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A Roundtable Discussion of J.C.A. Stagg’s *Borderlines in Borderlands*

An Overview of the Peace History Society

Teaching Humanitarian Intervention in the Classroom

Taking American History Overseas

..and much more!
Passport
The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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Passport is published three times per year (April, September, January), by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and is distributed to all members of the Society. Submissions should be sent to the attention of the editor, and are acceptable in all formats, although electronic copy by email to passport@osu.edu is preferred. Submissions should follow the guidelines articulated in the Chicago Manual of Style. Manuscripts accepted for publication will be edited to conform to Passport style, space limitations, and other requirements. The author is responsible for accuracy and for obtaining all permissions necessary for publication. Manuscripts will not be returned. Interested advertisers can find relevant information on the web at: http://www.shafr.org/newsletter/passportrates.htm, or can contact the editor. The opinions expressed in Passport do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SHAFR or of The Ohio State University.

The editors of Passport wish to acknowledge the generous support of The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University—Newark, and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

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Volume 40, Number 3, January 2010

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I am honored to serve as president of SHAFR, and I am happy to report that the organization is in good shape. Despite losses to our endowment—a phrase that every administrator of everything has uttered somewhere sometime in the past year—we remain in a strong position financially, able to fund our prizes and travel and research fellowships for members, support another summer institute, and shoulder the costs associated with our own conference and our activities at the AHA and OAH. We continue to get out the word on these and other initiatives, to internationalize and diversify our membership and our scholarship, to reach out to other organizations in and outside the discipline, and to find sustenance in the work we share, especially the essays published in *Diplomatic History* and the papers presented at the SHAFR meeting each June. For all this I thank my predecessors (Richard Immerman, Tom Schwartz, and Frank Costigliola), SHAFR meeting program chairs (last year Paul Kramer, now Anne Foster and Naoko Shibusawa), DH editors Bob Schulzinger and Tom Zeiler, and Executive Director Peter Hahn, who makes it all work.

Although past presidential columns in *Passport* have explored issues to be taken up, problems to be faced, and the workings of the organization itself, I would like to discuss something else altogether, something prompted by encounters with colleagues and current events. Asked by new acquaintances what I teach and write about, I often find myself saying that I do war and violence, broadly defined—the sorry results of diplomatic failure. I teach a two-semester survey of U.S. foreign relations, with the inevitable lowlights of Indian removal, war with Mexico, war with Spain and the Philippines, war in Europe and Asia and messy interventions in Latin America. I teach a course on the Vietnam War; I have done seminars on the Cold War, the atomic bomb, and the morality of war; and my U.S. history survey, which offers welcome relief with units on social and cultural history, nevertheless (and necessarily) cannot leave war alone. I have written about Vietnam and the bomb. I am, in other words, a chaser of history’s ambulances. I suspect many of you are too.

This answer, which causes many of my questioners to shrink back in confusion and horror, sounds harsher than I would like. I did not enter the field in search of violence, although I was interested in figuring out the origins of the Vietnam War. Violence, including structural violence, terror, the threat of violence, theories of violence, and so on, came with that territory. I have accepted that. I also feel a responsibility not to glorify or fetishize violence; I wish to understand without forgiving. There is, of course, a politics to this: we try to explain outbreaks of violence in order to prevent them. We offer space to witnesses of violence, recording and thus honoring their testimony. We expose to the light of day the perpetrators of violence, the reckless makers of war, the genocidal regimes and the agents of quotidian cruelties that must never be allowed to seem ordinary. “How can you read that stuff?” asks my wife. Peering over my copy of Stuart Miller’s *Benevolent Assimilation*, John Dower’s *War without Mercy*, or Samantha Power’s *A Problem from Hell*, I answer, “Someone has to.”

As I read and teach these and other, similar books, and as I reflect on the material I use in my writing, I try to adhere to a few simple rules concerning my awkward relationship to violence. First, I keep in mind what many have written: that violence, especially mass violence, cannot be grasped nor morally dispensed with using mere words. “It is stronger than me,” wrote the French historian Alain Forest on his visit to Cambodia’s dreadful Tuol Sleng prison in 1982, “and there’s no chance of thinking or writing about it. I pull my head instinctively down into my shoulders.” (Forest, with Françoise Corrèze, would write about it, as so many with pulled down heads have needed to do.) Second, I try not to succumb to the banality or mystique of violence. I allow violence its irony and dark humor, but I remind myself often that the frequency with which people inflict violence on others does not make it ordinary, normal, or acceptable. Finally, I work to prevent myself and my students from becoming inured to violence. I check in with students in the Vietnam War and atomic bomb courses to make sure they are not turning numb to what they are reading and seeing, although in some cases I am too late; a lifetime of playing video games can make a person pretty cold. And if I find myself unmoved by accounts of violence, I stop reading or writing or watching and try to reconnect to my human, reasonably decent self. Or I go back to the safer space of cultural foreign relations history, where the stakes are high but seldom a matter of life and death.

Forgive me this grim little meditation. And by way of lightening the mood, let me invite all of you to write me about SHAFR issues, anything at all. Are you happy with the direction of the organization? Do you have issues with it? What might we do better, or more often? I look forward to hearing from you; my email is arotter@colgate.edu.

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A Roundtable Discussion of J.C.A. Stagg’s Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1776-1821

J.M. Opal, David Dzurec, Brian DeLay, and J.C.A. Stagg

Review of J.C.A. Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1776-1821

J.M. Opal

What is done by the royal authority, with regard to foreign powers,” William Blackstone explained in his authoritative opus, Commentaries on the Laws of England, “is the act of the whole nation.” In the person or institution of His Majesty, “as in a center, all the rays of his people are united, and form by that union a consistency, splendor, and power, that make him feared and respected by foreign potentates.” Republican thinkers and doers attacked this notion during the quarter-century after Blackstone published it in 1765. They argued that the interests of the king and other hereditary classes, on one hand, and the people and nation, on the other, differed as night from day, in foreign policy and in everything else. The loudest of these anti-monarchical voices, at least in English, belonged to Thomas Paine, who insisted that kings and the “Nobility, or rather No-ability” wanted war while the people preferred peace. But even the U.S. Constitution that Paine so admired bore the impress of Blackstone’s formulation. The assumption remained that the conduct of foreign policy required a more concentrated, decisive authority than did domestic affairs. Although elected and held in check by purse-string wielding congressmen, the president would stand in for the nation in matters overseas, most notably by serving as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. As the president does, so does the nation.1

If this facet of executive authority haunts those constitutional scholars who believe in constitutional government, the inverse proposition bedevils historians of American foreign relations: as the nation has behaved, so too has the president behaved. Such is the implicit judgment of a formidable body of historical literature and mythology. Robert Kagan’s new Dangerous Nation, which Stagg challenges in a sharp endnote, offers a recent example. “American liberalism had created a type of man especially well suited both to territorial expansion and settlement and to the penetration of foreign markets,” Kagan writes. Politicians of whatever stripe were compelled to feed the “ravenous appetites” of these ordinary Lockean men. Anything in the way, whether ancestral Indian lands or fragile European claims, inevitably “fell” to their demands, which means that James Madison, president during a crucial phase of American expansion into Spanish territory in North America, had little to do with that process. Either he helplessly opposed or cynically enabled the inevitable.2

The best answer to such sweeping and irresponsible stories is precise, sober, careful histories, ones that ask clear questions and give convincing answers. J.C.A. Stagg’s Borderlines in Borderlands certainly fits the bill. No one better knows Madison’s public record as president, and yet Stagg focuses, laser-like, on a specific dimension of those two terms: relations with Spain during the Napoleonic era, chiefly in regard to Spanish possessions along the southern and southwestern border of the republic. What, exactly, did Madison intend to accomplish by sending special agents to West Florida, East Florida, and Texas after word arrived that the Spanish monarchy had fled the French invasion of Iberia in 1809-10? How did he understand America’s claim as spelled out in the retrocession of Louisiana? Did he order, authorize, or condone the various filibusters and armed rebellions that challenged Spanish rule in North America from 1810 to 1813? Stagg offers something like the final word on these issues—no small feat with any subject, however broad.

In addition to pouring through familiar sources from the Madison administration and the State Department, Stagg has mined Spanish, French, and British records while also uncovering a wealth of material from the agents, translators, filibusterers, and assorted adventurers who peopled the southwestern borderlands. He has also carefully sequenced and decoded the letters and reports that made their way from Mobile, Natchez, and Baton Rouge to Washington and the European capitals. In West Florida, federal agents tried to invite American settlers into what Madison called “the bosom of the American family” (79) without provoking war with the exiled government of Ferdinand VII. In East Florida, they had to cope with pirates, slave smugglers, and a local population that launched armed insurrections on their own accord. These agents often interpreted their orders broadly. Indeed, Madison’s man in East Florida, George Mathews, far surpassed his directions by planning an all-out
assault on Spanish authority in the peninsula and even contemplating the liberation (invasion) of Mexico and Peru. The administration, Stagg reports, was “horrified” by Mathews’ actions (120).

Unwilling to leave the Spanish territories to their own devices, but unable to control either the agents he sent or the conditions they encountered, Madison pressed on towards a consistent goal: the orderly and lawful passage of the two Floridas and possibly Texas into the American union, so as to avoid a renewed British presence on the continent. This goal reflected Madison’s belief that the United States was the rightful heir of the British dominions in North America, but not necessarily the sole sovereign over any and all lands its citizens coveted. In other words, Madison wanted and expected the United States to expand, but he desired above all to avoid a gratuitous war with the major powers and to secure legitimate claim to the Mississippi River basin and Gulf Coast.

Of course, it is difficult to establish such a hierarchy of motives, even with a president who left an enormous record of his ideas and decisions. Borderlines patiently constructs such a nuanced argument by showing what Madison was willing to give up or defer, and what he was determined to seize or secure. Faced with Mathews’ malefeasance in East Florida, the president wrote off the immediate incorporation of that province into the United States. His priority was to press American maritime rights, even at the expense of war, and to avoid violence with the Spanish and their Indian allies. He sympathized with the Texan revolt against Royalist rule and met with one of its leaders, José Bernardo Maximilian Gutiérrez de Lara, in January 1812. Yet the administration would only send troops to enforce the rights it discovered in the 1803 Louisiana treaty, not to participate in the rebellion. Madison and Secretary of War William Eustis wanted their agent for Texas, William Shaler, to make contact with the leaders of the rebellion in order to brace for whatever sort of government emerged west of the Sabine River.

If we can speak of these topics in terms of forests and trees, then Stagg is doggedly, almost militantly, focused on the trees. His book is a marvel of fine-grain, high-resolution detail. Even when the forests beyond all but shout for attention, he hacks through the underbrush. For example, William Shaler wrote “Reflections on the Means of Restoring the Political Balance and Procuring a General Peace to the World” while waiting to hear the results of an 1812 filibuster into Texas. Assuming that Napoleon’s grande armée would overrun Europe but not Britain, Shaler imagined a postwar world in which the United States would have to ward off perfidious Albinon, the old nemesis that had “subjugated India, and . . . openly aspires to the exclusive commerce of the world.” Rather than segue into a larger discussion of popular Anglophobia or international theory in the early republic, Stagg quickly summarizes the remarkable essay and pivots back to Madison’s opposition to the filibuster and efforts to suppress the “banditti” responsible. (He has, however, posted the essay on the William and Mary Quarterly’s notes and documents webpage; my thanks to Professor Stagg for thus providing an ideal primary source for a class).³

This focus is both admirable and unimpeachable. It allows the book’s central claims and conclusions to emerge from the evidence presented, rather than enabling rhetoric or assertion to distort that evidence. For the most part, any complaints about the close-up approach amount to little more than personal inclination and reader’s preference. Still, there are times when this approach prevents a more accurate and satisfying view from taking shape. For instance, Stagg mentions slavery and race on several occasions, for the simple reason that his sources do so. Madison and Mathews were both terrified at the prospect of black regiments in East Florida; power-holders in Georgia and South Carolina had long called for incursions into Spanish territory to recover fugitive slaves; West Florida planters may have favored annexation by the United States because its slave regime was far harsher than that of Spain. Yet these issues receive only a brief mention in Stagg’s book, focused as it is on Madison’s hand in managing the borderlands.

Perhaps the most important omission, though, is a fuller understanding of international law—the law of nations, in contemporary terms—in Madison’s thinking and in early national statecraft. The president did not withhold comment for Mathews in order to give his tacit support for filibustering, because “this would have been too cynical a violation of the law of nations for Madison to have approved” (111). It was his “long-standing hope that East Florida might be acquired in ways that would pass muster under international law” (121). In particular, Madison relied on Emerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations (1758) to ascertain everything from neutral rights along rivers to the proper way to recognize a new sovereign. In Stagg’s account, Madison is a sincere if critical student of Vattel, and by extension a range of European theorists such as Hugo Grotius, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Samuel Pufendorf, and Georg Friedrich von Martens.

I agree with this assessment, not least because it fits the mold of this highly bookish and intellectual founder. I only wish that Stagg had explored the wider implications for early American politics and political thought. My sense is that the law of nations was a bit like the Constitution, in that everyone praised and cited it even though—or especially because—no one agreed on what it said or implied. The only substantive criticisms of this “law” that I have found in the decades around 1800 came from radicals such as Paine, who found it too deferential to warmongering kings. The parallels with the Constitution go further still. For while the classic criticism of international law is the absence of any sovereign to enforce it, the Constitution—and the president—also had limited effect within the southern and western borders of the new nation. (Hence, the “illegal” filibusters that happened all the same.) And yet everyone who laid claim to power wanted their actions certified by Vattel, a Swiss diplomat who died in 1767.

In addition to why, the most salient question is what Madison’s regard for the law of nations prevented him from doing. Or, more broadly: how did that law shape or discipline the actions of post-Revolution statesmen? The final chapters of the Florida and Texas disputes cast some light on the subject. In 1818, Andrew Jackson transformed the situation in East Florida by invading...
it and breaking both the Spanish and Seminole powers there. He then justified his actions with . . . the law of nations, while his supporters saturated their speeches and pamphlets with passages from . . . Vattel. A generation later, the Jacksonian leader, James Polk, seized the war-making initiative in order to avenge the “American blood” shed on “American soil” of Texas. By then, the law of nations as conceived in the Age of Revolution and the Enlightenment had fallen out of favor and discussion, replaced throughout the Western world by various expressions of imperial sovereignty: extra-territoriality, concessions, Manifest Destiny.

Within this context, the president seized more power to deploy force, moving past the restrictions imposed by the Constitution and recommended by the law of nations. He became rather more like the unitary sovereign that Blackstone had theorized. It was this reassertion of the executive power over organized violence, this democratic appropriation of the king’s power to stand in for the whole nation in foreign affairs, that Madison avoided. Therein lays an important dimension not only of his two terms but also of the founding generation more generally.

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Notes:

One Madison, Two Floridas, and the Rule of Law

David Dzurec

Historians of the early American Republic have long debated what has come to be called the “James Madison problem.” The heart of this “problem” lies in the perceived differences between the young Madison who shepherded the Constitution and Bill of Rights into being and the Madison who served as fourth president of the United States. How was it, many wondered, that the man who had been labeled the father of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights could have been so indecisive and unsuccessful during his two terms in the White House?

Over the past two decades a number of historians have challenged this vision of “two Madisons,” arguing that as framer and as president Madison showed a consistency of political thought and action. J.C.A. Stagg, editor-in-chief of the James Madison Papers, has been at the forefront of this challenge. He has addressed the “James Madison problem” by focusing on some of the major foreign policy issues of Madison’s presidency. In his 1983 study of the War of 1812, Stagg depicts Madison, rather than congressional war hawks, as the key figure in wartime decisions, ultimately presenting a president who, while not an overpowering commander-in-chief, was able to overcome the challenges of wartime politics and remained consistent in his political philosophy.

In his recent book, Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1776-1821, Stagg again highlights a consistent and central role for James Madison in shaping American foreign policy.

The first three chapters of Borderlines convincingly demonstrate Madison’s deep-rooted involvement in Spanish-American relations and his commitment to protecting American interests while avoiding war. As early as 1778, Madison was privy to negotiations between the governor of Virginia and Spanish officials in Louisiana as a member of the Virginia Council of State. These negotiations included discussions about removing East and West Florida from English control and raised the possibility that England might hand West Florida over to the United States.

As a member of Congress in 1780, Madison served as advisor to Ambassador John Jay in his effort to secure Spanish recognition of American independence. After the Revolution, “Madison took a prominent role in shaping diplomatic strategies for the American commissioners in Europe” (25). From this position, Madison watched as Spanish officials repeatedly blocked American attempts to secure navigation rights on the Mississippi River and even went as far as to close the river to Americans altogether in 1784. “The very seriousness of these issues led Madison after 1783 to harden his attitude toward Spain, the more so as that nation ceased to be a potential friend and became instead the source of intractable problems” (28).

The 1795 Treaty of San Lorenzo, or Pinkney’s Treaty, helped ease some of these tensions. It provided a clear definition of Spanish-American boundaries and granted Americans the right to deposit goods at New Orleans for transshipment. Less than a decade later, however, the Louisiana Purchase again forced the issue of national boundaries to the fore. Although the initial terms of the sale seemed to suggest that the United States had been granted a “substantial” claim in West Florida and parts of Texas, the true extent of the Louisiana Purchase remained open for debate (41). As secretary of state, Madison was once again engaged with the Spanish over questions of national boundaries. These questions would remain unanswered until Madison assumed the presidency in 1808.

Madison entered the White House well versed in the history of Spanish-American relations. What followed were “decisions and actions” that were based on this experience and “were the product of a coherent and consistent way of viewing the world that changed relatively little over the course of his lifetime” (12). According to Stagg, Madison used his long-standing experience with the Spanish to guide the development of policy as it became clear that the strength of the Spanish Empire was dwindling. A weakened Spanish Empire only served to increase the need for clearly defined international boundaries, because the United States feared that the British might annex Spain’s North American possessions. When West Florida began to agitate for independence in 1810, Madison skillfully navigated the United States toward assuring American control of the region while simultaneously minimizing the risk of war with Spain (76). A year later, as East Florida began to agitate for independence, Madison hoped to negotiate a similar course, but when events there failed to develop as he had hoped—the most significant of those events being an attempted filibuster that failed to gain support among the population—he again chose a course that would avoid war with Spain while simultaneously protecting American interests in the region (130).

Stagg’s efforts to demonstrate Madison’s importance in the expansion of the United States are balanced by his attempt to refute
recent histories that depict Madison as a driving force behind rebellions in Spanish territories. The final chapters of *Borderlines* represent an explicit effort by Stagg to challenge this more sinister interpretation of Madison’s actions in the Spanish borderlands. Stagg argues that those who claim that Madison deliberately and purposefully adopted policies to subvert the Spanish authorities in the borderland territories have misread events in the region.3 While he addresses this issue throughout the work, it is in the final chapters, with his focus on Connecticut merchant William Shaler, that Stagg is able to demonstrate fully Madison’s commitment to the rule of law and expansion through legitimate means.

Building on his examination of Shaler’s role in a failed Texas filibuster published in the William and Mary Quarterly in 2002, Stagg successfully demonstrates that Madison did not authorize or encourage rebellion along the Louisiana-Mexico border in the hope of seizing Texas.4 In reality, the effect of the Shaler mission was not so much to kindle Americans’ desire for Mexican land; rather, it eventually convinced Madison of the need to secure American positions on the Pacific coast and thus ultimately laid the groundwork for the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819.

Stagg’s use of source material is sound, and his status as an editor of the James Madison papers leaves little question of his knowledge of the source material. One area for further consideration might be the public response to Madison’s efforts and to news of the unrest in the Spanish borderlands.

On the whole, however, in tracing Madison’s response to a changing Spanish North America, Stagg successfully demonstrates that despite different outcomes in East Florida, West Florida, and Texas, the fourth president used a reasoned and consistent approach in dealing with the Spanish Empire. Stagg depicts an active president who may have floundered at times in his foreign policy, but who ultimately remained committed to legal solutions for complicated international issues. Much as with his earlier study of Madison’s diplomacy, Stagg’s mastery of a broad range of sources makes for a convincing argument. In tracing Madison’s longstanding involvement with the Spanish borderlands and delving deeply into the specifics of filibusters in the Floridas and Texas, Stagg has successfully demonstrated a consistency in Madison’s political character. Finally, without taking anything away from John Quincy Adams, Stagg has also successfully demonstrated that “Madison contributed far more to the early territorial expansion of the United States than has been realized” (206).

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Notes:


Brian DeLay

I

n this learned book, J. C. A. Stagg sets out to defend the reputation of the fourth president from those who style him an underhanded schemer willing to do anything to despoil Spain of Texas and the Floridas. The most enthusiastic proponents of this interpretation seem to be authors seeking the deep history of American covert operations. There is something tidy, at least, about a narrative arc that links the U.S. government’s penchant for destabilizing Latin American states all the way back to the founders. Stare long enough at the bookish, mild-mannered father of the Constitution and you will see Henry Kissinger looking back at you.

Or not. One needn’t accept the facile analogy to critique Madison’s dealings with Spain. How many of us teach or write about the history of America’s acquisition of the Floridas without a bit of scolding? George Herring’s recent synthesis, for example, asserts that “Jefferson’s Florida diplomacy reveals him at his worst” and that Madison’s actions in regard to East Florida were “an embarrassing episode in early national history.” States pursue their interests, and it was plainly vital to the commercial and strategic interests of the United States to obtain the territories on the Gulf Coast. And yet, critics respond, the way the United States pursued those territories (insisting on an implausibly, even comically capacious definition of Louisiana’s boundaries; dispatching interested and intemperate agents who, not unpredictably, schemed to undermine Spanish rule through violence; relying upon overblown fears of British or French or Native American plans in order to justify violating Spanish sovereignty in the borderlands; etc.) seems somehow to take the shine off the Age of Giants. Perhaps it especially rankles that Madison (we have more or less come upon the Spanish borderlands; etc.) seems somehow to be party to such grubby doings.

Stagg makes no bones about his admiration of the man and mounts a defense that focuses, reasonably, on Madison’s own perspective—on how he viewed American claims upon the Spanish borderlands (lawful) and how he would have
characterized his own policy toward them (blameless). Although that policy may occasionally have been clumsy and ineffective, “at no time after 1809 did Madison ever assume that the nation’s territorial disputes with Spain could be solved by means that were other than legal,” and “as a consequence only a settlement consistent with the law of nations could give the United States good title to the territories in question” (4).

I doubt that any other scholar could have made the argument as persuasively. Madison emerges here as quite consistent, at least as far as American interests in the Floridas were concerned. Building upon the 1776 Model Treaty, he made a coherent argument for U.S. rights of access to the Gulf Coast in the report he wrote for John Jay at the behest of the Continental Congress. Stagg convincingly situates Madison’s early thinking on the issue within an imperial framework. Like many of his contemporaries, Madison saw the American Revolution as sundering a great empire in two. The future of the American half of that empire would depend, as Britain’s greatness had, on trade. Legal and dependable access to the Gulf Coast would therefore be a prerequisite to the development, even the survival, of America’s empire west of the Appalachians. This basic conviction drove Madison’s later dealings with Spain regarding the Mississippi, the boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase, and control over East and West Florida.

Stagg carefully reconstructs the decades-long struggle over the Gulf borderlands from Madison’s perspective. As he does so, the relatively familiar story becomes richer both in continuity (Madison’s dogged pursuit of core goals) and in contextuality. Indeed, the fluid narrative of shifting regional, national, and international realities only makes the president’s sustained determination more evident. Stagg’s research is thorough and impressive, and not only in regard to Madison. The significance of the dynamic European context to U.S. plans and policy comes across with particular clarity, as does the interplay between high national and international politics on the one hand, and certain local events in the borderlands, on the other.

Readers might feel, as I do, that the borderland context here is seriously weakened by the short shrift given to Spanish perspectives in the region and especially by the absence of Indians. Whether or not Madison thought much about indigenous peoples, Spanish administrators and American colonists in the borderlands had to. More broadly, the borderlands context that Spain sought to manage and that Madison labored to exploit was itself profoundly conditioned by the enduring power of Indians. One can’t understand why Spain colonized the territories in question, why those colonial efforts amounted to so little, or, somewhat paradoxically, why they lasted so long, without understanding Indians. Nonetheless, though the formidable and numerous native peoples in the Southeast and also in the borderlands, they never matter. In his reluctance to see Native peoples as important actors in the course of early American foreign relations, Stagg is clearly within the mainstream of the field. It seems to me that most scholars of diplomatic history in the early republic share the (perhaps unexamined) assumption that the operations of indigenous polities were too alien to be recovered and integrated into narratives of state politics and diplomacy. In some ways Borderlines reflects this assumption in a pure form, because Stagg’s impressive endnotes (and they really are impressive) make it clear that unlike some of his peers, he has taken the time to read much of the relevant historiography on the region’s Native peoples and has still concluded that they were essentially irrelevant to his subject. Insofar as the author’s subject is not simply Madison, but also “the linkages between policy making at the center of American government and the developments that unfolded at the peripheries of the American polity” (11), this conclusion is problematic.

That said, Borderlines provides a marvelously rich reconstruction of the imperial diplomatic narrative regarding Spain’s North American borderlands from Madison’s perspective. Along the way, the narrative is alive with revealing stories, exchanges, and anecdotes that are the fruits of Stagg’s deep familiarity with Madison’s life and work. For example, we glimpse Madison the boy transcribing Bacon’s work. For example, we glimpse Madison the boy transcribing Bacon’s work. For example, we glimpse Madison the boy transcribing Bacon’s work. For example, we glimpse Madison the boy transcribing Bacon’s work. For example, we glimpse Madison the boy transcribing Bacon’s work. For example, we glimpse Madison the boy transcribing Bacon’s work. For example, we glimpse Madison the boy transcribing Bacon’s work. For example, we glimpse Madison the boy transcribing Bacon’s work. For example, we glimpse Madison the boy transcribing Bacon’s work. 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heart of the book, and, again, if J. C. A. Stagg can’t vindicate Madison on this point no one can. The author convincingly portrays the man as a thoughtful leader determined to formulate and execute policy regarding Spain’s territories in a manner consistent with what he told himself were the republic’s legitimate and legal rights. Persuading readers of the accuracy of this portrait was Stagg’s stated aim, and he has succeeded. And yet one can’t but sense that the author wants to convince us of more than Madison’s own self-regard; that he wants us to stop scolding and take Madison’s talk about law and honor with less cynicism. But even in Stagg’s doggedly sympathetic rendition, the story of how the United States government sought Spanish territory on the Gulf retains enough dishonesty, expediency, dissimulation, and compromised ideals to keep fingers wagging for a long time.

The notion that the Louisiana Purchase included Texas, for example, continues to look silly and unbecoming. U.S. claims to Texas could be and were defended only on the narrowest technical grounds involving French exploration and charters. Spain argued that none of this mattered, insofar as France neither acted nor even really insisted upon these views prior to the retrocession treaty. Texas was never understood to have been included in the treaty and, in any case, the treaty itself was void because France failed to honor its terms. But even leaving these fundamental arguments aside, Spanish officials rightly noted that international notions of title followed from more than rights of discovery and royal charters. Possession, improvement, development—these conferred as much or more force to claims of sovereignty in the early modern world, perhaps especially in the Anglo-American world. However limited Spain’s accomplishments may have been in Texas, Spain had accomplishments in Texas. France didn’t. Moreover, at no time did Spanish officials, perpetually alarmed at the prospect of another European power gaining an approach to the mining regions south of the Rio Grande, seriously consider transferring Texas to France. For these reasons most borderlands historians have followed nineteenth-century Spanish officials in seeing American claims upon Texas as hopelessly cynical—however Madison and others rationalized them. Stagg urges historians not to “discount the extent to which the United States believed it had valid claims under international law to the borderlands and conducted its diplomacy in accordance with that belief” (9).

For West Florida, perhaps, but I have a difficult time seeing how minds like Jefferson’s and Madison’s could have thought the same about Texas. The author’s acknowledgment that both men saw the place “as a useful bargaining chip to obtain other more important objectives” (203) is not likely to inspire more confidence in the rightness of their claim. Problematic as they are, extravagant assertions about Louisiana’s boundaries have seemed less important to Madison’s critics than his actions in 1810-1813. As Stagg demonstrates so well, these actions were embedded in a complex of larger domestic and international concerns that shifted frequently and ought to be appreciated in their entirety.

Problematic as they are, extravagant assertions about Louisiana’s boundaries have seemed less important to Madison’s critics than his actions in 1810-1813. As Stagg demonstrates so well, these actions were embedded in a complex of larger domestic and international concerns that shifted frequently and ought to be appreciated in their entirety. Still, gross outlines of those concerns are sufficient to illuminate Spanish grievances. With the United States at peace with Spain, Madison ordered an agent into West Florida with instructions to encourage American colonists there to organize a convention that would invite the United States to take possession of the territory “as the successor to the expiring Spanish regime” (59). When West Florida’s Spanish governor appealed to his superior in Havana to help him reassert Spanish authority (and, in so doing, to put the lie to U.S. pretentions that Spain’s authority was “expiring”), the emboldened colonists considered the appeal itself sufficient grounds for arresting the governor and dissolving their compact with Spain. Stagg argues that these events came as an especially “unwelcome surprise” (69) to the president. If this is true then the synthesizers ought to abandon the deep history of American covert operations and instead look to Madison for the origins of that venerable (and often ruinous) American tradition, presidential self-delusion.

In East Florida one finds the same pattern of administrative orders, rationalized upon fine points of international law, resulting in injuries to Spain that were entirely predictable in outcome if not in detail, and for which the U.S. government refused to be held liable. In the summer of 1810 the administration sent George Mathews into East Florida as an agent to inform American colonists there that “in the event of a political separation from the parent country, their incorporation into our Union would coincide with the sentiments and the policy of the United States” (94). The War Department ordered troops to the ready in the event that Mathews managed to deliver East Florida, while the agent himself set about trying to interest the locals in revolt against Spain. When confronted on these facts by Britain’s minister to the United States, Secretary of State Monroe insisted that Mathews had been dispatched to East Florida not to subvert Spanish rule, but merely to keep an eye on the governor of Cuba. “It would be a mistake,” Stagg tells us, “to characterize this statement as a lie” (108). Assertions such as these suggest an author who has wandered a bit too far into the jungle of his subjects’ perspectives. Later, when Mathews wrote to request permission and resources to organize open revolt against Spanish authority, the administration gave no reply. Against historians who see in this inaction evidence that the president approved but wanted deniability, Stagg insists that such behavior would be “too cynical a violation of the law of nations for Madison to have approved.” Indeed, “it was almost standard practice” for administrators to ignore requests with which they disagreed: failure to reply meant that the agent’s request “was not approved” (111). We are to believe that, in the midst of war with Britain and numerous Indian peoples, the administration received the request of an agent of proven recklessness and poor judgment to initiate an act of war against another European state over territory that the United States had no legitimate claim upon, and deemed the request a matter of so little importance that it simply ignored it. Yes, a request unanswered can technically be considered a request denied. But in this and other cases, that which is technically defensible is also practically absurd. That has always been the problem with Madison’s (and his defenders’) rhetoric about international law and honor concerning his pursuit of the Spanish borderlands. Stagg’s fine book notwithstanding, it is still the problem.
Brian DeLay is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Notes:
3. For an excellent comparative study on property rights in the Anglo-American world, see John C. Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900 (Montreal, 2003). The monumental expression of Spain’s multifaceted claims on Texas was José Antonio Pichardo’s thirty-one-volume work on the subject, most of which is available in Charles Wilson Hackett, ed. and trans., Pichardo’s Treatise on the Limits of Louisiana and Texas, 4 vols. (Austin, 1931-1946).
4. Contrast the treatment of Mathews’ request with Monroe’s letter of June 5, 1813, to the administration’s agent in Texas. Having learned that the agent was engaged in a filibuster against Spanish authority there, Monroe issued a stern reprimand reminding the agent that the United States was at peace with Spain, and insisting that he “observe strictly” presidential orders not to interfere with events in Texas. Stagg, Borderlines, 167.

Roundtable Response

J.C.A. Stagg

I am honored by the decision of the editors of Passport to select my work for a roundtable. I am also grateful for the largely enthusiastic responses to that work from the panel of reviewers. In particular, the zest that Brian DeLay has brought to the task of applying some of the insights he developed in his own recent and remarkable monograph, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven, 2008), is quite exhilarating. Since DeLay’s review is the longest of the three, I will deal with it first before turning to the remarks from David Dzurec and J.M. Opal.

DeLay identifies four “problems” in Borderlines, around which he has organized his thoughts. The first is the “short shrift” (relatively speaking) that I give to the peoples of the borderland regions, especially the Spanish authorities and the Native Americans (and possibly African Americans too), in comparison with the attention I devote to James Madison and the larger international context. The second is my apparent downplaying of the threat Great Britain continued to pose to the American republic after 1821. The third is the soundness of some of the American claims to territory in the Spanish borderlands, especially Texas. And the fourth is the endlessly perplexing and troublesome case of George Mathews in East Florida.

As Delay rightly notes, I have read much of the recent literature on the indigenous peoples of the borderlands. Is it fair of him to suggest that I have “still concluded that they were essentially irrelevant to my story?” Much might depend here on how “essentially” is defined, but I would not put it that way, given that the trend in the historiography has been to confer ever greater amounts of “agency” on peoples located in the borderlands. Consequently, no one should write these days to deny these people agency in their own histories or to conclude that they were irrelevant, and it was certainly not my intention to leave such an impression. The reason why Native Americans and

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some other groups were not more in the foreground of my narrative is that I had to make decisions about what to include and exclude in my account in order to sharpen the focus on Madison. The fourth president can be a very hard man to pin down, hence my “dogged” pursuit of him through the documentary record as the best—and, I think, the only—way to bring him into clearer focus. The emphases in the narrative, therefore, arose from my strategy of trying to tell one large and reasonably well integrated story, centered mostly on Madison, as opposed to an attempt to tell a number of different stories, all of which might receive more or less equal weight.

Had I read DeLay’s War of a Thousand Deserts, as well as Pekka Hämäläinen’s The Comanche Empire (New Haven, 2008), before I delivered my manuscript to the publisher—which was in February 2007—I might have addressed some of these issues in a rather different way. Even so, irrespective of how much agency we might grant to Native Americans and others in shaping particular developments on the peripheries of the United States, by the end of my story, in 1821, the needs and wishes of these groups had clearly lost out to the dreams of the American Founders, Madison included. The organization of my narrative did not, therefore, really result from any disposition a priori on my part to write as a “mainstream” diplomatic historian; in fact, I could claim that my perspectives are rather broader than those of most “mainstream” diplomatic historians. I understand that many borderlands specialists might not be entirely satisfied with the results, but it is not easy to do full justice to both borderlands and metropolitan centers within the space of what I always intended to be a reasonably short and compact book. I might also observe that many borderlands specialists—not including DeLay—seldom make much effort to deal with events that emanate from metropolitan centers, if for no other reason than that they often regard such events as being of little or no consequence. That imbalance needs to be corrected when we try to write about borderlands in the context of the history of the nation-state.

In making the argument that the Transcontinental Treaty was a watershed event inasmuch as it altered the geopolitical environment in ways that enhanced the security of the United States, did I slight the extent to which Great Britain remained a threat throughout the nineteenth century? Not really. Of course, up until 1895 there were to be major crises with Great Britain—fueled by a potent legacy of Anglophobia—that might have resulted in war, and the former mother country was the one European power that could have seriously harmed the republic in the nineteenth century. But to emphasize this threat is to overlook the fact that by 1821 something had definitely changed with regard to the position of the United States in the Atlantic community of nations. Recall that in 1814 the Duke of Wellington declined suggestions from the ministry of Lord Liverpool that he might go to America to settle the war there—on the grounds that he knew he could not effectively do so. And as John Murrin has pointed out, by the 1820s the extent of the area and the population of the United States was such as to make conquest or occupation by any European power a virtual impossibility.1 Thereafter, the most serious threats to the Union were internal in nature, not external; or, to put it another way, an external threat could have succeeded only after some internal crisis had gravely weakened the nation.

As for whether American claims to borderlands territory, Texas included, were silly, grossly exaggerated, or outrageously cynical, there can be no definitive single answer, and I suspect that DeLay and I are not so very far apart on this matter. The starting point for American diplomacy in the early nineteenth century was the claim that however France understood the extent of Louisiana, that was what was purchased in 1803—and it included claims to both West Florida and Texas (though not to East Florida). To ground those claims historically as best he could was the reason Jefferson drafted his “Examination into the Boundaries of Louisiana” after he had read the 1803 treaty. As DeLay rightly notes, there were problems with this document—it rested too much on claims about prior discovery as opposed to effective occupation and settlement—but in truth none of the parties to the dispute, including Spain as well as France and the United States, could ever adopt any rigorously consistent position on boundaries that was entirely free from challenge. Even Jefferson understood that American claims were not all equally strong when he wrote that the title to West Florida was “substantial” while in Texas the nation had acquired rights that “may be strongly maintained.” That the United States was less interested in Texas than it was in East and West Florida was apparent as early as 1804, but that fact merely qualifies rather than negates my argument that American diplomatists believed that their claims had more merit than subsequent generations of historians—who have too willingly followed Henry Adams in this matter—have been prepared to concede. Nor should we forget that the United States also had serious and valid grievances against Spain, including the so-called “Spanish spoliations” from the 1790s that provided a basis in the law of nations for seeking East Florida by way of compensation.

The latter question brings us to the conduct of George Mathews in East Florida, an episode that has always been seen as involving nothing more than an appallingly cynical and flagrant violation of Spanish neutrality and sovereignty. My purpose here was not to argue that Madison did not make what was undeniably a bad and embarrassing blunder. It was merely to try to explain better the reasons why he might have made it. Doing so required me to wander, at least to some extent, “into the jungle of [my] subjects’ perspectives.” How far might be considered “too far” can always be a subject for debate. But one of the implications of DeLay’s remarks here is that the old indictment of Madison—that he sent Mathews into East Florida for the express purpose of fomenting rebellion for expansionist goals—might still stand. However, it cannot stand, for reasons that I outlined more fully in my 2006 essay in Diplomatic History than I did in Borderlines.2 And if the old indictment cannot stand, there has to be a different explanation for Madison’s behavior. DeLay points out, fairly enough, that as a practical matter, the president’s conduct is still a problem. As a practical matter, I don’t disagree but my argument was always directed more toward illuminating Madison’s motives than to defending...
his actions. In this context, there are a couple of other matters that require clarification. One is DeLay’s suggestion that the prompt repudiation of William Shaler’s conduct in Texas in June 1813 only highlights the administration’s complicity in Mathews’s misconduct in 1812. I would argue that it proves precisely the opposite. Shaler was promptly reprimanded in 1813 because by then the administration, with the example of Mathews before it, had become aware, albeit belatedly, of the dangers of assuming that by failing to check the actions of its agents explicitly that it might inadvertently seem to sanction them. The other is the remark that the United States “refused to be held liable” for the consequences of Mathews’s actions in East Florida. Before 1815, that statement might be correct, but eventually the administration of James Monroe did accept some responsibility for the depredations committed by Mathews’s Patriots and allowed for East Floridians to pursue compensation claims under article 9 of the Transcontinental Treaty. Finally, I should discuss DeLay’s more general point that I want historians “to stop scolding and take Madison’s talk about law and honor with less cynicism.” True enough—as far as it goes. Such scolding has always led historians to only one conclusion—that Madison’s Spanish diplomacy was never anything other than indefensible, and even DeLay cannot quite resist the temptation to wag his finger (though whether more at me than at Madison is perhaps unclear). Seldom, though, do those historians ever suggest what a more honorable and justifiable policy might have been. One exception is Isaac J. Cox who believed that early American policies toward Spain were unnecessary on the grounds that the inexorable workings of a “Turnerian” process of frontier development would have led to the incorporation of the Spanish borderlands without undue difficulty. Perhaps, but today we should not be too complacent about the inevitability of any historical outcomes. So, what should Madison have done and how should we judge him anyway? Would the United States have been better served by making no claims against Spain at all in order to preserve its moral integrity? Few American historians, to my knowledge, have been prepared to say as much explicitly. As DeLay notes, “states pursue their interests,” and Madison followed his course in ways that were consistent with his reading of the law of nations. To argue thus neither makes him a hypocrite nor a shallow and inept practitioner of realpolitik.

Turning to David Dzurec’s review I would like to say that I certainly appreciate his acceptance of my argument about the underlying consistency of Madison’s diplomacy. He also suggests that I might have done more with the matter of public and administration responses to press accounts of unrest in the borderlands. This is a useful point, so let me provide an example that I probably should have included in Borderlines. The administration newspaper, the Daily National Intelligencer, first reported the news of the Battle of Medina—and the effective end of the Texan filibuster—on 6 October 1813. It followed up with two subsequent accounts, taken from such local journals as the Red River Republican in Alexandria, Louisiana, on 11 and 30 October 1813. In the interim, rumors about administration involvement in the affair began to circulate, especially after John Hamilton Robinson decided to go into the filibustering business on his own. Consequently, on 6 November 1812, the Daily National Intelligencer devoted a full column, headed MEXICAN AFFAIRS, to rebutting the story. The journal freely admitted that the administration sympathized with the republican cause in Mexico, but added that the United States could only deal with legitimate governments and that the Royalists, for better or worse, were the sole legitimate source of authority there at that time. It did not deny the stories about Robinson; it merely pointed out that his official business as an agent of the United States had ended “during the last winter.” The remainder of the column was given over to an explicit denial that “our government has had any part in the business” or that it had ever promised “directly or indirectly” to aid any Mexican rebels or to assist any “armament” against the Spanish regime there.

J.M. Opal wishes that I had done more with the subject of the development of the law of nations and how it might have shaped early American statecraft generally—and Madison’s more specifically. His instincts here are entirely correct, and I can only plead in extenuation that the subject is a vast one, one that historians, of late, have only just begun to scratch the surface. I would also have liked to have said more about how William Shaler formed the opinions expressed in his essays, but his papers leave no clues as to the extent and nature of his reading. Consequently, I contended myself with the observation that Madison was probably not persuaded by Shaler’s thoughts about international confederations. Nevertheless, my claims about Madison’s deep commitment to the law of nations rest on more than potentially plausible assertions, even though that may not be immediately apparent to all readers of Borderlines. Here I was drawing on, if not citing, my earlier work—and early volumes of The Papers of James Madison—the contents of which reveal something of the extent to which Madison drew on the law of nations in formulating his policies of commercial restriction against Great Britain. And we ought not to forget that the only book Madison ever published in his lifetime was the lengthy, impenetrably dense, 1806 exposition of international maritime law entitled “An Examination of the British Doctrine which subjects to Capture a Neutral Trade Not Open in Time of Peace.” Possibly, when The Papers of James Madison publishes an annotated version of this text in the future, it will inspire a renewed interest in this rich subject. In the interim, I might refer readers to the remarks that Andrew Jackson allegedly made in justifying his 1818 incursion into Spanish Florida: “---n Grotius! D--n Puffendorf! D----n Vattel!—this is a mere matter between Jim Monroe and myself!” James Madison could never have endorsed such a sentiment.

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Notes:
5. See the titles by David Hendrickson, Nicholas Onuf and Peter Onuf, and Daniel Deudney as cited in footnotes throughout Borderlines.
6. This story was told by John Quincy Adams to Henry A. Wise and published in Wise’s Seven Decades of the Union (Philadelphia, 1881), 152.
Taking History Overseas

Douglas Karsner, Ron Eisenman, and David Koistinen

Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Bikini: Teaching American Nuclear Weapons Policy in Japan

Douglas Karsner

One of the greatest challenges confronting the American historian teaching in Japan is how to present the U.S. decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and how to frame American nuclear weapons policy more generally. Understandably, the bombing is a very sensitive issue for Japanese students, as theirs is the only nation to have suffered atomic attacks. Yet I learned that students have a variety of perspectives about the bombing, some of which might surprise Americans.

I encountered these perspectives while teaching at Temple University Japan (TUJ) in Tokyo as a full-time assistant professor from 1993 to 1996, and again from 2005 to 2009 as an adjunct professor during the summer semesters. Having done research on various aspects of atomic-age America in graduate school, I thought I was fairly well prepared to teach this issue in Japan. It seemed advantageous, however, to become more familiar with how the atomic bombings were taught in Japanese high schools. I did wonder if any of my future students would have family members who either perished in or survived the atomic attacks, and I was concerned about how they would react to an American teaching about this issue, but I hoped that my training as a historian, which would encourage analysis of the bomb from various viewpoints, would enable me to address any concerns such students might have.

Class composition changed considerably in one decade. In the mid-nineties, more than 90 percent of my students were Japanese. The remaining students were American and Korean, and there were a few of other nationalities. Most Japanese students did not talk much in class, probably because they had focused on rote memorization in high school and were not encouraged to ask questions. We examined American nuclear weapons policy in the second half of the U.S. history survey classes as well as in a topics course that I developed while at TUJ entitled “America in the Nuclear Age.”

In sharp contrast to the earlier period, from 2005 to 2009 only half of my students in the average class were Japanese. Americans made up the second largest percentage, followed by students from countries such as China, Austria, and Ghana. With a greater number of American students, the classroom dynamic changed, because they were more willing to talk. But more Japanese students now engaged in class discussion—a development that reflects changes in their society. We analyzed American nuclear weapons policy in a lower-level “War and Society” class and an upper-level modern U.S. foreign relations course entitled “Superpower America.”

In both decades, the key question used to structure the first part of our analysis was “Why did the United States drop atomic bombs on Japan?” This question had several advantages. It challenged students to think beyond the memorization of names and dates and to consider factors that led to the decision to drop the bomb. Moreover, it led us to a discussion of Japanese and American perspectives. I then introduced students to the essential historiography of this key event, including Herbert Feis’ orthodox position, presented in Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific (1961), and Gar Alperovitz’ revisionist interpretation, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (1965).

Asking the “why” question enabled me to complicate the dominant narratives for my students. That process was especially valuable for Japanese students, many of whom believed that all Americans supported the use of the atomic bombs. It also led to focusing on the cause and effect relationship, a cardinal element of studying history that many students had not encountered before.

In the mid-nineties survey classes, the text we used had only a brief discussion of the bomb, so I supplemented it with the debate “Was It Necessary to Drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan to End World War II?” from different editions of Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in American History. During some semesters I made this a written assignment, while in other semesters students met with me for one-on-one oral discussion and identified the theses, key points, and strengths and weaknesses of both arguments. It was during the office discussions that I occasionally learned students’ personal opinions. One Japanese student, for example, complained that neither argument made by Feis or Alperovitz discussed how the atomic bomb hurt many civilians. Her focus on the casualties reflects higashi ishiki—victim consciousness, a widespread feeling in Japan. In sharp contrast, a Korean student said that the United States was right to use the bomb because imperial Japan mistreated its colonies and would not easily give up. No doubt that assertion reflected the opinion of many Koreans on this subject.

In some sections of the U.S. history survey, Professor Pat Rosenkjar, a specialist in English language acquisition, assisted students with exercises designed to improve their language skills and comprehension of the material.

In the topics course, “America in the Nuclear Age,” we used a wide variety of sources. The introductory chapter from Kyoko and Mark Selden’s The Atomic Bomb: Voices from Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1989) placed the atomic bombings in the critical larger context of total war and the firebombing of Japanese cities. This chapter also presented multiple perspectives on the bombing,
including those of Japanese survivors. Showing multiple perspectives helped me earn the students’ confidence, I think, as I was not telling just the “victorious American side” of the story. Equally important, I emphasized that professional historians address controversial subjects by analyzing different points of view. Examining primary sources further reinforced this point. In contrast to students’ usual experience of looking at history from a leadership standpoint, we listened to popular music that reflected the reactions of common people. For example, we played country songs that talked about revenge and the belief in the divine origin of the atom, such as the Buchanan Brothers’ 1946 version of Fred Kirby’s “Atomic Power.” Sam Hinton’s 1950 cover of Vern Partlow’s “Talking Atomic Blues”—a rare anti-bomb song—urged an end to nuclear proliferation and called for world peace in the memorable final line, “Peace in the world, or the world in pieces.”

One crucial issue that we addressed in class was the influence of race on the decision to use the atomic bomb. Some students believed that the United States used the bomb on Japan because the Japanese were “colored” and did not use the bomb on Germany because the Germans were “white.” I addressed this issue by asking students when the first bomb was tested. When we determined that testing did not occur until July 16—more than two months after Germany had surrendered—a number of students seemed to reject this assumption. More difficult to address was the belief expressed by some that the Japanese were used as guinea pigs in a scientific experiment. The fact that the United States used two different types of bombs and that the target cities were virtually untouched by conventional bombing raids made it appear that Japanese civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were indeed part of a test to see which nuclear device was more powerful.

Most students opposed the American decision to use the atomic bombs. In conversations outside of class, many students told me that they thought that all war was bad. I rarely hear this perspective from my American students at Bloomsburg University in Pennsylvania, where I have taught since 1996. It is interesting that a few Japanese students supported the use of the bomb. When I asked why, the most common response was that it kept the Soviet Union out of Japan. A few believed it was necessary because the Japanese army would not have surrendered otherwise. Several students indicated that they had learned about some of these issues in high school. One student noted that her grandparents were hibakusha—atomic bomb victims.

The second major element of our study of American nuclear weapons policy was an analysis of nuclear testing in the Pacific. We discussed the atomic tests at the Bikini Atoll, which began in 1946, and the hydrogen bomb tests, which began in 1952. Our main focus was on the March 1, 1954, BRAVO H-bomb test. Although I was not sure how much students would know about this test, I assumed that they would not know much, because most Japanese history texts do not have extensive coverage of the twentieth century and none of the American texts I consulted included a discussion of this significant event. When the United States detonated the 15-megaton hydrogen bomb in the BRAVO test, fallout scattered far outside the government-designated safety zone, irradiating the entire crew of the Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon No. 5), a Japanese fishing vessel thirty miles outside the security area. After returning to port, the seriously ill sailors were all hospitalized, and one died from radiation sickness a few months later. The sale of their fallout-laden catch, which occurred before anyone realized what had happened, led to a “tuna panic” in Japan, and the incident hurt Japanese-American relations at a particularly crucial time in the Cold War. Remarkably, the Daigo Fukuryu Maru is preserved at an Exhibition Hall in Yumenoshima—Dream Island Park—in Tokyo. On a class trip to the museum, we examined this key artifact of the nuclear age, which dominated the interior space, along with many photos, newspapers, and other material artifacts related to the vessel, crew, and the domestic impact of the incident on Japanese society. The museum’s narrative of this event was consistent with the victim-consciousness perspective. Few panels had English translations. Our visit sparked much conversation. None of the students had heard of this event, and they expressed surprise that an American knew about it. Some felt uncomfortable being near the ship, asking if they should be concerned about radiation.

Because we could not do a class trip each semester, we sometimes utilized other primary sources to examine the impact of the March 1, 1954, H-bomb test. We listened, for example, to Bill Haley and His Comets’ “Thirteen Women.” Written by Dickie Thompson with assistance from Milt Gabler, this April 1954 “dream” song depicted the last man alive in a post-nuclear world, being attended to by thirteen women. (Apparently, traditional gender roles managed to survive the nuclear holocaust.) We also watched an excerpt from the science fiction film THEM! that was released in June 1954. The growing concern over fallout from the H-bomb provided the context for this movie, which depicted gigantic ants, mutated as a result of nuclear testing, devouring Americans. Although some students focused on the 1950s special effects, which were crude by 1990s standards, they understood the linkage between the events. These sources helped support Paul Boyer’s argument in By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (1985) that 1954 saw the beginning of the second cycle of activism and fear prompted by the bomb and radioactivity.

After the Smithsonian Institution opened its Enola Gay Exhibit in 1995, one of my former TUJ students, who had transferred to the school’s main campus in Philadelphia, asked me to take her to see it. Although the original exhibit had been transformed almost beyond recognition because of political pressure, what remained
still resonated for her. She was almost brought to tears by the sight of groups of Americans posing for pictures in front of a life-size photograph of the B-29’s crew, laughing, smiling, and making “V for Victory” signs. We talked about why Americans would act in this manner, but given the somberness of the experience for her, she found it difficult to understand their actions. Later she wrote a letter to the Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s largest newspapers, to express her astonishment at this scene.

When I began to teach again in Japan in 2005, I took advantage of the rapid expansion of atomic bomb-related websites, which include a wealth of primary source materials. These easily accessible sites influenced my decision to shift my focus away from popular culture to emphasize the actions of policymakers and scientists. Over the five summers we have examined several significant sources. Utilizing “Minutes of the second meeting of the Target Committee, Los Alamos, May 10-11, 1945” helped students realize that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the result of decisions made by men who were weighing different factors, such as the psychological impact of the bombing on Japan and other nations. The “Szilard Petition, First Version, July 3, 1945,” which urged the president not to use the bomb because it would accelerate the increasing ruthlessness of war and place responsibility on the United States for opening the door to a nuclear arms race, showed that some nuclear scientists opposed using the bomb even before the first test. It surprised not only Japanese but also American students. Finally, an entry from “Admiral Tagaki’s Diary,” dated August 8, 1945, showed the growing concern among Japanese policymakers that the Hiroshima bombing would accelerate deteriorating domestic conditions in Japan.

Secondary and primary sources sometimes led to interesting and lively discussions. One Chinese student asserted that “history is written by the victors,” perhaps to suggest that we were not examining all perspectives. We then briefly reviewed the key points in our class discussion to determine if our analysis was an example of that type of history, and we agreed that it was not. An American student proclaimed that Japan “deserved to be nuked.” When asked why he made this comment, which was not challenged by other students, he said that his grandfather had told him so. We then considered the historical context of the era in which his grandfather grew up, which helped to explain his perspective. Another American student commented, “What do you expect during wartime?” I did not hear such callous remarks in the previous decade. They suggest how difficult it is to instill historical mindedness in students, and they also demonstrate the difficulty of striking a balance between encouraging students to feel free to offer observations and trying to get them to argue historically.

During one summer session I took students on a class trip to see the Lucky Dragon No. 5. Several changes had been made to the exhibit since the mid-1990s, the most significant being additional English translations and an international timeline that depicted at what time nations joined the “nuclear club” and when and where they tested their weapons. Placing the Lucky Dragon incident in an international context helped students to see the broader dimensions of nuclear weapons testing. They seemed stunned by the number of tests, so we embarked on an extended discussion that linked the tests to the dynamics of the Cold War. Like the students from the mid-nineties, most of them had never heard of this event and some expressed fear of lingering radiation from the ship. This time, however, Americans comprised the largest percentage of students.

During the most recent summer session at TUJ, I taught a section of “War and Society” with Japanese students alone. I developed a questionnaire to gauge their opinions about the bomb more systematically. The nineteen students provided seven different responses when asked “Why did the US drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki?” The most common replies were: Japan refused to surrender; the Americans wanted to perform an experiment by testing the bomb on the Japanese people; and the Americans wanted to demonstrate their power to other nations. Only one student cited race as a factor, and it is possible that her grandfather’s death in the Philippines during the Pacific War helped shape her opinion. When asked what their knowledge was based on, most of the students cited junior high school history class; others mentioned history books and high school. One student specifically noted that when he attended high school in Osaka his teachers were Communists who stressed that Japan committed only “negative” acts during the war. Other sources of information included elementary school, museums, TV, comic books, and school trips to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Most interesting were their responses to “Was it necessary to drop the atomic bombs on Japan to end World War II?” Eight argued no, seven said yes, and the rest gave different replies. At first glance the seven “yes” results are surprising; they appear to be in sharp contrast to student perspectives in the 1990s. However, the reasons the students gave for their belief that it was necessary for the United States to drop the atomic bombs are instructive. Three students argued that it was necessary for human beings to learn how dangerous nuclear weapons are—an interpretation that may have helped to give meaning to the deaths of so many civilians. Two stated that the United States used the bomb because Japan refused to surrender. Another argued that using the bomb was necessary to keep the Soviet Union out of Japan—a contention that suggests a persistent fear of Communism among some Japanese. In the 1990s, a few students had also cited the army’s refusal to surrender and the fear of Soviet occupation. Finally, one student who believed the bomb was necessary pointed out what she saw as the positive consequences of that “terrible,
unhuman” act: Japan took the opportunity to change its government and became the first country to refuse war officially. Though she did not directly mention it in her answer, she seemed to be one of the many Japanese who still supported Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits an act of war by the state. It has been an increasingly controversial issue in recent years. Clearly, these responses indicated that young Japanese students had varied and complex attitudes toward the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

I administered the same questionnaire in the upper-level U.S. foreign policy course. Twenty-six students responded: eleven Japanese, ten Americans, and five students from four other countries. The most common reasons cited by American students for the use of the bomb were to influence the Soviet Union, to end the war as soon as possible, and to justify the enormous expenditures of the Manhattan Project. Many of these students were junior and senior International Affairs majors at TUJ, and their responses reflected the influence of their professors and the reading that they had done for classes. One student, for example, had read Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s important recent interpretation, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (2006). A few had also gathered information from documentaries. The most common responses among Japanese students were that the bomb was used to end the war as soon as possible and to influence the Soviet Union. While no one posited race as a factor, two Japanese students wrote research papers on the influence of race on the atomic bomb decision, which strongly suggests that they believed that race was indeed a crucial factor even though they neglected to mention it in the survey. Most Japanese students’ knowledge came from senior and junior high school classes. One student said that he first learned about the bomb in elementary school when he read Keiji Nakazawa’s powerful manga Hadashi no Gen (Barefoot Gen), first serialized in 1973. Overall, seven students of different nationalities cited their classes at TUJ as a source of knowledge.

Nine of ten Americans said that it was not necessary to drop the bomb to end the war. While this might seem surprising at first, the influence of coursework at TUJ probably influenced their perspective. Several of them said that Japan was already very weak and would soon collapse, and several said Japan was ready to surrender. Although I have not offered a similar questionnaire to my Bloomsburg University students in years, I suspect, based on my work with them, that they would not respond in the same manner. Perhaps American students who study in Japan are different from those who remain at home. Seven Japanese also said that dropping the bomb was not necessary, while one argued...
that it was. Two contended that they thought the first bomb was necessary, but not the second. It is unclear why the Japanese students in the upper-level class held such a different perspective on this issue from the lower-level class. Perhaps their additional class work also influenced them. The most common reason cited for why the bomb was unnecessary was that Japan was already militarily exhausted. One student argued that the atomic bombing “was a kind of Holocaust”—an interpretation examined in considerable detail by Mark Selden in “A Forgotten Holocaust: U.S. Bombing Strategy, the Destruction of Japanese Cities, and the American Way of War from World War II to Iraq,” posted on Japan Focus in 2007.

The experience of teaching American nuclear weapons policy in Japan has been intellectually rewarding. It has revealed that Japanese students’ understanding of why the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Japan is far more complex than I had initially imagined. To a lesser degree the same is true for students of other nationalities. I think I successfully negotiated a very sensitive issue in Japan by presenting different points of view and utilizing various sources that helped tell the story from the participants’ perspectives. Doing my homework to understand how history in general and Hiroshima and Nagasaki in particular are taught in Japan proved helpful. Japanese and American students’ lack of knowledge concerning the Lucky Dragon incident might indicate that the imperatives of the Cold War long suppressed explorations of “uncomfortable” topics in both countries—even into the post–Cold War era. Since 2005, teaching U.S. nuclear weapons policy has become easier, in part because of the availability of more online sources, but it has also become more challenging as the percentage of non-Japanese students increases at TUJ and the student body becomes more diverse. I hope students will be able to take away from my classes a greater appreciation of the contested nature of the past and the complexity of this topic, as well as enhanced critical thinking skills and historical mindedness.

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Two Weeks in South Korea

Ron Eisenman

Recently I was selected to participate in the Korean Studies Workshop, sponsored by the Korea Foundation and hosted by Yonsei University in Seoul. The foundation provided an all-expenses-paid study tour to South Korea for me and thirty-nine other secondary social studies educators from all over the United States. We spent ten days in the capital city of Seoul and three days visiting Gyeongju, the ancient capital of the Silla Dynasty, and Ulsan, the home of the Hyundai Corporation.

Although I had been to South Korea as a backpacker on three separate occasions between 1989 and 1995, I had no idea what to expect fourteen years later. Influenced by images from the U.S. media, I envisioned it as a country still scarred by the Korean War, panic-stricken by fears of Armageddon, and susceptible to the whims of Kim Jong II. I remembered extraordinary economic development (and rising costs) between 1989 and 1995. But what would that development look like fourteen years later?

I was unprepared for modern-day Korea. I found myself in a dynamic and prosperous culture that thrives despite the infamous split between North and South. Certainly, my host’s goal was to teach me that Korea was the most important country in the world. Although skeptical at first, I eventually came to accept that Korea’s story is vitally important for the world. It involves unprecedentedly rapid economic development and globalization, the development of a successful educational system, the rapid development of a vibrant democracy, and religious transformation.

I don’t mean to underestimate the threat that North Korea poses to South Korea and the world. During my stay in Korea, newspapers reported that cyber-hackers from North Korea had crippled the networks of governmental and financial institutions. Two American journalists had recently been sentenced to twelve years of hard labor for illegally crossing into North Korea and had not been released yet. North Korea had just resumed testing nuclear weapons. There were front-page articles speculating on Kim Jong II’s imminent death and its implications for South Korean security. The fact that the U.S.–Korea joint military command could destroy North Korea’s forwardly deployed artillery within one hour is little comfort for the 6 to 10 million people in Seoul who would perish in that time.

Although reunification is the professed goal of almost every Korean, it is increasingly difficult to imagine that the process could go smoothly. A separation of more than sixty years has resulted in vastly different cultures and economies in the North and South. Even the Korean language has evolved separately. For example, foreign loan words like “PC” and “computer” are not used in North Korea. It is estimated that up to 20 percent of the South Korean lexicon differs from that in the North. North Korean defectors have had a very difficult time adapting to life in South Korea; in fact, special schools have been established to help children transition to life in the South.

Before I visited Korea this summer, I imagined a country paralyzed by North Korean irrationality. Yet very few of the people I met showed much concern about North Korea at all. The only major manifestation of the conflict that I was aware of was compulsory military service for males, which lasts for 22 to 26 months. I did notice, however, that several tall buildings in the newly constructed business district on the southern side of the Han River had anti-aircraft guns on the roof. I was told that in case of a North Korean advance toward Seoul, South Korean battle plans provide for a retreat to the southern side of the Han River and destruction of the bridges.

I was also surprised to learn that apparently no one in South Korea would welcome a quick collapse of North Korea. Many fear that such an event might prompt a military incursion by China into North Korea, aimed at providing a buffer on China’s Manchurian border. Rapid unification based on negotiation and reciprocity also seems unlikely. South Koreans value democracy, freedoms, and economic development and would never surrender them to a
North Korean government. For its part, North Korea seems unwilling to relax its police-state practices or abandon hereditary Communist leadership, which is supported by the ideology of juche, roughly translated as "self-reliance." North and South are separated by walls and barbed wire, but they are also separated by values and ideals.

So what is to be done if integration, whether by warfare, negotiation, or North Korean collapse, is not the answer? Many academics I spoke with talked about providing just enough economic aid to ensure a minimum of stability in North Korea without encouraging irresponsible behavior. South Korea seems to have resolved that tolerating North Korean transgressions, short of war, is worth the price of progress.

One of my biggest regrets this summer is that I was unable to go to the DMZ to see the most fortified border in the world. Our guided tour was cancelled because of a reported H1N1 outbreak on the American base. However, one never knows the truth in this part of the world, where actions and incidents are commonplace. In the 1970's, two U.S. soldiers were killed with an ax by North Korean soldiers for attempting to cut down a tree that was blocking their view of the border. The artifacts of political theater along the border would have been fascinating to see. There is the so-called "Bridge of No Return," North Korean propaganda towns in which nobody resides after dark, the largest flagpole in the world, and the de facto nature preserve, 2½ miles wide and 155 miles long.

South Korea has achieved economic success at an extraordinarily rapid pace. In 1962, the per capita GNP was $87. Today it is almost $27,000, a figure that places South Korea among the top fourteen countries in the world. While capitalist, it has achieved growth through government policies aimed at promoting selected sectors of the export economy. Experts refer to the South Korean brand of capitalism, characterized by family-owned conglomerates, as chaebol ("business family") capitalism. Companies like SK, Samsung, LG, and Hyundai began as small family businesses after World War II. Today they are among the largest in the world. As of the late 1990s, the ten largest chaebols accounted for 60 percent of the economy.

No chaebol is more emblematic of the South Korean economy than Hyundai. Hyundai has transformed the sleepy fishing village of Ulsan into one of the most successful company towns in history. Fifteen percent of the world’s container ships are produced in its massive shipyard, which contains the world’s largest dry dock. We also saw the world’s largest parking lot for automobiles scheduled to be put on ships for export around the world.

What makes this economic growth even more extraordinary is that unlike Indonesia, China, Russia, Brazil, or India, South Korea has very few natural resources. Its success depends entirely on human resources and trade. The effort Koreans put into developing human resources through education was exemplified by the five extraordinary high school students from Goyang Foreign Language Institute who were among our hosts for this trip. These five were in what Koreans call the “7-11 club”—students who go to school at 7:00 a.m. and return home at 11:00 p.m. They study many of the same subjects that Americans do, but their emphasis is on foreign language acquisition. They take English and at least one other language, such as Chinese, Japanese, or Spanish. One of these students, who had never lived outside of Korea, got the highest possible score on the AP economics test in English. None of the students participated in interscholastic sports, but all were remarkably fit as a result of healthy diets and an effective physical education program. Another factor contributing to Korea’s educational success is its use of a highly rational, scientifically designed alphabet called Hangul. Linguists say that of all the written scripts in the world it possesses the best structure for promoting literacy and for use in text messaging and computer applications.

As an educator, I consider one of the highlights of my trip to have been a visit to a Korean high school, the Goyang Foreign Language Institute, on the outskirts of Seoul. Even though it was summer vacation, more than forty students showed up to act as hosts and discuss education with us individually. They did this even though their summer vacation is only half as long as that of American students. Korea’s commitment to education is so intense that it is part of the reason the birth rate of South Korea is now one of the lowest in the world. The social and economic resources needed to educate children are so great that families rarely have more than one child, even though the government has provided incentives for more children.

Contrary to my expectations, I found Korea to be a country firmly rooted in the international, globalized world. While Korean writing and food is everywhere in Seoul, English and Western cultural imports are also abundant. Fast-food establishments like KFC, Burger King, and Starbucks are found on practically every block in Seoul. One of the highlights for the teachers was being served Krispy Kreme doughnuts to fuel us for a morning of lectures on Korean society. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, the West can be very proud. Many things identified with the West are copied in Korea. In Seoul you can find KMC (“Korean Mania Chicken”) or Two Two chicken, which serves hot wings on a par with those found in Buffalo. Perhaps the most astonishing evidence of globalization is that 15 percent of all marriages involve a foreign spouse. In a traditionally homogenous and closed society (often referred to as “the Hermit Kingdom” by Westerners), this percentage is astounding. The face of Korea is literally changing. Such blending will inevitably result in major cultural changes.

Yet even as Korean society is experiencing globalization, it remains tied to the past in countless ways. Korea is busy with archeological excavations aimed at reconstructing cultural artifacts that were damaged by Japanese, Mongol, and Chinese invasions. Although education is a
springboard for social mobility that women are now taking advantage of, the wage differential between men and women is still among the highest in the world. Confucian ideals remain the basis of all interactions, with youth expected to show respect for elders and elders required to look out for the welfare of the young. Such ties made the Korean Studies Workshop run so smoothly. Our group leader, Professor Kim, constantly expressed his love for his students and his gratitude for their hard work, and in turn, his students and interns worked hard to live up to his praise and meet our needs.

Food and religion provide some of the most complicated connections between Korea’s rich past and its vibrant present. Kimchee is eaten with every meal, just as it was a century ago. At midnight, street vendors hawk comfort food like blood sausage and various boiled and fried organs for the drunken businessman headed home for the night. On the other hand, only a century ago Korea was a Buddhist and Shamanist country. Christians accounted for 0.1 percent of the population. Today South Korea is predominantly Christian. In a country where 53 percent of the people consider themselves religious, almost two thirds are affiliated with Christianity. Five of the ten largest mega-churches in the world are Korean, including the largest, Yoido Full Gospel Church. Koreans also export religion, sending over 16,600 Christian missionaries to 220 countries around the world. While the values of Buddhism and Shamanism are still deeply woven into Korean culture, the actual practice of Buddhism is declining. One morning at 4:30 a.m. I went to the main temple of the most popular sect of Buddhism in Korea and found only female senior citizens doing the morning prayers. One wonders what the future of Korean Buddhism will look like when these elderly women pass away.

The overarching lesson I learned during this trip is that America ought to pay close attention to all parts of the Korean story, not just the looming threat of war. But my sojourn in Korea taught me other things as well. As an individual, I re-learned the importance of eating well and exercising. One of my best memories is of my last day in Korea, when I visited the hiking trails of Dobongsan National Park. They were filled with happy and fit senior citizens effortlessly climbing its steep and spectacular terrain. As a teacher, I learned valuable economic and foreign policy lessons to bring home to my classroom. As a world citizen, I will remember the example of my wonderful hosts, who made every possible effort to make my trip memorable and build lasting social relationships, and I have great respect for the many Korean people who tried their best to communicate with me despite my poor Korean language skills.

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American History/American Studies in the Middle East Context: Reflections on Six Years at the American University of Beirut

David Koistinen

(An earlier version of this piece was presented at the January 2009 annual meeting of the American Historical Association.)

For six years, I taught U.S. history at the American University of Beirut. Known locally as the AUB, the university draws students from Lebanon and other Arab countries and is one of the most prestigious institutions of higher learning in the Arab world. My time in Beirut coincided with a particularly eventful period in modern Arab-American relations. I arrived in mid-September 2000, days before the eruption miles to the south of the second Palestinian intifada. I left in July 2006, in the midst of that summer’s Israel-Lebanon war. In the intervening years, I witnessed local reactions to the fall of the World Trade Center, the fall of the Afghan Taliban, and the fall of Baghdad in the spring of 2003. It was a lively context in which to teach the history of the United States.

Not surprisingly, there was a high level of student interest in my classes at AUB. The above-noted events were particularly tense episodes in an Arab-American relationship that has been characterized by great strain for several generations. U.S. government policies in the region have contributed to these strains. Almost all Arabs empathize with the Palestinians. Many in the region live under dictatorial regimes backed by the United States. As a result, most Arabs see America as having significant responsibility for the unfavorable conditions in which they live.

Against this backdrop, many Arabs, perhaps understandably, have a highly distorted view of how the U.S. government functions—and especially of how U.S. foreign policy is designed and implemented. It was, to take one example, a commonly held belief among my students, and among educated Lebanese in general, that the U.S. government is controlled by American Jews. It was likewise widely believed that U.S. foreign policy elites, and intelligence agencies in particular, are all-powerful, all-knowing, and supremely competent.

Given America’s role in the region, it is highly worthwhile for the Arab peoples to learn as much as they can about the United States. But to learn about the United States that actually exists, it is necessary to unlearn a great deal of supposed knowledge of the type just described. A more detailed example from the classroom demonstrates the kind of supposed knowledge about the United States that I encountered and the approach I took in attempting to refute it.

One of my most popular academic offerings at AUB was a course entitled “The United States and the Middle East.” This class probed cultural, economic, political, and diplomatic relations between the two areas over the last two hundred years. I first taught the subject in Fall 2000, when the incident described below took place. Post–World War II diplomacy was a major topic in the course. Near the end of the semester, we examined America’s 1991 war with Iraq. I assigned several readings on U.S. relations with the Persian Gulf countries in the years prior to 1990. The authors carefully considered American aims in the region and why U.S. leaders responded as they did to Iraq’s provocative move into Kuwait.

As class discussion of the subject began, I was dumbfounded to discover that almost all of my students were convinced that the United States had wanted Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait. The American government, my students believed, had effectively lured...
Saddam into a trap, creating the pretext for a war in which his power could be destroyed. Students repeatedly cited as evidence of this position the transcript released by the Iraqi government after the Kuwait crisis began and published in the New York Times. Knowledge of the piece was obviously widespread in the region and central to the popular mythology of the crisis. The transcript records Saddam’s pre-invasion interview with April Glaspie, U.S. ambassador to Iraq. At this meeting, my students claimed, Glaspie, acting on behalf of the U.S. government, gave Saddam the green light to take Kuwait. (It should be noted that these classroom events took place before the surge in anti-Americanism associated with the presidency of George W. Bush.)

During the latter part of my time in Beirut, another set of issues arose that reveal as much about America and the West as about the Arab world. In 2003, AUB received a multimillion-dollar grant to establish a Center for American Studies. Prince Alwaleed bin Talal of Saudi Arabia provided the funds. At the time the university had little formal academic expertise on the United States. A professor of literature and I were the only Americanists then on the faculty. A group of AUB professors and administrators undertook intensive planning for the new center. I participated actively in this work. A key issue that arose during this process was the extent to which the American Studies starting to emerge in the Arab world should resemble the field as it is pursued in the United States and other Western countries. A concrete question in this regard was the identity of the practitioners. The American Studies program at AUB would surely be interdisciplinary. But which academic disciplines should participate? Following current Western practice would entail a strong focus on the humanities and on studies of culture. In history, the emphasis would be on the often bottom-up social and cultural history model that has dominated U.S. scholarship for more than a generation. Given the present circumstances in the Middle East, it is not at all apparent that this approach to American Studies is appropriate.

To emphasize the relatively innocuous content of the transcript, I also distributed to the class a document posted on the Internet several years after the first Iraq war. The unknown author of the latter piece apparently agreed that the Times transcript was not particularly incriminating. This person therefore fabricated a much more damaging interchange in which Glaspie does give Saddam the green light to seize Kuwait. (The second document is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix 2.) I also added a scholarly reading that sought to reconstruct Saddam’s rationale for the invasion. Confronted with this array of evidence, my students were forced to concede that the widely held conspiratorial view of the origins of the first Iraq war was not tenable. This approach went some ways towards recalibrating students’ overall understanding of the manner in which U.S. leaders conduct foreign policy.

The method also served classic goals of liberal arts education. Presenting the material as I did prodded students to think critically about the conventional wisdom and pushed them to form conclusions in an empirical manner, based on verifiable evidence.

The United States and the Middle East course touched on a range of other hot-button issues, which I handled in a similar way. Considerable time was spent demystifying the activities of U.S. oil companies in the Persian Gulf. The role of the pro-Israel lobby in American politics received a great deal of attention as well. The lobby certainly exerts significant influence on U.S. policymaking towards the Middle East. But as I stated in class, this reality hardly validates the view commonly held in the region that Jewish interests dominate the U.S. government. In an open, democratic society such as the United States, I pointed out, there is nothing exceptional about a well-organized interest group securing policies it views as critically important. Dynamics of this sort are indeed commonplace in U.S. politics. Examples include the National Rifle Association’s virtual veto on gun control, the farm lobby’s perpetuation of unpopular agricultural price supports, and the favorable tax and regulatory treatment obtained by numerous corporations.

Class consideration of the first Iraq war ended in considerable disarray that initial semester. I resolved to prepare materials for the future that would directly address conspiratorial interpretations of the crisis. To this end, I retrieved the Glaspie transcript from New York Times microfilm in the AUB library. In a subsequent semester, we examined the document. (I used the AUB library copy only after assuring myself that there was no possibility that the CIA had doctored it. Local habits of thought are easily adopted.)

After carefully reading the transcript, as my students and I did, one sees that the text demonstrates nothing like what it is purported to show. As I impressed upon students, the document represents the Iraqi government’s version of what transpired; surely no information damaging to the United States was deleted. The transcript shows that Saddam engaged in generalized saber-rattling during the meeting with Glaspie. But he never suggested that Iraq intended to invade and occupy all of Kuwait. And Glaspie said nothing that could be construed as assenting to such an extreme course of action. (Key passages from the transcript appear below in Appendix 1)

To emphasize the relatively
the academy provides an alternative society and history. In this context, celebratory narrative of American and, one imagines, much of the K-12 self-congratulatory and patriotic. Mainstream American culture is has value in its native setting. Whatever of American history. Whatever the scholarly merits, this approach has value in its native setting. Mainstream American culture is self-congratulatory and patriotic. Media coverage, political rhetoric, and, one imagines, much of the K-12 curriculum propound an essentially celebratory narrative of American society and history. In this context, a blast of critical skepticism from the academy provides an alternative viewpoint for college undergraduates and the society at large to consider. These dynamics are reversed in the

Arab world. The view of American society that appears in political discourse and media coverage there is skewed in the opposite direction. The picture is more negative in numerous respects than even many radical American critics would endorse. To reproduce in this Arab environment the highly critical U.S. approach to American Studies tends to reinforce existing norms rather than challenging them. At worst, such an approach provides the imprimatur of experts to the most uninformed and distorted assumptions about American society. No one benefits from such an arrangement, least of all the Arabs.

The Arab world badly needs to develop a more balanced intellectual perspective on American society. The wholesale import of an American Studies model developed in the United States, in response to American concerns, is not the best path for advancing this goal.

Appendix 1: Key Passages from the Genuine Glaspie-Hussein Transcript

Here are key sections from the lengthy transcript released by the Iraqi government of the meeting between April Glaspie and Saddam Hussein. The transcript is widely available online. It also can be found in The New York Times, September 23, 1990, and in numerous edited collections including Micah Sifrey and Christopher Cerf, The Iraq War Reader (Touchstone, 2003); Sifrey and Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader (Random House, 1997); and Phyllis Bennis, Michael Moushion, and Edward Said, eds., Beyond the Storm (Interlink, 1998).

GLASPIE: . . . Mr. President, not only do I want to say that President Bush wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he also wants an Iraqi contribution to peace and prosperity in the Middle East. President Bush is an intelligent man. He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.

You are right. It is true what you say that we do not want higher prices for oil. But I would ask you to examine the possibility of not charging too high a price for oil.

HUSSEIN: We do not want too high prices for oil. And I remind you that in 1974 I gave Tariq Aziz the idea for an article he wrote which criticized the policy of keeping oil prices high. It was the first Arab article which expressed this view.

TARIQ AZIZ: Our policy in OPEC opposes sudden jumps in oil prices.

HUSSEIN: The price at one stage had dropped to $12 a barrel and a reduction in the modest Iraqi budget of $6 billion to $7 billion is a disaster.

GLASPIE: I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.

I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60's. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly. With regard to all of this, can I ask you to see how the issue appears to us?

My assessment after 25 years' service in this area is that your objective must have strong backing from your Arab brothers. I now speak of oil. But you, Mr. President, have fought through a horrific and painful war. Frankly, we can only see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned. And for this reason, I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship -- not in the spirit of confrontation -- regarding your intentions.

I simply describe the concern of my Government. And I do not mean that...
the situation is a simple situation. But our concern is a simple one.

HUSSEIN: We do not ask people not to be concerned when peace is at issue. This is a noble human feeling which we all feel. It is natural for you as a superpower to be concerned. But what we ask is not to express your concern in a way that would make an aggressor believe that he is getting support for his aggression.

We want to find a just solution which will give us our rights but not deprive others of their rights. But at the same time, we want the others to know that our patience is running out regarding their action, which is harming even the milk our children drink, and the pensions of the widow who lost her husband during the war, and the pensions of the orphans who lost their parents.

As a country, we have the right to prosper. We lost so many opportunities, and the others should value the Iraqi role in their protection. Even this Iraqi [the President points to the interpreter] feels bitter like all other Iraqis. We are not aggressors but we do not accept aggression either. We sent them envoys and handwritten letters. We tried everything. We asked the Servant of the Two Shrines - King Fahd - to hold a four-member summit, but he suggested a meeting between the Oil Ministers. We agreed. And as you know, the meeting took place in Jidda. They reached an agreement which did not express what we wanted, but we agreed.

Only two days after the meeting, the Kuwaiti Oil Minister made a statement that contradicted the agreement. . .

GLASPIE: Mr. President, it would be helpful if you could give us an assessment of the effort made by your Arab brothers and whether they have achieved anything.

HUSSEIN: On this subject, we agreed with President Mubarak that the Prime Minister of Kuwait would meet with the deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council in Saudi Arabia, because the Saudis initiated contact with us, aided by President Mubarak’s efforts. He just telephoned me a short while ago to say the Kuwaitis have agreed to that suggestion.

GLASPIE: Congratulations.

HUSSEIN: A protocol meeting will be held in Saudi Arabia. Then the meeting will be transferred to Baghdad for deeper discussion directly between Kuwait and Iraq. We hope we will reach some result. We hope that the long-term view and the real interests will overcome Kuwaiti greed.

GLASPIE: May I ask you when you expect Sheik Saad to come to Baghdad?

HUSSEIN: I suppose it would be on Saturday or Monday at the latest. I told brother Mubarak that the agreement should be in Baghdad Saturday or Sunday. You know that brother Mubarak’s visits have always been a good omen.

GLASPIE: This is good news. Congratulations.

[HUSSEIN:] Brother President Mubarak told me they were scared. They said troops were only 20 kilometers north of the Arab League line. I said to him that regardless of what is there, whether they are police, border guards or army, and regardless of how many are there, and what they are doing, assure the Kuwaitis and give them our word that we are not going to do anything until we meet with them. When we meet and when we see that there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death, even though wisdom is above everything else.

There you have good news. [This paragraph was mistakenly attributed to Glaspie in the original version published in the New York Times. A correction in the Times’ late edition of September 30, 1990 confirmed that the speaker is Hussein.]

AZIZ: This is a journalistic exclusive.

GLASPIE: I am planning to go to the United States next Monday. I hope I will meet with President Bush in Washington next week. I thought to postpone my trip because of the difficulties we are facing. But now I will fly on Monday.

Appendix 2: Fabricated Glaspie-Hussein Transcript

Below is the bogus transcript of the Glaspie-Hussein meeting, viewed in April 2003 at the website whatreallyhappened.com. I have corrected a few obvious typographical errors. The same piece, without the compromising second short paragraph (“I cannot confirm the reliability of the source . . .”), was still posted in April 2009 at http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/ARTICLE5/april.html

April Glaspie Transcript

Yes, remember April Glaspie and her amazing stint at Middle East diplomacy?

I cannot confirm the reliability of the source, a strange website called which [sic] I found via a meta-search engine, but here’s their scoop on Glaspie and Hussein.

Saddam-Glaspie meeting

Transcript of Meeting Between Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie.

July 25, 1990 (Eight days before the August 2, 1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait)

July 25, 1990 - Presidential Palace - Baghdad

U.S. AMBASSADOR GLASPIE: I have direct instructions from President Bush to improve our relations with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As you know, I lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. (pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship - not confrontation - regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait’s borders?

SADDAM HUSSEIN: As you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give negotiations only this one more brief chance. (pause) When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept
death.

U.S. AMBASSADOR GLASPIE: What solutions would be acceptable?
SADDAM HUSSEIN: If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab - our strategic goal in our war with Iran - we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq (i.e., in Saddam’s view, including Kuwait) then we will give up all of the Shatt to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be. (pause) What is the United States’ opinion on this?

U.S. AMBASSADOR GLASPIE: We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960’s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America. (Saddam smiles)

On August 2, 1990, Saddam’s massed troops invade and occupy Kuwait.

Baghdad, September 2, 1990, U.S. Embassy

One month later, British journalists obtain the above tape and transcript of the Saddam - Glaspie meeting of July 29, 1990. Astounded, they confront Ms. Glaspie as she leaves the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

JOURNALIST 1: Are the transcripts (holding them up) correct, Madame Ambassador? (Ambassador Glaspie does not respond)

JOURNALIST 2: You knew Saddam was going to invade (Kuwait) but you didn’t warn him not to. You didn’t tell him America would defend Kuwait. You told him the opposite - that America was not associated with Kuwait.

JOURNALIST 1: You encouraged this aggression - his invasion. What were you thinking?

U.S. AMBASSADOR GLASPIE: Obviously, I didn’t think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait.

JOURNALIST 1: You thought he was just going to take some of it?

But, how could you? Saddam told you that if negotiations failed, he would give up his Iran (Shatt al Arab waterway) goal for the Whole of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be. You know that includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always viewed as an historic part of their country!

JOURNALIST 1: America green-lighted the invasion. At a minimum, you admit signaling Saddam that some aggression was okay - that the U.S. would not oppose a grab of the al-Rumeilah oil field, the disputed border strip and the Gulf Islands (including Bubiyan) - the territories claimed by Iraq?

(Ambassador Glaspie says nothing as a limousine door closed behind her and the car drives off.)

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Information last updated on 02/09/96.

David Koistinen is Assistant Professor of History at David Paterson University.
A Classroom Simulation on Humanitarian Intervention

Philip Nash

The editors of Passport would like to thank the SHAFR Teaching Committee for soliciting the following essay. Like other teaching-related articles that have appeared in Passport, this one may also be found on the SHAFR website, under “Teaching Services.”

I regularly teach a lower-division general education course on the Holocaust. The course ends with a week on “Aftermath and Legacies” during which, to help students think about the question of legacies and think about the contemporary issue of humanitarian intervention, I devote one fifty-minute class to a simulation in which students assume the roles of presidential advisers who must decide whether to recommend dispatching U.S. troops to thwart a current case of genocide.

There are good reasons to avoid role-playing or simulations in Holocaust courses. The excellent guide for teaching about the Holocaust on the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum website notes that “even when great care is taken to prepare a class for such an activity, simulating experiences from the Holocaust remains pedagogically unsound.” Students may be engaged, “but they often forget the purpose of the lesson and, even worse, they are left with the impression that they now know what it was like to suffer or even to participate during the Holocaust.” In the end, the only result may be “trivialization of the subject matter.”

However, I believe this simulation is sufficiently removed from the events of the Holocaust to allay such concerns. The exercise is set in the present and, most important, does not ask students to imagine themselves as victims or perpetrators, which is obviously the most problematic type of Holocaust simulation.

My course features a fairly standard chronological presentation of themes such as early anti-Semitism, the rise of the Nazis, and the persecution and annihilation of the Jews, followed by a more in-depth thematic treatment of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders. The unit on bystanders places particular emphasis on the United States. The class discusses anti-Semitism in the United States, the restrictive U.S. immigration and refugee policies, and what the United States did and did not do during World War II to rescue Jews. This discussion is followed by a section on the conclusion of the war, the final ordeals of the victims (such as the “death marches”), and the liberation of the concentration camps.

In the final week the class deals with “Aftermath and Legacies.” We explore issues such as postwar justice, the founding of the state of Israel, human rights, and post-1945 genocide. In addition to the usual reading assignment from the textbook and documents reader, I assign a brief selection on the 1994 Rwandan genocide from Samantha Power’s A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York, 2003), so that students know at least a little bit about one case of post-Holocaust genocide and how the United States reacted to it.

When the students arrive for the simulation class I instruct them to break up into their usual discussion groups (typically five or six groups of four to seven students each). They do this every week, so it is routine for them. I then give each student a copy of the following memo:

TOP SECRET—EYES ONLY

TO: The Senior White House Staff
FROM: The President
DATE: 12 December 2008
SUBJECT: Genocide in Congo
The Director of Central Intelligence has informed me that, according to confirmed intelligence reports, the ongoing civil war in Republic of Congo has devolved into a campaign of genocide. Reports indicate that the civilian death toll reaches into the tens of thousands, at the very least; thousands more are apparently being murdered every day.

The Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has indicated that the Congolese National Army—which is perpetrating the vast majority of the crimes—is large, professional, and equipped to such an extent that only introduction of significant U.S. forces will be able to stop the killings swiftly. Such a course, she adds, will doubtless result in significant U.S. casualties.

I should add that the United States has NO significant commercial or strategic interests in Congo; that there is NO organized Congolese immigrant population in the United States that might apply pressure on us; and that, due to the complete news blackout and execution of several foreign correspondents, there is virtually NO knowledge of these events among the American public. This case would therefore seem to present us with what is primarily a moral issue. I would like your recommendation as to whether the United States should intervene militarily in Congo.

Your BRIEF, ORGANIZED memorandum on this subject should:

First, clearly state your recommendation re: military intervention, either for or against

Second, list your supporting reasons, making substantial reference to relevant historical cases, both from the mid-
The 82nd Airborne Division has been placed on alert and is standing by at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. I would like your memorandum within the hour.

TOP SECRET—EYES ONLY

(The case need not involve Congo, of course; it could focus on another case, or a hypothetical one.)

After overcoming the difficulty of imagining me as president, the students quickly do what they are used to doing; they select a rapporteur, in this case to produce the memo, and begin discussion. Discussion comprises 15 percent of a student’s course grade; I make it clear at the outset that discussion entails not only attendance, but also informed participation, that is, participation based on having completed the reading (which the occasional pop quiz helps ensure). The rapporteur, a volunteer, gets bonus points for that day’s discussion; and I announce at the outset that I will select what they see as past mistakes, advocate seeking to avoid repetition of what the parents of the fallen that, well, their son or daughter had probably enlisted to secure money for college and knew that death in combat might be the trade-off. I gently suggested that this approach was rather callous and that the tone might not be right for such a letter. And, of course, there will always be a few students for whom there is no accounting: one student a few years back immediately began drawing a very detailed hand with middle finger raised and “Congo” written under it.

I have found that this assignment works rather well. Most students react favorably to it and engage the issues seriously. Moreover, they seem to enjoy the role-playing aspect of it and are thus more likely to participate. No doubt it helps that, by this point in the course, they have been meeting in the same discussion groups every week and are (usually) comfortable with each other. The assignment can be completed within fifty minutes, with time for a general class discussion in which we compare the groups’ memos. Substantively, I find it useful because it requires students to do several things.

First, they must hash out the basic issue among themselves and come up with a single position. As they begin, I point out that they may, if necessary, take a vote in their group, or indicate in the memo that they were not unanimous, but part of the purpose of the simulation is to get them to try to persuade each other if they initially disagree. On numerous occasions, some groups have in fact been unable to achieve unanimity, yet they have produced good memos (indeed, sometimes their memos are better than those of groups that had come quickly to consensus).

Incidentally, the groups’ conclusions fall across the entire spectrum. A few groups eagerly embrace American global dominance. Some groups, while seeking to avoid repetition of what they see as past mistakes, advocate intervention and explain in the letter to the parents that the United States must serve as a moral force in the world and, if necessary, even risk the lives of its soldiers to that end. Other groups typically argue that the United States cannot and should not police the world and that intervention against the Nazis was justified because the Third Reich represented a profound national security threat to the United States, not only a humanitarian threat to a foreign population. Other arguments are unabashedly isolationist. This range of responses suggests to me that the assignment is sufficiently “balanced” and does not steer students in any particular direction.

Second, the exercise prompts students to think about what they have learned in the course in a new context, apply it, and integrate it with very recent events. In a related sense, it also suggests to them, not so subtly, the value of historical knowledge. That understanding is always a nice bonus, given that the overwhelming majority of my students are not history majors.

Third, the simulation leads students, in effect, to “put their money where their mouths are.” That is, students are horrified by the Holocaust and usually dismayed that the United States did so little, so late to help its victims. They readily subscribe to the slogan, “never again” (indeed, many see that as the main value of the course itself coming into it: we must learn about the Holocaust in order to prevent its recurrence). But now they are asked to consider what price they are willing to pay to transform the slogan, finally, into reality—thus my deliberate framing of the problem in such a way as to eliminate artificially other, non-moral considerations.

And fourth, with this assignment, students must grapple with this broader question: When is the use of military force justified? Educated citizens should engage with this issue, particularly at a time when the United States is involved in two wars and when, in my view, presidents enjoy great latitude when it comes to placing troops in harm’s way. I find that this question is particularly meaningful for my students, especially since a number of them have served—or may yet serve—in Iraq or Afghanistan or have friends or loved ones who have done so.

This assignment may have significant flaws, and I am certain it could use further refinement. It entails, of course, a great deal of poetic license; it raises the sticky issue of the use, and potential distortion, of history for policymaking purposes; and it grossly oversimplifies what a “real world” humanitarian crisis looks like. I am open to suggestions. But I believe that this simulation, or one like it, could be used to
significant advantage in any foreign relations course.  

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“Breaking Down the Walls: Increasing the Discourse in the American Policy Making Community”

Arizona State University, in conjunction with the LBJ and George H.W. Bush Schools and SHAFR, announce a conference, “Breaking Down the Walls: Increasing the Discourse in the American Policy Making Community,” to be held at the Phoenix Wyndham Hotel, March 31-April 2, 2010. The conference will feature panels and roundtables that bring together academics from various disciplines including history, political science, communication, and law with people who are or have been active foreign policymakers in such groups as the U.S. military, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, and non-governmental organizations. The goal is to create a good conversation on historical and contemporary topics with modern-day applications, from both theoretical and practical viewpoints.

Topics will include trafficking, anti-Americanism, energy policy and national security, the environmental impact of war, counterinsurgency, intelligence failures and successes, immigration, public diplomacy, Congress and foreign policy, and global terrorism. Participants include Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, Ambassador John Maisto, Ambassador Barbara Barrett, Admiral Vern Clark, Colonel Gian Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobsen as well as many others, along with a strong core of distinguished academics. Keynote speakers for the luncheons and dinners will include Dr. George Herring and Admiral Jim Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Please join us for this great opportunity in the Valley of the Sun.

For more information, please see our website at: http://bdtw2010.com/ or contact Kyle Longley at kyle.longley@asu.edu
A number of scholarly organizations have research interests similar to those of SHAFR, but the one with the greatest overlap is probably the Peace History Society (PHS), an affiliate of the American Historical Association that was founded more than four decades ago as the Conference on Peace Research in History (CPRH). Although it was not officially established until 1964, the CPRH had its roots in the 1950s, when scholars were growing increasingly uneasy about the Cold War and the accompanying nuclear arms race and were looking for ways to apply their expertise to the quest for a more peaceful world. In 1957, a group of these scholars founded the Journal of Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan/Ann Arbor. Two years later, a number of peace research institutes were established, including the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan, the Peace Research Centre in Lancaster, England, the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, and the Gandhi Peace Foundation in New Delhi.

Peace research began to take root within the U.S. historical profession during the early 1960s. Starting in 1962, Arthur Waskow (then with the Washington, D.C.–based Peace Research Institute, which later became the Institute for Policy Studies) and Paul Lauter (of the American Friends Service Committee) sought to spark interest in peace-oriented scholarship among historians. Although this effort resulted in a session focused on disarmament during the AHA convention of December 1962, advocates of peace research felt that a more substantial initiative was needed. One of them, Charles Barker (a distinguished historian at Johns Hopkins University and a leader of the Baltimore chapter of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy), wrote in April 1963 to his friend Merle Curti (Frederick Jackson Turner Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin) that he looked forward to the day when “disarmers take to the streets with discipline like that of most of the Negroes.” Later that year, two Quaker historians, Frederick Tolles and Edwin Bronner, sent an invitation to “historians interested in peace research” to attend an informal meeting during the AHA convention that December in Philadelphia. Held at the nearby Friends Meeting House, the gathering, chaired by Curti, was attended by nearly fifty historians.

It proved an important meeting. Regarded as the founder of the fields of American intellectual history and American social history, Curti was one of the best-known historians in the United States. He had served as president of both the AHA and of the Organization of American Historians. Yet he was also a figure who had been a sharp critic of war and had done pioneering studies of the American peace movement. Therefore, his remarks upon the issue of peace research carried substantial weight. According to one record of the meeting, he mentioned “some of the difficulties he had run into in the course of discussing this issue with historians, particularly the reluctance to deal with controversial issues on the grounds that one’s emotional commitment conflicted with one’s scholarly commitment.” But, then, he asked whether “it was really appropriate to separate ourselves as scholars from ourselves as human beings,” and suggested that “scholarly inquiry might help in understanding the problems of war and peace.” By the end of the meeting, a continuing committee had been appointed to form a special conference group within the AHA and to hold a joint session with that organization at its convention the following year.

The result was the launching of the CPRH. In June 1964, the continuing committee issued a call to historians to join its efforts “to encourage the kind of research on the history of war, peace, violence and conflict that can clarify the causes of international peace and difficulties in creating it.” At the December 1964 AHA convention, the committee formally established the CPRH. Barker was elected the group’s first president, while Waskow (who had just finished his Ph.D. dissertation in history under Curti’s direction) became its secretary-treasurer.

In subsequent years, the new peace research organization compiled an impressive record. At the AHA convention of December 1965, it hosted a session entitled “Disarmament: Historic Successes and Failures” and sponsored a luncheon meeting addressed by Walter Millis, who addressed the issue of “Peace Research and the Historian.” The following year, the CPRH held its first joint session with the AHA, with Professor Hilary Conroy of the University of Pennsylvania chairing a session entitled “How Wars End.” At the organization’s luncheon meeting, Barker spoke on “A Deeper American Dilemma: Multiple Sovereignty Under Law Versus Unilateral Sovereignty and Violence.” Conroy was elected CPRH president and Berenice Carroll of the University of Illinois secretary-treasurer.

These intellectual exchanges took place against the backdrop of the escalating Vietnam War, and in the late 1960s, that war played an increasingly significant role in shaping topics for discussion. At the 1967 AHA meeting, the CPRH sponsored a session entitled “The Historian in a Time of Crisis.” Drawing a large audience, it featured papers by Arno Mayer (Princeton) and Staughton Lynd (Yale), with comments by Roy Nichols, Harold Hyman, and Carl Schorske. Mayer argued that the Johnson administration’s Munich-Vietnam analogy was dangerously faulty, while Lynd called upon historians to get out of the ivory tower and grapple with the issues raised by the
war. At the AHA’s annual meeting in 1968, the CPRH sponsored a session on “Minority Opposition Groups in World War I,” chaired by Roderic Davison (George Washington University), with papers by Charles Chatfield (Wittenberg University) and Kenneth Calkins (Kent State University) and commentaries by William S. Allen and Christopher Lasch. The organization’s luncheon meeting featured an address by Senator George McGovern, who spoke on “History, Policy, and Peace Research.”

Subsequently, the CPRH and—after a change of name in 1994—the Peace History Society also sponsored panels at meetings of the Organization of American Historians, the International Peace Research Association, the Berkshire Conference of Women Historians, the International Congress of Historical Sciences, and of other organizations, including SHAFR. In fact, the CPRH co-sponsored a number of conferences with SHAFR and the American Military Institute. On occasion, the CPRH/PHS sponsored conferences of its own. Among them were gatherings focused on wars and societies, peace research and its impact on the curriculum, the antiwar movement of the Vietnam era, and gender, race, identity, and citizenship. In the last few years, such conferences have included “Peace Activism and Scholarship: Historical Perspectives of Social, Economic, and Political Change” and “Historical Perspectives on Engendering War, Peace, and Justice.”

In 1972, the CPRH founded its own scholarly journal, with Carroll and Glenn Price (California State College, Sonoma) serving as the first co-editors. Initially, most CPRH leaders involved in establishing the new publication wanted to call it Peace and People. But officials at California State College at Sonoma, which was slated to host and partially fund the journal, worried that the title might sound radical and thus offend the sensibilities of the state’s conservative Republican governor, Ronald Reagan. Therefore, after considerable discussion, they settled on what they considered a less inflammatory title, Peace & Change. To widen its readership and expand its funding base, the CPRH brought in a co-sponsor, the Consortium on Peace Research, Education, and Development (COPRED). Eventually, COPRED, which had more of a social science orientation than did the CPRH, morphed into the Peace and Justice Studies Association, which continues to co-sponsor the journal. Overall, however, historical articles in Peace & Change have consistently outnumbered those with a social science bent.

The CPRH/PHS developed a number of other ventures as well. These included a quarterly newsletter (PHS News) and two prizes: the Charles DeBenedetti Prize (for an outstanding article in peace history) and the Scott Bills Memorial Prize (for an outstanding first book or dissertation in peace history). Both prizes are named after former CPRH/PHS presidents. More recently, the PHS established a Lifetime Achievement Award for peace historians. In addition, moving into the digital era, the PHS established H-Peace, a component of the H-Net system that provides for exchanges of information among peace researchers on research, grants, conferences, articles, and books. In the 1990s, at the instigation of Jeffrey Kimball and Irwin Abrams, the PHS initiated the Peace History Commission—part of a worldwide multidisciplinary organization, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). Thereafter, under the auspices of the Peace History Commission, PHS members journeyed to Malta, South Africa, Finland, Hungary, and other nations for IPRA conferences and engaged in face-to-face colloquies with their overseas counterparts.

Actually, even before the establishment of the Peace History Commission, the CPRH was active in building a worldwide network of peace-oriented historians. Perhaps its most significant venture along these lines was the European-American Consultation on Peace Research in History, a small gathering that convened in the summer of 1986 in a castle operated by the Austrian Peace Research Institute in Sclaining, Austria. Organized by Charles Chatfield, a former CPRH president, this conference attracted an all-star cast of peace researchers from not only the United States, but also Western Europe, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Many were very interesting people. Ferenc Kúszegei, a Hungarian, had organized the first independent peace group in his Communist country. Ralph Summy, an Australian, had been born in the United States but after the Cuban missile crisis had decided that the time had come to relocate to a country where there was a better chance of surviving a nuclear war. He subsequently became a very prominent peace researcher. On most occasions, the group gathered in the Castle Schlaining to present papers, and the discussion was lively.

But there was also plenty of time for banquets and tourism. One evening, the entire group left by bus for a local vineyard, where wooden tables and benches had been set up outdoors to enable them to sample the “new wine.” Joined by some locals, they downed bottle after bottle and were soon lifting their voices in songs from their respective countries. An American recently recovered from heart bypass surgery and having a wonderful time, asked one of the locals what the delicious spread was on the crackers that they were devouring along with the wine. “Pig fat,” came the answer. “Pig fat,” shrieked the American. “I’m eating pig fat!”

As it turned out, the Schlaining conference had some significant consequences. It cemented ties among leading peace researchers from different nations, most of whom had never met there for the first time. The conferences also agreed on a broad definition of peace research in history: the study of the historic causes and consequences of violent international conflict and of the historic search for alternatives to such conflict. Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen (of the University of Bradford) drew together fifteen of the most significant papers from the conference into a book, Peace Movements and Political Cultures. This book was but one of many collective writing projects sponsored by the CPRH/PHS. An early venture of this kind was a 360-volume reprint series, The Garland Library of War and Peace, edited by Blanche Wiesen Cook, Sandi Cooper, and Charles Chatfield. But there were numerous others, including Charles Barker’s Power and Law, John Chambers’s Peace Research and Its Impact on the Curriculum, Solomon Wank’s Doves and Diplomats, Berenice Carroll, Clinton Fink, and Jane Mohraz’s Peace and War, Charles DeBenedetti’s Peace
CALL FOR APPLICATIONS:

THE 2010 SHAFR SUMMER INSTITUTE
Madison, Wisconsin
June 18-23, 2010

CO-SPONSORED BY
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations will hold its third annual summer institute, in Madison, Wisconsin, on June 18-23, 2010. Designed for advanced graduate students and early-career faculty members researching all aspects of international history, the program will place particular emphasis on exploring and expanding each participant’s research, preparing early career scholars for the job market, and helping first-time authors prepare their work for publication. Each participant will receive travel, accommodations, and an honorarium of $500.

Jeffrey A. Engel of Texas A&M University and Mark A. Lawrence of the University of Texas at Austin will co-direct the institute, which will focus on the ways historical narratives are used in policy debates. Whether it is the supposed “lesson” of appeasement’s folly which motivated policymakers after World War II, or the more recent received wisdom that Ronald Reagan actively won the Cold War through military strength fused with inviolable principle, history is more than merely academic for many decision-makers. Policymakers and pundits alike employ particular readings of the past in order to understand their contemporary world and, more importantly, to buttress support for their particular choices about the future. For those faced with difficult decisions, history is often prescriptive.

Because studying the way decision-makers understood their past and thus their range of acceptable policy options improves an historian’s understanding of the past, participants in the 2010 institute will engage moments in which particular readings of the past directly informed policy debates. They will discuss such moments with scholars of this genre of international history, and with practitioners who employed history during the policy debates of their own careers.

The goals of the institute are mentorship, intellectual development, and professional fellowship. Participants will discuss assigned readings during the institute’s core sessions. Participants will also present their current research for discussion and critique in preparation for completing their dissertations and enhancing their subsequent employment prospects. Participants will also be exposed to entertainment and culture. The institute schedule is designed to enable participants to remain in Madison to attend the 2010 SHAFR annual meeting at the University of Wisconsin, on June 24-26.

The deadline for applications is February 1, 2010. Applicants should submit a cv along with a one-page letter detailing how participation in the institute would benefit their scholarship and career, to Griffin Rozell, Assistant Director of the Scowcroft Institute, at grozell@bushschool.tamu.edu. Additional information may be found at http://bush.tamu.edu/scowcroft/. Questions may be directed to jaengel@tamu.edu or malawrence@mail.utexas.edu.
Heroes in Twentieth-Century America, and Melvin Small and William Hoover's Give Peace a Chance. Not the least of these was Josephson's monumental Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders—750 essays on world peace leaders written by 250 specialists from 15 nations.16 Warren Kuehl's Biographical Dictionary of Internationalists17 started out as a CPRH venture and was supposed to be paired with Josephson's Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders. But Kuehl apparently grew frustrated with organizational delays and eventually decided to move forward with this project on his own. Even so, the two reference volumes were cross-indexed, and this fact, coupled with their marketing by the same publisher, led to their becoming companion volumes.

Another collective venture emerged because of an initiative by Soviet scholars. With the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev's liberalizing leadership in the Soviet Union, researchers at the Institute for General History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences seized the opportunity to contact the CPRH and inquire if it would like to work with them on producing an anthology of major writings on world peace. As this book, tentatively entitled Peace/Mir, would be the first Soviet work to break out of the straitjacket of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and provide Soviet citizens with genuinely peace-oriented essays, CPRH leaders found the idea very appealing. Determined to proceed with the project, Charles Chatfield secured a grant from the United States Institute of Peace that would fund travel by U.S. scholars to Moscow for a lengthy conference with Soviet participants. Consequently, a group of prominent CPRH members—Chatfield, Sandi Cooper (a specialist on European peace movements), Carole Fink (an historian of European diplomacy), David Patterson (an historian of the U.S. peace movement and the deputy historian at the U.S. Department of State), and I—set out on our mission to Moscow.

We ended up living and working in Moscow from June 22 to July 2, 1990. Ensconced in the Academy Hotel—a dingy, decrepit place, with sour-faced women grudgingly doling out limited supplies of toilet paper on each floor and serving what passed for food in a very tiny cafeteria—we nevertheless got on very well with our Soviet counterparts.18 Our initial fear that we might be pressed to accept the official Soviet view of things proved totally erroneous. For the most part, our hosts at the Institute for General History were sharply critical of the Communist regime and had no difficulty agreeing with us upon a broad range of essays for Peace/Mir. Our initial fear that we might be pressed to accept the official Soviet view of things proved totally erroneous. For the most part, our hosts at the Institute for General History were sharply critical of the Communist regime and had no difficulty agreeing with us upon a broad range of essays for Peace/Mir.

In the evenings, we joined them for dinner at their rather modest apartments, participated in large banquets, or were escorted to cultural events. All that remained was to wrap things up. Not long after our visit a small Soviet delegation—headed by the Institute's Ruzanna Ilukhina—met with us in the United States at Rutgers University. There we renewed friendships, put the finishing touches on Peace/Mir, and discussed plans for its publication. However, by the early 1990s, when the book was finally published in the United States and Russia,19 the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, and as a result the anthology was no longer extraordinary. On the other hand, we did have an impact on our Soviet counterparts—or so Ilukhina maintained. She said, in fact, that she took inspiration from what she had learned of peace activism when—together with thousands of others resisting the attempted coup by the Communist Old Guard in 1991—she stood defiantly in front of Moscow's government buildings bearing a sign that read: “Soldiers, Don't Shoot Your Mothers!”

Of course, aside from engaging in these collective writing projects, members of the CPRH/PHS turned out a great deal of scholarship on their own. Much of this scholarly work focused on peace movements and individual peace proponents, including major books by Harriet Alonso, Irwin Abrams, Scott Bennett, Donald Birn, Peter Brock, John Chambers, Charles Chatfield, Roger Chickering, Sandi Cooper, Charles DeBenedetti, Justus Doenecke, Frances Early, Michael Foley, Charles Howlett, David Hostetter, Kathleen Kennedy, Robbie Lieberman, Marian Mollin, David Patterson, Jo Ann Robinson, Timothy Smith, Amy Swerdlow, Lawrence Wittner, and Nigel Young.20 But many writings by CPRH/PHS members have dealt primarily with diplomacy, international organization, arms control and disarmament, civil defense, and even military ventures. These works include books by Blanche Wiesen Cook, Carole Fink, Dee Garrison, Joan Hoff, Jeffrey Kimball, Warren Kuehl, Howard Schonberger, Martin Sherwin, Melvin Small, Geoffrey Smith, and Lawrence Wittner.21 Indeed, John Chambers, a former CPRH president, served as the editor of a highly-regarded encyclopedia of military history.22

Naturally, then, there has been a confluence of interests between SHAFR and CPRH/PHS. This confluence is illustrated not only by occasional joint conference sessions and by some overlapping of leadership, but by SHAFR's Guide to American Foreign Relations since 1700, which includes sections on peace, arbitration, internationalism, disarmament, international organization, international law, and peace movements. Not surprisingly, many of these sections were written by CPRH members.23 It is also illustrated by the awarding of prizes. SHAFR gave the Robert Ferrell Book Prize to Jeffrey Kimball for his Nixon's Vietnam War and the Arthur Link Prize to Justus Doenecke for his In Danger Undaunted.24 SHAFR's Warren Kuehl Prize was awarded to Harriet Alonso, Frances Early, Lawrence Wittner, Charles DeBenedetti, Charles Chatfield, Melvin Small, and Harold Josephson for books they had written or edited.25 Conversely, the CPRH presented its Charles DeBenedetti award to Wittner for an article of his that appeared in Diplomatic History.26 One difference between the two societies is that PHS, unlike SHAFR, has the explicit goal of utilizing scholarly research to help secure a peaceful world. As
Arthur Waskow put it decades ago, the new organization "would not have gathered itself into being if its members had not cared about the future, as well as the past." To some SHAFR members, at least, this kind of problem-solving, "value-oriented" history is a dangerous thing and is bound to undermine objective historical research. But is their assumption correct? War, after all, is a genuine problem. In the past century, it led to the deaths of over a hundred million people, and today, in a world armed with some 24,000 nuclear weapons, it has the potential to annihilate the human race. Therefore, a good case can be made that it is perfectly appropriate for scholars to seek solutions to this problem and that, in their search for solutions, they will not necessarily lack objectivity. After all, is there anything wrong with biologists studying cancer in the hope of eradicating it or with psychologists studying mental illness with the goal of curing it? Why, then, should the phenomenon of mass violence not be studied by historians in an effort to help end it?

Although scholars differ in their answers to this question, the Peace History Society seems likely to continue for some time in its efforts to cast light on approaches to a more peaceful future. It recently elected a new and youthful slate of officers: Virginia Williams (Winthrop University), president; Doug Rossinow (Metropolitan State University), vice president; E. Timothy Smith (Barry University), treasurer; and Christy Snider (Berry College), treasurer. In October 2009, it held its annual conference, "Toward a Peaceful World: Historical Approaches to Creating Cultures of Peace," at Winthrop University, in Rock Hill, South Carolina. Peace & Change continues as well, as does the PHS quarterly newsletter, lots of scholarly activity, and a network of peace researchers that now stretches around the globe.

To learn more about the Peace History Society, SHAFR members can examine its website at http://www.peacehistorysociety.org/. People interested in joining can do so via the website or by contacting Professor Christy Snider, Department of History, 5010 Mt. Berry Station, Berry College, Mt. Berry, GA 30149.

Lawrence S. Wittner is Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany.

Notes:


Each year, the Mershon Center for International Security Studies presents the Edgar S. Furniss Book Award to an author whose first book makes an outstanding contribution to the field of international security.

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Passport January 2010
Frances Bolton and Africa, 1955-58

Andrew DeRoche

Frances Payne Bolton was born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1885. She attended local private schools and went to finishing schools in New York and Paris. When she returned to Ohio she became involved in charitable work, and after a stint volunteering with visiting nurses in Cleveland, took up the cause of nursing education. In 1907 she married Chester Bolton, and the couple settled in Lyndhurst, Ohio. Even though she had three children (a fourth died in infancy), Bolton continued her campaign to promote nursing education and during World War I served on a committee in Washington that established an army school for nurses.

Mrs. Bolton and her husband were both active in the Republican Party, and in 1928 Chester was elected to Congress. He was re-elected five times, but in 1939 he died unexpectedly, and Frances Bolton won a special election to take his place. She ran again in 1940 and earned a seat in Congress in her own right. She was re-elected to that seat fourteen times and did not leave Congress until 1969. In 1941 Bolton was appointed to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, where she remained for twenty-eight years. In the 1950s she chaired the subcommittee on Africa, and it was during her tenure in that position that she made her greatest contributions to U.S. foreign relations. At her own expense, she conducted a spectacular study mission to Africa in 1955. As a result of that trip the attention paid to Africa by the highest officials in Washington increased significantly.

In spite of Bolton's remarkable career, her life has attracted almost no attention from scholars. Although she was probably the single largest influence on U.S.–Africa relations during the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, recent studies of this period have ignored her completely. She was mentioned briefly in Thomas Noer's groundbreaking study of U.S. policy toward southern Africa, and Peter Schraeder quoted her once in reference to Ethiopia in his book on U.S. foreign policy and Africa, but he made no mention of her 1955 trip or the significance of her achievements. The few historians who have noted her study mission have underestimated its impact, particularly as it related to the creation of a separate African Bureau in the State Department in 1958, which has been attributed almost entirely to Vice President Richard Nixon. A recent article issued by the African Bureau itself credited Nixon and Ralph Bunche but failed to mention the congresswoman. By ignoring Bolton's role in the birth of the African Bureau, scholars (including myself) have distorted the historic record.

Of the 435 members of the House of Representatives in 1955, only 17 were women, and none of them contributed as much to foreign relations as Frances Bolton. Indeed, few women in all of American history have been as active in international affairs. However, just as her role has been ignored by historians of U.S.–Africa relations, she has also received very little attention in studies about women. Bolton garnered a brief mention in Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones's major work on women and foreign policy, but only regarding her views on World War II. The important volume edited by Edward Crapol left her out completely. One female contemporary of Bolton's whose international involvement has been thoroughly examined is Senator Margaret Chase Smith. Patricia Wallace's excellent biography of Smith discusses Bolton's close friendship with her but never indicates that Bolton was equally important in foreign relations. Finally, while Homer Calkin's book on women and the State Department does briefly describe Bolton's experience as a delegate to the United Nations, it includes nothing about her key role in the birth of State's African Bureau. By examining her 1955 Africa trip in some detail, this essay attempts to shine some light on Bolton and her tremendous contributions to American foreign relations.

On 30 August 1955 Representative Bolton departed from Washington, D.C., for a three-month epic journey of discovery. After changing planes in New York, London, and Paris, she touched down in Dakar late in the evening of 1 September. For the next six weeks she and her three companions experienced a whirlwind tour of West Africa, utilizing planes, cars, and boats. Setting the pattern for her entire trip, she observed Africans in their living quarters, visited local clinics and schools, and met with American diplomats and businessmen. She also talked with important political leaders, most notably Kwame Nkrumah, the future prime minister of Ghana. Many of her interactions were photographed or even filmed, and she produced three educational movies from the footage.

In mid-October the congresswoman crossed the Congo River
from Brazzaville on a small ferry for a lengthy stay in the Belgian Congo that began in Leopoldville (Kinshasa). Among the personnel she encountered at the U.S. consulate there was Margaret Tibbetts, who in her previous posting at the American embassy in London had laid out the Eisenhower administration’s position supporting the British amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland into the Rhodesian Federation. The U.S. position would remain essentially unchanged until Eisenhower left office in 1961.11 Tibbetts was an old family friend, too. Bolton took time out from her busy schedule to write a letter to Tibbetts’s father and assure him that Margaret was “doing a fine job.”12 Bolton was not the only one impressed by Tibbetts’s work: she would rise through the Foreign Service ranks and become ambassador to Norway in the 1960s.

After the chance meeting with Tibbetts in Leopoldville, Bolton flew east to visit Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi), a UN trusteeship administered by Belgium. She had an audience with the Queen Mother of the Watusi. The two powerful women discussed the challenges involved in raising children and then watched a wonderful display of dancing. After the ceremony, Bolton met a group of mothers with babies. She took one child in her arms and he began to cry. Instinctively shifting the boy to her hip, she was relieved when the baby and mother relaxed. A real human connection was made, and she was “flooded with a curious sensation of love and understanding of belonging, quite impossible to describe.”13 These encounters suggest that there was a unique benefit to having Bolton conduct the study mission, as it is hard to imagine a male official such as Richard Nixon making similar connections.

After an exhilarating experience in Albert National Park, where she was charged by a bull elephant, she flew to Elizabethville (Lubumbashi) in the mineral-rich Katanga region of the Congo and got back to business. She toured the large Prince Leopold mine at Kipushi; operated by the powerful Union Minière syndicate, the mine produced huge quantities of copper and zinc. From the mine she went on to inspect the company schools and clinics. While in Elizabethville, Bolton also visited a government hospital, met with the head of the American Methodist Mission in the Congo, visited the U.S. consulate, and granted a lengthy interview with the local press. “For the Elisabethville people it was an unique experience to meet an American lady in public life,” observed U.S. consul Thomas Murdock. He added that “everybody who met Mrs. Bolton found themselves fascinated by her charm and obvious sincerity.”14

Bolton’s first stop in Northern Rhodesia was at Nkana, to see the Rhokana mines owned by Anglo-American, a company controlled primarily by South Africans. Bolton and her companions briefly inspected the native houses at Nkana before proceeding on to Luanshya and the Roan Antelope Mine, owned by the Rhodesian Selection Trust, which was controlled by American investors. The Roan Antelope Mine also produced copper, which the United States desperately needed for military materiel and for consumer goods such as television sets. America had imported over 60,000 tons of copper from the African Copperbelt region in 1954 alone. In order to ensure continued access to Northern Rhodesian copper, the United States and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had both granted major loans to the Rhodesian Federation.15 Visiting this operation was therefore an important item on Bolton’s agenda.

The general manager of the mine, Jack Thompson, hosted an “extremely cordial reception” for the congresswoman.16 In her official final report, Bolton singled out the mine management for high praise. Unlike Anglo-American, which had “done a great deal for the cause of future racial harmony in Africa” and suggested that “news of the part played in the struggle by Americans should be more widely disseminated.”17

On 26 October Bolton spent the whole day touring Luanshya and the Roan mine facilities. Combined with her earlier visits to the operations of Union Minière in the Congo and Anglo-American at Nkana, her tour of this mine meant that she had inspected the social welfare efforts of the three major corporate entities operating in the Katanga/Copperbelt region. She was therefore able to reach some conclusions on what it was “possible to achieve in the way of social progress, with a mineral economy.”18 Bolton had long been involved in medical issues in the United States, doing much to advance nursing education, so it was natural that she would pay particular attention to health care during this trip. In Luanshya she inspected an “interesting hospital” at which over twenty-five operations were performed each day. Shots were administered outdoors. Over two thousand children had been born there, but sadly, birth “malformations” were common. Bolton speculated that these may have somehow reflected a “tribal” influence, but it seems more likely that they were an early sign of the toxic effects of mining practices that would later have such tragic repercussions in Zambian cities such as Kabwe.19

In Lusaka, the capital city of Northern Rhodesia, the congresswoman continued her focus on health care, stopping at the Tuberculosis X-Ray Detection Center, the Training School for Native Assistants, and the General Hospital for Natives. At the hospital, Bolton talked with a “very nice matron” who struggled with the task of preparing over a thousand meals per day in a very old kitchen. They had too many patients for the facility, but fortunately the staff was “more than usually adequate.” The matron also informed the congresswoman that there were “many abortions” performed at the hospital.20

The Chileshe family hosted Representative Bolton at their home. Safeli Chileshe was a successful businessman and one of four blacks appointed to the Northern Rhodesian legislative council. His wife Martha was equally influential. A leading figure in the Girl Guides movement, she was the first black woman in Northern Rhodesia to earn a driver’s license. The white examiners had repeatedly failed her, but she would not give up, and they eventually gave her a license.21 During the visit, Bolton talked mostly with the
Irrepressible Martha, who detailed the difficulties black women faced in Lusaka. She described their situation as being “very bad.”\(^{22}\) This enlightening conversation with Martha was undoubtedly a key reason that Bolton praised the black woman of the Federation in her final report, characterizing them as “making the most of the opportunities made possible to them.”\(^{23}\) On the afternoon of 27 October, Bolton’s party flew from Lusaka to Livingstone, where they stayed for two days.\(^{24}\) On 28 October the congresswoman “walked on the edge” of Victoria Falls. She then took a cruise up the Zambezi River and observed hippos, herons, and egrets. Perhaps most exotic of all, a small group of American tourists from Minnesota was also on the boat.\(^{25}\)

In South Africa, Bolton first visited the U.S. embassy in Pretoria. She then flew to Cape Town and made her way back up the coast, stopping in Port Elizabeth and Durban. The congresswoman had expressed her negative opinion of apartheid clearly in a December 1953 speech at the United Nations, and her 1955 tour did nothing to change that view.\(^{26}\) In her official report she summed up South Africa as being “so utterly beautiful, so rich, so full of misunderstanding and fear. Everywhere there is the cloud of anger, of indignation too well known for me to discuss here.” As for Southwest Africa (Namibia), which was essentially a colony of South Africa, she advocated a referendum among the residents, conducted by the UN.\(^{27}\) From Durban she flew to Lourenco Marques (Maputo) in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique for a brief visit, then returned to the Rhodesian Federation, this time to focus on Southern Rhodesia.

Bolton arrived in Salisbury on 10 November and spent a few days meeting with local American diplomats and Federation politicians and attending receptions and dinner parties. Sunday (13 November) found her at a Methodist mission in Mrewa, where she inspected the school and clinic. The highlight of the day was the church service. About 250 boys and girls marched into the church to the beat of drums. They sang hymns in their native language, including one by Brahms. The congresswoman was overwhelmed: “Such music! Only at Tuskegee Institute have I heard anything to equal it. The young rich voices have a rare quality which the perfection of pitch and rhythm give an effect which no words of mine can possibly describe.”\(^{28}\)

After the minister preached a lengthy sermon on the need for Christian education, he asked Bolton if she had a message from the people of the United States. She felt honored to address the congregation. She explained that the United States “was a land of many races” and that Americans were “indeed their brothers and sisters.” Bolton and her party then went for a hike in the nearby hills to see cave paintings and enjoyed a fine chicken dinner at the missionaries’ residence. It had been an “exquisite” day, she concluded, “one which will stay with each of us for many years to come.”\(^{29}\)

From Southern Rhodesia, Bolton and her party journeyed to Tanganyika. After two days there, they visited Zanzibar, Kenya, and Uganda. In Ethiopia, Bolton met with Emperor Haile Selassie. She then flew to Eritrea, Sudan, and finally Egypt.\(^{30}\) During her 6 December flight from Khartoum to Cairo, she found time to write lengthy letters to President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. She summarized her experiences and encouraged these architects of U.S. foreign policy to pay more attention to Africa in the future. She explained to the president that “we need to re-evaluate our methods and our policies.” Eisenhower was greatly impressed by her efforts and insights and believed that she would “be able to cast a lot of light and understanding in the Congress and among the people.”\(^{31}\) On 10 December, her ninety-nine-day African adventure came to an end. In late July she submitted her official report to Congress, detailing each of the twenty-four countries or colonies in Africa she had seen.

Bolton’s involvement with Africa blazed trails for the women who would take center stage in U.S.–Africa relations in the future. In 1972, soon after Bolton retired from Congress, President Richard Nixon appointed Jean Wilkowski as ambassador to Zambia. Wilkowski was the first American woman ambassador in Africa, and she played a key role in increasing U.S. diplomatic involvement in the region.\(^{32}\) Had Bolton lived until the late 1990s she would have seen women at the highest echelons in Washington. Madeleine Albright became secretary of state. Susan Rice was named assistant secretary for African affairs—the position Bolton helped create. The situation in 2009 still reflected her legacy, with Hilary Clinton as secretary of state and Rice back in the government as ambassador to the UN.

Bolton’s 1955 trip was a success in a number of ways. Not only did it set a precedent for women’s involvement with Africa in the future, it was also an extraordinary journey for a 70-year-old woman. Bolton visited so many places and gathered so much information that no American politician has ever surpassed her journey. Moreover, Bolton increased awareness of Africa at the highest levels in Washington with her letters to President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, her final report, her photos, her films, and her speeches before Congress. Her efforts, as much as anyone’s, helped to create a separate Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department in August 1958.\(^{33}\) As her colleague Congresswoman Edith Rogers (R-Mass.) stated moments before the new bureau was approved, “I have never known anyone more deserving of greater credit for this important work than the gentlewoman from Ohio.”\(^{34}\) Bolton’s role in the history of American foreign relations certainly deserves more scholarly attention, and hopefully this essay will inspire others to examine her work in more depth.

Andrew DeRoche is Professor of History at Front Range Community College.

Notes:
1. The only biography of Bolton was published over fifty years ago. See David Loth, A Long Way Forward: A Biography of Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton (New York, 1957). It is a well-written book but obviously includes nothing about the last two decades of her life.
3. See Thomas Noer, Cold War and Black
Passport January 2010

SHAFR.ORG NEEDS BLOGGERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

SHAFR.org wishes to thank its outstanding guest bloggers from the fall 2009: Laura Belmonte, Oklahoma State University; Will Gray, Purdue University; John Prados, the National Security Archive; Kimber Quinney, Cal State-San Marcos; and Molly Wood, Wittenberg University.

SHAFR members who are interested in serving as bloggers in the future should contact the webmaster, Brian Etheridge, at: briane@LaTech.edu. SHAFR.org’s editorial board is also happy to consider unsolicited single submissions. For more information, visit the SHAFR webpage at: www.shafr.org/news/

11. Tibbetts’ 1953 telegram to the State Department espousing American support for the British plan for the Federation is quoted in Andrew DeRoche, Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998 (Trenton, NJ, 2001).
15. Her career is briefly discussed in Calkin, Women in the Department of State, 109-11, 172. She is also mentioned in an essay by Joan Hoff-Wilson in Crapol's Women and American Foreign Policy but is erroneously referred to as Marjorie Jay Tibbetts.
17. Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio, USA (hereafter WRHS), Frances Payne Bolton Papers (hereafter BP), container 146, folder 2571, Bolton to Dr. Tibbetts, 11 October 1955. The Tibbetts family lived in Bethel, Maine, where Bolton's brother had been active in a health clinic and was also a major supporter of Gould Academy.
1. Personal and Professional Notes

Carol Anderson (Emory) was elected to the Nominating Committee of the American Historical Association.

Gary Hess (Bowling Green) retired after forty-five years of teaching at Bowling Green State University. He also received the Ohio Academy of History’s 2009 Distinguished Historian Award presented annually to a “historian whose teaching and scholarship, including substantial publications, have an interest to educated persons beyond the discipline of history.”

Galen Roger Perras (University of Ottawa), who received tenure and promotion to Associate Professor in 2008, was appointed as the Chair of the Graduate Studies Committee in History in July 2009, and won an Excellence in Education Award from the University of Ottawa (Canada) in 2009.

2. Research Notes

NSA Releases Documents Related to Leipzig October Revolution

In 1989, crowds of East German demonstrators took to the streets in Leipzig starting their own October revolution that would bring down the Berlin Wall a month later. Ironically, these peaceful crowds of about 70,000 people gathered in the streets and squares of Leipzig just two days after the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic and the visit by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to Berlin. Party General Secretary Erich Honecker’s security forces were faced with a choice—to apply the Chinese Tiananmen model or to go along with their Soviet patron’s advice not to use force. They chose the latter, and several days later Honecker was sent to retirement and replaced with reform Communist Egon Krenz on October 17, 1989.


For more information contact:
Svetlana Savranskaya or Thomas Blanton: 202-994-7000
http://www.nsaarchive.org

New Declassification Releases by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) on October War Intelligence and the Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program.

During the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research was one of the few U.S. intelligence organizations to dissent from the Bush administration’s allegations of a revved-up Iraqi nuclear program. Secretary of State Colin Powell ignored his own experts, but INR’s prescience raised its prestige.

INR also got it right in its forecast of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, according to a recently declassified post-mortem on the U.S. intelligence failure during the October War, published by the National Security Archive. In the spring of 1973, INR analysts wrote that, absent diplomatic progress in the Middle East, “the resumption of hostilities will become a better than even bet.” INR analysts argued that Egyptian president Anwar Sadat would go to war not for specific military objectives, but to take “military action which can be sustained long enough” to get the United States and the Soviet Union strongly involved in the Middle East peace process.

Among the other ISCAP releases are:
* A Special National Intelligence Estimate from December 1960, the U.S. government's first intelligence estimate on the purposes of Israeli nuclear activities at a nuclear reactor complex near Beersheba: “We believe that plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort.”

* Biographical sketches of members of the Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in 1969. For years, the CIA routinely refused to declassify its biographical reporting.

* A top secret report from November 1973 on the possibility that Moscow shipped nuclear weapons into Soviet bases in Egypt during the 1973 Middle East war.

* A National Intelligence Estimate from April 1986 on “The Likelihood of Nuclear Acts by Terrorist Groups” which found that the “prospects that terrorists will attempt high-level nuclear terrorism” was “low to very low.” While the CIA analysts speculated that even the terrorist groups of the 1980s may have had inhibitions against actions that produced civilian mass casualties, they suggested that the inhibitions could erode and that groups "with a different state of mind" could emerge.

For more information, visit http://www.nsarchive.org.

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The Secret Sentry: Declassified Documents Reveal the Inner Workings and Intelligence Gathering Operations of the National Security Agency

Declassified documents confirm that prior to the launch of the first spy satellites into orbit by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in the early 1960s, the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations conducted by the National Security Agency and its predecessor organizations were virtually the only viable means of gathering intelligence information about what was going on inside the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and other communist nations. Yet, for the most part, the NSA and its foreign partners could collect only bits and pieces of huge numbers of low-level, uncoded, plaintext messages, according to Archive visiting fellow, Matthew M. Aid, who posted a collection of declassified documents obtained for his book The Secret Sentry on the Archive's Web site.

The Secret Sentry discloses that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was far from the first time when U.S. government officials, including senior military commanders and the White House, "cherry picked" intelligence information to fit preconceived notions or policies and ignored intelligence that ran contrary to their expectations. The Secret Sentry and the documents posted show that widespread manipulation of intelligence also occurred during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, for example, when Washington ignored intelligence on Chinese intervention in Korea, resulting in catastrophic consequences.

The Secret Sentry also details how since the end of World War II, constant changes in computer, telecommunications, and communications security technologies have been the most important determinants of NSA’s ability to produce intelligence. NSA has oftentimes found itself behind the curve in terms of its ability or willingness to adapt to technological changes, with delays and bureaucratic inertia causing immense harm to the agency’s ability to perform its mission. As a result, during the past four decades NSA has dramatically increased the amount of the raw material that it collects, even while it has produced less and less intelligence information.

This posting of 24 documents consists of a selection of reports and memoranda prepared by NSA officials concerning the role played by Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in selected military conflicts and crises, a number of classified internal histories written by NSA historians on key events in the agency’s past, and a selection of declassified articles from NSA internal journals.

For more information contact:
Matthew Aid: 202-994-7000
http://www.nsarchive.org

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Brazil Conspired with U.S. to Overthrow Allende

In December 1971, President Richard Nixon and Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazu Medici discussed Brazil’s role in efforts to overthrow the elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile, formerly Top Secret records posted by the National Security Archive reveal. According to a declassified memorandum of conversation, Nixon asked Medici whether the Chilean military was capable of overthrowing Allende. "He felt that they were," Medici replied, "and made clear that Brazil was working toward this end."
According to the Top Secret "memcon" of the December 9, 1971, Oval Office meeting, Nixon offered his approval and support for Brazil’s intervention in Chile. "The President said that it was very important that Brazil and the United States work closely in this field. We could not take direction but if the Brazilians felt that there was something we could do to be helpful in this area, he would like President Medici to let him know. If money were required or other discreet aid, we might be able to make it available," Nixon stated. "This should be held in the greatest confidence."

The U.S. and Brazil, Nixon told Medici, "must try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to reverse these trends."

During the same meeting, President Medici asked Nixon if "we" should be supporting Cuban exiles who "had forces and could overthrow Castro's regime." Nixon responded "we should, as long as we did not push them into doing something that we could not support, and as long as our hand did not appear."

The documents were declassified in July as part of the State Department’s *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series.

The memcon records Nixon telling Medici that he "hoped we could cooperate closely, as there were many things that Brazil as a South American country could do that the U.S. could not." Indeed, the documentation reveals that Nixon believed that a special relationship with Brazil was so important that he proposed a secret back-channel between the two presidents "as a means of communicating directly outside of normal diplomatic channels." Médici named his private advisor and foreign minister Gibson Barbosa as his back-channel representative, but told Nixon that for "extremely private and delicate matters" Brazil would use Col. Manso Netto. Nixon named Kissinger as his representative for the special back channel.

Communications between Nixon and Medici using the special back-channel remain secret.

For more information contact:
Peter Kornbluh: 202-994-7000
http://www.nsarchive.org

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**CIA Torture Reports, and The Torture Archive: 83,000 Pages Now Online, Full-text and Indexed**

The National Security Archive has posted a side-by-side comparison of two very different versions of a 2004 report on the CIA’s "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities" by Agency Inspector General John Helgerson. Recently, the Obama administration released new portions of the report including considerably more information about the use of torture and other illegal practices by CIA interrogators than a version of the report declassified by the Bush administration in 2008.

New revelations include:

* Details on "specific unauthorized or undocumented torture techniques," including the use of guns, drills, threats, smoke, extreme cold, stress positions, "stiff brush and shackles," waterboarding, mock executions and "hard takedown."

* A look at the legal reasoning behind the Agency’s use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” and the development of Agency guidance on capture, detention, and interrogation.

* A brief discussion of the history of the CIA interrogation program, including the "resurgence of interest in teaching interrogation techniques" in the early 1980s "as one of several methods to foster foreign liaison relationships."

* The conclusion that, while CIA interrogations had produced useful intelligence, the "effectiveness of particular interrogation techniques in eliciting information that might not otherwise have been obtained" is not "so easily measured."

The National Security Archive also announced the publication of the Torture Archive; more than 83,000 pages of primary source documents (and thousands more to come) related to the detention and interrogation of individuals by the United States, in connection with the conduct of hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in the broader context of the "global war on terror." The goal of the Torture Archive is to become the online institutional memory for essential evidence on torture in U.S. policy.

With support from the Open Society Institute and the JEHT Foundation since 2006, this initial launch of the Torture Archive includes the complete set of declassified Combatant Status Review Tribunal and Administrative Review Board files from the Pentagon, and thousands of documents resulting from FOIA litigation brought by the American Civil
Previously Classified Interviews with Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades

During a 1972 command post exercise, according to top Soviet generals interviewed by Pentagon contractors at the end of the Cold War, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev “trembled” when he was asked to push a launch button, asking Soviet defense minister Grechko “this is definitely an exercise?” During the exercise, leaders of the Kremlin listened to a briefing on the results of a hypothetical war with the United States, in which a U.S. attack killed 80 million Soviet citizens and destroyed 85 percent of the country’s industrial capacity.

This story appears in a recently declassified two-volume study on Soviet Intentions, 1965-1985, prepared in 1995 by the Pentagon contractor BDM Corporation, and published for the first time by the National Security Archive. Based on an extraordinarily revealing series of interviews with former senior Soviet defense officials -- “unhappy Cold Warriors” -- during the final days of the Soviet Union, the BDM study puts Soviet nuclear policy in a fresh light by highlighting the leadership’s recognition of the catastrophe of nuclear conflict, even while it supported preparations for fighting an unsurvivable war.

BDM’s unique interview evidence with former Soviet military officers, military analysts, and industrial specialists covers a wide range of strategic issues, including force levels and postures, targeting and war planning, weapons effects, and the role of defense industries. BDM staffers compared this new evidence with mainly official and semi-official U.S. interpretations of Soviet strategic policy and decision-making during the Cold War. The BDM analysts identified what they saw as significant failures of analysis, including:

* Erring “on the side of overestimating Soviet aggressiveness” and underestimating “the extent to which the Soviet leadership was deterred from using nuclear weapons.”

* Seriously misjudging Soviet military intentions, “which had the potential [to] mislead ... U.S. decision makers in the event of an extreme crisis.”

* “Serious[ly] misunderstanding ... the Soviet decision-making process” by underestimating the “decisive influence exercised by the defense industry.” That the defense industrial complex, not the Soviet high command, played a key role in driving the quantitative arms buildup “led U.S. analysts to ... exaggerate the aggressive intentions of the Soviets.”

* The BDM study also shows that Soviet military high command “understood the devastating consequences of nuclear war” and believed that nuclear weapons use had to be avoided at “all costs.” In 1968, a Defense Ministry study showed that Moscow could not win a nuclear war; even if it launched a first strike. Although Soviet ideology had insisted that survival was possible, no one in the leadership believed that.

During the 1970s, Team B critics of CIA intelligence analysis argued that the Soviets believed that they could win a nuclear war. According to William Burr, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive, “these previously secret interviews show that inflated notions of the Soviet ‘present danger’ -- such as the Team B exercise -- were wrong, but that more conventional U.S. analysis -- Team A -- also misunderstood Soviet nuclear thinking and decision making.”

For more information, contact:
William Burr: 202-994-7032
http://www.nsarchive.org/nukevault

Briefing Book: JOE-1: U.S. Intelligence and the Detection of the First Soviet Nuclear Test, September 1949

Sixty years ago, President Harry Truman made headlines when he announced that the Soviet Union had secretly tested a nuclear weapon several weeks earlier. Truman did not explain how the United States had detected the test, which had occurred on August 29, 1949 at Semipalatinsk, a site in northeastern Kazakhstan. Using declassified material, much of which has never been published, this briefing book documents how the U.S. Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and U.S. scientific intelligence worked together to detect a nuclear test that intelligence analysts, still unaware of the
extent to which the Soviets had penetrated the Manhattan Project, did not expect so soon.

Stalin and the Soviet Politburo were probably stunned by Truman's announcement; they did not know that Washington had a surveillance system for detecting the tell-tale signs of a nuclear test and they wanted secrecy to avoid giving the United States an incentive to accelerate its nuclear weapons activities. Joe-1 (as U.S. intelligence designated it) was also a jolt for U.S. intelligence analysis, which for several years had asserted that the Soviets were unlikely to have the bomb before mid-1953, although mid-1950 was also possible.

For more information, contact:
William Burr: 202-994-7000
http://www.nsarchive.org
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb286/

Conspiracy of Silence?: Colombia, the United States and the El Salado Massacre

The United States harbored serious concerns about the potential involvement of Colombian security forces in the February 2000 massacre at El Salado, an attack that occurred while the two countries were hammering out the final details of the massive military aid package known as Plan Colombia, according to declassified documents posted on the National Security Archive Web site.

The massacre, orchestrated and carried out by paramilitaries from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), an illegal paramilitary army, has long been alleged to have been facilitated by Colombian security forces, including those from the Colombian Navy’s 1st Marine Infantry Brigade, by vacating the town before the carnage began and constructing roadblocks to delay the arrival of humanitarian aid. U.S. assistance under Plan Colombia required the Colombian military to demonstrate progress in breaking ties with paramilitary forces.

The documents described in the article below--and in Spanish on the Web site of Semana (Colombia’s leading news magazine)--show that U.S. officials had significant doubts about the credibility of their Colombian military counterparts and were well aware, even before El Salado, of the propensity of the Colombian military to act in concert with illegal paramilitary forces, whether through omission or commission.

These findings also complement those of Memoria Histórica, an independent group charged by Colombia’s National Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation with investigating the history of the country’s armed conflict. Its report on El Salado, La Masacre de El Salado: Esa Guerra No Era Nuestra (The El Salado Massacre: That Was Not Our War), was released this week before audiences in El Salado and Bogotá.

Highlights from the documents include:

* The U.S. Embassy's record of a January 1999 meeting in which Colombia's deputy army commander said that the Army "had no business pursuing paramilitaries" as they were “apolitical common criminals” that “did not threaten constitutional order through subversive activities.”

* Another 1999 report from U.S. military sources found that the Colombian armed forces had "not actively persecuted paramilitary group members because they see them as allies in the fight against the guerrillas, their common enemy."

* A U.S. military source who opined that evidence indicating some of the paramilitary members were wearing Colombian Army uniforms suggested “that many of the paramilitaries are ex-military members, or that they obtain the uniforms from military or ex-military members.”

* State Department talking points that pointed to the capture of a mere 11 of the 450 perpetrators of the massacre as evidence that the military had actively pursued the perpetrators and was improving its record against paramilitaries.

* A U.S. Embassy cable based on a conversation with a source apparently close to the investigation who strongly suggested that the Colombian military knew about the massacre ahead of time, cleared out of the town before the killing began and “had been lucky in capturing the eleven paramilitary members.”

* A document casting doubt on the military’s explanation of its role in El Salado, including the U.S. Embassy’s view that it was “difficult to believe that the town of El Salado had not been subject to threats of an attack prior to the massacre, considering the town is situated in a high conflict area.”

* A U.S. Embassy report on Admiral Rodrigo Quiñones, one of the military members alleged to have facilitated the massacre, noting that “an unmistakable pattern of similar allegations has followed him almost everywhere he has held
State Department Cable says Colombian Army Responsible for Palace of Justice Deaths, Disappearances

A declassified U.S. State Department document filed in a Colombian court blames the Colombian Army, and Col. Alfonso Plazas Vega in particular, for the deaths of over 70 people during military operations to retake the Palace of Justice building from insurgents who had seized the building in November 1985. The document, a January 1999 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, was obtained by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act.

The cable states in paragraph four that Col. Plazas Vega (misspelled as “Plazas Vargas”) “commanded the November, 1985 Army raid on the Supreme Court building” and that the operation “resulted in the deaths of more than 70 people, including eleven Supreme Court justices.” The Embassy adds that soldiers under the command of Col. Plazas Vega “killed a number of M-19 members and suspected collaborators hors de combat, including the Palace's cafeteria staff.”

Col. Plazas Vega is currently on trial for the disappearances of eleven civilians during the course of the operation, several of whom worked in the Palace cafeteria. The Palace of Justice tragedy began on November 6, 1985, after insurgents from the M-19 guerrilla group seized the building, taking a number of hostages. The building caught fire and burned to the ground during Colombian military and police force efforts to retake the Palace, killing most of the guerrillas and hostages still inside.

Other published documents provide new details on military operations to retake the building and on Colombia's fruitless efforts to find a diplomatic post for Col. Plazas Vega in the mid-1990s.

* In the midst of the crisis, the Embassy reported, “We understand that orders are to use all necessary force to retake building.” Another cable reported that, "FonMin [Foreign Minister] said that President, DefMin [Defense Minister], Chief of National Police, and he are all together, completely in accord and do not intend to let this matter drag out.”

* A pair of contradictory Embassy cables: one reporting that “surviving guerrillas have all been taken prisoner,” followed by another, two days later, reporting that “None of the guerrillas survived.”

* A February 1986 Embassy cable reporting that Colombian military influence on society and politics, “no doubt exercised at times of crisis such as the Palace of Justice takeover, is also sometimes overdrawn.”

* A highly-redacted U.S. Embassy document from 1996 regarding an inquiry about “human rights and narcotics allegations” against Col. Plazas Vega. Discussing his rejection as Colombian Consul to Hamburg by the German government, the cable notes that “[the State] Department concurred that the [Colombian government] be informally asked to withdraw Plazas' nomination?” The Embassy adds that, “None of the above allegations [against Plazas] were ever investigated by the authorities -- a common problem during the 1980's in Colombia.”

Kennan and Forrestal Papers Opened

Princeton University’s Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library has completed a one-year project to process the papers of George Kennan and James Forrestal, two Princeton alumni who were important figures in shaping U.S. policy at the inception of the Cold War.

Kennan, a diplomat and historian, is best known for writing the “Long Telegram” and the subsequent “X” article in Foreign Affairs in which he advocated for a new course in U.S.-Soviet relations that became known as “containment.” Kennan, a 1925 Princeton graduate, was involved in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union throughout most of his distinguished career in the U.S. Foreign Service. As a historian at the Institute for Advanced Study, he studied modern Russian and European history and became an important critic of American foreign policy. His papers document his entire career.
Forrestal, a 1915 Princeton alumnus and a Wall Street businessman, was the first U.S. secretary of defense, overseeing the unification of the U.S. military departments in 1947. He previously served as assistant to President Franklin Roosevelt as well as undersecretary and secretary of the Navy. His papers date from his service in the U.S. government during and immediately after World War II.

The finding aid for the George F. Kennan Papers is available online at http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/n009w2294 and the finding aid for the James V. Forrestal Papers is available at http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/8w32r561t.

The processing of these papers was completed in June and managed by project archivist Adriane Hanson. It was made possible through the support of the National Historical Publications and Records Commission.

As part of this project, the Arnold A. Rogow Papers on James V. Forrestal were also processed. The Rogow papers are composed of materials he collected for his book *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy* (1963) and include correspondence with individuals who knew Forrestal, Rogow’s notes, and other research materials. The finding aid is available at http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/2v23vt455.

For further information about these collections or about conducting research at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, visit:

Daniel J. Linke
University Archivist and Curator of Public Policy Papers
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library
Princeton University
http://www.princeton.edu/mudd/
http://blogs.princeton.edu/mudd/

Berlin Wall Materials

On the occasion of the 48th anniversary of the construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961 and the 20th Anniversary of its fall on November 9, 1989, CWIHP has created a new website section dedicated to the history of the Berlin Wall. This section highlights materials from the CWIHP Virtual Archive, CWIHP Bulletin, and Working Paper Series.

Explore this new material at: www.cwihp.org.

New Evidence on Inter-Korean Relations, 1971-1972

The North Korean International Documentation Project is pleased to announce the publication of NKIDP Document Reader #3, *New Evidence on Inter-Korean Relations, 1971-1972*. This latest addition to the NKIDP Document Reader series features newly available South Korean, Romanian, East German, and Bulgarian documents on the North-South dialogue, which marked the first significant thaw between the rival regimes on the Korean Peninsula.

The Reader can be downloaded at: www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/InterKoreanRels_DocReader_WEBFINAL.pdf.

CWIHP Conference Publication: From Helsinki to Belgrade

CWIHP is pleased to announce the publication of the proceedings of the international conference “From Helsinki to Belgrade--The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade 1977/78,” co-sponsored by CWIHP. Edited by Vladimir Bilandzic and Milan Kosanovic the recent publication includes papers delivered at the March 2008 conference “From Helsinki to Belgrade--The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade 1977/78.”

For more information, visit the conference website at: www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=541476.
Soviet-Indonesian Relations: New Evidence from Russian Archives

In this latest addition to the growing Parallel History Project’s materials on the Global Cold War, this collection by Ragna Boden analyzes early contacts between Indonesian Communists and their Soviet counterparts and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Jakarta. Her essay is accompanied by documentary evidence from the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI).

For more information or to access the collection, visit: www.php.isn.ethz.ch.

3. Announcements:

2010 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War
April 22-24, 2010, Washington D.C.

Three partner institutions, the George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW), the Center for Cold War Studies (CCWS) of the University of California Santa Barbara, and the Cold War Studies Centre at LSE IDEAS are pleased to announce their 2010 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War, to take place at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, April 22-24, 2010.

The conference is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to present papers and receive critical feedback from peers and experts in the field. We encourage submissions by graduate students working on any aspect of the Cold War, broadly defined. Of particular interest are papers that make use of newly available primary sources. A two-page proposal and a brief academic C.V. (in Word or PDF format) should be submitted to elidor@gwu.edu by February 4, 2010 to be considered. Please note in the subject line of your e-mail GRAD STUDENT COLD WAR CONF. Notification of acceptance will be made by February 25. Successful applicants will be expected to email their papers by March 26. Further questions may be directed to the conference coordinator, Elidor Mehilli, at the aforementioned email address.

The conference sessions will be chaired by prominent faculty members from GW, UCSB, LSE, and elsewhere. The accommodation cost of student participants will be covered by the organizers (from April 22-24), but students will need to cover the costs of their travel to Washington, D.C.

As in past years, a prize will be offered for the best paper. The winner will have the opportunity to publish the paper, after revising it, in the journal Cold War History. Graduate students from history as well as related fields are encouraged to apply.

In 2003, GW and UCSB first joined their separate spring conferences, and two years later, LSE became a co-sponsor. The three cold war centers now hold a jointly sponsored conference each year, alternating among the three campuses. For more information on our three programs, please visit the respective Web sites:
http://www.ieres.org for GWCW;
http://www.history.ucsb.edu/projects/ccwsfor CCWS;
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/IDEAS for IDEAS-CWSC.

For more information contact:
Elidor Mehilli
Conference Coordinator
PhD Candidate, Princeton University
Mellon Fellow in Contemporary History
George Washington University
elidor@gwu.edu
http://www.ieres.org

CFP: 'Education and Empire'
Sixth Galway Conference on Colonialism
June 24-26, 2010, Galway, Ireland

The aim of this interdisciplinary conference is to explore the role of education in shaping, promoting, and challenging imperial and colonial ideologies, institutions, and processes throughout the modern world. We invite papers that address the following themes:

• the role of educational institutions, ranging from primary schools to institutions of higher education such as universities,
missionary colleges, engineering and medical schools, and so on, in shaping imperial, colonial and global processes.

- the relationship between imperialism, colonialism and the development of modern knowledge systems, including new disciplines and new techniques of rule, particularly in areas such as science.

- the development of curriculum innovation to meet the needs of empire.

- education about imperial history (during and after empire).

- education and imperial and (post-)colonial models of childhood.

- education and the creation of professional diasporas.

- types and patterns of knowledge transfer within the framework of empire, including publications and broadcasting relating to education, science, technology, health and government, both between metropoles and colonies and within and between colonies.

- the insecurities or failures of imperial and colonial educational and knowledge practices, as well as of resistances to these practices.

- transitions in educational practice, either from pre-colonial to colonial or colonial to post-colonial eras.

Since this conference is being in part funded through a grant provided by the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences to an inter-university group to explore the relationship between empire and higher education in Ireland, papers are especially invited for a strand exploring the particularity of Irish institutions of higher education in shaping the above processes, and of the role of higher education in shaping Ireland’s ambiguous coloniality.

Papers should be no longer than 20 minutes.

Please submit an abstract, of not more than 300 words, to Fiona Bateman and Muireann O’Cinneide at www.conference.ie before January 31, 2010.

For more information, contact:
Fiona Bateman
SSRC
St Declan’s
Distillery Road
NUI Galway
Ireland
00 353 91 492280
fiona.bateman@nuigalway.ie
http://www.conference.ie/

CFP: “1898 and Transnational American Studies”

As Amy Kaplan has suggested, the events surrounding U.S. interventions and acquisitions in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and Hawai’i in 1898 were not an imperialist “aberration” from the course of U.S. history. Research focusing on the Spanish-American War of 1898 has exposed important continuities between these overseas sites and domestic U.S. politics and culture. Scholars such as Kaplan, Ann Laura Stoler, Victor Bascara, Alfred McCoy, and Francisco Scarano have investigated the “intimacies of empire,” the “anarchy” it fosters, and the various ways in which the nation’s new unincorporated territories served as a “colonial crucible” for new developments in covert policing, surveillance, public health, and environmental management. Others—such as E. San Juan Jr., Vera Kutzinski, and Frances Negron-Muntaner—have uncovered political and literary continuities connecting 1898 with longer independence struggles in Cuba and the Philippines, and to subsequent developments such as the racialized migration of Filipinos and Puerto Ricans or the ongoing foreign interventions that have characterized the U.S.’s informal empire. Still, much work remains to be done in synthesizing and theorizing the range of cultural responses to the consolidation of U.S. imperialism in and around 1898.

A special forum for the Journal of Transnational American Studies will bring together cultural and critical perspectives from a range of locations in order to further our understanding of the reconfigurations of cultural and social space brought about by discrete but interconnected events including the Spanish-American War, the Philippine-American War, the annexation of Hawai’i, the occupation of American Samoa, and the U.S.-assisted Panamanian declaration of independence. Possible contributions include considerations of visual, historical, and literary archives; theoretical essays
that reframe understandings of U.S. empire, comparative anticolonial struggles, and the post/colonial literatures of 1898; new translations, with commentary, of significant texts that address events surrounding 1898; studies of domestic transformations precipitated by U.S. empire; analysis of gendered strategies of rule and resistance; comparative discussions that draw connections between differently positioned groups; and speculations on the resonances between 1898 and subsequent U.S. interventions.

Proposals for essays of 6,000-7,500 words should include a 1-page description of the contribution and a brief CV. Proposals are due by January 15, 2010, and should be submitted by email to Hsuan L. Hsu (hlhsu@ucdavis.edu). Completed essays, due by July 30, 2010, will be peer reviewed.

For more information, contact:
Hsuan Hsu
hlhsu@ucdavis.edu
http://repositories.cdlib.org/acgcc/jtas/

CFP: Gender Across Borders: Globalisms
April 2–3, 2010, Institute for Research & Education on Women & Gender, State University of New York at Buffalo

Gender Across Borders is a biennial forum for the interdisciplinary study and discussion of women and gender where scholars in fields ranging from the health sciences to comparative literature meet to share their research and work. Our theme for the 2010 conference is “Globalisms.”

On the brink of a climate catastrophe that will disproportionately affect women and other historically disenfranchised groups, and at a time when the global economy is devising new ways to reduce masculinity and femininity to market segments or consumer categories, it seems especially important to (re)consider the ways in which questions of gender and sexual difference intersect with our notions of what it means to be a global citizen. Our 2010 conference will thus convene scholars with diverse approaches to “the globe” in all of its various manifestations and permutations:

• the Material Globe: natural resources, global warming/climate change, ecology, environmentalism, agriculture, contamination.
• the Biomedical Globe: disease, ability, public health, reproductive rights, the pharmaceutical industry, global pandemics, transmission, infection, transgender medical issues.
• the Literary Globe: world literature, diasporic literature, transatlantic literature, travel literature, literature in exile, eco-poetics, translation.
• the Political/Economic Globe: globalization, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, world war, terrorism, international relations, the United Nations, humanitarianism, (post)colonialism, immigration, border crossings and encounters, global political movements, sex trafficking, human rights and everything in between.

We welcome proposals for pre-arranged panels, individual papers, and posters from all disciplines which address such questions from the specific perspectives of gender, sexual difference, and/or sexuality. Please send a brief proposal (300 words) and a short bio (100 words) as MS Word attachments to Lydia R. Kerr (lydiakerr@gmail.com). The deadline is January 15, 2010.

For more information, contact:
Lydia R. Kerr
Graduate Assistant
Institute for Research & Education on Women & Gender
State University of New York at Buffalo
716.645.5200
lydiakerr@gmail.com
http://genderin.buffalo.edu/genderacrossborders.php

CFP: 2010 Transatlantic Studies Association Annual Conference
July 12–15, 2010, St. Aidan’s College Durham University

The Chairman of the Transatlantic Studies Association, Prof. Alan Dobson (University of Dundee), and Conference Chair for 2010 Prof. John Dumbrell (Durham University), would like to extend an invitation to the 2010 Transatlantic Studies Association Conference.
Our outstanding 2010 plenary speakers will be: Mitchell Lerner (Ohio State University) & Rob Kroes (University of Amsterdam). There will also be a multi-disciplinary Roundtable on Vietnam and Transatlantic Relations, chaired by John Dumbrell.

Panel proposals and individual papers are welcome for any of the general or sub-panels. A 300-word abstract and brief CV should be submitted to panel leaders or to Alan Dobson by April 30, 2010.

The general panels, subpanels, and panel leaders for 2010:

1. Literature and Culture: Constance Post, cjpost@iastate.edu and Louise Walsh, walsh.lou@gmail.com
   Sub-panel: Transatlantic Exceptionalisms: Travel Literature and Ideologies, Cansu Özge Özmenc, oezmen@jacobs-university.de
2. Planning and the Environment: Tony Jackson, a.a.jackson@dundee.ac.uk and Deepak Gopinath, d.gopinath@dundee.ac.uk
3. Economics: Fiona Venn, vennj@essex.ac.uk, Jeff Engel, jengel@bushschool.tamu.edu and Joe McKinney, joe_mckinney@baylor.edu
4. History, Security Studies and IR: Alan Dobson, a.p.dobson@dundee.ac.uk and David Ryan, david.ryan@ucc.ie
   Sub-panels:
   i) (Re)Turning Points in Transatlantic Security: nuclear arms control; and France’s re-integration into NATO: David Haglund, haglundd@post.queensu.ca, Michel Fortmann, fortmann@umontreal.ca and Annik Cizel, annick.cizel@univ-paris3.fr
   ii) NATO: Ellen Hallams, EHallams.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk and Luca Ratti, ratti@uniroma3.it
   iii) The London Embassy 1938-2009: 70 years in Grosvenor Square. Dr. Alison Holmes, a.holmes@yale.edu and Dr. J. Simon Rofe, jsimonrofe@le.ac.uk
   iv) Diplomats at War: The American Experience, Dr. Stewart A. Stewart, jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk and Dr. Rofe, jsimonrofe@le.ac.uk
5. Multi-disciplinary Panel: “Special Relationships” in Transatlantic Studies - what makes a “special relationship” special? Tony McCulloch, tony.mcculloch@canterbury.ac.uk

CFP: Secessions: From the American Revolution to Civil War
October 22-23, 2010, Louisville, Kentucky

The Filson Institute for the Advanced Study of the Ohio Valley and the Upper South proposes a two-day academic conference to examine calls for secession or disunion in the United States from the Revolutionary era to the Civil War. The conference, which takes place in Louisville, Kentucky, at The Filson Historical Society, marks the 150th anniversary of South Carolina’s secession.

The conference seeks to explore the moments in U.S. history between 1783 and 1865 when Americans threatened or acted upon a perceived “right” to secede from or nullify the laws of national or state authorities. Nearly one hundred and fifty years ago, in December 1860, South Carolina declared its independence and seceded from the Union, helping to plunge the nation into Civil War. Secessionists believed they defended and upheld political values and traditions established during the Revolutionary era. Some claimed that the Declaration of Independence established a precedent for principled rebellion in opposition to “tyranny,” while states’ rights advocates defended secession as a constitutional right.

But southern secessionists were not the first to appeal to the Revolutionary tradition of disunion and rebellion or to the Constitution: between the Revolution and the Civil War many groups and political leaders, discontented with conditions in the nation, invoked the right to leave the union or nullify federal laws.

The organizers of the conference welcome paper and panel proposals that adopt a variety of approaches to the study of secession, including the social, economic, and cultural causes of secession; the political theories Americans used to justify secession; secession and the contested meanings of the American Revolution; secession as a means to effect progressive social change or conservative counter-revolution; the sources of opposition to secession within a seceding region; the factors that led some states or regions to reject secession; the role of the media in secession debates; the role of Native Americans in secession and separatist movements; secession and state formation; secession in trans-Atlantic and transnational perspective; and the memory of secession and war.

The organizers seek paper and panel proposals that explore a variety of nullification and separatist movements, such as:

- The State of Franklin
- The Spanish Conspiracy
• The Whiskey Rebellion
• The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
• The Burr/Wilkinson/Blennerhassett Conspiracy
• The Hartford Convention
• The Nullification Crisis and States’ Rights Theory
• The Republic of Texas
• Abolitionist Disunionism
• Northern Opposition to the Fugitive Slave Laws
• Secession in South Carolina and the Deep South States
• Secession in the Ohio Valley and Upper South
• Southern Unionism
• Secession within the Confederacy (West Virginia, Eastern Tennessee, the Free State of Jones)

A selection of revised essays from the conference will be published as part of The Filson’s “Ohio Valley and the Nation” book series with Ohio University Press.

Please send three copies of a proposal of no more than two pages clearly outlining subject, arguments, and relevance to the conference topic, and a vita of no more than two pages, to: The Filson Institute Conference, The Filson Historical Society, 1310 S. Third St., Louisville, Kentucky 40208.

Proposal deadline is April 5, 2010 (postmarked). Single papers or conference panels are welcomed. For panel proposals please provide a one-page summary of the panel in addition to paper proposals and vitas from each participant. The conference will meet in consecutive single sessions, with three sessions each day. Papers will be placed on-line on The Filson Historical Society’s website prior to the conference. Funds will be available to help defray some travel costs for presenters.

For more information:
Dr. A. Glenn Crothers
The Filson Institute Conference
The Filson Historical Society
1310 S. Third St.
Louisville, Kentucky 40208
502-635-5083
crothers@filsonhistorical.org

Anniversary of the Korean War
June 24-26, 2010, Victoria College, Victoria, Texas

The Victoria College/University of Houston-Victoria Library is commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Korean War by sponsoring a conference to be held at the Victoria College, Victoria, Texas, on June 24-26, 2010. Presentations on all aspects of the conflict will be considered. Proposals must include a brief biography, a one-paragraph abstract, and the name, street address, and e-mail address of the presenter.

Submissions should be sent to James M. Smallwood at jms8466@okstate.edu or by mail to 1413 S. Lindsay St., Gainesville, Texas 76240-5625, no later than January 15, 2010.

For more information, contact:
James Smallwood
Professor Emeritus, Oklahoma State University
1413 S. Lindsay St.
Gainesville, Texas 76240-5625
jms8466@okstate.edu

Peace & Change July 2009 Special Issue: The Iraq War

Peace & Change, the journal of the Peace History Society, is pleased to announce that its July 2009 issue is devoted entirely to the Iraq War and the “War on Terror.” The issue includes an essay on “The Origins of American Power in Iraq, 1941-1945,” by Christopher O’Sullivan and Manaf Damluji, an essay by Max Elbaum, “Ending U.S. Wars in Vietnam and
Iraq: Today’s Antiwar Dilemmas in Historical Perspective,” and over thirty reviews of books and four film reviews. The issue was conceived in part to help professors select readings and films for their students as the Iraq War and the abuse of prisoners at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib make their way into history, political science, sociology, and law classes. Many of the authors and reviewers whose work appears in the special issue are members of SHAFR. A complete table of contents is available by following the links to Wiley-Blackwell from the Peace & Change page on the PHS website, www.peacehistorysociety.org/journal.php.

A limited number of individual copies of the journal are available for $10, postpaid, from the guest editor: Prof. Robert Shaffer, History Department, Shippensburg University, 1871 Old Main Dr., Shippensburg, PA. 17257. Make checks out to “Peace History Society.”

Friends of the Princeton University Library Grants

Each year, the Friends of the Princeton University Library offer short-term Library Research Grants to promote scholarly use of the research collections. The Program in Hellenic Studies with the support of the Stanley J. Seeger Fund also supports a limited number of library fellowships in Hellenic studies, and the Cotsen Children’s Library supports research in its collection on aspects of children’s books. The Maxwell Fund supports research on materials dealing with Portuguese-speaking cultures. In addition, starting this year, awards will be made from the Sid Lapidus ’59 Research Fund for Studies of the Age of Revolution and the Enlightenment in the Atlantic World. This award covers work using materials pertinent to this topic donated by Mr. Lapidus as well as other also relevant materials in the collections.

These Library Research Grants, which have a value of up to $3,500 each, are meant to help defray expenses incurred in traveling to and residing in Princeton during the tenure of the grant. The length of the grant will depend on the applicant’s research proposal, but is ordinarily up to one month. Library Research Grants awarded in this academic year are tenable from May 2010 to April 2011, and the deadline for applications is January 15, 2010.

Applicants are asked to complete an online application form and submit a single Word or PDF file (preferred) containing a budget form, a curriculum vitae or résumé, and a research proposal not exceeding one thousand words in length. Applicants must also arrange for two confidential letters of recommendation to be sent directly to the Library Research Grants Committee at the address given below. To begin the application process, visit this web page: <http://www.princeton.edu/rbsc/fellowships/instructions.html>.

The proposal should address specifically the relevance to the proposed research of unique resources found in the Princeton University Library collections. Applications will be considered for scholarly use of archives, manuscripts, rare books, and other rare and unique holdings of the Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, including Mudd Library; as well as rare books in Marquand Library of Art and Archaeology, and in the East Asian Library (Gest Collection). Prospective grantees are urged to consult the Library’s home page at http://library.princeton.edu/ for detailed descriptions of the collections, especially those in the Department of Rare Books and Special Collections. Applicants should have specific Princeton resources in mind as they prepare their proposals. The general circulating collections and electronic resources of the Princeton University Library are not relevant for purposes of this grant program.

A committee consisting of members of the faculty, the library staff, and the Friends will award the grants on the basis of the relevance of the proposal to unique holdings of the library, the merits and significance of the project, and the applicant’s scholarly qualifications. Awards will be made by April 1, 2010.

For questions, send e-mail to: pulgrant@princeton.edu

CFP: The Global South

The Twelfth Annual Conference of the Marxist Reading Group

In the context of global capital, developing countries have been referred to as the “Global South.” The term can be understood as a hemispheric replacement for the three-worlds model that emerged from area studies during the Cold War. However, this pointedly geographic designation does more than simply reaffirm capitalism’s exploitation of developing countries. Beyond dividing the world in half economically, it divides the world racially between the Euro-American and the rest. This model also encodes a regionalism upon developing or economically disadvantaged areas, given capital’s political, cultural, and economic marginalization of them as primarily working-class or provincial places—tendencies that manifest from as early as the triangle trade and colonization to today’s movement of manufacturing jobs and affective labor to Southeast Asia and Latin America. These trends indicate a long existing economic, racial, and regional fault line along which the power may dramatically shift in the near future.
The twelfth annual conference of the Marxist Reading Group seeks to investigate from a Marxist perspective how regional, marginalized, or racialized identities, practices, cultures, histories, and economies form within and influence global affairs. Has the hemispheric bifurcation of north and south always existed? How do the political and social circumstances of the Cold War lead to our conceptions of today’s economies along hemispheric lines? How is race a factor in the split? How does “south”—a term fraught with regional problems for the U.S.—become a global term? How has the current economic recession refigured the balance of the hemispheres? And finally, how might these inquiries renew or revise models of centers and peripheries?

Possible topics include but are not limited to:
• Histories of the Global South, both geographically and as a cultural context
• Finance capital and the global recession
• Indigenous decolonialization
• Gender and the informal sector of the global economy
• Migration of laborers
• Historical (re)constructions of the Global South
• Commodification of regional identities
• Exceptionalisms, American, regional, or otherwise
• Postcolonial feminism—domestic, cross-regional, and international
• Critical Cartographic representations of developed or undeveloped countries or both
• Literature, film, culture, or politics of the Global South
• Red states and blue states, in the U.S. and globally
• Unions and labor practices in the Global South

Please submit a 250-word abstract (and some subject keywords) for a 20-minute presentation along with a short biography and contact information to theufmrg@gmail.com by January 22, 2010. Please indicate any a/v requirements (DVD player and data projection available). Authors of accepted papers will be notified by February 5, 2010. For questions concerning the conference, please contact us at theufmrg@gmail.com.

For further information:

Jordan Dominy
Department of English
University of Florida
jjdominy@ufl.edu
http://www.english.ufl.edu/mrg/

Call for Contributors: Diplomats at War: The American Experience

Following the successful publication and reception of Diplomats at War: The British and Commonwealth Experience (Martin Nijhoff, 2008), Dr. Andrew Stewart and Dr. J. Simon Rofe are seeking contributors to a volume addressing the experience of diplomatic envoys in or from the Americas during times of conflict. The work considers an envoy in broad terms, including a Presidential or Prime Ministerial ‘Special Representative’; a member of the government or opposition; or NGO; or a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an Ambassador, or other embassy official. The important criteria is that the envoys were influential in determining events while either the nation they were representing or the one in which they were posted was at war. The work focuses upon envoys during the twentieth century though others from beyond this timeframe may be considered. Further, we would seek to include a range of scholars and those who may currently be located beyond the ‘Atlantic World’. We envisage twelve chapters of up to 7500 words.

If you are interested in contributing or have any additional queries about this project please do not hesitate to be in touch with either Dr. Stewart at: AStewart.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk or Dr. Rofe: jsimonrofe@le.ac.uk

Dole Institute Grants

The Dole Institute of Politics at the University of Kansas is announcing a travel grants program intended to defray costs associated with research related travel to the Dole Institute. This program will offer reimbursements of up to $750 to students at the university level including post-doctoral scholars and independent researchers. Scholars will have full access to Senator Bob Dole’s extensive collections, which document his 36-year career in the House and Senate and provide extensive documentation on specific legislative issues. Applicants are encouraged to browse the Dole Archive database or consult a Dole archivist for specific collections information, at the Dole Institute Archives: www.doleinstitute.
To apply for a 2009-2010 Travel Grant, please submit:

1. Completed Travel Grant Application.
2. A five-page research proposal which introduces your topic of research, indicates how this research project falls within the body of historical literature and addresses specifically how the Dole Archive may contribute to this research. Please also include possibilities for publication of your final research product.
3. Resume or Curriculum Vita.
4. Letter of reference (professional or academic).

In addition, applicants for a travel grant will need to submit a budget detailing the following costs:
- Roundtrip coach airfare (booked no less than one month in advance)
- Mileage (if traveling by car, at $0.55/mile)
- Lodging and meals

Travel grant applications will be reviewed on an ongoing basis. There is no deadline to apply and applications will be accepted until funds are exhausted. Application materials may be sent electronically to mrd@ku.edu or by mail to:

Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics
Attn: Research Fellowship
2350 Petefish Drive
Lawrence, KS 66045

Please direct all questions regarding the Dole Institute Archives Travel Grant program to:
Morgan R. Davis, Senior Archivist
785-864-1405
mrd@ku.edu

Fellowships and Seminars at The Center for Historical Research
The Ohio State University

The Center for Historical Research brings together faculty, students, and the general public to examine the historical foundation and development of critical issues of global importance. The Center offers resident fellowships for senior and junior faculty, as well as those completing dissertations. We also invite members of the academic community and independent scholars to make presentations at our seminars.

For the academic years 2009-2011, we are studying, “The Intersection of Diaspora, Immigration, and Gender in World History.” We believe that a gendered analysis of group migrations may reveal new patterns in diaspora and immigration history, shed light on specific migrations, and bridge the historiographical gap between diaspora and immigration histories. A gendered analysis of group migrations may help us better differentiate the meaning of forced and voluntary migrations, and the processes by which people maintained, discarded, and transformed their cultures, and their host cultures.

For the 2010-2011 academic year we are conducting a fellowship competition and seeking presenters whose research falls in the period from the 19th century to the present. We invite scholars from all disciplines, studying any peoples and geographic area(s) relevant to our program. Application information for fellowships can be found on our website, http://chr.osu.edu/, and are due by February 1, 2010. Those interested in making presentations at the seminars should contact the CHR director, Alan Gallay, at osuchr@osu.edu.

The Ohio State University is an Equal Opportunity/ Affirmative Action employer. Women, minorities, veterans, and individuals with disabilities are encouraged to apply.

For more information, contact:
Alan Gallay
The Center for Historical Research
The Ohio State University
Dulles Hall 253
230 W. 17th Ave.
Columbus, OH 43210
osuchr@osu.edu
http://chr.osu.edu/
2010-11 National Miller Center Fellowship Applications Now Online

The Governing America in a Global Era (GAGE) program at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs invites applications for the 2010-11 National Miller Center Fellowship. The Miller Center Fellowship is a competitive program for individuals completing their dissertations on American politics, foreign policy and world politics, or the impact of global affairs on the United States. The GAGE fellows represent a new cohort of academics who seek to address critical issues facing our nation by engaging a larger public in a discussion about patterns in American political development.

The fellowship provides up to eight $20,000 grants to support one year of research and writing. Along with the fellowship grant, the Miller Center assists the fellow in choosing a senior scholar as fellowship mentor to make suggestions on the literature in which the fellow should frame the project, read the fellows work, and give general advice on research.

The Miller Center also invites applications for the Wilson Carey McWilliams Fellowship. The McWilliams Fellowship supports a graduate student in political science or history whose dissertation combines the special blend of Political Theory and American Politics that characterized the late Wilson Carey McWilliams’ extraordinary scholarship. The applicant must be a Ph.D. candidate who is expecting to complete his or her dissertation by the conclusion of the fellowship year. The McWilliams fellow will participate in the regular Miller Center Fellowship program and will also be paired with a fellowship mentor.

The Miller Center encourages applicants from a broad range of disciplines, including but not limited to history, political science, policy studies, law, political economy, and sociology. Applicants will be judged on their scholarly quality and on their potential to shed new light upon contemporary developments in American Politics, Foreign Policy, or World Politics.

Requirements: An applicant must be 1) a Ph.D. candidate expecting to complete his or her dissertation by the conclusion of the fellowship year, or 2) an independent scholar working on a book. This is not a post-doctoral fellowship.

Residence is strongly encouraged but not required. All fellows are expected to participate in and contribute to the intellectual discourse at the Center, as well as attend conferences in Fall 2010 and May 2011. These two conferences will provide a forum for presenting research and findings to the scholarly community at the Miller Center and the University of Virginia.

To Apply: Please complete our online application at http://www.millercenter.org/academic/gage/fellowship.

All applications must be submitted online by February 1, 2010. Applicants will be notified of the selection committees decision in April 2010. Inquiries should be directed to Anne Mulligan at acm8k@virginia.edu or 434-243-8726, or Bart Elmore at bje5d@virginia.edu. Additional information is available at http://www.millercenter.org/academic/gage/fellowship.

The Governing America in a Global Era (GAGE) program examines the intersection and historical roots of contemporary American foreign policy and domestic politics. This groundbreaking initiative integrates the American Political Development and America in the World programs.

The Miller Center of Public Affairs is a leading nonpartisan public policy institution aimed at bringing together engaged citizens, scholars, members of the media, and government officials to focus on issues of national importance to the governance of the United States, with a special interest in the American presidency.

4. Letters to the Editor:

To Whom It May Concern:

I was thrilled when I received the news that I was awarded the 2008-2009 SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship. Until that moment, I was anticipating a difficult struggle in dividing my time between my teaching responsibilities and dissertation writing in the coming school year. The SHAFR funds freed me from that struggle and allowed me to devote the entire year to my dissertation writing. Such precious extra time guaranteed that I would complete a quality dissertation on time. In July 2009, I successfully defended my dissertation and graduated from the University of Georgia.

Among other things, I greatly appreciated the flexibility of my schedule this year. My prime work time is usually at night.
Without classes to teach the next day, I did not have to force myself to stop writing at midnight. I enjoyed the luxury of following my natural routine, which I believe helped me think and write better. Above all, I enjoyed the luxury of taking time to contemplate on the new ideas that emerged during the process of the dissertation writing. These ideas often demanded extra readings and sometimes led to revisions to the already-written parts. Without the extra time that I had, I might have chosen not to deal with many of them for the sake of completing the project on time. Fortunately and very graciously, the SHAFR funds gave me the luxury of time, which allowed me to develop a richer dissertation. I am very grateful for the help that these funds gave me.

Min Song
University of Georgia

October 2009
To Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Re: 2009 Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant – Report

As the 2009 recipient of the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant, I would like to express my sincere thanks to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) and the Bernath Grant Selection Committee. Thanks to the grant I was able to spend the majority of the academic year 2008-2009 conducting research for my doctoral dissertation in international archives. My doctoral research examines how Portuguese decolonization and Angolan independence compromised détente, and how revolutionary politics on the African continent challenged American foreign policy makers in the Ford administration. It aims to link intellectual and foreign relations history, investigating the ways in which decolonization and revolution destabilized the bipolar world.

Mention the Cold War and thoughts instinctively turn to Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, D.C. Few realize that significant Cold War struggles also took place in the African cities of Luanda, Kinshasa, and Pretoria. Yet in 1975 the unthinkable happened: a localized anti-colonial war of national liberation escalated sharply into an international crisis. The Angolan case was remarkable in the vehemence of its inter-partite conflict and the unprecedented level of external intervention. During the anti-colonial struggle, U.S. support bolstered the Portuguese metropole, contiguous African states harbored competing revolutionaries, and great and medium powers – including Cuba, China, and apartheid-era South Africa – provided weapons, combat troops, and mercenaries to the three main liberation parties. In the period of intense armed resistance, from 1961 to independence in 1975, the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA1 waged a struggle for the soul of the nation, competing as much for internal legitimacy (from Angolans) as for external recognition (from the international community). 2008 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the U.S. Bureau of African Affairs, yet the social and political histories of what anthropologist James Ferguson has termed “the inconvenient continent” remain critically underexplored, as does what Thomas Noer has called the “invisible chapter in American diplomacy.” Investigating the Ford Administration’s Angolan policy provides insight into how the United States responded to a diverse set of Cold War problems: race and revolution, nationalism and anticommunism, decolonization and fragmentation in the international system.

In October 2008 I completed a preliminary research trip to the National Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew, Surrey, examining European reactions to the Angolan crisis. The Bernath Grant allowed me to return to Kew in February 2009 and to spend another two weeks completing research at these archives, where I reviewed British and European communication from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Major collections consulted include: Liberation Movements in Southern Africa, United Kingdom Policy on Angola, and Cuban Involvement in Angola. Memoranda of conversation between European leaders and the Nixon and Ford administrations, as well as discussions among the Europeans themselves point to a period where the United States often looked to its western allies for guidance. These documents help to provide a multi-national context to the international history of the Angolan crisis, and provide a useful counterpoint to more prominent American views.

In May 2009, the Bernath Grant helped fund a major research trip to Lisbon, Portugal. There I visited three federal archives: the Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais/Torre do Tombo, the Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático and the Arquivo Histórico-Ultramarino, which specializes in holdings from the former Overseas Territories. For a different perspective I also visited two private archives, the Arquivo Mário Soares, which contains the records and recollections of former Prime Minister Soares, and the Centro de Informações e Documentação Amilcar Cabral (CIDAC), which was a Lisbon-based anti-imperialist organization in the 1960 and 1970s. CIDAC is now a well-known non-governmental organization with an excellent library and collection of original documents from the independence struggles.

I reviewed documents from Portuguese government sources (both pre- and post-1974), international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and from the liberation movements themselves. Collections consulted include: 10th Anniversary of the Organization of Africa Unity, International Aid to the liberation movements, and limited records from the Portuguese secret police (Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado, PIDE). The documents I have found on these trips, including a trove of revolutionary propaganda from the liberation parties (songs, poetry, military training and literacy manuals, posters, speeches, etc.), reflect many aspects of an extended and complex series of historical processes, which had implications far beyond their immediate borders. I also made useful contacts with Portuguese academics, researchers, Africanists, and archivists.

The Bernath Grant allowed me to begin my research earlier than anticipated, to meet my dissertation research goals for 2008-2009, and to maintain my teaching and graduate community commitments. Balancing professional and personal
obligations, teaching, and research can be a difficult task, and financial awards go a long way toward making the process more manageable. I was able to conduct research and be a teaching assistant, without taking on additional paid work to fund my research, or forfeiting professional development opportunities by spending long blocks of time abroad. Since the grant relieved part of the financial burden of multiarchival research, I am now well-positioned to make progress going forward into my fourth year. Once again, thank you to SHAFR for your continued support of emerging scholars.

Candace Sobers
University of Toronto

Note:
1. *The National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola Party, respectively. The parties are generally cited by their Portuguese acronyms.

5. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of $1,000 is awarded annually.

The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee’s c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee’s excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year’s OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer’s specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded $1,000 plus up to $500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in Diplomatic History.

To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2010. Nominations should be sent to:

Walter Hixson
University of Akron
Department of History
Arts & Science Building 216
302 Buchtel Common, Akron, OH 44325-1902
whixson@uakron.edu

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of $1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article’s acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

All articles appearing in Diplomatic History will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2009, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination by February 1 to:

Lien-Hang T. Nguyen
The Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of $2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient’s career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee’s major scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate’s career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate’s classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate’s services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-nominations are accepted.

Graebner awards are announced at SHAFR’s annual meeting. The next deadline for nominations is March 1, 2010. Submit materials to:
Marc Gallicchio
Department of History
Villanova University
403 St. Augustine Center
800 Lancaster Avenue
Villanova, PA 19085
marc.gallicchio@villanova.edu.

The Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize In International History

The Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize in International History recognizes the best dissertation writing by a rising historian who has completed a research project defined as international history. The Prize of $1,000 is awarded biannually (in even years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years. For a dissertation to qualify, the research must be multinational in framing and scope, and there will be a preference for works that have a multilingual source base. In endowing this prize, Oxford University Press hopes to recognize the stellar work of junior scholars and to highlight works that have not been the focus of area studies and other regional and national approaches. Winners will be invited to submit the resulting manuscript to Oxford University Press USA for a formal reading for possible publication. The authors must be members of SHAFR at the time of submission.

The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference (even years).

A dissertation may be submitted for consideration by the author or by the author’s advisor. Three copies of the dissertation should be submitted, along with a cover letter explaining why the dissertation deserves consideration. To be considered for the 2010 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 28, 2010. Submit materials to:

SHAFR Oxford Prize Committee
Department of History
Ohio State University
106 Dulles Hall
230 West 17th Avenue
Columbus OH 43210
SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship

SHAFR invites applications for its dissertation completion fellowship. SHAFR will make two, year-long awards, in the amount of $20,000 each, to support the writing and completion of the doctoral dissertation in the academic year 2009-10. These highly competitive fellowships will support the most promising doctoral candidates in the final phase of completing their dissertations. SHAFR membership is required.

Applicants should be candidates for the PhD in a humanities or social science doctoral program (most likely history), must have been admitted to candidacy, and must be at the writing stage, with all substantial research completed by the time of the award. Applicants should be working on a topic in the field of U.S. foreign relations history or international history, broadly defined, and must be current members of SHAFR. Because successful applicants are expected to finish writing the dissertation during the tenure of the fellowship, they should not engage in teaching opportunities or extensive paid work, except at the discretion of the Fellowship Committee. At the termination of the award period, recipients must provide a one page (250-word) report to the SHAFR Council on the use of the fellowship, to be considered for publication in Passport, the society newsletter.

The submission packet should include:
A one-page application letter describing the project’s significance, the applicant’s status, other support received or applied for and the prospects for completion within the year
A three-page (750 word) statement of the research
A curriculum vitae
A letter of recommendation from the primary doctoral advisor.

Applications should be sent by electronic mail to dissertation-fellowships@shafr.org., The subject line should clearly indicate “Last Name: SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship.”

The annual deadline for submissions is April 1. Fellowship awards will be decided by around May 1 and will be announced formally during the SHAFR annual meeting in June, with expenditure to be administered during the subsequent academic year.

5. Recent Publications of Interest

Allen, Michael J. Until the Last Man Comes Home: POWs, MIAs, and the Unending Vietnam War (North Carolina, 2009).
Asmus, Ronald. A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
Bailey, Beth. America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Harvard, 2009).
Carruthers, Susan L. Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing (California, 2009).
Chapman, John W. M. Ultronalism in German-Japanese Relations, 1930-45: From Wenneker to Sasakawa (Hawai‘i, 2009).
Cumings, Bruce. Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power (Yale, 2009).


Hassner, Ron E. *War On Sacred Grounds* (Cornell, 2009).


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In Memoriam: Saki R. Dockrill

Saki Ruth Dockrill died on 8 August 2009 in London after a long and courageous battle against cancer. She was an eminent historian of the Cold War, British and American foreign policy, international relations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and the Pacific War and its long-term ramifications for East Asian security.

Born in Osaka, Japan on 14 December 1952, Saki Dockrill gained a Masters in Law (LL.M) from Kyoto University in 1976, and a Masters degree in International Relations from the University of Sussex, in 1982. She received her Ph.D. from King’s College, University of London, in 1988. Her doctoral thesis on West German rearmament, Britain and NATO was published under the title Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-1955 by Cambridge University Press in 1991. During 1988-89, she was with the Department of History, Yale University, having been awarded one of the first three John M. Olin Fellowships. She regarded her time at Yale as an invaluable experience. It shaped her academic work for years to come, allowing her the opportunity to embark on assiduous archival research in American presidential libraries and NARA. She was thus able to broaden her understanding of U.S. foreign policy, related national security issues, and America’s interaction with Britain, continental Europe, and Japan, and in the meantime she acquired the confidence to address a larger international audience. The Eisenhower archives at Abilene, Kansas became her home away from home and she acquired a unique familiarity with their holdings. Her work there culminated in a series of articles and in her monograph Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961 (Macmillan/St Martin’s, 1996) which is still a reference point for historians of this period.

After her return to Britain, she joined the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, serving successively as MacArthur Fellow in 1992; lecturer, from 1992 until 1997; and senior lecturer from 1997 until 2003; and in April 2003 she was promoted Professor of Contemporary History and International Security. Devoted to the college and her department, she soon emerged as a scholar of international renown, an excellent teacher and a model administrator. Above all, however, Professor Dockrill was an inspirational, effective, and approachable teacher. She invariably made time available to her students and few will forget her lively and wide-ranging seminars. She freely shared her knowledge and opinions with students, while acknowledging theirs. Often, discussions would continue well after the end of the seminar. Along with her husband, the distinguished historian, Professor Michael L. Dockrill, she nurtured intellectually a generation of international historians well beyond KCL and the University of London. Her co-editing with G. Hughes of Palgrave Advances in Cold War History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) was a product of her desire to make available to students a textbook that contained recent historiographical developments on the Cold War. Her strengths as a teacher were recognized formally when in 2002 she was elected as a member of the Higher Education Academy.

Saki Dockrill was a thoughtful scholar with an extraordinary capacity for hard work and attention to detail. Her intellect was impressive. She combined an enquiring and restless mind with forensic research, and she was always ready to confront and consider new historical interpretations, never letting go of a topic until all aspects had been considered. Her voluminous publications have enriched the historiography of topics ranging from the Pacific War, the Cold War, transatlantic relations, Britain and Europe, the British retreat from East of Suez, and U.S. national security policy covering the Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush administrations. Fluent in several languages, her work was based on the deep mining of British, American, Japanese, French, and German archives. In addition to the books already mentioned, she also authored or co-edited the following works: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, ed. (Macmillan, 1994), Controversy and Compromise: Alliance Politics, between Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, 1945-67, ed. (Philio, 1998), Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of July 1955, ed. with G. Bischof (Louisiana University Press, 2000); Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World? (monograph), (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); L’Europe de l’Est et de l’Ouest dans la Guerre froide 1948 et 1953 ed. with Georges-Henri Soutou et al (Presses de l’Université de Paris Sorbonne, 2002); The End of the Cold War Era: The Transformation of the Global Security Order (Hodder Arnold/ OUP, 2005). She was the General Editor of the Macmillan Palgrave Cold War History and the Global Conflict and Security Book Series. She turned them both into hubs of innovative thinking and approaches. Nearly thirty books were published under her stewardship. Until the very last days of her final illness, she was working actively on a number of major research projects, including the Pacific War, its legacy, and contemporary East Asian security.

Professor Dockrill received research awards from the British Academy, the British Council, the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the European Union, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Japan Foundation, and the Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation. Most recently, she was awarded a prestigious Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship for her project “Impossible Victory: Japan in the Pacific War and its Contemporary Legacy.” Saki was not bound by the academic world. She was a fun-loving, feisty, elegant, and irrepressible woman with an array of interests. She was an accomplished pianist and painter and a keen gardener. She loved the cinema, theatre, pop music, and dancing. She was fascinated by the intricacies of jazz. She researched the tides of fashion - Harvey Nichols was a favourite haunt – as assiduously as any archive. Saki was a loving and doting wife, a dutiful daughter, and a wonderful and loyal friend who was always there for her friends during both good and bad times.

Professor Saki Dockrill is survived by her husband Professor Michael L. Dockrill.

Effie Pedaliu
18 August 2009
In Memoriam: Eduard M. Mark

Dr. Eduard M. Mark, a longtime member of SHAFR and major historian of the early Cold War, passed away on June 2, 2009. Born in 1943 and raised in New Jersey and Connecticut, Ed received his B.A. in English (1966) and his M.A. in History (1967) from the University of Connecticut. He then volunteered for the U.S. Army, receiving his commission in November 1968. He later credited the EC-121 incident of April 1969 with saving him from service in Vietnam, as it led to a reinforcement of American troops in Korea, where he was sent during the following summer. While in Korea he was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant, but he chose to leave the army in September 1970, receiving an honorable discharge. Returning to the graduate program at the University of Connecticut, he received his Ph.D. in 1978 with a dissertation entitled “The Interpretation of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1928-1947.” After teaching for a time at Mohegan Community College, in 1982 Ed accepted a position with the Air Force history program, where he worked until his death. Possessing a reading knowledge of German, Classical Greek, Latin, Russian, French, Rumanian, and Bulgarian and holding a top secret clearance to examine U.S. documents for the World War II and early post-war periods, he researched the origins of the Cold War in a depth virtually unmatched. His combination of high intelligence and great self-discipline enabled him to analyze issues with a rigor and sophistication that ensure his work’s lasting importance.

Ed’s most important contributions to Cold War scholarship were in articles on U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, which focused on the “open spheres of influence” concept advanced by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and State Department Soviet specialist Charles Bohlen during 1945 and 1946,1 on U.S. perceptions of Stalinism, which traced the evolution of attitudes from the 1920s to the late 1940s;2 the war scare of 1946, which illuminated the genuine concern in Washington about Soviet intentions and diplomatic tactics regarding Turkey;3 the Alger Hiss case, which helped establish to a level approaching certainty Hiss’s involvement in Soviet espionage;4 and the evolution of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s policy toward Europe during World War II and its immediate aftermath.5 Ed was also a frequent contributor to H-Diplo, for which he wrote numerous detailed, meticulously researched, and (rarely gently) argued commentaries.

Ed also wrote Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars, which was published by the Center for Air Force History in 1994, and “A Glooming Peace,” a book-length study of U.S. war plans during the early Cold War, which is currently in the last stages of a government declassification process. Other studies on the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe were in progress. Efforts are underway to make the completed portions of these studies, as well as some of the foreign language documents on which they are partly based, available to researchers.

In his spare moments away from research and writing on the Cold War, Ed spent considerable time on the rooftop of his condominium building on Capitol Hill peering through his telescope and the “light pollution” of the East Coast at the universe beyond the earth’s atmosphere. He also employed his classical Greek to study the life of Alexander the Great, a topic on which he occasionally lectured to friends over the phone or at dinner.

Ed possessed exceptional mental abilities. While some may have found him intolerant of their views, others knew him as a generous and valued friend who, especially in later years, made a genuine and commendable effort at self-awareness. His personal presence will be missed, but his work will live on.

David Alvarez
Geoff Roberts
William Stueck
Jonathan Winkler

Notes:
Ernest Richard May, the Charles Warren Professor of History at Harvard University, and a Past President of SHAFR, died of complications after surgery for cancer on June 1, 2009. To the legions of his former students, this news came as stunning and unexpected shock. Yes, Professor May was 80 years old, but his vitality and energy made him seem a permanent presence in our lives, someone we would always be able to contact for advice and counsel. It is still difficult for me not to hear him weighing in on our current foreign policy debates, from Afghanistan to Iran to Putin’s Russia. During a recent memorial service and conference in Cambridge honoring May’s legacy, Graham Allison, the former Dean of the Kennedy School and longtime collaborator and colleague of May’s, spoke for many of us when he said he still found himself pondering a critical issue, like the comparison of Afghanistan to Vietnam, only to say, “I’ve got to ask Ernie about that.” Indeed. Ernest May was not only one of the world’s leading authorities on the history of international relations, whose work over the last fifty years had a major impact on the field, but he was also a scholar who sought to use history to improve public policy and administration. His first book, The War and American Isolation, 1914-1917, won the George Louis Beer Prize of the American Historical Association in 1959. He went on to produce such definitive and influential books and essays including Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of the United States as Great Power (1961), “Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy” (1972), The Making of the Monroe Doctrine (1974), Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Between the Two World Wars (ed. and contributor, 1985), Thinking in Time: Uses of History for Decision Makers (with Richard Neustadt, 1986), The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (with Philip Zelikow, 1997), and Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (2000). In 2002, May was awarded the American Historical Association’s Award for Scholarly Distinction for pioneering research in international relations. Ernest May was also fascinated with the connection between our understanding of history and public policy, and he was dedicated to the idea that a better understanding of history could improve public policy. Graham Allison noted that “No other historian of recent memory has so successfully bridged the chasm between history and public policy.” Ernest had a genuine appreciation for the dilemmas and difficulties of public service, and a large number of his students entered government. (May would have pleased and very proud when Andrew “Drew” Erdmann, a former member of the Policy Planning Staff and one of his more recent doctoral students, literally flew back from Afghanistan, his hiking boots still on, to attend the memorial service.) May was a historical consultant for the Central Intelligence Agency, and his pioneering work in intelligence history led to his role as a senior advisor to the September 11 Commission. Along with John Steinbrunner and Thomas W. Wolfe, May co-authored the History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At the time of his death he was still an active teacher and scholar at Harvard, offering courses at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Ernest May was a man of many talents, not least his ability to read several languages and his extraordinarily wide-ranging interests. When computers were still in their infancy, I remember him telling me that he had purchased a software program that would allow him to train to be a pilot! Of course there was always his tennis game, which seemed to keep him perpetually youthful, vigorous, and always engaging, with new ideas and projects. Despite all his achievements and honors there was also a genuine humility to Ernest, rare among those who taught at Harvard for more than half a century. No student of Ernest May could not escape his passionate belief that history really mattered, and that better history could yield better policy. Recently I was working in the papers of McGeorge Bundy, only to find a letter from May shortly after Bundy, the former Dean of Harvard, had gone to Washington. Apologizing for being another bit of “unsolicited advice bearing a Cambridge postmark,” May lamented the absence of institutional memory within the government, and encouraged Kennedy’s National Security Adviser to consider the creation of an internal group of historians, who could provide incoming administrations with “brief but comprehensive histories of the Berlin question, the Indo China tangle, the Brazilian and Bolivian problems, and like subjects.” May’s idea does not seem to have gone anywhere, as Bundy was very hesitant about the idea of a “staff of historians” in his office. But this effort reflected May’s lifelong attempt to have policy makers and the academic community speaking and learning from each other, something not often in evidence in more recent times. Ernest Richard May was born in Fort Worth Texas on November 19, 1928, the only child of Ernest and Rachel Garza May. His mother’s family was of Mexican origin, an old landholding family in Texas before it was independent. May’s mother died when he was only four years old, and later when his father entered the military during World War II, May lived in a YMCA under the supervision of a guardian. Ernest went to California at the age of fifteen for college, and received his bachelor’s degree in 1948 and his doctorate in 1951 from UCLA. He served in the Navy during the Korean War and in 1954 joined the Harvard faculty, where he would spend the next 55 years. I knew Ernest for more than thirty years, ever since I walked into his office as a new graduate student intimidated by the world-famous professor. That feeling did not last long. Ernest was, at heart, a teacher, and his method, sometimes direct, sometimes by example,
had a profound effect. He taught me to question my assumptions, interrogate the evidence, and always consider the alternative hypothesis. One of his favorite quotations, one he used often in challenging the government leaders and the CIA officials he taught in his classes at the Kennedy School, was from Oliver Cromwell, when he wrote to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, “I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you might be mistaken.” My own hope is that the questioning Ernest provoked, the belief he held so deeply that better policy decisions and better governance could come from it, will be the legacy he leaves us.

Ernest May is survived by his wife, Susan Wood, three children from his first marriage, and three grandchildren. He is also survived by a more than half-century of doctoral and undergraduate students, who cherished his teaching and guidance, and who will dearly miss this gentle and kind man.

Thomas A. Schwartz, Vanderbilt University
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