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From the Chancery: Gratitude

Andrew L. Johns

This is not the column I intended to write.

Originally, I meant to address—yet again—the chaotic, dysfunctional, toxic, and dangerous state of our current political and academic environments. I could have talked at excruciating length about the forces that continue to polarize our society, imperil our rights, and undermine basic decency and civility. But I just could not bring myself take on the Sisyphian task of writing another jeremiad on our contemporary woes and the humorless, condescending, and sanctimonious scolds from the Ministry of Outrage who make everything even worse.

Then, in the wake of the president’s inexplicable, Brobdingnagian—yet depressingly predictable—diplomatic blunders in Singapore and Helsinki (among others), I thought I had zeroed in on a great idea for a column. I could actually focus on foreign relations and politics for once. Of course, I then realized I would have to move all of the content slated for this issue to the next issue in order to fit everything I wanted to say into a single essay if I started down that road....

I could have written long columns about a host of other topics: the question of academic advocacy and activism, or the perilous state of the FRUS series (read the HAC report in this issue for details), or the incomprehensible decisions being made by NARA about the status of and access to documents at presidential libraries and elsewhere that will affect the writing of history in years to come, just to name a few. But none of those inspired me to put pen to paper—which is actually how I begin drafting everything still (although you can expect more on each of those topics in Passport in the near future).

At a loss, I was pondering what I could write—or even if I should write anything for this issue—while babysitting my granddaughter. That is when I had an epiphany and decided to devote this column to the deep sense of gratitude that I feel for SHAFR. Amazing what a fifteen-month-old can do for your perspective.

I am grateful that I have been a member of SHAFR for over twenty-five years. For me—and for so many others—it is an intellectual home, a community that shares a passion for history and scholarly inquiry. I know I am not the only one who looks forward to mid-June as one of the best weekends of the year. Of all of the academic organizations I am a part of, SHAFR is easily the most welcoming, most intellectually open, most thought-provoking, and most fun. One anecdote from last year’s conference in Philadelphia that encapsulates this: on Wednesday night, a bunch of the usual suspects and a couple of new people were sitting in the bar at the Sheraton when a long-time member of SHAFR (and a good friend) wandered by the table. He looked a little lost, a little down, and a little tired, so we invited him to sit with us and have a drink. At first, he begged off, but eventually he joined us....and for the next two hours we had a terrific time talking about some fantastically interesting research, SHAFR, current events, and life in general. As he got up to leave, he leaned over to me and said, “thanks, I really needed this.” I am grateful to be part of a group that can have that kind of positive effect on people....especially in times like these.

I am grateful for the relationships that I have enjoyed because of SHAFR. Most of my closest friends are members of the organization (I’m not sure what that says about my lack of a life the other eleven months and three weeks of the year), and the sense of camaraderie and friendship that permeates the Renaissance and other conference sites is overwhelming. At the risk of leaving someone out (and I apologize if I do), I need to express my thanks to those who inspire me with their work, listen patiently while I rant, support me in my various projects, rein in my crazier ideas, and keep the free Cokes and Dr. Peppers flowing: Kathryn, Kim, Mitch, Molly, Dustin, Jeremi, Brian, Heather, Marc, Kelly (both literal and Shannon), Chester, David, Tom, Chris, KC, Ken, Jason, Jeff, all the Andrews, Peter, Mark, Laura, Fred, Tim, Bob, Amy, Justin, Lori, Paul, Hang, Matt, Jen, Tom, Jessica, Scott, Salim, Nate, David (I promise the Humphrey book is coming!), Ryan, Fabian, Frank, George, Steve, Kurk, Kate, Anne, Jake, Ryan, Steve, Amanda, Dan, David, Dawn, Lauren, Rasmus, Chris, David, Tizoc, Henry, Michael, Mark, Chris, Kyle, Jim, Simon, Lisa, Jason, Greg, Aaron, Will, Richard, Seth, Matt, John, Mel, Luke, Tim, Sarah, Stephen, Klaus, Joe, John, Steve, Carol, Sandra, Grant, Sayuri, Vanessa, Ara, Terry, Sarah....and scores of others too numerous to list here.

I am grateful to the team that helps make Passport a reality—Julie Rojewski, Allison Roth, and Brionna Mendoza, our new assistant editor—and for the opportunity to continue to serve the members of SHAFR in this capacity. It has truly been one of the great pleasures and honors of my academic career. And a huge thank you to everyone who contributes to the roundtables, reviews, and essays that Passport publishes. Your enthusiasm and engagement make my job as editor enjoyable (and much easier) and opens my eyes to ideas that I might not otherwise have considered.

Finally, I am grateful for my long-suffering wife (we just celebrated our 27th anniversary, which qualifies her for sainthood at least five times over), my three children, my parents, my son-in-law (no, really), my granddaughter, and my dogs. In a world of chaos, uncertainty, and insanity, family is one of the few things I can always count on to make my life better and give it meaning.
2018 SHAFR Election Results

**PRESIDENT**  Barbara Keys, University of Melbourne

**VICE PRESIDENT**  Kristin Hoganson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

**COUNCIL**  Andrew L. Johns, Brigham Young University

**COUNCIL**  Kelly Shannon, Florida Atlantic University

**COUNCIL (GRADUATE STUDENT)**  Vivien Chang, University of Virginia

**NOMINATING COMMITTEE**  Sarah B. Snyder, American University

In addition, the referendum to amend the SHAFR By-Laws to shorten the election cycle to August 15 through September 30 passed with 98.6% of the vote.

Thank you to the 536 members of SHAFR (a 51.3% participation rate) who voted in the election.
Sociologists tell us that voluntary associations typically proliferate in periods of social dislocation, meet needs for fictive families, and often feature elaborate hierarchies. It’s easy to see how SHAFR, founded in 1967, enabled a group of historians with particular interests to carve out a specialized identity in an era of social upheaval and professional expansion. Reflecting its reputation for comity and civility, SHAFR is fondly described by some members as a “family,” but with nearly 1,300 members in over forty countries, it is a family with a hierarchical system of governance that can sometimes work in opaque ways. My purpose here is to shed light on the unwritten rules of how SHAFR works with the aim of encouraging more members to participate more fully in the organization. (In this aim, I am following in a tradition of presidential SHAFR messages; see, for example, Frank Costigliola’s Passport message in 2008).

To the uninitiated, the most striking element of SHAFR’s work is how thoroughly it depends on the willingness of members to donate time and energy. The organization has very few paid staff, and because those few are usually paid fixed sums rather than hourly salaries, they donate a great deal of their time at below-market rates. Executive Director Amy Sayward is the heart and lungs of the group: she’s a CFO, COO, and CIO rolled into one. The editors of Diplomatic History, currently Anne Foster and Nick Cullather, along with Andy Johns at Passport, deserve special mention for their hard work making SHAFR’s publications so outstanding. Alan McPherson has recently led the publication of the annotated bibliography known as The SHAFR Guide, with contributions from members.

Beyond the relatively visible prize committees that oversee SHAFR’s awards (and whose members are appointed by SHAFR presidents), many committees and task forces operate behind the scenes. The Web Committee, for example, has helped design and commission content for shafr.org. Right now, a task force of dedicated volunteers is drafting a code of conduct for future conferences. A suite of ad hoc committees staffed by volunteers appointed by the president has just overseen editorial reviews and searches for a new publisher and editors for DH.

Few people devote more of their time to SHAFR than the chairs of the annual conference’s program committee, who are appointed by the incoming president on the basis of their organizational skills, scholarly vision, integrity, and willingness to devote long hours to the greater benefit. With the help of a larger program committee, they coordinate the selection of panels and papers for the annual conference, a job that has increased in magnitude as the number of proposals has come to greatly exceed the conference capacity (in terms of rooms and time available). The program chairs then have the difficult task of scheduling all the accepted proposals in ways that avoid overlapping topics, keep the very high audio-visual costs down, and assign the available rooms to reflect predicted audiences. (Those of us who grumble at the simultaneous scheduling of interesting panels might keep in mind that the parameters involved make a perfect program for all attendees impossible.) In Washington this June, why not thank co-chairs Jay Sexton and Kaeten Mistry, who will have put countless hours into organizing the conference and who will probably be spending much of their time coping with last-minute changes.

By tradition, the program chairs select both the topic and the speakers for a plenary session intended to address an issue that interests most SHAFR members. The elected president has the duty of giving a presidential luncheon address and the prerogative of inviting a luncheon speaker, who may be chosen without consultation. SHAFR members unhappy about the selection of speakers are welcome to raise those concerns directly with the person or people responsible. SHAFR’s governing Council meets twice a year: at the AHA conference and at the SHAFR conference. Council consists of nine elected Council members, including two graduate students; the president; the vice president; and past presidents for three years after their terms end. The immediate past president chairs the Ways & Means Committee, which keeps an eye on the budget and makes financial recommendations to Council. Although the vice president does not stand for election to the presidency until August and is not certified as president until October, she or he starts undertaking tasks associated with the following year’s conference as soon as the current one is over. Anyone who, like
me, has been puzzled by SHAFR’s apparently Stalinist practice of running a single unopposed candidate for president should consider that the vice president is really a president-elect (and perhaps we should consider a name change that reflects that reality).

What part can you play, if you’d like to get involved? You might take a look at the committees listed at SHAFR.org to see if any of them draw on your areas of expertise and interest. Have you been a major fundraiser at your university or for your local library? Send a note to the current president explaining your experience and put your hand up for the Development Committee—or submit a note at shafr.org/volunteer. Did you just win a teaching prize and are you brimming with ideas for how to do innovative teaching in foreign relations history? Write to the chair of the Teaching Committee with a few suggestions. Interesting in running for Council? Read the Council minutes at shafr.org/about/governance/council-minutes to see what Council does, consider whether you want to commit to attending the AHA and SHAFR conferences every year for three years, and then look at the nomination procedures. Have colleagues in the organization who know you well write in support, telling the Nominating Committee what you’d bring to SHAFR.

It’s a feature of many groups that power tends to gravitate toward an elite. Power and responsibility in SHAFR have been wielded by those willing to take it on, and we should all be thankful that so many people over so many years have put so much of their labor and creativity into this organization, to our mutual benefit. That does not mean we should rest on our laurels. SHAFR, like most organizations, has blind spots and traditions that may have outlived their purposes. We are more diverse than in 1967 but still much less diverse than the societies we live in. We almost certainly rely too heavily on scholars at highly selective universities who are leaders in scholarship, at the expense of scholars at other kinds of institutions who may have superb leadership qualifications. As with most organizations, there is room for greater power-sharing and for new ideas.

SHAFR does not normally have an open Business Meeting as some societies do, but thanks to the initiative of members, I have decided to hold a “State of SHAFR” open meeting at the conference in June 2019. Please come and share your thoughts on how to make SHAFR better!
A Roundtable on Grant Madsen, Sovereign Soldiers: How the U.S. Military Transformed the Global Economy After World War II

Laura Hein, Michael J. Hogan, Aaron O’Connell, Carolyn Eisenberg, Curt Cardwell, and Grant Madsen


Laura Hein

I conduct this exercise by concluding that the format is a case of “be careful of what you wish for ...” All authors want their work to be taken seriously and all journal readers prefer lively, engaged material. You, dear readers, will be satisfied on both accounts. On the other hand, assembling five very well-informed reviewers to train their full attention—publicly—on a younger scholar’s first concerted effort is a lot of muscle. I suspect I am not the only member of the firing squad to be glad that no sly editor offered me this devil’s bargain of an opportunity back when my first book appeared.

Grant Madsen started with a really great question: How and in what ways did military leadership of American occupation governments affect economic policy? His thesis was that a coherent economic policy emerged when U.S. military governments led by Army generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and Lucius Clay remade the economies of various territories under their command. Further, they applied those lessons to the postwar American and global economies during the Eisenhower administration. But then, his own research suggested that the actual answer was, “it depends on too much else to attribute over-all economic policy, let alone economic outcomes, to these actors.” Good researchers frequently find themselves in this position, and writing one’s way out of it is one of the hardest tasks I know. As his response to the other four reviewers shows, Madsen’s ideas are still evolving, but the book itself reveals a scholar who had not fully integrated the implications of the research with the framing argument when it went to press. To cut to the chase, this book does a number of interesting things but does not succeed in its main goals.

Madsen was tripped up by three general problems, all flagged by the four reviewers in different ways: Who are the key actors? What is the relationship between economic theory and economic policy? What role does politics play in this narrative and its reception?

The book begins by introducing Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Clay as the crucial figures around whom the book will be structured. They are famous and powerful men, they operated in contexts where their orders were frequently obeyed, and they had long and impressive careers. Nonetheless, they just don’t shoulder the task that Madsen assigned to them. First of all, they don’t work as a set. Although all three were U.S. generals, they shared little else in terms of temperament, management style, assumptions about the foreigners under their control, or even priorities regarding U.S. national security after 1945. MacArthur is particularly intractable when it comes to arguing that he shaped Japan’s economy, a subject he found of little interest. His own pronouncements tended to stress things like “eliminating feudalism,” which functioned more as talking point than as a policy blueprint.

Second, all three men quickly delegated economic planning to their economic advisors, who were not career military men. This is what irks Aaron O’Connell, who, after reading the first 60 pages, expected the book to show how specific economic ideas or policies were connected to the experience of military leadership—of running occupied territories rather than waging war. I shared O’Connell’s experience of misdirection and his reaction that Madsen’s question would have been better answered by looking at fully military-run governments, such as in Haiti, rather than the occupations of Germany and Japan, which were staffed at the upper levels largely by men who had joined the war effort after substantial civilian careers. Indeed, Madsen would not have needed to travel far: the Army was running its own shows in Korea from 1945 until 1948 and in Okinawa until 1972 with far less civilian input than in neighboring Japan. Neither episode was known for good economic management, however, suggesting that career military men, as they repeatedly say in this book, were poorly trained for that task. I would add that both Madsen and O’Connell are a bit too quick to assume that Big Men who stood atop a chain of command had the most effect on outcomes. That may be why Madsen did not reframe his book by introducing his key civilian actors at the outset together with his military ones, which would have better helped his readers understand his true focus.

In fact, my own work argues that the key players were often not Americans at all but included economists among the Germans and Japanese whom they ostensibly governed, a claim substantiated but not highlighted in the book. There were profound policy disagreements but they usually did not line up as Japanese versus American views. Takemae Eiji, Mark Metzler, Aiko Ikeda, Scott O’Bryan, Tsuru Shigeto, and W. Elliott Brownlee join me in pointing out that the Americans interacted with Japanese experts throughout their years there and that all of them experienced those engagements as deeply collaborative, although sometimes also frustrating. Some of these Japanese individuals are mentioned in Madsen’s tale, as are several German planners, but only episodically. Madsen is clearly developing
this point when he somewhat aspirationally states in his “Response to Reviewers” that “I claim that a group of non-
Nazi German economists ultimately provided the basic blueprint that became that [transnational postwar] policy regime.” The book does not do so, but perhaps his future work will.

I share Curt Cardwell’s pleasure that Madsen and his cohort are returning to the study of political economies. Madsen focuses on currency conversion, inflation control, banking, and taxation, all truly important topics. He sheds his coyness about why in his Response—this is a critique of Keynesianism—which answers Carolyn Eisenberg’s question of why he ignores equally important aspects of the economy, such as industrial relations, deindustrialization, and reparations. (The book is most explicit on this in the middle of Chapter 11.) Yet, here too Madsen’s facts don’t really run in parallel with the argument. As Cardwell explains, Madsen’s actors were operating in a larger context that was profoundly Keynesian, as the U.S. government poured resources into the Marshall Plan, domestic and international military spending, and highways. Madsen disagrees but incoherently.

Separately, I think the chief reason that none of us found Madsen’s economic arguments persuasive is that he focused on theory per se when the historical debate was actually about what was happening in the real world—that is, how to apply theory. All economists, including Keynes himself, see inflation under most conditions as a problem and all of them know that fighting wars encourages governments to cause excess inflation. (Keynes first made his name analyzing the inflationary effect of German post-World War I reparations.) The challenge postwar policymakers faced in Germany, Japan, and the United States was not whether inflation was bad in some abstract sense but whether the tangle of problems they faced meant that it should be tolerated a little longer to meet other economic goals. Similarly, Keynesian and neo-classical economists alike share the theoretical assumption that economies grow when firms invest in their workers and in new technology, they just differ on the policy question of whether tax cuts are the best way to encourage firms to make that investment. Madsen’s periodic forays into the musings of individual economists would more effectively assess their assessments of actual economies in specific times and places. His Response begins to do so but only by changing the subject to preparation for international trade, a topic that is almost invisible in the book itself.

Madsen very usefully makes clear the vast distance between fiscal conservatism of the 1950s and either the Tea Party or Trumpist conservatism of today, as well as his own admiration for the former. In the 1945-55 decade, it was impossible to argue that the U.S. government was an inherently incompetent economic actor, given its recent victory in an enormous multi-front war. I believe Madsen when he tells us that his protagonists became less attracted to interventions such as price and wage controls over time (although Richard Nixon still supported them in the 1970s), but Madsen reads an ideological critique into Hogan’s comments that strikes me as paranoid and, in the claim that Hogan paints Germans as passive, incompatible with Hogan’s own scholarship. Frankly, I read that review as a determined attempt to be kind by using most of his real estate to summarize (quite usefully) Madsen’s book and by eviscerating it primarily as too ambitious rather than internally incoherent, polemical, or misleading.

Notes:


Review of Grant Madsen, Sovereign Soldiers: How the U.S. Military Transformed the Global Economy After World War II

Michael J. Hogan

Grant Madsen’s interesting book provides the reader with several different, though related, stories. He begins in the Philippines, with a brief look at the American occupation after the Spanish-American War through the Organic Act of 1902 and the Jones Act of 1916. During this time, the Philippines had no prospect of statehood in the American union; nor did Filipinos have any hope of American citizenship. They were promised eventual independence, to be sure, and came to enjoy many of the rights, privileges, and protections enjoyed by American citizens under the Constitution. They could pass their own laws, for example, and negotiate their own treaties.

The exercise of such rights, however, was subject to American review and approval, creating what Madsen, borrowing from Robert Latham, calls an American “external state.” By this he means a set of governing institutions, basically military institutions, tied to but functioning outside the United States and used to govern non-American people. The external state in this case administered the American occupation of the Philippines. From there, the military went on to operate in Nicaragua, Mexico, and elsewhere, including Japan and Germany, to which Madsen devotes much of his attention.

The second story is something of a collective biography of the officials, most of them Army officers, who administered the American external state, both from Washington and in the occupied areas. Here Madsen focuses largely on Douglas MacArthur, Lucius Clay, and Dwight Eisenhower, as well as some of their key associates, especially the Detroit banker Joseph Dodge and General William Draper. He traces the careers of these men and the lessons they learned as they marched from assignment to assignment across the map of the American external state, from World War I through the interwar years.

We learn, for example, of their disappointment with the rapid postwar reduction of American force levels and defense spending, which led the army to streamline its command structure but left it unprepared for the next war. The War Industries Board notwithstanding, they did not think the United States had an effective war-time plan for controlling and coordinating industry. Without a plan, the American economy underperformed its potential in World War I. It seldom produced what mattered most for the war effort, suffered from inflation, and, when the figures were adjusted for inflation, experienced no real growth in the
years between 1914 and 1920. Finally, these men agreed with Wilson's vision of postwar international cooperation and free trade, but they condemned his position on war debts and reparations, which led inevitably to economic collapse, depression, and war. From their limited experience as an occupying force in the Rhineland, and their postwar duties in the Philippines and Panama, they saw the benefit of empowering local governments, so far as possible, and the need to stimulate production and trade, balance budgets, and control inflation by means other than government regulation.

As these views suggest, the lessons they learned from wartime mobilization and their experiences with the American external state drove MacArthur, Eisenhower, Clay, and their associates away from key elements of the Keynesian approach to economic recovery that became so fashionable in the 1930s, toward a more conservative strategy. Although both sides saw free and fair trade as essential to global growth and stability, Keynesians were more anxious to promote political and social as well as economic reforms in the occupied areas, more tolerant of deficit spending to prime the pump of the economy, and more inclined to use wage and price controls to tame inflationary pressures—all of which were at odds with the monetary and fiscal strategies favored by Clay, Eisenhower, and other more conservative policymakers. These and related differences came to a head during the occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II, which is the third part of Madsen's multistoried narrative.

In Germany, for example, these policymakers rejected a strategy that put political and social reforms before economic recovery. This had been Woodrow Wilson's approach after the First World War. He emphasized smashing the large German industrial conglomerates and, if necessary, averting starvation and civil unrest through deficit spending and economic controls to dampen inflation. It was also the approach embedded in the Morgenthau Plan and JCS 1067, which emphasized the deindustrialization of Germany and the decentralization and denazification of its political and economic structures.

Clay and his colleagues wanted instead to stimulate long-term economic growth and stability, even if it meant slowing or suspending denazification, working with existing German authorities, and letting decentralization take a back seat to restarting German industry. Most important, they wanted to control inflation, devalue Germany's inflated currency, balance its budget, and limit the power of German trade unions, even if these and other reforms had an inequitable impact on certain elements of the German population. They believed this was the route to real economic recovery and freedom, as opposed to a Keynesian strategy, which sought political justice ahead of economic stability, they said, but ended inevitably in deficit spending, inflation, crushing taxes, price controls, rationing, and other state encroachments that would lead inexorably to economic regimentation and the end of private enterprise and democracy.

They followed this course not only in Germany, but also in Western Europe as a whole. The Marshall Plan, as noted earlier, was to function more or less as an economic czar in this corner of America's external state. Under his direction, the new approach worked. Over time wages began to increase, unemployment declined, inflation dropped, and budget deficits moved toward surpluses. At the same time, however, labor suffered. About 126,000 railway workers lost their jobs, and government employment fell by another half million.

Given these and other shortfalls, it is not surprising that Dodge's reforms remained unpopular with the Japanese government, labor unions, and the press. Even the American State Department complained that economic gains were minimal and hardships substantial, and they warned that economic and political collapse was inevitable if Dodge's reforms were not reversed. That is exactly what happened when Matthew Ridgway replaced MacArthur as the head of the American occupation and when the outbreak of the Korean war led American officials to prize Japanese loyalty over Dodge's conservative economic policies. The irony, according to Madsen, is that Dodge's reforms were actually succeeding: exports were climbing, prices were stabilizing, inflation was declining. Even after much of Dodge's work had been undone, the Japanese government still embraced the idea of a balanced budget and avoided any increase in the national debt for years to come, even as it once again pumped additional funds into the economy in order to spur growth and higher levels of employment.

Having covered this story, Madsen starts over with a fourth narrative, turning his attention back to political and economic policy in the United States through the Eisenhower administration. During his years as chief of staff and NATO commander, Eisenhower, as noted earlier, was moving away from Keynesian theory as the best way to balance defense spending against domestic social and welfare programs, while the New and Fair Deals moved toward it. Truman's management of the economy during the Korean War reinforced his thinking. Truman signed off on the massive military buildup envisioned in NSC 68 and financed the expansion through a frankly Keynesian strategy that accepted large budget deficits. New debt,
piled on top of debt accumulated during World War II and financed by buying government bonds at suppressed prices, pumped too much money into the economy, caused inflation, and led to wage and price controls that, as Eisenhower saw it, threatened private enterprise and the loss of economic liberties.

When he became president, Eisenhower sought a new balance that would pair economic with military strength. Applying the lessons he learned in Europe from the German occupation and the Marshall Plan, he aimed to curb inflation, balance the budget, reduce taxes, and put an end to wage and price controls, all while protecting key social programs inherited from his Democratic Party predecessors. To achieve these goals he had to overcome strong opposition from conservatives in his own party who wanted deeper and faster cuts in wartime taxes, much less spending on both defense and domestic programs, and a balanced budget as soon as possible. Ike's answer was the New Look, which envisioned a capital-intensive strategy of defense that relied less on expensive manpower and more on airpower and nuclear weapons to guarantee the nation's security. This strategy, together with the end of the Korean War, allowed Eisenhower to curb the growth of military spending, which in turned cleared a path toward a balanced budget and a modest reduction in taxes.

Despite the recessions that began in 1953 and 1957, Madsen considers Eisenhower's program a success. It succeeded in large part because the president was not a conservative ideologue. He favored limited tax reforms over massive tax cuts and the New Look over the strategy of “flexible response,” which took hold under President Kennedy in the 1960s. He was also willing to protect, and even slightly grow, New Deal social and jobs programs, like social security and the Highway Act of 1956. His greatest achievement was slowing the pace of defense spending, which Madsen describes as reversing the Keynesian strategies of the past, and making progress toward a balanced budget, not locking one in place.

However brief this summation, it gives the reader a good sense of the sweep of Madsen's account. Its breadth is commendable, but it is also something of a problem. Consider, for example, his treatment of the American “external state.” He is right to suggest at one point that a comprehensive exploration of this concept, built on the American experience as an occupying power, would make an exceptional contribution to the literature. However, his narrative dips into concrete experiences only here and there. The result is a somewhat sketchy account that is limited by its focus on just a few of the policies and policymakers involved. Often, for example, he notes only that certain individuals built bridges, roadways, and harbors during their stints in the Philippines or in Panama or Germany after World War I. Even his more detailed treatment of the German and Japanese occupations is limited, as are his efforts to tie German occupation policy to the Marshall Plan (although there are definite connections).

In short, while Madsen examines some episodes in more detail than others, no episode is treated in depth. And nowhere is it clear that conservative fiscal and monetary policies alone accounted for whatever success the Americans enjoyed. In Japan, for example, he has to concede that Dodge fell short of his objectives and his gains were largely reversed. Something similar can be said about Madsen's collective biographies. For example, his treatment ignores important differences between the military leaders involved. In Japan, to cite just one case, MacArthur seemed quite comfortable with the New Dealers who ran the occupation in its early years, before he switched his loyalties to Dodge, for reasons that are not fully explained. Most important, it is impossible to gauge the influence of these conservatives without measuring it against that of other American officials, in Washington and elsewhere, who also played central roles in the occupation. In sum, Madsen may have tried to do too much, or too much too quickly.

What is more, Madsen often makes claims that are hard to defend. This is the case with his claim that Dodge's hard line succeeded in Japan, despite the dislocations, unemployment, and protests it provoked, its repudiation by the State Department, and its reversal by the Japanese government. To cite another example, his effort to distinguish Truman's thinking from Eisenhower's is forced. Until the Korean war, Truman had worked day and night to combat pressure for increased defense spending coming from his service chiefs and hawks in his administration. He defended the goal of a balanced budget and drove defense spending down from the record levels achieved in World War II. Even after the outbreak of the Korean war, Leon Keyserling and other Keynesians notwithstanding, he refused to spend as much as many of his military advisers wanted and tried to drive the budget backwards as the war began to turn. When it came to military budgets, in other words, he and Eisenhower had more in common than Madsen seems to realize, including a shared fear of turning the United States into a garrison state.

In truth, Madsen's account raises doubts about how committed Eisenhower was to some of the conservative strategies the author appears to celebrate. He admits that Eisenhower never took conservative economic policies as far as Robert Taft and congressional conservatives wanted, even though he resisted the drift toward Keynesian solutions. Among other things, Ike lived with budget deficits when he had to; supported the interstate highway program, which was basically a jobs program; limited tax cuts; and endorsed new funding for social security. Madsen may not see Eisenhower as a Keynesian liberal, but neither does he see him as a conservative ideologue of the sort we are all too familiar with today.

If space permitted, it would be possible to mount a more thorough challenge to Madsen's celebration of the conservative monetary and fiscal policies that he attributes to Eisenhower, Clay, MacArthur, and other veterans of the American external state, and that he sees as succeeding, more or less by themselves, in rebuilding Japan, Germany, and all of Western Europe. But I would rather close on a more upbeat note. Despite the limits of his analysis, not to mention his somewhat hyperbolic title, Madsen attempts a big book. It covers a serious subject—the external state, as he calls it—over a long period of time; deals with difficult and complicated economic issues of the sort that most diplomatie historians choose to avoid; advances a conservative interpretation in a scholarly field not known for its conservative views; and is clearly written and based on solid research.

Eisenhower's insistence on moderation may have been the key to his success and may be the main reason why he is more or less ignored by Donald Trump's Republican Party. He had his convictions, of course, but he could live with reasonable compromise and had a pragmatic approach to policymaking, as Madsen shows in his discussion of the Highway Act of 1956. When all is said and done, it seems clear that Madsen really means to celebrate Eisenhower himself more than any particular approach to economic policy. He is what we used to call an "Eisenhower revisionist."
Review of Grant Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers: How the U.S. Military Transformed the Global Economy after World War II*

Aaron O'Connell

It is always painful to review a first book negatively, particularly a book that emerged from a doctoral dissertation. Who among us does not remember the years of research, the search for a meaningful argument, the competition between themes and theses, and the advice from committee members (which sometimes exacerbates rather than settles the competition between themes and arguments)? We were all that student once, and our memories of those difficult years might tempt us to be more charitable than we should be when holding our graduate students to high standards.

Writing bad reviews is even harder with books that span more than one subfield, as this one does by moving between economic history and military history. I know nothing about the former, but something about the latter. After two careful readings, I must conclude that *Sovereign Soldiers* may be very good economic history—that is for others to judge—but as military history, it falls far short of the mark.

Sometimes a book title promises more than it can deliver, and with this book, the promise came in the subtitle. Before reading *Sovereign Soldiers*, I had read a number of books and articles on the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan, but I had encountered no work that argued—or even suggested—that the economic policies developed in occupied Germany or Japan came home to the United States, let alone “transformed the global economy.” As someone who is always interested in the hidden military origins of everyday items, I was a bit cowed by the book’s focus on economics, but decided to risk it anyway. If the broad outlines of today’s economic common sense—an insistence on low inflation, readily available credit, and (until recently) free trade, all managed by an interventionist federal government—had military origins, then I wanted to know about it. The book’s angle seemed fascinating; the arguments seemed timely; and the entire project looked impressive, important, and ambitious.

In fact, it was far too ambitious. Worse still, I think Madsen was not served well by those who steered the project to publication, because the final product is poorly organized, unfocused, and in need of a good editor. There are no problems with the prose, which is clear and direct, but there are numerous issues with basic organization, argument, chapter structure, evidence, and even a few problems with footnotes. These problems make it impossible to review *Sovereign Soldiers* positively.

The issues begin in the introduction with the author’s explanation of the book’s purposes, which diverge markedly from the argument promised in the title. Madsen explains that *Sovereign Soldiers* has three goals. First, it hopes to offer “an institutional history of military government starting after the Spanish American War” to explain “how the army found itself capable of governing a foreign people” after World War II (2). Second, it chronicles the “intellectual history of the political economy that military governments created during the occupations of Germany and Japan” (2). Third, it explains how the economic lessons learned in the occupations “came to dominate not only postwar Germany and Japan, but ultimately the United States in the 1950s” (3). All of this will be revealed, readers are told, by a careful study of the military careers of the generals who ran the occupations: Douglas MacArthur in Japan, and Dwight Eisenhower and Lucius Clay in Germany.

Madsen makes it clear that he will not discuss every U.S. occupation; rather, he will focus only on the army and on the people and the moments that “link military government as an institution with the economic policy that came out of military government and returned to the United States in the middle decades of the twentieth century” (4). This seems a narrow scope for a book that promises an institutional history of military government, particularly since some of the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ occupations—Haiti (1915–1933), the Dominican Republic (1916–1924), and Nicaragua (1926–1939)—were some of the longest in U.S. history. But fair enough. Surely the Army learned specific lessons in the Philippines, the Rhineland, and the Panama Canal Zone. Perhaps those lessons made their way forward to World War II. Perhaps they even came home to the Eisenhower administration and had some effect on the world economy thereafter.

If so, we never learn what they were. Instead of a focused history of U.S. military government in three countries (or even the economic components of those occupations), readers get a jumble of different topics: summaries of the 1898 Battle of Manila, the Root reforms in the U.S. Army, logistics failures in World War I, and a number of other matters that have nothing to do with military government or economic policy. Nowhere are we told what the specific military missions were in the Philippines, Panama, or the Rhineland (and this omission is important, because the missions weren’t all the same). We never learn how many soldiers served in the occupations, what they did there, how the occupations were organized or led, or whether the missions succeeded or failed according to the goals set by the commanders and the president.

Interpersed throughout the book are the outlines of MacArthur’s, Eisenhower’s, and Clay’s professional biographies, but there is very little new information here. And instead of serving as a vehicle for the argument, the biographical sketches are at best colorful vignettes, and at worst, major distractions. In the early chapters, they cover the officers’ time at West Point, their first assignments, Eisenhower’s early interest in tanks, his work on the Army Battle Monuments Commission, the influence of General Fox Conner, Eisenhower’s time at the Army Command and Staff College, and his strained relationship with MacArthur in the Philippines. There is occasional mention of how each officer understood economics (really just Eisenhower), but this information comes mostly from memoirs and biographies, and precious little of it seems to rise above commonsense counsel about the dangers of rampant inflation or massive debt.

A quick tour through chapter 3, “The Army in a Time of Depression,” reveals the book’s organizational problems and basic lack of focus. The chapter begins with seven pages on the 1920s, Versailles debt, the 1929 crash, and the ensuing depression, with short explanations of how economists interpreted these events as they happened. This segues into a narration of Roosevelt’s 1932 election victory and Army Chief of Staff MacArthur’s spats with the president, neither of which concerns economics or occupation policy in any real sense.

Five pages later, MacArthur and Eisenhower are off to the Philippines, with Lucius Clay soon to follow. But of course, by 1935, the Philippines were not under U.S. military government at all; the country had a Filipino constitution and a Filipino president with broad executive authority, as well as a Filipino-led national assembly and Filipino-led...
supreme court. General MacArthur served as the military advisor to President Manuel Quezon, and Eisenhower had important duties—namely, to help the Philippines build a thirty-division army—but none of this can be properly called military government.

It is admittedly fascinating that three future leaders of postwar occupations all lived in the same hotel in Manila, but the only lessons Madsen captures from their time together concerns personality: MacArthur was aggressive, confrontational and willing to accept enormous risk; Eisenhower was practical and attuned to means and ends; Clay preferred Eisenhower to MacArthur and liked building dams. All of this is interesting, but none of it coheres into an argument about the army in the Depression or how the Philippines experience shaped the thinking of these future leaders in uniform or as civilians.

Chapter 4 is titled “The Army, the New Deal, and the planning for the Postwar,” and here, Madsen turns to the economic theories that would influence the postwar occupations. But again, there is a lack of focus, and the titles are misleading. We get eight pages on Keynesianism, Bretton Woods, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s thoughts on the relationship between economics and security, which segues into a discussion of Treasury Secretary Hans Morgenthau’s plans for de-industrializing Germany. Generals Eisenhower and Clay don’t enter the story until three pages before the chapter’s end, and they get a total of two paragraphs, most of which is just a summary of a conversation with Secretary Morgenthau.

The army doesn’t come into the chapter at all.

From a military history perspective, chapter 4’s failure to address how the army prepared for postwar occupations is perhaps the book’s biggest omission, because there is a history here and it is one of the reasons the post-WWII occupations succeeded and later ones in Iraq and Afghanistan did not. In 1942, the army established the School of Military Government (SOMG) in Charlottesville, Virginia, in order to train officers in the precise subject of Madsen’s book: running foreign occupations. The SOMG took civil servants and businessmen from civilian life, offered them direct commissions in the army, and put them through months of coursework in preparation for overseas service.

When the need for occupation officials grew after the Italian surrender, the army also launched the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP) – a separate course of study for officers running military occupations, which was hosted by ten universities around the country (including the University of Chicago—Madsen’s own alma mater). Much like the School of Military Government, the CATP drew on existing faculties from the humanities, area studies, and social sciences—including economists—and gave military officers a four-month-long orientation on the history and culture of the countries they would later be deployed to, ten hours of which were devoted to economics. By mid-1943, the CATP was graduating 450 officers per month.

The thousands of officers that came through the School of Military Government and CATP all went on to hold staff or field positions in every occupation the army ran, and some served in the most senior positions. (Indeed, when Lucius Clay took over in Germany, he replaced General Cornelius Wickersham—a former director of the School of Military Government.) Record Group 389, “Records of the Office of the Provost Marshall General,” in the National Archives and Records Administration has a five-volume history of military government training and numerous training manuals and curricula. How can these stories and sources be absent from a book that seeks to explain “how the army found itself capable of governing a foreign people” after World War II?

Chapters 5 through 10 deal with the fiscal and monetary policies of the German and Japanese occupations, with three chapters devoted to each country. Here, readers will find the same problems of distracting biography (MacArthur’s failures in the 1948 Wisconsin presidential primary are not relevant to how he ran the Japanese occupation, nor are Commodore Matthew Perry’s visits to Tokyo Harbor in the 1850s), but the bigger problem is that the book’s core argument doesn’t survive basic scrutiny. Yes, Germany and Japan faced serious economic problems after the war—inflation, debt, currency transition issues, and (particularly in Japan), deficit spending and corporate monopolies (the zaibatsu)—and it is true that by the end of the U.S. occupations, those problems had largely subsided. But the entire premise of the book is that the U.S. Army fixed these problems and even brought those lessons back to the United States in the 1950s. It didn’t; civilians did.

Joseph Dodge, then the president of the Detroit Bank, is far and away the most important character in that story: he was the economic prime mover in both occupations, and his “Dodge Line” became a synonym for the economic policy of the Japanese occupation. But he was also a civilian and never served in uniform. The other drivers of economic policy in the German occupation were also civilians: Lewis Douglas, Lewis Brown, Robert Murphy, Bernard Bernstein, Gerhard Colm, Raymond Goldsmith, and indirectly and from afar, John Kenneth Galbraith and Adolph Weber (brother of the sociologist Max Weber). These are the key voices in the intellectual history of the political economy of the occupations, and almost none of them are military ones.

The same was true in the headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), which ran the occupation of Japan. While there was a general in charge of SCAP’s economics section, Madsen admits that “the majority of staff serving MacArthur’s generals came from the State or Treasury” or from the private sector (131). And this makes sense, since fiscal and monetary policy were so complex and removed from military expertise that even MacArthur—a man not known for admitting what he did not know—pleaded with his staff to “find me somebody that knows something about the economy of Japan, because I don’t. And my military officers who are responsible for it don’t either” (142).

Were these civilians operating under army authority when they reigned in spending, slashed budgets, stabilized prices, and haggled with German and Japanese politicians over budgets and policies? Yes. It is fair to say that because of that, “the U.S. Military” revised the German and Japanese economies or “transformed the global economy”? No.

The book’s final three chapters all concern how the fiscal and monetary lessons of the occupations made their way back to the United States in the Eisenhower administration. I will leave it to economic historians to evaluate how well the book makes that case, but it seems unlikely to me that President Eisenhower’s economic approach during his presidency came exclusively, or even primarily, from the occupations. After all, his tenure as military governor in Germany lasted only seven months, and few—if any—of the major economic decisions were taken under his leadership. Getting American troops home, restoring basic safety, dealing with refugees and POWs, and preventing mass starvation were the tasks that undoubtedly filled his day. Thereafter, as Chief of Staff of the Army, he was consumed with the work of running the entire U.S. Army as it merged with the Navy Department to form the Department of Defense—no small task.

What specific economic lessons did Eisenhower take from the occupations? What is the evidence that he learned them there? It is true that some occupation officials came into the Eisenhower administration—Joseph Dodge was his budget director—but was Dodge channeling the occupations’ lessons or just sticking to economic principles that had served him well in a lifetime of banking?
First books are hard, and they are harder still when first-time authors get insufficient guidance along the way. Most of the problems enumerated above—overly ambitious claims, an overreliance on biography, unnecessary background and undermining evidence—should have been noted and corrected before the book went into print. The University of Pennsylvania Press did Madsen no favors in choosing (or allowing) a title that overpromises in several directions (both on the role of “the U.S. Military” in the story and on the claim that it “transformed the global economy”). Strong editing would have reined in the competition between narratives and excised unnecessary background. Sound copyediting would not have omitted footnote 24 on empiricism from the introduction or allowed the eight footnotes on the Rhineland occupation (35–36) to be drawn (erroneously, it seems) from www.worldwarone.com — a website that any scholar should be dubious of, and which does not contain the material cited in the notes.

It is possible these problems were noted but ignored, but the more likely explanation is that the publication process was rushed, and unfortunately, it shows. There is much still to be written on the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan—and indeed, on the many other less successful attempts at military government that have occurred in U.S. history. Sovereign Soldiers is unfortunately not a significant contribution to that literature.

With considerable detail, Madsen describes how beleaguered occupation officials concluded that “future peace depended upon integrating Germany and Japan into the global system of trade and finance” envisioned at Bretton Woods. But they also understood that a prerequisite for this development was the stabilization of their individual economies.

Notes:

Review of Grant Madsen, Sovereign Soldiers: How the U.S. Military Transformed the Global Economy after World War II

Carolyn Eisenberg

In this challenging book, the author takes on a long-neglected subject, namely the role of the U.S. military in shaping economic policy around the world. In the service of this objective, he has tied together the stories of three generals, each of whom occupied leadership roles in military governments after the Second World War: Douglas MacArthur, Lucius Clay and Dwight Eisenhower. Some of this biographical material will be new to readers, including the description of the generals’ relations with one another over decades.

Yet Madsen is less concerned with their individual personalities than with the policy questions they confronted and resolved. In the background of this inquiry is the author’s awareness of the American military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. And while he does not engage these experiences directly, he discerns a continuity in such activities that goes back to the American occupation of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

To their responsibility for military government, all three generals brought disparate understandings. Yet regardless of how they started, or the location of their actions, all three eventually arrived at similar conclusions about how U.S. economic policy should be applied. The author considers this evolution to have significant repercussions beyond the occupied areas. He contends that the insights gained in postwar Germany and Japan informed Eisenhower’s approach to domestic and national security policy once he became president.

With considerable detail, Madsen describes how beleaguered occupation officials concluded that “future peace depended upon integrating Germany and Japan into the global system of trade and finance” envisioned at Bretton Woods (4). But they also understood that a prerequisite for this development was the stabilization of their individual economies. Casting aside the Keynesian approach to public finance that had taken root within the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, military officials adopted “a policy regime” that featured “balanced budgets, a zero-inflation monetary policy and investment-led growth” (4).

Madsen’s narrative brings to American foreign policy a useful angle of vision, and he is surely correct in maintaining that the role of U.S. military governments in the economic sphere has received insufficient attention. Moreover, in telling this story, he highlights consequential economic decisions implemented by military officials that are often overlooked when submerged in the more dramatic accounts of the early Cold War.

Despite its muted tone, Sovereign Soldiers is in its quiet way a “triumphalist” history in which the major decisions of the military authorities are portrayed as stellar achievements from both an economic and a political standpoint. While Madsen argues the case for the former, he treats as self-evident the idea that the economic choices made by the Americans furthered the cause of democracy in Germany and in Japan.

Although fulsome in his praise for General Clay, Madsen is more critical of the decision-making by General MacArthur. His complaint is that during the early period of occupation MacArthur granted too much latitude to the New Dealers on his staff and was slow to recognize the necessary course for Japan. Yet, fortunately wiser heads prevailed, as key figures from the U.S. military government in Germany pointed him in a more conservative direction.

Madsen also seems unimpressed by MacArthur’s handling of the Korean War, but these failings are tangential to his main themes.

In discussing the American occupation of Germany, the author takes aim, as many scholars have done, at JCS 1067, the initial set of instructions given to General Eisenhower for the occupation of the country. Often treated in the historical literature as the unfortunate outgrowth of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s desire for revenge and his wish to de-industrialize the country, its flaws have seemed obvious. Yet Morgenthau’s anger notwithstanding, JCS 1067 and subsequent directives also reflected a powerful reform impulse that administration New Dealers injected into postwar planning.

The reform agenda for Germany was not primarily about de-industrialization. It was a multi-faceted commitment to wide-ranging denazification, the encouragement of a vibrant labor movement, the decartelization and de-concentration of German industry, and the decentralization of banking. Of this list, the only policy seriously implemented was banking reform, but even that was watered down over time.

The reformers in military government were also in favor of substantial reparations from both capital equipment and current production. Unlike Secretary Morgenthau, who was mainly interested in the removal of capital equipment, most reformers saw the need for current production as well, which implied the retention of a significant industrial capacity. Underpinning this approach was the recognition that generous reparations were vitally important as a means of ensuring four-power cooperation in occupied Germany.

For the Soviet Union, the ravages of the German invasion and the costly effort to drive Hitler’s army back to Berlin had left them in urgent need of material compensation from their recent foe. Absent such deliveries, pledged by
President Roosevelt at Yalta, the planned experiment in quadripartite occupation was unlikely to work.

In relating the story of the military government in Germany, Madsen omits almost entirely the American relationship with the Soviet Union and the tragic division of Germany. Early in his book he states clearly that he will not “take up the causes or course of the Cold War.” Yet by sidestepping this topic, he precludes a more hardheaded assessment of American economic decision-making.

In Madsen’s narrative, the splitting of Germany is taken for granted, as something that American officials were powerless to affect. So minimal is the attention to this development that for stretches of the narrative, one might imagine that the eastern zone of Germany did not exist, nor for that matter did Eastern Europe. In repeated references to Europe and to the “global economy,” these places are mostly invisible.

Yet the division of Germany was not a given, nor is it self-evident that the Russians preferred this outcome. For the short term at least, they seemed to prefer a unified country and were willing to make significant concessions to achieve it. From the declassified records of the Allied Control Council, it appears that a series of U.S. and British decisions in the economic realm seriously undermined the prospect of a quadripartite project.

These economic decisions were problematic even for France and the Benelux countries, all of which feared a revived West Germany that could re-emerge as a military threat. However, for these other countries the promise of Marshall Plan assistance significantly diluted their objections, as did the subsequent formation of NATO. Madsen correctly stresses the importance of currency reform in triggering a remarkable resurgence in the economic prospects in Western Germany. The collapse of the Eastern zone of Germany did not exist, nor for that matter did Eastern Europe. In repeated references to Europe and to the “global economy,” these places are mostly invisible.

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Review of Grant Madsen, Sovereign Soldiers: How the U.S. Military Transformed the Global Economy after World War II

Curt Cardwell

I am encouraged by Grant Madsen’s book, Sovereign Soldiers, because I am a huge fan of political economy in the study of U.S. foreign relations history and history more generally. Political economy is what got me interested in diplomatic history in the first place and why I ended up going to graduate school and on to the professoriate as a student and teacher of it.

There are signs that political economy is coming back in vogue after three decades in semi-retirement. According to Sven Beckert, one of its foremost practitioners, one of the main achievements of the “new” history of capitalism sweeping through the history profession of late is that it “reinstalls political economy as a category of analysis,” which is indeed encouraging because of the weight that this new history is currently carrying in the profession.1 Brad Simpson of the University of Connecticut characterizes political economy in a recent essay as a “seriously neglected area of research and writing in the history of foreign relations,” which is true enough. His essay is a call for historians of U.S. foreign relations to reengage with it, and hopefully the call will be answered.2 This is all to the good. Sovereign Soldiers, it is a pleasure to state, adds to a growing list of books emphasizing political economy.

Since this is a roundtable there is no reason to offer an extensive summarization of the book’s argument. Fortunately, and to his credit, Madsen lays out his thesis succinctly, so a brief summary is readily available. Sovereign Soldiers is an institutional history of military government as an occupation force rather than a fighting force. This is important to Madsen because, beginning with the Philippines, the military had to learn how to be an occupation force. But the book is also an intellectual history of the political economy that military government created through its experiences in the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan—a political economy that was, Madsen says, transferred to the United States via Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and Lucius Clay and had a deep impact on the domestic political economy of the 1950s.

To navigate what is well-traveled terrain in the realm of U.S. foreign relations history—the early Cold War period—Madsen employs the theory of the “external state,” apparently developed by political scientist Robert Latham. As Madsen tells it, the external state of military government learned from the experiences of occupation, beginning in the Philippines and carrying on through the many occupations that military government engaged in throughout the early twentieth century through World War II and into the Cold War. Because no one really knew how to carry out such occupations, and because there was little direction from Washington, military government had to learn on the fly.

Madsen follows the careers of Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Clay to relay this history. He contends that, while Washington twiddled its thumbs, these top generals were forced to devise plans to operate the occupations of postwar Germany and Japan. However, they were well prepared to do so from their past experiences in Panama and the Philippines. He proceeds to analyze their actions through the lens of political economy, which he never defines but appears to accept as having a straightforward political element and a straightforward economic element. The lens allows him (and us) to better understand the action of these men vis-à-vis Washington policymakers with whom they often did not agree. The views of Eisenhower and Clay become more central in the end because Eisenhower became president, with Clay as his close advisor, while MacArthur, as we know, merely faded away.

As a student of political economy, and especially of the time period in question, I find this a useful book. There is great factual information in it as well as primary sources that I find fascinating, intriguing, and confirming. Military government did have to act in ways that it was unprepared for, especially as occupation forces in the Philippines and Panama; and the history Madsen tells here is fascinating in that regard, if brisk. Its positioning of the U.S. military as key to the political economy of the global economy that emerged under the United States’ watch and guidance is a needed addition to the new history of capitalism, where the military’s role has thus far received short shrift. This is the book’s greatest strength. It helps us identify with more specificity the role that military government played in the global economy’s development after (and before) World War II, and that makes it an important contribution to the literature.

That said, the book, unfortunately, does not live up to its promises, and I mean that as one who sincerely wishes that it did. First, the concept of an external state is not satisfactory. Madsen admits that one of its primary advantages is that it “allows for a fresh take on the vast literature already written on the topic” (8). This is true. The concept provides a new window through which to view well-worn territory. However, even his own evidence does not bear out the existence of an external state at the level to which he wants to elevate it. The theory works fairly well in the beginning, when military government was an occupation force in the Philippines and Panama; at that point such occupations might have been new for the United States, and communications were still limited (although it can be argued that the army’s war of conquest against the American Indians from 1865 to 1890 provided experience enough). To his credit, Madsen mentions this fact briefly in

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Dodge, who had earlier done extensive work on German

World War II occupations of Germany and Japan—the evidence is less convincing. Although there is no doubt that military government had a degree of autonomy in the postwar occupations, often because of uncertainty and disinterest back home, and local events happening in real time, Madsen’s own evidence demonstrates that, in the end, the directives largely came from Washington and were followed as strictly as possible. For instance, we learn that “while many Japanese believed that MacArthur made the occupation rules on his own authority . . . in reality he did his best to follow the written policy he received” (127). We are also told that MacArthur “planned to accomplish a radical transformation of Japanese society” but that “the orders he had already received from Washington told him to do the same thing” (130). And again, Madsen tells us that “in advancing these reforms [in Japan], MacArthur followed both the spirit and letter of the orders sent from Washington” (132). In October 1948, the National Security Council issued NSC 13/2, which forced MacArthur to “accept an ‘ambassador’ to spearhead economic reforms” (145). Undersecretary of the Army William Draper chose Detroit banker Joseph Dodge, who had earlier done extensive work on German

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recovery. “Dodge,” Madsen writes, “would have the rank of minister and would ‘advise’ MacArthur. But he would answer to Truman” (147, my emphasis).

A stronger case can be made in Germany, but still, examples of a non-external state abound. Secretary of War Henry Stimson helped General Lucius Clay and General Dwight Eisenhower “maneuver against [Hans] Morgen-thau” (87) to reinterpret Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067, which emerged from the Morgenthau Plan to punish Germany. Madsen does not mention this, but after meeting with Clay and Eisenhower, Stimson even met with Truman to discuss the problems with JCS 1067 and received Truman’s general agreement.

In January 1946 Washington sent a “special mission of technical experts on anti-inflationary measures” to Germany, against Clay’s wishes. Ultimately, the experts produced the Clay-endorsed Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith plan, officially known as the Plan for the Liquidation of War Finance and the Financial Rehabilitation of Germany. In the end, it was blocked by the joint State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and went nowhere in Washington despite lobbying efforts by Dodge and Colm. Madsen claims that Bizonia, the combining of the American and British sectors of Germany into one unit, was Clay’s handiwork, which, if true, might stand as a prime example of an external state, but it is not. Clay pushed only for an economic bizon with Britain, which he thought would bring the Soviets in (a fact Madsen ignores). The State Department mutilated Clay’s proposal and set out to create the bizon as a unified economic and political entity that would pave the way for a separate West German state. That was the exact opposite of what Clay wanted.

There is also the Marshall Plan. It is certainly far too simple to argue, as Madsen does, that Secretary of State George Marshall’s visits to Clay in Germany in early 1947 were the basis for the “outline of the Marshall Plan” (111). The Marshall Plan came from many directions, and Clay was not always enthusiastic about it. After a recitation on what the Marshall Plan intended to do, Madsen concludes that “Marshall aid simply encouraged the rest of Europe to do what military government aimed to accomplish within Germany” (112). This is supposed to be a strong argument in support of the external state thesis, but one could certainly argue that it shows that Washington developed the Marshall Plan quite independently, with little input from military government in Germany. Both of these instances seem to be attempts to elevate the role that Clay and military government played in the Marshall Plan above and beyond what it actually was. Madsen makes a stronger case when he examines Clay’s role in enacting currency reform in western Germany, but, although the reform proved more successful than Clay or anyone else could have imagined, currency reform was not the be-all or end-all of German recovery by any stretch.

On all these issues concerning Germany, I am discouraged by the fact that Madsen makes so little use of Carolyn Eisenberg’s Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949.3 Eisenberg shows in painstaking detail the way in which military government was undermined by officials in Washington, often to the point where Clay, who supported trying to reach agreement with the Soviets so as to keep eastern Germany free until that alternative became untenable, would react with utter disbelief. Her point is that officials in Washington were out of touch with what was happening on the ground in Germany, but their decisions still overrode those of military government.

One further observation, rather than a criticism, is that the book seems to be a thinly veiled dig at Keynesian economics, almost as if that is its main goal. Madsen contends that MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Clay “missed what came to be called the Keynesian Revolution” because they were stationed overseas during the Depression years. When John Maynard Keynes wrote his famed treatise that all but ended classical economic theory for the next fifty years.

My point is that the external state, on close inspection, does not appear to have been as external as Madsen would like us to believe. It might be, but Madsen does not, to my mind, prove that in this book.

On another matter, I do not know what to make of a book on the political economy of U.S. foreign relations published in 2018 that sees “the turn to the idea of ‘empire’ to explain the way the United States functions in the global context” as “another recent development among scholars” (7, my emphasis). I think, were he alive, that would be news to William Appleman Williams, whose The Tragedy of American Diplomacy came out nearly sixty years ago, and his last book, Empire as a Way of Life, over forty. It would also be news to John Lewis Gaddis, still very much alive, who spent a career trying to refute Williams but whose 1995 book We Now Know concedes that the term “empire” applies to the United States (something theretofore rejected by conservative scholars), although not in the way Williams explained it; and it might surprise Geir Lundestad, also very much alive, whose seminal article from 1986, “Empire by Invitation,” moves in the same direction.4 Oddly, Madsen cites Lundestad’s 2012 book The Rise and Decline of the American “Empire” but seems unaware of the earlier work.

Scholars such as Noam Chomsky, Gabriel Kolko, Joyce Kolko, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Marilyn Young have been using the framework of an American empire since the 1960s. In the 2000s, even conservative scholars were adopting the term. Witness Andrew Bacevich’s The American Empire and Robert Kagan’s Dangerous Nation.5 I do not know if Madsen is actually unaware of this previous scholarship, but I can only go by what he wrote. Personally, I doubt it, but that raises another set of issues that space does not allow me to comment upon.

One further observation, rather than a criticism, is that the book seems to be a thinly veiled dig at Keynesian economics, almost as if that is its main goal. Madsen contends that MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Clay “missed what came to be called the Keynesian Revolution” because they were stationed overseas during the Depression years, when John Maynard Keynes wrote his famed treatise that all but ended classical economic theory for the next fifty years (61). He argues that in their occupation policies the three men (although it is hard to discern if MacArthur really felt this way) believed in what were essentially anti-Keynesian policies—balancing budgets, cutting taxes, abolishing price and wage controls, and curbing inflation even if doing so meant high unemployment—in direct contrast to the Truman administration, which stood by its Keynesian policies, particularly in and through the Fair Deal and NSC 68. This belief came from their experiences as occupation leaders, when, supposedly, they prevented deficit spending to put people back to work. Furthermore, he argues that these policies then informed Eisenhower’s and Clay’s actions when Eisenhower became president, thus linking the lessons of the occupations to the domestic political economy. In this endeavor, there can be little doubt that Madsen is a big fan of Eisenhower, Dodge, and Clay (he is less sure of MacArthur) and that he is essentially using them as historical actors to denigrate Truman and the Keynesians.

The problem is that he is ignoring a major aspect of the story that undermines this rosy view of the supposed non-Keynesians: the role that military spending played in the recovery of Germany’s and Japan’s economies and in jumpstarting, or at least priming the pump of, prosperity in the United States, which is often referred to as military Keynesianism. I am not questioning that Clay (through...
Dodge) in Germany and MacArthur (through Dodge) in Japan adopted anti-Keynesian measures, particularly as regards deficit spending. But the Marshall Plan, first, then military spending under the Mutual Security Program, allowed Germany to avoid the deficit spending that otherwise would have been necessary, by Madsen’s own admission. And, in Japan, which had no Marshall Plan, the anti-Keynesian Dodge Plan largely failed (again, by Madsen’s own admission), even if Japan did avoid deficit spending. But it was military spending by the United States that allowed the Japanese to avoid that spending.  

Turning to the domestic economy, we take it for granted that Eisenhower was not a Keynesian and that he rejected Truman’s economic policies. He even managed to balance the budget several times during his presidency. But military spending did not shrink under Eisenhower in as dramatic a fashion as scholars often claim, especially when they are trying to compare him to the Keynesian Truman. For the fiscal year budget prior to NSC 68, Truman was seeking a defense budget of $13 billion, down from $14.5 billion from the year before, because he, too, was concerned about budget deficits (ignored by Madsen). Then, beginning in July 1950, military spending increased dramatically under the impact of NSC 68 and the Korean War. Eisenhower vowed to cut defense spending, down to about $42 billion. He did so by relying more on nuclear than conventional weapons to “defend” the United States and its allies, a questionable choice when assessing the soundness of Truman’s versus Eisenhower’s policies. (Truman’s approach was guns and butter; Eisenhower’s was apparently guns and butter plus annihilation.) Still, a $42 billion military budget was hardly close to the $13 billion figure Truman had hoped for in 1949, and, what is more important, the budget mostly increased thereafter, right into the stratosphere.

When Eisenhower left office, military spending was close to $50 billion and would go up ever after, with increases in the nuclear arsenal as well. Eisenhower did not have to pursue deficit spending (although he did do that too) because he benefited from an economy that was growing overall, as NSC 68 had predicted it would. Yes, good anti-Keynesian that he was, Eisenhower cut price and wage controls and things turned out wonderful for the American economy. But this was due, again, to the overall growth of the economy, which likely would not have happened absent NSC 68 or the rearmament program it and the Korean War engendered. Proof for these claims is not hard to find. It can be found, among other places, in my own book on political economy and the early Cold War, which I encourage interested parties to check out from their libraries.  

Notes:

Response to Reviewers
Grant Madsen

I would like to thank Andrew Johns for making this roundtable possible. When he told me whom he had invited to review my book, I will confess to freaking out. As will become clear below, I spent months—perhaps years—working my way through the scholarship of these reviewers (and our panel moderator, Laura Hein). I never imagined I would face them all at once, all in one roundtable! Given how well I feel I know their work, and how much I depended upon it in my research, simply thanking them for their reviews seems insufficient, so I would like, in addition, to express my gratitude to Laura Hein, Carolyn Rosenberg, Michael Hogan, Curt Cardwell and Aaron O’Connell for their wonderful scholarship, which has so informed my own feeble efforts to do justice to their work.

Before responding to their challenging reviews, let me explain a little about Sovereign Soldiers. The book crosses a lot of historical subdisciplines—economic history, policy history and American political development, diplomatic history, and military history. In selecting the reviewers, it seems clear that Andrew Johns tried to find scholars who could speak to individual aspects of my study, or so their reviews seem to suggest. Each takes up issues dear to his or her own research.

At root, however, Sovereign Soldiers is an intellectual history of economic policy. Its central claim is that the United States, Japan, and West Germany shared a distinct economic policy regime in the 1950s because a central set of political actors, working in and around military occupations (what I label the “external state”), developed that regime, first in occupied Germany, then in Japan, and ultimately in the United States. There is much more to the story that I will discuss below. But I wanted to establish my goal because, in reviewing Sovereign Soldiers from their individual vantages, only one reviewer mentioned what is, in my estimation, the central insight. When all is said and done, I claim that a group of non-Nazi German economists, provided the basic blueprint that became that policy regime.

The only reviewer to really acknowledge this part of the story is Aaron O’Connell, and he only acknowledges it to disqualify those who participated in it. “These are the key voices in the intellectual history,” he writes of the German and American civilians working together in the occupation, “but almost none of those voices are military ones.”

As for the policy regime itself, I summarize it as two questions. “Should a vastly empowered government function (roughly speaking) on a pay-as-you-go basis? Or should it accomplish its goals on credit” (6)? The military and civilian leaders I write about decided that “the answer to this question had enormous consequences,” because “a pay-as-you-go approach tended to keep a balance between the interests of the state and citizenry” and avoided “over-commitments and broken promises that could lead to political upheaval later” (6). In other words, the men who came out of the occupation worried that loose monetary policy and deficit spending would lead (at best) to the kind of inflation and stagnation that in large happened in the 1970s. At worst, they feared that these policies would end in economic totalitarianism. So they avoided both.

Their assessment provides for some fine-grained distinctions that animate my response to Curt Cardwell on how we should understand Keynesian economics. It also raises questions about how the Bretton Woods Agreements should relate to domestic economies generally and Keynesian economics specifically (which does not come up in the reviews but plays an important part in my economic analysis).
Finally, I am influenced by a number of diplomatic historians who try to think beyond largely American concerns and methodologies. As I will discuss at greater length below, all the reviewers, with the possible exception of Carolyn Eisenberg, seem to have analyzed my book with concerns in mind that stem primarily from American historiography. Michael Hogan essentially reads my book as a return to Eisenhower revisionism and as a so-so defense of American conservatism; Curt Cardwell feels it fails to appreciate American imperialism and the role of America’s military Keynesianism; and Aaron O’Connell sees it as failing to provide a clearly demarcated institutional history of the American military.

By contrast, my research is closer in spirit to a book like Daniel Rodgers’s *Atlantic Crossings* (although in my story policy ideas also cross the Pacific before coming ashore in the U.S.). The military matters, because after World War II it sprawled around the world and therefore functioned as the transmitter of ideas or “circuit of exchange” (9). The subtitle of my book, “How the U.S. Military Transformed the Global Economy after World War II,” speaks to how the military was uniquely positioned to communicate, influence, and implement ideas at that particular moment in history and how it created a kind of “external state” not completely tied to any one nation (although clearly more American than either German or Japanese).

While I will try to respond to each of my reviewers in turn, in places it makes sense to link them, given the overlapping concerns they have.

Of all the reviewers, Carolyn Eisenberg makes the best effort to engage my book on its own terms. This came as no surprise. In important ways, *Sovereign Soldiers* offers an extended response to her own *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany*. I take up many of the same issues she addresses and follow her methodology. Like her, I look at political and military elites working in and with military government. Thus, contrary to what Aaron O’Connell says, I follow Eisenberg in thinking of military government as concerning more than those in uniform. And like her (and unlike O’Connell) I found little help in the archives of the School of Military Government (SOMG) or the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP). As Eisenberg notes, Henry Morgenthau began to eclipse the work done there when he involved himself in occupation planning. More to the point, Lucius Clay began to change his mind about many of his orders almost from the beginning. If one wants to understand the roots of, for example, Germany’s currency conversion, one will search the records of the SOMG as well as the CATP in vain (which, sadly, I did).

Eisenberg is right to say that my narrative does not do justice to the original hopes of New Deal reformers seeking “a multi-faceted commitment to wide-ranging denazification, the encouragement of a vibrant labor movement, the decartelization and de-concentration of German industry.” She is also correct when she notes that the story of reparations, “vitally important as a means of insuring four-power cooperation in occupied Germany,” does not get as much attention as it might. Nor does the “relationship with the Soviet Union, and the tragic division of the country.” But she essentially articulates my reason for these omissions when she writes that too often “consequential economic decisions implemented by military officials” have become “submerged in the more dramatic accounts of the early Cold War.” That is exactly how I would say it. My particular story would get lost, I feared, in the drama of the Cold War.

Eisenberg is most on point in asking “in what sense can we consider the economic policies in Germany and Japan a ‘military’ achievement? What about the outsized influence of American businessmen in the Economics Division of U.S. military government?” In many ways, this question prompted my own research years ago. I wondered whether it seemed fair to ascribe the genesis of so much policy to (for example) William Draper’s experience with Dillon, Read. More to the point, why was Lucius Clay “usually a reliable ally and an effective implementer of [Draper’s] ideas?” What was it about his prior experience that suggested he planned to set aside much of JCS-1067, design a currency conversion that would launch an economic miracle, or devise economic policy at all?

Thus, I started my research by investigating the prewar experience of the military and civilian leaders who led the occupations in Germany and Japan. Contrary to what Eisenberg (and, as I will argue below, Michael Hogan) contends, I found little to suggest a shared ideological commitment to what ultimately happened in the occupation. What Aaron O’Connell refers to as “at best colorful vignettes, and at worst, major distractions” serve to demonstrate not only what military leaders learned in prior occupation experiences, but also the biases they did not demonstrate. As I write, “Given the longer lens of this study, it seems unlikely Clay or Eisenhower had any strong ideological leanings at war’s conclusion. If anything, they leaned toward the New Deal and not a nascent ‘conservatism’—whatever that meant at the time. More than anything, they seem motivated by a pragmatic moralism” (283, n. 35).

The conclusion that Clay, et. al., did not necessarily come to the occupations with a particularly strong ideological bent opened up the possibility (as I describe particularly in chapter 6) that none of these figures played the critical intellectual part in the story. Indeed, I discovered that none of the key Americans really knew enough about what they were doing to implement a coherent economic policy. They did not understand why the German economy remained stagnant, how to rescue its worthless currency, or how to get industry to perform. Pragmatists that they were, they ultimately tried to solve these problems by turning to the source at hand: German experts who had lived through a similar experience after World War I.

In other words, when Eisenberg declares that “whether the military should be regarded as the formulator of those policies or as the servant of others remains an open question,” I would argue that the word “servant” is both too pejorative and vague, but the essence of the statement is exactly right. From an intellectual history point of view, the policies coming out of the American occupation of Germany represented a collaboration of German expertise and American implementation. In short, the policy regime belonged to both.

This takes us to a second important issue that Eisenberg rightly raises and that, I must admit, I try to address only by implication: “the role of coercion” in relation to “the public’s wishes.” It is possible that the public (I think she means the occupied Germans) wanted a more robust labor movement with greater denazification than what emerged—although some might argue otherwise. At the same time, though, to have any legitimacy an economic system must “deliver the goods,” so to speak. This is a very complicated topic, the debate over the relative merits of economic growth versus social equality has raged and will continue to rage for some time, and it will not be put to rest in this venue.

In writing *Sovereign Soldiers*, though, I argue against the assumption that a wide variety of economic arrangements
might have produced a stable economic outcome. I am skeptical, in other words, that Clay had many options at hand (a point I will return to in my response to Michael Hogan). Here the comparison to Japan is helpful. Japan followed more aggressively the political reforms Eisenberg mentions, only to see its economy go nowhere. American officials began to panic. One wrote home to complain—with some justification, I think—that a “sane democracy cannot rest on an empty stomach” (132).

Moreover, Japan (along with several other European countries) also performed currency conversions shortly after the war, none of which produced an economic miracle—which raises the obvious question of why. What other policies were in place in Western Germany that were not in place elsewhere? As subsequent military occupations suggest, it is no easy task to revive another nation’s economy. The effort is fraught with problems and potential pitfalls, and discovering a mix that accomplishes recovery often proves as elusive as it is instrumental in protecting the very political reforms (limited thought they may be) that Eisenberg recommends.

If Carolyn Eisenberg’s Drawing the Line gave me the thematic concerns that animate Sovereign Soldiers, Michael Hogan’s A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954 provided the blueprint for how to write a history that brings together an analysis of state institutions, foreign policy, and economics. I appreciate his lengthy elaboration of the narrative arc and also his (tentative) approval of the scope of my “big book.” At the same time, he offers a few criticisms that deserve a response. He fears that even the “more detailed treatment of the German and Japanese occupations is limited, as are [my] efforts to tie German occupation policy to the Marshall Plan (though there are definite connections).” Where he says “limited” I would prefer to say “focused.” He is right that “no episode is treated in depth,” nor do I prove that the kind of “fiscal and monetary policies” I discuss “alone accounted for whatever success the Americans [I would add the Japanese and West Germans] enjoyed.”

Fair enough. But having said that, the book would have a hard time doing all these things without becoming unmanageable. Moreover, my main lay in tracing the origins of policy and how it spread. While I think there is good evidence for giving credit for the solid economic growth that occurred in the United States, Germany, and Japan through the 1950s to the policy I discuss (and I cite the economist Michael Bordo to that end), I do not offer a thorough economic analysis.

Hogan suggests that I must “concede that Dodge fell short of his objectives [in Japan] and his gains were largely reversed.” Curt Cardwell agrees. The “anti-Keynesian Dodge Plan largely failed, again, by Madsen’s own admission.” To be clear, I don’t say this. True, Dodge thought (in 1952) that he had failed and that Japan would go back to a high-inflation, big-deficit economy. It didn’t. As for Dodge, he always thought that he had failed. He thought he failed. Clay as finance director in the German occupation and Eisenhower as director of the Budget Bureau. It was part of his charm.

What I actually write is that “Dodge profoundly underestimated his impact” in Japan (181). More to the point, I argue that in the 1950s, in both Japan and the United States, “there were state institutions that could have been used along Keynesian lines. They could have facilitated deficit spending to spur growth in the name of full employment. Yet both countries adopted policy regimes that eschewed government debt in the name of low inflation” (182). I discuss how the United States came to follow Japan in subsequent chapters, with Dodge’s help.

Along these lines, Hogan fears that I “often” make “claims that are hard to defend.” For example, he quotes me as saying that “Dodge’s hard line succeeded in Japan, despite the dislocations, unemployment, and protests it provoked, its repudiation by the State Department, and its reversal by the Japanese government.” There is a genuine debate about the economic consequences of Dodge’s program and whether it or the spending associated with the Korean War ultimately sparked Japan’s own economic miracle. Again, my first concern lay in showing how it took hold.

Having said that, though, perhaps I can ask a question posed to me by an economist friend who reviewed this chapter: “What unemployment?” As I show in chapter 10, the occupation’s statisticians never put the unemployment rate above two percent! That is an extraordinarily low number, and it raises at least one question: how should we judge economic “dislocations” that hardly affect broad economic indicators, or quite quickly affect them in a positive way? Indeed, many of the main indicators began showing improvement by early 1950, before the Korean War began and at the very moment things supposedly looked bleakest for the Japanese economy.

I spent some time in chapter 10 talking about how American officials could not make sense of the way some Japanese officials complained about the Dodge Line when the economic data they collected told a very different story. I included this discussion as a metaphor for the similar disconnect between historians and economists today. Historians (Hogan included) have tended to generalize the complaints and take them at face value; the data, by contrast, seem to say something very different.

Finally, what policy reversal? To give a few more examples, Dodge set the exchange rate for Japan at 360 yen to the dollar. It remained there for two decades. He insisted that Japan develop an export-oriented economy based on that stable exchange rate. When did that change? There is, however, a more important point I raise that is implicit in Hogan’s concerns, and here let me turn the tables just a bit. While the corporatist approach strongly influences my research, its interest in organizational forms sometimes undercuts the search for good explanations for policy formation. Ideology ends up compensating for this weakness, where labels like “conservative” and “liberal” stand in for the intellectual genealogy necessary to understand policy in its own right. Ideology explains the organizational form which explains the ideology which explains the form, etc. My research indicated a distinct policy regime coming out of the occupations that did not comfortably fit the terms “liberal” and “conservative” as commonly used. Knowing that readers might be tempted to apply those terms anyway, I tried to preempt the temptation by warning, for example, that “the ‘big government-small government’ debate can trap historians in categories that often obscure the many ways the American state has evolved both domestically and internationally” (6). Specifically, as I explain throughout, the occupiers accepted (and even promoted) big government even if they rejected the American interest in Keynesian deficit spending. In other words, they were not conservative in the typical American sense, although I did not give their distinct approach a name.

Thus, I avoid the terms “conservative” and “liberal” as...
best possible, trying to keep the focus on the actual policies rather than on labels. For example, in the roughly 260 pages of my narrative, I employ the term “conservative” eight times, often in reference to American historiography. In Hogan’s ten pages of review, by contrast, it appears fifteen times. More to the point, at times he reads into my book a conservatism that is not there. For example, he writes that “Joseph Dodge, another veteran of the German occupation . . . reduced taxes, curbed government spending, and eliminated price and wage controls [in Japan].” This sentence is two-thirds true. Dodge curbed government spending and ultimately saw an end to wage and price controls.

However, as my book shows in detail through chapter 9, Hogan is wrong on taxes. Ikeda Hayato, Japan’s finance minister, desperately begged Dodge for even a small tax cut and Dodge refused. In fact, Dodge went on to reform tax collection in a way that effectively raised taxes by spreading the tax burden. (Prior to the reforms, tax collectors worked on a quota system; once they had achieved their target, they stopped collecting. Taxpayers could avoid payment if they could wait long enough for the collector to reach his goal.) Japanese officials, not Dodge, sought tax cuts.

Similarly, Hogan writes that “from their limited experience as an occupying force in the Rhineland, and their postwar duties in the Philippines and Panama,” the occupiers “saw the benefit of empowering local governments, so far as possible, and the need to stimulate production and trade, balance budgets, and control inflation by means other than government regulation.” Here, again, this sentence is only partly true.

As I point out in chapters 3 and 4, Eisenhower at least, readily embraced regulation before World War II. At that point enamored of Bernard Baruch, Herbert Hoover that recommended price controls and rationing in times of inflation. Moreover, both he and Clay embraced the National Recovery Administration, which set prices, production levels, and wages for whole sectors of the economy. In addition, Clay made his reputation by integrating the Army Corps of Engineers into the Works Progress Administration, and Eisenhowern hoped to join the Public Works Administration until his boss, Douglas MacArthur, vetoed the idea. Both of those agencies represented large public works efforts funded by borrowed money. Neither Clay nor Eisenhowern raised any ideological objections at the time.

In a long and thoughtful review, these are perhaps small errors. But they are both telling. As if to illustrate my larger frustration with the way corporatism overuses ideology, nearly every time I see Hogan misstating what I wrote, he is doing so by asserting aspects of American conservatism that are not in my story; or I went to pains to demonstrate were not true.

I suspect this explains why he omits the key role played by the German economists in shaping occupation policy in Germany. He implies a ready-made “conservatism” sitting on the shelf, as it were, for Eisenhowern, Clay, Dodge, and Draper et al. to simply implement. Thus, when he does talk about the German occupation, he describes a Germany that is, in effect, a tabula rasa, prostrate before its American conquerors and ready to reproduce American politics on a new stage. “Although both sides saw free and fair trade as essential…Keynesians [the first side] were more anxious to promote political and social as well as economic reforms in the occupied areas, more tolerant of deficit spending to prime the pump of the economy, and more inclined to use wage and price controls to tame inflationary pressures…” while the other side “Clay, Eisenhowern, and other more conservative policymakers,” had different views. As the occupiers discovered, however, there were more than “two sides.” Really, the whole question of “sides” fundamentally misunderstands what they faced. They had inherited a combination of economic problems without precedent in the American context—massive inflation on top of a well-developed but moribund industrial economy, sealed foreign borders (not to mention sealed regional borders between occupation zones), and huge relief issues generated by a massive influx of refugees. Worse still, the American economics profession had been (rightfully) obsessed with solving the Great Depression; economists had given much less thought to how inflation could cause stagnation (or what we now call “stagflation”). American experts had almost nothing to offer. Hence the need for a distinct mission to “analyze programs and results of anti-inflationary action taken by other European countries as well as analyze the German situation” (f01).

This whole reliance on domestic political categories becomes most blatant in the last paragraph of his review. Hogan makes a gesture in the direction of what I argue for most of the book: “Madsen doesn’t see Eisenhowern as a Keynesian liberal nor does he consider him a conservative ideologue.” But then, to my astonishment, it turns out that this should disappointment me, since my account “raises doubts about how committed Eisenhowern was to some of the conservative strategies [Madsen] appears to celebrate.” Hub?

To reiterate, I had hoped to make this whole discussion beside the point. Eisenhowern “never really engaged in the fight between American liberals and conservatives. His political economy fit a global context where he never lost his focus” (244). Hogan may disagree, and in advancing his view he certainly carries a gravitas that I do not. But I think the need to characterize policies within the simple and very American binary of “liberal” and “conservative” has grown a bit tired, even in contemporary American politics.

I can live with Curt Cardwell, and I appreciate not only his review of my book but also his willingness to promote our shared interest in political economy. He dispenses with a summary of the book to get to his concerns, so I will do the same.

Both Cardwell and Michael Hogan have reservations about the external state. While Hogan sees promise in a “comprehensive exploration” of it, he writes, that my effort “is a somewhat sketchy account that is limited.” Cardwell goes beyond Hogan in doubting its efficacy. While “military government had a degree of autonomy in the postwar occupations,” in the main, he says, my “evidence demonstrates that… the directives largely came from Washington and were followed as strictly as possible.” Specifically, he shows where my text demonstrates Washington choosing to halt, revise, or “mutilate” initiatives begun by MacArthur, Clay, or Eisenhowern.

This criticism is well taken. I leave the term “external state” undertheorized. In all honesty, I am still not sure how “external” an institution must be to qualify as truly “external.” In fairness, though, total independence never fit the definition. The term refers to “those institutions functioning outside the formal boundaries of the United States, while still tied to it” (7). Still, this does not settle the question of how much independence is necessary for an institution to count as “external.”

In crafting the book, my challenge could be summed
up in this question: how can we apply scholarly work on nation states (work in the subfields of policy history and American political development, for example) to state-like institutions that do not belong entirely to a single nation or within its borders? Military government may have ultimately depended upon the nation state in many ways, but it also remained responsible to and for non-American subjects—and, in the German context, at times remained surprisingly open to input into the policy process from local citizens. The “external state” seemed the best shorthand for getting at that.

At the same time, I think Cardwell overstates the degree of Washington oversight. To give one example from his review, when I write Dodge “answered to Truman” (147), I meant only that Douglas MacArthur had no authority over him. As the subsequent chapter demonstrates, Truman never in fact instructed Dodge to do anything once he assumed his role in Japan. Indeed, Dodge had such a free hand that he openly implemented policies that directly contradicted what Japanese officials saw happening under Truman in the United States. “One of the greatest difficulties I have to overcome, and a growing one,” MacArthur complained to Dodge at the time, “is the basic difference in the policies we are imposing here and the policies being followed in the United States” (I71). How should we characterize a situation where military government pursues a set of policies directly contradicted by those promulgated by Washington? Here, I felt the “external state” served as a handy analytic tool.

While I could well be mistaken, it feels as if Cardwell really just prefers the rubric of empire to “external state,” and that might motivate some of his criticism. That helps me understand his indignation at my incomplete footnote on the historiography of empire. It might also explain his puzzling concern about why I make such “little use of Carolyn Eisenberg’s Drawing the Line.” Given what I have written above, he must mean that my narrative should have accepted her conclusions in toto rather than using her book as a launching pad to strike off on my own.

Turning to the economic part of my story, Cardwell observes that my book “seems to be a thinly veiled dig at Keynesian economics.” To be clear, there is no veil (thin or otherwise) over what I say about Keynesian economics. This is a central argument of the book, and specifically an argument against historiographic accounts that summarize the postwar decades as part of a Keynesian revolution.

This leads us to Cardwell’s last paragraph, which raises a host of issues in a short space. Some of these issues involve some fine-grained interpretive arguments, and I will try my best to untangle what I can. Cardwell concludes that my book “ignores a major aspect of the story that undermines this rosy view of the supposed non-Keynesians”—specifically, “the role that military spending played in the recovery of Germany’s and Japan’s economies.” So far, so good. I agree that this spending was important. But then he adds that such spending is “often referred to as military Keynesianism,” and that is also true in one sense: people do say that. But I don’t use the term, and people who do are wrong to apply it to Eisenhower’s years in office.

American historiography tends to call “Keynesian” any government activity designed to generate economic growth. Whether it is Marshall aid, or tax cuts, or perhaps even land-grants, as long as the state is doing something to spur the economy, it gets labeled “Keynesian.” Of course, this would make nearly every president and Congress Keynesian, starting with George Washington. But it would make nearly all economists, from Milton Friedman to Paul Krugman, Keynesian as well, because nearly all agree that government spending can spur growth, at least in the short term. But that was never the issue for Keynes nor for those who followed him.

For economists, the debate usually turns on whether state spending crowds out private investment, whether it tends to generate greater long-term gains than private investment, and so on. But this is beyond my interest. My point here is that the term “Keynesian” can only have coherence analytically if it refers to something more than “look how much the government spent here.”

Because I feared this kind of simplistic approach to what we mean by “Keynesian,” I spend a fair amount of time in the book explicating the thinking of the foremost adopters and adapters of Keynesian economics in the United States, and particularly the people who would go on to criticize the Eisenhower administration for failing to understand Keynes’s insights. I write about Alvin Hansen and Paul Samuelson, along with Leon Keyserling and Walter Heller (I also spend some time on Ishibashi Tazan in Japan). These men feared that savings do not automatically become investment, so they worried about “liquidity traps”—“idle funds for which there is no outlet” and which, if left unused, result “in a downward spiral of income and production” (187). They also feared that even a small economic downturn would quickly become a depression as “animal spirits” drove investors from the market. The solution? They recommended “an easy-money policy (reduced interest rates) . . . large governmental expenditures of all types, and . . . huge public works programs financed by public borrowing” (187, italics added). In general, they did not fear inflation. As Paul Samuelson said, the country should not let “concern over price inflation dominate our decisions” (251).

In general, they also agreed that demand created its own supply, which in very simple terms means that if one just has enough money, eventually someone else will produce what one wants. For the American Keynesians, this often meant that governments could generate ideal levels of production if they just spent enough. The economic historian Brad DeLong nicely summarizes American Keynesians as agreeing that the business cycle represented a fluctuation “below some sustainable level of production,” not a “fluctuation around” it.1 Thus, throughout the 1950s, people like Keyserling and Samuelson criticized Eisenhower for letting the economy drop below its optimal output, for letting unused resources go to waste.

Cardwell does a nice job of laying out the defense spending figures for the Eisenhower administration as a way of showing that military spending persisted at high levels throughout. He also mentions that we can find this information in his own book. As it turns out, I worked up the same figures in a variety of places in my book (see, for example, “Figure 18: US defense spending, 1950–1961.” The point, though, is that these figures alone are not sufficient to telling us who won a baseball game by revealing only one team’s score, which does not tell us much, even if it’s a high score.

As I tried to clarify repeatedly throughout the book, to understand the policy regime that emerged from the occupations we must consult the financing side of the ledger. What the occupation taught Clay, Dodge, Draper, Eisenhower et al. was to ask these questions: Where did the money come from? From taxation? From borrowing? From
printing money? And why? Did the spending serve to soak up “idle funds?” Did it aim to keep “effective demand” high enough to guarantee maximum output and full employment? Was it devised to counteract “animal spirits?” These are the questions they cared about, and their answers distinguished them from the Keynesian economists, who had very different answers and fears (as I mention above).

Military spending may have positively affected the overall economy in the 1950s. Cardwell thinks so: 1950s growth “would not have happened absent NSC 68,” he writes. I am less certain. But in and of itself, military spending is not necessarily Keynesian unless it fits within this broader analysis and unless it aims to “compensate” for some failure in the private economy.

Meanwhile, there is another sentence that needs a little unpacking. Cardwell writes that “the Marshall Plan, first, then military spending under the Mutual Security Program, allowed Germany to avoid deficit spending that otherwise would have been, by Madsen’s own admission, necessary.” If one follows the analysis of my book, it should be clear that this sentence cannot make sense. Forgive me for spending perhaps too much time on this one sentence, but it gets at an important point that is also often misunderstood. As noted, Keynesian economics is often simplified into the notion that “demand creates its own supply.” But there are some catches. First, what if your economy simply does not produce what you need? For example, suppose your country can’t grow enough food to feed you. How can you spend on something that simply does not exist in your context? Worse, what if no one in or outside your country trusts your money enough to give you anything of value for it? No matter how much you have, you can’t buy anything because no one wants your worthless money.

In general, both of these conditions held true for postwar Germany and Japan, which raises questions about Cardwell’s understanding of the economic implications of what he says in the sentence quoted above, particularly where the Marshall Plan is concerned. What could deficit spending hope to accomplish? As long as the West German government tried to spend its own money, who would sell anything to it, regardless of whether it “balanced” its budget? Joseph Dodge made exactly this point in a radio address supporting the Marshall Plan in 1947. “We are not sending so much of our money abroad as we are sending our goods,” he explained. “Monetary stimulations within Germany are of no help, for the goods the extra money would buy, no matter how soundly based or tightly controlled the money might be, are simply not available” (111–12).

This was the Achilles heel of the Keynesian analysis in its foreign context. Unless a country has access to goods and has a currency trusted by its own citizens and foreign trade partners, deficit spending (indeed any attempt at spending) will not work. That, in a nutshell, was the central problem of the occupations. Hence, in both Germany and Japan the occupiers insisted on restoring a currency that would generate this trust; they worked to build a global trading system that included both countries while insisting that both focus on growth through exports; and ultimately insisted that the United States fight inflation, because its currency remained the anchor for the financial system they had just insisted Japan and Germany join. True, American aid facilitated these aims. But again, the mere fact that the United States provided goods for other countries does not make that aid “Keynesian,” for the reasons stated above. More to the point, the aid had to be American because America had the goods. No amount of German or Japanese deficit spending could change that fact.

American historiography tends to call “Keynesian” any government activity designed to generate economic growth. Whether it is Marshall aid, or tax cuts, or perhaps even land-grants, as long as the state is doing something to spur the economy, it gets labeled “Keynesian.” Ultimately, Eisenhower saw some deficits. He also spent nearly all his political capital closing those deficits as quickly as he could. But again, that is not entirely the point (or the focus of my book). In making policy, he never talked about guaranteeing full employment through government spending. He never blamed liquidity traps for an economy running below its potential, or feared “animal spirits” among the investor class. He worked hard to limit inflation because he feared what would happen to a global economy tied to the dollar if America’s trade partners lost confidence in its currency. “Good Keynesian” is a weird misnomer for Eisenhower.

I have left my response to Aaron O’Connell to the end because I am not sure what to say. He writes that as a “military history” my book “falls far short of the mark.” Given the way he reads it, I can’t see how it could have been otherwise. If, like him, one dismisses the economic heart of the book as so much fuss over economic “common sense,” then reads the institutional aspects of the story exclusively through the lens of military history (ignoring the American-political-development-cum-policy-history lens I try to employ), and then dismisses much of the intellectual history because, well, the source of so many good ideas never served in uniform, how could my book not seem like a failure? As he excludes from the outset much of what the book attempts to accomplish, it is no wonder O’Connell finds himself perusing the footnotes for spelling errors. What else does he have to add?

I suspect that he had hoped that my book would look a lot like his Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps, a good book to be sure. To speak to his sensibilities, I should have blended organizational analysis with cultural history, which would illuminate the way army leaders developed governing capacities as well as a governing ethos that would ultimately become a coherent set of doctrines, capabilities and ideological commitments within an evolving United States Army. I should have elaborated “what the specific military missions were in the Philippines, Panama, or in the Rhineland” and, in addition, should have considered “how many soldiers served in the occupations, what they did there, how the occupations were organized or led, or whether the missions succeeded or failed according to the goals set by the commanders and the president.” At least I think that is what he expected. Obviously, I did not write that book. But I agree with him that such a book is long overdue.

In any event, his is not the review I expected either, which is disappointing since I like his scholarship very much and thought there might be some interesting overlaps in our work. So, in hopes that turnabout is fair play, let me describe what I had hoped to get from him. In my ideal review, O’Connell offers a few thoughts about how we should relate military history to intellectual history, policy history, and/or American political development, and he brings up some connections to his own work. He expands on the way military historians have thought about non-military actors who nevertheless had an impact on the things he cares about: organizational capacity; public relations, and institutional culture. He takes up, for example, that part of my book when Joseph Dodge wanders the halls of Congress, drumming up support for the currency conversion plan. He even considers the clever way Lucius Clay and William Draper take advantage of the “missions” of businessmen to advance the military government’s policy aims. In my ideal review, he notes that these episodes dovetail nicely with his own work, which also considers the clever ways military leaders legitimize their organizations with Congress and the American public.
Eventually, in my ideal review, O’Connell explains how military historians make sense of people like Clay or Eisenhower after they transition into professional and political life. Finally, he offers some pointed criticisms along with avenues for further thought about the external state (a term he never mentions) and military government. Perhaps he even brings his critique into the present, contemplating specific parts of the occupation in Iraq that were subcontracted to private firms like Haliburton and expressing insights about how military historians make sense of shared duties between private actors and army officers. Here he might even offer some thoughts based on his own military experience, thoughts that speak to the concerns raised by Michael Hogan and Curt Cardwell about exactly how free military governors are to make their own policy.

Of course, these were my expectations and concerns, not his. He is fully entitled in his review of my book to defend his intellectual turf at my expense. But I would have liked a little credit for inviting O’Connell to maybe share a bit of his turf and try strolling around some of mine. In the end, though, his review mostly just said “Get off my lawn!”

Note:
In An American Dilemma (1944), his landmark study on the “Negro problem” in the United States, Gunnar Myrdal declared the impossibility of black nationalist politics. In a section of the book entitled “The Garvey Movement,” prepared with the assistance of Ralph Bunche, Myrdal acknowledged the remarkable “response from the Negro masses” to Jamaican activist Marcus Garvey and his organization, the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). But this response, he argued, had come at a cost.1

Because Garveyism relied on what Myrdal referred to as “an irrational and intensively racial, emotional appeal,” it alienated whites and was “rightly” rejected by the “better” classes of black Americans. And because, in his view, it should be taken “as an evident matter of fact” that black people could “never hope to break down the caste wall except with the assistance of white people,” Garveyism and likeminded movements were “doomed to ultimate dissolution and collapse.” The undeniable appeal of Garveyism as a mass movement—and its unprecedented success—was rendered meaningless by the more pertinent reality that black people could “never hope to break down the caste wall except with the assistance of white people,” Garveyism and likeminded movements were “doomed to ultimate dissolution and collapse.” The undeniable appeal of Garveyism as a mass movement—and its unprecedented success—was rendered meaningless by the more pertinent reality that black people could “never hope to break down the caste wall except with the assistance of white people,” Garveyism and likeminded movements were “doomed to ultimate dissolution and collapse.” The undeniable appeal of Garveyism as a mass movement—and its unprecedented success—was rendered meaningless by the more pertinent reality that black people could “never hope to break down the caste wall except with the assistance of white people,” Garveyism and likeminded movements were “doomed to ultimate dissolution and collapse.”

In the generation after the publication of An American Dilemma, African American history acquired mainstream acceptance in the American historical profession. And just as Myrdal’s formulation of the “Negro problem” had a notable impact in shaping the policy parameters of the civil rights struggle, his conclusions about the virtue of integrationist politics and the impossibility of black nationalism became accepted truths of mainstream historiography.

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testimony to the horrors of racial oppression. They create iconography and shape culture. What has remained undertheorized is the import of black nationalism as a living politics, one that has always had profound consequences in shaping black communities, projecting black perceptions, and structuring relations of power. As Brenda Gayle Plummer long ago observed, “the scholarly literature often fails to link black nationalism to vital world-historical currents,” presenting black nationalism and pan-Africanism not as globally significant movements engaged in struggles against colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and white supremacy, but as merely “esoteric crusades.”

All of this is to say that Keisha N. Blain’s new book is not merely a remarkable work of scholarship, but also a timely one. Set the World on Fire uncovers a vibrant world of black nationalist activism during the Great Depression, World War II, and early Cold War eras. Far from fading with the declining fortunes of Garvey’s UNIA, Blain shows, black nationalist politics thrived in these decades under the leadership of a number of dynamic black women theorists and organizers. By following the lives and work of Amy Ashwood Garvey, Mittie Maud Lena Gordon, Celia Jane Allen, and others, Blain not only makes a series of important historiographical interventions but also an ontological one. In Set the World on Fire, black nationalism is anchored in time and place and in the lived experience and political aspirations of its adherents. Its rootedness creates, sustains, and reproduces the conditions of its possibility.

Set the World on Fire joins a recent wave of scholarship that has illustrated the centrality of Garveyism to the black freedom struggle, both in the United States and elsewhere. The book opens with the rise of the UNIA, which by the early 1920s had spread its message of anti-colonialism, race unity, and black pride throughout the world and had emerged as the largest mass movement in the history of the African diaspora. Blain shows how Amy Ashwood Garvey, Marcus Garvey’s collaborator and first wife, played a crucial role in the UNIA’s formation and early constitution; how black women like Amy Jacques Garvey, Maymie De Mena, and Laura Kofey were drawn to the movement; how black women were constrained by the patriarchal rhetoric and gendered hierarchy within the organization; and how they sought, often with success, to challenge these proscriptions and expand leadership opportunities for women.

At the same time, Blain encourages scholars to look beyond Garveyism to recognize the broader, deeply established, and eclectic traditions out of which it emerged. The black nationalist aspiration for autonomy, for freedom from the colonizing and subordinating impulses of Western society, had found expression in marronage and in the insurrectionary plots of the enslaved, in emigration from the colonizing and subordinating impulses of Western society, had found expression in marronage and in the insurrectionary plots of the enslaved, in emigration and exodus movements, in freemasonry and religious worship. It was no accident that Mittie Maud Lena Gordon, who launched the Peace Movement of Ethiopia (PME) after splitting from the UNIA in 1929, was raised in Arkansas, a hotbed of “Liberia fever” in the nineteenth century.

Blain’s approach, as she points out, acknowledges the influence of Garveyism without reducing black nationalism to a single stream of thought and activism. The PME, she notes, adopted several tenets of Garveyism but also took on elements of Noble Drew Ali’s syncretic form of Islam and strains of Ethiopianism. And as the PME acquired a following among working-poor black women and men during the Great Depression, Gordon and her followers brought to life a grassroots organization that articulated a variety of black nationalism that presented its own theoretical and practical innovations. Notably, the PME offered a space for black women’s leadership—on the board of directors, as supervisors of chapters, on the executive council—that was unavailable within the more rigid gender constraints of the UNIA.

The creation of space is a crucial and recurring theme in Set the World on Fire. If organizations like the UNIA and PME sought to build on long historical trajectories, they also intervened in struggles over the negotiation of black peoples’ daily existence in place. Black nationalist women, Blain shows, pursued “autonomous spaces in which to advance their own social, political, and economic goals.” She refers to those spaces repeatedly. Within the UNIA, activists like the Freetown-based Adelaide Casey Hayford found a “space” to advance their aims. Women sought to lead “from the margins” of the patriarchal spaces in which the UNIA (29). The decline of the UNIA opened up new space for women to engage in black nationalist politics (45). The PME “provided a crucial space for working-poor black men and women in Chicago to engage in black nationalist and internationalist politics during the economic crisis of the 1930s” (61). Organizing for the PME in Mississippi, Celia Jane Allen was able to gain access to existing spaces of exchange—the black church and its social networks, Garveyite networks—to build new spaces for grassroots politics (84, 103). And so on.

Within black communities, black nationalist organizations and publications offered “political incubator[s]” where gender conventions could be challenged, stretched, and transformed (20). And in defense of those communities, they attempted to redraw space to link local activism to global struggles (what Blain calls “grassroots internationalism”), to transgress state power, or otherwise to redraw “geographies of containment” in favor of their own “rival geographies.” This effort to reconfigure space whether to build a “nation within a nation,” to link hands with anti-colonial activists around the world, or to relocate to Liberia—was at the heart of the black nationalist imagination. By locating black nationalism in the places it sought to transform, Blain is able to give voice to its powerful appeal. The overall effect of Blain’s methodology—which reveals the enduring popularity, flexibility, and ingenuity of black nationalist women’s activism over several decades—is to expose the “thinness” of much of our conversations and assumptions about the black nationalist tradition. The current narrative sees black nationalist politics fading from the scene with the UNIA in the 1920s, only to resurface several decades later with the rise of Malcolm X and his heirs in the Black Power movement. The Marcus-to-Malcolm trajectory focuses our attention on two dramatic eras of activism, visibility, and stridency. By doing so, it lends weight to the impression that black nationalism is more of an impulse than a tradition, more the result of external stimuli (World War I, decolonization, the civil rights movement, the urban crisis) than of political desire, more the product of charismatic leaders than of popular will. By contextualizing black nationalism in time and space, Blain points to a way to write black nationalism back into the narrative framework of the black freedom struggle.

To see the promise of this approach, one has only to look at Set the World on Fire’s wonderful third chapter, in which Blain painstakingly recovers the organizing work of Allen in the Jim Crow South. Following the PME’s wildly popular emigration campaign of the early 1930s, Gordon sent Allen down south to organize sharecroppers and other rural blacks around the shared goals of Pan-African unity,
economic self-sufficiency, political self-determination, and Liberian emigration. Working with limited financial resources, Allen nevertheless built a strong organizational base in Mississippi, and developed a political network that stretched into Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee. By cataloguing Allen’s and the PME’s efforts to establish spaces for intellectual exchange, to build activist networks, and to train local leaders, Blain uncovers a black nationalist “organizing tradition” that she rightly compares to the far better known and more celebrated work of civil rights organizers like Ella Baker.12

Indeed, Set the World on Fire demonstrates not only how much we can learn by asserting black nationalism’s possibility, but how much work remains to be done. Blain’s primary focus on the Peace Movement of Ethiopia and on the formation of black nationalist women in the PME and elsewhere to promote Liberian emigration draws much-needed attention to a rich and enduring stream of black nationalist activism. But as Blain indicates at many points in the book, the streams of thought and activism emerging from the UNIA’s heyday were manifold and diverse.

During the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, black nationalist ideas and aspirations were pursued by followers of the Moorish Science Temple, the Nation of Islam, the Universal Ethiopian Student’s Association, and Carlos Cook’s African Nationalist Pioneer Movement.13 They took root in the Rastafarian movement in Jamaica, the Wellington movement in South Africa, the literary renaissance in Harlem, Havana, and Port-au-Prince, and the global response to the Ethiopian crisis of 1935. During these critical decades, black nationalist varieties of pan-Africanism merged with Marxist-influenced ones to generate a new and explosive anti-colonial praxis. Black nationalist ideas were adopted in creative ways by radicals like Suzanne and Aimé Césaire, Paul and Eslanda Robeson, Claudia Jones and C. L. R. James, and others. In other words, amid the global transformations of the mid-twentieth century, black nationalism worked its way into the fabric of anti-racist, anti-colonial, and liberatory politics. It was not an adjunct to the global black freedom struggle. On the contrary, it was enmeshed within its central story: the effort to decolonize nations, the law, and the mind; to create spaces free of the false universalism of the West, and to create citizens empowered as equal participants in global society.

Blain’s work has rightly garnered attention for its recovery of the voices of black nationalist women. Set the World on Fire, along with recent work from scholars such as Ula Y. Taylor and Ashley D. Farmer, demands that future studies of black nationalism conceptualize women leaders and participants at the center of the narrative.14 In accomplishing this important revision, Blain has shifted the axis of our vision in another way. For decades, too much scholarship on the black freedom struggle has viewed black nationalism through the lens of failure, impossibility, and panic. Scholarship on the black freedom struggle has viewed the axis of our vision in another way. For decades, too much scholarship on the black freedom struggle has viewed black nationalism through the lens of failure, impossibility, and panic. For other recent studies that center the work of black women activists, see Dayo F. Gore, Jeanne Theoharis, and Komozo Woodard, eds., Want to Start a Revolution: Radical Women in the Black Freedom Struggle (New York, 2009); Erik S. McDuffie, Sojourning for Freedom: Black Women, American Communism, and the Making of Black Liberal Feminism (Durham, NC, 2013); Dayo F. Gore, Radicalism at the Crossroads: African American Women Activists in the Cold War (New York, 2011); Mia Bay, Farah J. Griffin, Martha S. Jones, and Barbara Savage, Towards an Intellectual History of Black Women (Chapel Hill, NC, 2014); Tanisha C. Ford, The Revolution Has Come: Black Power, Gender, and the Black Panther Party in Oakland (Durham, NC, 2016).
Review of Keisha Blain’s *Set the World on Fire: Black Nationalist Women and the Global Struggle for Freedom*

George White, Jr.

This year, thousands of children have been separated from their asylum-seeking parents and sequestered in internment camps throughout the country. The precise numbers are unclear, because this administration is still working on getting its lies straight, and, as Puerto Rico demonstrates, they only can count the dollars lining their pockets. The current crisis holds meaning for this review, given the call to arms against white nationalism in the book under consideration here.

I was going to begin my remarks here by talking about Solange Knowles’s chart-topping 2016 album “A Seat at the Table.” This black feminist recording, particularly the song “Cranes in the Sky,” speaks to the nuanced, complex, and contradictory ways in which black women confront the white-supremacist-capitalist-patriarchy. Keisha Blain’s *Set the World on Fire* does much the same, except with a focus on a discrete group of black women in the mid-twentieth century. This connection is real, as is the less obvious association between the sequestered children and white nationalism. Blain’s monograph about black radical female activists from the 1930s and ’40s fills a gap in the historical canon and serves as yet another serious meditation on why we, at present, find ourselves weeping in the playtime of others.

In part, *Set the World on Fire* attempts to extend the period some refer to as the “golden age of black nationalism.” Blain argues quite persuasively that black nationalism did not die with the demise of Marcus Garvey. In fact, her well-researched book follows a number of female activists who not only sustained the momentum of black nationalism but expanded its reach through their own unique forms of organization and political collaboration. One of the great achievements of the text is that it takes seriously the lives and works of working-class and poor black women activists.

*Set the World on Fire* pursues the journeys of women like Mittie Maude Lena Gordon and Amy Jacques Garvey, as well as others much less famous, to write a group of black radicals back into the history of the human rights struggles of the early-to-mid-twentieth century. In addition to building on the extant scholarship on black nationalism, black internationalism, and black female activism, Blain knits together a story using materials from archives and sources as diverse as naturalization and census records, FBI files, international correspondence, and a collection of the writings of an avowed white supremacist. Without question, she achieves a fundamental goal of the book: understanding why these activists engaged in the radical politics and controversial tactics that put them at odds with the mainstream of African American organizing in the period.

The book opens with a survey of some of the female pioneers within Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (“UNIA”), women like Eunice Lewis, Maymie De Mena, Laura Adorker Kofey, and the two Amy’s—Amy Ashwood Garvey and Amy Jacques Garvey, first and second wives, respectively, of the UNIA leader. Amy Ashwood helped Marcus build the UNIA in Jamaica and bring it to larger prominence in the wake of World War I. Their work came less than fifty years after the death of Reconstruction. African Americans had scarcely moved out of slavery—an institution that routinely separated parents from children—when white conservative political forces, armed with violent rhetoric and tactics, compelled them to squat in the shadow of democracy cast by “police powers” and “law & order.” The law upon which Jeff Sessions currently relies has its roots in this era, a period in which eugenicists and others declared that the federal government should halt the entry of “undesirable aliens” into the country. The appeal of the UNIA rose in the third decade of the twentieth century precisely because mob violence and racial fascism surged in 1919 and disappeared countless black people from their families via lynchings, riots, and other terrorist means.

While Garveyite women articulated similar views within this strain of black nationalism—racial pride, economic nationalism, self-help, racial separatism, an end to African colonization, and Black emigration to the continent—they often did so in varying roles. Some worked in the African Motor Corps or served as Black Cross nurses, while others wrote opinion pieces on the “Women’s Page” of the *Negro World*. Those who attained leadership roles found their autonomy circumscribed by men in the group. Nevertheless, many exhibited what Blain characterizes as “proto-feminist” behavior, mentoring other women, for example, and calling for change in the old type of male leadership, even as they publicly touted a black masculinist approach as key to the liberation of all African-descended people. Marcus Garvey’s eventual arrest and deportation from the United States served as a watershed moment for this community of female activists, and it is in the subsequent chapters that the book truly shines.

Chapters 2 and 3 not only demonstrate the critical importance of this cadre of activists to the survival of pan-Africanism in the twentieth century, they reveal the unique ways in which these leaders organized outside the presence of the charismatic Garvey. The birth of the PME and like-minded groups demonstrate the centrality of female black nationalists.

Espousing and building community around black nationalist theory was never easy in the United States, but it was especially daunting in the American South. Employers large and small, abetted by elected officials and law enforcement, worked furiously to thwart the challenge to white supremacy known as the Great Migration. Any activist promoting race pride and black self-help had to be prepared for harassment, surveillance, and violence. Yet the leading promoter of the PME in the Jim Crow South was the diminutive Celia Jane Allen. Allen, and women like her, grew PME chapters in the Deep South not through a flair for the dramatic but through the quiet, patient, tactical building of relationships with local people, often starting with working-class preachers.

Blain’s exhaustive archival work helps shine a light on this type of organizer and her tireless efforts. Because these women often left little record of themselves, it is not surprising that a large swath of what Blain can tell the readers about Allen comes from the author’s analysis of FBI files maintained on her and other “race women.” Blain’s exhumation of Allen also is important because this radical history has been largely overshadowed by the work of competing activists in the Community Party USA or mainstream groups like the NAACP and the National
Urban League.

Chapters 4 and 5 maintain a focus on relationship-building, but this time within the context of the quest for black emigration to Liberia. These chapters contain well-referenced examinations of the relationships that Allen, Gordon and others built (or tried to build) with the leaders of Liberia, as well as with self-declared white supremacist like Earnest Sevier Cox and U.S. Senator Theodore Bilbo. These political marriages of convenience served the interests of the black nationalists by extending their network to include influential white citizens who could help the dream of Liberia become a reality.

Bilbo was particularly helpful to the cause; he wrote and sponsored legislation to have the U.S. government financially support black emigration. His introduction of the Greater Liberia Bill was in itself a victory for the PME, but more interesting were the ways in which Allen and Gordon lobbied the senator by performing as submissive, unsophisticated constituents. Blain's analysis here is quite instructive, because it underscores the savvy nature of PME leaders while distinguishing them from their sisters like Amy Jacques Garvey, who supported Bilbo's legislation but took a much more assertive tone in her correspondence with the Mississippian. In addition to relationship-building, these chapters also highlight the tensions within the black nationalist movement and the criticisms that Gordon and her cohort faced from the leaders of integrationist organizations. As with other great scholarship in this area, Blain's work illuminates the gender and class fissures that dogged these female activists.

The final chapter of the book also is fascinating, but it is perhaps the least compelling. Blain does a masterful job of distinguishing the older generation of black nationalists from the younger generation of activists who emerged in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education and the lynching of Emmett Till. Where the former saw Liberia as the preferred destination to begin an African-based Renaissance, the latter grew to maturity watching the dismantling of formal colonialism in Asia and Africa. Consequently, they either imagined Ghana or Nigeria as a possible base for pan-Africanism or entertained the possibility of creating a black nation within the confines of the United States. Blain does well to highlight the differences and overlaps between the UNIA and similar groups, on the one hand, and the Nation of Islam and the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, on the other. What is less convincing is the argument that the UNIA or PME deeply influenced the new generation of radicals. Still, this a small quibble with this superb book.

Blain's expert depictions of this cadre of black female radicals avoids the trap of hagiography, a real accomplishment because there is so much to admire in these women. She eschews sentiment in favor of a clear-eyed analysis of their lives, works, and rivalries, thus rendering them as fully formed human beings. Throughout their odyssey, the women who leap from the pages of Blain's book often wrote less about gender than many of their contemporaries while actually doing more to become leaders and promote other women to leadership positions. At the same time, many of them supported Victorian notions of family life or openly promoted black male primacy.

Many of those who professed a deep, sincere affection for Africa also promoted civilizationist ideas that suggested the westernized children of Africa would save and uplift those on the continent. Even those women who wrote columns or editorials championing natural black beauty often did so in publications that contained advertisements for skin-bleaching creams or hair straighteners. Blain's eye for the contradictions in the work of these activists does not diminish them; indeed, it makes their commitment and achievements all the more impressive. The operational flexibility demonstrated by these historical actors also makes for gripping storytelling. It is no understatement to say that Blain's work has earned a place next to some of the most thought-provoking scholarship of the last several years.


Finally, it bears mentioning that Blain's monograph provides one possible antidote to the nation's current malaise. The mid-twentieth century educator/philosopher/mystic Dr. Howard Thurman poignantly scrutinized white nationalism in his 1965 book The Luminous Darkness. To his mind, a white supremacist society was more than signs and status. Such a society would have to “array all of the forces of legislation and law enforcement . . . it must falsify the facts of history, tamper with the insights of religion and religious doctrine, editorialize and slant news and the printed word.” Ultimately, Thurman mused that “the measure of a man’s estimate of your strength is the kind of weapons he feels he must use in order to hold you fast in your prescribed place.” The modern-day machinery of oppression is vast and deadly. Accordingly, Blain's perceptive rendering of the heroines in Set the World on Fire compels us to do everything in our power to support truth-telling and promote fusion organizing against the dismal tide.

Note:

A Review of Keisha N. Blain, Set the World on Fire: Black Nationalist Women and the Global Struggle for Freedom

Hasan Kwame Jeffries

The “golden age of black nationalism” is a phrase wholly familiar to historians of the African American experience. It refers to the period from the middle of the nineteenth century through the first quarter of the twentieth century, when black nationalist thought flourished among African Americans. Historian Wilson Jeremiah Moses popularized the phrase in the 1980s with his book of the same name.1 In The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850–1925, as well as in his subsequent work, Moses established the chronological bookends of the age and set out the ideological boundaries of black nationalist
thought, framing it as reflective of a separatist impulse that found primary expression in the emigrationist arguments of ministers and educators like Henry Highland Garnet and Alexander Crummell and culminating in the Back-to-Africa organizing of race-first advocate Marcus Garvey.

Moses’s work made an invaluable contribution to our understanding of black nationalist thought as an authentic and logical response to white supremacy, but it deemphasized black nationalist ideologies that fell outside the spectrum of separatist ideas, left little room for black nationalist organizing after Garvey’s most active years, and minimized the black nationalist articulations and activism of black women.

John H. Bracey, August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick, writing almost a decade before Moses, and Ula Y. Taylor and Rhonda Y. Williams, writing several decades after him, laid the groundwork not only for broadening the range of black nationalist ideologies and pushing the “Golden Age” chronology forward in time, but also for retrieving black nationalist women from the margins of history. Keisha N. Blain builds on this foundation, greatly expanding our understanding of black nationalism and black nationalists during the highpoint of the “Golden Age” through the Second World War.

Blain sees black nationalism as “the political view that black people of African descent constitute a separate group or nationality on the basis of their distinct culture, shared history, and experiences” (3). Hers is an expansive definition, one that could be so encompassing that it loses its nuance. But Blain applies it judiciously, allowing for the inclusion of new black nationalist voices and ideas, specifically those of African American working-class women, without including every voice and idea emanating from race-conscious black thinkers and activists. This selectivity enables her to place black nationalism on a continuum of black political thought.

Blain’s framing of black nationalism allows for the ideology to co-exist alongside other political constructs, especially integration, which for most people is what comes immediately to mind when they think about black approaches to change. Its coexistence with other constructs is not limited to the “Golden Age” writer; it is both timeless and ever present, although it ebbs and flows in popularity. Imagined this way, the pertinent question is not whether people subscribed to black nationalism outside of the “Golden Age,” but rather how widely and deeply did they embrace it before, during, and after this period?

For Blain, then, black nationalist thought is the entry point for excavating the ideas and actions of untold numbers of African American working-class women when black nationalism flourished. And since black nationalism thrived beyond the high point of the “Golden Age,” Blaine introduces us to a bevy of unfamiliar black nationalist women thinkers and organizations and reintroduces us to a handful of familiar ones known mainly to us because of their visibility during the “Golden Age.”

Not surprisingly, Blain chooses the Garvey movement as her starting point. It is a logical choice, given its size during the early twentieth century and its influence long after. She explains that untold numbers of black nationalist women began their political activism in Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and gained a sense of empowerment as members of the organization. But she pushes hard against a Garvey-centric understanding of black nationalism that positions Garveyism “as the sole or even primary prism through which women leaders crafted political responses to global white supremacy” (6). The UNIA, she writes, “functioned as a political incubator,” politicizing and training black women for “future leadership” (26). It is where many black women launched their activist careers, but it is not where those careers ended.

Blain sees the life of Amy Ashwood, Garvey’s first wife and a champion of Garveyism, as particularly instructive. Activists like Ashwood carved out a space for themselves in the UNIA that enabled them to exercise authority beyond the narrow confines of what men within the organization thought women’s roles should be. More than that, argues Blain, these women created opportunities for other black women. “During its formative years,” she writes, “Ashwood maintained a vocal presence in the UNIA, encouraging the integration of women into the organization’s leadership structure” (18). At the same time, Blain makes it clear that Amy Ashwood’s black nationalist ideas were very much her own, and her activism stretched far beyond simply trying to spread Garveyism. In fact, Blain shows that it often departed from Garveyism entirely, resulting in expressions of black nationalism that Garvey himself had never imagined.

Blain follows Amy Ashwood into the “post-Garvey moment,” the two decades or so after his imprisonment in 1923. Tracking her into this period reveals that the void created by Garvey’s decline did not remain unfilled. A cadre of women organizers stepped into that space because they had been deep political thinkers and activists for years. “A vanguard of nationalist women leaders emerged on the local, national, and international scenes,” writes Blain, “practicing a pragmatic form of nationalist politics that allowed for greater flexibility, adaptability, and experimentation” (3).

Retracing Amy Ashwood’s activist steps not only highlights the work of black nationalist women, but it also makes it demonstrably clear that black nationalism did not die on the vine of Garveyism when the patriarch of the movement was no longer able to nourish it. The very existence of the “cadre of effective women organizers and leaders” to which Amy Ashwood belonged belies the popular declension narrative of black nationalism, which posits that black nationalist thought and activism went into a steep decline during the Depression and World War II eras.

Blain deploys the biographical approach that she uses to tell the story of black nationalist women associated with the Garvey movement to great effect throughout the book. It is an approach that shows the evolution of these women as independent thinkers and activists, which is essential to understanding them on their own terms rather than as ancillary characters in stories about black nationalist men. To be sure, black nationalist men, most prominently Garvey, played significant roles in the political lives of black nationalist women. But they were conduits for women’s black nationalist expressions, not messiahs to whom the women pledged blind fealty. Although black nationalist women shared the men’s vision and views, they developed thoughts and ideas of their own. Their independent perspectives enabled them to take leadership positions within organizations like the UNIA and to form their own black nationalist groups after the UNIA declined.

Finding these women was no easy task. They operated outside of mainstream civil rights organizations and radical left circles because they rejected the integrationist appeals of organizations like the NAACP and dismissed the Marxist philosophy of groups like the Communist Party. In
addition, as working-class women, they were not part of the black middle-class ‘women’s club movement. This doesn’t mean that they were marginal actors in the black freedom struggle; it only means that they were marginalized by scholars who showed greater interest in organizations and groups that were not these women’s primary vehicles for political expression.

Blain searches for these women in places others ignore. She combs through the records of post-UNIA black nationalist organizations like the Peace Movement of Ethiopia (PME), which provided working-poor black women with a “crucial space” for engaging in black nationalist and internationalist politics during the 1930s (61). While far less recognizable than the NAACP and other mainstream civil rights organizations, these groups existed alongside them and maintained steady if not always thriving memberships.

The author also mines a wide range of sources to unearth evidence of these women’s activism and political thinking. She examines what they wrote in private correspondence and what they published in newsletters and newspapers. She tracks their travel overseas as they lived out their global vision for black freedom. And she carefully sifts through government surveillance records, filtering out the racist paranoia of federal agents and interpreting black dissembling to reveal rare glimpses of black nationalist women’s grassroots organizing work.

Blain evaluates these women’s activism by “examining the principles and philosophies that undergirded (their) actions” rather than by strictly assessing the “tangible outcomes of their political struggles” (5). This is no small thing. There is tremendous value in measuring the effectiveness of an activist’s work by assessing the extent to which they realized their goals. But far too often, when an activist’s work is less than totally effective, that person is overlooked, especially if that person is a black nationalist, and particularly if that person is a black nationalist woman. Considering black nationalist women’s work from start to finish makes what they did the focus of analysis instead of how others responded to what they did. Blain’s approach centers black nationalist women; the latter decenters them.

Taking black nationalist women seriously as political thinkers enriches Blain’s analysis of their preferred pathways to black empowerment. Her explication of their global vision for black freedom. And she carefully sifts through government surveillance records, filtering out the racist paranoia of federal agents and interpreting black dissembling to reveal rare glimpses of black nationalist women’s grassroots organizing work.

The author also mines a wide range of sources to unearth evidence of these women’s activism and political thinking. She examines what they wrote in private correspondence and what they published in newsletters and newspapers. She tracks their travel overseas as they lived out their global vision for black freedom. And she carefully sifts through government surveillance records, filtering out the racist paranoia of federal agents and interpreting black dissembling to reveal rare glimpses of black nationalist women’s grassroots organizing work.

Blain introduces us to activists who promoted everything from black capitalism to Pan-Africanism. And she also points out the numerous strategies they used to advance their various viewpoints—tactical approaches to change that included letter writing campaigns, petition drives, and political lobbying. Here she includes a noteworthy discussion of black nationalist women’s ideological inconsistencies, such as the willingness of some to collaborate with avowed white supremacists like Senator Theodore Bilbo in an effort to win federal support for emigration. She explores these problematic partnerships and concludes that they were born of political pragmatism, a characteristic of black nationalist women, but one that in this particular instance served to undermine their credibility.

Blain also explains that this political pragmatism extended to the ways in which these women operated in highly gendered black nationalist spaces. By examining their words and actions, she shows that they challenged the “prevailing ethos of black patriarchy” (12). Still, they “wavered between feminist and nationalistic ideals, articulating a critique of black patriarchy while endorsing traditionally conservative views on gender and sexuality” (36). It is clear that black nationalist women were of their time, and to expect them to be otherwise would be to hold them to an unfair standard. At the same time, Blain makes a compelling argument that they exhibited a kind of “proto-feminism” through their advocacy of gender equality inside and outside of black nationalist organizations, anticipating struggles for women’s liberation that materialized in the 1960s and 1970s.

Blain is actually quite deft at pointing out precursors. She does so again in her chapter on the work black nationalist women performed in the Jim Crow South. Focusing specifically on Mississippi, she highlights their grassroots organizing activities, which in many ways foreshadowed the work of organizations like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) a couple of decades later. Civil rights scholars write about the ways grassroots activists in the 1960s tapped into a black organizing tradition, especially in the rural South, but they typically just assert what was the case rather than provide a focused analysis of historical examples. Blain makes the black organizing tradition visible by following black nationalist women organizers into the homes of rural black Mississippians as they tapped into preexisting social networks, especially those rooted in the black church, to win converts to their cause.

By excavating the activities of black women organizers, Blain also enhances our understanding of black working-class political thought. She takes us inside the weekly meetings of black nationalist organizations like the Peace Movement of Ethiopia, led by Maude Lena Gordon and Celia Jane Allen and thereby shows us the willingness of African Americans in the rural South and the urban Midwest, places usually overlooked when considering black political thought during this time, to engage in black internationalist discourse. Clearly Amy Ashwood was a global thinker, but so too were the many nameless and faceless black tenant farmers and factory workers who shared her understanding of a transnational color line.

Blain’s work builds toward the important conclusion that the political ideas that informed the activism of black nationalist women during the first quarter of the twentieth century continued to percolate years later and still found a
receptive audience among the black working class during the most dynamic years of the civil rights era. “Black nationalism not only survived but also thrived during the postwar era,” writes Blain, “taking on new shapes and expressions in a range of black political organizations in the United States and across the globe” (168).

This persistence did not mean that there were not significant points of divergence between old guard black nationalist women and younger civil rights and Black Power advocates. Blain points out, for instance, that Liberia had lost much of its appeal by the 1960s. Significantly, though, Africa had not. Beginning with Ghana, newly independent African nations sparked new interest in the continent.

Blain sets out to “uncover the previously hidden voices of black nationalist women activists and intellectuals.” Through outstanding research, she achieves her primary goal. But in doing so, she reveals something more. She shows that the voices of black nationalist women were hidden in plain sight. As activists and intellectuals, black nationalist women played major roles in black nationalist organizations, several of which they founded, and through these groups, they shaped the contours of black nationalist politics and practice. Blain teaches us that black nationalist women were never silent. Amplifying their voices, therefore, is absolutely necessary for understanding their contributions to black nationalist movements, and for making sense of the trajectory of black political thought and working-class activism.

In any event, the privileged denizens of what Martin Weil referred to as “a pretty good club” might have seen their doors pushed open just a crack, but most of the subjects of the study of the American people and their nation’s foreign policy were still on the outside looking in. Keisha N. Blain’s new book puts a powerful shoulder to those doors and in so doing makes a number of significant contributions to our understanding of the deeper meaning of “American foreign policy.”

Notes:

Review of Keisha N. Blain,
Set the World on Fire: Black Nationalist Women and the Global Struggle for Freedom

Michael L. Krenn

Decades ago, those of us who toiled in the field of U.S. diplomatic history spent most of our research time locked in the dusty confines of the National Archives in downtown Washington DC, patiently (or not) waiting for the staff to bring us boxes of documents from Record Group 59. On occasion, we also traveled to the various presidential libraries, scouring the files for anything related to foreign relations. Wherever we ended up, however, the focus was almost inevitably the same. The Department of State was where the action was.

The actors themselves—officials at State and the diplomats sent abroad; foreign policy experts in the White House—were a pretty homogenous group, so much so that the old joke about the typical denizen of the foreign policy making bureaucracy being “pale, male, from Yale” seemed to be too accurate to dismiss as a mere stereotype. In fact, it became a topic for scholars, as Martin Weil, Robert D. Schulzinger, Andrew L. Steigman, Homer L. Calkin, and others turned their attention to the elitism and exclusionary practices that kept State a bastion of white male privilege. Even the passage of the Rogers Act in 1924, which was supposed to make the Foreign Service more “democratic,” failed to make much of a dent in what African American newspapers and magazines routinely referred to as the “lily-white club.”

Then things changed, both in the scholarship and to a lesser extent in the Department of State and Foreign Service. A steady stream of books and articles appeared in the 1990s and early 2000s that focused on the African American interest in and impact on U.S. foreign relations. These studies differed from earlier attempts to analyze the impact of racism on American diplomacy—which, after all, traditionally focused on the racism exhibited by the elites in the Department of State and White House. Instead, this new body of work sought to understand the African American viewpoint on the nation’s international affairs: their priorities; the main ways in which they communicated their interests; their critiques and recommendations; the interconnections between the Civil Rights Movement and Cold War diplomacy; and even their (very limited) direct participation as U.S. representatives and diplomats. Research appeared from Gerald Horne, Mary L. Dudziak, Thomas Borstelmann, Brenda Gayle Plummer, Carol Anderson, Penny Von Eschen, and so many others, on the NAACP, the Council for African Affairs, W.E.B. Du Bois, Ralph Bunche, Paul Robeson, African American artists and intellectuals who served as unofficial cultural ambassadors, and the handful of black diplomats who managed to forge careers in State, the Foreign Service, and the United States Information Agency.

New research, yes, but was the focus truly different? We still zeroed in on leaders, notables, outstanding individuals and groups, people whom Carol Anderson referred to as the “bourgeois radicals” of the NAACP, and, to a large extent, African American men. Perhaps it was the fact that records for these individuals and groups were more readily available; or perhaps it was merely the old style of focusing on elites, white or black. In any event, the privileged denizens of what Martin Weil referred to as “a pretty good club” might have seen their doors pushed open just a crack, but most of the voices of the American people and their nation’s foreign policy were still on the outside looking in. Keisha N. Blain’s new book puts a powerful shoulder to those doors and in so doing makes a number of significant contributions to our understanding of the deeper meaning of “American foreign policy.”

Blain focuses on a “cadre of black nationalist women” who sought to “challenge global white supremacy during the twentieth century” by “seeking to advance black nationalist and internationalist politics” (1). Some of these women, such as Amy Jacques Garvey, might be familiar to historians. Many of the others emerge from the shadows. “Feeling alienated from many of the ideas and political approaches of activists in mainstream civil rights organizations like the NAACP and the NUL [National Urban League] and rejecting the Marxist platform of leftist organizations like the Communist Party, the black nationalist women...created spaces of their own in which to experiment with various strategies and ideologies” (2).

From the outset, then, Blain is clearly talking about a group of African Americans who are “different” from the people who have have populated most of the previous studies of black Americans and U.S. diplomacy. They are, first and foremost, women. These black nationalists might have started their careers in activism supporting better known men, such as Marcus Garvey, but in the 1940s and 1940s they “became central leaders in various black
nationalist movements in the United States and other parts of the globe, agitating for racial unity, black political self-determination, and economic self-sufficiency” (3).

These women are not easily pigeonholed. They had clearly turned their backs on what they perceived to be the sham of “American democracy,” but they also seemed to have little interest in the political machinations of the communists. Their ideology was most definitely a racial ideology. They sought neither equal rights nor assimilation, but instead looked to escape—going “back to Africa”—as the only solution for the crushing racism they experienced in the United States. Finally, these women were outsiders in almost every sense of the word. Most significantly, they were not “elites”: they, and many of their followers, were the poor, the dispossessed, the working class.

In studying these women, Blain moves away from the traditional forms of scholarship that have attempted to place African American activists somewhere along the accepted political spectrum—radicals, communists, conservatives, liberals—and then insert them into the international issues of the day: late nineteenth-century imperialism; World War I; World War II; and, most particularly, the Cold War. They might be critics; they might be supporters; they might even be active participants, but in one way or another they were actors in fairly familiar settings.

Blain takes us to another world that is populated by little-known individuals such as Celia Jane Allen, Mittie Maude Lena Gordon, and Ethel Waddell, and the organizations they led, such as the Peace Movement of Ethiopia (PME). Organizing mostly within the United States and Jamaica, these women also reached out to potential allies in the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere to support their black nationalist agenda. They had no desire to work with the U.S. government to achieve “common goals” in the international arena because their goals were completely different from the government’s. They wanted “racial unity, black political self-determination, and economic self-sufficiency” (3).

The ultimate goal for many of these women was to convince U.S. officials to assist them in returning to Africa. Not only did this goal make them anathema to most of those within the mainstream media, and even a large number of African American civil rights activists, but—and this is one of the most interesting findings in Blain’s study, it pushed them toward alliances with a bizarre cast of characters. Receiving no responses to their requests from the Department of State, the White House, and most congressmen, they turned to the only people who seemed to share their desire to have African Americans return to Africa: white supremacists.

It is jarring to read about African Americans writing to such despicable characters as the racist firebrand from Mississippi, Senator Theodore Bilbo, and Earnest Sevier Cox, who portrayed himself as a philosopher for the white supremacists of America, and accentuating their common goal of removing African Americans from the United States. But these women believed that desperate times called for desperate measures. As Gordon explained in the 1950s, “The condition of the world is so dark for black people, it is hard to believe that our government will do anything for us. They seem to have forgotten all about the suffering slaves in America” (182). She and the other black nationalist women had no illusions that the support of reprehensible characters such as Bilbo and Cox flowed from an altruistic attitude toward African Americans. Nevertheless, they believed that such alliances with the devil were the only alternatives open to them in their search for support for their back-to-Africa plans.

Blain also highlights the more routine approaches these women took to achieve their black nationalist goals. Since they did not operate within large bureaucratic agencies or organizations, their funding was meager, to say the least. When we read of Celia Jane Allen tramping on foot through the heart of the Jim Crow South in the 1930s, relying on the kindness of strangers for housing, food, and donations, we begin to understand that this is a very different stage of the “global struggle for freedom.” Ignored by most of the press (even the African American newspapers and magazines), they engaged in grassroots organizing and fund-raising. In many ways, however, this was by choice. They knew that their message did not resonate with most African American elites, and so they reached out to the masses of poor and working-class blacks, handing out literature, giving countless speeches, enrolling them in their organizations, collecting pennies, nickels, and dimes in donations and signatures on petitions. The contrast between them and Walter White, the executive secretary of the NAACP, who wrote directly to the White House about his concerns, or Du Bois, who attended the meetings in San Francisco that led to the establishment of the United Nations, could not have been starker or more meaningful.

The book is not without its problems. I noted one minor error. Charles Mitchell is referred to as the “U.S. ambassador to Liberia” (108) in the 1930s; Edward R. Dudley became the first ambassador in 1949. And although Blain praises the organizational abilities of the black nationalist women and the appeal of their messages, there is little evidence—as aside from the oft-mentioned PME petition of 1933 asking for U.S. government assistance in helping African Americans emigrate to West Africa signed by an “estimated 400,000” people—that the largest groups they headed ever numbered more than a few thousand full-time members.

More problematic is the fact that the “internationalism” of the women discussed in the study is sometimes difficult to discern. To a large degree, their focus tended to be on local and national issues. Even the interest in Liberia was not always evidence of seeing the race issue on a global level. As Blain makes clear, many African Americans saw emigration as a way to “solve our problem” in the United States.
Yet, by focusing on this little-known group of activists, Blain is clearly asking us to expand our field of vision when we consider what makes up our nation’s foreign policy, and who makes it. Simply because these women faced such immense struggles to have their voices heard does not mean that those voices were not important. The very fact that they faced so much opposition and that the FBI expended so many resources in harassing them suggests two important conclusions. First, that those in power draw very definite boundaries for what is and what is not allowed to be part of the discussion regarding international relations. Second, the fact that these are usually lower/working class women of color clearly indicates that there are also very sharp lines of demarcation for who is allowed to participate. The women in Blain’s book did not succeed in setting the world on fire, but it seems clear that this study will help to set some new fires burning in the fields of U.S. diplomatic history and international relations.

Note:

Response to Roundtable on Set the World on Fire

Keisha N. Blain

Set the World on Fire was a very challenging book to write. First, I set out to tell a story about a group of women whom many scholars had previously overlooked. These women were “on the margins”[1]; they struggled to find a place in their own communities—let alone in mainstream U.S. and global politics.1 Second, I set out to tell a story about a group of women who maintained many controversial and unconventional views. While the women in this study shared a common thread of black nationalism, their political ideas and practices were far more fluid, complex, and complicated than this one term suggests. Third, I set out to write a social and intellectual history of mostly black, working-poor activist-intellectuals—a group of individuals who for the most part did not write books or articles. The absence of such documents posed a particular challenge for me as a writer determined to capture these women’s voices.

In the end, I was able to piece together these women’s lives and ideas by drawing on a range of sources, including archival material, newspaper articles, oral histories and FBI files. Set the World on Fire is the result of my effort not only to expand our understanding of black women’s politics in the twentieth century, but also to build an archive, which is an extensive, time-consuming process. What I wanted more than anything else was for readers to develop an in-depth understanding of these women’s ideas and politics. I also wanted readers to engage these women in a way that takes their contributions to national and global politics seriously. The thoughtful and generous reviews included in this roundtable confirm that I accomplished these goals. I appreciate the scholars who carefully read the book and took the time to grapple with the many themes I explore.

As Adam Ewing acknowledges, black nationalism remains an underrepresented topic in studies on the black freedom struggle. Scholars still have a hard time understanding the significance of black nationalist thought in general, and they certainly struggle to see the significance of the women who were so instrumental to its growth and dissemination. It is difficult to dismantle ideas that have been fixed in U.S. thought and culture for decades. And as I wrote the book and worked with FBI records, I was constantly reminded of the extreme lengths to which federal officials went to silence the voices of the historical actors who take center stage in my book.

In many ways, the academy has replicated this act of censorship by continuing to marginalize black nationalist thought and praxis. Each year, scholars produce books, dissertations, and articles on the black freedom struggle that fail to take seriously the historical significance of contributions of black nationalist activists, especially those who preceded Malcolm X and the Black Panthers. As Ewing rightfully points out, “black nationalism continues to be approached from the perspective of its assumed impossibility.” I would add too that black nationalism in the academy (and beyond) continues to be approached from a male-dominated and masculinist perspective, one that marginalizes—and sometimes ignores—the crucial role of women.

In writing Set the World on Fire, then, I hoped to encourage historians to dismantle many of the ideas that have been cemented into the field of history. There is perhaps no greater feeling of accomplishment than knowing that the book has helped to broaden the scholarly discourse on global black politics while also helping to push historians to think outside of the box when it comes to the matter of sources, methodology, and approaches.

As Michael L. Krenn emphasizes in his review, Set the World on Fire “makes a number of significant contributions to our understanding of the deeper meaning of ‘American foreign policy.’” One of the crucial aspects of the book is that it shows how the idea of black internationalism was fundamental to these women’s political visions. The key figures in the book, including Amy Ashwood Garvey, Mittie Maude Lena Gordon, Celia Jane Allen, Maymie De Mena and Amy Jacques Garvey, maintained a global racial consciousness and were committed to ending racism and discrimination not only where they lived, but also in every part of the globe. Through a myriad of mediums, these women built transnational networks with a diverse group of activists in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

Whereas scholars often view black internationalism through the prisms of international travel or foreign policy, I focus on the varied ways in which black activists and intellectuals engaged in internationalist politics from the margins (often through the lens of grassroots internationalism). Africa—both real and imagined—figured prominently in the minds of black nationalist women in the twentieth century.

These women envisioned Africa—and they were often thinking specifically of Liberia—as a haven for people of African descent. Many desired to relocate to Liberia as a means of escaping racism in the United States and improving their socioeconomic conditions. They supported emigration as a practical solution to many of the challenges they were facing in this period. Their strong affinity for Africa motivated their decision to lead a vibrant emigrationist movement in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. But their interest in leaving the United States should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in dismantling the global color line. As I detail in the book, these women resisted global white supremacy and believed that improving the economic and political standing of Liberia—as well as Africa in general—was one step toward liberation.

Their efforts had a significant global impact. Many of the women were able to mobilize activists around the world. Those who had the means to travel overseas collaborated with a diverse group of activists and politicians in various locales. Amy Ashwood Garvey, for example, relocated to...
Liberia in the 1940s and worked closely with the Liberian president, William V.S. Tubman. Other women activists who could not travel abroad utilized a variety of means to build a transnational network of activists who were committed to the cause of black liberation. During the 1940s, for example, Mittie Maude Lena Gordon organized a ten-day visit for Akweke Abyssinia Nwafor Òrízu, a nationalist from Eastern Nigeria who became acting president of Nigeria in 1966.

These are only a few examples to underscore the diverse and creative means by which these women engaged internationalism in the twentieth century. Their ideas and activities look a lot different from those of the historical figures who usually occupy countless books and articles. However, they are no less significant to the historical narratives on twentieth century black internationalism.

To be sure, some of the groups I discuss in the book were small. I estimate they had a few hundred or thousand members. But it is important to remember that these groups were able to amass large followings, and their activities had significant impacts that went far beyond the number of people who formally joined. I think it is also important to remember that their influence and reach extended far beyond membership figures. As George White Jr. astutely points out in his review, black nationalist women “not only sustained the momentum of black nationalism but expanded its reach through their own unique forms of organization and political collaboration.”

Another of the fundamental goals of my book is to move beyond organizations and even individuals in order to underscore the power of ideas. As I try to demonstrate in the book, ideas cannot be contained by one individual, organization, or movement, and they are often sustained in black communities for centuries, moving across time and space. The narrative arc of the book helps to convey this point. I intentionally open the first chapter with the formation of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1914. What began as an idea and a rather small gathering led by Marcus Garvey and Amy Ashwood emerged into one of the most influential black organizations in the globe.

It was this organization—and more specifically, the ideas that flourished in this critical space—that captured the imagination of someone like Mittie Maude Lena Gordon, who in turn established the Peace Movement of Ethiopia (PME) in Chicago in 1932. And it was through Gordon’s PME that someone like Celia Jane Allen came to view black nationalism as a logical response to global white supremacy during the 1940s. And so on.

To be sure, some of the groups I discuss in the book were small. I estimate they had a few hundred or thousand members. But it is important to remember that these groups were able to amass large followings, and their activities had significant impacts that went far beyond the number of people who formally joined.

Robert F. Williams, Malcolm X, and Stokely Carmichael—drew on these women’s ideas and political strategies. Historians have largely overlooked this point, and I try to make those ideological connections clear amidst a very complex and complicated story.

Finally, I reject the notion that these women did not “set the world on fire” simply because they failed to achieve many of their tangible goals within their lifetimes. As Hasan Jeffries explains, “Considering black nationalist women’s work from start to finish makes what they did the focus of analysis, instead of how others responded to what they did.” This was certainly what I set out to accomplish—to center black nationalist women’s politics and highlight the significance of their perspectives and approaches without assessing them based on whether or not they were “successful” in the eyes of others. As I chart in the book, black nationalist women leaders led and participated in a series of political and social movements that significantly transformed the lives of countless black men and women. These activists dared to dream of a better future and sought to (re)awaken the political consciousness of black men and women in the United States and across the African diaspora. The “freedom dreams” they envisioned propell them to create new spaces and opportunities for people of color to openly confront racial and sexual discrimination and assert their political agency. In so doing, they left an indelible mark on the lives of many black men and women in the decades to follow.

Notes:
1. bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From the Margin to the Center (Cambridge, MA, 2000).
The 2019 SHAFR annual meeting will be held from June 20-22 at the Renaissance Arlington Capital View in Arlington, Virginia, site of the 2015 and 2017 conferences. We hope you will join us there!

Luncheon Address

The 2019 Luncheon Address will be delivered by Kristin Hayden, founder and senior advisor of OneWorld Now!, which seeks to develop the next generation of global leaders. Founded in 2002 as a global leadership program, OneWorld Now! runs programs for under-served high school youth, including language programs in Arabic and Chinese and leadership and study abroad scholarships.

Within two years, OneWorld Now! was recognized as “one of the nation’s most innovative after school programs” by the Jack Kent Cooke Foundation and led to Hayden’s appointment to the Board of Trustees for Evergreen State College (2007-12) and as the official spokesperson for the Global Access Pipeline (GAP), a national consortium with the goal of increasing the representation, preparedness, and retention of under-represented groups in the international arena.

Plenary: 99 Years after the 19th Amendment

The conference also will feature a Thursday afternoon plenary entitled “99 Years after the 19th Amendment” chaired by Brooke L. Blower of Boston University. Other participants will include:

- Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, University of California, Irvine
- Keisha N. Blain, University of Pittsburgh
- Joanne Meyerowitz, Yale University
- Chris Capozzola, MIT

The central question guiding the participants will be: how have shifts in the distribution of gendered power at “home”— in both the household and the nation—reshaped foreign relations? A century after women acquired the vote in many Anglophone countries, and in our current moment of female empowerment, the 2019 plenary panel analyzes the ways in which the history of political participation, enfranchisement— and disenfranchisement—shed light on the history of transnational relations and the projection of U.S. power around the world.
Renaissance Arlington Capital View Hotel

The LEED-certified Renaissance Arlington Capital View is located at 2800 South Potomac Avenue, two miles from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (airport code DCA). There is complimentary hotel shuttle service every 20 minutes between 7 am and 11 pm to DCA and the Crystal City Metro (blue and yellow lines). In the lobby, SOCCi Urban Italian Kitchen and Bar serves breakfast, lunch, and dinner, while Espressamente illy Coffee House serves coffee and light fare during the day. A 24-hour fitness center is also available on site, and there is complimentary wi-fi access in the lobby.

Conference room rates are $175/night, single or double occupancy, plus tax (currently 13%). Hotel guests will receive complimentary high-speed internet access in their rooms. On-site parking is available for at a 20% reduced rate for conference attendees.

Hotel reservations can be made by through the link on the “Events” page of the SHAFR website or by calling 1 (800) 228-9290 and mentioning “SHAFR 2019.” The deadline for receiving the conference rate is May 31, 2019. The hotel is required to honor the reduced rate until this date OR until all the rooms in the SHAFR bloc have been booked. Once the block is fully booked, the hotel will offer rooms at its usual rate, if any are available, or may even be completely full. Please make your reservation as early as you can.

For more details about conference arrangements, visit https://shafr.org/conferences/annual/2019-annual-meeting or follow us on Twitter @SHAFRConference. For questions about registration and other conference logistics, please contact Amy Sayward, SHAFR Executive Director, at Amy.Sayward@shafr.org.

Presidential Luncheon

The presidential luncheon address will be delivered by SHAFR President Barbara Keys and will be entitled “How International Relations Become Personal: Diplomats as Friends, Enemies, and Everything in Between.” Tickets for the Presidential and Luncheon addresses will be sold separately at $50 standard or $25 for students, adjunct faculty, and K-12 teachers (limit of one reduced-price ticket per person).

Friday Night SHAFR Social

This year’s Friday night social event will be at the Ruth’s Chris Steakhouse that faces Reagan National Airport, at 2231 Crystal Drive, 11th Floor, Arlington—just a short walk from the conference hotel. We hope you will be able to join us for this opportunity to eat and talk together in an informal setting. Vegetarian and vegan options will be available. Tickets are $50 standard or $30 for students, adjunct faculty, and K-12 teachers.

Booklets and Registration

Printed program booklets and registration forms will be mailed out to all SHAFR members with a current domestic U.S. address prior to the conference. Online registration, including luncheon and social event tickets, will be available in early April. Registration fees for the 2019 conference are $100 standard and $40 student, adjunct faculty, or K-12 teacher. After June 1, 2019, fees increase to $120/$55.
The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association is pleased to announce the creation of a new book prize, the Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award.

The prize honors Tonous Hanna and Warda Paulis, who immigrated to the United States from Syria in 1900, married in 1906, and became U.S. citizens along with their children in 1919. Tony and Warda Johns, as they became known, emphasized the importance of education, hard work, and philanthropy to their children and grandchildren, and had a deep and abiding love for their adopted country and its history. These values—shared by so many other immigrants to the United States—profoundly shaped the lives of their descendants. In celebration of these ideals and in recognition of Tony and Warda’s continuing influence on their family, the Johns family created this endowment in the hope that Tony and Warda’s legacy will be felt and appreciated by the PCB-AHA community and that the award will encourage and recognize excellent historical scholarship.

The Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award will recognize the outstanding book (monograph or edited volume) in the history of U.S. foreign relations, immigration history, or military history by an author or editor residing in the PCB-AHA membership region. The inaugural award will be presented at the 2019 PCB-AHA conference—which will meet from July 31 through August 2 on the campus of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas—on the 100th anniversary of Tony and Warda’s U.S. citizenship.

Copies of books submitted for consideration for the award should be sent directly to each of the three members of the prize committee by March 1, 2019; more details will be available at pcb-aha.org/awards.

Questions about the award or inquiries regarding donations to the endowment should be directed to Michael Green, PCB-AHA executive director, at michael.green@unlv.edu.

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association was organized in 1903 to serve members of the American Historical Association living in the western United States and the western provinces of Canada. With over 4000 members, it is one of the largest professional historical organizations in the United States.

The PCB-AHA thanks the founding donors to the endowment for their generosity:

Andrew & Kayli Johns
Laurence & Judy Johns
Patrick Payton
Janet Griffiths & family
Michael & Rosemarie Johns
Elizabeth Johns

Tony and Warda Johns (seated in center) with their children (c. 1946).
An Amazing Academic Adventure: Five Lessons We Learned from Team-Teaching

Lori Clune and William Skuban

A promising new chapter in U.S.-Cuban relations appeared to be opening on December 14, 2014, when President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro announced intentions to “normalize” relations between their two countries. The relationship continued to progress when embassies re-opened in both countries in 2015. In 2016 Obama traveled to Havana for an official state visit. He attended a baseball game and even did “the wave” with Castro.

We (Lori, a historian of the U.S. Cold War, and Bill, a historian of Latin America) followed these developments closely, and decided to challenge both our students and ourselves by developing a new course: a team-taught, upper-division class on U.S.-Cuban relations that would draw on our individual strengths and collective passions. We both studied at UC Davis, although at different times; we both have maintained strong research agendas; and, perhaps most important, we both have an enduring love for and commitment to innovative classroom teaching.

There were numerous bureaucratic and logistical hurdles to overcome, but with the help of a supportive department chair we were able to offer the course to forty-five upper division history majors in the fall of 2017. In their evaluations of the course, students reported that they learned a lot. This brief essay will describe what we learned, and will argue that in teaching the history of U.S. foreign relations, a team-taught class by regional specialists holds enormous benefit for students and instructors alike.

Lesson #1: Planning

Continuous, ongoing planning was key. We felt that we had to reach consensus on virtually every element of the course, and although time-consuming, we viewed this practice as the best guarantee for a successful course. We met several times during the spring and summer of 2017 to select and plot the readings, topics, and course assignments for this class that would meet twice (Monday and Wednesday) weekly. During the fall semester, with the class in session, we met for lunch (occasionally enjoying Cuba Libres!) every Friday to review what had been successful that week and to plan the following week’s lectures and presentations. We used Google Slides (albeit minimally) during our presentations for the Monday class meeting, and we assigned groups of students to lead the Wednesday class meeting, which was devoted entirely to discussion.

Collaborative grading proved essential. As mentioned above, we planned and agreed upon all assignments (précis, papers, exams, presentations) and developed rubrics for all to insure transparency and to help everyone understand the agreed-upon criteria for grading. To ensure fairness, we divided the work evenly and swapped the first few papers of each assignment, as well as those papers deemed especially problematic. For the midterm and final, we individually chose and were responsible for grading those identification terms and essays that aligned with our individual strengths.

Lesson #2: Integrating Material and Modeling Intellectual Debate

We decided early on to employ an interactive teaching model, meaning that we would both attend every class meeting and that we would interact (ask questions, make comments, etc.) during the lectures. We felt that students would benefit from consistently hearing multiple perspectives on the topics and materials covered in the class from specialists working on different sides of the U.S.-Cuban divide. This aspect of the course worked extremely well. These remarks from one student were typical: “On Mondays (lecture days) the way they split time in half with one doing the U.S. perspective while the other the Cuban perspective was a wonderful mixer.”

Nevertheless, although we were careful to balance content and perspectives, during the first few weeks of the semester we kept our presentations separate and somewhat self-contained. As we became more acclimated to team-teaching, and as the course progressed and entered the twentieth century, we chose to integrate our presentations much more tightly. This strategy involved alternating every ten to fifteen minutes between Lori and Bill lecturing. At times students weren’t sure who would speak next. This method had the added benefit of keeping students on their toes and riveted to the presentation.

In addition, we found that an integrative teaching model allowed us to model
civil intellectual debate. Although our political bearings and sensibilities are very similar, we did sometimes disagree, and these moments became excellent opportunities to show students how rational adults can disagree in a respectful manner. Moreover, students could observe how specialists from two different fields of history, each employing varying methodological approaches, may interpret the same material differently. We believe this practice delivered a more nuanced understanding of the complicated history of U.S.-Cuban relations.

**Lesson #3: Incorporating Open-Ended Questions and Problems**

Lecture, discussion, and document analysis afforded opportunities to probe open-ended problems. Indeed, the very content and dynamic of this course lent itself to exploring questions from different angles and coming up with many different and possibly conflicting “answers.” We encouraged students to think critically about the material and to develop a sense of historical empathy, to look at an issue from both the U.S. and Cuban perspective, and to imagine themselves in the shoes of any one of a diverse number of historical agents, perhaps an American diplomat, or a Cuban poet, or an American businessman, or a Cuban *guajira* (peasant woman).

Wednesday discussions and document analyses proved ideal in this regard. We selected primary documents from both the United States and Cuba, documents that would allow students to sense how people from different walks of life experienced the evolving nature and impact of official U.S.-Cuban relations. Each week we charged a different group of students with developing a plan to initiate discussion, invite questions and responses, and interpret the material at hand.

We stayed in the background for the most part, but we intervened to add context, suggest alternative interpretations, or highlight key points. We strove to create a safe space in the classroom, one in which all participants could advance their own answers without the risk of being “wrong.” As one student observed: “The way in which we worked in groups to analyze primary source documents over the weeks was engaging and effective. Having each group lead a discussion helps us all in our ability to lead, speak, and promote poignant, captivating back-and-forth discussion.”

**Lesson #4: Be Willing to Learn and to be Surprised**

By being in the classroom together, we learned how a Latin American historian and a U.S. historian approach and teach one area (in this case Cuba) of U.S.-Latin American relations, but each of us also learned from observing the other’s pedagogical style and classroom management strategies. These revelations may not be all that surprising, but the experience was priceless. To say that we came away feeling that we were better teachers would be an understatement. We are firmly convinced that an interactive, team teaching model, conscientiously employed by serious instructors of U.S. foreign relations, is the most effective way to approach the subject.

What genuinely surprised us, however, was the degree to which students engaged with this class. As one student wrote, “This is my favorite class I have ever taken... Drs. Clune and Skuban work well together which helps make the class more comfortable and makes students want to participate in discussions.” Students seemed to really take ownership of the material and, on Wednesdays, the entire classroom. On the day of the final, we walked into the classroom to find that the students, during a study session, had covered the whiteboards with content-rich graffiti:

We were surprised at our level of excitement in developing this class, but the level of enjoyment our students demonstrated was even more surprising.

**Lesson #5: Students Want It**

Finally, we learned that students greatly appreciate the team-teaching format and want more classes taught this way:

- “Having dual professors whose focus was on counter perspectives helps gain the full picture of this history.”
- “I rate this an outstanding class and hope it continues to be a course that is combined.”
- “I hope to have two professors for a course again.”
- “Why wasn’t this implemented years ago?”

**Conclusion**

As a final point, and by way of conclusion, we should disclose that we planned to take students to Cuba as a complementary and voluntary component of the course (approximately twenty-five students were highly motivated to make this trip). The provost approved our proposal; we negotiated with travel agencies and finalized an itinerary; we secured financial aid for our students; and we paid a deposit. Sadly, the brave new opening in U.S.-Cuban relations engineered by Presidents Obama and Castro was narrowed significantly by the Trump administration, and then, just as our class began in the fall of 2017, reports of the mysterious “sonic attacks” in Havana led to the decision by the California State University system and its insurers to no longer provide coverage for students travelling to Cuba.

That was the death blow to our trip. We do not see these restrictions easing anytime soon. Still, building on what we learned, we taught this course again in the spring of 2018. Team teaching is an exhausting experience, to be sure, but one that is pedagogically rewarding for teachers and intellectually stimulating for students and teachers alike.
Brooke L. Blower is Associate Professor of History at Boston University and founding co-editor of the Cambridge University Press journal, Modern American History. She is the author of Becoming Americans in Paris: Transatlantic Politics and Culture between the World Wars (2011) and co-editor, with Mark P. Bradley, of The Familiar Made Strange: American Icons and Artifacts after the Transnational Turn (2015). A reluctant California expatriate, she lives in Somerville, Massachusetts with her husband, daughter, and a pair of fairly unimposing gerbils.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

Too hard! How about favorite World War II movies? Then: Das Boot (riveting); Pan’s Labyrinth (feminist fantasy horror set in Franco’s Spain); Casablanca (of course); The Thin Red Line; Letters from Iwo Jima; The Pianist; Lust, Caution (sex and politics in wartime China); The Bridge on the River Kwai (which also has an interesting genesis and critical reception); and Mudbound (a haunting portrait of the American home front).

I teach a lot of domestic U.S. history courses on popular thought and political culture, so when I watch American t.v. and film I’m always thinking about how to incorporate it into my classes. So, to relax, I watch a lot of European and British television instead—particularly crime dramas.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

My Bernath lecture, which took place in a hallway-shaped restaurant dining room in Denver, standing on top of uneven terracotta tiles with only Tom Zeiler’s guitar stand to prop up my notes. I started speaking at the start of the dessert course, and waiters swished back and forth in front and behind me. But these details aren’t really what made this so nerve-wracking. I’ve given talks before in less than ideal settings, including loud restaurants. But this scenario was positively terrifying, because it wasn’t in front of strangers but rather in front of so many people I know, care about, and admire.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

One way to answer this question is to think about what we wish we knew that hasn’t made it into the archives. What aspects of the human experience have been lost for lack of documentation? What would we give voice to, if only we could? I’d want to hear more from women—about their dreams and their talents, the things that they wanted to do but never did, because they had been discouraged. I’d want to know about the dangers they faced and the secrets they carried, because telling them would have only brought more pain. That’s not really dinner party fare. It would have to be a great gathering from across the ages—at the UN with the help of its translators— where all could testify: Cleopatra and Catherine the Great; Sacajawea and Sojourner Truth; Madame Curie and Frida Kahlo; Rosa Luxemburg and Rosa Parks; Margaret Sanger, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Mata Hari, and Marilyn Monroe.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

I never play the lottery, but if some distant, unknown aunt died and left me such a sum, I would buy a big lake house in Scotland or Vermont or somewhere and transform it into a retreat for friends, family, and fellow writers (maybe it could work like a free SHAFR timeshare). I’d probably also have to buy a single-family house with a big backyard so that my husband could build the skateboard ramp he’s been bugging me about. The other $496 million would go toward promoting the humanities and funding humanitarian and social justice causes.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?

I grew up rooting for the L.A. Dodgers, not least because my dad knew several of them, including Mike Scioscia who was very kind and encouraging to me. From a young age, I played softball (you know, baseball, but with a ball that is heavier and harder to throw). I made a terrible outfielder but a passable infielder, who, because I’m ambidextrous, threw right but batted left. I was a four-year letterman in high school but not nearly as good as a lot of the athletes I played with and against, several of whom went on to college ball and the Olympics. In college I rooted for the Chicago Bulls (because Michael Jordan), and in graduate school I rooted against the Lakers (because the Lakers). But since then I haven’t followed sports, a sacrilegious statement among my colleagues at BU, some of whom have been retained merely on the promise of parking near Fenway.

What are five things on your bucket list?

I’d like to write a few more books, do some more traveling (particularly around the Pacific), and watch my daughter grow up.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I could envision giving up academia to be a full-time narrative nonfiction writer. Otherwise, if I hadn’t become an historian, maybe I would have been a filmmaker. I also have this feeling that I could have made a really good homicide detective or FBI major crimes investigator. But that overconfidence probably stems from all those British murder mysteries I watch.

I got hooked on presidential history when I read The Death of Lincoln for a second-grade class assignment. I first decided I wanted to become a historian when I was a junior in high school, however, after 9/11. I credit Mike Doran, my global studies teacher at La Salle Prep in Clackamas, Oregon, as the first in a long line of mentors to encourage my interest in understanding the historic roots of the world’s seemingly intractable problems as a way to try and find solutions.

My wife, Michelle, and I live in Portland, Oregon with our energetic Australian cattle dog, Blue, where we enjoy the restaurant scene and exploring the great outdoors.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

My favorite movies of all time are Mrs. Doubtfire, The Hunt for Red October, and the Hitchcock trilogy of Vertigo, North by Northwest, and Psycho. My favorite TV shows of all time are Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, The Office, Boston Legal, and Battlestar Galactica.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

When I defended my dissertation in front of my committee in a tiny attic-like room on the top floor of the New Deal-era building housing the University of Colorado history department. It was a hot afternoon in early May and it felt like everybody was literally on top of me at the small table where I defended my arguments and (literally) sweated bullets as I took questions and criticisms. It was probably the longest two hours of my life.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

#1: President Lyndon B. Johnson. I’d want to know why he went ahead and started the Vietnam War even when he knew he was going to lose, but I’d also want to see how entertaining and cringeworthy he’d be as he alternately flattered and shamed everyone who walked into the room.

#2: A prominent member of the community of Issei (first-generation Japanese immigrants). I’d want to understand more firsthand about how they survived leaving Japan, building their families and (in many cases) businesses from nothing, then made it through the horrors of losing it all in detention during World War II.

#3: Molly Brown. She led a rich and varied life in tumultuous times, and I’d love for her to personally give me a tour through her amazing mansion in Denver after we finished eating!

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Michelle and I would probably buy houses in Oregon and Colorado, her home state; and buy our parents new houses. (After paying off our student debt first, of course!)

What are your favorite professional sports team(s), and did you compete at any level?

I wanted to play in the NBA when I was young, but I never got beyond playing varsity my freshman year at my tiny high school before it closed; after which time, I transferred to a much bigger school where I had no shot at making the squad. My favorite team is the Portland Trail Blazers, but I usually root for any team in Oregon, Washington, and Colorado.

What are five things on your bucket list?

#1: Travel to Europe, Hawaii, and Australia/New Zealand
#2: Become a dad
#3: Own a big house and piece of property, with a basketball court, hot tub, man cave, and enough space for outdoor hiking trails and mini-golf
#4: Visit every Major League Baseball park
#5: Create a garden where I can grow all my fruits and vegetables

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I’d be a sports public address or play-by-play announcer. I would love to get paid to watch sports!
I grew up on a farm in Oregon, and I still have strong ties to the U.S. Pacific Northwest. I spent my undergraduate years playing guitar and studying American Cold War imperialism at Whittier College. After graduation, I taught history and economics at a bilingual secondary school in Honduras, an eye-opening and challenging experience that sparked an interest in U.S. relations with Latin America—a theme that carried over into my doctoral research at Cornell. My first book, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy toward Argentina* (Cornell, 2013), examines the American response to the widespread state-sanctioned violence carried out by the Argentine military dictatorship in the 1970s. Competing visions of human rights are also at the heart of my current research on U.S. foreign relations in the 1980s, focusing on the Reagan administration’s interventionism in Central America. In 2010 I joined the History Department at Bucknell University, where I received tenure in 2016. In 2018 I left central Pennsylvania for Holland, where I took a position at the Institute for History at Leiden University. I am currently learning Dutch and honing my cycling skills with my food sociologist partner, Elisa Da Viá, and our two wild, wonderful daughters.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?

Any discussion of great films should begin with *The Big Lebowski*. I’ve watched *Patton* and *The Great Escape* an embarrassing number of times. I’m a big fan of Wes Anderson’s films, especially *The Royal Tenenbaums*. Daniel Day Lewis is such a great actor that it’s hard to pick a favorite, but *Last of the Mohicans* is epic. I love spy movies. Mysteries too, and it doesn’t get much better than Kenneth Branagh in the *Wallander* series.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

One particularly anxiety-producing moment occurred when I was “shopping” my dissertation around to various academic presses in the hope of getting a book contract. I had a brief meeting scheduled with an editor at a big conference and I spent a lot of time preparing a presentation that would be concise yet convincing. But about 60 seconds after I began to speak, the editor fell asleep! I didn’t know what to do, so I just stopped talking. There was a moment of extreme awkwardness. Then the editor woke up, looked at me, and said, “We usually tell our younger scholars to take a year or two to revise the dissertation.” That was the end of the meeting—needless to say I ended up publishing the book with a different press.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Franklin Roosevelt, Robert F. Kennedy, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara—for a chat about the politics of reform and revolution.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

I’d give to the History Department at Whittier College. I’d take a suitcase full of 100 dollar bills to the JHC-CDHA clinic in Nicaragua, which provides essential medical services on a shoestring budget to thousands of people. I’d squirrel some away for my daughters’ future college tuitions. I would travel more. And I’d stop feeling guilty about eating expensive sushi.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?

In high school I made the all-state team in basketball. I was recruited to play at Whittier but I ended up as Editor-in-Chief of the school newspaper instead. I played with intramural teams off and on after that, but gave it up after almost getting into a fight with a Bucknell undergrad over a flagrant foul.

What are five things on your bucket list?

My bucket list is entirely travel-related. Recently, I’ve managed to avoid grading papers by studying up on hiking the Jordan Trail, backpacking across China, and cycling through southern Utah.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I like to think that I’d be involved in human rights work or perhaps sustainable agriculture. I also enjoy woodworking. We just bought a house and I’m attempting to build a lot of our furniture. My family is supportive but, given my teaching schedule and research deadlines, concerned that we won’t have a dinner table for the foreseeable future.
My name is Megan Armknecht and I am a second-year History Ph.D. Student at Princeton University. My research interests center on the gendered dynamics of U.S. diplomacy during the long nineteenth century. I am interested in looking at how, what I call “diplomatic households” functioned and facilitated U.S. diplomacy before its professionalization. As an undergraduate, I majored in English literature, but migrated over to the History discipline towards the end of my time as an undergraduate. But with both disciplines, I’m interested both in what is said and left unsaid in the stories we tell.

I am originally from Lindon, Utah, and grew up loving hiking, spending time with my large extended family, and singing. A lot of family and singing time was spent on long family road trips, where I learned to love to travel. I got married this spring and my husband and I enjoy rock climbing, trying new recipes, and spending as much time outdoors as possible.

What are my favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

Movies: O Brother, Where Art Thou?
TV shows: The Great British Bake-Off, The Good Place

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

I haven’t had too many yet, though once at an undergraduate conference at the McNeil Center at Penn, something in my paper touched a nerve with a senior scholar and she and my graduate student mentor got into a heated debate about my paper in front of the entire audience.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Joan of Arc—I’ve always admired her since I was seven and would like to talk with her about her experiences and what she thinks of how people have remembered her.

Louisa Catherine Adams—I wrote my master’s thesis about her experiences in the Imperial Russian Court in St. Petersburg in 1812, and since I’ve written and read so much about her, it would be nice to talk with her in person. I’d also want to pick her brain on her hostess-ing techniques.

Martha Hughes Cannon—I admire her gumption and ambition, and I also admire how she doesn’t fit neatly into any boxes (she was a Latter-day Saint woman who went to medical school in the late 19th century, who was the fourth plural wife of a polygamist in Utah, she had her own medical practice, she was a suffragist, and she beat her husband in the Utah State Senate race to become the first-ever female state senator of any state).

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

I’d buy some land in Provo Canyon to build a cabin, but after that I’d just keep my head low and go out to eat more.

What are your favorite professional sports teams and did you ever compete at any level?

I like the Boston Red Sox (my dad grew up in the Boston area, and that was the first professional game I ever went to). I only competed in T-Ball leagues.

What are five things on your bucket list?

Travel on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, become a writer, start an NGO, travel widely, and learn how to make pottery.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

A travel writer
Hello, I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Kansas. My advisor is David Farber. I am about a year and a half into my dissertation: “President Richard M. Nixon, the War in Vietnam, the National Security Council, and the Architecture of the National Security State.” My dissertation explores how Richard Nixon reorganized the architecture of the National Security State and considers how that reorganization affected Nixon’s approach to the Vietnam War. I have a forthcoming article in Presidential Studies Quarterly on Vice President Nixon’s involvement in the Eisenhowser administration’s Vietnam policy. I am a modern US historian whose research focuses on State development and foreign policy-creation. I received my MA in History from Trent University in 2015, my Bachelor of Education from Queens University in 2013, and my BA from Trent University in 2012. I am originally from Ottawa, Canada, and try to go home frequently to spend time with my family.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?


What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

Going into SHAFR for the first-time. While in retrospect, it could not have been a more welcoming intellectual community, the first time I attended the conference I felt beyond socially awkward and out of my depth. It felt like I spent the entire conference fumbling with my notes and endlessly turning the pages of the conference program.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

That’s easy, Richard Nixon. His contradictions, human failings, and political genius would make him a crazy good dinner mate. Second would be Lady Diana, Princess of Wales, for the royal watcher in me, and to appreciate her generosity, and jaundiced views of the monarchy. Then would come Sir Winston Churchill—I’m not much of a drinker but I’d love to have a few glasses with him.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

Not to sound too much like a Miss Universe candidate but I would buy a house, set aside money for my future family, donate to Charity, and fund scholarships at my alma maters for women in history. Then I would take the international adventure I have always dreamed about: a long tour of England and then a serious exploration of Vietnam.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?

I am a Canadian, therefore I absolutely love Hockey. Any Team Canada Olympic or World Juniors Hockey game has me glued to the television screen. I have followed the Pittsburgh Penguins since Sidney Crosby got drafted there. Studying at KU, I have fallen in love with Kansas Jayhawks Basketball. I played hockey as a child but currently I am a runner, and have completed several half-marathons.

What are five things on your bucket list?

1. Run a marathon 2. Go to England, and see Buckingham Palace 3. Go to Everest Base Camp 4. Be a historical expert for a movie 5. Travel (I just want to see the world)

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I would probably teach high school history. Before I discovered my passion for research, I was in an education program and have my Ontario, Canada, College of Teachers certification. I love teaching.

Ashley Neale
Ask Amy:
About SHAFR Elections

Amy Sayward

When SHAFR shifted to electronic elections in 2010, we also chose to include space to have members make comments and provide feedback; but that feedback is anonymous (unless the commenter includes their name) with no functionality for replying to the comments. This column answers some of the questions that have cropped up over the last few elections.

I appreciated the direct links to cv and bio information. Thank you for making a ballot easy to navigate and useful in helping make an informed decision.

It would be really nice if the candidate bios could be opened as a single document, rather than needing to open each one individually.

Thanks for this feedback. Perhaps next year we’ll have both a single-page as well as individual pages in order to make the voting process more convenient for all.

I wish there were more than one candidate for president. Do we have a mechanism for write-in?

SHAFR may consider changing the terminology from Vice President to President-Elect, similar to how the American Historical Association names this office, because that is how the office functions. Essentially, the Vice President is training for the next year’s duties as well as taking the leading role in planning for the conference that is eighteen months ahead as soon as they assume the office of “Vice President.” So when SHAFR members vote for their Vice President—which always has two candidates, they are electing the next year’s President.

Although there is no “write-in” option on our ballot, additional nominees (above and beyond those put on the ballot by the Nominating Committee) can be placed on the ballot “when proposed by petition signed by twenty-five members in good standing; but such additional nominations, to be placed on the ballot, must reach the Chair of the Nominating Committee by July 1.” (Article II, Section 5(d)) This mechanism has never been used.

I am very disappointed that the two women candidates were up for the same council seat so that I could not vote for both of them. Totally ridiculous.

It is nice to see so many women on the ballot!

Greater diversity of candidates in terms of Ph.D. granting institution and specialty is still highly desirable. While progress has been made in many areas, it continues to lag in those two.

There was a discussion of this issue at the January 2018 Council meeting, following a recommendation from the Nominating Committee. Under SHAFR by-laws, the Nominating Committee has the power to determine how the ballot is constructed, and over the last two decades, different Nominating Committees have opted for different methods of voting for open Council seats. Given the pros and cons of various options, these committee members have found that pairing of candidates is useful to promote diversity and ensure certain kinds of representation, depending on SHAFR’s goals.

As the second comment suggests, a pair of two community-college professors—for example—could be used by the Nominating Committee to ensure representation of this group on Council. If SHAFR members would like to see more diverse representation on Council, they are always encouraged to make nominations to the Nomination Committee.

Thanks for the reminder in Sep. SHAFR News—the ballot had ended up in my junk mailbox—I was wondering when I would receive the ballot!!

I hope that you find the emailed SHAFR News a good source of information and timely reminders as SHAFR moves through its calendar each year. If you change email or postal addresses, be sure to email me (Amy.Sayward@shafr.org) so that we can keep you apprised of any important news for the organization. For example, just before the close of the election, SHAFR was asked to join a federal amicus brief, and ultimately, those SHAFR members with email addresses made the decision (per our by-laws amendment of last year) about whether or not that would happen.

Are there other things about SHAFR that you would like to “Ask Amy” about? You can always email the SHAFR Executive Director at Amy.Sayward@shafr.org.
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Prepared by the Committee on Women in SHAFR: Nicole Anslover, Kurk Dorsey, Catherine Forslund, Astrid Kirchhof, Kathleen Rasmussen (Chair), and Ilaria Scaglia

Introduction

In June 2007, a breakfast conversation among Frank Costigliola, Petra Goedeke, and Kelly Shannon about the dearth of women SHAFR presidents - at that time, there had been only one in the forty years since the organization’s founding - led to a proposal for a committee examining the status of women in SHAFR. Soon thereafter, SHAFR President Richard Immerman approved the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee on Women. One year later, the committee presented its findings at the annual meeting in Columbus at a roundtable, “Is SHAFR Sexist?” it subsequently published its report in the January 2009 issue of Passport. In June 2013, the committee – now a standing committee known as the Committee on Women in SHAFR – issued a second report, which it presented both to the SHAFR Council and at a roundtable, “Where is SHAFR Headed? Assessing Our Advances in Diversity,” at the annual meeting in Arlington; a summary of the report was published in the January 2014 issue of Passport. Last June, the committee submitted its third report to Council, which it also discussed at an annual meeting roundtable, “Women in SHAFR: The Latest Assessment,” in Philadelphia. This is an abridged version of our full report, which is on the committee’s page on the SHAFR website, https://shafr.org/content/committee-women.

The professional challenges faced by women in the humanities are - or should be - well known by this point. Long-standing concerns about slower progression through the academic ranks, gaps in pay, underrepresentation at the highest levels of the profession, and balancing competing professional and personal demands have recently been joined by newly prominent issues such as unconscious bias and sexual harassment.

The professional challenges faced by women in the humanities are - or should be - well known by this point. Long-standing concerns about slower progression through the academic ranks, gaps in pay, underrepresentation at the highest levels of the profession, and balancing competing professional and personal demands have recently been joined by newly prominent issues such as unconscious bias and sexual harassment.

The Executive Director of SHAFR, Editors of Diplomatic History and Passport, 2018 SHAFR Program Committee, American Historical Association (AHA), American Political Science Association (APSA), International Studies Association (ISA), and the Committee on Women in SHAFR provided data for this report. We thank Nick Cullather, Jeffrey Engel, Kate Epstein, Anne Foster, Giuliana Franchetti, Andrew Johns, Laura Leddy, Liz Townsend, and Thomas Zeiler for their assistance. Special thanks go to Amy Sayward for her many efforts on our behalf and support.

The majority of the data in this report was not originally categorized by gender, leaving committee members to code thousands of names manually for gender. This tremendously time-consuming process can be imprecise and presents the very real risk of gender misidentification: in those instances in which we could not determine a person’s gender, we excluded that person from our analysis, as was done in the committee’s previous two reports. A simple way to streamline and better ensure the accuracy of future reports would be for SHAFR to collect demographic information during the membership registration/renewal process, as does the Organization of American Historians (OAH), for example. Alternatively, SHAFR could conduct periodic membership surveys, as it did in 2008. Collecting members’ demographic information would be of great use to not only this committee but also the organization as a whole; moreover, it would be in keeping with the practice of organizations such as the AHA, OAH, APSA, and ISA.

Membership

Given the size of the SHAFR membership roster, the committee followed the precedent set in previous reports of compiling data at five-year increments and comparing trends over time. In this report, we focus on comparing data collected from the 2017 membership roster to the data reported in 2013.

During the past five years, women’s percentage of SHAFR membership has increased. There are currently
290 female members out of 1205 total members, or 24.1%. This represents about a 5-percentage point increase since 2012, when 265 women made up approximately 19% of total members. This proportional growth stems from a 9.4% increase in the absolute number of female members (from 265 in 2012 to 290 in 2017) combined with a 23.4% decrease in the absolute number of male members (from 1129 in 2012 to 915 in 2017). While we cannot explain the sharp decline in men joining SHAFR, the net gain of 35 women members over the past five years is a positive development. Why more women chose to join SHAFR is also unclear: one factor might be Council’s January 2014 decision to make membership mandatory for all annual meeting participants, a decision that took effect in June 2015.

Overall, there has been growth in women's share of membership since the 1990s, when women comprised 12-16% of members; of course, since SHAFR began with only one woman in 1967, it would be nearly impossible not to have seen growth. However, as was noted in the 2013 report, the absolute number of female members has remained relatively stable over the past two decades: 286 in 1996, 248 in 2003, 266 in 2007, 265 in 2012, and 290 in 2017. What has changed over that time has been the absolute number of male members, which has been consistently declining: from a high of 1517 in 1996 to a low of 915 in 2017. This suggests that the increase in women's share of membership has less to do with attracting new female members than with losing male members. The data thus suggest that SHAFR is mostly maintaining the status quo, rather than enjoying robust growth, as far as women members are concerned. (See Figure 1.)

In 1996, women comprised 28.3% of SHAFR student members. This percentage is greater than the overall female membership, which could indicate that SHAFR is doing well at recruiting new members at the beginning of their careers; it could also be the result of the annual meeting membership requirement. Either way, such data were not included in the 2013 report, so we do not know whether the percentage of women student members has increased over the past five years.

Within the overall field of history, there are fewer women than there are men. However, the data indicate that SHAFR counts significantly lower percentages of women members than does the AHA. The AHA reports that, according to 2017 data, 41% percent of its membership was female; this number is roughly in keeping with the most recent Ph.D. conferral rate we could find, which indicates that women earned 45.1% of history doctorates in the United States in 2015. The gap between SHAFR's membership rate and that of the AHA may suggest that women historians generally work in fields of study other than international relations, but it still reveals that SHAFR attracts far fewer women to its ranks than does the AHA.

The committee also compared SHAFR membership numbers with those of two comparable organizations, APSA and ISA. The most recent data for both organizations reveal a higher percentage of women members, with APSA at 34.8% and ISA at 43.8%; moreover, APSA reports that of those members who identify International Politics as their specialty, 35.7% are women. These numbers again indicate that as an organization, SHAFR reports a much lower percentage of female members than do organizations with related concerns. Because ISA in particular is very closely related to SHAFR in terms of areas of study, low female SHAFR membership is probably not due solely to low numbers of women interested in international issues.

While SHAFR saw a modest increase in women members over the last five years, the continuing gap between SHAFR membership rates and those of the AHA, APSA, and ISA is noteworthy. In 2013, the committee reported anecdotal evidence that SHAFR seemed like an “old boys club” to some; that women did not always feel like they “fit in,” particularly at the annual meetings; that some women felt more judged on what they wore than on what they contributed to the conference. Do such concerns and perceptions persist? Does SHAFR have an image problem? While SHAFR and Diplomatic History are more inclusive both demographically and intellectually than ever before, is the word just not getting out? One way to find answers to such questions might be through a qualitative membership survey; one way to highlight SHAFR's increasing diversity would be to collect and publish demographic data on its website.

Goverance

An area in which SHAFR can exert a great deal of influence in promoting gender equity is its governing structure. To determine women's representation in governance, we examined committee and Council rosters from 2015-2017, as well as the list of presidents from 2013-2017. At the time of the drafting of this report, we did not have access to complete committee and Council membership data for 2013 and 2014 and so excluded those years from our analysis. Moreover, in a few cases in the 2015-2017 period, it was not clear when particular members rotated on and off specific committees or whether the roster was complete. While the absolute numbers that we present below may thus contain the odd error, we are confident that the proportion of men and women should still be reliable and that the overall conclusions should not be affected.

From 2015-2017, women filled more committee positions than did men, with a participation rate of between 52.1% and 55.9%. Not only is this dramatically higher than women's share of membership, it represents a sharp increase from the committee's 2013 findings, which reported a 40.7% women's participation rate across all committees. Barring potential differences in the counting method, this is a substantial increase that reflects the continuing success of SHAFR's attempts to incorporate women into governance. Similarly, from 2015-2017, Council consisted of two-thirds women, which far outstrips women's share of membership and represents a considerable increase from the number reported in 2013 (47%). Altogether, from the SHAFR perspective, the gender breakdown of committee and Council membership is not just well balanced, but in fact increasingly favors women.

Figure 1: SHAFR membership by gender, 1996-2017 (selected years).
with 0.4% serving on more than one committee. Meanwhile, 22.8% of the 290 female members served on committees, with 4.5% serving on more than one committee. This means that women were more than three times as likely to be active in governance as men were; moreover, female committee members were more than three times as likely to serve on more than one committee as male committee members were.

Bringing women into SHAFR governance can be seen as positive because it represents the organization’s commitment to gender inclusion. It also likely fosters women’s professional visibility and extends their academic networks. However, that growing network does not necessarily support their careers, as committee work is often behind the scenes and distracts from other important academic work (e.g. publications). Being active in SHAFR committees may also reflect a greater willingness by women to take on administrative duties. Finally, committee participation does not necessarily translate into women assuming leading roles within the organization.

A case in point is the position of SHAFR president, which remains predominantly male. From 2013-2017, SHAFR had four male presidents and one female president. This yields a proportion of 20% women in the presidency, the same rate noted in the previous reporting period. This is cause for optimism, as it represents a consolidation of the positive trend documented previously. By way of contrast, during SHAFR’s first four decades, women presidents were a rarity: from 1968-2007, only two women served in that role, a rate of 5%. While the current 20% rate broadly reflects women’s proportion of membership, it is far lower than their proportion of committee and Council service. We are encouraged that the next SHAFR president is a woman and that she was the winner of an election that took place between two female candidates.

The committee also considered the gender breakdown of individual committees. Here, we reached a similar conclusion as the 2013 report, which indicated that women and men tend to cluster around certain committees. (See Figure 2.) As in the earlier report, the committee with the highest proportion of women was the Committee on Women in SHAFR, with, on average, more than 80% of its members being women. Other committees with a high proportion of women were the Myrna F. Bernath Book and Fellowship Awards Committee (which oversaw two awards reserved for women), Graduate Student Committee, and Committee on Minority Historians. Committees with the lowest proportion of women include the Development Committee, Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship Committee, and Membership Committee. The reasons behind this pattern are unclear. On one hand, we should be careful not to over-interpret the gender breakdown of smaller committees with few members, where the presence or absence of one woman in one year can make a large difference to the service proportion. On the other hand, the fact that a similar pattern has been detected by both this and the previous report suggests that there might well be a difference there. Are women more likely to be asked to serve on committees that deal with issues concerning protégés like students and academically underrepresented groups like women and minorities? Are women more likely to want to serve on such committees?

Prizes and Fellowships/Grants

Previous reports did not assess the rate at which SHAFR bestowed prizes, fellowships, and grants on its women members. In this report, we chose to examine this area as a highly visible manifestation of the value that SHAFR members place on their colleagues’ work, including that done by women. As with other data sets in this report, interpretive caveats apply: in particular, the small sample size of recipients for each award means that one woman more or less can lead to very different results. Nevertheless, awards merit examination because of the powerful message that they send to members - and prospective members - about SHAFR’s commitment to judging its members’ work on merit and merit alone.

Over the last five years, SHAFR has bestowed its annual prizes on women at rates that exceed their current membership share. From 2013-2017, women were awarded 40% of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prizes, Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prizes, and Robert H. Ferrell Book Prizes, as well as 60% of the Stuart Bernath Scholarly Article Prizes. These rates compare favorably with those of the past. From 1990-2012, 24.1% of the recipients or co-recipients of the

![Figure 2: Proportion of women serving on individual SHAFR committees, 2015-2017. The bars indicate the average percentage of positions filled by women in any one year. The dashed line indicates equal male and female membership (50%).](image-url)
Bernath Book Prize were women; from 1989-2012, 25% of Bernath Lecture Prize winners and 16% of the recipients or co-recipients of the Bernath Scholarly Article Prize were women; and from 1991-2012, 15.8% of the recipients of the Ferrell Book Prize were women.

Of the five biannual awards, one - the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award - is reserved for women and was therefore not included in this analysis. The remaining four are the Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Award for Documentary Editing, Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize in International History and Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize (which are awarded in alternate years), and Norman and Laura Graebner Award. While the biannual nature of these prizes means that there is a very small sample size from which to draw conclusions, the results are nevertheless not encouraging. From 2013-2017, there were seven recipients or co-recipients of three Link-Kuehl Awards, only one of whom was a woman (14%). This number is similar to that of three previous Link-Kuehl Awards (2005, 2009, and 2011; the SHAFR website does not list a 2007 award), where only one of the six recipients or co-recipients was a woman (16.7%). None of the five winners of the alternating dissertation prizes from 2013-2017 was a woman, although a woman did receive an Honorable Mention in 2017. This represents a decline from the 2009-2012 period, when two of the six recipients or co-recipients of the prizes were women (33.3%). Finally, neither of the winners of the Graebner Award during the last five years was a woman. Indeed, of the 15 total recipients of this honor - described as “a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career” - over the last three decades, not a single one was a woman.

Where prizes reflect the value that SHAFR places on the work produced by its members, fellowships and grants offer an indication of the organization’s commitment to supporting the work of student and junior faculty members. As with the prizes, one fellowship - the Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship - is reserved specifically for women scholars and was therefore not included in this analysis. From 2013-2017, 50% of the recipients of the highly competitive Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship were women. During that same period, women won 60% of Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grants; 40% of W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowships and Lawrence Gelfand - Armin Rappaport - Walter LaFeber Dissertation Fellowships; and 33.3% of Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowships. Moreover, from 2016-2017, women received at least half of the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants and William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants. These results, which exceed the rate of women’s membership, are all roughly in line with those of prior periods. From 2008-2012, women won 60% of Young Dissertation Fellowships; from 1985-2012, women won 44.7% of Bernath Dissertation Grants; from 1989-2012, women won 22.6% of Holt Dissertation Fellowships; from 2004-2012, women won 77.8% of Gelfand - Rappaport - LaFeber Dissertation Fellowships; and from 2003-2012, women won 50% of Hogan Foreign Language Fellowships.

Overall - with the important exception of the Graebner Award - SHAFR has honored and supported the work of its women members at a solidly high rate during the last five years.

Annual Meetings

There were continued signs of improvement in all annual meeting categories since 2013. While women’s SHAFR membership and conference participation both grew during the period of study, their share of the annual meeting program again exceeded their share of the membership roster. Over the last five years, women’s share of membership rose from 19% to 24.1%, while their five-year average annual meeting representation grew from 28.1% to 35% of all panelists. The committee reported a similar gap in its two previous reports, leading it to suggest that either women panelists choose to join the organization at lower rates than men do or women members participate in the conference at higher rates than men do. In order to understand this persistent gap, the committee considered the effect of the June 2015 requirement that all conference panelists be SHAFR members on the 2017 annual meeting. To do this, we counted the total number of unique participants (as opposed to the total number of positions on the conference program, which includes instances in which one individual served in multiple roles during the conference), finding that 145 women and 242 men participated in the conference. This translates to women comprising 37.5% of the individuals on the program, a number that greatly exceeds their 2017 membership share. If all panelists were indeed SHAFR members (and did not neglect to join or renew, say, or were exempted from the requirement), then it would appear that female members did participate in the 2017 conference at a higher rate than their male counterparts did.

Breaking women’s annual meeting participation down into specific roles, from 2013-2017 women’s appearances in each of the three conference categories - presenters, commentators, and chairs - exceeded their membership representation in all but one instance (in 2013, when women comprised only 17.7% of chairs).11 (See Figure 3.) Moreover, there were gains across all three categories over the last fifteen years. From 2013-2017, women gave an average of 36.5% of total presentations; the comparable numbers were 30.5% for 2008-2012 and 24.5% for 2003-2007. The increase in numbers for both commentators and chair is even more notable. From 2013-2017, women served as 32.7% of the commentators and 32% of the chairs; those numbers were 23.5% and 22% for 2008-2012 and 14.5% and 14% for 2003-2007, respectively. As a result of these increases, women now appear on panels in roughly comparable numbers as...
In 2013, the committee reported that women appeared as commentators at only 77% of their numbers as presenters and as chairs at only 72.1% of their numbers as presenters, both of which represented increases from the period reviewed in its inaugural report. The 2013 report offered two explanations for the prevalence of women as presenters compared to either chairs or commentators. One theory was “that women may be disproportionately concentrated in junior ranks and hence be less likely to be considered for positions perceived as requiring seniority.” A second was “that panel organizers (male and female) may prefer male commentators and chairs, possibly because men are perceived as carrying more ‘weight’ in the field. Paper and roundtable presenters are often self-selecting, and any woman wishing to present at the annual conference has the option of organizing and submitting a panel. Panel chairs and commentators, on the other hand, appear at the invitation of panel organizers.”

In the period under review for this report, those disparities have come closer to disappearing: from 2013-2017, women served as commentators at 89.8% of their numbers as presenters and as chairs at 87.9% of their numbers as presenters. While women remain underrepresented, their continued gains in both categories may indicate increasing numbers of more respected senior women in the field; they also suggest that women’s status in the organization and the field as a whole has risen. It is also possible that SHAFR’s efforts to encourage diversity at its annual meetings, such as in its calls for papers and with its Global Scholars and Diversity Grants, are bearing fruit.

Over the last decade, the number of participants - measured by the total number of presenters, commentators, and chairs - at SHAFR annual meetings has trended upward. While the number of men on the program continue to drive the relative size of the conference, the increasing representation of women has left its mark. (See Figure 4.)

The continued marked increase in women’s annual meeting participation at all levels is a very bright spot, and SHAFR should keep working to maintain this momentum.

**Diplomatic History and Passport**

*Diplomatic History* has long been the public face of SHAFR, and appearing in its pages constitutes a mark of importance in the field. There are five ways that a scholar might be a part of *Diplomatic History:* publishing an article or special forum piece; serving as an article referee; reviewing a book; having a book reviewed; and serving on its editorial board.

Over the last five years, on average women have contributed 25% of the articles and special forum pieces published in *Diplomatic History.* This number is in line with their share of SHAFR membership and represents a modest increase over the 22.3% contribution rate noted in the committee’s 2013 report. Hidden within this average, however, are substantial year-by-year fluctuations ranging from 11.1% to 36.4%. (See Figure 5.) This volatility stems from the fact that while the absolute number of men’s annual publications was remarkably consistent throughout the five-year period, ranging from 31 to 35 (an average of 32.4 per year), the annual number of publications by women swung widely, ranging from a low of 4 to a high of 20 (an average of 10.8 per year).

The editors of *Diplomatic History* have similarly reported a notable variation in women’s shares of annual article submissions (new and revised), from a low of 12.7% to a high of 25%. (Note that the editors use June 1-May 31 as their reporting year.) The reason behind these fluctuations are not as clear as that behind those in the publication rate, as the absolute number of annual submissions by men and women both displayed variability: men’s annual submissions ranged from 86 to 126 (an average of 109.8 per year), while women’s ranged from 17 to 42 (an average of 27.4 per year). Notably, over the five-year period under review, submissions from men increased each year, while those from women first declined, then bottomed out, and then rapidly rose. Overall, women contributed about 20% of the submissions to *Diplomatic History* from 2013-2017.

As did the committee in its 2008 and 2013 reports, we compared women’s publication rates with those of their participation as annual meeting presenters, given that presenting a paper is usually a step in the publication process. From 2013-2017, women gave an average of 36.5% of SHAFR presentations, but published only 25% of the pieces in *Diplomatic History.* A comparison with women’s average share of submissions is similarly instructive, where their 36.5% presentation rate dwarfs their 20% submission rate. These results are in keeping with previous findings. In 2013, the committee suggested that the gap between presentations and publications might be explained by men being more likely to seek to publish what they present at SHAFR and/or that women are publishing in venues besides *Diplomatic History* in higher proportions than men are. Whatever the reason, this persistent trend bears continued examination.

The editors of *Diplomatic History* cannot control who submits articles (although they do have considerable control over the roster of special forum contributors), but there are several areas in which they can exert influence, including invitations to referee articles and review books; the choice of books to be reviewed; and the composition of...
the editorial staff. Referees, reviewers, authors of reviewed books, and editorial staff members are important because, like commentators and chairs at the annual meetings, they represent positions of acknowledged authority within the organization and respect within the field. The people who fill such positions play a critical role in setting the tone of the organization - as do the choices as to who should fill these positions.

While scholars sometimes decline to serve as referees for articles, and it may be that one gender is more likely to decline such invitations, the overall numbers in this area are nevertheless enlightening. From 2012/2013 to 2015/2016, the share of women who served as Diplomatic History referees fluctuated between 23.9% to 32.6%, with a four-year average of 26.8%. Given that these numbers either hover around or exceed women's share of SHAFR membership, the editors of Diplomatic History appear to have done a good job in ensuring that women are equitably represented among its referees.

The editors did an even better job when it came to including women as book reviewers: from 2012/2013 to 2016/2017, women authored between 25% and 34.4% of the reviews published in Diplomatic History, with an average of 29.8% per year. Not only does this exceed women's share of SHAFR membership, it represents a robust increase over the two previous reporting periods, in which women constituted an average of 15.7% (2008-2012) and 12.2% (2003-2007) of all reviewers. On a year-by-year basis, there was little consistency in the number of reviews of women-authored books in Diplomatic History, which varied between a low of 4 (13.3% of total reviews) to a high of 21 (45.7% of total reviews); by way of contrast, yearly reviews of books written by men fluctuated less sharply, ranging between 25 to 31. Averaged out over five years, the numbers look better, with an average annual review rate of 10.6 women-authored books, or 27.9%. The numbers look even better when compared to the past: the comparable percentages for 2008-2012 and 2003-2007 were 17% and 16.5%, respectively.

Finally, women were represented on the Diplomatic History editorial board in numbers exceeding their membership share. In the five years under review, the nine-member editorial board always had three or four women members. Encouragingly, five of the 13 assistant editors were women; this contrasts with the previous five years, when all of the assistant editors were men. Moreover, during the period under review, the first female editor took the helm at Diplomatic History, one of two co-editors who led the journal from 2014.

An important development over the last several years has been SHAFR's expansion of the role of its newsletter, Passport, to include roundtables on noteworthy books, individual book reviews, historiographical essays, research notes, and commentary. It is harder to quantify the role of women in the pages of Passport because of the range of pieces published. For the purposes of this report, we focus on roundtables, book reviews, and historiographical essays, as these contributions are often invited and more important for professional development, thus representing an area in which SHAFR can more directly encourage diversity.

The 15 editions of Passport published from 2013-2017 included 21 roundtable reviews of monographs, to which 24 women and 77 men (not including the authors of the books being reviewed) contributed (23.8%); of the 21 books reviewed, 5 of them were written by women (23.8%). There were four roundtables on subjects such as Obama’s foreign policy and using film in the classroom, which included 5 female authors and 19 male (20.8%). In terms of book reviews, Passport published reviews of volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series throughout the five-year period; from April 2015 on, it began to add reviews of monographs and edited collections. All seven of the standalone reviews of six FRUS volumes were written by men, as were the reviews of three volumes included in a roundtable on Nixon and Vietnam. From 2015-2017, 17 of the 48 reviews of monographs were written by women (35.4%); however, just five of the 51 authors of the monographs reviewed were women (9.8%). Finally, women wrote three of the 12 historiographical essays (25%). Overall, these numbers are roughly comparable to women’s share of SHAFR membership. The number that stands out as the most concerning is that of women’s share of reviewed books: while the numbers in this area represent a small sample size, at 9.8% of all monograph reviews there is clearly room for improvement.

Conclusions

- Women continue to be better represented in SHAFR. Since the committee’s last report, women’s share of membership has risen by 5 percentage points to just over 24%. While this increase is encouraging, the data suggest that it has less to do with SHAFR attracting new female members than with losing male members. Moreover, women’s SHAFR membership rates continue to lag behind those reported by AHA, APSA, and ISA.
- Women are represented in SHAFR governance in numbers exceeding their membership share, which speaks well of the organization’s efforts to ensure that their voices are heard. However, the evidence suggests that women are overrepresented at the committee and Council levels and tend to be clustered in certain committees. While women occupy the presidency at the same rate as during the previous reporting period, this rate is far lower than their share of committee and Council service. We are encouraged that the next president, who will serve from 2018-2019, is a woman.
- Overall - with the troubling exception of the Norman and Laura Graebner Award - the data on prizes, fellowships, and grants indicate that SHAFR as an organization holds the work of its women members in high regard.
- There has been a marked increase in women’s participation at SHAFR annual meetings, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of total panelists. The sizeable increases in women’s rates of participation as commentators and chairs are particularly encouraging.
- Broadly speaking, women are equitably represented within the pages of Diplomatic History and on its editorial board; of particular note is the rise in their average rates of participation as referees, reviewers, and authors of reviewed books. However, women’s share of SHAFR annual meeting presentations continues to exceed their shares of publications in and submissions to Diplomatic History by significant margins. The overall results are less clear when it comes to Passport, where the low review rate of women-authored books is a cause for concern.
Recommendations

1. SHAFR should formalize the collection of demographic data about its membership. Ideally, it would do this through adding a questionnaire to the online membership registration/renewal process; alternatively, it could periodically survey its members.

2. In addition to basic demographic data such as gender, race/ethnicity, and country of residence, SHAFR should consider collecting professional information such as broad institutional affiliation, status, rank, and fields of study. Such data would better enable this committee - and the organization as a whole - to identify broad professional trends within the field of diplomatic and international history.

3. If SHAFR formalizes the collection of members’ demographic data, it should publish a summary of the data on its website, as do organizations such as APSA and ISA.

4. SHAFR should take a proactive approach to identifying and preventing sexual harassment and other inappropriate behaviors at its annual meetings, including spelling out a code of conduct and instituting procedures through which sexual harassment and other inappropriate behaviors can be reported and addressed.

5. SHAFR should continue to emphasize its commitment to diversity at its annual meetings in its calls for papers. It might consider ways to suggest the inclusion of commentators or chairs from underrepresented groups as appropriate on proposed panels lacking diversity.

6. SHAFR should continue its efforts to encourage theoretical and methodological diversity at its annual meetings and in Diplomatic History, which have proven to lead to greater demographic diversity.

7. SHAFR should continue its recent initiatives to support parents of babies and young children at its annual meetings, including the inclusion of information concerning local childcare options in the program and the provision of a dedicated hospitality suite with access to refrigerated storage and hand-washing facilities.

8. SHAFR should consider instituting a mentoring session for women at its annual meetings. Such a session might follow the model of the highly successful job search workshop, in which volunteer mentors meet to discuss specific challenges with mentees who have pre-registered for the session. A more extensive model might involve mentors and mentees making contact before, during, and after the conference, with mentees undertaking to introduce mentees to other scholars with similar interests; a less extensive model might simply be mentors and mentees agreeing to grab coffee or lunch during the conference (each one paying her own way, of course). Such a program need not be confined to women scholars; however, if instituted, its description should include specific reference to the challenges faced by women as being among the items that can be addressed.

9. SHAFR should consider instituting informal dinners at its annual meetings in which interested attendees can sign up to dine on a specific night with senior scholars. Each participant would pay her/his own way.

10. In order to support the promotion of historians from associate professor to full professor, SHAFR could consider instituting a grant to support the research and/or writing of the second monograph. From the perspective of this committee, such assistance could help address the historically slower progression of women scholars through the academic ranks.

11. The Committee on Women in SHAFR should continue to issue reports every five years on the status of women in the organization.

Notes:


6. In 2017, there were actually 1215 SHAFR members: however, for the purposes of this report, we did not count the 10 members whose gender we could not identify.

7. The AHA data are from Liz Townsend, AHA Coordinator for Data Administration and Integrity; the Ph.D. conferral rates is from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Humanities Indicators, “Percentage of Doctoral Degrees Awarded to Women, Selected Humanities Disciplines, 1987-2015,” https://www.humanitiesindicators.org/cmsData/xls/suppII-13d.xlsx.

8. The APSA data are from https://www.apsanet.org/RESOURCES/Data-on-the-Profession/Dashboard/Membership/ the ISA data are from http://www.isanet.org/ISA/About/ISA/Data/Gender.

9. Note that several people occupied more than one committee position, so that the absolute number of men and women serving on committees is less than the number of committee positions.


11. Given that some panels have one person serving in more than one role, the committee followed the practice used in previous reports to count each role on the program: for example, if the same person served as both chair and commentator, we counted her/him in the numbers for both chairs and commentators. We also counted roundtable presenters and plenary and luncheon speakers as presenters; responders as commentators; and roundtable chairs and moderators as chairs. This differs from the methodology used in the 2013 report, which included a “special” category for breakfast, luncheon, and plenary speakers.


13. This count does not include roundtable reviews of two edited works.

14. All of the contributors to this roundtable, which included FRUS reviews and an essay, were men. This roundtable was not included in the count for either the book review roundtables or subject-focused roundtables noted earlier in the paragraph.

Commentary

Mark Atwood Lawrence

Ten years have now passed since SHAFR’s first report on the status of women within the organization. Over that decade, numerous SHAFR members have devoted considerable time and energy to the issue, and the whole membership owes them sincere thanks. They have done remarkably thoughtful and meticulous work. The very process of studying gender equity on an ongoing basis, enshrined since 2013 in a standing Committee on Women in SHAFR, has no doubt gone some way to addressing the underlying problem by demonstrating the value the organization attaches to fairness and diversity. And the periodic reports strike me as models of rigor, judiciousness, and good sense.
Certainly, that is the case with the latest study, “The Status of Women in Diplomatic and International History, 2013-2017: A Follow-Up Report.” Part of the study’s achievement lies in the deftness with which it describes the complicated trends at work within SHAFR. Clearly, there is both good and bad news. On the positive side, the organization can take pride in the growing number of female members, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total membership. Especially encouraging is the relatively high proportion of women among student members, indicating that SHAFR has particular appeal to young scholars just beginning their careers. But the best news of all is the increasingly prominent role that women have achieved within SHAFR as participants in the organization’s governance, as panelists at the annual meeting, as contributors to *Diplomatic History*, and as recipients of grants and awards. Indeed, in these categories, women’s attainments have far exceeded their proportion of overall SHAFR membership. On the whole, it seems, SHAFR is doing well in involving women in the functions most important to shaping the organization, projecting its identity to the outside world, and propelling the careers of its members.

Yet problems persist. Most strikingly, the growing proportion of female members is due less to increasing numbers of women than the declining numbers of men belonging to SHAFR. The study leaves little doubt that the organization still has trouble drawing women to its ranks, a problem that seems likely to grow amid the broader decline in the organization’s appeal suggested by shrinking overall membership. Other troubling data reveal that the women most actively engaged in SHAFR cluster in relatively low-visibility and arguably low-prestige roles. For instance, impressive numbers of women serve on SHAFR committees and the executive Council, but very few have served as the organization’s president. Women have received prizes and grants at rates exceeding their proportion of the overall SHAFR membership, but no woman has ever received the prestigious Norman and Laura Graebner Award for “lifetime achievement.” Happily, some of these problems seem likely to fade as more women, so well represented at relatively junior levels, advance in their careers and emerge as senior figures. Evidence suggests that such a trend is well underway. Most revealing is the growing number of women serving as commentators and especially chairs of sessions at the annual meeting—roles traditionally filled by senior scholars broadly recognized as leaders in their fields. Also encouraging is the election of three women as president during the four-year span from 2017 to 2020, along with a lengthening list of strong female candidates for the position in the years to come. Given the obvious desire to help women flourish within the organization, I have little doubt that women will be increasing well represented in SHAFR’s brightest spotlight and at the highest rungs of achievement.

More troubling is the fact that women’s share of presentations at the SHAFR annual meeting greatly surpasses their shares of submissions to—and publications in—*Diplomatic History*. Given the fact that women are well represented in other dimensions of the journal’s activity, it’s difficult to say what the problem may be. Perhaps female scholars tend to write on subjects for which other journals are more appealing options. A more disturbing possibility is that women feel discouraged about the prospects of revising their presentations for submission to scholarly journals in general or to *Diplomatic History* in particular.

Problems persist. Most strikingly, the growing proportion of female members is due less to increasing numbers of women than the declining numbers of men belonging to SHAFR. The study leaves little doubt that the organization still has trouble drawing women to its ranks, a problem that seems likely to grow amid the broader decline in the organization’s appeal suggested by shrinking overall membership.

My sense is that all of these factors may be at work, but good answers will emerge only from careful study of the issue, including comparisons with trends in other scholarly organizations.

As the report suggests, SHAFR would do well to collect more information from its members in order to gain better understanding of this and other problems. No doubt the organization would benefit from collecting basic demographic data, as other large scholarly organizations routinely do. But SHAFR might entertain the possibility of going beyond the recommendations of the report by gathering more detailed, qualitative feedback. To be sure, in an era of ever-present customer-satisfaction surveys, none of us wants to see another questionnaire pop up in our inboxes. And yet the time might be right for a “climate survey” to gauge attitudes of SHAFR members about various dimension of the organization’s activities.

Such a survey might, for instance, assess attitudes about the roles of women in SHAFR and further steps that the organization might take to encourage openness and fairness in all arenas. A survey might also yield valuable information about attitudes toward the growing methodological and theoretical diversity of the annual meeting and *Diplomatic History*, a trend generally assumed to reflect and invite more participation by women. How receptive is the organization to new approaches? How should these fresh agendas be balanced against traditional interests in elite policymaking? How comfortable are women and members of minority groups in participating in SHAFR programs, including the annual meeting? How might the organization be reformed to make it more inviting and diverse? A systematic effort to poll the membership might yield some fresh perspectives.

A climate survey might also yield insights into the “elephant in the room” problem that the latest gender report mentions but does not analyze in any depth: the declining overall membership in SHAFR. Does this trend reflect the shrinkage of international and diplomatic history as academic specialties? Are SHAFR members opting for other scholarly organizations that seem to better serve to their interests? Is SHAFR losing members with relatively narrow, “traditional” interests as it becomes more intellectually diverse? New efforts to answer these questions might enable the Committee on Women in SHAFR and other bodies concerned with the organization’s future to take their deliberations to the next level, not least by appreciating how efforts to promote all kinds of diversity may affect perceptions of SHAFR’s distinctiveness and value outside the academy.

I would propose two other additions to the report’s superb list of recommendations. First, I suggest redoubled efforts to highlight the work of SHAFR members at the conferences of other scholarly organizations. To be sure, SHAFR has sponsored panels and other programming at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association for many years, and this practice should continue. But what about the Berkshires Conference of Women Historians or the annual meetings of large groups such as the Organization of American Historians, the Society for the History of the Early American Republic, or the American Society for Environmental History? I am well aware of the perception that these organizations are simply not interested in what we do or that the labor involved in organizing a significant presence at other meetings exceeds the benefits. And yet it seems to me that even slow, incremental progress is important progress. As other historical fields become
increasingly international in their scope and ambition, it stands to reason that scholars with no connection to SHAFR will be drawn to our organization.

Second, SHAFR might consider placing greater emphasis on helping its members navigate the trickiest part of the academic career trajectory—the years between a graduate student’s first foray on the job market and, for scholars pursuing a traditional academic career, preparation of a tenure file. The report sensibly recommends mentorship programs and child-care provisions at the annual meetings.

In addition, I would propose regular conference panels on the academic job market, non-academic careers, the work-life balance, writing for audiences outside the academy, and the tenure process. These topics are so important that the Program Committee should take charge of organizing conference sessions rather than waiting for proposals to emerge from the membership. Passport could also devote greater attention to these and other career-development themes. One idea would be to start a column that would give a SHAFR member the opportunity to share the story of her/his career. In my experience, young scholars learn a great deal from the “life stories” of individuals who’ve gone before them.

Of all the report’s recommendations, I would most strongly endorse the last one. The Committee on Women in SHAFR should continue to issue reports every five years. Attention to the status of women has provoked enormously beneficial discussion and brought significant improvements to SHAFR that all members should value. I look forward to more great work in the years ahead.

In the next issue of Passport

- A roundtable on Bob Brigham’s Reckless;
- The historiography of early U.S. foreign relations;
- Stephen Rabe on D-Day;

and much more!

Milorad Lazic

"We don't have a dog in that fight," Secretary of State James Baker said in 1991, referring (in)famously, to the U.S. role in the Yugoslav crisis. But the consequences of the United States' neglect of that conflict, according to James Pardew's memoir, included the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives, the creation of millions of refugees, and the endangering of American strategic interests and moral leadership in world affairs. When the American engagement in the region did begin, in the summer of 1995, it prevented further human rights abuses and additional genocide, fortified U.S. alliances, and enhanced American national and security interests. Pardew is clear, as his title suggests, that American leadership was instrumental in bringing peace and stability to the former Yugoslavia.

Pardew's memoir provides a unique vantage point from which to observe the United States' role in the wars and the nation-building in the former Yugoslavia. A soldier-turned-diplomat, Pardew spent over thirteen years working on U.S. policy toward the Balkans. First, as chief of the Balkan Task Force in the Department of Defense, then as leader of the Train and Equip (T&E) Program in Bosnia, then as U.S. special representative for Kosovo Implementation, and, finally, as U.S. envoy in Macedonia. His memoir, well-written and rich in detail, is a timely and welcome addition to other works by U.S. policymakers and diplomats who were present at the creation of American policy toward the former Yugoslavia. Based on his memory and diaries that he kept during his assignments, the book chronicles U.S. policy toward the region from 1995 to 2008. More than a half of it is dedicated to Washington's involvement in Bosnia; the rest deals with Kosovo and Macedonia.

Pardew sees the United States' initial abstention from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as being due to the lack of a "concrete vision of America's role in the world after the doctrine of containment was no longer relevant" (6). The Bush Sr. administration was mired in "post-Iraq fatigue"; its national security leaders "were not particularly interested in the conflict and didn't see sufficient US interest in Bosnia" (14). Faced with domestic issues and crises in Rwanda and Somalia, the Clinton administration adopted this passive attitude in its early years; and the Pentagon, with Vietnam still fresh in its memory, opposed any kind of U.S. military involvement in the Balkans. But the EU and the UN proved unable to prevent the bloodshed there. Taking advantage of this vacuum in international affairs, Yugoslav nationalist leaders, foremost among them Slobodan Milošević of Serbia, "created massive human misery and threatened to derail the expansion of democracy" in this part of the world (324).

Pardew writes that genocide in Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 forced the United States "to take a dramatic turn from sideline criticism to active involvement," which "would be put on full display in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia (20). However, this change in policy was made possible by personnel changes within the Clinton administration that brought the proponents of engagement to the fore. One of the most ardent supporters of the United States' active role in Bosnia was Richard Holbrooke, who had returned to Washington in 1995 after his short tenure as the U.S. ambassador in Berlin. Holbrooke, a "constant crusader" with a "visible and vast personal ego," was the power engine behind US diplomatic efforts in Bosnia.

Pardew became part of Holbrooke's team after a traffic accident on Mount Igman (in what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina) killed the three U.S. diplomats who had been the original members of Holbrooke's task force. Holbrooke launched an intensive shuttle diplomacy between the capitals of the former Yugoslav republics and the capitals of U.S. partners. According to Pardew, he alternated between cajoling and threatening his interlocutors. Holbrooke quickly developed a rapport with Yugoslav leaders, particularly with Milošević, but he could just as easily become a "threatening tyrant" when necessary. Limited NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs augmented the power of these diplomatic tactics. Ultimately, the success of U.S. policy in Bosnia was crowned with the Dayton Accords, which established a lasting, if imperfect, peace.

In Pardew's view, Bosnia provided a blueprint for a successful foreign policy that relied on diplomatic and military pressures coupled with multilateral cooperation with U.S. partners (the EU and Russia). Pardew argues that this kind of approach, first tested in Bosnia, brought about a series of successful diplomatic feats in the former Yugoslavia. As head of the T&E program, Pardew used "stick and carrot" diplomacy to force the Bosnian government to curtail its military connections with Iran. Multilateral cooperation and the use of military force prevented Serbia from committing genocide in Kosovo and allowed the Kosovars to develop a democratic society independently. Finally, a mix of pressure, incentives, and successful multilateral cooperation secured Macedonian national integrity and provided the Albanian minority with basic human rights. Pardew advises practitioners of U.S. diplomacy to remember that "except for purely humanitarian assistance, any US envoy in conflict resolution should use every piece of available leverage to advance the negotiations and the implementation of an agreement" (340), including military force.

The limited use of NATO military force in Bosnia in
This criticism notwithstanding, Pardew’s memoir is an enjoyable and valuable read. His incisive character studies offer memorable vignettes of the main episodes and actors of the Yugoslav drama, notably about Richard Holbrooke (“a realist tempered by American idealism”) and Slobodan Milošević and his circle (“a shabby group of provincials passionately committed to a brutal cause”). Moreover, Pardew’s memoir is a timely reminder that the U.S. national interest and the interests of the people in the region would best be served by democratic communities based not on religion or ethnicity, but on shared values and equal opportunities for all. This assessment has new urgency today, Serbian-Kosovar negotiations are in the final phase as I write this (fall 2018), and present and past administrations’ officials are nudging for peaceful ethnic cleansing that would destroy decades of U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region. Although some of Pardew’s assessments of the Yugoslav crisis and the U.S. role in it might be revised when archival documents became available, Peacekeepers is an invaluable read for historians of the region and U.S. foreign relations as well as practitioners of U.S. diplomacy.

Notes:
2. Holbrooke, To End a War, 26.
4. See Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York 1997).


Edwin A. Martini

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cholars trained in the history of U.S. foreign relations, and particularly those trained in the history of the American War in Vietnam, are exceedingly familiar with the often heated battles over revisionist histories of that war. Every so often, those battles resurface, most recently with the 2006 publication of Mark Moyer’s Triumph Forsaken. With another decade behind us, filled with a rich array of scholarship that has added greatly to our
understanding of the war and its legacies, another attempt at revisionism has appeared. Like Moyar’s book and other ghosts of revisionism past, Michael Kort’s *The Vietnam War Reexamined* displays a great deal of enthusiasm in its attempt to synthesize and revive the “debate” between revisionism and “orthodoxy,” but it offers significantly less in the way of evidence and persuasion.

The debate between revisionism and orthodoxy, according to Kort, revolves around two central questions. First, was it “necessary and wise” for the United States to go to war in Vietnam in the first place? And second, once the United States was committed, was that war “winnable” (2–3)? Kort summarizes the two schools of thought by claiming that orthodox accounts answer both questions in the negative, while revisionists answer both in the positive. Based on his reading of an eclectic mix of texts that he holds up as a sort of canon of orthodoxy, he claims that “most students of American foreign policy are unlikely to encounter in their course assignments a sympathetic or even a reasonably impartial overview of the revisionist narrative” (4). This leap in argumentation is presented without any evidence to support it, and it is not the last leap Kort makes. To be fair, he acknowledges that each school does contain a diversity of viewpoints, but his reliance upon this outdated binary framework becomes increasingly difficult to sustain as the narrative progresses.

*The Vietnam War Reexamined* is organized in a straightforwardly chronological narrative, with an introduction and epilogue framing the larger arguments about the merits of revisionism. The introduction, “The Vietnam War in History,” lays out the central points of contention upon which Kort wishes to focus. In his examples of orthodoxy, he relies on some familiar as well as some outdated texts, ranging from George Herring’s *America’s Longest War* to Stanley Karnow’s *Vietnam: A History* and Frances FitzGerald’s *Vietnam: A Fire in the Lake*. (Other widely used texts, such as Marilyn Young’s *The Vietnam Wars*, are dismissed as “Marxism or Neo-Marxism” and thus not worthy of serious engagement.) In making the case for revisionism, Kort draws on some original revisionists, such as Guenter Lewy, a variety of more recent work by military historians and veterans and military leaders from the Vietnam War era, and Moyar’s *Triumph Forsaken*. In an unusual approach, he repeatedly justifies his choice of revisionist works by directly referencing positive reviews of those works, often from somewhat obscure journals.

Kort’s narrative includes some sweeping early chapters such as “Vietnam 101: Origins to 1946,” and “Vietnamese Communism, 1920–1959.” In these chapters, he repeatedly makes several arguments that he sees as central to the revisionist cause: Ho Chi Minh and his followers were not “authentic” nationalists, because they were clearly driven by communism; the Vietnamese communists had an unfair advantage throughout the struggle for the future of their country because of outside aid from their communist allies; and those same forces were ultimately successful in attracting support among the Vietnamese people because they cleverly concealed their true intentions for communist dictatorship (63).

The framing of these issues is indicative of the larger shortcomings of the book. Kort holds up often outdated works as indicative of some mythical scholarly meta-consensus, makes specious and often sarcastic arguments, and ignores critical evidence in support of counterpoints while taking the reliability of more recent revisionist work as a given. For instance, in laying out his case for the shortcomings of orthodoxy on Vietnamese history prior to the 1940s, he leans heavily on Frances FitzGerald’s *Fire in the Lake*, an account that few contemporary students of the war would point to in addressing the state of scholarship on any aspect of the war, let alone the history of Vietnamese nationalism. In discussing how it was that such supposedly hardcore Marxist-Leninists could hoodwink the United States into an alliance during the Second World War (leaving aside altogether the American-Soviet wartime alliance), Kort argues that “the Americans were totally taken in by Ho and his comrades, who successfully portrayed themselves as pro-American nationalists.” This clever performance, he notes, did little for U.S. interests during the war, but did result in the Vietnamese acquiring large stocks of American weapons that they would later turn upon the United States. The long history of Vietnamese engagement with American history and culture, documented exhaustively by Mark Bradley and others, is nowhere to be found.

Finally, in laying out the case for why the Vietminh were ultimately successful in the “so-called First Indochina War,” Kort argues that it was the support of China and the Soviet Union (“the Vietminh’s good standing in the world communist movement, not its Vietnamese nationalist credentials”) that proved decisive at Dien Bien Phu. Leaving aside problematic arguments about the Vietminh’s bona fides on Vietnamese nationalism, what is most telling about this section is that Kort completely ignores the fact that the United States was paying for more than 75 percent of the French war effort by 1954.

In laying out the case for why the Vietminh were ultimately successful in the “so-called First Indochina War,” Kort argues that it was the support of China and the Soviet Union (“the Vietminh’s good standing in the world communist movement, not its Vietnamese nationalist credentials”) that proved decisive at Dien Bien Phu. Leaving aside problematic arguments about the Vietminh’s bona fides on Vietnamese nationalism, what is most telling about this section is that Kort completely ignores the fact that the United States was paying for more than 75 percent of the French war effort by 1954. In Kort’s hands, orthodox Cold War historiography fuels Vietnam War revisionism, where aid and alliances between communist nations are always signs of control and corruption, and U.S. aid and interventions are always just and justified.

Later chapters move into frameworks and chronologies that will also be very familiar to most readers, such as “America Comes to Vietnam, 1954–1963” and “The Americanization of the War.” Kort’s narrative takes readers up through the Tet Offensive, the Paris Accords, and the final “abandonment” and “betrayal” of South Vietnam by the United States (or more accurately, according to Kort, by the Democratic Congress) that ultimately led to “Black April” in 1975. Aside from the chronology and basic topics covered, however, most contemporary historians of the American War in Vietnam will find these chapters rather befuddling, littered with straw men and seemingly unsure about what the rules of engagement are in the supposed ongoing battle between revisionism and orthodoxy. While Kort pays lip service in passing to some of the more important work done by the current generation of Vietnam War scholars, he fails to acknowledge the ways in which they have rendered irrelevant many, if not most, of the ostensible divisions upon which he relies to make his case.

Perhaps the best example of the shortcomings of Kort’s approach is his discussion of Ngo Dinh Diem, which builds off the revisionist case, made most recently and most infamously by Moyar, that Diem was not the illegitimate and ineffective leader orthodox scholars have made him out to be. Kort is clearly aware of at least some of the most recent work by scholars such as Phillip Catton and Edward Miller that has greatly complicated our understanding of Diem (although other important work, such as Jessica Chapman’s, remains absent), but he argues tellingly that
these works “have not gone nearly far enough for Mark Moyar” (104). The rest of this chapter is less a defense of Diem than a defense of Moyar. Yet it never actually delves seriously into the many criticisms of and challenges to Triumph Forsaken, and it ends with the acknowledgement that Moyar and Catton (and others in the “orthodox camp”) are actually not that far apart in their assessments of Diem (115–16). What, then, is all the fuss about?

If readers can make it through the epilogue, which is less a summary of the core arguments and their importance than a jeremiad against Marxism, they can only conclude that The Vietnam War Reexamined is the perfect textbook for the age of Trump. It is less a scholarly synthesis than a projection of grievances from outdated conflicts, grasping for relevancy in a world that has largely passed it by.

Randall Fowler, More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2018)

Randall Fowler’s More Than a Doctrine explores the interplay of U.S.–Middle East relations, Cold War policymaking, and the presidential rhetoric of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Between 1953 and 1958, Fowler contends, the Eisenhower administration oversaw a crucial shift in American perceptions of and engagement with the Arab world. Ike’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric transformed what had heretofore been a low-stakes area for U.S. national interest into “a region worthy of major American concern—and therefore military investment,” setting the stage for subsequent administrations’ interventionist policies (29). While the terrain Fowler covers is well-trodden, his account provides a novel reexamination of the rhetorical origins of American entanglements in the Middle East.1 By investigating the rhetorical strategies Eisenhower employed alongside the Iranian coup, the Suez Crisis, and the intervention in Lebanon, Fowler reveals the symbiotic relationship between rhetoric and policy, the entwinement of domestic and international affairs, and important continuities between the Cold War and the post-9/11 world.

At its core, More Than a Doctrine argues that presidential rhetoric constitutes a unique platform for the White House to shape public discourse, bypass legislative constraints, and render certain policy choices imaginable and compelling at various junctures. “Presidents use rhetoric as a means of achieving an objective, responding to a problem, or analyzing a situation,” Fowler writes. At its core, More Than a Doctrine argues that presidential rhetoric constitutes a unique platform for the White House to shape public discourse, bypass legislative constraints, and render certain policy choices imaginable and compelling at various junctures. “Presidents use rhetoric as a means of achieving an objective, responding to a problem, or analyzing a situation,” Fowler writes.

According to Fowler, what is most noteworthy about Eisenhower’s Suez Crisis speech was its role in establishing the “rhetorical foundation” of the Eisenhower Doctrine (129). In his televised address introducing the doctrine the following year, Ike warned that Soviet ambitions in the Middle East threatened the Cold War imperative of containment, Western access to the region’s oil supply and markets, and religious freedom. With the retreat of European imperialism, it was the “responsibility” of the United States to ensure that the “free nations of the Mid East” remained safe from Communist aggression (32–33). Without the rhetorical precedent of the Suez Crisis speech, Fowler explains, the United States’ new role as the “guardian and guarantor of liberty” in the region would have been less palatable to an American audience (133). More tangibly, it paved the way for the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958, which “consummated” Eisenhower’s articulations (165).

More Than a Doctrine’s rhetoric-as-strategy argument is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on presidential rhetoric and discourse in U.S. policymaking. It also provides a valuable overview of U.S. dealings with the Middle East in the 1950s. It is in his close reading of Eisenhower’s speeches, especially, that Fowler really shines. However, one cannot help but wish that he had expanded his source base beyond Ike’s diplomatic correspondence and public statements. How, for instance, did Eisenhower’s
assumptions, emotions, and motivations figure in the framing and articulation of his speeches? Further, how did their intended recipients—both stateside and overseas—receive, interpret, and contest the evolving presidential narrative? The dissemination of rhetoric, after all, is almost always an interactive rather than a unidirectional process.

Nevertheless, Fowler’s contribution is an important one, not least because the Middle East would remain a mainstay of U.S. strategic concerns for the rest of the Cold War and beyond. Eisenhower’s successors would continue to perpetuate and reinvent the discourse he inaugurated to justify military interventions in far-flung corners of the world. “Ike’s legacy in the Middle East was, and is,” Fowler writes, “the creation of argument fields that served as sites of rhetorical invention in presidential discourse” (170). In view, particularly, of the current president’s penchant for provocative rhetoric, Fowler’s study is a timely reminder that the lexical decisions of U.S. presidents past and present shaped the American political landscape and carried significant policy implications.

Note:

Statement from SHAFR President Peter Hahn

SHAFR has concluded its independent, external investigation of events that occurred during its annual meeting in Philadelphia.

Council is treating its findings as confidential. Council remains committed to approving a conference policy in advance of its 2019 annual meeting.

SHAFR’s leadership is committed to ensuring that our events are free from abuse and discrimination.
Professional Notes

Pierre-Theodore Braunschweig, a long-time member of SHAFR from Switzerland, passed away.

David Engerman has joined the Department of History at Yale University.

Julia Irwin (University of South Florida), Adriane Lentz-Smith (Duke University), and David Engerman (Yale University) have been named to the U.S. Department of State's Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation (HAC).

Andrew L. Johns (Brigham Young University) has been named to NARA's FOIA Advisory Committee for the 2018-2020 term.

Jeremy Kuzmarov and Roger Peace have developed a new educational peace history website (http://peacehistory-usfp.org) that aims to provide a coherent overview of U.S. foreign policies and military actions, to examine great debates over U.S. policies and wars, and to evaluate these policies from a principled perspective that reflects “just war” and contemporary international humanitarian norms.

Mark Sanchez (Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), former SHAFR conference coordinator, has accepted a position as Lecturer in History and Literature at Harvard University.

I very much appreciate Andrew Johns's willingness to allow me to introduce the 2017 Annual Report of the State Department's Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation (HAC) to explain the lateness of its publication in Passport and highlight the report's primary concern.

The reason for delay in producing the Annual Report's is doubtless familiar to many SHAFR members. Without precedent, immediately prior to the December 2018 HAC meeting the State Department rejected the application of the Historical Office (HO) to renew three members’ three-year terms. At this and the subsequent February meeting, the committee, fearing its politicization and independence, insisted on receiving an explanation. When none was forthcoming, following the June meeting Bob McMahon, SHAFR's representative on the HAC, resigned. His letter of resignation appeared in the September 2018 Passport. And Seth Denbo published a related article in the AHA's Perspectives the same month.

We held off writing the Annual Report until the issue of HAC's membership was resolved. That also occurred at the June 2018 meeting. In February 2018, the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Michelle Giuda, requested that the HAC submit a proposal to provide for a regularized schedule of rotating tenures on the HAC for the future. We did, and Assistant Secretary Giuda accepted it. She also accepted a subsequent proposal that clarified the process for appointing at-large committee members. Although fully understanding Bob's rationale for resigning, the remaining committee members judged the resolution satisfactory. We completed the Annual Report.

The HAC worries that the attention justly paid to the controversy over the HAC's membership might distract SHAFR's membership from concentrating on a graver danger to the future of HO, or more specifically, the future of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. The source of the threat is the inability of the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide timely and quality declassification reviews as required by the 1991 FRUS statute. As the Annual Report discusses, in 2017, DoD completed its review of only one volume out of 11 HO submitted for review throughout the entire year. In the last month of 2017, it denied in full the release of 589 historically significant documents, without redacting them for release. These volumes had been under DoD review more than 300 days beyond the deadline established by the 1991 statute. Accordingly, the HAC cannot assess any of the FRUS volumes in which DoD has an equity as “thorough, accurate, and reliable.” As a consequence, HO may only be able to publish 4 FRUS volumes in 2019 and none in 2020.

The annual report provides more detail on what can only be labeled a crisis, as does a piece I wrote on it for the November Perspectives. We urge you to read both carefully.

Richard H. Immerman
Chair, Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation
Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation
January 1-December 31, 2017

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation to the Department of State (HAC) has two principal responsibilities: overseeing the preparation and timely publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series by the department’s Office of the Historian (HO), and monitoring the declassification and release of State Department records.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-138 [105 Stat. 647, codified in relevant part at 22 U.S.C. § 4351 et seq.]) mandates these responsibilities. Known as the FRUS statute, it calls for publishing a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of United States foreign relations no later than 30 years after the events that they document.

Although the HAC continues to applaud the performance and capabilities of HO and the staffs of both the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the State Department’s Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS), and while 2017 produced notable successes, the year presented a number of challenges that threaten the continued progress the HAC has reported in its annual reports over the past several years. Throughout the year, the pace of the reviews of FRUS volumes submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense (DoD) and the declassification of documents was disappointing. The impressive number of FRUS volumes published in 2017 masks this behavior, but it will be evident in a noticeable decline in coming years. NARA and IPS, moreover, remain underfunded and understaffed.

Potentially exacerbating both these phenomena are the retirements in 2017 of Stephen Randolph, who as the State Department’s Historian was so integral to HO’s positive trajectory since his appointment in 2012, and Sheryl Shenberger, whose performance during her seven year tenure as the director of NARA’s National Declassification Center (NDC) was a boon to scholars. Further, the unexpected and unprecedented decision of the State Department’s leadership in December to reject HO’s request to renew three HAC members unsettled both the committee and the office.

Publications of the Foreign Relations Series

Compiling the multiplicity of records necessary to document an administration’s foreign relations, culling from them the limited number that can be managed in one volume while still providing a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary history, and then receiving authorization from the appropriate agencies to publish previously classified documents, poses an arduous and time-consuming challenge. The difficulty of this challenge underscores that the eight volumes HO published in 2017 constitutes a very impressive achievement. These volumes are:

1. FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XV, Central America
2. FRUS, Iran, 1951–1954
3. FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific
4. FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

Headlining this list is Iran, 1951-1954. More than 15 years in the making, this is a retrospective volume intended to supplement FRUS 1952–1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, published in 1989. The initial FRUS volume on Iran distorted history by omitting all references to the CIA. This was the catalyst for the 1991 FRUS statute. Also noteworthy, 2017 was the capstone to a four-year run during which HO published 35 volumes (for budgetary reasons the recent volumes were only published electronically, but cloth-bound volumes will ultimately follow), a record rate of production that has enabled the office, after years of failures, realistically to envision meeting the legally mandated 30-year timeline. The current state of the interagency declassification process places at risk continued progress toward that goal.

HO’s project to digitize and post online fully-searchable versions of the entire catalogue of FRUS volumes dating back to its origin in 1861, however, will maintain its momentum. The project was launched in 2008, and in 2017 it added 81 more volumes. As a result, currently available on HO’s website is a complete set of digitized FRUS volumes beginning in 1900.

The Challenge of the 30-Year Requirement

Despite the prodigious efforts of HO’s compilers, reviewers, and editors, the office is unlikely to maintain its extraordinary rate of FRUS publication in 2018 and continue to progress toward meeting the 30-year timeline. Part of the problem inheres in the explosion of documents which HO’s historians must locate among the multiple departments, agencies, and executive offices that participate in the foreign relations process. An increasing number of these documents cover covert actions or are otherwise sensitive. The time required to declassify these documents is frequently prolonged—considerably—because in most cases diverse agencies and departments hold an “equity” (interest or concern) in the document and therefore are entitled to approve or deny its release in part or full. Further, because the same declassification offices in many agencies handle Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requests as well as FRUS reviews and declassification, growing numbers of FOIA/MDR requests often are given priority over FRUS’ requirements. For a volume such as the one on the Iran Hostage Crisis, moreover, intractable legal issues can cause indefinite delays.

The HAC commends the Systematic Review Program (SRP) division of IPS for the rigor and vigor of its reviews. The National Security Council’s (NSC) Office of Access Management likewise warrants plaudits. And despite such burdens as the Kyl-Lott Amendment, which requires page-by-page reviews of documents for Restricted and Formerly Restricted Data related to nuclear matters, the Department of Energy (DOE) has improved the pace of its reviews.
But the Department of Defense (DoD), which the HAC criticized in last year’s annual report for its failure to meet FRUS’s statutory timeline and substandard record of reviews and declassification, has performed more negligently—and violated the statute more egregiously. The 1991 FRUS statute requires the DoD (along with all departments and agencies) to conduct a declassification review of a FRUS volume compilation within 120 days of receiving it from HO. Should DoD determine that it must withhold a record from declassification in order to protect national security information that remains sensitive, it must try to redact the text in an effort to make it releasable. When HO appeals a decision to deny the release of a document in part or in full, the statute requires DoD to respond to the appeal within 60 days.

In 2017 the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR), which is responsible for DoD’s reviews, was unconscionably tardy and inattentive. It completed only one out of eleven volumes submitted for review throughout the entire year. Perhaps worse, when in the last month of 2017 DoD finally responded to ten outstanding FRUS referrals, it denied in full the release of 589 historically significant documents. These volumes had been under DoD review for an average of 429 days—more than 300 days beyond the deadline established by the 1991 statute. And DOPSR made no effort to sanitize documents to make them releasable. Accordingly, the HAC cannot assess any of the FRUS volumes in which DoD has an equity as “thorough, accurate, and reliable,” and HO cannot publish any of them.

Although in 2017 CIA did not behave nearly as irresponsibly as DoD, it performed below the expectations produced over the several preceding years. Because of personnel changes and time constraints imposed by director-mandated special projects, the CIA requested that the NSC suspend the process of convening High Level Panels (HLPs). These panels determine whether or not to acknowledge covert actions by declassifying records pertaining to them. 2017 lacked a single HLP approval. This has produced already at least a two-year delay in publishing any FRUS volumes that must include covert action documentation to meet the “thorough, reliable, and accurate” standard. And the number of volumes which require the release of sensitive information continually increases. HO referred six such volumes to the CIA for review in 2017, and projects referring more than double that number in 2018. In December 2017 the HAC met with CIA personnel and its Historical Review Panel to discuss these challenges. The HAC is optimistic about the agency’s commitment to FRUS but appreciates the hurdles.

The State Department’s IPS, conversely, continues to serve as a model for the other agencies. In 2017, its SRP division completed the reviews of all the volumes referred to it by HO. On average it completed the reviews well ahead of the 120-day statutory deadline. Moreover, the quality of SRP’s reviews and IPS’s efforts to coordinate reviews throughout the State Department were uniformly exemplary. No less exemplary were the contributions of the NSC’s Office of Access Management. In addition to completing its reviews of referred documents with White House equities in advance of the statutory deadline, it provided constructive commentary on other agencies’ declassification decisions.

The Review, Transfer, and Processing of Department of State Records

The HAC in 2017 also carefully monitored the progress made in reviewing, transferring, and processing State Department records. It regularly received briefings from and questioned representatives from IPS and NARA, including the NDC and Office of Presidential Libraries.

Funding and staffing personnel continue to pose challenges to each of these entities, and in some cases the federal government’s hiring freeze exacerbated the challenges. The HAC congratulates them all for how well they have performed under these constraints. IPS’s SRP characteristically overachieved. Taking full advantage of its first full year in its renovated Newington facility, despite is staffing vacancies it met all its 2017 reviewing requirements: In addition to 13 FRUS volumes, it reviewed 6,685,000 pages of paper and 2,059,424 pages of electronic records. Further, after assuming responsibility for all State Department Mandatory Declassification (MDR) cases, it reviewed 2411 of them, shattering the all-time annual record that it set last year.

NARA likewise performed admirably. Indeed, it substantially completed processing the records of the United States Information Agency (Record Group 306) which have been declassified, which it established as a priority for 2017. It also progressed on its Finding Aids initiative, which entails inventorying the paper finding aids, working to resolve problems found in the electronic inventory, and creating folder lists for new and frequently-requested series. Meanwhile, NARA’s NDC is meeting its processing goals, with a release rate of over 96 percent for records identified for State review. In addition, its popular Indexing on Demand program remains a success.

NARA also continued to accession valuable permanent valuable records, dating to the 1980s, transferred by the Department of State. At present, however, this transfer does not include certain State central files dating from 1980 and later. These interrelated sub-sets of files provide researchers with crucial insight into issues the files document. The HAC will continue to monitor State’s efforts to resolve the technological issues that prevent its transfer of these files.

The HAC is concerned about the Obama Foundation’s decision not to house any of the presidential records in a brick-and-mortar library at the Obama Presidential Center in Chicago, Illinois. NARA currently plans to assume custody of these records at National Archives II, which potentially poses space and other challenges. This issue will require close monitoring.
Recommendations:

Following up on a 2017 meeting with staff from the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the HAC offers the following recommendations:

In 22 USC 4353 (b) (2), the underlined sentence should be added to the end of the paragraph:
If the Historian determines that the meaning of the records proposed for inclusion in a volume of the FRUS series would be so altered or changed by deletions that publication in that condition could be misleading or produce an inaccurate or incomplete historical record, the Historian shall take steps to achieve a satisfactory resolution of the problem with the originating agency. Within 60 days of receiving a proposed solution from the Historian, the originating agency shall furnish the Historian a written response agreeing to the solution or explaining the reasons for the alteration or deletion. If the Historian determines the alteration or deletion would still lead to an inaccurate or incomplete historical record, the Historian may appeal to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

Each United States government agency engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support shall prioritize FRUS declassification review. The Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense should establish a dedicated FRUS Declassification Review Coordinator to serve as a liaison with HO. FRUS Declassification Review Coordinators should be authorized to make declassification review decisions on behalf of their Agency and to consult directly with component reviewers, desk officers, or other decision-making authorities. Proposals to withhold historical information 20 years old or older shall be accompanied by a credible and specific description of anticipated damage to national security resulting from release.

The FRUS series shall disclose for the historical record significant covert actions undertaken as a matter of United States foreign policy unless the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, after a deliberative process engaging senior officials in the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council staff, determines that disclosure would result in significant demonstrable harm to U.S. national security. Such determinations shall be reported to the HAC.

In 22 USC 4352 (a) (2), the number of years for historian access should be reduced from less than 26 years to less than 21 years. Other departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government shall cooperate with HO by providing complete access to the records pertinent to United States foreign policy decisions, and actions and by providing copies of selected records in accordance with the procedures developed under section 4353 of this title, except that no access to any record, and no provision of any copy of a record, shall be required in the case of a record that was prepared less than 21 years before the date of a request for such access or copy made by the Office of the Historian.

The Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall consult with the Office of the Historian prior to mandating special projects or discretionary releases. The purpose of this consultation will be to align the projects and releases to the extent possible with the compilation of in-progress FRUS volumes.

Minutes for the closed portions of the committee’s meetings may be found at https://history.state.gov/about/hac/meeting-notes.

Richard H. Immerman, Chair (American Historical Association)
Laura Belmonte (Organization of American Historians)
Mary L. Dudziak (American Society of International Law)
James McAllister (American Political Science Association)
Robert McMahon (Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations)
Trudy Huskamp Peterson (Society of American Archivists)
Susan Perdue (At-Large)
Katherine A. S. Sibley (At-Large)
Thomas Zeiler (At-Large)
Recent Books of Interest


Cox, Michael. *The Post Cold War World: Turbulence and Change in World Politics Since the Fall* (Routledge, 2019).


Erenberg, Lewis A. *The Rumble in the Jungle: Muhammad Ali and George Foreman on the Global Stage* (Chicago, 2019).


Graham, Jessica. *Shifting the Meaning of Democracy: Race, Politics, and Culture in the United States and Brazil* (California, 2019).

Green, Nancy L. *The Limits of Transnationalism* (Chicago, 2019).


Mann, Thomas C. *President Johnson, the Cold War, and the Restructuring of Latin American Foreign Policy* (Kentucky, 2018).


Miller, Jennifer M. Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan (Harvard, 2019).

Ngoei, Wen-Qing. Arc of Containment: Britain, the United States, and Anticomunism in Southeast Asia (Cornell, 2019).


O’Rourke, Lindsey A. Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War (Cornell, 2018).

Pechlivanis, Paschalis. America and Romania in the Cold War: A Differentiated Détente, 1969-80 (Routledge, 2019).

Pee, Robert and William Michael Schimdli, eds. The Reagan Administration, the Cold War, and the Transition to Democracy Promotion (Palgrave, 2018).


Reynolds, David and Vladimir Pechatnov. The Kremlin Letters: Stalin’s Wartime Correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt (Yale, 2018).


Rother, Bernd and Klaus Larres. Willy Brandt and International Relations: Europe, the USA, and Latin America, 1974-1992 (Bloomsbury, 2018).

Rutkow, Eric. The Longest Line on the Map: The United States, the Pan-American Highway, and the Quest to Link the Americas (Simon & Shuster, 2019).

Sainlaude, Stéve. France and the American Civil War: A Diplomatic History (UNC, 2019).


Unger, Corinna R. International Development: A Postwar History (Bloomsbury, 2018).

Vermeiren, Jan and Matthew D’Auria, eds. Visions and Ideas of Europe during the First World War. (Routledge, 2019).


“History My Way”

Apparently I missed the memo that Paul Kramer has been named arbiter of the capacious field of U.S. imperial studies. Kramer’s extraordinary assault on Daniel Immerwahr’s Bernath Lecture offers considerable analysis and insight into imperial studies and like most of Kramer’s work the essay is well worth reading. I write not to defend Immerwahr’s essay, which may well be thin but more likely is not nearly as significant as Kramer’s obsessive exegesis would suggest.1

Kramer rightly champions an outpouring of significant work that decents the United States or illuminates American history in a colonial/imperial context. He writes, “The best histories of the United States in the world were likely to be situated ‘outside’ of U.S. history or in the rich interstices between the United States and the rest of the world.” That may be—there is some very good work of this sort being done, some of which Kramer cites—but it is highly reductionist to dismiss all U.S.-centered diplomatic history as irrelevant, or an empty exercise in “nationalist transnationalism.” (Kramer, 921-22)

Can U.S. foreign policy really be illuminated only from the outside in? Should we keep our focus on Manila while we ignore Middletown? Are American leaders important? Is Congress important? How about American religiosity, regionalism, popular culture, chauvinism, the national security bureaucracy, or the propensity for violence on the part of the imperial settler state, a propensity rooted in centuries of American ethnic cleansing of indigenous people? If we already understand the United States so thoroughly that we no longer need to study it from the inside why has the Trump phenomenon come as a shock to so many people?

Kramer deserves credit for taking Immerwahr’s essay seriously and subjecting it to a productive critical analysis, but in the end he cheapens his own argument by insisting that the only worthy imperial history is the kind Kramer himself is doing.

Walter L. Hixson
Distinguished Professor
University of Akron

Note:

I’d like to thank Walter Hixson for engaging my essay. It strikes me that we agree on many points: that the field of U.S. imperial history is rich and wide-ranging, that studying this history from both the “outside in” and the “inside out” is necessary, and that “empire” needs to be defined broadly, to include, importantly, the settler-colonial histories his own scholarship has explored.

I think we also agree that historians must study the history of U.S. political institutions and American culture, even as they study the ways these histories were shaped from the “outside in”; many of the works in my essay’s bibliography show that “inside out” and “outside in” perspectives are not only compatible, but complementary.

The aspect of my essay Hixson emphasizes, my critique of “nationalist transnationalism,” was not intended to critique the study of metropolitan U.S. institutions or culture; on the contrary, I see the study of these themes as essential to our field. Rather, I challenged the claim that U.S. imperial history needs to be brought into “mainstream,” U.S. national history, and that scholarship which engages with non-U.S. histories and historiographies seriously, alongside an attention to the U.S., is somehow insufficiently “mainstream” in its orientation.

Finally, Walter Hixson and I agree that the field requires no arbiter. This is a complex, multi-generational conversation that is ongoing, and only becoming stronger, more diverse and illuminating. Only through critical debates about this scholarship will we be able to maintain its forward momentum.

Paul Kramer
One Saturday morning after I had turned in the first third of my first seminar paper to Robert H. Ferrell, my phone rang. “Is this Terry Anderson? This is Professor Ferrell,” “Yes, sir,” I replied. “There are problems with your paper,” and I was on my bike and at his office in fifteen minutes. The first three pages looked like a battlefield, filled with circles and cross-outs, as he plowed into page 4. “Carolyn,” he said to his 6 year-old daughter, “how do you spell ‘received’?, and she rattled it off correctly. Then he said “spell ‘Massachusetts,’” and by that time I was grabbing for my paper. “Some grad students,” he said as I slouched out the door, “don’t take spelling and grammar seriously.” I promised an error free copy Monday morning at 8am, and years later we laughed about this episode.

Like all of his graduate students, his thoughtful editing taught me how to use my language. “Writing is the knife of the intellect,” RHF said to his student Steven L. Vaughn. “Writing helps us sharpen and clarify out thinking. You never really know what you think about something until you try to write about it.”

Robert H. Ferrell died on August 8, 2018, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he had moved to be near Carolyn after the unexpected death of his wife Lila in 2002. One of the “Founding Fathers” of SHAFR, he served as the organization’s fourth president in 1971.

Bob was born on May 8, 1921 in Cleveland. His father was a banker and his mother a teacher. He loved the piano and thought that he might eventually become a music teacher, but World War II interrupted his undergraduate education at Bowling Green State University in Ohio. He served in the U.S. Army Air Corps as a sergeant with desk duties writing orders and preparing payrolls, or as he joked, “I served in the chair force.”

With the end of the war he returned and completed his B.A., but the world conflict had stimulated his interest in history. He was admitted to Yale University to study with Samuel Flagg Bemis, one of the nation’s first historians to research and write about early American foreign policy. Bob’s dissertation, “Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact,” was published by Yale University Press in 1952 and won the AHA’s George Louis Beer Prize.

Five years later he published American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 and then American Diplomacy: A History, which eventually was published in four editions. He then became the editor of the series, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, and wrote volume 11, Frank B. Kellogg and Henry

Bob began teaching in 1952 at Michigan State University, where he met and married Lila. The next year Indiana University hired him and he began a thirty-five-year career at IU, where he reached the rank of Distinguished University Professor and mentored 34 Ph.D. students (some of whom contributed to this essay). While his colleague, the late David Pletcher (SHAFR president in 1980), taught the graduate reading colloquium, Bob focused on the writing seminar—and all of his students have stories about the “Ferrell Treatment,” how he trained us to write lucid prose, cut modifiers, and use the active voice.

Bob “had a genius for editing manuscripts,” wrote Steve Vaughn, continuing that when he turned in a 25 page paper, RHF told him to go get a cup of coffee, and when he returned 30 minutes later “He had read the entire paper and it appeared to me, on first glance, that he had simply cut out about 40 percent of the words I had used. After I had read through what he had done more carefully, I realized that he had not changed the meaning of anything . . . but simply had produced a much leaner and more clearly written paper.”

All of his students have similar stories, for RHF had many ideas about writing. “There’s not an undergraduate at I.U. who knows how to use a semi-colon,” he said to me, and to Joyce Goldberg, “Avoid ‘ize’ words. It’s use not utilize, priority not prioritize.” Joyce also advises her students this RHF saying, “History does not show or prove anything and the facts don’t speak for themselves. Historians show, prove, or demonstrate the meaning of the facts.”

During the 1966 OAH meeting in Cincinnati, Ted Wilson remembered, “a group of 20 or so mostly senior historians met . . . with the aim of exploring whether there was sufficient interest in establishing some sort of professional organization with a focus on diplomatic history. The consensus was to do so, and I recall that Bob was a strong supporter of the idea.” Included in that group over the next year were the first presidents of SHAFR: Thomas Bailey, Alexander DeConde, Richard Leopold, Wayne Cole, and RHF, who Bill Pickett noted “received insufficient credit because of his proclivity to remain out of the limelight.” Bill recalled that RHF circulated a petition, which he signed as a graduate student, and numerous scholars attended the 1967 OAH conference in Chicago to organize SHAFR.

All the while RHF continued an incredible rate of publishing, and by the 1980s his topic was Harry Truman. Bob visited the Truman Presidential Library in 1978 in search of letters that the former president wrote during World War I. He found few, but the archivist informed him of a cache of newly-opened documents, which Bob edited and telephoned RHF, who “expressed great concern” and “assured me that if I still wanted to continue my graduate work, there would be a place for me the following fall.” Joyce Goldberg, myself, and many others went to Indiana to study with RHF, and we were out of state with no funding, which was rather common at that time in our profession at large public universities. He got on the phone, and in a couple days he got Joyce an editing job and me a position in the Department with in-state tuition.

After his retirement in 1988, Bob received many accolades. In the late 1990s, Steve Vaughn and I began a fund drive and his students raised money to establish SHAFR’s Robert H. Ferrell Book Award. In the summer of 2005 his daughter Carolyn and his husband Lorin Burgess held an extraordinary event at Bob’s home in Ann Arbor, the “Book Bash.” Bob invited former students and friends for a weekend reunion with the purpose of earmarking books from his ten-thousand-volume library to be sent to them upon his death. At that event J. Garry Clifford and Theodore A. Wilson revived the plan of writing a Festschrift honoring RHF. Sixteen of his students quickly agreed and wrote essays. Clifford and Wilson asked Beverly Jarrett of the University of Missouri Press, a venue that RHF often engaged, if she would be interested in the collection. She offered a contract, and in 2007 published Presidents, Diplomats, and Other Mortals: Essays Honoring Robert H. Ferrell. The book includes a Clifford essay on “The Young Bob Ferrell,” “An Appreciation” by his graduate school colleague Lawrence Kaplan, and a list of his 34 Ph.D. students and their dissertations.

Robert H. Ferrell is survived by his daughter Carolyn, son-in-law Lorin, and granddaughters Amanda and Samantha. The last time I visited with my wife Rose and Steve and Bev Vaughn in August 2016, he again revealed his warm sense of humor and his remarkable sweet tooth. After treating us to a lunch at Al Ameer in Dearborn’s Middle Eastern district he insisted on stopping at Shatila where he forced us all to break diets and gorge ourselves on desserts like baklava.

As James Goode wrote, “Our discipline has lost a great advocate and one of its most productive scholars.” Arnie Offner and Ted Wilson dedicated their book Victory in Europe 1945, to him: “Distinguished practitioner of historical narrative, indefatigable investigator, peerless mentor, and a truly kind and gentle man.”

I’m sure that every RHF student would agree with Arnie Offner’s summary. Bob “had a remarkably kind and generous spirit, a nurturing manner, and a sense of commitment to others that stands as a monument to a remarkable person and life. His legacy lives in all of us who were fortunate enough to have been part of his world.”

Terry H. Anderson

(With the help of Joyce Goldberg, James Goode, Howard Jones, Arnold Offner, Bill Pickett, Steve Vaughn, Ted Wilson, and the friend of all of us—Carolyn Ferrell)
In Memoriam: 
Kenneth J. Grieb

Dr. Kenneth J. Grieb, the John McNaughton Rosebush Professor and the SNC Corporation Professor in International Relations at the University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh, died on July 13, 2018 at the age of 79.

Dr. Grieb—who taught at UW, Oshkosh for over fifty years as a professor and the coordinator of international studies—received his B.A. and M.A. from the University of Buffalo in 1960 and 1962, and he subsequently earned his Ph.D. from Indiana University in 1966. He was the author of numerous books, including The United States and Huerta (1969); The Latin American Policy of Warren G. Harding (1976; 2nd ed., 1977; 3rd ed., 2000); Guatemalan Caudillo: The Regime of Jorge Ubico, Guatemala—1931-1944 (1979); and Central America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: An Annotated Bibliography (1988). In addition, he published more than fifty articles and book chapters, scores of entries in scholarly reference works, and well over 100 book reviews.

Dr. Grieb received multiple awards for his teaching, including the Regents Teaching Excellence Award in 1998, which is presented by the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents to a single faculty member selected from the 3300 teaching at the thirteen campuses of the University of Wisconsin system. He was also named Professor of the Year by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 2004. In 1968, Dr. Grieb began serving as the faculty adviser for the UW, Oshkosh Model United Nations Team. For 34 years, the team consistently ranked as one of the Outstanding Delegations at the National Model UN competition, which involves over 5000 students from 220 universities in 48 countries.
The Last Word: Trumpism in the University—A Tale of Politics and Principles at the Miller Center

William I. Hitchcock

On July 12, 2018 I received an email from the director of the University of Virginia’s Miller Center announcing what he called “an exciting development.” The message, sent to the Center’s faculty and staff, reported that in a few days, Marc Short, Donald Trump’s outgoing legislative affairs director, would be named a senior fellow. The Center’s director, Bill Antholis, stated in his message that he was “impressed with Marc’s intelligence, integrity, and collegiality,” and that Short “highly values our nonpartisanship and bipartisanship.” This email, and the appointment it hailed, triggered three months of controversy within the Miller Center that continues to roil today. It sparked heated and emotional arguments, strained friendships, and jeopardized the reputation of a distinguished research center.

Soon after learning of the announcement, I spoke to my colleague Melvyn P. Leffler, a former SHAFR president. He shared with me his sense of surprise and shock that a man like Mr. Short, who was at the time still serving in the Trump White House and was known nationally for his extreme partisanship and his vituperative appearances on television as a spokesman for President Trump, would be offered a paid fellowship at the Miller Center. This small research institute has for over 40 years described itself as a “nonpartisan affiliate of the University of Virginia that specializes in presidential scholarship, public policy, and political history and strives to apply the lessons of history and civil discourse to the nation’s most pressing contemporary governance challenges.”

To me, the words that matter here are “nonpartisan” and “civil discourse.” I found it impossible to associate Mr. Short with such words. Marc Short entered politics as a campaign staffer for Oliver North’s Senate run from Virginia in 1994. North had been a principal architect of the Iran-Contra affair and lied to Congress about his role. (Today, Mr. North serves as president of the NRA.) Short, who holds a business degree from UVA’s Darden School, then traveled in Republican political and financial circles and eventually became the president of Freedom Partners, the financial arm of the Koch brothers’ political action group. An early supporter of Mike Pence’s presidential ambitions, Short later threw his hat in the ring with the Trump forces in 2016. He was rewarded with a job as President Trump’s Congressional liaison. In that role, Short ardently supported every one of Trump’s most controversial policies, from the Muslim ban to the family separation policy and the imprisonment of migrant children. In our city, Short was also notorious for vocally endorsing President’s Trump’s offensive and dismissive remarks about the lethal neo-Nazi riots in Charlottesville in August 2017.

Why would the Miller Center wish to bring such a figure onto its roster of scholars? Over the course of the next few weeks, Mel and I attempted to find clarity about why our research center, known for its commitment to dispassionate, scrupulously vetted scholarship, had been opened to one of the most visible foot-soldiers of a highly polemical administration. We wanted to know why the faculty of the Center had not been consulted before the hire was made. We wanted to know what possible benefit could come to the Center from a man with no scholarly credentials, no record of written work, no qualifications to teach, and a man who serves as a regular pro-Trump talking head on CNN. Was the Miller Center the right place for this zealous and active political partisan?

The answers we received from the Director can be summarized as follows. First, the Miller Center studies the U.S. presidency, and welcoming senior fellows who have experience in the White House supports the Center’s mission. Former Obama officials Melody Barnes and Chris Lu had previously been welcomed as senior fellows. A Trump official was no different. Second, Marc Short would provide a window into a presidency that few scholars had been able to penetrate. By revealing what he knew, Short would allow Miller Center scholars to “pierce the veil” of the Trump White House, as one Center staff member claimed.

To some of our Miller Center colleagues, to the Miller Center’s board, and to the University administration, these arguments looked sound. A university must accommodate diverse views. Loud accusations from the right about “political correctness” on college campuses have placed universities on the defensive, and here was an opportunity to demonstrate broad-mindedness and inclusiveness. Mr. Short looked like a “home-run get,” as Bill Antholis put it. To oppose Mr. Short’s appointment, Antholis countered, was to exhibit close-mindedness and intolerance.

This sleight of hand—in which the far-right presents itself as a victim of intolerance, even as it exhibits the most odious intolerance toward women, people of color, immigrants and asylum seekers, journalists (“enemies of the people”) and any political critic—is a familiar enough trick. Yet what stunned Leffler and me was that our own university and colleagues were using this rhetorical ploy on us to compel us to accept the appointment of a right-wing political operative at our nonpartisan scholarly research center. This we refused to do. On August 1, Leffler and I announced our resignations from the Miller Center.

Were we right to do so? Intelligent and well-meaning people will disagree, but the reasons we offered for our resignations focused on two matters. First, in response to those who simply shrugged and asked, “what’s so different about Marc Short from other former officials?” we answered: everything. Trump’s presidency has served to erode democratic norms, validate white nationalism, denigrate women, and promote inequality. In our view, to embrace Marc Short, to honor him with a prestigious appointment and to pay him a stipend was to legitimize the extremism of the Trump presidency. The Miller Center could easily arrange for Mr. Short to speak, give lectures, “pierce the veil” of the Trump presidency, and engage with the public as a private citizen. He was and is free to speak anytime at our university. But he need not be granted a paid
fellowship at a nonpartisan research center as the price for expressing his partisan views.

Second, we argued that universities are, in essence, communities of honor, bound by respect for certain rules. We believe that scholarship should be grounded in fact and should reflect a good faith effort to examine the available evidence. We believe that scholarship is a continual process of learning and discovery. Changing one’s mind in light of new evidence is an obligation of our guild. The Trump White House, by contrast, has consistently distorted the truth in the service of political advantage. Marc Short himself proudly exhibited a combative, take-no-prisoners style of political brawling. Though effective in Washington, his corrosive partisanship, we contended, has no place in a nonpartisan scholarly community dedicated to evidence-based, reasoned inquiry.

To our great surprise, news organizations across the country reported our resignations widely. We did numerous interviews, wrote op-eds and received floods of emails. Gratifying as this attention was, we remained dismayed and downcast. After all, we lost the argument. Marc Short’s appointment was not rescinded; the university administration, though embarrassed by the Miller Center’s blunder, closed ranks, fearing a backlash if Short’s offer was withdrawn. We gave up some perks—nice offices, endowed chairs, research funds—but more importantly we lost the prospect of conducting future scholarship at the Center.

Meanwhile, the media attention grew into a storm, and enterprising journalists began to ask pointed questions. A FOIA request by *Politico* unearthed the contract the Miller Center offered Marc Short, revealing that in exchange for a $48,000 fee, Mr. Short would be asked to appear on a few panels and “meet with donors and help to think strategically about fundraising.” The prospect of tapping Marc Short’s ties to the Koch network had weighed in the appointment after all. As for “piercing the veil,” it soon came out that Mr. Short had signed a non-disparagement agreement, limiting him from saying anything critical about his former boss. And as of this writing, Marc Short has yet to make a public appearance at a Miller Center event. But he *has* been a regular fixture on cable news, where he remains an outspoken apologist for President Trump’s agenda. So much for the Miller Center’s legacy of nonpartisanship.

Mel Leffler and I, and the thousands of people who signed a petition opposing the appointment, may have failed in our efforts to reverse this unwise appointment. But in a small way, we took a stand for our professional values: intellectual integrity, a commitment to evidence and rational argument, and a generosity of spirit that allows for collaborative learning in an atmosphere of mutual respect. Such characteristics make universities not bubbles of intolerance, as the far-right asserts, but oases of humanity in a troubled world. If we do not occasionally stand up to defend that vision of a scholarly community, we will lose it altogether.