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Marc Selverstone’s subject is the creation of the anti-communist Cold War mind-set that came to dominate Anglo-American foreign policy for many years: the positing of the “monolith” of Kremlin-directed subversion and challenge to democratic liberties. As Selverstone writes in his introduction, “The monolith functioned primarily as a metaphor—a simplification of reality—and therefore served as a kind of mental filter or psychological tool, satisfying the very human need to fit voluminous and often conflicting information into manageable categories” (3). Constructing the Monolith draws on the substantial secondary literature on this subject (including the work of British scholars such as Martin Folly, Diane Kirby, and Richard Aldrich) and is rooted in first-hand, detailed examination of British and American archives. The result is a very original, subtle and sophisticated evocation of U.S.–UK policy debates in the early Cold War.

Selverstone does far more than make the relatively simple argument that monolithic anti-communism was both unfortunate and counterproductive. He cannot, however, resist comparing monolithic anti-communism with President George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” (7), and his book can be read as an oblique contribution to twenty-first century policy debates. A central concern of the early part of Constructing the Monolith is how to explain the reluctance of U.S.–UK policy elites to recognize the pre-1940 rifts in international communism. Selverstone posits a particular “Anglo-American historical consciousness” emerging from the turmoil of the 1930s, with only a handful of diplomats (such as Gladwyn Jebb at the Foreign Office in London) questioning the simple “red fascist” typology of post-1945 international communism. By the end of 1946, George Kennan and Winston Churchill had done their part to further construction of the monolith. (Although he acknowledges Churchill’s view of the enigmatic nature of the USSR, Selverstone offers a rather one-dimensional interpretation of Churchill’s contribution to the early Cold War; in this connection, readers should consult the recent work of Klaus Larres.)

Selverstone links the developing dynamics of the Cold War to domestic political battles (notably Harry Truman’s dismissal of Henry Wallace and the “revolt” of Labour MPs such as Ian Mikardo and Michael Foot). What he calls “the binary universe”—the historic battle between the forces of democratic light and communist darkness—became central to the public diplomacy of the period. Selverstone is particularly good at linking public-private propagandist discourse in the early Cold War. He takes us through Anglo-American reactions to the birth of the Cominform in 1947 and shows that, although many policymakers persisted in the belief that the old Comintern had actually never shut up shop, many leading Western diplomats welcomed the Cominform Declaration, at least insofar as it exposed the myth of “nationalist communism.” Selverstone examines the rift between Moscow and Tito’s Yugoslavia at length. Western reactions to the rift made it clear that a wedge strategy was emerging. On the day after the Cominform’s expulsion of Yugoslavia in June 1948, U.S. diplomats in Belgrade and Washington urged the “boldest possible exploitation of this defection in the keystone of (the) Soviet satellite structure” (118). Selverstone also reviews arguments in Washington and London about how—or even whether—to exploit intra-communist rifts. Events in Asia tended to reinforce the position of officials who advocated the monolithic, “two camps” position. October 1949 saw the communist takeover in China, and State Department Far Eastern Affairs chief Walton Butterworth expressed his concern that in Vietnam Ho Chi Minh was “working towards extending Soviet domination in Asia” (166). In the final chapter of his book, Selverstone considers the Korean conflict and analyzes President Truman’s December 1950 public address on “the national
emergency” created by “Communist imperialism” in Korea (189). He sees the onset of McCarthyism as ending any hope that wedge thinking would take root in public discourse.

A major concern in Constructing the Monolith is demonstrating the degree to which many U.S. and UK policymakers did accept intra-communist distinctions, did recognize that developing world nationalisms often trumped the desire to elicit support from Moscow, did advocate—indeed actually began to operationalize—a wedge strategy. George Kennan well understood the limits of “two camps” thinking in regard to the developing world. As Mao’s state was coming into being, State Policy Planning Staff member John Paton Davies poured scorn on the notion of Soviet-Chinese communist unity. In a 1949 paper authored with Ware Adams, he summarized the objections to monolithism that were to become common currency in the later Cold War. Chief among them was the removal of incentives for satellitists, nationalists, and anti-Stalinists to move away from Moscow’s patronage. Selverstone analyzes these currents of thought very well, although the counter-monolithism of people such as Davies and Charles Bohlen has been extensively documented in previous studies. What he finds a little more difficult is how to explain the diplomatic mindset that simultaneously recognized and dismissed as insignificant the existence of significant and substantive intra-communist divisions. It was not simply that figures like Bohlen and Davies were bureaucratically outmaneuvered, nor that the accelerating historical dynamic sometimes seemed to have left them stranded. There was also a degree of cognitive dissonance at work. Selverstone suggests that Kennan, Bohlen, and Thomas Brimelow (a Soviet specialist at the Foreign Office in London) “themselves showed signs of operating from within a monolithic framework.” They sought to wean nationalist and satellite communists away from Moscow, while simultaneously recognizing “the affinity that all Communist parties had for Moscow” (72). Selverstone also suggests that monolithism might, at least on one level, have had an element of conscious self-deception. Perhaps policymakers tended to “embrace, if not outright promote, a simplistic view of the Communist world in order to help them manage its complexity” (194).

This uncertainty about monolithism leads me to the first major question I wish to raise about Selverstone’s excellent book. What exactly was the nature of international communism in the late 1940s? Selverstone seems to imply that, in suppressing or compromising their own knowledge of intra-communist divisions, policymakers were distorting historical dynamics, endangering the peace and converting the “two camps” analysis into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Admittedly, in his final chapter he does acknowledge the difficulty of demonstrating that “the monolithic framework” significantly altered “the actual practice of U.S. foreign policy” (221). Nevertheless, he suggests that it did have very damaging effects in Vietnam, that it damaged U.S. Cold War counterintelligence and had a huge impact on U.S. domestic affairs. My point, however, is that nowhere does Selverstone really discuss the actual historical dynamics of late 1940s communism. These were surely complex, both integrationist and centrifugal. Maybe Kennan, Bohlen, and Brimelow might actually be forgiven for adopting an analysis that recognized these tensions? I was also a little surprised that Selverstone did not make more of the distance between Kennan’s version of containment and Paul Nitze’s globalistic analysis in NSC 68. It is interesting that Selverstone notes that NSC 68 saw the USSR as “having solidified the monolith . . . through the use of armed force,” creating a system that “contained the seeds of its own decay” (160). Constructing the Monolith would have benefited from some hindsight-enhanced evaluation of America’s containment strategy.

My second major question relates to the Anglo-American focus of the book. While it is gratifying to see British diplomacy taken so seriously, I felt that this Anglo-American dimension needed to be explained and justified a little more directly. By the late 1940s, after all, the United States was well on the way to global superpowerdom, while Britain was busy losing an empire and failing to find a role in world politics. One justification for analyzing late 1940s policymaking in U.S.–UK terms may lie in the putative interpermeability of British and American policy thinking. Oliver Franks (surprisingly mentioned just once by Selverstone) certainly had extraordinary access to Truman’s high diplomatic and policymaking circles.2 Habits of cooperation forged during Hitler’s war persisted. Yet these were also years of U.S.–UK tension, not least regarding issues of war debts and nuclear sharing. Selverstone does have some discussion (as on page 88) of concrete U.S.–UK policy interactions, but this aspect of the study is rather underdeveloped. We are left wondering about the real importance of London’s thinking on Soviet relations in this period. At several points, Selverstone’s comparative approach actually breaks down in favor of an American narrative. Selverstone is clearly an historian of American rather than British foreign relations. Nevertheless, he performs an important service here by helping to demolish the “Greeks and Romans” mythology that still surrounds British views of how London should deal with Washington. There is not much sign in Constructing the Monolith of worldly-wise British diplomats instructing their callow American counterparts in the subtle ways of international politics, despite London’s less “raucous anticommunism” and its lack of a counterpart to the House Committee on Un-American Activities (91).

Scholarship marches on. Readers of Selverstone’s chapter on the onset of the Korean War should also consult Steven Casey’s Selling the Korean War? State-private networks
in early Cold War America have also been the subject of some important recent academic work. All in all, however, Constructing the Monolith is an exemplary and enlightening piece of brilliantly researched historical writing.

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Notes:

Review of Marc Selverstone, Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945-1950

Curt Cardwell

In Constructing the Monolith, Marc Selverstone seeks to examine the image of monolithic communism and to explain how it “came to permeate the language of policymakers and the public” in the early Cold War period (3). Monolithic communism, defined as the “notion that every Communist functioned as a Soviet lackey,” became “the dominant image of international communism during the formative years of the Cold War,” Selverstone tells us, but the reason for its dominance has not been adequately explained (1, 11). I will take the risk that other commentators will outline the book and I will cut right to the chase to discuss the image of monolithic communism in the Cold War, which is the primary focus of the study.

Selverstone’s answer to the question of why the monolithic image took hold in the postwar era is quite startling. While he notes that some U.S. and British officials remained unconvinced of the monolithic argument into early 1946 because in fact the Soviets were not behaving all that badly, he contends that their disposition changed because the Soviets became more ideological. Stalin’s “election” speech of February 1946 was the turning point. “Thereafter,” he writes, “[U.S. officials and journalists] would interpret Soviet actions through the lens of ideology, treating Moscow as an expansionist, totalitarian power that lay at the center of a global conspiracy” (36). As U.S. and British officials grew increasingly wary of Soviet intentions, the monolithic image grew apace, in effect coming to dominate their thinking about all things Soviet. All the familiar events of the early Cold War after Stalin’s speech, which Selverstone lays almost entirely at the feet of the Soviets in ways reminiscent of the old Cold War traditionalists, forged the image into an ideology. It was not until March 1953, around the time of Stalin’s death, that the concept underwent serious scrutiny, he contends. By the early 1960s, after the Sino-Soviet rupture, some people who had been proponents of the concept in the heyday of the Cold War were denying that any such thing had ever existed. In this sense, Selverstone appears to be arguing that the period in which monolithic communism reigned as a way of thinking about the Soviet threat was an aberration of sorts, although, frankly, he is not as clear on this point as one would like, and there is some confusion about precisely what he is arguing. In any event, I am not convinced, although I do not mind stating up front that perhaps I have misread him. I will return to this possibility in my closing paragraph.

That said, there are four points or observations that I would like to make. I am confining my comments here primarily to U.S. officials, about whom I can speak most authoritatively. First, Selverstone takes it for granted that his historical actors actually believed in monolithic communism without ever questioning whether they might have used it as a ruse to achieve other objectives or as a tool for developing consensus both with Congress and among themselves. Those are standard suggestions that date back to the 1950s. That U.S. officials did at times exaggerate the Soviet threat for these reasons was proven long ago. Acknowledging this basic fact is certainly necessary, and the absence of such an acknowledgment is conspicuous indeed. A case in point is his treatment of the Clifford-Elsey report. I do not doubt that Clifford and Elsey, authors of a report on the Soviet Union completed in the summer of 1946, believed in the communist monolith, although this claim is not proven in the book. But Selverstone portrays Clifford and Elsey as though they were driven singularly by fear of communism. Not noted are the many flaws in the report. He also leaves out their concern for the postwar U.S. economy and fails to acknowledge the possibility that they had other motives that might explain the hyperbolic rhetoric of the report. He cites Melvyn Leffler in regard to the report in his endnotes without telling his readers that Leffler blasts the report in A Preponderance of Power. It was full of “double standards and self-deception,” Leffler writes, and it offered a “totally misleading rendition of Soviet capabilities.”

For Selverstone simply to ignore this critique is misleading, to say the least. If Leffler is correct, and I believe he is, the thinking about the Soviet Union was more complex than Selverstone’s monolithic concept allows for.

Second, in accepting that his historical actors truly believed in monolithic communism, he is forced to argue (or so it would appear) that the Soviet threat was the primary, if not the sole, concern of U.S. and British officials in the immediate postwar era. In fact, in Selverstone’s depiction they come off as caricatures of the Cold War warrior standing firm against unabashed communist expansion (as in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s famous phrase that the Cold War was simply “the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression”). Not since Joseph Jones’ The Fifteen Weeks have U.S. officials looked so good! Such an argument, however, is implausible, as numerous monographs have shown over the years. While the Soviets and their “allies” were certainly a major concern of U.S. officials in the immediate postwar era, they were hardly the only concern, nor arguably the most important. Certainly as great a concern was a world torn to shreds by two world

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wars and a worldwide depression in between and how to fix matters so that the “free world” could survive. Space does not permit a lengthy discussion of this reality, but not even to acknowledge that this concern existed and may have had something to do with the creation of the communist monolith, as other scholars have noted, is, again, to mislead. Frankly, it is difficult to understand why such issues are not addressed in the study.

Third, Selverstone would have us believe that in the early Cold War period all officials and all social commentators were scared to death of the Soviet threat and monolithic communism. Thus, their response to it was purely defensive (or at least they believed it was). But this argument also flies in the face of the evidence. U.S. officials were, in the early Cold War period, so dismissive of Soviet concerns and interests that it defies logic to paint them as unduly agitated by monolithic communism. Among the actions that belie any such agitation: tying a loan to the Soviet Union to correct demands. U.S. officials were neither dumb nor naive; they were well aware that they had the upper hand over the Soviet Union. Selverstone does not have to agree with this argument, but to paint U.S. officials as unwitting defenders against a ruthless aggressor determined to communize the world is, after all that we have learned over the years, frankly, mind-boggling. It really taxes credulity to claim that the image of the communist monolith drove the actions of Western policymakers.

Finally, Selverstone would also have us believe that there were no dissenters from the communist monolith concept. But such an assertion greatly distorts the facts. Where are those officials and other elites—Eisenhower, Clay, and Marshall among them—who dissented from the more harrowing depictions of the Soviet Union being proffered by Forrestal in the early days of the Cold War (Leffler, Preponderance, 46)? Where are Henry Wallace and the progressive internationalists who sought accommodation with the Soviet Union? Where is Walter Lippmann’s critique of “containment” that prompted George Kennan himself to back away from the policy and argue that he had been misunderstood? Where are Ambassador Steinhardt’s reports that the Czech “coup” was not Soviet-orchestrated? Where are the dissenters from the bombastic language and false depiction of the Soviet Union found in NSC 68 (readily available in FRUS 1950, Volume 1)? Where are the intelligence reports that argued for Soviet weakness and non-aggression?

At the very least, these dissenters demonstrate that the issue of the communist monolith was more complicated than Selverstone depicts. Selverstone offers a rare moment of skepticism when he points out that officials in both countries neglected to note serious dissension from time to time within the communist camp, arguing that “this reluctance to consider schismatic tendencies in international communism is curious given the movement’s brief, turbulent history” (30). Here was a missed opportunity. Although it seems doubtful that the “wise men” of U.S. foreign policy did not consider such tendencies, the belief on Selverstone’s part that they did not should have tipped him off to the possibility that perhaps there was more going on here than meets the eye. Such an observation might in turn have sent him down a wholly different path of inquiry and produced a very different book.

His sources may be part of the problem. Missing, from what I can tell (the book lacks a bibliography, almost certainly not his fault, but dismayingly nonetheless), are Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power; William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace; Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line; Richard Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy; Fred Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder; and William Borden, The Pacific Alliance, among others, although, to his credit, he cites Richard Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism. All of these authors, in varied ways, demonstrate either that U.S. officials were not always forthright in their depictions of the Soviet threat or that there were other issues confronting them that could explain their use of the Soviet threat to achieve other ends. Selverstone would not have to agree with these authors, and assuredly he does not, but he should at least have acknowledged that these counter arguments exist and explain why his analysis is superior to or counters theirs. Nor would it be enough to say that these sources are outdated or that they have been disproved because they are not outdated and they have not been disproved.

All of the above aside, I will concede the possibility that I have misread Selverstone. Perhaps his argument is simply about how and why monolithic communism—the notion that communism was one movement led by the Soviet
Union—developed and emerged, in which case I would have much less to quibble with. But I do not think so, because the Soviet threat and the image of monolithic communism, at least as Selverstone portrays it, were one and the same in the minds of U.S. officials in the early Cold War period. I would suggest a different interpretation: that U.S. leaders believed in the notion of monolithic communism but also believed that the Soviet Union was weak and not willing to use military force to expand its reach. If this interpretation is correct, the monolithic aspect of the threat is, in the final analysis, not really that important, for what, then, did it matter? What Selverstone might better have done is to point out that this concept of the communist monolith emerged, that it did not conform to reality (a point he concedes in his conclusion), and that, given this fact, what needs to be explained is why it carried such weight. In my estimation, such an approach would have made for a far stronger study.

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Notes:


Karen B. Bell

The perception of international communism as a monolith emerged as a universal belief among Anglo-American policymakers during the early years of the Cold War. International communism was a global phenomenon that contributed to the creation of nation states and reinforced what Benedict Anderson refers to as “imagined communities.” Anderson defines a nation as an imagined political community in which people imagine themselves as part of a community defined by nationality. His imagined communities are both inherently limited and sovereign, products of an invented narrative. The idea of an invented political narrative has also been advanced by Lloyd Gardner in Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (1970), which argues that the United States was responsible for the way in which the Cold War developed.

These studies provide the context for Marc J. Selverstone’s Constructing the Monolith, which presents a familiar thesis on the way in which the Cold War emerged. Since 1917, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States had perceived profound differences within their two societies. Both developed a conceptual framework to defend against perceived threats. In the geopolitical sphere, Anglo-American anti-communist ideology depicted the Soviet Union as aggressively internationalist, committed to sustaining world revolution until every democratic political system was replaced by Soviet-style communism. The Soviets developed an equally rigid ideology that informed their approach to the Cold War. The ideological circularity in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union mirrored and reinforced each other and provided the context for the construction of international communism as a monolith.

Constructing the Monolith examines the mutually antagonistic forces that emerged during the critical half-decade following World War II and charts how both British and American policymakers viewed international communism as both a “monolithic and non-monolithic force” (5). The book is divided into eight chapters. The first four examine the origins of the Soviet monolith and the process by which the Soviet monolith manifested itself in the written statements of policymakers. The remaining chapters analyze the strategies Great Britain and the United States employed to diminish the influence of the Soviet monolith and examine the ineffectiveness of the “wedge strategy” in sustaining fissures within the monolith (116). This subject has garnered the attention of several scholars, most notably John Lewis Gaddis, Gordon H. Chang, and David Allen Mayers, but Selverstone makes an important, thought-provoking and illuminating contribution to the scholarship.

Much more than a work of synthesis, his study offers new insights on the milieu in which policymakers worked and lived as they viewed international communism from their positions in “the binary universe” of a world divided in two opposing spheres (54).

The primary objective of this study is to answer a fundamental question about the monolithic image: “Why did Americans and Britons in the postwar era come to see international communism as a monolithic force when the history of that movement suggested otherwise” (4)? Selverstone seeks to answer this question by examining the “Anglo-American historical consciousness” during the 1930s and 1940s (4). This historical consciousness emanated from the Whig tradition and the belief in American exceptionalism (although, it is interesting to note, Selverstone does not use the term American exceptionalism). The shared heritage of Great Britain and the United States reinforced their collective response to the threat that communism presented to global enlightenment. From the vantage point of British imperialism, American republicanism, and the Whig tradition, the aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union after World War II engendered an apocalyptic struggle against the agents of darkness (197-200).

Selverstone notes that the construction of the monolith began after the Bolshevik Revolution and continued after World War II. Vladimir Lenin formulated his position on factions in 1921 at the Tenth Party Congress by urging communists to speak with one voice. Similarly, Gregori Zinoviev, head of the Comintern, sought to instill uniformity among party members and invoked the image of the monolith to do so. At the 1923 party conference in Leningrad, Zinoviev explained that it was necessary “sometimes to cut off a very considerable section of the Party . . . in order to achieve a single monolithic Communist Party rather than a ‘parliament of opinions’” (15). Coeval with these developments (and in large part because of the failure of American intervention in the Russian Civil War), American policy toward the Soviet Union coalesced into nonrecognition of the communist regime. Further signs of a monolithic construction appeared at the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924.
During this Congress, the Kremlin advanced its agenda of bringing the world’s communist parties in line with the policies and practices of the Soviet state. It eviscerated all factional activity and centralized the organization of native parties, effectively bolshevizing them (15). The post–World War I context is critical. However, Selverstone does not discuss how the Committee on Public Information, headed by George Creel, set the precedent during World War I for shaping how American policymakers and the public viewed communism and international conflicts from 1917 through the Cold War era.

The United States and Great Britain still had not formulated a coherent strategy to meet the Soviet threat when World War II ended, but that situation would change after the publication of George F. Kennan’s eight-thousand-word telegram defining the Soviet threat on February 22, 1946. According to Selverstone, Kennan’s “Long Telegram located both ideology and Russian history at the center of the Soviet mind-set and had an electrifying effect on Washington” (36-37). Kennan portrayed the Soviet Union as “impervious to logic of reason, and highly sensitive to logic of force.” His missive proclaimed the Soviet Union a monolith and completed the anti-Soviet consensus of the Truman administration. Britain’s assessment of the rise of international communism paralleled that of Kennan. Frank Roberts, the British chargé in Moscow, wrote a series of three telegrams that addressed the Soviet challenge to British interests (40). Following Roberts’ assessment, the Foreign Office established the Committee on Policy toward Russia, otherwise known as the Russia Committee, which became a center for “hard-line” thinking about Soviet dogma (41).

The “public culture” of the Cold War served as the sphere for manufacturing and maintaining consensus between the United States and Great Britain (6). Indeed, both countries sought to propagate Western ideas, images, beliefs, and representations of their political values to counter the Soviet threat. In this context, nongovernmental actors sought to popularize the understanding among the general public that the Kremlin would promote communist power throughout Europe and possibly renew its commitment to a revolutionary, conspiratorial, international crusade. In conjunction with the Truman administration, organizations such as the Advertising Council (AC) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce were active in promoting the image of communism as un-American and dangerous. Through the print media, the AC warned of the dangers of foreign ideologies and worked cooperatively with the White House to promote free enterprise. According to Selverstone, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was at least as influential as the AC and even more vigorous in its demonization of communism and its adherents (51-52).

In an effort to foster and accelerate divisions within the communist world, Anglo-American policymakers pursued the wedge strategy. Selverstone analyzes this development as an extension of the monolith’s corporeal intercorporeal nature. In its earliest formulation, the wedge strategy sought to encourage those nations under the influence of Soviet power to renounce the Soviet Union and establish independent foreign policies (116). Relations between the Soviet Union and China brought American Asian policy to the fore. Initially, U.S. policymakers were skeptical of a link between Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and hoped to divide the two. However, in July 1946, the Central Intelligence Group characterized the CCP as “an unusually effective instrument of Soviet foreign policy” (47). The establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, and Moscow’s recognition of Communist China reinforced the perception of Soviet control of world communism (147-49). Nevertheless, hope for a schism between Moscow and Beijing persisted, especially in Great Britain, where policymakers continued to pursue the wedge strategy (176). The collapse of the Chinese Nationalist government also had a major impact on how policymakers viewed the threat in Indochina. Secretary of State George C. Marshall interpreted Ho Chi Minh’s ideology and organization as “emanating from and controlled by the Kremlin.” That position mirrored the American perception of Chinese communism (48).

The reality of a communist monolith became increasingly apparent to Britons and Americans during the summer and fall of 1947. Selverstone posits that observers attributed it to the imperatives of party discipline and intrabloc cohesion. Ideological interpretations of the communist threat also shaped perceptions of communist behavior as Soviet and East bloc activities came to be seen as manifestations of communist teachings (73). One nation, however, stood out as the locus of Soviet loyalty: Yugoslavia. The capital city, Belgrade, housed the Cominform, and its leader, Josip Broz Tito, was arguably the most doctrinaire and powerful communist outside the U.S.S.R. Indeed, the British Foreign Office and the U.S. intelligence community viewed Yugoslavia as “largely a ‘monolithic’ totalitarian state,” firmly within the Soviet camp. Similarly, as of June 1948 the CIA regarded the bloc nations of southeastern Europe as solidly within Moscow’s grip (95).

The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948 provided an opportunity for policymakers to reevaluate the cohesion of the communist bloc. As Selverstone notes, Moscow’s decision to marginalize the Balkan nation also presented the West with a strategic propaganda opportunity. The split within the communist ranks marked the last week of June 1948 as perhaps the most optimistic moment in the emerging Cold War (96). In this context, Selverstone adduces an important historical truth. The first official U.S. statements on the Tito affair—a paper by George Kennan and a telegram from Marshall—revealed several assumptions that American policymakers were now making about the dynamics of international communism. First, the Tito split destroyed the image of monolithic unity and infallibility that the Kremlin had worked assiduously to create. Second, regardless of the particular circumstances facing communist parties, each would now question their ties to Moscow. Finally, American officials looked upon a country’s internal politics as less important to U.S. interests than the character of its external relations (99).

In implementing the wedge strategy, both Great Britain and the United States established a
relationship with Tito by providing limited economic aid. Both nations lifted restrictions on trade with Yugoslavia. The United States allowed Tito to purchase a steel mill from an American manufacturer in August 1949. In moving closer to the West, Tito diverted resources away from the Soviet bloc and saturated its member-states with increasingly hostile rhetoric. In an effort to finalize the split between Belgrade and Moscow, the United States, in early September 1949, agreed to loan Yugoslavia $20 million through the Export-Import Bank. In short order, Russia and the Cominform states abrogated their defensive alliance with Yugoslavia, casting the Balkan nation adrift in the widening gulf between East and West (137).

Despite the Soviet-Yugoslav schism, developments in Asia and Eastern Europe pointed toward the greater integration—not fragmentation—of the communist world. The international order lost whatever fluidity it might have had during the early post war years, and as it began to harden, so too did perceptions about international communism and the monolithic framework (144). Selverstone’s juxtaposition of these two developments—integration and fragmentation within the communist world—reveals that the former, in relation to the latter, solidified the monolithic dimensions of international communism.

The period from 1947 to 1950 represented the high point of the communist monolith. The containment of communism evolved as a major Anglo-American foreign policy response. The Soviet Union’s detonation of its first atomic bomb in the fall of 1949 and North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, confirmed to U.S. officials that communism had passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and would now use invasion and war (172). On the domestic front, the campaign of Senator Joseph McCarthy to uncover communist influences in the executive branch influenced the national consciousness and heightened the new offensive against communist propaganda (157-159).

Selverstone’s fundamental contention that the events of the early Cold War years necessitated a new American strategic imperative. Missing from his analysis, however, is a detailed discussion of how Soviet pressures on Turkey, the civil war in Greece, and the Berlin blockade impacted the construction of the monolith. The exclusion of these historical developments is problematic for two reasons. First, Selverstone misses an opportunity to further his thesis on why Anglo-American policymakers viewed the expansion of international communism as monolithic. Second, these events were intertwined with the onset of the Cold War and warrant in-depth treatment as vital components of the new American strategic imperative. The Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe, Soviet pressures on Turkey, the civil war in Greece, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, the “fall” of China, the ascendancy of Ho Chi Minh, and the Korean War all underscored the Anglo-American belief in a world engaged in a struggle between the forces of freedom and the forces of tyranny. In the realm of international communism, the monolith achieved full expression for the Soviet Union and Anglo-American policymakers as the physical reality in the narrative of the bi-polar world of “imagined communities.”

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“a neat, comprehensible formula,” was that the communists were the source of the trouble and that they all took their orders from the Kremlin (2). The monolith thus became “a simplification of reality” (3) that supposedly helped contemporaries on both sides of the ocean understand this harrowing time.

According to Selverstone, Life publisher Henry Luce helped lay the basis for the belief in a communist monolith by telling the magazine’s three million subscribers in February 1941 that the United States had a mission to fight totalitarianism by spreading its republican ideals in a new dualistic world of good versus evil. The rapid growth of Bolshevism in Russia during the Great War had fed Western fears of an international revolution that threatened freedom. In Washington the postwar government attempted to ferret out Bolsheviks in a massive witch hunt known as the “Red Scare” (13), while in London British leaders sought to stamp out the “Red menace” (14). The rise of Josef Stalin during the 1920s greatly enhanced the Kremlin’s control over the communist International (Comintern), and a new, totalitarian threat—“Red Fascism”—arose when the Soviets united with the Nazis in the Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939 (21).

As World War II came to an end, a number of American experts on the Soviet Union, including the chargé in Moscow, George F. Kennan, joined British policymakers in warning that their wartime ally had not given up its intention to control neighboring states. Raymond E. Murphy from the State Department warned President Harry S. Truman just before the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 that the Soviet Union was ready to launch a revolutionary expansionist program. Armime Dew in the British Foreign Office agreed with this position, arguing that the Soviets had never abandoned their global aims. Several of his colleagues feared that the Soviets had replaced the Nazis as the new threat in Europe and that the Kremlin would try to disguise its imperial drive in appeals for security.

Both American and British leaders believed that the Kremlin relied heavily on ideology to justify its expansionist goals. Stalin confirmed this fear when he highlighted the basic antagonism between communism and capitalism in his February 9, 1946 speech to his Soviet comrades. Kennan argued in his Long Telegram that Marxist ideology and Russian history had combined to create an “ideologically monolithic” threat grounded in socialism and “directed by Moscow” (37). Selverstone describes Kennan’s views as “a sobering portrait of Soviet foreign policy: peaceful coexistence as a pipe dream; Soviet behavior as driven by historical and ideological forces; and the international Communist movement—of which Moscow was only its foremost proponent—as a well-oiled global conspiracy” (37).

The West’s concern over the division of the postwar world into two ideological camps became evident when American and British leaders drew comparisons between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in warning against the new danger of Red Fascism. Nowhere was this global split more vividly expressed than in the Truman Doctrine of March 1947. The president’s speech, Selverstone notes, used “rhetoric bordering on the apocalyptic and cast the struggle with Moscow in highly Manichean language” (55). Totalitarian regimes were all the same, President Truman asserted. “I don’t care what you call them, Nazi, Communist or Fascist or Franco, or anything else” (37). The Truman administration’s fear of a monolith became more evident when it opened the Marshall Plan to all nations on the Continent, including the Soviet satellites, in an effort to undermine their ties to Moscow. The British Foreign Office also thought the economic aid offer would cause a split between the Kremlin and Eastern Europe.

American and British policymakers saw their fears justified when Moscow—in reaction to the Marshall Plan, they believed—warned its European cohort not to accept American assistance and established the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform, in an attempt to tighten its grip on local communist parties. This move, argues Selverstone, was “the clearest expression of the Communist monolith to date” (74). Numerous U.S. officials considered the Cominform to be nothing more than a resurrection of the Comintern, noting that both opposed capitalism. The CIA concluded that the Cominform marked “the clear identification of Communist parties as agents of the Kremlin” (75). The National Security Council concurred, pointing out that the new organization had warned the communist parties in Western Europe “that they must adhere to the policies and plans of the Kremlin” (75). The advent of the Cominform, Selverstone argues, helped transform the Cold War from a clash with the Soviets and their allies into a more general struggle against communism itself (74–75). The Soviets, asserted many news commentators, had declared “political and ideological war” on the West (75).

But cracks appeared in the communist bloc—most notably in Yugoslavia in June 1948—that led Western policymakers to consider adopting a “wedge strategy” intended to separate the Soviet Union from its allies. Kennan surmised in a circular telegram signed by Marshall and sent to American missions all over the world that Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito might have shattered the Kremlin’s “aura of mystical omnipotence and infallibility” (99). The British reacted in similar fashion, tempering their enthusiasm until they could determine how deep the schism ran. Foreign Office officials agreed with the American view that it would be “wrong to deduce from these symptoms that the Soviet system in Eastern Europe is crumbling” and warned that the matter promised complications (101). American and British policymakers both thought the issue was a complex one, that communism was monolithic as well as non-monolithic and that breaking up the monolith might encourage national communism and thereby increase the number of communist states.

Some American and British
strategists advocated an alternative strategy based on making a distinction between communist policies and Soviet imperialism. The American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, asserted that the United States "does not fear communism if it is not controlled by Moscow and not committed to aggression" (122). Ware Adams from the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff worked with Asian specialist John Paton Davies to prepare a study urging the administration to warn Americans that Soviet imperialism posed a greater threat than Soviet communism. The West’s focus on a monolith, they wrote, had twisted reality and furnished "an increasingly great force in aid of the Kremlin’s desire to increase and solidify its monolith" (124). Inside the United Kingdom, the same reassessment was underway; analysts in the Foreign Office emphasized that Soviet communism was less dangerous than Soviet imperialism. But these suggestions had little effect on U.S. strategy. As Selverstone argues, "Rarely did administration officials differentiate between the spread of communism, as an effort to further the class struggle the world over, and the extension of Moscow’s power" (165).

The public assessment of communism on both sides of the Atlantic therefore remained fixed on a monolith, and policymakers leaned toward a wedge strategy intended to divide that monolith and thereby weaken the entire communist movement. By December 1949 the National Security Council supported that approach, as did the Information Research Department of the Foreign Office, which produced a study in February 1950 entitled "Anti-Stalinist Communism" (153) that explored the ramifications of the rift and referred to "Titoism" as "National Communism" (154). The growth of national communism, the study argued, constituted a threat to the international communism run by the Kremlin. "We should regard the estrangement of national Communist Parties from Moscow not as an end in itself, but as a step towards the disruption of Communism in all its forms" (154).

But McCarthyism undercut any serious attempt to promote national communism as a means of undermining Soviet communism. Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1950 that national communist parties were in "every sense of the word the instrumentalties and agents of Russian foreign policy" (161). The following April, NSC-68 reiterated the belief in a monolith, referring to "the Soviet-directed world communist party" and the Kremlin’s use of the People’s Republic of China as a Soviet "springboard" for "further incursion" into Southeast Asia (160). The Cold War had become a "worldwide" battle between "freedom" and "slavery" (162).

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 further promoted the widespread Anglo-American belief in a communist monolith. Truman saw ties between "Fascism, nazism, and Soviet communism" (173), while Acheson and his Republican adviser on foreign affairs, John Foster Dulles, specifically accused the Soviets of coordinating an attack comparable to the Nazi blitzkrieg of World War II. Time declared that the Soviet Union had "launched the Korea attack" as a "test of American determination" (173). British officials also held the Soviets responsible for the assault. The chances for a new Cold War strategy virtually disappeared when the Americans melded Soviet communism and Soviet imperialism into one and the same threat and chose to regard China as a puppet state of the Kremlin.

In tracing the development of a perception that took on the appearance of reality, Selverstone tells a story that is familiar in both the United States and the United Kingdom. His account is often repetitious, even in the overly long conclusion, where he summarizes the same events and arguments that he had earlier explored in depth from all sides. Yet he has contributed a highly useful analysis of the origins of the Western perception of the communist monolith. The Soviet Union bolstered that perception through its aggressive military and ideological policies—policies that drove the Atlantic nations closer together.

Western assumptions about a communist monolith were not valid, Selverstone concludes, for from the first, communism pulsed with tension. As early as World War II, Moscow declared that there were "different roads to socialism" (207), thereby conceding that national rather than international communism was the dominant force on the world stage. Both the United States and the United Kingdom repeatedly considered a wedge strategy intended to separate the focus on communism from the real danger of Soviet imperialism, but ultimately they pursued an ideological approach that labeled all communist regimes as Kremlin-directed threats to the West. Domestic politics in the United States blocked any serious effort by American policymakers to break up the monolith, particularly if such an action was interpreted as encouraging the growth of national communism in a fearsome time when even the appearance of a concession left people vulnerable to accusations of going "soft" on communism and suggested a lack of patriotism.

Paradoxically, Selverstone argues, the American emphasis on the threat of a communist monolith helped to make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. As he notes, the State Department "never addressed the issue in any systematic way" (204), nor did it discuss with Americans "the monolithic and non-monolithic aspects of international communism" (218). As a result, there was a widespread and irrational belief in a communist monolith that heightened the ardor of domestic politics, greatly limited the capacity of American officials to develop a more creative foreign policy, and further intensified the Cold War.

The rapid succession of critical events in this half decade made it difficult for both the Americans and the British to look at the Cold War in a calm and measured way. Instead, the rhetoric they aimed at the Soviet Union spiraled upward in ferocity and fostered the perception of a communist monolith built on ideology and expansion. Alas, Selverstone concludes, there was no way to change the situation. "Given the combination of a shared historical consciousness, the weight of contemporary evidence, the uncertainties of the age, and the politics that went along with them, it is hard to see how great numbers of those living at the time could have done otherwise" (222).

Selverstone’s study demonstrates the power of perception in a period of great stress even in the face of contradictory facts. There never was a
communist monolith, yet the image of such a monolith drove both American and British foreign policy. The tragedy is that the Anglo-American concern over this perceived danger undercut any meaningful approaches to dealing with the Soviet challenge in the postwar period. Selverstone also insists that the dangerous global atmosphere that led to the belief in a communist monolith has reappeared in the twenty-first century. The events of September 11, 2001 culminated in the “War on Terror” (7) and spawned another monolith—the “axis of evil,” comprising Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—that likewise signified a totalitarian threat. The result was a loss of “clarity of thought and coolness of judgment” (8) that put Iraq at the top of a hit list despite strong arguments that the real architects of 9/11 were Osama bin Laden and the terrorist group al-Qaeda. As with the communist monolith, Selverstone argues, the clear-cut differences among the axis states took the appearance of a single moral evil, again creating a worldwide division between good and evil that portrayed anyone disagreeing with the United States as the enemy.

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A Response to the Roundtable Discussion of Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945-1950

Marc J. Selverstone

I would like to thank the editors of Passport for soliciting a roundtable review of Constructing the Monolith. It is an honor to have one’s work, especially one’s first significant work, considered for such treatment, and I greatly appreciate the time and energy the reviewers devoted to it. By way of a preface, I should note that my goal in writing Constructing the Monolith was not to offer another study of the origins of the Cold War nor even of American (and/or British) perceptions of the origins of the Cold War, but of American and British perceptions of international communism. These matters are, of course, related, but they are also distinct. I had sought to focus primarily on the process by which that image of a monolithic movement had come to dominate perceptions of the Communist challenge. Since Karen Bell, John Dumbrell, and Howard Jones generally accepted my terms of reference, I will address their remarks before turning to Curt Caldwell’s treatment of the book.

I am grateful for Karen Bell’s remarks on my contributions to the scholarship and am pleased that she situated my effort within the broader theme of national identity. When I began work on this project, my sense was that issues of identity were indeed connected to constructions of the monolithic image. The experience of the Second World War was central in this regard; the identification of that conflict as one between the forces of democracy and those of tyranny offered a convenient and compelling script for many who sought to understand and explain the nature of the postwar struggle between the forces of communism and those of democracy. Indeed, the emerging reluctance to distinguish between the Nazi and Soviet systems—between species of totalitarians—contributed to a similar propensity to lump together the varieties of Communist experience. Had I considered Anderson’s ideas, as Bell suggests, and focused more consciously at the outset of my work on the “imagined communities” of both self and other, my study might well have yielded additional insights.

I would, however, like to amend Bell’s description of the first half of the book. She writes that those initial four chapters examine “the process by which the Soviet monolith manifested itself in the written statements of policymakers,” but in charting that process I focused not only on the writings of both policymakers and pundits, but also on the expression of the monolithic image within the broader public culture. Since one of my goals was to try to approximate the texture of those early postwar years, I extended those themes through the entirety of the monograph—the better, I thought, to help explain the emergence of the monolithic perception. Bell does cite my effort to situate the landscape for this development within both “the milieu in which policymakers worked and lived” as well as within the “public culture” more broadly, but I would like to re-emphasize the continuity of this approach throughout.

As for Bell’s concerns about various omissions from Monolith, I am not as convinced as she that these lapses constitute significant shortcomings. These oversights include a dearth of commentary on topics such as George Creel’s Committee on Public Information, the postwar situations in Greece and Turkey, and the Berlin Blockade of 1948. I had hoped that my inclusion of writings and remarks by public officials during the Great War and interwar periods would have highlighted thinking about international communism during those eras. While the Creel Committee was at times more nationalist and anti-German than anti-Bolshevik, I’ll grant that its inclusion in Monolith could have provided a bookend for later commentary on governmental efforts to shape public opinion. Regarding Turkey and Greece, it is true that I do not focus much on events, say, from the summer and fall of 1946. But the pressures on those nations that President Truman addressed in March 1947 are central to my narrative in chapter 3. And while the situation in Berlin was of vital concern to policymakers during 1948 and 1949 and carried implications for their perceptions of Soviet behavior, it conveyed little of substance, I believe, about the nature of international communism itself—hence my decision to invoke but not dwell on the episode at the end of chapter 4 and the beginning of chapter 5.

I am particularly pleased, though, that Bell highlighted my comments on the lessons U.S. policymakers drew from the Tito affair of 1948, especially the notion that officials “looked upon a country’s internal politics as less important to U.S. interests than the character of its external relations.” As I tried to illustrate, policymakers referenced that mantra repeatedly but showed little inclination to explore its implications with the American public. This is one aspect of the study I had hoped to flesh out in greater detail. As I have surely touched just the surface of the monolithic image and the assumptions policymakers held about the non-Stalinist Communist world, perhaps future scholarship might explore these matters more thoroughly.

I am equally gratified that Howard Jones found the book worthwhile and appreciate his commentary on
it. I am especially pleased that he chose to highlight the ways in which “the power of perception in a period of great stress” can lend credence to compelling if incorrect appraisals of one’s enemy. (Imagine they might also affect appraisals of one’s own nation in a similar way.)

I would also concede Jones’s claim that Monolith becomes repetitious in spots. In part, this repetitiveness stemmed from my interest in cataloging the sustained usage of certain terms or phrases, a practice that resulted in passages that likely seemed familiar from one chapter to the next. I recognized this tendency during the writing process and struggled with various compositional approaches to avoid it before settling on a chronological scheme, with all the attendant drawbacks that Jones noted. I am grateful he found the work useful nonetheless.

I would dissent with some of his characterizations of the book, however, as I think they paint my account as slightly flatter than I had intended. For instance, I would not describe the postwar belief in a Communist monolith as “irrational,” a characterization that Jones seems to attribute to me. I do think that belief reflected an incorrect understanding of the workings of international communism, but I also recognize that policymakers and the public had legitimate reason to believe in the existence of a international, coordinated movement in the immediate postwar period. I would also draw a clearer distinction between depictions of the enemy that became popular during the emerging Cold War and those that appeared during those first few years after September 11. While I do see similarities between the monolith and the “axis of evil,” my sense is that Americans living during the early postwar years had far more reason to fear coordination among their perceived enemies than the more recent generation ever did.

I was particularly appreciative of John Dumbrell’s comments, for he alone among the reviewers focused a significant portion of his remarks on the Anglo-American dimension of my study. And I say this even as I acknowledge his generally critical treatment of the British side of my book. For Dumbrell is indeed on target in describing me as a historian of American rather than British foreign relations.

In truth, I had first conceived of the project as one that focused solely on the American experience. After I began my research, it became apparent to me that some comparative focus might help to clarify the extent to which the monolithic framework was uniquely American. The time I spent working in British archives and reading British histories proved to be some of the most rewarding of the entire project as I took to my exploration of Britain and the early Cold War with all of the enthusiasm—as well as some of the missteps—of the autodidact.

While I might have fallen short in providing well-rounded portraits of British figures or British policy, I still think the exercise helped to frame the American experience. For one thing, it helped to highlight the similarity of British and American depictions of international communism during this period, a similarity that emerged for the most part independently of exchanges between the State Department and the Foreign Office. While coordination between the two services picked up in 1948 and became more vigorous in 1950, policymakers in both London and Washington were equally taken with images of a coordinated though fractious Communist movement. Both were aware of the opportunities presented by the Tito affair, for example, but were equally uncertain about how they might reap its potential rewards. Too much glee might alienate those wary of the Kremlin but no less put off by Western values and practices; too little outreach might enable Moscow to shore up its defenses and ideological outposts.

Dumbrell also wishes I had explored the nature of international communism in the 1940s more vigorously. He is right to have urged me in this direction, for I spend comparatively little time discussing the actual dynamics of global communism. While I believe that my portrayal of its workings in the concluding chapter faithfully represents the findings of recent studies, this is surely one of the topics I might have pursued in greater detail as part of a larger project. Western representations of international communism tell only one side of this very complex story, and it would have been worthwhile not only to have looked at international communism itself more closely but also to have examined a similar dynamic from the other side: Soviet and Communist Party representations of an international capitalist monolith.

Dumbrell suggests, too, that I might have forgiven Charles Bohlen, George Kennan, and Thomas Brimelow for adopting an analysis that recognized the tensions between the centripetal and centrifugal forces at work in international communism. I agree entirely, and if I conveyed a contrary point of view, I regret the imprecision in my writing. Indeed, I can well appreciate the challenges of devising policy in an environment where the evident tensions within international communism were unlikely to become manifest in ways that would have benefited western policymakers in the near term.

Finally, Dumbrell wishes I had explored the divergence between Kennan’s strongpoint vision of containment and Nitze’s more globalistic approach in NSC 68 as part of a broader evaluation of U.S. grand strategy. He is right to note this omission in Monolith. A narrative that more pointedly compared the pervasive use of monolithic rhetoric by policymakers and pundits with the actual policy preferences of those same individuals might have yielded valuable insights. Nevertheless, I decided against any such wholesale evaluation of policy choices, not only because others had already addressed these matters in depth but because I saw them as slightly tangential to my mission. It does seem striking, however, that Kennan’s and Nitze’s visions of containment—one particularist and the other universalist—both recognized that the forces of nationalism would ultimately wreck the Soviet system from within.

Curt Cardwell offers an altogether
different critique of Monolith. I regret that he found the book so unsatisfying, and I fear that he may have mistaken my objectives, as he himself indicated might be the case in the conclusion of his review. Because his interpretation of the book is so much at odds with the others, I feel the need to address his remarks in depth.

At the heart of Cardwell’s assessment is his embrace of a particular historiographical position on the origins of the Cold War. Much of his response flows from his contention that “[i]t was the United States that was the aggressor in the Cold War, as the Soviet Union did not even have the capability of fulfilling that role, except insofar as it was unwilling to simply kowtow to Washington’s demands.” Cardwell’s fidelity to this position is remarkable given recent scholarship on the early postwar period from Melvyn Leffler, Arne Westad, Robert Jervis, and Vojtech Mastny, among others—scholarship that argues for a much more interdependent relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, one does not have to embrace the more critical portraits of Stalin and the Kremlin painted by John Gaddis and Vladislav Zubok to recognize that the origins of the Cold War involved dynamics far more complex than the ones Cardwell cites.

As a result, he interprets my narrative of the early postwar period as a blanket acceptance of the traditionalist or orthodox claim that responsibility for the Cold War lay solely with Moscow, not Washington. Let me be clear: I do not endorse that interpretation. I am much more sympathetic to accounts that cast the conflict as a mutually antagonistic struggle spurred on by a feedback loop in which one nation’s perceptions of insecurity—however divorced from the reality of another nation’s intentions—led to actions to minimize that insecurity, creating a corresponding and spiraling sense of insecurity among adversaries.

My purpose in providing a narrative of that era with all of the markers characteristic of an orthodox account was simply to concentrate on those developments that, for policymakers and the public, stood out as signal moments in the emerging Cold War. I was not interested in offering a new interpretation of the origins of the Cold War, in evaluating the wisdom of policies pursued by U.S. and British policymakers, or even in probing the impact of those policies. Although I make a brief nod in that direction in the conclusion, as when I suggest that monolithic rhetoric inhibited America’s diplomatic flexibility and poisoned the domestic political climate, my primary focus was on tracing the process by which individuals came to endorse an image of international communism as a monolithic conspiracy. A focus on episodes that elicited the most vigorous debate about communism and its nature, which included the Stalin election speech, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the founding of the Cominform, the collapse of Czech democracy, the Tito affair, the establishment of NATO, and the outbreak of the Korean War, therefore hardly seems ill-conceived.

Cardwell finds this narrative misleading, though, and repeats that charge so frequently throughout his review that I began to wonder whether he thought I was willfully trying to deceive unsuspecting readers. I do hope my perception here is mistaken. He writes, for instance, that “Selverstone would also have us believe that there were no dissenters from the communist monolith concept,” and he points to Dwight Eisenhower, George Marshall, and Lucius Clay as officials who rejected the more lurid image of the Soviets that James Forrestal endorsed. It is important to note here that what these officials objected to was not any particular image of communism that Forrestal was pushing, but U.S. behavior that stood in the way of Soviet-American cooperation. That is indeed a distinction with a difference. It was never my intention to deal with policy matters, except in spots where I explore the wedge strategy with the much more limited agenda of appraising official interpretations of the nature of communism itself. Readers should also note that Cardwell chooses statements from Eisenhower, Clay, and Marshall that date to 1945, a period that preceded the full-blown emergence of both the monolithic image and the anti-Soviet consensus; within two years, all those Cardwell cites as critics of the anti-Soviet reflex would be practitioners of it.

Cardwell further looks askance at my alleged refusal to recognize challenges to administration policy. “Where are Wallace and the progressive internationalists?” he asks. Answer: on pages 50-51, where I note that Wallace’s criticism of Truman’s “get tough” policy served to remove from power the highest-ranking official resisting the administration’s hardening approach. Question: “Where is Lippmann’s critique?” Answer: on page 153, where I note Lippmann’s support of administration policy designed to foster rifts between Moscow and Beijing, but more specifically on pages 164-165, where I record Lippmann’s great frustration with administration policy on neutralism. For as Lippmann’s critique of containment in his celebrated response to George F. Kennan’s “X article”—the main focus of Cardwell’s concern—my interest in citing the exchange was not to comment on the broader strategic debate between the two, as Cardwell would have preferred, but to highlight Lippmann’s own contribution to the monolithic imagery that saturated public discussion. While Lippmann rejected containment as a “strategic monstrosity,” he also maintained, as I point out, that “the ‘communist party in any country is the fifth column” (emphasis in original),’ the local adjunct of ‘the Red International’” (71). Whereas Lippmann’s critique of containment is well known among students of the era, I would contend that his more bold-faced acceptance of communism as a monolithic movement is not and is therefore, I believe, well worth noting. As for Cardwell’s question about U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Laurence Steinhardt and his disbelief in Moscow’s orchestration of the Czech coup, I simply chose to highlight Steinhardt’s 1946 opposition to the notion of a Communist monolith (44) rather than the views he expressed in 1948.

Actually, I am surprised that Cardwell was unable to locate dissenters from the monolithic idea, because I make them a central part of the story. He might have noted the three entire pages I spend on the working paper written by policy planners Ware Adams and John Paton Davies (122-125), which explicitly rejected both the frequent use of monolithic rhetoric and the purported
real...tory of what such language sought to describe. Not only do I offer Adams and Davies as paragons of this anti-monolithic perspective and refer back to them and their work at several points (140, 143-144, 151, 178, 188, 203, 215, 218), I offer similar commentary from Far East expert Charlton Ogburn and make repeated references to his handiwork thereafter (178-179, 188, 194, 215, 218). I even begin my introduction with a separate communication from Adams decrying the use of monolithic imagery (1-2) and launch my conclusion with yet another incantation of Adams’s *cri de coeur* (196). Since these passages rank among those I found most satisfying and reflect research that, in some cases, had yet to find its way into the literature, I am particularly struck by Cardwell’s refusal to acknowledge their existence.

Cardwell’s remarks on the Clifford-Elsey Report are another case in point. Cardwell asserts that I failed to note the “many flaws” in the document and that I neglected to tell readers that one of my sources on the matter, Melvyn Leffler, “blasts the report.” I could have cited any number of scholars but chose to invoke Leffler precisely because he blasted the report, as it is fully worthy of such condemnation. As I note in *Monolith* (with particular reference to the issue that most concerned me), “[not] once did the Clifford-Elsey study highlight tensions within the Eastern bloc or within local Communist parties” (45). Indeed, my main purpose in citing the report was to emphasize the increasing importance of ideological interpretations in explicating the whys and wherefores of Soviet behavior. While Clifford and Elsey clearly recognized the political utility of their analysis, they were hardly insincere in their appraisal of Russian communism—an interpretation of the report that a close reading of Leffler would reveal. Surely Clifford and Elsey “were no fools,” as Leffler writes, and engaged in distortion and oversimplification. But neither were they misrepresenting their most deeply held convictions about Soviet communism, and establishing what those were was my primary purpose in citing this episode.

Cardwell also makes several accusations that are simply incorrect. He claims that I “[take] it for granted that my historical actors actually believed in monolithic communism without ever questioning whether they might have used it as a ruse to achieve other objectives or as a tool for developing consensus both with Congress and among themselves.” On the contrary, I entertain the notion that administration officials may well have embraced, if not promoted, “a simplistic view of the Communist world in order to help them manage its complexity” (194). I recognize, for example, that both Clark Clifford and Dean Acheson were very much alive to the political utility of branding all Communists as essentially the same. Clifford made that clear during the 1948 presidential campaign (89, 129), as did Acheson in the aftermath of the Chinese Communist Revolution (161).

Near the end of his review, Cardwell wonders whether the monolithic image is important at all. Since U.S. policymakers never believed in the likelihood of Soviet military aggression, what did it matter that they regarded international communism as a monolithic movement? I would refer him back to Leffler’s appraisal of the Clifford-Elsey Report. As Leffler writes, “[n]o one expected war to occur from a pre-meditated attack. Conflict would erupt from miscalculation as powerful nations strove to enhance their security and maximize their interests.” But the concerns of U.S. policymakers ran deeper. As I state in *Monolith*, “if Communist parties and states the world over were internationalist and therefore loyal to the Kremlin, then each of them, in theory, enhanced Soviet capabilities, dramatically altering the global balance of power. Although U.S. and British statesmen were downplaying the likelihood of Soviet military aggression in the near term, the threat posed by Communist political gains and Moscow’s ability to capitalize upon them—particularly in the vital regions of Europe and Asia—was enormous” (2-3). That would be particularly true if the Soviets were able to exploit the economic misery and dispiritedness of Europe by offering a more attractive political and economic model. If Moscow were to succeed in that effort, it would have gained significant leverage in a political and potentially military struggle with the United States.

Finally, Cardwell suggests that I might have done better to explore the reasons the image of communism as a monolith carried such weight. That is precisely what I thought I had done, though I am certainly willing to admit that my explanation offers only a partial answer. I tried to explain the emergence of the monolith by situating it within a larger framework of meaning, incorporating long-, medium-, and short-term historical dynamics. If I were to categorize the lens that I did adopt, it probably would be close to what Akira Iriye has described as the cultural approach, which involves “the creation and communication of memory, ideology, emotions, life styles, scholarly and artistic works, and other symbols.” My intention was to offer as “thick” a description of British and American political cultures as I could, within the word limit prescribed for the monograph, in order to trace the process by which the Communist monolith came to represent depictions of international communism in the early postwar period.

I would like to conclude my portion of the roundtable by once again thanking the editors of *Passport* and the reviewers for their interest and efforts. My original wish was for *Constructing the Monolith* to make only a marginal contribution to the literature on the early Cold War and perhaps encourage others to look more closely at the emergence of this particular facet of the Cold War consciousness. I had also hoped that my comparative focus might spark explorations of related dynamics among America’s key allies and prompt others to consider the varieties of anti-communism from a cross-cultural perspective. I am therefore gratified that several of the reviewers found it perhaps more valuable than I had imagined and that, warts and all, it still has something useful to say about an oft-covered era.

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W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship:
Lauren Beth Hirshberg (Michigan) for a dissertation titled *U.S. Production of Destruction in the Marshall Islands: Kwajalein, 1944-1986*. Drawing on insights from such disparate fields as comparative colonialism, environmental and suburban history, and the United States in the world, Hirshberg’s dissertation addresses the U.S. construction of a distinctly American space on Kwajalein in service to Washington’s Cold War goals. At a time when the United Nations was assiduously pursuing decolonization, the United States was moving in the opposite direction on Kwajalein, which it acquired as a UN sanctioned Trust Territory in 1947 and to which it exported all of the creature comforts of American life for the U.S. personnel who called the island home. The melding of several different historiographies into a project with tremendous potential particularly impressed the committee.

Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant:
Kevin Arlyck (New York University) for his dissertation, *The Means of Preventing Disputes with Foreign Nations*: *Lawyers, Courts, and Foreign Relations in the Early Republic, 1783-1825*, which on its most basic level seeks to discover the role of elite lawyers in U.S. foreign affairs during the nation’s formative decades, particularly insofar as issues of piracy and privateering were concerned. In an impressively conceptualized project that draws on his law background, Arlyck promises to add complexity to current understandings of the nation’s place within the larger Atlantic community and the ways elite lawyers helped to shape conceptions of national sovereignty. The committee was especially impressed with the sophisticated nature of Arlyck’s study and its reminder that there are still valuable projects to be found in the pre-twentieth century period.

Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport Fellowship:
Stefanie Bator (Northwestern University) is the recipient of this year’s Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship. Bator’s dissertation, *Agents of Empire: American Reform, Filipino Nationalism, and Colonialism in the Philippines, 1898-1946*, addresses the heretofore understudied role of private organizations, such as the YMCA, the Red Cross, and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, in furthering the U.S. imperial project in the Philippines. Taking their cue from Progressive Era reformers at home, these organizations took up the tasks of development and modernization in the Philippines once the U.S. government lost interest in such efforts, revealing in the process the crucial role that informal influences played in propelling the process of Americanization. Bator’s project impressed the committee with its careful conceptualization, creative use of heretofore un- or underutilized manuscript collections, and successful mixing of foreign and domestic historiographies.

William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants:
Heather Dichter (Toronto) for *The Political Uses of Sport in Germany from Occupation Through the Cold War 1944-1971*; and Heather Stur (Southern Mississippi) for *Dragon Ladies, Gentle Warriors, and Girls Next Door*.

Michael J. Hogan Fellowship: Victor Nemchenok (Virginia)

Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants:
Caitlin Casey  Philip Dow  Maurice LaBelle
Hajimu Masuda  Brian McNeil  Sarah Miller Davenport
Louie Milojevic  Michael Neagle  Victor Nemchenok
Amy Offner  Joy Schulz  Annessa Stagner
Tom Westerman  Tal Zalmanovich
How Did Political Leaders Experience the Fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989?

Mary Elise Sarotte

Editor’s note: The article below is adapted from Mary Sarotte’s new book, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton, 2009).

On the night of November 9, 1989, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl had the feeling that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, and he did not like it. He had arrived in Warsaw to great pomp and fanfare earlier that day with an enormous delegation, including nearly all of his top aides. The visit, by any standard, was essential; Kohl had come to Poland to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi attack in autumn 1939. The goal of his extended stay was to improve West German-Polish relations, now that members of the independent trade union Solidarity were out of prison and in government. But questions about East Germany kept coming up from the minute he landed. The subject first arose in a conversation with world-famous Solidarity leader Lech Walesa. Kohl and Walesa had started talking at 6:05 p.m., even as an ill-starred press conference had just begun in East Berlin, and Walesa had surprised Kohl by asking what it would mean for Poland if the wall opened. Walesa’s instincts, though, were better than Kohl’s; even as the chancellor took leave of Walesa and made his way to the opening banquet, he began getting word that the East German Politburo member and media spokesman, Günter Schabowski, had announced something big at the press conference. Schabowski had not meant to do so. The East German regime only wanted to make some forms of travel easier, not to open the wall altogether, but Schabowski’s bungled announcement had made it sound as if the wall were open.

At the elegant state dinner, the head of Kohl’s press office, Johnny Klein, did the unthinkable. He came to the chancellor at the banquet table and interrupted Kohl’s conversation with the Polish prime minister, former Solidarity activist Tadeusz Mazowiecki. His excuse was that earlier reports of some kind of sensation at the Schabowski press conference seemed to be true. Around 9:00 p.m., Kohl excused himself from the table and called one of the few trusted aides left back in Bonn, his head of public relations, Eduard Ackermann, to ask what was going on. “Mr. Chancellor, as we speak the wall is falling!” his aide replied enthusiastically. “Ackermann, are you sure?” the chancellor demanded. “Yes,” the aide responded, he was sure, because there were already crowds assembled on the eastern sides of border crossings, hoping to exit. Indeed, if he was rightly informed, a few had already made it. Ackermann was referring to a trickle at the Bornholmer Street border crossing that would soon turn into a wave. Kohl had to take Ackermann’s word for it. Even in the West German embassy in Warsaw, it was not possible to get television channels from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Sitting inside Warsaw Pact territory, the chancellor had limited ability to send or receive sensitive communications. In other words, he was now certain that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, and he would have to do something about it.

Kohl, the youngest of three children born to a Catholic family in 1930, had grown up admiring another Catholic politician: the first chancellor of West Germany, Konrad Adenauer. The younger man admired Adenauer’s attempts to revive democracy after the disaster of the war, in which Kohl’s older brother Walter had died at age nineteen. The young Helmut decided to become active in politics as early as possible by joining the youth organization of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and studying political history in college. He would eventually earn a Ph.D. in history at the University of Heidelberg with a dissertation on the formation of West German political parties after 1945. Kohl’s studies in no way interfered with his political career; a shooting star within the CDU, he was already governor of the state (or “Land”) of Rheinland-Palatinate by 1969, before he turned forty. Later, his talent for local party politics proved suited to the national level as well. Kohl became chancellor of all of West Germany in 1982, after winning the support of the liberals. He would hold that position for sixteen years.

In 1989, however, he was on the verge of what could potentially be the biggest crisis of his chancellorship. As a student of history, he was not about to make the same mistake that Adenauer had made. On the advice of the Western allies, Adenauer had not gone to Berlin in 1961 in the midst of his own major crisis, when the wall went up. The old man had been soundly criticized for staying away from the scene of the action, and Kohl did not want to face the same criticism. Tracking events as best he could after the formal banquet ended, well into the wee hours of Friday, November 10, Kohl decided that he had to go back—not to divided
Berlin, but rather to his seat of power in the West: Bonn.
First, however, he had to find a way to extract himself from
Poland without insulting his
hosts. After a morning in which
he retraced the footsteps of Willy
Brandt, the Nobel Prize–winning
former chancellor who had fallen
to his knees at the memorial to the
Warsaw Ghetto victims, Kohl got
more unsettling news. The mayor
of West Berlin, Walter Momper,
a member of Brandt’s opposition
Social Democratic Party of Germany
(SPD), had organized the first major
press event for 4:30 p.m. that very
afternoon. It would be held at the
Schöneberg town hall, or Rathaus,
in West Berlin, where President
Kennedy had delivered his famous
speech. Missing it would make Kohl
and his party seem out of control.
Kohl’s close aide
Teltschik, his most
trusted adviser
on foreign and
security policy,
thought that
was precisely
Momper’s point.
The chancellor
called Polish
President
Wojciech Jaruzelski at noon and got
his agreement to reschedule their
talk, originally set for that afternoon.
Kohl made similar arrangements
with the rest of the Polish leadership,
who were less than happy about
it. The chancellor then had to deal
with the fact that under still-binding
occupation air traffic rules, a West
German plane was not allowed to
fly to West Berlin. To get there by
air from Warsaw, a trip of 320 miles,
the chancellor did what Cold War
realities required. He asked the
United States for help. The U.S. Air
Force agreed to have an American
aircraft meet Kohl’s in Hamburg and
take his party to West Berlin. With
a 2:30 p.m. departure from Poland,
Kohl and his advisers just made it to
the site of the event at 4:30 p.m.,
only to find that the starting time had been
pushed back.
In West Berlin, they learned that the
local branch of Kohl’s party, the CDU,
had organized another event for the
same night. Kohl would obviously
have to speak there as well afterward;
the likelihood of his getting back to
Bonn any time soon, where he had
access to support staff and secure
communications with other world
leaders, was dwindling. It was too
much for the man who was supposed
to be in charge and instead had been
scurrying from Warsaw to Hamburg
to West Berlin on little notice. The
chancellor exploded with rage and
declared every member of his party
in West Berlin to be incompetent.
Going on stage at the Rathaus,
he in turn had to face an explosion
of anger, this time from the
audience. West Berlin was known
for its vocal and active left-wing
political organizations as well as
its regional pride. Even if it had
been a less dramatic moment, a
left-wing West Berlin rally would
not have been an event at which a
conservative Catholic politician from
the Rhineland (that is, Kohl) would
be welcome. Now, with emotions
running high, the crowd had no
patience for him whatsoever.
Having just
applauded a
hero of the Left—
“Berlin will live
and the wall will
fall,” the elderly
Brandt had told
the crowd, to
great effect—the
spectators wanted to show their
opposition to the CDU by drowning
out Kohl and driving him off the
stage.
Ignoring their deafening catcalls,
Kohl focused on the millions who
would be watching on television,
particularly in the East. “I would like
to call out to everyone in the GDR:
You are not alone! We stand at your
side! We are and will remain one
nation, and we belong together!” It
had been a long time since a leader of
West Germany had spoken that way.
Momper subsequently called Kohl’s
appearance an embarrassment. Kohl
was “stuck in yesterday’s thinking,”
the mayor proclaimed. He had
“apparently failed to comprehend”
that the East Germans were “not
interested in reunification, but rather
in a free Europe with open borders.”
Indeed, there was some question
as to whether the people of the FRG
were interested in reunification.
Pollsters in 1987 had found large
majorities who said simultaneously
that they favored unification
in theory but had no particular
expectation that it would ever
happen. Younger generations had
established a new West German
identity and were committed more to
a multinational European vision than
to the nationalistic and problematic
German past. Momper and many
others in the SPD were guessing
that Kohl was falling afoul of that
identity. Europe should matter more
than the nation-state at the end of the
twentieth century, they felt.
They were not the only ones
unhappy about Kohl’s expressions
of nationalism. While the rally
was going on, Teltschik was called
to the phone to take an ominous
message from Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev. Its gist, which was
repeated to other Western leaders
the same night, was that the events
of that evening “could create a
chaotic situation with unpredictable
consequences.” Such a message did
not bode well and capped a deeply
unsettled couple of days. In short,
for Kohl the experience of November
9-10 was one fraught with disruption,
uncertainty, and risk.
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As Germans tried to understand what November 9 meant for their lives and their divided country, leaders in capitals around the world tried to understand what it meant for them.
Bush was particularly pleased that NATO at this crucial time, President Bush said, would be one of the last people to talk to Wörner; they spoke only four days before the German’s untimely death from cancer in 1994. This personal connection meant that Bush was open to suggestions from and cooperation with Wörner, and it would prove critical to the process of reconciling NATO and German unification. It was also helpful that Wörner was a member of Kohl’s party, the CDU, and was therefore trusted in Bonn.

The other important international organization in Europe besides NATO in 1989—the European Community (EC)—had a rotating presidency, which was held by France in the second half of 1989, the year that marked the two hundredth anniversary of the French revolution. François Mitterrand therefore spoke not only as the president of France but also as the leader of the EC that November. And both he and Kohl were powerful presences within the EC regardless of whether their countries held the presidency or not.

Mitterrand was as shocked as the rest of the world by what happened in Germany on November 9. Just six days earlier, at Kohl’s urging, he had stated at a press conference that he was not afraid of German unification, but he had no idea that it would become a real possibility so soon. The unification process could not go forward without his response to the opening of the wall, but he was slow to develop one. Simply put, for German unification to be acceptable to Germany’s neighbors, it had to take place in a way that was agreeable to both France and the EC.

Mitterrand had long emphasized in his public remarks that a European framework was essential to any theoretical future German unification. He maintained that view even as unity became much more likely, but there were many possible ways to construct such a framework. Forceful action by either France itself or by the EC under its leadership could potentially slow the process.

Indeed, if events developed in such a way that France or the EC felt threatened, Mitterrand could align a powerful constellation of European actors to block unification. If no-holds-barred comments by senior European leaders to the effect that rapid unification was ruining the EC circulated in an election year among a West German population that believed strongly in European unity and worried about paying for the needs of the East German population, life could become difficult for Kohl. As it was, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher turned out to be the only one willing to make such take-no-prisoners comments in public. Others would confine themselves to private expressions, which did not have the same impact.

Years later U.S. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft was still puzzled that the British, French, and Soviets did not manage to agree on any strategy at the outset to slow the process down. Mitterrand and the Soviet leadership shared concerns about the consequences of German unification—concerns that arose at least in part from painful memories of World War II. The Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, who was born in 1928, had lost his brother Akaky in the early days of the war. One statistic encapsulates the suffering inflicted on his generation: of the seven hundred thousand men called up from his home region of Georgia, only half would return. As Shevardnadze would write in his memoirs about 1989, “Even when we were forced to face facts by the pace of events, none of us dared to ignore the inborn wariness of our people about German unity.”

It grew out of “the memory of the two world wars unleashed by Germany, especially the last war, which cost our country 27 million lives.” On some level, Shevardnadze found “it was useless to appeal to forgiveness. . . . The victors had become losers. When the heart is in such pain political rationality has little chance.”

Gorbachev himself, born in the village of Privolnoye in the Stavropol region of southern Russia in 1931, had been too young to serve, but his hometown was occupied when he was a child. His village, it was rumored in January 1943, was scheduled to be the next target of mass executions that had been carried out elsewhere; but before that could happen, Soviet troops retook the city. “The battle front passed once more through our area, this time moving westwards,” Gorbachev remembered later. Everything had been destroyed; “no machines were left, no cattle, no
seeds. Spring came. We ploughed the land by hitching cows from our individual households. The picture is still fresh in my memory, the women crying and the sad eyes of the cows.”

As a result of these experiences, Gorbachev, Mitterrand, and Shevardnadze would resort to Nazi metaphors in their conversations to describe what was happening in the days and weeks immediately following November 9. These elements of their personal experience and background seem to have militated against the rapid and rational formulation of policy in the early days and meant that both France and the Soviet Union were slow off the mark. While Mitterrand would eventually recover and get up to speed with Kohl, Gorbachev would never really do so.

Of course, the problem was bigger than simply getting over bad memories. Gorbachev had tolerated and encouraged reformers within the Communist and Socialist parties, but the complete breakdown of order in divided Germany had not been part of his vision. It further endangered the existence of the Warsaw Pact and exposed the economic weakness of socialist states, including his own. In addition, as the leader of the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev expected, quite reasonably, to be informed of major decisions affecting it, such as the decision to open an armed border to an enemy state. In hindsight it is clear why there was no information about it made available to him, since there was no actual decision to open the border, but that was not apparent at the time. Moscow was thus upset because it had received updates only on how the new travel regulations were progressing and not about the headline news that the border would open.

In summary, none of the political leaders who would soon play critical roles in unifying Germany had any idea of what would happen in advance. A bungled press conference by a severely sleep-deprived East German press spokesman mistakenly gave East Germans the impression that the wall was open, and they rushed to it, overwhelming the border guards. World leaders were forced, as they so often are, to improvise responses to chance and circumstance on the fly. The story of the construction of post-Cold War Europe is the story of how they responded to the events of November 9, 1989.

Mary Elise Sarotte is Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California.

THANKS!

SHAFR and Passport wish to thank Ed Goedeken of the Iowa State University Library System for his many years of hard work on behalf of SHAFR members.

Ed has compiled the annual list of dissertations relevant to diplomatic history, which ran in the newsletter for many years.

The list now appears on the SHAFR website, rather than in print, and can be accessed at:

http://www.shafr.org/publications/annual-dissertation-list/

The 2009 list is now available!
How I Became a Novelist and Lived (Learned) to Tell the Tale

Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffmann

Historians are plainspoken creatures. We arrange narratives in the clearest possible order, shining the bright light of reason on events to illuminate their causes. We are the dogs of the story-telling world: happy, guileless, and transparent.

Novelists are the cats. Subtle and mysterious, they employ indirection to send readers down blind alleys. They meander and feign indifference to the auditor’s understanding. Smoke, mirrors, and emotion are the tools of their trade.

E.B. White observed in The Elements of Style, the famous guide to expository writing, that either the writer works or the reader works. Historians labor so that the reader doesn’t have to wonder what’s going on. The novelist, conversely, raises ambiguous questions. While the historian glories in analysis, the novelist forces the reader to analyze events for himself.

I wish I had known all this when I set out to write my first novel. It would have saved me a lot of time. In The Lion’s Den, released in August of 2009, was a project I set myself several years ago when I held the Mary Ball Washington Chair at University College Dublin through the Fulbright Program. As other Fulbright Scholars can attest, an Americanist is at a disadvantage working in foreign libraries, since their collections naturally emphasize their own national histories. Consequently, I decided to use the year abroad to write historical fiction instead of pursuing my normal research.

The idea for the novel was likely born when I saw the light. My reader’s brain—dashing through prose to "R." Literary agent Jodie Rhodes loved the book. She was convinced it would sell and immediately launched an impressive assault on the New York publishing world. But editor after editor told us they were accepting no, or very few, new novels because the industry was in the doldrums. Some said that only women bought fiction these days, and they “wouldn’t accept” a male protagonist. Others indicated that they liked historical settings (think cool costumes), but didn’t want actual historical characters. Most important, a number added that they were just not captivated by my “voice.” Indeed, I heard so often about my “voice” that I began to think I should consider gargling or practice singing scales.

Instead, I drew several favorite, best-selling novels from my bookshelf, determined to find out what I was doing wrong. That’s when I saw the light. My reader’s brain—dashing through prose to
follow a story’s quick path—had never noticed the purposeful, willful convolution of so much literary writing. Its modus, I realized, was to hint at meanings, not explicate them.

The lesson was underscored by reading B.R. Myers’ illuminating essay from the Atlantic Monthly (July/August 2001), “A Reader’s Manifesto.” Myers lays into the intellectual fashion that scorns “any accessible, fast-moving story written in unaffected prose …[as] ‘genre fiction’—at best an excellent ‘read’ or a ‘page turner,’ but never literature with a capital L.” Too many of today’s writers (and reviewers) believe it is “more important to sound literary than to make sense,” Myers asserts.

When I told an old friend at the University of Arizona of my travails, he expressed amusement. An enormously prolific historian and straight-shooting essayist, he recounted that he, too, had once tried to write a historical novel—the plot was all worked out, with enough intrigue, sex, and dastardly doings to keep any reader’s eyes glued to the page for hours—but gave it up after one day. “I just couldn’t do it,” he said. “It wasn’t worth the aggravation!”

But persistence pays. I went back and re-ordered bits of my story, dangled odd clues in unexpected places, and re-ironed the prose to introduce idiosyncratic wrinkles. Unwilling to shuck my commitment to clarity as a historian and friend-of-the-reader, I nonetheless had fun with the editing: undermining and complicating my usual streamlined style and trying on new hats. On my agent’s advice, and after reading a New York Times article on the subject, I decided to publish with iUniverse, a print-on-demand company that adopted the book for its selective “Editor’s Choice” and “Rising Star” lists. I put some money into the project, and the Rising Star designation meant that the publisher picked up some of the promotion costs, sharing the financial risk. Within six months, In the Lion’s Den was a lovely little book, endorsed by Joseph Ellis (Passionate Sage and Founding Brothers) as a historical novel of “conspicuous grace and style.”

It might also be the only novel suitable for assigning in a survey course on early American foreign relations. In the past, I have assigned a few twentieth-century novels (The Quiet American, Our Man in Havana, etc.), but I have never found one suitable to accompany the monographs and primary documents I use for the nineteenth century. Next semester I intend to assign my novel as an experiment, with copies on reserve in the library so that students do not necessarily have to purchase the book.

Fiction can play an important pedagogical role. My own interest in history was first piqued by historical novels when I was a child. (I have to concede that most of the protagonists were female: Mara: Daughter of the Nile, Forever Amber, Katherine, and Désirée.) Fiction forces the reader, along with the protagonist, to watch history unfold in the order it does in real life—looking forward onto an uncertain future rather than backward onto the dead past. Contingency is foremost, deepening the reader’s empathy. Keeping that suspense alive is the novelist’s daily writing challenge.

My sense is that In the Lion’s Den will go well with my favorite non-fiction monographs. With luck, the different genres will get along better than cats and dogs.

Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman is the Dwight Stanford Professor of American Foreign Relations at San Diego State University.
The Program:

Building on the success of last year’s annual conference, this year’s conference is also shaping up to be an exciting event. The 2010 committee—Anne Foster, Naoko Shibusawa (co-chairs), Amy Greenberg, Jason Colby, Kristin Hoganson, Dirk Bönker, Carol Anderson, Salim Yaqub—includes some veterans of the 2009 committee. Reflecting the chosen conference theme, “Crossing Boundaries: Foreign Relations and Transborder Histories,” the call for papers encouraged the submission of panels and paper proposals that deal with the history of United States’ role in the world in the broadest sense. In order to complement SHAFR’s signature and continuing strengths in diplomatic, strategic, and foreign relations history, particularly for the post-1900 period, the committee especially encouraged proposals that deal with non-state actors and/or pre-1900 transborder histories, as well as proposals that involve histories of gender and race, cultural history, religious history, environmental history, economic history, labor history, immigration history, and borderlands history. The committee also invited applications from scholars working in areas other than U.S. history, and panels that include work by such scholars. Finally, the committee welcomed panels dealing with issues such as pedagogy and professionalization.

The committee circulated the call for papers on 42 listservs, while SHAFR advertised the CFP in the OAH Magazine and in Perspectives. Committee members also made an effort personally to encourage colleagues in related fields, as well as graduate students in the field of United States foreign relations. The diversity of subject area expertise on the committee facilitated reaching a wide variety of scholars.

As with last year, there was a terrific response to this outreach. Although SHAFR conferences that are not held in Washington DC tend to attract fewer applicants, the committee received 81 complete panel proposals by the December 1 deadline, and an additional 34 individual paper proposals. The quality was quite high, and virtually all panels received some support from those reading the proposals. Panels in general were balanced, well organized and tightly focused, suggesting that the panelists are making clear contributions to the field. At least 113 scholars will be newcomers to the conference, indicating to us that many are newly looking to SHAFR as an important venue for presenting their scholarship. Newcomers included historians who do not traditionally identify with the field of foreign relations as well as geographers, anthropologists, political scientists, and those in American Studies. We had a strong showing from scholars based internationally, especially in Europe. We continue to attract many applications from graduate students, and retain our reputation as a welcoming place for those early in their scholarly career. The largest group of applicants remains, as expected and appropriate, those with a primary identification and scholarly commitment to the field of the history of United States foreign relations. The conference will provide an invigorating mix of approaches.

Highlights of the conference will include:

- An opening reception sponsored by the Women’s Committee, especially to welcome graduate students and newcomers on Thursday before the plenary.
- A Saturday luncheon talk on the conference theme of foreign relations and transborder histories.
- A Saturday evening reception organized by Jeremi Suri, the local arrangements chair, at the Wisconsin Veterans Museum, which is located in Capitol Square in downtown Madison.

We look forward to seeing you in Madison this summer to greet old friends and make new ones at what will surely be a stimulating and invigorating conference.

Anne Foster, Indiana State University
Naoko Shibusawa, Brown University

The Location:

Madison in late June proves that cold, snowy winters make for near perfect summers. The city shines in the warm glow of the sun sitting comfortably above the isthmus, the lakes, and the ubiquitous outdoor
festivals that bring the community and its lucky visitors alive. Madison is, in fact, much more than a state capital, a university town, a business hub, and an artists’ enclave. It is a forward-looking community with a strikingly traditional commitment to people and place. Few other cities share the same devotion to landscape. Few other cities share the same daily sport in turning the landscape into a cause for group recreation. Madisonians love their city and they consume their city in a very spirited way.

SHAFR participants will have the easy privilege of enjoying all the glories of Madison during their visit to town. The city sits astride a narrow isthmus between two large lakes: Lake Monona (“Lake of the Rising Sun”) to the South, and Lake Mendota (“Lake of the Setting Sun”) to the North. The beautiful alabaster white Capitol dome, completed in 1917 as a near replica of the Nation’s Capitol dome, sits at the epicenter of the isthmus. All roads lead to this focal point of progressive government, or so the “Wisconsin Idea” of Robert La Follette, John R. Commons, and Richard Ely promised. The Capitol Square remains a serious place, but it is more frequently populated by visitors to the eye-catching Frank Lloyd Convention Center on Lake Monona, the Wisconsin Veterans and Historical Society Museums, and, most of all, the gargantuan Saturday farmers market. You have never seen so much cheese!

Traveling West off the Capitol Square one finds the pedestrian throughway of State Street – more than a mile of shops, restaurants, cafes, and more cafes connecting progressive government to the progressive University. On summer nights State Street, running parallel to Lake Mendota, is filled with an eclectic mix of families, students, professionals, bohemians, and even a few bums. The walk between the Capitol and the university includes the breath-taking Overture Center for the Arts, recently designed by César Pelli, the surprisingly modest Peace Park devoted to the 1960s protests, and the entrance to the Lowell Center and other conference accommodations.

The Western end of State Street opens into the University of Wisconsin campus. To understand this university you must think of three things: Frederick Jackson Turner and the frontier, Fred Harvey Harrington and the “multiversity” of the Cold War era, and Jamie Thompson and stem cells. You can feel Turner in the university’s palpable connection to a frontier landscape that hugs Lake Mendota. The stately Wisconsin Historical Society library and the monuments to creative scholarship across campus attest to the frontier individualism (and eccentricity) that continues to define cutting-edge research and teaching. The never-ending parade of hyper-modern (postmodern?) buildings, as far as the eye can see, reflects the rapid and extensive growth of the university after the Second World War – the creation of a mini-empire that receives more federal research dollars than any other university, excluding one that performs classified research. The section of campus nearest to State Street and our conference facilities focuses on our proud humanities and social sciences, but a run around the lake will show the powerful presence of “big science.” Stem cells and other major discoveries shape the financial, cultural, and topographical landscape almost as much as semi-corrupt Big Ten Athletics.

We can thank all of these elements for our fantastic state-of-the-art SHAFR meeting home. Madison is a prime time summer conference destination, and the university actively contributes to this exceptional experience. All of the SHAFR conference panels and related sessions will occur in the sleek Pyle Conference Center, near the crossroad of State Street and the campus, overlooking Lake Mendota. Everyone can walk from their accommodations and other activities to and from the conference center with ease. Hundreds of diverse food and drink options are less than five minutes away on foot. All facilities meet the highest standards for easy access.

Perhaps the greatest of all Madison treasures sits beside the conference center. The University of Wisconsin Memorial Union is the social center for people of all tastes. The rococo building includes a cozy high quality coffee shop, a lakeside dining facility, a true German Rathskeller with more beer on tap than any other American university bar, and Badger ice cream. Move over Ben and Jerry’s, our university cows are the creamiest!

Most significant, the backside of the Memorial Union building is attached to the Lakeside Terrace, a beer garden built out onto Lake Mendota. You can sit in comfortable chairs, eat brats and hamburgers, drink pitchers of beer, watch the sailors and wind-surfers, and even place your feet in the water. Don’t worry, the ducks rarely bite. When the sun goes down, each evening includes an outdoor concert with more food and drink, of course. Families, students, faculty, politicians, and visitors mingle together in this remarkable setting. Come early and enjoy the easy fun. Please do remember, however, that you should attend a few of those SHAFR panels at the Pyle Center next door...

Suggested Restaurants – good food, reasonably priced, walking distance:

Blue Marlin Fish and Seafood Restaurant -- 101 North Hamilton Street (608) 255-2255
Chautara Indian-Nepalese Restaurant -- 334 State Street (608) 251-3626
Fresco Restaurant (Overture Center rooftop) -- 227 State Street (608) 663-7374
Frida Mexican Grill -- 117 State Street (608) 256-4000
Husnu’s Turkish Restaurant -- 547 State Street (608) 256-0900
Kabul Afghan Restaurant -- 541 State Street (608) 256-6322
Murasato Japanese Restaurant -- 106 King Street (608) 260-2680
Tornado Steakhouse -- 116 South Hamilton Street (608) 256-3570
Tutto Pasta Trattoria -- 305 State Street (608) 256-9071

Suggested Bars in walking distance (most have live music on Friday and Saturday nights):

Brocach Irish Pub -- 7 West Main Street (608) 255.2015
Edgewater Hotel Bar -- 666 Wisconsin Avenue (608) 256-9071
The Nitty Gritty -- 223 North Frances Street (608) 251-2521
Old Fashioned -- 23 North Pinckney Street (608) 310-4545
Overture Center Rooftop Bar -- 227 State Street (608) 663-7374
Zander’s -- 118 State Street (608) 280-9999
**Other Entertainment Options in walking distance:**
Capitol Building Tours -- 2 East Main Street (608) 266-0382
Orpheum Movie and Music Theater -- 216 State Street (608) 255-8755
Overture Center for the Arts -- 201 State Street (608) 258-4177
University of Wisconsin Memorial Union Theater -- 800 Langdon Street (608) 265-ARTS
Wisconsin Historical Society Museum -- Capitol Square (608) 264-6400
Wisconsin Historical Society Library and Archives -- 816 State Street (608) 264-6400
Wisconsin Veterans Museum and Archives -- 30 West Mifflin Street (608) 267-1799

Jeremi Suri, E. Gordon Fox Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

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**The Research:**

**Resources at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Archives**

The UW-Madison Archives was established in 1951 and serves as the repository for the records of the Madison campus, UW System Administration, and the UW Colleges and UW Extension. Most records dealing with foreign relations would be from faculty members involved with other countries or who taught about foreign relations. In addition the University Archives contains records on Peace Corps programs developed here (Madison has produced the 2nd highest number of Peace Corps volunteers in the country), the Land Tenure Center (which supported multidisciplinary research in land tenure and agrarian structure in Latin America, Africa, and Asia beginning in 1962), etc. Unfortunately few of our finding aids are available online, but most collections are cataloged in the university’s main library catalog, MadCat (http://madcat.library.wisc.edu).

**Oral History Program**

The University of Wisconsin-Madison Oral History Program (http://archives.library.wisc.edu/oral-history/overview.html) was established as part of the University History Project in 1971. Its initial charge was to interview prominent emeritus faculty members about their research and careers at the University. Over the years, the program became a part of the UW Madison Archives, changed from a project to a program, and expanded its scope to include interviews with campus administrators, staff, and students as well as faculty. Taken individually, these interviews reflect the careers and interests of the interviewees; taken collectively they constitute a narrative of the development of the University over time. As such, they form an invaluable part of the historical record of the University in its over 160 years of existence.

**The Collection**

The Oral History Program’s collection--held at the UW-Madison Archives--currently encompasses over 1,000 interviews (nearly 3,500 hours) touching on all aspects of the University’s history. A significant portion of the total collection were conducted as a part of special series covering subjects such as the Teaching Assistants Strike of 1970, the UW Merger, the Arboretum, and printmaking at UW since World War II. Other significant historical themes run through many of the interviews, including the Depression, the return of the GIs after World War II, the protests against the Vietnam War, academic freedom, and gender and race issues.

**The Foreign Policy Aspects of the Collection**

At first glimpse the UW-Madison oral histories appear to have no relation to U.S. foreign policy. While a researcher would have to dig, there are narrators in our collection who, through their involvement in their research or their department or their protests, have ties to our foreign policy. An interested researcher can contact Troy Reeves, oral history program head, at treeves@library.wisc.edu or 608-890-1899 with his or her research interest, and he will do some quick searching to see if any of the interviewees discuss that topic, that person, or that part of the world.

**Wisconsin Historical Society**

The library and archives of the Wisconsin Historical Society provide the largest collection of published and unpublished material documenting the history of North America outside of the Library of Congress (http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/libraryarchives/about.asp). Although the WHS is a separate state agency, its library serves as the American history library for the Madison campus, and it is located on campus. The manuscript collections from the WHS are cataloged in a separate catalog, ArcCat (http://arcat.library.wisc.edu/). Many of their collections are also included in Archival Resources in Wisconsin (http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/wiarchives/).

Troy Reeves, Head, Oral History Program David Null, Director of Archives University of Wisconsin Library System

**Wisconsin Veterans Museum Research Center**

The Wisconsin Veterans Museum (WVM) Research Center is a nationally known, state of the art research facility that offers something unique to historians. Whereas many institutions focus their collecting on a particular conflict, branch of service, or military unit, the WVM Research Center presents a microcosm of the American military and veteran experience by presenting all conflicts, branches, and units focused through the lens of the Badger State. Thus researchers can access the collections of a Civil War Army sergeant, a World War I Marine, a Vietnam War sailor, and an airman from Operation Enduring Freedom during the same visit.

Its collections include an archives with more than 2,500 linear feet of manuscript collections, records, and photographs pertaining to individual Wisconsin veterans, Wisconsin veterans organizations, and the Wisconsin National Guard; a military history library with over 11,000 titles including published veteran memoirs, rare regimental histories, and field manuals; an oral history collection with more than 1,200 interviews with veterans of the Spanish-American War through the current conflicts; a periodical collection of over 1,500 titles.
including wartime unit newsletters and veterans organizational newsletters; and a poster and print collection with more than 2,500 items ranging from Civil War recruitment flyers to artsy World War I war bond posters.

The military and foreign relations are so often associated with one another that it should be no surprise that the WVM Research Center collection contains numerous collections pertaining to the latter. Often providing the views of an individual on foreign affairs, there are many relevant collections and documents preserved at the WVM Research Center. Listed below are several resources that might be of interest to scholars in that field.

However, they are but a small part of the larger collection. These constantly growing collections are cataloged on both WisCat (www.wiscat.net) and WorldCat (www.worldcat.org), and researchers are strongly encouraged to search for items of interest prior to their visit.

The letters and papers of Wisconsin’s World War II veterans often relate closely to issues of foreign affairs. In addition to the hundreds of letters and diaries describing individuals’ thoughts about Pearl Harbor, the declaration of war, the use of atomic bombs, and the end of the war, many collections contain more in depth looks at more obscure incidents. Francis Brewster, an Army officer in both World Wars, served as the military governor of Bavaria during the Allied occupation following World War II. His collection contains correspondence, orders, reports, and other documents relating to Bavaria and nearby Czechoslovakia. Robert Sasman was en route to the Pacific Theater when the war ended—he served occupation duty in the Philippines. In addition to discussion of the interactions of Americans in the occupation forces with Filipinos, his letters, papers, and photographs include coverage of independence celebrations and the inauguration of Manuel Roxas.

Eunice Onsrud, a native of Stoughton, Wisconsin served in North Africa and Italy with the Women’s Army Corps during World War II. In July 1947, she accepted an administrative position with the Corps of Engineers in Greece as part of the Marshall Plan. She worked there for over a year, and her manuscript collection includes letters written home to her family describing her experiences abroad, her work, and her thoughts on the Greek people and the conditions they faced. Also included are government publications providing information about the program as Onsrud joined in 1947 and a summary as she was leaving in 1948.

A delicate aspect of foreign relations during the Cold War and Vietnam War pertained to negotiations regarding prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action. Two manuscript collections touch very directly upon this topic: the Harold T. Kamps papers and the Richard W. Fischer papers. Kamps served as an intelligence officer on a C-130 “Hercules” that was shot down over the Armenian border after straying into Soviet airspace. Although initially acknowledging the crash, Soviet officials only returned the remains of six of the seventeen crew members, excluding Kamps. This led to a forty year struggle by Kamps family to get information about Harold. The collection contains correspondence with U.S. Senators that provided updates on negotiations with the Soviet government as well as released Soviet reports regarding the incident. Fischer’s story, though set in Vietnam, is similar and his family sought answers from the U.S. and Vietnamese governments after he went missing in action. His collection includes copied reports detailing American efforts to find the remains of Fischer, who was presumed dead.

All of the materials mentioned above, as well as a permanent exhibit tracing the development of the Wisconsin National Guard, a manuscript display case that features rotating exhibits highlighting collections, a great location with a tremendous view of both the Wisconsin State Capitol building and famous State Street, and a friendly and courteous staff just waiting to help you, are open to the public at the Wisconsin Veterans Museum Research Center, located at 30 West Mifflin Street, Suite 300 in Madison, Wisconsin. The facility is open to the public weekdays from 9:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., and by special appointment. Please contact Reference Archivist Russ Horton at 608.267.1790 or russell.horton@dva.state.wi.us to schedule an appointment or if you have any questions regarding the WVM Research Center or its collections.

For more information about conference logistics, including accommodations, registration, and travel, please visit the conference website at http://www.shafr.org/conferences/annual/2010-annual-meeting/ or email Jennifer Walton at conference@shafr.org.
As an acquisitions editor for a university press I often attend events with academics, and these days, whether I am at a publishing panel for recent Ph.D’s or a dinner with senior scholars, I am inevitably asked, “What about e-books?” Younger scholars usually pose the question with a note of excited trepidation. Senior scholars are simply curious. No matter the audience or the publishing experience of my conversation partners, my answer is the same: “What academic publishers plan regarding digital books is far less important than what your department chair and dean think about them.”

It is true that publishers, university presses and commercial presses, alike, are laboring to find the technological, economic, and legal means to distribute books in digital form. We have many questions, and the relative novelty of the technologies, the uncertainty about how libraries will purchase e-books, and the indeterminacy of reading habits associated with the technologies offer us few publishing axioms with which to work. It is truly a period of experimentation, and it is all the more momentous and risky because we have embarked on it with depleted financial resources and, for academic publishers, at a time of gross uncertainty in higher education.

I trust that commercial publishers will figure things out. In October, the founder of Amazon.com, Jeff Bezos, claimed that when a book is available in both print and digital formats, Amazon is registering 48 percent of its sales in digital versions. Allowing for some error here, that number shows that commercial publishers are starting to make sense of the e-book.

Yet the question of how scholarly book publishing will develop in this still-new digital age is not one that can be answered by the commercial market alone. While university presses certainly publish many books that look outside scholarly disciplines toward popular audiences, supporting scholarly communication and the intellectual life of colleges and universities remains our primary mission. Therefore, the directors of academic presses cannot be sure how to develop their digital publishing programs until academic departments, college administrators, and individual scholars come to an understanding about the value they attach to digital books. University presses look to universities and organizations such as SHAFR to tell them not just what to publish but, now, how to publish.

The working life of professional historians transpires in an environment suffused with digital technologies. Scholars across the humanities and social sciences have been communicating via the Internet since at least the mid-1990s. Personal email has been supplemented by more public forms of communication such as Web logs and listservs like H-Net. Archives have gone online at a steady pace in the last decade, and a serious digital search of archives around the world is now the first step in researching any topic. We all expect to read our newspapers and periodical literature online via accounts with a library and to keep up with literature in the field via journal archives such as JSTOR and Project Muse. The most recent articles in the American Historical Review and Diplomatic History are, of course, accessible via the online accounts that go along with membership in the AHA and SHAFR. The currency of digital communication, coupled with the fact that one can keep track of political, diplomatic, and military events almost in real time, has led scholars to seek up-to-date digital sources for their own use as well as the use of their students.

When it comes to new books, however, there is a reluctance to embrace digital technology. Given the prevalence of digital communication and electronic journal publishing in professional history, the reluctance of most scholars and academic officials to value digital books on par with printed books requires some explanation. We can all recite the commonplace arguments for the printed book: we are accustomed to reading on printed pages; printed pages are more legible than anything digital readers can offer; well-made books are beautiful objects that accentuate the best written expression; books are easier to carry, open up, and use in all the ways that we need as critical readers. (I wager that these commonplace reasons for preferring books are shared, and quite strongly, by most book editors.) These features, and many more I did not list, make books a sticky technology (for technology they are). How we will all slowly—and with all of the reluctance that comes with setting aside long-held habits and aesthetic preferences—get detached from these sticky aspects of books is a process not at all specific to the practices of historians.

For historians, the authority of digital books is likely the main question. How did a book come to be published and did qualified scholars support the case for publication? These are always legitimate questions, and university presses have created systems of scholarly review precisely so that we know we are publishing excellent works and so that our authors can address such questions with complete confidence. But when it comes to e-books these questions are tinged with skepticism. The digital book carries the same taint as a self-published book or a work that appears from a vanity press. The main criticism of communication on the World Wide Web applies to e-books: it is wonderful that everyone has the liberty to make their thoughts known, but most of what is posted on the Web is garbage. Because digital publishing, at least in terms of the production and distribution of (what we now call) content, holds the promise of being easier and less expensive than sending physical
books out into the world, there is the suggestion that less care was put into the work and less critical attention brought to bear on the research and writing. The many virtues of digital communication—e.g., speed, lack of expense, currency, ready distribution—come to be seen, in the case of books, as signs of the inferiority of work published via digital means.

A book published exclusively as a digital download is thus met with skepticism. This prejudice is less applicable in the case of books that are published in both print and digital form or later come to be available on the Web when they become part of the public domain. In such cases, the digital book is seen as a supplement to the printed book, just as access to online articles in Diplomatic History is a supplement to the printed version that arrives in one’s departmental mailbox. So long as care was taken at all levels to acquire, referee, edit, and produce the work in print, the accompanying digital book largely shares the prestige and authority that goes along with the book that rolled off a printing press. But what if a book were made available via print-on-demand (POD) technologies (meaning very few, if any, books would be printed up front but only upon the request of paying readers and libraries) while also being available for sale as an e-book? What if the digital book was made available for free if read online and for a fee if ordered as a POD paperback?

More and more questions about the authority of the book would likely arise. One can imagine a graph in which a line showing the increasing importance of digital delivery in the publication of a book is matched by a parallel line showing an increased skepticism about the quality of the book itself.

The authority of the digital book in comparison to the printed book is the real issue in this discussion. Is there then a way that the prevailing prejudice against digital books can be removed? More to the point, can scholars and publishers establish a process that will allow digital books to be assessed on par with printed books in decisions pertaining to hiring, tenure, and promotion? The short-to-medium-term future of digital scholarly books is then more likely to be determined by developing academic standards and university policy than changing technology.

Scholars and academic publishers have, of course, tried to set up processes that would put e-books and printed books on an equal footing. Indeed, despite disappointments, we continue to try. But I think it is fair to say that we have not yet succeeded.

The most ambitious e-book project to date was Gutenberg-e. In collaboration with the American Historical Association and with funding from the Mellon Foundation, Columbia University Press embarked on a bold publishing plan that made digital books in the humanities available at a modest cost via institutional subscriptions. The digital version featured elements that could not be accommodated in print books—e.g., additional illustrations, notes containing hyperlinks to documents and images, and expanded back matter. The e-book was presented as better than any possible print version and, moreover, was integrated into the digital environment of the online reader. Cognizant of the question of the authority of digital books, Gutenberg-e set up a prestigious editorial board to vet submissions and sought only manuscripts that were based on prize-winning dissertations. Equally aware of the reluctance of young scholars to participate in such an experimental venture, Gutenberg-e offered $20,000 to authors in order to support their research and defray any costs they incurred in developing the book.

The first books for Gutenberg-e were signed and the first monetary prizes awarded in 2000. The experiment came to an end in 2008, however. Gutenberg-e published a total of thirty-five books, but in a 2007 report, the Mellon Foundation concluded that Gutenberg-e had not succeeded in establishing the viability of academic digital book publishing. It cited three reasons: publishing costs were higher than those for printed books; reviews in relevant journals were few; and the professional success of the authors (measured by tenure-track appointments) was below the average for recent Ph.D.’s. On the Gutenberg-e Website full books can still be read online and PDF files of the chapters downloaded. It is even possible to order a bound copy of a Gutenberg-e book, for $60, on the main Webpage for Columbia University Press. But the press is no longer accepting submissions to be published in this manner.

University presses watched Gutenberg-e with interest. Meanwhile, almost all of them were seeking to find their various ways toward successful digital publishing. They explored or established ties with Kindle or with digital content packagers such as ebrary and NetLibrary in order to make print books available for purchase in digital format. Many presses, including Cornell University Press, are looking to cooperate to create a common system through which digital publications can be made available to readers.

Most recently, University of Michigan Press moved ahead with a broad digital publishing initiative and announced that it had redefined its mission in order to emphasize e-books. Working with the University of Michigan Library, its new institutional home, it will now focus on developing digital media, while (at least for the time being) still selling printed books to readers via POD technology. Other presses are also working with the libraries of their home institutions to share digital resources such as servers in order to create platforms for the distribution of digital books. Inevitably in such partnerships there are debates about open access, free access, and access for a fee. Each form of distribution has its own difficulties regarding distribution, finances, and scholarly prestige.

For all of this activity—and it is considerable and promising—the matter of the scholarly value of the digital book remains unclear. Gutenberg-e made every effort to
address prejudicial attitudes against e-books, but it did not succeed in removing them. (A May 2003 article in Perspectives on History suggesting that Gutenberg-e had established a high level of prestige for its e-books turned out to be overly optimistic.) Moreover, it is telling that the areas in which digital books show a fair chance of professional success are subdisciplines in states of decline, where book sales are rapidly decreasing. Because fewer and fewer presses can afford to publish a printed book that may only sell 250 copies, scholars in these subdisciplines cannot insist on the prestige of a printed book. To do so could be professional suicide. Faced with the choice of no book or an e-book, these scholars have to turn to e-books, and boards in charge of hiring, tenure, and promotion will have no choice but to credit e-books if they want to hire and keep younger scholars. We are seeing leading scholars in these subdisciplines rally to the e-book cause and establish book series geared toward various modes of digital publication. It is too early to tell if these initiatives will succeed where Gutenberg-e did not, but there is reason to think that they will (albeit on modest terms). Short of waiting for a crisis in their discipline that forces a reconsideration of e-books, what can diplomatic historians do to create room for digital book publishing and in turn make sure that quality of new electronic books is every bit as high as that of print books? Here are some suggestions:

Know what is and what is not entailed in digital publishing. Scholars should be aware that, while digital technologies are changing many aspects of publishing, they are not altering how book projects are assessed by editors and vetted by outside scholars. The shared work of editors, scholarly readers, editorial boards, and faculty boards at university presses is the same for e-books as it is for print books. Manuscripts might go out in digital form and reader reports might come back via email, but the need to make sure that candidates for publication meet the standards of the press and the relevant discipline need not change. As ever, editors at university presses need to be convinced of the importance of the topic, the quality of the research, and the clarity of the presentation. These standards for the evaluation of book projects—whether they will appear solely in print, in a mix of print and digital delivery, or solely as e-books—will remain constant.

Take an active role in new publishing efforts. The quality of e-books is further assured by your own engagement with new digital publication plans. If a press is considering a new book series dedicated to making books available in digital form and solicits your advice or participation, please strongly consider taking part in the venture.

Recognize that e-books are part of the more general digital economy of information. It seems odd to set the book apart when the great majority of a historian’s daily reading and writing occurs in a digital environment and employs digital media. Sequestering the scholarly book in the analogue world could well result in the obsolescence of the book as a form of writing and communication.

Provide guidance. When younger scholars ask about digital publishing, provide them with frank and balanced advice. If a young scholar has a chance to have his or her first book come out as a digital publication, the scholar should be encouraged to investigate the possibility. Factoring in all of the other matters crucial to making a decision regarding a press—e.g., the general reputation of the press, how helpful the editor at the press has been, whether there is an appropriate series for the book—the possibility of digital publication should not be treated as a disqualifier. Also, help younger scholars by making sure that they inquire about the review process and gain assurances of the integrity of the vetting process.

Support digital publications in the hiring, tenure, and promotion process. Professional evaluations have to be made on the merits of the work in question, not the form of delivery. A digital publication is not an inferior publication, and the full integration of e-books will happen only when they are given the same weight as printed books in the tenure and promotion system.

Make use of digital communications, including e-books. In a field such as diplomatic history that is international in scope, in which scholars are dispersed across the globe and key archives are in a multitude of countries and in multiple languages, the ease of communication that digital technologies provide cannot be stressed too strongly. The merits of email, digital document sharing, and journal publishing make a further case for digital books. While books inevitably move slower than events and research, e-books hold the promise of making timely and authoritative accounts of crucial matters available to readers around the world.

If scholarly publishing moves more aggressively into e-publishing, there is no reason the same editorial and scholarly standards that we are accustomed to in traditional print publishing cannot be applied to e-books. In fact, it should be the mission of universities and scholars to ensure that they are. Because of the close connection between the work of academic presses and the processes of assessment within academic disciplines, the directors of presses and their editors cannot embark on this endeavor in a unilateral manner. Indeed, as we move ahead with digital book publishing, university presses look to and require substantial guidance and, yes, leadership from scholars, administrators, and the officers of organizations dedicated to maintaining the vitality of scholarly communication in the field of history.

Michael J. McGandy is acquisitions editor with Cornell University Press.
A Call to Broaden the Reach of SHAFR Through the Social Science Research Network

Dan Margolies

I listened to the discussion of the name of the journal and the direction of the field of the history of American foreign relations at the June 2009 SHAFR meeting with much interest in the broadened perspectives of historians writing today but also with a sense that the discussion was focused on the wrong topic. It seems worth asking what is more effective—attempting to reconfigure and re-label a diverse body of research and theoretical perspectives in line with the current emphasis of a particular assemblage of scholars, or capitalizing on the substance of all the best new research through the widest possible dissemination of the insights that SHAFR members are producing. If relatively few in the broader scholarly and policy realms know what kind of new questions historians of American foreign relations are asking, who cares what labels are used to describe them?

This is a modest proposal to strengthen the field of American foreign relations and deepen its connection to a broad interdisciplinary scholarly community interested in many of the same issues. SHAFR should consider making a strong push as an organization to utilize the impressive reach of the Social Science Research Network (SSRN, available at http://ssrn.com/). In so doing, SHAFR could readily (and at no cost) showcase the innovative work being produced by the transnational and international scholars agitating for change to the name, trajectory, and objective of the organization while also broadening the appeal and availability of its more traditional core scholarship.

SSRN is a well-established database of the newest scholarship in the social sciences from a wide variety of fields, including economics, political science, international relations, business history, legal history, law and society, and other legal scholarship. It is a significant scholarly resource that is all the more impressive for being free. The vast bulk of papers and articles on the network can be downloaded at no cost in PDF form after a free registration and can be uploaded easily by authors or institutions. A few of the abstracts link to fee-based access to individual, previously published, copyrighted articles, but fees should not be a significant problem; SSRN requires journals to charge the lowest available fee available to subscribers, and many scholars already have electronic access to journals through subscription-based databases anyway.

SSRN serves as an easy, comprehensive search engine without the inherent narrowness that characterizes many academic database searches. The search function is quick and intuitive. All the articles on the network are also connected to Google Scholar, which further ensures that work does not disappear into the “deep Web” and become accessible only through the search functions at proprietary portals and for-profit databases with subscription requirements. Downloads of all papers are fast and reliable from anywhere in the world, since in addition to the New York headquarters, there are SSRN mirror sites at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, European Corporate Governance Institute, Korea University, and Stanford Law School. Indeed, SSRN has announced its intent to make the newest research available to scholars in parts of the globe where access is an issue.

Scholars use SSRN intensively. The site touts its impressive usage statistics on the main search screen. In the last year there have been 7,686,077 downloads from the network, including 644,547 in the month before this essay was written. SSRN is the primary resource for a stunning array of 122,934 scholars, many of whom work on topics and utilize approaches of interest to historians of American foreign relations. As of October, 2009, there were 253,669 abstracts posted on SSRN, and the full text of 209,206 papers was available in PDF format. (One of my favorite statistics is that there are currently 4,507,131 footnotes in the papers on SSRN.) Scholarly organizations also use SSRN. They highlight and make available the research of their members, organize conference proceedings, announce grant and fellowship opportunities, and provide abstracts of forthcoming published work in peer-reviewed journals. An example of perhaps the greatest relevance to an organization like SHAFR is the Political Science Network in SSRN, which is edited by David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins.

Diplomatic, transnational, and international historians alike, however defined, have a substantive interest in sparking discussion with scholars in other fields who regularly...
have a negative impact on the
vigor or profitability of Diplomatic
History. Posting article abstracts,
which is not a tradition in the field
but could easily become one, will
almost certainly increase traffic to the
articles themselves in the same way
that H-Diplo announcements seek to
do. Foreign scholars and scholars in
other fields who are not familiar with
Diplomatic History will encounter it
more readily and, if their institutions
do not have access to the Blackwell
database, will have the opportunity
to purchase articles directly. There is
no conceivable downside to making
Diplomatic History articles more
prominent and accessible.

SHAFR should consider
establishing its
own working
paper series in
which revised
conference
papers, book
chapters and
article drafts,
and other studies
could be placed
on SSRN. Papers
and commentary
from past SHAFR
annual meetings
have heretofore been fitfully archived
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The dearth of historical scholarship
on the site provides an opportunity
for SHAFR, which could set a clear
standard for how history is presented
there.

How specifically might SSRN be
made to work for SHAFR? On the
most basic level, involvement in
SSRN would increase the prominence
and reach of SHAFR and of its
members’ work. It would place
SHAFR at the vanguard of history
organizations moving to this type
of free online scholarly commons. A
presence on the network would also
complement the existing SHAFR
Webpage and drive traffic to it,
and a strong showing for SHAFR
scholarship would reaffirm the
relevance of the study of the history
of U.S. foreign relations as a central
focus of the social sciences and would
expose the work of historians to more
scholars in other fields.

In no way will embracing SSRN
new and ongoing research on a free
site because they had concerns their
work would be stolen by others or
that a SSRN working paper would
somehow have an impact on the
publication of their research when
it was completed. However, the
opposite is the case in all of these
other fields, where research is
circulated extensively in working-
paper form before publication. These
fears seem unreasonable. They also
reflect a lack of imagination about
the vast promise of a free system like
SSRN. Indeed, SSRN seems an ideal
way to make other scholars aware of
the breadth and approach of one’s
interests and the nature of one’s
preliminary findings. In the
field of history, especially, this
kind of sharing occurs all too
infrequently at annual
conferences and in publication
after years of initial
development and review.

It is time for
our work to
be made available more rapidly to
other historians and, more usefuly,
to scholars in other fields, as is so
common in other disciplines. There
is no reason SHAFR should not be at
the forefront of this effort.

If this essay reads like an
advertisement for SSRN it is only
because I have personally found
the site to be an irreplaceable
resource for my current research on
extraterritoriality and legal spatiality
in American foreign relations at the
end of the nineteenth century. Much
of my theoretical approach for this
project (and for my classes on foreign
relations and on globalization)
has been shaped by the diverse
interdisciplinary materials available
at this site. Furthermore, the size,
scope, and ease of use of SSRN
holdings have made my employment
at a small institution with inadequate
access to databases less of a handicap.
This is precisely the kind of use of
the internet for scholarly purposes
that theorists of technology have
heralded.

All historians have an interest in
expanding awareness of their work
A Postcard From Your Friend, Joe Canuck

Brian Clancy

The following essay is part of the Passport series, “The View from Overseas,” which features short pieces written by someone outside of the United States, examining the views held by the people and government in their country about the United States. SHAFR members who are living abroad, even temporarily, or who have contacts abroad that might be well-positioned to write such pieces are encouraged to contact the editor at passport@osu.edu.

The hard-working editorial staff at Passport approached me with a request that no self-respecting Canadian SHAFR member could refuse: offer a brief and informal overview of what we in the Great White North have been saying lately about our American neighbors. At first I thought of putting this task off until the Stanley Cup play-offs in June, after one of our teams takes another shot at liberating the cup from an American trophy case. But then the last thing I want to do is reinforce bad popular myths that Canadians do little more than sit around on our couches wearing toques, drinking beer while watching hockey. Nothing could be further from the truth, really. In fact, sometimes we sit around in our toques watching hockey, drinking beer and talking about our American cousins—during the commercials, of course. Canadians of all political stripes do enjoy gazing south, curious as to what our exciting friends are up to. And judging from the chatter around my local coffee shop, among my students on campus, and from our national media, you have certainly given us a great deal to talk about recently.

Canadians know two Americas: Uncle Sam’s America—the exceptional cultural and financial empire projected around the world that the 9/11 terrorists targeted—and the America of Woody Guthrie and Bruce Springsteen. We know American people, you see. And here I’m talking about folks. Most of us live a short drive from our peaceful border, and we travel, shop, and vacation among you. The Americans we meet while washing our dishes in New England campgrounds are kind, considerate, and generous people. When Canadians travel and live further abroad, as my wife and I have done, we sometimes meet people from other wonderful cultures who like Americans about as much as the Grinch liked Christmas. And they have their reasons. So as a friendly neighbor who has traveled some of the space between Woody Guthrie’s America and Uncle Sam’s America, let me fill you in on what I’m hearing round these here parts.

Canadians enjoy watching American politics. Your campaigns are so much more exciting than our own (and so much more expensive: you could probably power the city of Toronto for a year with what it costs one of your senators to run for re-election). We greeted Barack Obama’s victory with overwhelming approval. Those of us with a liberal bent embraced his intellectual credentials, his measured judgment, and his warm personal touch. Those who lean towards the conservative end of our political spectrum admired the decisiveness of the Obama victory. All Canadians were impressed with the excitement and enthusiasm his campaign generated. In fact, I overheard a few of my students say they even recorded an episode of “Canadian Idol” so they could watch a televised debate live. There was no denying the excitement in the air. Senior political observers made direct comparisons with the Kennedy campaigns of the 1960s. Watching televised interviews with the African American community throughout the campaign, Canadians felt the excitement and deep sense of pride Obama’s victory generated. It was a heart-warming sight for those of us who had witnessed the anger and disappointment caused by the Hurricane Katrina evacuation...
Canadians have been paying close attention to your recent health care debate. Overall, our national media gives your Congress high grades when ranking your legislative output against that of other democracies, but on this issue, Canadians generally feel President Obama’s opponents should keep their sticks on the ice. Perhaps only an Olympic gold medal hockey game fires up Joe and Jane Canuck’s national pride more than our Medicare system. As a people, Canadians put the needs of the group ahead of the individual. When a Democratic president tries to do that, his severest critics charge he’s a communist or lose all sense of decorum and shout out: “You lie!” Those of us who have followed your health care debate closely do believe that serious-minded Democrats and Republicans have legitimate concerns about how to pay for such a sweeping program, however. Simply put, it’s going to cost you a fortune. Canadian politicians passed our Medicare program in the 1950s. If we had to build it from scratch today, I’m convinced our shortsighted partisan members of parliament would fail miserably. In fact, our parliament is so dysfunctional that Prime Minister Harper has dissolved it twice in the last year. (Yes, we can do that up here . . . and come to think of it, dissolution usually coincides with the NHL All-Star game.) Still, I think most Canadians would agree that universal health care is a humanitarian investment, one that pays its dividends right in your neighborhood. For you, we think it’s an idea whose time has come. Our Medicare is expensive. No question. And there can certainly be long waits because the system is overburdened by an aging population. By and large, however, Canadians value the service and find it a reasonable use of their hard-earned tax dollars. Perhaps Ted Kennedy had the right idea: pass an imperfect bill now, then fix it later. Heck, that’s been our legislative mantra since 1867.

The war on terror is another frequent topic around the Canadian water cooler. It’s quite possible that no empire has ever faced a more complex national security challenge than the current Afghanistan-Pakistan situation. It’s almost beyond human capacity to imagine the complexities of the problem, not to mention what could be at stake should we fail. While Americans have been focused largely on seeking revenge for the 9/11 murders by decapitating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda using blunt military force, Canadians and many of your NATO allies have chosen to work on fixing the failed state that sheltered the terrorists. The war is under new American management now, and General McChrystal and his supporters are looking to build lasting security for the Afghan people in a rushed, short-term sort of way. With President Obama up for re-election in two years, it’s understandable that he doesn’t want to face the thought of investing a generation of young Americans in Afghanistan just yet. But that’s just what Canadian defense experts believe it’s going to take to build a viable Afghan state that is capable of defending itself.

The Canadian government chose to sidestep the war in Iraq in order to focus its efforts in Afghanistan. At the moment, Canada keeps a force of 2,800 soldiers deployed around Kandahar on a six-month rotation. This contingent is drawn from an army of 20,000. Unlike the troops of many other NATO allies, these soldiers engage in combat operations. Since the mission began in 2002 they have suffered 140 deaths, mainly from roadside bombs (this number is as of early January 2010). Each casket returns home with military honors and full television coverage. While troop morale remains high, our military is quietly suffering from the strains of the mission. Combat stress from multiple deployments, high rates of divorce, and difficulties retaining soldiers—problems common to the U.S. military as well—are symptoms of a proud fighting force in need of rest and refurbishment. Consequently, our government is committed to withdrawing our combat forces beginning in July 2011, a move that has broad public support. Polls suggest that Canadians remain committed to rebuilding Afghanistan; they just don’t want their soldiers involved in the fighting. Canadians, you see, pride themselves on their peacekeeping missions—a concept that earned our Prime Minister Lester Pearson the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. Any withdrawal of combat troops could prove difficult, however, since the current Harper government plans to continue its civilian humanitarian development.
mission after 2011 and it’s likely that diplomats, aid personnel, RCMP, the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, and military officers in the Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams will remain to help build this failed state. Who will protect these Canadians? The answer to that question will be settled after our next federal election. Meanwhile, there is a deep concern that our withdrawal may lead other NATO members to pull up stakes as well.

The war on terror has also tested our commitment to human rights. What rights should enemy combatants be accorded? Canadians have some firm opinions on this subject. We disapprove of the torture of detainees, whether at Guantanamo Bay, in secret CIA prisons, or at the notorious prison at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan. It simply undermines all that our two nations represent to the world. When the Canadian public learned that terror suspects apprehended by our troops in Afghanistan were being handed over to Afghan authorities to be tortured, the furor from home was immediate and severe. In fact, we halted the transfer of prisoners three times in 2009 until guarantees were issued that the detainees caught by our soldiers would not be tortured. While the war on terror captures a great deal of attention up here, we do have other shared concerns.

Canadians take an interest in American environmental policy. We were happy to see President Obama take a serious interest in the 2009 Copenhagen environmental summit. We continue to drag our feet on this issue at our collective peril. Acid rain, air pollution, pollution in the Great Lakes, and global warming affect both sides of our border. And Canadians have done their share of polluting. Indeed, Al Gore recently criticized the Alberta oil sands project for the environmental degradation it has caused. In the Canadian north, Arctic Ocean ice is melting at a frightening rate, endangering the polar bear population, and the opening of new waterways has raised sovereignty questions as developers from the United States and other nations eye the region’s rich, untapped natural resources. However, the Harper government refuses to put a specific environmental plan on the table until the American government shows its hand, preferring instead to harmonize our continental efforts. Meanwhile, environmentalists and some of our European friends are accusing Canada of stalling on environmental issues, despite our promises to reduce emissions by 20 per cent from 2006 levels before 2020. While Canadian and American citizens work locally to save the planet, our governments continue their serious-minded search for a pragmatic means to follow the public will. Until they find that elusive path, we sympathize with those who don’t want to aggravate the Great Recession by enacting environmental regulations that might place excessive strains upon our industries. I guess we will all muddle along as best we can.

So that’s the way you look from here as we close the door on the first decade of the millennium. May this new decade be a little less exciting than the old one, but should it prove otherwise, you can count on your Canadian friends through the good and the bad. Now, if you don’t mind, I’ve got to get back to my hockey game. Cheers, eh!

Brian Clancy is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Western Ontario.

SHAFR would like to thank the contributors to the first SHAFR.org roundtable:

Obama’s Foreign Policy: An Assessment After Year One

Andrew Johns, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, Cary Fraser, Tom Zeiler, KC Johnson, Sandra Scanlon, and Walter Hixson.

The roundtable can be seen on the SHAFR webpage at: http://www.shafr.org/category/roundtable/

SHAFR.org welcomes proposals for future roundtables, which can be sent to Brian Etheridge at: webmaster@shafr.org
1. Personal and Professional Notes

**Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht** won a Choice Outstanding Academic Title 2009 award for her book *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations*.


2. Research Notes

**Kennedy Considered Supporting Coup in South Vietnam, August 1963**

At a critical moment in August 1963, President John F. Kennedy saw only negative choices on Vietnam, according to new audio recordings and documentation posted by the National Security Archive. Recently declassified tapes of secret White House meetings on the possibility of U.S. support for a military coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem show that Kennedy believed that if Diem’s brother Ngo Dinh Nhu remained a major influence, the war might not succeed. Recognizing that Congress might get “mad” at him for supporting coup-minded Vietnamese generals, Kennedy said that it will “be madder if Vietnam goes down the drain.” Thus, Kennedy did not disagree when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said that the U.S. needed to “plan how we make this thing work.” The tapes also show that McNamara, long held to have opposed the Diem coup, failed to express such a strong view at the moment of this decision.

The newly declassified tapes are authoritative evidence on U.S. policy toward the Vietnamese coup, and they shed fresh light on one of the most controversial episodes of the American war in Vietnam. In continuation of its previous coverage of this aspect of U.S. policy during the Vietnam War, the National Security Archive is posting the Kennedy tapes and memoranda containing the written accounts of the same National Security Council (NSC) meetings, together with related documents concerning this affair. The episode is covered in considerable detail in *William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster*, by National Security Archive fellow John Prados.

The new evidence shows that:

* President Kennedy repeatedly pressed for better information regarding the balance of South Vietnamese forces for and against a coup. While Kennedy expressed reluctance to proceed with a coup that had no chance for success, he agreed with other senior U.S. officials that under the existing Saigon leadership there was no chance of success in the Vietnam War. On the tapes, Kennedy can be heard moderating NSC deliberations that aimed at forging a policy specifically aimed at the Saigon coup.

* Kennedy and other top U.S. officials agreed that, at a minimum, Saigon leader Diem had to be made to eject his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Nhu’s wife, Madame Nhu, from the South Vietnamese government. Whether this could be done by diplomatic approaches or required resort to a coup became the focus of much of these NSC deliberations. Even officials opposed to a coup agreed on the necessity to eject Nhu. Defense secretary Robert S. McNamara, who, like President Kennedy, voiced support only for a coup that could succeed, also concurred on the Nhu problem. The range of consensus included U.S. officials who subsequently gained credit for opposing expansion of the Vietnam War, most prominently Undersecretary of State George W. Ball.

* Kennedy and his advisers saw proposals to halt U.S. aid to South Vietnam as measures to weaken the Diem government in the face of the South Vietnamese generals or to direct the aid to the Vietnamese military rather than Diem.

* Proposals to evacuate Americans from South Vietnam were explicitly linked to the military coup. The tapes reveal that plans for an American withdrawal were created in the context of NSC deliberations on the coup; they became a feature of diplomatic maneuvers to induce Diem to oust Nhu.

* The specific U.S. policy choice that Kennedy made—-to send Secretary McNamara and General Maxwell D. Taylor on a diplomatic mission to Saigon in September 1963—was prefigured in these NSC discussions. The tapes show that their mission, designed to pressure Diem to get rid of Nhu, originated as a maneuver to achieve the U.S. goal by diplomacy while the South Vietnamese generals recruited more supporters for a coup.
All these points bear on important aspects of our understanding of the Vietnam War. For example, the tapes’ discussion of the purposes for planning an American withdrawal from South Vietnam weakens claims by some that President Kennedy intended to get out of the conflict all along. Though JFK expresses doubts—in the Oval Office on August 29 he tells his inner circle, “We’re up to our hips in mud out there”—the president never forthrightly rejects the Vietnam commitment. In fact Kennedy tells the same group shortly afterwards that while Congress might get “mad” at the U.S. sidling up to the Vietnamese generals, “they’ll be madder if Vietnam goes down the drain.” President Kennedy’s emphasis indicates his determination to fight the war, not abandon it.

For more information, visit the Archive Web site at http://www.nsarchive.org, or contact John Prados at 202-994-7000.

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The Soviet Origins of Helmut Kohl's 10 Points

Secret messages from senior Soviet officials to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl after the fall of the Berlin Wall led directly to Kohl's famous "10 Points" speech on German unification, but the speech produced shock in both Moscow and Washington, according to documents from Soviet, German, and American files posted on the Web by the National Security Archive.

Published for the first time in English in the Archive's forthcoming book, Masterpieces of History, the documents include highest-level conversations between President George H.W. Bush and Kohl; the text of the letter Kohl had delivered to Bush just as he announced the "10 Points" to the Bundestag on November 28, 1989; excerpts on Germany from the transcript of the Malta summit between Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev; Gorbachev's own incendiary meeting with the German foreign minister after Kohl's speech; and more.

For more information, visit the Archive Web site at http://www.nsarchive.org or contact: Svetlana Savranskaya/Thomas Blanton at 202-994-7000.

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Jacobo Timerman Destabilized Argentine Dictatorship

Thirty years after the release of Jacobo Timerman, the former newspaper editor and Argentina’s most famous political prisoner during the military dictatorship, the National Security Archive has posted declassified documents that confirm that his case almost resulted in the fracture of the military regime. One September 1979 document states, "President Videla, the civilian Minister of Justice, and the entire Supreme Court threatened to resign" if the military high command refused to release Jacobo Timerman. The U.S. Ambassador requested that Videla directly call President Jimmy Carter if Timerman was released "so the American President would be the first to know the fate of [a situation] of his high interest."

A selection of 18 U.S. documents illustrates how the military used multiple legal pretexts to break up his newspaper, La Opinión, expropriate his other properties, strip him of his citizenship, and expel him from the country. After he was finally released and expelled from Argentina on September 25, 1979, Timerman recounted his experience in a best-selling book, Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number, which drew international attention to the repression in Argentina.

As part of this collaborative project with the National Security Archive, the Provincial Commission for Memory in Argentina has published a selection of secret documents on the Timerman case from the files of the Directorate of Buenos Aires Police Intelligence. In addition, the College of William and Mary is publishing a chronology of abuses committed against Jacobo Timerman.

For more information, visit the Archive Web site at http://www.nsarchive.org or contact Carlos Osorio at 202-994-7061, cosorio@gwu.edu.

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Thirtieth Anniversary of NATO’s Dual-Track Decision: The Road to the Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War

Thirty years ago, NATO defense and foreign ministers made a landmark decision designed to unify the alliance, one that also contributed to the collapse of détente and helped provide an agenda for the end of the Cold War. To mark the NATO "dual-track" decision that linked U.S. deployments of long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) to proposals for negotiations with Moscow over those and Soviet forces, the National Security Archive has published for the first time a selection of declassified U.S. documents that record some of the key developments in the U.S. and NATO decision-making processes.

NATO leaders saw the "dual-track" decision as a response to Soviet long-range forces targeting Europe and as a way ultimately to roll them back, yet the Soviet leadership saw the NATO plan as a threatening escalation of the nuclear arms race. The NATO decision to deploy 572 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II missiles in Western
Europe contributed to the deterioration of East-West relations and triggered the "Euromissiles crisis," involving antinuclear campaigns and mass demonstrations in Western Europe.

The Carter administration played a central role supporting the NATO decisions, but it did not agree to support the GLCM and Pershing II deployments quickly, ultimately concluding that political and diplomatic imperatives made them necessary. Thus, Washington helped shape a consensus in NATO for a policy that integrated deployments and arms control strategies. While many important U.S. and NATO documents on these developments remain secret, U.S. government declassification decisions make it possible to get a better sense of the "dual-track" process, including the very important alliance consultations.

For more information, visit the Archive Web site at http://www.nsarchive.org, or contact William Burr at 202-994-7000.

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**Bush and Gorbachev at Malta**

President George H.W. Bush approached the Malta summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989 determined to avoid arms control topics and simply promote a public image of "new pace and purpose" with him "leading as much as Gorbachev"; but realized from his face-to-face discussions that Gorbachev was offering an arms race in reverse, according to previously secret documents posted on the Web by the National Security Archive.


The posting also includes the transcript of Gorbachev's historic meeting before Malta with Pope John Paul II at the Vatican, featuring remarkable agreement on values and the "common European home," including the Polish pontiff's statement that "Europe should breathe with two lungs." From the American side, the documents include the before-and-after National Security Council talking points prepared for Bush, the preparatory memos to Bush from Secretary of State James Baker and other top aides, intelligence briefings for Bush from the CIA and the State Department, and the Bush script and briefing book contents list for Malta itself - all obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

For more information, visit the Archive Web site at http://www.nsarchive.org, or contact Svetlana Savranskaya or Thomas Blanton at 202-994-7000, nsarchiv@gwu.edu.

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**Operation Sofia: Documenting Genocide in Guatemala**

The Guatemalan army, under the direction of military ruler Efraín Ríos Montt, carried out a deliberate counterinsurgency campaign in the summer of 1982 aimed at massacring thousands of indigenous peasants, according to a comprehensive set of internal records presented as evidence to the Spanish National Court and posted by National Security Archive on its Web site. The files on "Operation Sofia" detail official responsibility for what the 1999 UN-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission determined were "acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people."

The National Security Archive's Kate Doyle presented the documentation as evidence in the international genocide case, which is under investigation by Judge Santiago Pedraz in Madrid. Ms. Doyle testified before Judge Pedraz on the authenticity of the documents, which were obtained from military intelligence sources in Guatemala. Earlier this year, Defense Minister Gen. Abraham Valenzuela González claimed that the military could not locate the documents nor turn them over to a judge in Guatemala, as ordered by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court in 2008.

After months of analysis, which included evaluations of letterheads and signatures on the documents and comparisons to other available military records, Doyle said, "we have determined that these records were created by military officials during the regime of Efraín Ríos Montt to plan and implement a 'scorched earth' policy on Mayan communities in El Quiché. The documents record the military's genocidal assault against indigenous populations in Guatemala."

The appearance of the original "Operation Sofía" documents provides the first public glimpse into secret military files on the counterinsurgency campaign that resulted in massacres of tens of thousands of unarmed Mayan civilians during the early 1980s, and displaced hundreds of thousands more as they fled the Army's attacks on their communities. The records contain explicit references to the killing of unarmed men, women, and children, the burning of homes, the destruction of crops, the slaughter of animals, and the indiscriminate aerial bombing of refugees trying to escape the violence.

Among the 359 pages of original planning documents, directives, telegrams, maps, and hand-written patrol reports is the initial order to launch the operation issued on July 8, 1982, by Army Chief of Staff Héctor Mario López Fuentes. The records make clear that Operation Sofía was executed as part of the military strategy of Guatemala's de facto president, Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, under the command and control of the country's senior military officers, including then Vice
Minister of Defense Gen. Mejía Víctores. Both men are defendants in the international genocide case in front of the Spanish Court.

The posting includes a complete inventory of the Operation Sofia documents, as well as photographs from the Ixil region taken in 1982 by photojournalist and human rights advocate, Jean-Marie Simon.

For more information, visit the Archive Web site at http://www.nsarchive.org, or contact Kate Doyle at kadoyle@gwu.edu.

The Taliban Biography: The Structure and Leadership of the Taliban, 1996-2002

Three years before al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States on 9/11, U.S. officials detected an alarming shift in the ideological stance of Taliban leader Mullah Omar toward pan-Islamism -- a change that portended a burgeoning alliance between the Afghan regime and Osama bin Laden. The report that Omar might be falling under bin Laden’s “influence” is contained in a December 1998 U.S. Embassy cable from Islamabad, Pakistan, one of a number of recently declassified government documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive and published on the eighth anniversary of the Taliban’s expulsion from Kabul.

The new documents provide other revealing insights into the inner workings of the notoriously opaque Taliban which underscore the challenges and potential opportunities that continue to confront U.S. policy-makers today. For example, while the organization in the late 1990s showed a troubling inclination toward radical Islamic thinking on issues beyond its usually more parochial concerns, it also displayed a pragmatic and even opportunistic side, recruiting troops from a variety of political perspectives including local communists. And although the documents describe Mullah Omar as highly authoritarian and adept at keeping his political rivals off-balance, the organization had evidenced a surprising diversity of viewpoints within its upper ranks, which suggested possible weak spots in the organization's control.

Essential background information on the regime has always been largely second-hand, contested or altogether absent from the public record. In order to facilitate better public understanding of the group and its principal figures, the National Security Archive has organized a unique and comprehensive chart, compiled entirely from U.S. government sources, detailing biographical and professional information on more than 40 important Taliban officials.

For more information, visit the Archive Web site at http://www.nsarchive.org, or contact Barbara Elias at 202-994-7000, belias@gwu.edu.

New Evidence on Warsaw Pact Military Exercises

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) is pleased to announce the publication of new evidence on Warsaw Pact military planning in the mid-1970s and late-1980s, the Warsaw Pact command staff exercises SOYUZ-75 and TARCZA-88.

These formerly classified materials represent early results of the ongoing cooperation between CWIHP and the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) in Poland, and are part of a growing collection of documents obtained by CWIHP on the history of the Warsaw Pact and the Polish intelligence services.

For more information, visit the Warsaw Pact Military Planning collection in the CWIHP Virtual Archive at: http://www.cwihp.org.


The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, like most counter-insurgencies, consisted not only of military operations but also of a massive nation-building project. Moscow sent thousands of advisers to build up the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), organize and improve government institutions, and help carry out pacification measures. Kalinovsky's paper analyzes this aspect of Moscow's counter-insurgency efforts, and argues that Soviet nation-building efforts in Afghanistan were marred by institutional rivalries, poor understanding of local conditions, and lack of coordination.

For more information or to download the paper, visit the webpage at http://www.cwihp.org.
CIA Collection: *Preparing for Martial Law: Through the Eyes of Colonel Ryszard Kulinski*

The CIA has released a collection of over 75 documents concerning the planning and implementation of martial law in Poland from mid-1980 to late 1981. The collection release coincided with a CIA symposium honoring Colonel Ryszard Kulinski, a member of the Polish Army General Staff and the source of the documents, who provided documents and personal commentary that gave intelligence analysts and U.S. policy makers invaluable insight into the crisis.

The dossier can be downloaded at the CIA's electronic reading room at http://www.foia.cia.gov/MartialLawKulinski.asp.

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3. Announcements:

**CFP: Great Lakes History Conference: "Civil Wars in Domestic and Global Context: Conflict and Resolution from the Battlefield to the Home Front"**

*October 8 & 9, 2010, Grand Rapids, Michigan*

The 35th annual Great Lakes History Conference, sponsored by Grand Valley State University, will be held in Grand Rapids, Michigan on October 8-9, 2010. All fields of history, as well as other disciplines, are invited to submit proposals related to this year's theme: "Civil Wars in Domestic and Global Context: Conflict and Resolution from the Battlefield to the Home Front." In the last two decades, scholarship on war and its impact on social, political, economic and cultural life has broken new theoretical ground and re-shaped the ways in which historians conceptualize the larger significance of mass violence, trauma, and society. We invite scholars from a wide range of fields and disciplines to exchange ideas and research on this topic. Papers and arranged panels addressing this year’s topic are welcome. We encourage comparative work across regions and chronological boundaries. Please consult the Grand Valley State University History Department website (www.gvsu.edu/history) and its link to the conference for updated information.

If you are interested in presenting a paper, please send an abstract of approximately 200 words and curriculum vitae by June 30, 2010, to Dr. Scott Stabler at stablers@gvsu.edu. Please include your address, email, and phone number. Those interested in commenting on a session should send a CV and indicate areas of expertise. Papers must take no longer than 30 minutes in a 2-paper session and 20 minutes in a 3-paper session. Sessions will last 90 minutes. Full panel proposals are welcome.

Conference headquarters will be at the L.V. Eberhard Center of Grand Valley State University in downtown Grand Rapids. Hotel accommodations will be available at the Holiday Inn of Grand Rapids (formerly the Days Hotel), which is across from the Eberhard Center. The telephone number is (616) 235-7611. The conference is within easy walking distance of museums and restaurants. Grand Rapids is served by most major and regional airlines.

Registration and program information will be sent in summer 2010.

Please address all inquiries and abstracts to:

Dr. Scott Stabler  
Grand Valley State University  
1 Campus Drive, D-1-I60 MAK  
Allendale, MI 49401  
(616) 331-3298  
stablers@gvsu.edu

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**CFP: 2010 Transatlantic Studies Association Annual Conference**  
*St. Aidan's College Durham University, July 12 – 15, 2010*

The Chairman of the Transatlantic Studies Association, Prof. Alan Dobson (University of Dundee), and Conference Chair for 2010, Prof. John Dumbrell (Durham University), would like to extend an invitation to the 2010 Transatlantic Studies Association Conference.

Our outstanding 2010 plenary speakers will be Mitchell Lerner (Ohio State University) and Rob Kroes (University of Amsterdam). There will also be a multi-disciplinary Roundtable on Vietnam and Transatlantic Relations, chaired by John Dumbrell.

Panel proposals and individual papers are welcome for any of the general or sub-panels. A 300-word abstract and brief CV should be submitted to panel leaders or to Alan Dobson by April 30, 2010.

The general panels, subpanels, and panel leaders for 2010:

1. Literature and Culture: Constance Post, cjpost@iastate.edu and Louise Walsh, walsh.lou@gmail.com
   Sub-panel: Transatlantic Exceptionalisms: Travel Literature and Ideologies, Cansu Özge Özmenc, oezmen@jacobs-university.de
2. Planning and the Environment: Tony Jackson, a.a.jackson@dundee.ac.uk and Deepak Gopinath, d.gopinath@dundee.ac.uk
3. Economics: Fiona Venn, vennj@essex.ac.uk, Jeff Engel, jengel@bushschool.tamu.edu and Joe McKinney, joe_mckinney@baylor.edu

4. History, Security Studies and IR: Alan Dobson, a.p.dobson@dundee.ac.uk and David Ryan, david.ryan@ucc.ie

Sub-panels:

i) (Re)Turning Points in Transatlantic Security: nuclear arms control; and France’s re-integration into NATO: David Haglund, haglundd@post.queensu.ca, Michel Fortmann, fortmann@umontreal.ca and Annik Cizel, annick.cizel@universite-paris3.fr

ii) NATO: Ellen Hallams, EHallams.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk and Luca Ratti, ratti@uniroma3.it

iii) The London Embassy 1938-2009: 70 years in Grosvenor Square. Dr. Alison Holmes, a.holmes@yale.edu and Dr. J. Simon Rofe, jsimonrofe@le.ac.uk

iv) Diplomats at War: The American Experience, Dr. Stewart A. Stewart, jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk and Dr. Rofe, jsimonrofe@le.ac.uk

5. Multi-disciplinary Panel: “Special Relationships” in Transatlantic Studies - what makes a “special relationship” special? Tony McCulloch, tony.mcculloch@canterbury.ac.uk

For further information, contact:

Dr. David Ryan
Department of History
University College Cork
Cork, Ireland
david.ryan@ucc.ie
http://www.transatlanticstudies.com/

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CFP: Coalition Warfare from the Early Modern Era until Today
May 3-4, 2011, Denmark

The conference on Coalition Warfare from the Early Modern Era until Today will take place as a joint venture of the Royal Danish Defence College and the Danish Commission for Military History.

In the topical debate on coalition warfare, focus is mostly on the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan or on the War on Terror in general. However necessary, this debate largely ignores some salient issues, which are prominent in wars of the past. The history of coalitions and their war aims, troubles, and achievements reaches a long way back. This conference will address political aims as well as military operations, procedures, and experiences from the history of coalition warfare from Early Modern Era until the present, as well as lead nation responsibilities, national and coalition loyalty requirements, logistical difficulties.

The perspective will be eclectic comprising viewpoints of lead nations as well as those of minor or major contributing countries. At the conference there will be key note addresses by Professor Richard Holmes, UK, Professor Doug Delaney, Canada, Senior Lecturer Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, Denmark, and Dr. Niels Bo Poulsen, Denmark. Moreover, it is planned to have 12 papers in four sessions, most of which will be published in the conference proceedings or as an International Revue of Military History.

Full conference program and registration at: http://forsvaret.dk/FAK/Fakulteter%20og%20Centre/FSMO/Center%20for%20Militærhistorie/Seminarer/Pages/ConferenceonCoalitionWarfare.aspx

The conference organisers would welcome proposals for papers on themes related to the conference title. Please send a 700 -word proposal accompanied by curriculum vitae of the paper giver(s). The deadline for submissions of abstracts is August 1, 2010 and all proposals should be sent to the following address:

Ms Britt Solbjerg Madsen: coalition@fak.dk
Points of contact: Kjeld Galster: cfm-11@fak.dk
Royal Danish Defence College, Ryvangs Allé 1 DK 2100 København Ø Denmark

For more information, contact:

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CFP: Fourth Annual Graduate History Conference  
*May 14-15, 2010, Athens, Ohio*

The History Graduate Student Association at Ohio University invites submissions to present current research at the Fourth Annual Graduate History Conference to be held on May 14-15, 2010, at the Ohio University Campus in Athens, Ohio.

The organizing committee is seeking graduate students from all disciplines to submit proposals on any historical topic, though there will be a special focus on modern American history.

The conference will feature a distinguished OU alumnus Dr. Jeremi Suri, E. Gordon Fox Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, as the keynote speaker on Friday, May 14. This public lecture will be held at Ohio University’s Baker University Center. Panels will take place on the following day, Saturday, May 15. Presentations will last approximately fifteen minutes with panel discussants being selected from among the Ohio University faculty.

Those students interested are asked to submit a 200-word abstract and a current C.V. to ouconference@gmail.com. Address the submissions to Anthony Crews.

Deadline for abstract submissions is April 15. Completed papers are due May 1. Registration fee is $10.

For more information about the conference, please see the Ohio University History Graduate Student Association at www.ohio.edu/orgs/hgsa or contact Anthony Crews, the conference planning chair, at: ac250003@ohio.edu. We look forward to reading your submissions.

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CFP: The Baltic Sea Region and the Cold War  
*November 27 – 28 2010, Tartu, Estonia*

The historiography of the Cold War circles usually around the great players and the major events and developments. The Baltic Sea region seemed to play only a peripheral role in this context. Nevertheless, the last 20 years saw a blossoming of national approaches to the history of this region. In the light of new research in recently opened archives, it turns out that the role of the region before and during the Cold War was more diverse and probably more important than previously expected. The impact of the Cold War even on so-called neutral countries was obviously larger than thought. The workshop aims at bringing together scholars and PhD-students working on the history of the region during the Cold War and to overcome the isolation of national historiography.

Fields to be covered might be:

- International Relations in the Baltic Sea Region
- Social and Economic History of the Cold War
- Cold War Culture
- Military and Security Impact of the Cold War on Regional Identity
- Legacy of the Cold War in the Region

A preliminary version of the paper should be distributed to all participants in advance. During the workshop the major themes of the paper should be presented in 20 minutes. Time will be left for extensive discussion. It is the intent of the organizers of the workshop to publish the final versions of the papers afterwards. The workshop will be held at the University of Tartu, Estonia. Board and accommodation and part of the travel expenses will be covered for all paper presenters. We encourage especially Ph.D students to propose papers.

The workshop is organized by the Institute of History and Archeology of the University of Tartu, Estonia, and supported by the Nordic and North/Central European Network of Cold War Researchers, the target financed project "Estonia in the Era of the Cold War" and the project "Baltic Regionalism: Constructing Political Space(s) in Northern Europe, 1800–2000."

Please send your proposal for a paper (250-300 words) and a short CV by no later than May 1, 2010, by e-mail, to the organizer, Dr. Olaf Mertelsmann (omertelsmann@yahoo.co.uk).

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The Institute for Historical Studies Fellowships

The Institute for Historical Studies at the University of Texas at Austin welcomes applicants at all ranks for residential fellowships for 2010-11. The theme for the year will be "Power and Place." For more information about the theme, the fellowships, and the Institute for Historical Studies, please see:

http://www.utexas.edu/cola/insts/historicalstudies/

For further information or queries, please contact the IHS Director, Julie Hardwick, at: historyinstitute@austin.utexas.edu
New Congressional Oral History Collection

The Clerk’s Office of History and Preservation is proud to announce the launch of the official U.S. House of Representatives Oral History Web site at http://oralhistory.clerk.house.gov/. Interviews include a range of House staff and officers, as well as children of members of Congress. In addition to interview transcripts in html and PDF formats, the site features video and audio clips, brief interviewee biographies, artifacts, images, and educational resources for teachers. And, the content will be growing in the coming months as we process more interviews and add them to the site.

Kathleen Johnson
Office of History and Preservation
Office of the Clerk
U.S. House of Representatives
202-226-1300
Kathleen.Johnson@mail.house.gov
http://oralhistory.clerk.house.gov

4. Letters to the Editor:

January 29, 2010

Please allow me to thank the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) for its generous support of my project, “The Fall of the Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1961-1964.” Without SHAFR’s support, I would surely not have been able to carry out eight months of fieldwork in Bolivia between April and December 2009.

In order to maximize the funds provided me through SHAFR’s Samuel Flagg Bemis Grant program, I employed it alongside grants from the University of London and the George C. Marshall Foundation. The latter fellowships, totaling $3500, covered my housing costs for the entire eight-month period. I then applied my Bemis Grant toward food and maintenance costs, as well as travel within Bolivia. Thanks to SHAFR, I was able to carry out interviews and archival work all over Bolivia, from La Paz and Sucre to Cochabamba and Tarija.

The fruits of this research are already becoming evident. One chapter of my dissertation, entitled, “Ideology as Strategy: Military-led Modernization and the Origins of the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia,” has been accepted for publication in Diplomatic History. Meanwhile, I am putting the finishing touches on my dissertation, which I am scheduled to submit and defend this spring. Once again, my sincerest thanks to SHAFR for making this possible.

Thomas Field
Ph.D. candidate
International History Department
London School of Economics and Political Science

5. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize For Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize is awarded for outstanding collections of primary source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents and set them within their historical context. Published works as well as electronic collections and audio-visual compilations are eligible. The prize is not limited to works on American foreign policy, but is open to works on the history of international, multi-archival, and/or American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy.

The award of $1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best work published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Procedures: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Send three copies of the book or other work with
letter of nomination to Jeffrey P. Kimball, Miami University, Department of History, room 254 Upham Hall, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056 (e-mail: jpkimball@muohio.edu). To be considered for the 2011 prize, nominations must be received by November 15, 2010.

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship was established by the Bernath family to promote scholarship in U.S. foreign relations history by women.

The Myrna Bernath Fellowship of up to $5,000 is intended to defray the costs of scholarly research by women. It is awarded biannually (in odd years) and announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applications are welcomed from women at U.S. universities as well as women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and those within five years of completion of their PhDs.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web site. To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by 1 October 2010. Submit materials to myrnabernath-committee@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

6. Recent Publications of Interest

Adams, John A. The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944: An Operational Assessment (Indiana, 2010).


Bernstein, Thomas P., and Hua-yu Li, China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present (Lexington, 2009).


Clingan, C. Edmund. The Lives of Hans Luther, 1879-1962: German Chancellor, Reichsbank President, and Hitler’s Ambassador (Lexington, 2010).

Conrad, Sebastian. Trans. Alan Nothnagle. The Quest for the Lost Nation: Writing History in Germany and Japan in the American Century (California, 2010).


Del Pero, Mario. The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy (Cornell, 2009).


Engerman, David C. Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (Oxford, 2010).


Green, James N. We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States (Duke, 2010).

Herf, Jeffrey. Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (Yale, 2009).


Kim, Jodi. Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War (Minnesota, 2010).
Loveman, Brian. No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776 (North Carolina, 2010).
Maddock, Shane J. Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present (North Carolina, 2010).
Oliver-Dee, Sean. The Caliphate Question: The British Government and Islamic Governance (Lexington, 2009).
Seed, David, and Susan Castillo, eds. American Travel and Empire (Chicago, 2009).
Smith-Rosenberg, Carroll. This Violent Empire: The Birth of an American National Identity (North Carolina, 2010).
Thomas, Baylis. The Dark Side of Zionism: The Quest for Security through Dominance (Lexington, 2009).
Turner, Michael J. British Power and International Relations during the 1950s: A Tenable Position? (Lexington, 2009).
Walgrave, Stefaan, and Dieter Rucht, eds. The World Says No to War: Demonstrations against the War on Iraq (Minnesota, 2010).
Weintraub, Sidney. Unequal Partners: The United States and Mexico (Pittsburgh, 2010).
Williams, Randall. The Divided World: Human Rights and Its Violence (Minnesota, 2010).
In debating the relative merits of term limits, a consensus emerged in support of the Committee's recommendation for a two-term limit. Council also agreed that non-elected appointees are a Presidential prerogative that should be preserved within the new election system. It was noted that shrinking the number of Council members by adding an additional seat designated as international would grant this group a level of representation (33%) disproportionate to its actual size. It was also expressed that the creation of an international seat might stigmatize prospective international candidates, while reducing the rate of access currently allotted to other international groups. After further discussion, it was suggested that as an alternative to designing new rules, the NC should be encouraged to adopt international seat policies that are consistent with SHAFR's effort to internationalize. It was also noted that an international Council seat would serve to integrate non-US members and make them feel more welcomed within the SHAFR body. In opposition, it was noted that enlarging Council in this manner would be consistent with SHAFR's effort to internationalize. It was also noted that the NC should be encouraged to nominate slates to promote geographical diversity as well as diversity of rank, ethnicity, gender and methodological approach.

Recommendations were also made about clarifying the election process. Vigorous debate then ensued on whether the NC should have Presidential involvement in the nominating process. In discussion, Council agreed that the NC has the authority to construct the ballot. Recommendations were also made about clarifying the election process. Vigorous debate then ensued on whether the NC should have Presidential involvement in the nominating process. In discussion, Council agreed that the NC has the authority to construct the ballot.
Immerman moved (Schwartz seconded) that the convention of opposing pairs of candidates running for each of the two Council slots be replaced by a slate of four candidates running for the two Council slots, with election going to the two who receive the highest number of votes. By a vote of 6 to 6, the motion failed to pass. Rotter stated that the split vote would be interpreted as an affirmation of the current practice of paired elections.

Immerman moved (Costigliola seconded) to expand Council membership by one with the additional slot reserved for an international candidate. The motion passed by a vote of 7-5.

Discussion ensured on the question of how to best define “international candidate” with regard to the above motion. Some advocated in favor of a very broad definition of international while others urged that it refer to individuals who have lived or taught outside of the United States for a specific period of time. After further discussion, Osgood moved (Mahan seconded) to define international as someone who has taught or resided outside the United States for the previous three years. The motion passed by a vote of 6 to 5.

Schwartz moved (Preston seconded) to hire Election Service Corporation to conduct SHAFR’s elections. The motion failed by a vote of 6-6. Rotter asked for affirmation that it was indeed Council’s desire to transition to electronic ballots administered on the SHAFR website by SHAFR staff. Council responded in the affirmative, with the understanding that the NC would exhibit sensitivity to members uncomfortable with electronic media. It was also stipulated that SHAFR staff be compensated for the extra burden of administering the online election process.

After further discussion, a consensus emerged that the task force would clarify formal motions to be considered at the June meeting in order to clarify the specific changes to electoral process and serve the legal purpose of taking the first step toward revising SHAFR’s by-laws.

(6) Motions from Ways and Means Committee

Schwartz reported that the Ways & Means Committee recommended Council approval of two measures and was seeking Council’s guidance regarding a third measure. The Committee recommended a proposal to recognize Alan Spetter’s significant contribution to SHAFR by granting him a lifetime service award, lifetime SHAFR membership, and funds to travel to the 2010 meeting to accept the award. The Committee also recommended a proposal to contribute $250 to support the Woman’s Luncheon at the OAH annual meeting in Washington D.C.. Council unanimously approved these two recommendations.

Schwartz reported that the Ways & Means Committee sought Council’s guidance on the issue of funding travel by overseas SHAFR members to professional meetings in the United States. A member based overseas requested funds for travel to the AHA meeting where the member was participating in a session officially cosponsored by SHAFR. The Ways & Means Committee was reluctant to approve this proposal but wanted Council to discuss it further.

During discussion, it was clarified that SHAFR now has in place a three-year program to fund overseas travel of persons attending the SHAFR meetings. It was also noted that funding such travel would advance SHAFR’s ongoing effort to internationalize and it would promote the inclusion of SHAFR sponsored panels at national meetings, and that travel funds at European institutions are often considerably lower in comparison to the amount offered at U.S. institutions. After extensive discussion, a consensus emerged that SHAFR should provide transportation funds for international SHAFR members to attend their SHAFR committee meetings held during the annual SHAFR conference, in cases where financial support is not available from the home institution. A motion so directing passed unanimously.

After further discussion, Council unanimously approved a motion to provide transportation funds on a “sliding scale” model for international SHAFR members to conduct SHAFR-related work at non-SHAFR conferences, in cases where financial support is not available from the home institution.

(7) Resolution of appreciation to the University of Wisconsin Library for digitizing FRUS

Rotter introduced the following resolution:

SHAFR acknowledges with gratitude the diligent service of the University of Wisconsin Libraries in digitizing and posting on the Web the content of the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series, covering the century between 1861 and 1960. That accomplishment has greatly facilitated teaching and researching the history of U.S. foreign relations, to the benefit of the American people and the larger world community alike.

The resolution passed unanimously.

(8) Discussion of memorials at annual meetings

Schwartz moved to establish a memorial moment during the Presidential luncheon to recognize the passing of those who have made a significant contribution to SHAFR. After discussion, the motion carried.

(9) OAH outreach event

Hahn reported that Rotter has approved discontinuation of SHAFR’s recent sponsorship of a graduate student breakfast at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians, in light of per person costs. Council authorized Hahn to explore alternative graduate student outreach initiatives at OAH meetings.
(10) Endowment
Matray reported on SHAIR’s investment package. He noted that the endowment reached the low point of the year in March 2009, when it stood 34% below its peak of November 2007, but that the endowment had recovered during the remainder of 2009, recovering more than half of the value lost in the tumble. The endowment finished 2009 with a small gain over the balance at the end of 2008. It was noted that SHAIR’s financial status remains healthy despite devastating losses incurred during the recent crisis.

(11) Teaching Committee Memo of Understanding
Rotter asked Council to discuss the following Memo of Understanding recently submitted by Mark Stoler clarifying the relationship and collaborative responsibilities between SHAIR’s director of Secondary Education and the Teaching Committee.

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAIR) has hired a Director of Secondary Education, who will oversee the production and dissemination of lesson plans on major topics in the history of American foreign policy. It is understood that SHAIR’s Director of Secondary Education will work closely with the SHAIR Teaching Committee in carrying out these and related responsibilities, principally through a subcommittee that will serve as an advisory board to the Director and as a communication channel to the full Committee. As of August 2009, the subcommittee on secondary education consists of five Teaching Committee members: John Tully, Director of Secondary Education, ex officio; Nicole Phelps; Matthew Masur; Robert Shaffer; and Brian Clancy.

During discussion, Lerner reported that the Teaching Committee and the Director of Secondary Education have collaborated well in the past and that the MOU would strengthen this relationship by clearly delineating the relationship. The motion approving the MOU passed unanimously. Council also indicated that the Director of Secondary Education should submit a report on his work in a timely manner.

(12) Diplomatic History
Zeiler submitted his biannual report on Diplomatic History both in writing and orally. Since July 2009, the journal has received 35 articles and the acceptance rate has remained largely unchanged. In contrast to previous years when submissions ran low, the journal currently has a backlog of 22 articles and 31 book reviews. Zeiler noted that SHAIR might want to consider expanding the journal’s page allotment during subsequent contract negotiations and that the DH editors have been considering the merits of publishing a portion of the journal’s book reviews online. It was noted that the forthcoming issue will feature a special forum on George H. W. Bush edited by Jeff Engel. Other special issues will focus on the politics of troop withdrawal and on the intersection between labor and U.S. foreign relations. While the latest circulation numbers will not come out until March, Zeiler emphasized that more people are downloading DH articles than ever before. It was noted that the dramatic increase in article downloads should give SHAIR increased leverage during future contract negotiations.

(13) SHAIR Guide to the Literature
Zeiler informed Council both orally and in writing on the 2009 updates to the electronic version (3rd edition) of the SHAIR Guide to the Literature. In 2009, the significant changes concerned the online format. ABC-CLIO overhauled its website, and the new page for the Guide is more user-friendly. As well, ABC-CLIO made several changes in line with its previously announced intention to retire the SHAIR Guide V1 code base in favor of sole hosting via the History Reference Online eBook hosting platform. This year, 15 chapters were updated significantly, adding 359 entries to the Guide. One editor made changes to existing entries, but no new updates. In consultation with Zeiler, editors on the other 17 chapters decided to accumulate more sources in 2010. It was noted that some editors require more encouragement to produce entries in a timely fashion. Zeiler also noted that the $100 or book certificate “gift” to editors who have completed their chapters was well received. Zeiler thanked SHAIR for its generosity and expressed thanks to the editors for expending time and thought to maintain the high scholarly standards of the Guide.

(14) Passport
Lerner reported that Passport is in good financial standing, costing SHAIR $7,000 annually. For comparative purposes, it was noted that the production of the former SHAIR Newsletter cost SHAIR $10,000 per year. Lerner also briefed Council thoroughly on a legal matter pertaining to the January 2010 Passport issue.

(15) 2010 Summer Institute
Engel reported that the 2010 Summer Institute on the topic “Policymaking and Lessons of History” would be held in Madison, Wisconsin immediately preceding SHAIR’s annual meeting. The 2010 Institute will be co-sponsored by the University of Texas and Texas A & M and will seek to target newly-minted or nearly-finished PhDs. The Institute will also give focused attention to the professional transition process that recent PhDs and junior faculty confront. Susan Ferber will give a talk on the process and procedure of publishing the first monograph and participants will have the opportunity to participate in mock job talks. Guest lecturers will address the Institute on the interaction between history and the policymaking process. Some concern was expressed about the low number of applicants thus far, and Engel was encouraged to solicit applications through some graduate departments.

(16) Summer Institute Oversight Committee report on 2010-2011
Costigliola reported on a recent proposal from Carol Anderson and Thomas Zeiler to host the 2011 Summer Institute at Emory University on the topic “Freedom and Free Markets: Globalization, Human Rights, and Empire.”

(17) 2010 annual meeting
Yaquib reported on the 2010 annual meeting in Madison, Wisconsin. He was pleased to note that despite challenging economic
conditions and the usual lower application rate for SHAFR meetings outside of Washington, D.C., a high number of quality proposals were received, indicating that the effort to increase the numbers and types of panels at the 2010 annual meeting have succeeded. The CFP had been widely publicized in print journals as well as on dozens of H-Net listservs. In response to its outreach, the committee received 80 full panel proposals. The committee formed 4 additional panel proposals based on the 33 individual papers submitted. In keeping with the conference’s theme, a large percentage of panels made an effort to “cross boundaries” whether chronologically, geographically, or in relation to disciplines. The Committee was also pleased with the high number of applicants from outside the diplomatic history subfield and the historical profession. There was also a strong showing from scholars based internationally, especially in Europe. Given the high quality of the applicant pool combined with SHAAR’s desire to reach out to a broader and more diverse audience, the 2010 conference committee plans to accept between 71 and 74 panels.

Costigliola commended the committee, noting that its success in maintaining a large number of high quality panels with a rate of acceptance similar to 2009 was a great achievement since conference participation has historically been much smaller when outside of Washington D.C. Rotter updated Council on efforts to organize a plenary session. It was also reported that Jeremi Suri, chair of the local arrangements committee, is currently working to have the Wisconsin Veterans Museum host the conference reception.

Hahn reported that the subcommittee formed in response to Sara Wilson’s recent retirement selected Dr. Jennifer Walton as SHAAR’s new conference organizer. Walton, who holds a PhD in diplomatic history, has been in communication with Wilson throughout the fall and Hahn was confident that the transition would be a smooth one. Council expressed its gratitude to Wilson for her excellent work over the years.

(18) 2011 annual meeting
Rotter reported that the 2011 annual meeting will be held in the Washington D.C. metro area. Hahn explained that he was in negotiation with a hotel and with a broker who had offered to survey the Washington market and provide SHAFR with a list of venue options. If SHAFR were to sign a contract with a hotel identified by the broker, the hotel would pay the broker’s fees. After discussion on the tactics of negotiating, Council authorized Hahn to proceed with the negotiations. President Rotter is empowered to sign a contract with the hotel selected.

(19) Hogan Fellowship
Hahn reported that the Hogan Fellowship would be awarded to Victor Nemchenok with honorable mention going to Patrick Kelly.

(20) Bernath Dissertation Grant, Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship, and Holt Fellowship
Hahn reported that the 2010 Bernath Dissertation Grant would be awarded to Kevin Arlyck, the 2010 Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship would be awarded to Stefanie Bator, and the 2010 Holt Fellowship would be awarded to Lauren Beth Hirshberg.

(21) Williams Grants and Bemis Fellowships
Rotter reported that Williams Appleman Williams Grants for 2010 would be awarded to Heather Dichter and Heather Stur; and that Bemis Fellowships for 2010 will be awarded to Caitlin Casey, Philip Dow, Maurice LaBelle, Hajimu Masuda, Brian McNeil, Sarah Miller Davenport, Louie Milojevic, Michael Neagle, Victor Nemchenok, Amy Offner, Joy Schulz, Annessa Stagner, Tom Westerman, and Tal Zalmanovich.

(22) Announcements and other business
Immerman informed Council of recent developments at the State Department’s Office of the Historian. Ambassador James Campbell was named Acting Director of the Office of the Historian and then was succeeded by Ambassador Edward Brynn, a former ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ghana and a Ph.D. in history from Stanford. A decision has been reached stipulating that the Historian must hold ambassadorial rank with a background in history. Immerman noted that the effort to solicit a General Editor for the FRUS series has been reopened. He encouraged Council members to recommend qualified candidates for this position and to monitor carefully the recent Executive Order on Declassification. Council was reminded that the HAC currently includes four SHAAR members and that Bob McMahon is now chair of the HAC.

Rotter urged Council to think of new and creative ways to improve and strengthen SHAAR. He told Council members not to hesitate in contacting him to discuss these or any other issues. Rotter concluded the meeting by thanking everyone for attending. The meeting adjourned at 12:00 pm.

Respectfully submitted,
Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/cr
Sally M. Kuisel, who worked at the Diplomatic Branch of the National Archives from 1975-1990, and later from 2000-2006, died of breast cancer at her home in Washington September 13, 2008. Along with her late boss, Milton Gustafson – whom Sally often affectionately referred to as “Lou Grant” – Sally was one of the last of the diplomatic specialists at NARA, an archivist who made an extraordinary difference for numerous researchers and scholars. Her comprehensive knowledge of the diplomatic records, along with her friendliness and patience, made her an invaluable guide to several generations of graduate students.

(As Bill Burr of the National Security Archive recently reminded me, nowadays archivists go through rotations and there are no real specialists with the extraordinary depth of knowledge of the records that Sally represented so well.)

I met “Sally Marks” in 1982, when I began my research at the National Archives. In those long ago and faraway days a graduate student could actually work in the stacks themselves, surrounded by an intimidating array of finding aids and records. Sally helped me make sense of these, and she did so with an amazing cheerfulness, patience, and real joy that left a lasting impression on me. It made all the difference to have an enthusiastic archivist who provided so much useful information and direction.

I did not hear of Sally’s death until December 2009, when I saw her husband Richard Kuisel, the noted French historian, at a Washington event. Not long after that I asked on H-Diplo for those with memories of Sally to share them with me for a tribute. I don’t have the space here to mention them all, but I was not very surprised by the numerous and similar stories about Sally. Chester Pach, Bill Walker, and David Painter, my contemporaries as graduate students, had the same distinct memory of Sally’s helpfulness and cheerfulness within the gloomy archives. As Chester put it, “I was lucky when starting out to have someone so knowledgeable and helpful who pointed me in the right direction.” Sally was particularly revered by foreign scholars who found the National Archives a forbidding institution. Barin Kayaoglu, a University of Virginia graduate student from Turkey, wrote of the difficulty of getting started at the archives until he followed his supervisor’s suggestion of contacting Sally. She provided him with a list of the collections he needed, and as he put it, “What was truly amazing about her assistance was that, on that particular day, [she] was busy finishing an important project for NARA herself. Few people could be so selfless as to extend that sort of help for a researcher on short notice.” Jill Edwards from the American University in Cairo commented upon Sally’s “patient help” with the archives, but also upon Sally’s love of art and the fact that “even there in the windowless bleakness of the old Pennsylvania building her partition was filled with color and visual interest.” She concluded that “to a foreigner like me, she represented all that is best in America. Washington will be the bleaker without her.”

Perhaps the most interesting note I received came from Mary Dudziak, which began, “if it had not been for Sally Marks, I don’t think my book Cold War Civil Rights would ever have been written.” Dudziak told the story of meeting Sally in the summer of 1987, having never had any specific training in diplomatic history research. Sally’s patient explanation of the decimal system, and her answers to so many questions that may have seemed ignorant made an enormous difference, and encouraged Dudziak to pursue her research. “If I had shown up at the Archives today, or even if I had encountered one of the gruff archivists from the earlier days, I most likely would have left in frustration.” For Dudziak, Sally made the difference, and when one considers the impact which books like Dudziak’s have had, one comes to an even greater appreciation for what Sally meant to our community of scholars.

Sally McCarthy was born in Lynchburg, Virginia, and graduated in 1969 with a degree in history from the old Stratford College in Danville, Virginia. She earned a Master’s Degree in history from Virginia Tech, and from 1972-1975 she worked at the White House as presidential diarist and was responsible for recording the President’s daily schedule. Sally was the author of “the Covert War in South America,” the 10th part of the 18 volume series Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Military Deception during the World War II Era.” She was also a painter and a member of the Corcoran College of Art and Design. She volunteered as an archivist at the National Gallery of Art and welcomed visitors at the Washington National Cathedral.

I did not know Sally well, but I feel like I learned a great deal about her in the process of composing this tribute. Sally made our work as historians so much easier and more enjoyable. She cared about what we do as historians in a way that is all too rare among archivists today. She was also, as her husband wrote of her, “a gracious, talented, lovely, and loving woman who possessed an extraordinary zest for life, and quiet courage and dignity in death.” Speaking for the community of diplomatic historians, we will dearly miss her.

Thomas Alan Schwartz
Vanderbilt University
The Last Word

Mitchell Lerner

One of my favorite restaurants is a barbeque place outside of Austin, Texas called “The Salt Lick.” Many of you no doubt have been there. If you have, you likely remember the “all-you-can-eat” approach they offer, with steaming hot plates of delicious meats constantly being brought to your table. When I was in graduate school in Austin, I would go to the Salt Lick once in a while, where I always endeavored to embrace the “all-you-can-eat” experience to the fullest extent. I never counted how many of their extraordinary ribs I actually ate, but that may be simply because I can’t count that high, even using the fingers and toes of my entire immediate family. Eventually we would head for the car where, about ten minutes into the drive home, I would start getting heart palpitations. Then a headache. On 3 or 4 occasions, I actually vomited, it was not unheard of for me to spend a day or two lying on the couch afterwards, moaning and begging for salad. After many years of this (too many, really), I learned an important lesson: yes, indeed, you can have too much of a good thing.

I thought of this lesson again a few weeks ago at the AHA Conference in San Diego, while I was having dinner with some friends from the State Department’s Office of the Historian. Bill McAllister, the Acting General Editor of the FRUS series, expressed a concern that I admit I did not take very seriously at first: the impending threat to the historical profession from the excessive amount of documentation expected to emerge over the next few decades. Yes, that’s right. Too much material. Despite the battles historians have had with federal agencies over the past decades, perhaps best embodied in the struggles over Executive Order 13233, the argument made over dinner that night was that we needed to be just as concerned about having too much material to work through as we were about having too little. And much to my surprise, I came away convinced.

The list of factors outlined that night is a long one, and I won’t belabor it here (although I will encourage you to consider attending the panel Bill has organized for the summer conference in Madison, to hear a far better explanation than I could ever give). But it is a classic example of the perfect storm, with a number of unlikely circumstances all merging over the past few decades. Some reflect the simple but extraordinary growth in the bureaucracy that conducts American diplomacy; in 1961, for example, an average of 7 federal agencies were represented at the typical US embassy overseas, while the number now is 30. Some reflect straightforward change overseas, ranging from the dramatic growth in the number of countries in the world to the parallel growth in the size and complexity of many of their policymaking apparatuses. The growth of NGOs and IGOs has followed a similar trend. Some reflect evolving technology, as satellites and other forms of electronic intelligence allow for the creation of massive and unprecedented collections of digital materials, much of which goes uncategorized in standard finding aids. Some reflect the ease with which officials can now create and widely disseminate electronic documents. And then, of course, there are the many problems created by mass e-mails, by unregulated texting, and by social media networks like Facebook. Most troubling to me were tales of technological record creation and management systems, planned for broad implementation, which may inadvertently discourage officials from saving critical original documents, even while other aspects of the system encourage the retention of subsequent (and possibly, altered) versions of the same materials.

I think most of us would agree that historians are better at analyzing the past than predicting the future. Still, it seems possible that historians will face an important series of questions related to sources over the next few decades, all tied to the central issue of what can be considered a document in the 21st Century, and how can we best preserve and organize them to advance historical understanding. But it seems equally likely that if we wait until the issue explodes, we will have waited too long to have an impact. Perhaps it is time for SHAFR, through our Historical Documentation Committee or through our Council or through our connections to the AHA and OAH or through something entirely different, to try to take a role in the process. I am afraid that if we ignore this potential problem, future generations of historians will all feel as if they had a double-dose of the all-you-can-eat dinner at The Salt Lick.
2010 SHAFR Conference
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