in Paris, France. He grew up in a multi-lingual household. His mother Marie Louise was French-born and became a teacher of Spanish. His father was a U.S. military officer. After his mother’s death, he honored her every year at her gravesite in the small French commune of Merlas (Department of Isère), gathered with French relatives to celebrate family, and immersed himself in the beautiful city of Lyon. In recent years, during the commemorative attentions to World War I, Don was especially moved by the simple plaques, erected decades earlier by small French villages, that listed their many local young men who died in the Great War.

Don received his B.A. from California State University, Long Beach (1968), where he was named to Phi Beta Kappa. He became a conscientious objector during the Vietnam War and worked in an x-ray department of a Veterans Administration hospital. In 1971, the University of California, Irvine, awarded him an M.A. in History. At the University of Connecticut, I welcomed Don as a doctoral student and learned from him. He earned his Ph.D. in History in 1981. He made lasting friends at UConn with his then-wife and life-long, dearest friend Susan Murray at his side.


After leaving Virginia Tech, Don became an “International Program Specialist” for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), with emphasis on its international search-and-rescue program. He next shifted to the International Relations Division of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), where he led the Europe, France, and European Space Agency Teams. In the 1990s, Don participated in designing NASA’s policy towards the states of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the People’s Republic of China. In 1996, he received a NASA achievement award for his leadership of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Team for U.S.-Russia Space Cooperation. From 2003 to 2007, Don served as the NASA European Representative, located in Paris, a prestigious posting that he cherished. After his return to the United States, Don served in NASA Headquarters with the Office of Space Communications and Navigation. He was also appointed the American Executive Director of the U.S.-Russia International Space Station Advisory Council to manage the activities of the Council and its task forces. He retired from NASA in 2012 and settled in Washington, D.C.

Before his death, Don funded two undergraduate scholarships at California State University, Long Beach. One is the Jean Donald Miller Endowed Scholarship in American History and the other is the Marie Louise Miller Endowed Scholarship in French and Francophone Studies. Donations to these scholarship funds are welcomed. Checks (made out to CSULB 49er Foundation) may be sent to Howie Fitzgerald, Director of Development, College of Liberal Arts, California State University, Long Beach, 1250 N. Bellflower Blvd., Long Beach, CA 90840.

Thomas G. Paterson
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Many of us work in professions with many benefits. Few people in society have the opportunity for tenure, large latitude regarding freedom of speech, or the intellectual invigoration often provided by students and colleagues. Yes, there are drawbacks, especially in the modern corporate universities, where many who work hard do not share in such benefits.

But as I reflect on my twenty-five-year career, I can say that one of the best benefits I have had remains the relationships I have developed in the profession, especially within my major fields of study. There are the obvious ones, such as those that evolved during graduate school. Few mean more to me than my friendship with my doctoral mentor, George Herring (and his wife Dottie). In thirty years, it has gone well beyond the classroom to the softball field, dinners, and conferences. He remains a constant source of wisdom and support.

The same is true of my best friend in graduate school, Bob Brigham (as well as his wife Monica). Bob and I spent many hours together in the classroom, but we also frequented the basketball court and the Dairy Queen, where we indulged in Blizzards when we had some extra money. We are quite the pair—a West Texan and New Yorker—but it works. While he went to Vassar and I headed southwest to Arizona State, we remain close. Our families have vacationed together, and we always make time for each other. It has been and remains an amazing friendship created by the common bonds of academics.

While I know most academics have close relationships in their own departments, I also greatly value my professional colleagues outside ASU. I am blessed to have many friends from many fields, ranging from foreign relations to social and cultural history. These friendships have developed within many professional associations, including the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR).

While some may say these are merely professional relationships, they often go much deeper. There are too many examples to name, but several stand out—one none more than my relationship with my colleague, Laura Belmonte (dean of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences at Virginia Tech), whom I love dearly. Yes, I said “love,” because our friendship is that deep (she calls me her brother from another mother). We talk about everything from our common research interests in foreign relations to administrative duties to our families. My wife Maria loves her, and I love her spouse, Susie. Maria jokes that Laura is the only person who can text me late at night without subsequent questions arising at home. We would do anything for each other.

Laura and I always take a long bike ride (twenty miles plus) when we are at the SHAFR conference. Riding side-by-side, we discuss our lives and future and solve all the problems of the world, and it is always the best part of the conference. She is one of many friends who have been of great comfort to me as I endured a very difficult professional catastrophe while working for the National Archives.

Another good friend who supported me through that time was Mitch Lerner, from The Ohio State University. You could not find two guys with more different backgrounds and personalities, but we mesh seamlessly. When the story about the National Archives broke, he called immediately to check on me and my mental and physical state. He has done so repeatedly and has publicly come to my defense several times. It was of great comfort to me for him (and other friends) to say often that they knew it was not me, but the agency that had the problems. As we arrived at a recent conference, he pulled Maria aside and asked several times, “How’s he doing?” We talked a few times, and he continued to offer solace and support. I cannot say often enough how much it meant to me.

Mitch and many other colleagues (too many to name, but you know who you are) from around the world have made phone calls and sent texts, emails, and Facebook messages expressing support and asking how they could help. Until this episode, I didn’t know how many friends I had. The constant support has helped me endure a very bad situation and emerge on the other side with a new appreciation for all that we have in academia.

But one of the greatest things about these relationships is that they continue to multiply. That often happens as you network within different organizations. The Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA (PCB) has been a great source of friendships for me. More than fifteen years ago, I began attending the PCB conference because I loved its focus on many different fields. Its size prevented distance from developing between areas of emphasis, as it does in organizations such as the AHA or OAH (or even some departments). People came together because of their love of their fields in often wonderful locations like San Diego, Santa Fe, and even Hawaii.

I have met so many wonderful people as I moved from program chair to council to president, including Barb Molony (an Asianist) and her husband, Thomas Turley (a medievalist); Anne Hyde (a Western historian); and Al Camarillo (Latino history). All provide different views and experiences, and each contributes to broadening my understanding of their fields and helps provide a good network of people that I run into all the time. And of course, we have created a strong presence for people studying foreign relations, including this year’s president, Andy Johns, as well as board members Jason Colby and Dustin Walcher (and many others who participate regularly).

And none have been as important as my great friend David Wrobel, dean of Arts and Sciences at the University of Oklahoma and a preeminent scholar of the American West. Our friendship began as we served on council together, and we have become very close. We come from similar backgrounds, his in England and mine in Texas, we have talked research, life, and families. He has been and continues to be a constant source of information and support.
I have been blessed to develop all these new friends through these organizations, and I would encourage everyone to join associations like them, as they are important to moving us beyond our comfort zones and helping us see the world differently. They also provide such a great opportunity to make new friends.

But friendships can also extend beyond university walls. For example, my relationship with my editor at Cambridge University Press, Debbie Gershenowitz (who is now at the University of North Carolina Press), is truly terrific. I have had some wonderful editors, but Debbie and I have been friends for years because of our common interest in the Vietnam War. Our friendship became deeper over time as we worked together on my most recent book, *LBJ’s 1968*, and it will continue as we work on another book in the near future. Although she is a great editor, Debbie has been an even better friend. When my recent professional crisis arose (combined with a serious health issue for my father), Debbie consistently checked in on me. She has continued to do so, which means a lot to me and makes me appreciate all that she does beyond editing my books.

When I started in this profession—and I hope to have many more years in it—I never knew how often my academic village would be there for me, in the good times as well as the bad. The great thing is that I continue to add more people to my circle of friends, especially younger scholars who bring new perspectives and experiences, such as Cody Foster, Gabrielle Westcott, and Amber Batura. All of this is so important to me, as we live in a world that is increasingly tribal, even within our own families. It makes me so thankful for all the friends that I met because I chose to work in academia.

I hope younger scholars have the same good fortune. It is a perk of the job that I never anticipated, but I am very glad to have it.