Inside...

A Roundtable Discussion on Hiroshi Kitamura’s Screening Enlightenment

The State of the FRUS Series

The Convergence of Military and Diplomatic History

...and much more!
Passport
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review

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In This Issue

4  Contributors

6  Roundtable on Hiroshi Kitamura’s Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan
    Akira Iriye, William M. Tsutsui, John Sbardellati, Eric Cunningham, and Hiroshi Kitamura

17  Imperial and Financial Overstretch Under Nixon and Obama: Are There Any Lessons to be Learned?
    Klaus Larres

22  Modernization and Development in U.S. Foreign Relations
    Daniel Immerwahr

27  Review of the Foreign Relations of the United States Volume on SALT
    David Tal

30  The Convergence of Military and Diplomatic History: A Roundtable
    Thomas Zeiler, Brian McAllister Linn, Jennifer D. Keene, Phyllis L. Soybel, and Mark A. Stoler

38  Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Documentation, January 1 - December 31, 2011

41  The Foreign Relations Series: A Sesquicentennial Estimate
    Stephen P. Randolph and Kristin L. Ahlberg

45  In Their Own Words: Comments from Participants at the Williams College FRUS Sesquicentennial Conference
    William B. McAllister

49  An Introduction to Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State
    David A. Langbart

54  The Diplomatic Pouch

66  Dispatches

68  In Memoriam: Betty Miller Unterberger

70  The Last Word: SHAFR is from Mars...
    Kelly J. Shannon
 Contributors

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A Roundtable Discussion of
Hiroshi Kitamura’s
Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan

Akira Iriye, William M. Tsutsui, John Sbardellati, Eric Cunningham, and Hiroshi Kitamura

Roundtable Introduction

Akira Iriye

The U.S. occupation of Japan after the Second World War has been extensively studied in a number of contexts: as an epilogue to the war history, as an aspect of the emerging Cold War, as a prelude to the postwar Japanese transformation, as the point of origin for the development of close cultural ties between the two countries, etc. This book makes important contributions in all these areas. It would be superfluous for me to summarize those contributions, for the three reviewers do so admirably, each in his unique way. Instead, I would like to discuss how the study may also enhance our understanding of transnational history. Screening Enlightenment is not just about the United States or Japan, or even about U.S.–Japan relations as a bilateral phenomenon. It also helps elucidate some of the key themes that are emerging in the field of transnational history.

First of all, the book says a great deal about American-Japanese encounters at the individual rather than just at the inter-state level. The story of what William Tsutsui calls “the integration of Japan into global commerce and culture after 1945” is very much a transnational one. It represents not only or even primarily a foreign policy agenda but the sum of the behavior and attitudes of millions of individuals, only a handful of whom represented the authorities. Of course, the occupation of any country by foreign military and civilian personnel is a geostrategic phenomenon involving decisions at the highest levels. This book, as John Sbardellati notes, makes a careful examination of decision-making within a “corporatist” framework. But that story belongs more in international than in transnational history.

As events in Afghanistan and Iraq are daily demonstrating, however, what counts in the long run are not so much high-level decisions—what Eric Cunningham refers to in his review as “the strategic manipulation of a defeated people”—but the quantity and quality of non-state, non-geopolitical interactions. In other words, informal transnational developments are ultimately more enduring than formal international relations. They can take place at personal or group levels and can be either direct or indirect. One would never know the long-term impact of the U.S. occupation of Japan unless we examined the thought and behavior of individual Japanese and Americans. They need not have met each other directly, but what they experienced personally would stay with them for years and constitute their individual and collective memories.

A cultural product like cinema provides an excellent way for an individual to form an impression of another world. This is the second transnational history theme explored by this book: cross-national cultural interactions. Hollywood movies provided postwar Japanese audiences with a cultural experience and became part of their memory. For hundreds of thousands of Japanese after 1945, those movies—as well as non-American products like Bicycle Thief and The Open City—gave a glimpse into the world they had not known or had forgotten. That is why Kitamura’s stress on “how people back then made sense of the movies” is so important.

As one of those people, I can personally testify to the phenomenal impact these movies had on middle school and high school students in occupied Japan. “I was amazed,” Tsutsui writes, “that, after almost seven years of occupation, the Japanese people ended up being as attached to Hollywood films as they were.” I am amazed that he should be so “amazed.” We—I was in fifth grade in 1945—were starved for entertainment of any kind, and one of our first cultural experiences in the aftermath of the defeat was to walk a long distance to one of the few movie theaters that had not been destroyed by air raids and watch Soyokaze (Breeze), the popular Japanese film made right after the war. It was sensational, but it was soon eclipsed by all the Hollywood imports, to which we flocked after school and through which we made mental connections between Japan and the United States, indeed between our insular country and the wider world that American movies were introducing us to. (According to the diary I kept, the first Hollywood movie I saw was Madame Curie; in March 1946.) And our teachers, who were just as eager fans of such products, often used them as texts to tell us about American values and ways of life. We were envious and thought Japan would never be able to reach those heights. It would be unfair to characterize such an attitude as “fawning,” as Tsutsui does.

Similar experiences were undoubtedly duplicated in other countries occupied by U.S. forces after the war, notably Germany and Austria. Studies by Petra Goedde and Reinhold Wagnleitner, in conjunction with Kitamura’s, suggest that the introduction of American culture through Hollywood movies was an exceptionally effective way of bringing about postwar reconciliation.

The propitiative power of culture is also a theme in transnational history.

Another transnational perspective that is relevant to reading this book is that of memory. Whether Japanese and Americans share some memory of the occupation provides a key to the legacy of the occupation. To the extent that they retain a positive view of the occupation, in comparison with U.S. military occupations of other countries since then, not to mention numerous instances...
of foreign troops’ treatment of defeated people, shared memory may be due to a significant degree to the “collaboration” of American film-makers and the Japanese movie-goers. The question, which Cunningham poses, as to whether “the Hollywood democratization project was ultimately a positive exercise in modern global civics” is at one level a matter of what Americans and Japanese remember of those days and those movies. It is also a quintessentially transnational question. If shared memory is a prerequisite to a stable, friendly association among people of different countries, works of arts certainly contribute to its construction. Hollywood movies as well as postwar Japanese film, as Cunningham notes, may have played that role.

There may be some generational differences at work here. That is another transnational theme that is detectable in this book but could have been more systematically explored. The older generations living in post-defeat Japan, say those born before 1910, were undoubtedly familiar with Hollywood and European cinema, both of the silent and sound categories. For them, to see American movies after the war was to be reunited with what they had already experienced. To the generation that had fought the war, those born roughly between 1910 and 1930, Hollywood products may initially have been seen as propaganda imported by a victorious power into a defeated country. Kitamura’s book seems to pay particular attention to this generation, whom the occupation authorities were anxious to convert to pacifism and democracy. Then there was the youngest generation, born after 1930 or thereabouts, for whom this cinema was their first introduction to American life and culture. This book seems to suggest that all these generations were “enlightened” through their exposure to the screen. That may well have been the case, but it would have been interesting to examine how the wartime generation in Japan—and in other countries—could be said to have been reconciled to the United States through Hollywood and whether shared memories helped Americans, in turn, become reconciled to erstwhile enemies.


*William M. Tsutsui*

Some things in life seem so obvious that they don’t need to be questioned. You get what you pay for. Tang is what astronauts drink. The Yankees are better than the Red Sox. Historians are, of course, as guilty of this generally innocuous intellectual laziness as anyone. How can any of us get through a lecture in a big survey class without taking a few things for granted, leaving a few intellectual stones unturned?

One of those unquestioned assumptions that I (and many others, I suspect) have always made is that it was somehow natural and inevitable that Hollywood movies would charm Japanese audiences and commercially dominate the Japanese box office in the decades after World War II. American popular cinema, after all, has seemed like the common denominator of global mass culture over the past century or so, a kind of universal entertainment that has suffused every media market around the world. It stretched no one’s credulity that if the pasty, bouffanted (and recently deceased) dictator Kim Jong-il was a megalomaniacal fan of movies, he would be a devotee of Hollywood blockbusters. It just makes sense to us that everyone, including the leader of an atavistic Communist hermit state (who was once described by the BBC as a “cinephile despot”), would love Sean Connery, Elizabeth Taylor, the *Friday the 13th* franchise, and Rambo every bit as much as we do. And especially given the historical experience of Japan—as a significant consumer of American movies prior to the war, having suffered a kind of withdrawal during the wartime “dark valley” (when ersatz local versions of imported standards like Popeye were churned out to satiate Hollywood-deprived audiences), and having, after an unambiguous defeat, become the United States’ very junior partner in Cold War Asia—the postwar triumph of American movies in Japan may well have seemed like a foregone conclusion.

It was thus with a certain trepidation that I read Hiroshi Kitamura’s engaging and revealing new book. Kitamura is not content with the easy, unquestioned assumptions about Japan’s embrace of American movies. Instead, he details (meticulously and convincingly) how hard so many people, both American and Japanese, had to work in the first years after World War II to assure Hollywood’s imaginative and commercial dominance of Japanese minds and markets.

Kitamura is not content with the easy, unquestioned assumptions about Japan’s embrace of American movies. Instead, he details (meticulously and convincingly) how hard so many people, both American and Japanese, had to work in the first years after World War II to assure Hollywood’s imaginative and commercial dominance of Japanese minds and markets. Moreover, Kitamura assures us, it may have been less the wholesome smile of Deanna Durbin and rugged good looks of Gary Cooper that won Japan over to Hollywood thrall than the far-from-glamorous scut work of countless Occupation functionaries, American film distributors, Japanese theater owners, highbrow cinema critics, and earnest young movie fans. So much, it seems, for my easy assumptions.

I will not summarize *Screening Enlightenment* here. You should read it, if you haven’t already. It is well researched, nicely argued, and neatly presented, as all first books should be (although, as we know, disappointingly few are). Even if you do not care about uplifting Hollywood biopics and Japanese theater syndicates in the 1940s (which I honestly do not) or the complex minutiae of U.S.–Japanese interactions during the Occupation and the reintegration of Japan into global commerce and culture after 1945 (which I do, in fact, happen to be very interested in), Kitamura’s book is richly rewarding. It does not rise to the heady heights of John Dower’s *Embracing Defeat*, which recast our historical vision of the Occupation, but it certainly delivers far more than many works on “MacArthur’s Japan” that ooze with American triumphalism, drag the plow once again through well-furrowed historiographical fields, or dissect the intricate interplay of occupiers and occupied without nuance or an eye for irony. *Screening Enlightenment* is, I can assure you, well worth your investment of time.

Kitamura’s treatment of the marketing and distribution of American movies in Occupied Japan is often engrossing and is far more painstaking in its scholarship than Joseph Anderson and Donald Richie’s hoary *The Japanese Film: Art and Industry*. His discussion of the Hollywood-loving “culture elites” of immediate postwar Japan, especially his detailed profiles of the critics Nakano Gorō, Honda Akira, and Sakhanishi Shijo, is fascinating and a welcome addition to the literature. And although Kitamura’s analysis of Occupation film policy and censorship pales next to Tanikawa Takeshi’s monumental *Amerika eiga to senpō seisaku* (*American Films and Occupation Policies*), *Screening Enlightenment* is a worthy complement to...
Tanikawa’s study and the more widely known Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo by Kyoko Hirano.

After I read Kitamura’s study, two observations really stuck in my mind. First, I was amazed that, after almost seven years of occupation, the Japanese people ended up being as attached to Hollywood films as they were. During the years of American stewardship, it was a miracle that there was any enjoyment at all to be found in Japan’s movie theaters, what with the Occupation bureaucracy censoring and shaping everything that the movie-going public saw. Hollywood’s representatives and Japanese exhibitors regulating and reforming how pictures were to be viewed, and finger-wagging intellectuals and fan magazines sternly lecturing audiences about the proper ways to appreciate shot-em-up westerns and madcap comedies. One can only imagine a night at the movies in Occupied Japan being more a grueling exercise in forced enlightenment than a form of recreational entertainment: General MacArthur and Hollywood’s proxies strongly advise you to watch only suitably wholesome and didactic pictures, be on time, sit up straight in your seats, practice your English, and be sure to be vigilant for hints on being properly democratic and modern!

Second, although Kitamura echoes the historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht in describing American Occupation personnel as “reluctant propagandists” (43), his narrative suggests just the opposite. The generally faceless operatives of SCP (Screening Enlightenment) were, as might be expected, alternately a faceless body responsible for hooking the Japanese public on American movies. The first chapter of Screening Enlightenment surveys Hollywood’s experience in Japan prior to 1945: after a surge in American film imports in the 1910s, concerted efforts by the Japanese movie industry and government regulators clawed back market share for domestic producers. Although (as Kitamura tells us) Hollywood controlled up to 40 percent of the Japanese box office around the time of World War I, its share had declined to around 20 percent in the nationalistic, autarkic climate of the 1930s. In Kitamura’s recounting, Japan dealt an unaccustomed “psychological blow to the U.S. film industry” (21), as Hollywood proved unable to dominate the prewar Japanese movie market. To me, at least, Hollywood’s ability to command fully a fifth of the market in Japan in the face of hostile political and economic conditions was remarkably impressive. It was also closer to domination, one might argue, than Kitamura would care to admit. By way of comparison, in 2009 Walmart (hardly a bit player in the American economy) claimed just an 11.3 percent share of the U.S. retail market; in October 2011 Toyota commanded only 11.5 percent of the American auto market, with Honda taking 8.5 percent. During the Occupation, Hollywood’s market share in Japan did rebound to a healthy 40 percent although, as Kitamura notes in passing, that figure slumped back down to 20 percent once the American troops left in 1952 and Hollywood’s dominance only came in the 1960s, when American blockbusters finally overwhelmed bankrupt Japanese studios that could only produce what one critic dismissed as “a plethora of nudity, teen age heroes, science-fiction monsters, animated cartoons, and pictures about cute animals.” In either case, Kitamura’s argument that a dynamic collaboration among SCP officials, U.S. studio representatives, domestic exhibitors, and local intellectuals was primarily responsible for hooking the Japanese public on American movies.

The suggestion that Japan’s addiction to Hollywood was already well in place before the war (or that it did not fully gel until sometime after the end of the Occupation) would undermine Kitamura’s key argument that a dynamic collaboration among SCP officials, U.S. studio representatives, domestic exhibitors, and local intellectuals was primarily responsible for hooking the Japanese public on American movies.

I was somewhat disappointed that Kitamura seemed content to tiptoe around business history throughout his book. He does make passing reference to the resurgence of American managerial ideas in Occupation-era Japan, the parallel between Hollywood’s postwar experience and phenomena like the rise of quality control in Japanese industry and government regulators clawed back market share for domestic producers. Although (as Kitamura tells us) Hollywood controlled up to 40 percent of the Japanese box office around the time of World War I, its share had declined to around 20 percent in the nationalistic, autarkic climate of the 1930s. In Kitamura’s recounting, Japan dealt an unaccustomed “psychological blow to the U.S. film industry” (21), as Hollywood proved unable to dominate the prewar Japanese movie market. To me, at least, Hollywood’s ability to command fully a fifth of the market in Japan in the face of hostile political and economic conditions was remarkably impressive. It was also closer to domination, one might argue, than Kitamura would care to admit. By way of comparison, in 2009 Walmart (hardly a bit player in the American economy) claimed just an 11.3 percent share of the U.S. retail market; in October 2011 Toyota commanded only 11.5 percent of the American auto market, with Honda taking 8.5 percent. During the Occupation, Hollywood’s market share in Japan did rebound to a healthy 40 percent although, as Kitamura notes in passing, that figure slumped back down to 20 percent once the American troops left in 1952 and Hollywood’s dominance only came in the 1960s, when American blockbusters finally overwhelmed bankrupt Japanese studios that could only produce what one critic dismissed as “a plethora of nudity, teenage heroes, science-fiction monsters, animated cartoons, and pictures about cute animals.” In either case, Kitamura’s argument that a dynamic collaboration among SCP officials, U.S. studio representatives, domestic exhibitors, and local intellectuals was primarily responsible for hooking the Japanese public on American movies. Naturally, as with any book of ambition and scale, readers will find as much to question as to celebrate in Screening Enlightenment. Many of my issues are trivial, barely rising to the level of quibbles. Is it fair, for instance, to describe the atomic bombing of Nagasaki as a “surprise attack” (128), considering the close association of that term with Pearl Harbor, not to mention the fact that “Fat Boy” was dropped just three days after the destruction of Hiroshima and following the firebombing of over sixty other Japanese cities? Under these circumstances it seems to me that another devastating urban raid would have been anything but surprising. Some of my concerns are more substantial, however, and warrant more attention. Central to Kitamura’s analysis is the assertion that Hollywood only really came to dominate the Japanese film market after World War II. Indeed, Kitamura’s stress is clearly on the Occupation years as the critical time in which Japanese film culture took on a decidedly American orientation. The suggestion that Japan’s addiction to Hollywood was already well in place before the war (or that it did not fully gel until sometime after the end of the Occupation) would undermine Kitamura’s key argument that a dynamic collaboration among SCP officials, U.S.
critics and fans advising, encouraging, disciplining, and frequently chiding Japanese moviegoers, just how successful the elaborate postwar campaign of “enlightenment” actually was. Did Japanese audiences really attend movies as earnest students of modern life, eager to erase democratic lessons from the silver screen, prepared to watch films with thoughtful reverence and American standards of decorum? Doesn’t the repeated hectoring by occupationaires and culture elites suggest that the masses of Japanese packing the movie theaters did not, in fact, get it? For all the American propaganda work and high-minded columns in fan magazines, doesn’t it seem likely that most Japanese moviegoers in those tough days after the war wanted entertainment and distraction above all? Didn’t most want to be transported by glitzy stars and exciting genre pictures rather than being schooled in inspiring life lessons? And didn’t most walk away from movie theaters imagining America as a storybook place, not because of its wholesome values and democratic institutions but because of its wealth, sophistication, and sheer power?

Getting at answers to such questions about reception is, of course, notoriously difficult. Kitamura does as well as he can, although even sources like the popular magazine *Eiga no tomo* capture the views of only a small slice of the audience, and their content reflects editorial priorities at least as much as reader perspectives. In the end, though, it is hard to conclude, based on the evidence provided, that Japan’s moviegoing masses really embraced the kind of “correct viewership” promoted so assiduously by the Americans and their Japanese surrogates. Certainly Japanese theater owners, who were ceaselessly harangued by Hollywood distributors for their crowded and dirty venues, lack of customer service, and indifference to punctuality, seemed to have embraced American standards only very reluctantly and slowly: reports from the late 1950s still described the vast majority of Tokyo movie houses as “packed to the rafters,” “run down, dumpy, and dangerous,” and “by any international standard . . . extremely poorly managed.”

Finally, I feel compelled to ask whether the process described in *Screening Enlightenment*—with American proconsuls and businessmen joining hands with fawning Japanese critics and fans to establish Hollywood at the very center of Japan’s postwar film culture—was really as benign as Kitamura describes it. I have to admit to cringing when I read his conclusion that “Hollywood empowered its consumers [and] deeply affected the hearts and minds of the Japanese” (178). That seems like a sunny Hollywood happy ending tacked onto a book otherwise dominated by dark tales of invasive censorship, incessant propagandizing, and the profound cultural, political, and economic asymmetries of the U.S.–Japanese relationship in the aftermath of World War II. It is hard to overlook the extent to which the Japanese public was mobilized, regulated, and trained—dare one say brainwashed?—into accepting a sanitized, sterilized, idealized vision of America, filtered through Hollywood studios and Occupation censors, touted by self-serving, sycophantic Japanese intellectuals and film aficionados. And it is hard not to be struck by the profound continuities in the administration of the film industry in Japan between the imperial 1930s and the supposedly enlightened Occupation years. In terms of censorship, the cozy intimacy between movie studios and state, and even the financial oversight of Hollywood’s Japanese operations, MacArthur’s occupationaires behaved much like the fascist bureaucrats who preceded them.

I would not want to dismiss Hollywood’s experience in Occupied Japan as just another ho-hum instance of American cultural imperialism. Kitamura’s book makes it clear that the reality was considerably more complicated than that. But to read Japan’s postwar “Hollywood craze” as some kind of therapeutic balm, a generous gift from America for a nation in search of a new identity or a rejuvenating catalyst for collective activities in a shattered society (as Kitamura does) is to stray far too far in the opposite direction. What I yearned to see in *Screening Enlightenment* was some inkling of resistance, some sort of questioning of the mounting Hollywood hegemony in postwar Japan. Kitamura argues that Japanese audiences “appropriated, reshaped, and absorbed American film culture” (xii), but did anyone oppose the red, white, and blue repackaging of the moviegoing experience in Japan? Did such resistance to the Hollywood steamroller simply not exist among the Japanese people, or could it not even be expressed in the constrained public sphere of Japan under the Occupation? Or, perhaps, did Kitamura just not look very hard for it?

Kitamura closes *Screening Enlightenment* by positing a “transpacific dialectic” that lay at the heart of the postwar “bicultural intimacy” of the United States and Japan (183). It is difficult, however, to detect in Kitamura’s account of Hollywood movies in Occupied Japan such a dialectic in the making. American dominance and Japanese acquiescence hardly constitute a dialogue. One can protest that the Japanese did, in fact, exercise real agency—appropriating, reshaping, and absorbing, at least within the narrow parameters prescribed by SCAP officialdom. But without room for real resistance during the Occupation, the alleged dialectic looked more like a didactic, condescending, and irritating monologue.

Notes:

Review of Hiroshi Kitamura, *Screening Enlightenment*

John Sbardellati

In *Screening Enlightenment*, Hiroshi Kitamura delivers an important contribution to our understanding of U.S.–Japanese relations during the American occupation by highlighting the ways in which cultural tools were used in the service of political goals. General Douglas MacArthur’s Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) aimed to remake Japanese society, and Kitamura details the ways in which Hollywood served as a key instrument in SCAP’s so-called “enlightenment campaign.” Kitamura’s study has broad implications, for it sheds light on the nuances of the “corporatist” alliance between film industry representatives and U.S. government officials. At the same time it presents a balanced portrait of American cultural imperialism by taking into account the important role of Japanese reception of American films.

Kitamura aptly utilizes a corporatist approach in his account of the collaboration between the various American state and private institutions that converged on postwar Japan. He deftly navigates the seemingly byzantine network of government and business organizations, detailing not only the cooperation
among them, but also their frequent conflict. Though the occupation was nominally an Allied affair, it was controlled by MacArthur's SCAP. Drawing on the work of John Dower, Kitamura illustrates that SCAP’s main goal in Japan was “democracy by intervention” (31). SCAP’s political and economic reforms went hand in hand with a cultural initiative designed to extinguish Japanese militarism and foster democratic ideals.

Why was Hollywood central to this program? “In an era before the flowering of television and digital culture,” Kitamura correctly observes, “cinema was arguably the most influential medium for reaching the general population” (33). SCAP set up two administrative units to police cinema in Japan, the Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) and the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD). The former was a civilian outfit apparently modeled on the Office of War Information, whereas the latter was a military intelligence division. The CIE provided advice; the CCD decided whether or not a film (Japanese or foreign) would be approved for exhibition. Often their imperatives matched, but sometimes the two units clashed—with each other or with Japanese or American studios.

Kitamura devotes a few early chapters to tracing the development of these government bodies and detailing their impact on Japanese filmmaking. The CCD established a Motion Picture Code that focused on law and order. Films that might incite the masses to disturb the peace or question the terms of the Potsdam Declaration were forbidden. The CCD was especially vigilant in its suppression of atomic dissent. For example, it delayed the production of The Bells of Nagasaki—a true story about a radiologist suffering from leukemia who survived the atomic attack but lost his wife—until after the Soviet detonation in 1949 “rendered the censorship of nuclear news obsolete” (57).

By contrast, the CIE had no formal censorship powers. Its attempts at persuasion were heavy-handed, and in this regard its operations mirrored the intrusive practices of the Office of War Information in Hollywood, as Clayton Koppes and Gregory Black have shown. In fact, Kitamura might have done more to demonstrate the similarities between the OWI’s operations in Hollywood and the CIE’s activities in Japan. Both desired more from film than pure escapism; both cherished liberal values and requested that films not only entertain but also instruct audiences in the ways of democracy. In Japan this objective meant that certain themes—militarism, feudalism, nationalistic chauvinism—had to be erased from the screen. For example, the American censors deemed Japanese period films (jidaigeki) “feudalistic” because of the prevalence of violent swordfights and themes of vengeance. However, as with the patrolling of atomic subjects, American efforts to suppress the jidaigeki genre proved transitory. Kitamura observes that the “heyday of the period film arrived after MacArthur’s departure” (61).

If American efforts to reshape Japanese cinema proved fleeting, the attempt to force the Japanese market to accept Hollywood’s screen fare had a more lasting impact. Here the corporatist theme emerges in full scope. Since the 1920s, Hollywood’s Hays Office had collaborated with the State and Commerce Departments in helping the American motion picture industry achieve global dominance. During the 1930s, however, protectionism was on the rise, and after Pearl Harbor Hollywood was cut out of Japan completely. Hence the corporatist alliance: American business and government would work hand in hand to force open the Japanese market, providing profits for the movie studios and at the same time performing the “enlightenment” task for occupation officials who shared industry leader Eric Johnston’s view of Hollywood as “America’s greatest salesmen.”

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women's political and social rights” in Japan (78-79). To Hollywood, however, SCAP’s exacting standards were a nuisance. Occupation authorities prioritized reeducation over profitability and too frequently selected dramas over lighter fare. The MPEA was justifiably upset about censorship standards, which were inconsistent because SCAP vested multiple agencies with censorship authority. In Kitamura's depiction, the corporatist arrangement in occupied Japan was thus “a tense negotiation of power among American institutions” (86).

Screening Enlightenment offers a nuanced account of American corporatism in operation, but it also succeeds as a sophisticated analysis of U.S. cultural imperialism. Kitamura finds that extending American cultural hegemony in Japan was a process of negotiation rather than imposition. Many of the Japanese figures that appear in these pages supported Americanization, often with enthusiasm. And yet, Kitamura contends, “this cultural negotiation was also a hegemonic practice, one in which U.S. agents capitalized on local initiatives to reinforce their dominance over the Japanese” (xii).

The cultural negotiations Kitamura traces did not occur on a level playing field. SCAP promoted the superiority of the “American way of life,” while Hollywood, through the CMPE, presented its films as the essence of high culture (bunka). There may be an irony in Hollywood promoting the seemingly “lowbrow” as “highbrow,” but the more critical factor here is that American movies enshrined the power of men over women, Anglo-Saxons over other peoples of color, and ‘civilization’ over ‘savagery’” (89). Through film, Hollywood presented an idealized image of American society that was intended to serve as a model for Japan, though, given the broad assumptions of American superiority, it seems clear that the Japanese were never expected to live up to the model fully.

Nevertheless, the CMPE continued to try to impose American standards on the Japanese movie-going public. To improve the movie-going experience, the agency focused not only on the quality of the films exhibited but also on the places of exhibition. If Hollywood equaled bunka, then movie-going itself had to be gentrified. Under its “good movies to good theaters” policy (118), the CMPE used its leverage to pressure Japanese theaters to make their movie palaces dens of middle-class respectability. This meant greater concern for hygiene and safety, establishing and abiding by standards for seating capacity, and other changes, such as the addition of “romance seats” (124) to maximize the viewing experience (or at least audience enjoyment). There is an important, if undeveloped, theme here: Hollywood was exporting a model theater experience that had been established domestically. Scholars such as Lary May have traced how a similar process of gentrification occurred in the United States to make the movies more respectable.

There is an important, if undeveloped, theme here: Hollywood was exporting a model theater experience that had been established domestically. Scholars such as Lary May have traced how a similar process of gentrification occurred in the United States to make the movies more respectable. Many of the Japanese figures that appear in these pages supported Americanization, often with enthusiasm. And yet, Kitamura contends, “this cultural negotiation was also a hegemonic practice, one in which U.S. agents capitalized on local initiatives to reinforce their dominance over the Japanese” (xii).

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Kitamura's last two chapters are, perhaps, the highlight of this fine work. Rather than being satisfied with tracing the efforts of American cultural imperialists to implant the Hollywood product and model, Kitamura turns to the reception of Hollywood films by Japanese audiences. It is difficult to gauge audience reception: how can we know what audiences thought while watching movies some six decades ago? Fortunately Kitamura has discovered two groups who were so fascinated by Hollywood films that they left an extraordinary paper record detailing their responses.

The first group Kitamura labels the “culture elites.” These were prominent figures in artistic, professional, and political circles who were so enraptured by Hollywood that they organized the American Movie Culture Association (AMCA) to raise awareness of Hollywood’s cultural importance across Japan. Of course they were assisted by Hollywood’s CMPE, but Kitamura stresses that they participated actively in the film enlightenment campaign. The AMCA organized screenings, produced a lecture series, hosted “movie classrooms” to promote visual literacy, and put out a newsletter, Amerika eiga bunka (American movie culture), that published critical reviews.

Many in the AMCA were reformers who were drawn to the humanistic values of Hollywood films. They especially liked prestige pictures such as The Life of Emile Zola or The Best Years of Our Lives. Such movies centered on the emotional bonds between characters and elicited compassion and sympathy from audiences. Honda Akira, a literature professor who had opposed Japanese militarism during the war, believed these movies really could play an important role in reorienting Japanese society. “Honda’s applause for Hollywood humanism reflected his urge for vindication,” Kitamura writes. “His embrace of humanistic attitudes arose from his anger toward the Japanese military and those who voluntarily supported it with a ‘narrow-minded patriotism’” (149). For the culture elites, Hollywood presented an imagined America that could serve as a model for a new Japan.

Japan’s Hollywood enthusiasts included not only the culture elites, but also members of a youth culture that eagerly welcomed Americanization. This youth movement coalesced around Eiga no tomo (Friends of the Movies), a popular magazine devoted to all things Hollywood. Kitamura presents this fan community as political actors whose passion for American film also signaled their support for the occupation. “Hollywood furnished its patrons with more than mere escapism,” he proclaims. “Many moviegoers praised American movies for their therapeutic quality, especially their characteristic happy ending that restored joy and confidence to life” (167). Americanization, therefore, occurred not so much through direct transmission, but rather cultural appropriation. There must have been Japanese who opposed the enthusiastic acceptance of the American model, but if so, Kitamura does not mention them, and perhaps with good reason. Though Japanese cinema rebounded after the occupation, American movies remained extremely popular, and Japan still represents Hollywood’s largest foreign market.

Screening Enlightenment has many strengths. Kitamura has fruitfully mined numerous archives across the United States and Japan. His scholarship seamlessly blends the methodology of the political and the cultural historian. He correctly notes in the book’s preface that most of the existing studies on global Hollywood focus on Europe, and this is yet another reason why his study is such an important addition to the literature. However, it is also interesting to consider what his work adds to the literature on American domestic Cold War culture. A dominant theme in Screening Enlightenment is the U.S. effort to export the “American way of life,” but the domestic background in these years witnessed a sharp clash over the definition of Americanism. Ironically, several of the films that were selling America in Japan—The Best Years of Our Lives and
The critical role that American movies played in the researched, and altogether refreshing account of histories and works on film studies. It has no political axes something of a hybrid between conventional Occupation characterizes the works of the latter. Kitamura’s book thus to grind, as do most of the books of the former category, does not adhere to any particular methodological frame as run-of-the-mill history book either. Kitamura does great deal to our understanding of an important period in reconstruction, Occupation, Americanization of early postwar Japan. This book is eager to re-invent themselves after World War II, a multi-layered apparatus of the U.S. government–Holocaust complex that helped defeat Japan as well as reconstruct its modern identity. Kitamura’s careful research provides us not only with an abundance of top-down empirical data on production and policy, but also with some remarkable “close-ups” of the popular reception of American movies as well. The not-entirely-linear nature of Kitamura’s narrative warrants at least a brief synopsis of each chapter.

Chapter 1 (“Thwarted Ambitions”) provides a well-constructed overview of the state of cinema in Japan (foreign and domestic) before the war. In this chapter Kitamura makes it clear that even before the outbreak of hostilities in 1941, a cinematic struggle pitting a world-dominant Hollywood against a vigorous but largely state-controlled Japanese film industry was well underway. By the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the distribution of American movies in Japan had been dramatically reduced by state censorship, protectionist legislation, and confiscatory taxation on the Japanese receipts of major Hollywood studios.

Chapter 2 (“Renewed Intimacies”) explains how the U.S. government enlisted the top Hollywood studios, not only to help fight the war, but to help win the peace as well. Kitamura introduces American officials such as Will H. Hays and Eric Alva Johnston, men who helped transform the motion picture industry into an unofficial organ of U.S. foreign policy. He also enumerates the multi-layered bureaucracy of government agencies that set the content standards and managed the distribution of American and Japanese films in Occupied Japan.

Chapter 3 (“Contested Terrains”) portrays the difficult relationship between SCAP (Supreme Command of Allied Forces, Pacific) officials and Japanese studios, whose producers worked valiantly to resurrect and reform their nation’s film industry under the constraints of tight protocols for ideologically correct cinema. This is the first chapter in which Kitamura takes up any kind of specific formal film analysis, describing the trials involved in getting three screenplays, Drunken Angel (1948, directed by Kurosawa Akira), The Bells of Nagasaki (1956), directed by Oba Hideo), and Daibosatsu Pass (which was actually not produced until 1953) past the American censors.

Chapter 4 (“Corporatist Tensions”) shows that dealings between Occupation officials and Hollywood were often just as contentious as those between SCAP and the Japanese film studios. In order to meet Army and Occupation standards, American films, including many that had been made during the war, had to “represent the very best in American Cinematic Art . . . carry a true projection of U.S. domestic life, and . . . [accord] with the objectives of the occupation” (64). Accordingly, films, or even scenes from films, that depicted anything less than an idealized portrait of modern American life were withheld from distribution. Not only did these restrictions keep a number of superior films (e.g., Alfred Hitchcock’s Lifeboat [1944]), out of Japanese theaters, they arguably led to the valorization of ideologically correct movies (e.g., The Yellow Rose of Texas [1944]) that may not have necessarily represented the “very best” in cinematic art.

Chapter 5 (“Fountains of Culture”) describes the strategies by which American studios marketed their films to the Japanese public. As Kitamura shows us, Hollywood pictures were pitched in Japanese trade magazines not only as consumer goods categorically superior to anything being made in Japan, but as great works of art in a new

The Farmer’s Daughter, for example—were deemed “un-American” by an emerging anti-Communist coalition back home. Indeed, when Eric Johnston appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1947, he lamented HUAC’s effort to portray Hollywood’s movies as subversive. He instead insisted that Hollywood threatened the Communists, that it was “their No. 1 hate.” And he took pains to stress his industry’s patriotic cooperation with the government through its dissemination of films to “the occupied countries of Austria, Germany, and Japan to assist in the reorientation of these former enemy peoples.”

Johnston failed to impress HUAC, but Kitamura’s wonderful book shows that the committee certainly should have listened.

Notes:

Review of Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan

Eric Cunningham

In Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan, historian Hiroshi Kitamura gives us a highly informative, very well-researched, and altogether refreshing account of the critical role that American movies played in the “democratization” of early postwar Japan. This book is something of a hybrid between conventional Occupation histories and works on film studies. It has no political axes to grind, as do most of the books of the former category, and leaves out the detailed theoretical analyses that characterize the works of the latter. Kitamura’s book thus seems to be an exercise in good old-fashioned history; it takes a relatively neglected topic in a large field, brings forth a wealth of new research, and in the end, adds a great deal to our understanding of an important period in history.

That said, Screening Enlightenment is not exactly your run-of-the-mill history book either. Kitamura does not adhere to any particular methodological frame as he lays out a series of episodes that reveal the diverse but overlapping aspirations of Hollywood executives, American Occupation authorities, and newly minted Japanese “citizens” eager to re-invent themselves after the devastation of Japan’s Fifteen Year War. Neither are Kitamura’s stated goals particularly dramatic. He seeks to “understand Hollywood’s role in Japan’s postwar reconstruction,” to “enrich the understanding of the Occupation,” to study the reception of Hollywood movies in Japan, and to examine the influence of “Americanization” abroad, using Japan as a point of reference (x). Kitamura succeeds with all of these general aims, and he offers a number of thought-provoking gems at each step along the way, but his presentation of data stays well clear of challenging—or even affirming—any of the common assumptions of Occupation history.

The sequence of chapters takes us from a general recounting of prewar Japanese cinema all the way through a case study in postwar fandom, passing through the multi-layered apparatus of the U.S. government–Hollywood complex that helped defeat Japan as well as reconstruct its modern identity. Kitamura’s careful research provides us not only with an abundance of top-down empirical data on production and policy, but also with some remarkable “close-ups” of the popular reception of American movies as well. The not-entirely-linear nature of Kitamura’s narrative warrants at least a brief synopsis of each chapter.

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Chapter 5 (“Fountains of Culture”) describes the strategies by which American studios marketed their films to the Japanese public. As Kitamura shows us, Hollywood pictures were pitched in Japanese trade magazines not only as consumer goods categorically superior to anything being made in Japan, but as great works of art in a new
high modern culture. Movies like Rhapsody in Blue (1945) and Little Women (1949), which celebrated the American traits of ingenuity and toughness in the face of adversity, also served as exemplary artifacts of a superior bunka (culture). In this chapter, Kitamura also highlights the career of Charles Mayer, who as head of the Central Motion Picture Exchange directed the importation, promotion, and distribution of Hollywood films in Japan. While Mayer appears to have been divided between the occasionally competing imperatives of political propaganda and commercial profitability, he was able to satisfy both through the effective marketing of movies in the public and private sectors.

In Chapter 6 (“Presenting Culture”), Kitamura takes us on an absorbing detour into the theaters, great and small, where Japanese fans consumed their visions of America. His descriptions of the “prestige theater” Subaru-za and its blockbuster “road shows,” along with other “shrines of culture” such as the Nagoya State-za and the Daichi kobusai gekijō, not only provide some fascinating new information and images, but also evoke a vivid feeling of everyday life in Occupied Japan. Readers who have spent any amount of time in Japan and have participated in the familiar yet somehow alien experience of going to a Japanese movie theater will find this chapter especially interesting.

Chapter 7 (“Seeking Enlightenment”) examines the positions of several intellectuals who were outspoken in their praise of American motion pictures as means of educating Japan in the ways of popular democracy. What makes this chapter especially interesting is the revelation of the degree to which scholars on both the prewar left (Hori Makoto) and right (Nakano Gorō) converged during the Occupation to exalt the beneficial effects of Hollywood movies and the “enlightened” democratic civilization that produced them. Kitamura’s descriptions of the aims, activities, and membership of the American Movie Culture Association (AMCA) are among the best features of the entire book.

Chapter 8 (“Choosing America”) recounts the ways in which non-elites—the “real” Japanese film buffs—made Hollywood culture their own through fan magazines and study groups. The chapter focuses on the popular magazines Eiga no Tomo, and its legendary editor, Yodogawa Nagaharu. Under Yodogawa’s sincere and inspired leadership, Eiga no Tomo became something of a culture unto itself and drew the “lowbrow” masses of Japanese moviegoers into well-informed discussions of cinema, humanism, and modern democracy. As a long-time Japan resident who spent many a Sunday evening watching Yodogawa’s western “road shows” on TV, I found this professional biography of Japan’s foremost (and most enduring) Hollywood critic very satisfying, and more than a little natsukashii!

Screening Enlightenment gets better with each passing chapter, and by the end of the book I found myself admiring Kitamura’s project while simultaneously wishing that the entire book was as potent as the last several chapters. Kitamura is at his best when he is presenting the human, social-historical side of his topic, an expertise best demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 8. He has a great knack for getting to the core of people’s concerns, whether they are Japanese movie fans struggling to define the limits of individual freedom in a new political order or movie executives wrestling with the conflict between profitability and patriotism.

Kitamura does many things well in Screening Enlightenment. He writes clear and concise narrative summaries of background historical events, and his treatment of the history of Japanese cinema and the transformation from pre-war to Occupation is especially solid. He shows clear mastery of the bureaucratic machinations that informed the plan to democratize Japan through popular culture, and he provides good descriptions of the alphabet soup of government agencies involved in the regulation of film. He lays out meticulously ordered explanations of SCAP’s rationales for its cultural strategy in Japan and has a firm grasp on the role of each player and project involved. His new research material is truly interesting, and he is able to construct a local history of the Occupation that manages to steer clear of ideological quicksand. This is no small feat, considering how divided this field has always been. For most of the postwar era, Occupation studies have been tendentiously one-dimensional, whether written by conservatives trumpeting the success of the American way of life or liberals lamenting the absorption of Japan into America’s Cold War Empire. For students of modern Japanese history who have grown weary of this debate (especially now that China’s rise as the region’s hegemonic power will inevitably make it irrelevant), Screening Enlightenment is, as I suggested above, a refreshing book. No villains are being unmasked here, and no fascisms exposed.

It is worth asking, though, if Kitamura’s successful avoidance of controversy has left this book without any particularly sharp critical edge at all. As an Occupation historian, Kitamura should probably at least allude to the larger interpretive debate and give some indication as to where he stands in it. Aside from two brief references to John W. Dower’s Embracing Defeat, he makes no specific mention of the wider field of Occupation studies. He does observe that “a new body of scholarship has cast attention on such issues as race, gender, education, and popular culture,” but he does not explicitly place his own book among them (x). His goal, to state it again more clearly, is “to elaborate the [Occupation] story by examining the active involvement of Hollywood [in it]” (xi). This is fine, except that Kitamura never defines “Hollywood” as anything but a few select movies, a few select individuals, and a labyrinth of government bureaus and corporate agendas. We know that none of these movies were made with the Japanese audience in mind—some of them were made in the aggressively patriotic context of the Second World War with the express purpose of shaping American popular consciousness. How then do we deal with the fact that the United States is still involved in at least one quasi-occupation, it would have been constructive, I think, if Kitamura had made some judgments about whether modern Enlightenment is still worth screening, or even exporting at all.

Although he is a film historian, Kitamura offers only superficial discussions of the movies that played such a great role in the transformation of postwar Japan. Obviously there is only so much that an interdisciplinary...
work can accomplish, but most of the film references are thin and scattered throughout the text. Aside from the four films mentioned in Chapter 4, Little Women (1949), Rhapsody in Blue (1945), Union Pacific (1939), and Cry of the City (1950), Kitamura does not make a sustained attempt to show how American films, either individually or categorically, matched up with the stated aims of the Occupation. The Best Years of Our Lives (1946), which enjoyed great success in Japan and is mentioned seven times in the text, is only interpreted once, briefly, through the eyes of Japanese intellectual Nakano Gorō. Considering the importance that Kitamura has placed on “Hollywood,” it would seem that a more thorough and systematic method of film criticism—to say nothing of a proper filmography in the appendix—would have a good place in this book. In this regard his treatment of movies as products of cultural excellence is as generic as his treatment of “Hollywood” as an agent of cultural formation.

This problem is especially noticeable in the several places where he juxtaposes Hollywood movies with signature Japanese films of the era. He mentions Drunken Angel (1948) and Rashomon (1951), yet overlooks No Regrets for Our Youth (1946), Stray Dog (1949), To Live (1952), and a host of other films. The great Japanese films of the Occupation arguably have more profound things to say about the nature of modern democracy than semi-factual biopics of Madame Curie and Abe Lincoln, to say nothing of the various Roy Rogers flicks that were being passed off as the products of a superior culture. Of course this book is about Hollywood, not Japanese cinema, but the disparity in quality between some of these Japanese films and their popular Hollywood counterparts draws us back to the question of whether the Hollywood democratization project was ultimately a positive exercise in modern global civics or the strategic manipulation of a defeated people. The question is even more perplexing when we think of Japanese intellectuals like Nakano or popular critics like Yodogawa serving as spokesmen for Hollywood Americanism when their own countrymen were producing masterpieces. I think Screening Enlightenment would have been a better book if Kitamura had raised some of these questions instead of giving us such a flat-screen projection of both Hollywood and the Occupation.

These considerations lead me to suggest that the most evident shortcoming of Screening Enlightenment is that there is no strong critical argument holding the book together. It is fine for a historian to enrich an existing field with new insights and ideas, but leaving sub-surface questions about the assumptions of the larger dialogue not only unanswered but unasked leaves the reader thinking that some great opportunities were missed.

All in all, however, Screening Enlightenment is a highly worthwhile read for anyone interested in this most remarkable period. It fills some large holes in our understanding of Occupation policy and brings forward several remarkable episodes in the history of postwar culture that until now have not been common knowledge.

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Roundtable Response
Hirosi Kitamura

To have one’s work examined in a Passport roundtable is a privilege and an honor. Let me begin by thanking the three reviewers—Eric Cunningham, John Sbardellati, and William Tsutsui—for devoting their sharp minds and analytical rigor to this forum. I also extend my appreciation to Akira Iriye for penning the introduction. Finally, this exchange would not have happened without Andrew Johns’s encouragement. I thus would like to convey my gratitude to him as well.

First of all, I am excited to know that the three reviewers have found my book to be of some worth. I am flattered to learn that they consider Screening Enlightenment a “wonderful book” (Sbardellati), “a highly worthwhile read” (Cunningham), and “a book well worth your investment of time” (Tsutsui). The reviewers have identified several constructive qualities. Sbardellati, for example, thinks positively of the ways in which I analyze the “corporatist” alliance between film industry representatives and U.S. government officials. For Cunningham, my descriptions of exhibitors “evoke a vivid feeling of everyday life” and my treatment of Yodogawa Nagaharu’s followers “get[s] to the core of human concerns.” Tsutsui regards my discussion of the culture elites as “fascinating and a welcome addition to the literature.”

I am also happy that the reviewers have brought up a number of insightful questions and criticisms. Since spatial constraints will not allow me to respond to all of them, I will focus on five of the most pertinent issues. The first one concerns my treatment of the American context. Sbardellati asks how the film policies implemented in Japan either compared or related to parallel developments in the United States. For example, in what ways did the Office of War Information’s activities compare to those of SCAP’s Civil Information and Education Section? Was the CMPE’s exhibition reform identical to the efforts to cultivate respectability in American theaters? Such questions are fascinating and worthy of further investigation, although the OWI-CIE connection, in my mind at least, could be deduced from existing studies. As for exhibition reform, I chose to concentrate fully on Japan, since we simply do not know much about it. Future scholars may devote more time to comparing the two national spheres. It is my hope that Screening Enlightenment ultimately aids our effort to understand moviegoing experiences around the world.

The second issue concerns my interpretation of the occupation. Cunningham states that my book is “refreshing” because it does not replicate polarizing arguments that either championed or condemned SCAP. However, he then seems to want me to take part in this Manichean dialectic, for he says he wishes to know “whether the Occupation itself was a positive or negative thing.” To respond, I sincerely believe that the occupation was both positive and negative; although SCAP’s operation was at best a democracy enforced from above, it created a milieu that largely did away with Japan’s horrifying militarism. While conservatives in Japan may have detested MacArthur’s towering presence, many others were favorable and appreciative. In my opinion, MacArthur’s involvement in Japan—like other U.S. occupations—was far more complex than just “good” or “bad.” It was coercive and hegemonic but inspiring and liberating.

To some readers, my book may now seem like what literary critics would call an “open text”—a postmodern narrative that lends itself to countless readings and diffused messages. But I wish to stress that the mixed message was the message. Instead of “closing the text” with one-dimensional judgments, I chose to weave
together an abundance of voices and avoid simple moralizing. Although I did not design this project as a direct prescription for present (and future) U.S. occupations, I believe my case study can offer some simple but often neglected "lessons" for foreign policymaking. For instance, any policy formation requires a careful consideration of multiple viewpoints and causalities, particularly with regard to the diverse group of individuals and institutions "on the ground." We should also take culture and soft power much more seriously, because they can wield great influence on global publics. Using Hollywood as an example, my book tried to crystallize a political, social, cultural, and institutional process that helped shape Japan's "renewed intimacy" with the United States after 1945. As I assert in my book, U.S. cinema was a powerful instrument that affected the Japanese in significant ways. Hollywood demands the attention of everyone—regardless of political orientation.

The third issue concerns how I treat the films. Cunningham finds it troubling that I present "only superficial discussions of the movies" while writing a book about "Hollywood." He desires to see more textual analyses in my narrative. Furthermore, he questions the fact that I offer only limited coverage of Japanese cinema. While aware that my book is about Hollywood, Cunningham wishes that I had discussed No Regrets of Our Youth, Stray Dog, Ikiru, "and a host of other films" in addition to Drunken Angel and Rashomon—two of the few Japanese films that I do discuss (although my coverage of the latter is brief). He then declares that "the great Japanese films of the Occupation arguably have more profound things to say about the nature of modern democracy than semi-factual biopics of Madame Curie and Abe Lincoln, to say nothing of the various Roy Rogers flicks that were being passed off as the products of a superior culture."

I agree with Cunningham that studying the film text is an important exercise. Yet in my opinion, the existing scholarship on cinema has focused too much on the celluloid, often overlooking the diverse body of non-filmic sources that also shape the cinematic experience. Thus in Screening Enlightenment I tried to demonstrate how "cinema" was shaped as much by the wide array of contextual formations—from movie ads, film reviews, and the sites of film screenings to fan gossip—as by the films themselves. This is why I endeavored to merge film policy, censorship, promotion, exhibition, and consumption in a single volume—in ways that few scholars had done in the past. In my book, "Hollywood," to build on Cunningham's speculation, means many things: it is a filmmaking community, a bureaucratized industry, an abundance of screen texts, and an even greater amalgamation of off-screen sources. For this reason, its transpacific expansion became nothing less than a "joint creation of the producers, brokers, and consumers of U.S. cinema in the two societies" (xii).

With regard to the lack of coverage on Japanese films, my short answer is that studying this cinema was not my central objective in this project. For more on Kurosawa, Mizoguchi, Ozu and others, one can turn to useful studies by David Bordwell, Kyoko Hirano, Stephen Prince, and Lars-Martin Sorensen (among others). The bigger issue, to me, lies in Cunningham's assumption that Japanese "masterpieces" appear to have greater depth and meaning than "popular" Hollywood movies. As someone who is currently writing a book on postwar Japanese cinema, I fully agree that studying this subject is fruitful and rewarding. Yet in positioning canonized Japanese narratives above the biopics, B-westerns, and other U.S. films that I investigate in Screening Enlightenment, Cunningham imposes the auteurist and "masterpiece"-centered assumptions that many bring to the field of cinema today instead of trying to understand how people back then made sense of the movies. The aim of my book was to do the latter. Through an analysis of contemporary discourse, I wanted to comprehend how and why Hollywood was able to achieve a large following, and how and why the cinema of a former enemy state could position itself over Japanese cinema—at times by "promoting the seemingly 'lowbrow' as 'highbrow'" (Sbardellati). Therefore, my work tries to answer the following questions: how did U.S. business representatives and SCAP authorities attempt to forge this cultural hierarchy? Why—more strikingly—did many Japanese intermediaries and audiences actively take part in constructing it?

The fourth issue is the question of Hollywood as a source of "enlightenment." While acknowledging the value of my research, Tsutsui asks "just how successful the elaborate postwar campaign of 'enlightenment' actually was." Pointing out my limited sample size (among other things), he argues that it is "hard to conclude" that the Hollywood-occupation apparatus ultimately had its way in imposing its "correct viewership" upon wider audiences.

Tsutsui makes an important point. It is likely that many fans visited the movie-houses—depending on the movie, the place, the timing, or one's feeling and mood—just for pleasure and escape. But as my book illustrates, Hollywood never abandoned its leisure function even at the height of the "enlightenment campaign." Rather, it offered both "entertainment" and "enlightenment." Therefore, the CMPE regularly boosted its star power and genre ingredients while launching its bunka campaign (94–95), culture elites did treat the movies as pastimes (147, 151), and Tomo no kai members poured out from theaters, heartily amused and entertained (165–67).

What interests me about Japan, though, is the extent to which the U.S. film industry departed from what Will Hays referred to in the 1930s as "pure entertainment." Instead of marketing cinema just as amusement, U.S. studios during the occupation also touted it as an embodiment of "intellect" (kyōdō) and "culture" (bunka)—in part to satisfy occupational importers, but also to maximize profits. Through my research, I also learned that many fans actively consumed Hollywood as bunka. Tsutsui aptly points out that editorial interventions may have influenced the making of this consumer image; I agree that I should have stressed the politics of the magazine some more. Yet after having read a multitude of fan responses, I cannot help but conclude that a great many of them do reflect the writers’ genuine feelings. Additionally, the fact that the "enlightenment campaign" involved a profit incentive leads me to think that the appeal of U.S. cinema as kyōdō and bunka did inspire communities beyond the two audience bodies I discuss in detail.

Perhaps another way of thinking about Hollywood's "enlightenment" function is to look at the possible legacies of the occupation-era campaign. Although Hollywood is undoubtedly an entertainment industry, we can spot a barrage of endeavors that present U.S. cinema as an educational resource in Japan today. For example, there is a large body of DVDs, TV shows, and websites that use movies—from Casablanca and Gone with the Wind to Forrest Gump and The Transformers—for language learning. Bookstores carry "dialogue books" that couple English-
language transcriptions with Japanese translations and interpretations. Smart-phone apps are available for busy “salary men” to improve their “listening” (risṣiningu) abilities through the movies. Schoolteachers make use of American movies to teach language as well as social and cultural issues. Travel agencies and tour guides regularly invoke specific films (e.g., Roman Holiday for Rome and West Side Story for New York), at times offering exclusive “location tours” (rōkenchi meguri), and cater to the customers’ desire to broaden their worldviews. Critics, commentators, publicists, and subtitlers wax eloquent about the screen texts, screenplays, and backgrounds of the films on TV and in movie pamphlets, magazines, blogs, tweets and other media platforms. And the list goes on.

What should one make of such activities? My answer is that these cultural endeavors do not negate or overtake Hollywood’s role as entertainment, but rather illustrate how an entertainment-oriented text can also embody pedagogical value—with varying levels of seriousness and intensity. Although it is hard for me to say if these cultural endeavors all originated from the occupation, I submit that one needs to situate current developments within a broader time span. I speculate that there are continuities between the “enlightenment campaign” of the early postwar era and the educational role American movies have played in recent times.

The final issue deals with the question of resistance. Tsutsui seems to be frustrated with my treatment of consumption and with the conclusion of my book, which appeared to him to be little more than “a sunny Hollywood happy ending.” The biggest problem for him is the lack of resistance. “Did anyone oppose the red, white, and blue repackaging of the moviegoing experience in Japan?” he asks. While not as critical as Tsutsui, Sbardellati likewise speculates that “there must have been Japanese opponents” to Hollywood. As noted elsewhere, I did try hard to find evidence on defiant and subversive moviegoing, but I was unable to uncover a whole lot. For this reason, I sincerely wish Tsutsui had offered concrete suggestions on sources and research avenues, as he has also studied this era in detail. Perhaps one might find counter-hegemonic discourses in left-wing newsletters, publications of Japanese film fans, and regional periodicals—which I did explore at some length. But at the same time, I still wish to assert that my novel and useful, as we still know so little about Japan’s discussion of motion picture fandom offers something that one needs to situate current developments within a postwar era and the educational role American movies have played in recent times.

Notes:
2. Some informative works do exist. See, for example, Katō Mikirō, Eigakan to kankyaku no bunkashi (Tokyo, 2006).
5. For an overview of Japanese film studies as an academic discipline, see Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, Kurosawa: Film Studies and Japanese Cinema (Durham, NC, 2000), 8–49.
6. For an online example, see the following website of the language education company ALC: http://www.alc.co.jp/eng/eiga/ (accessed February 11, 2012).
10. I was even more surprised to learn that one of the first American hits after the occupation was John Wayne’s Sands of Iwo Jima. Sasaki Tetsuo, a former CMPE employee, once told me that he was instructed to edit words like “Jap” and “Nip” from the film to prevent popular outrage. But even so, why did Japanese moviegoers choose to watch a film on an experience that demoralized and traumatized so many?
Imperial and Financial Overstretch
Under Nixon and Obama:
Are There Any Lessons to be Learned from the Crisis Years of the 1970s?

Klaus Larres

The complex challenges of war and an ailing economy preoccupied both Richard Nixon and Barack Obama to a great extent. These problems defined their presidencies and undoubtedly will play a crucial part in determining the legacy of both men and their place in history. Nixon was confident at the beginning of his presidency that he would be able to end the Vietnam War quickly and overcome the country’s trade deficit and profound economic problems. He was not able to do so, however, and soon his administration was dominated by his re-election ambitions. Obama has found himself in a similar predicament. With no real end in sight, the war in Afghanistan has become his war, and the Great Recession and America’s financial problems have turned out to be much more formidable than expected. Obama also faces re-election in very difficult circumstances.

Like the present, the 1970s were characterized by severe financial disruptions, deep political divisions and controversial military engagements. The historian Tony Judt wrote that the decade was a “protem moment in the international and national history of our times.” In fact, an increasing number of historians view the 1970s as a crucial period of transition in recent world history. The German scholar Hartmut Kaelble believes the decade may have been a “soft turning point.” In other words, it was a turning point that did not occur because of the beginning or ending of wars or the traumatic breakdown of empires. Instead, it was characterized “by rapid economic changes and by cultural upheavals.”

Nixon himself considered the year 1971 as “the watershed year” in American foreign relations because of greatly improved relations with China and the Soviet Union and, in Nixon’s view, with Japan and Europe. It was certainly true, to quote Tony Judt again, that “the Nixon presidency coincided with . . . an important turning point in world affairs.”

Although it is somewhat early to judge, the Obama years can also be seen as a crucial period of time in recent history: in particular, the dangers posed by international terrorism and the Great Recession are unique and crucial phenomena that will be of lasting importance for years to come. Like the 1970s, our own era is characterized by such a plethora of external and internal problems that the United States and Europe appear to be greatly overstretched.

Nixon seemed to recognize the limits of American power when, during a press conference in Guam on July 24, 1969, he said that he wanted to make “sure that our policies in the future, all over the world, in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the rest, reduce American involvement . . . [Assistance, yes, assistance in helping] them solve their own problems, but not going in and just doing the job ourselves.” This statement electrified America’s allies everywhere. Nevertheless, in the end the Nixon doctrine of American withdrawal from some of the country’s global commitments had very few if any practical consequences. The Nixon administration never resolved the dilemma of how to commence the desired partial retrenchment of America’s power without endangering Washington’s global hegemony. In the end hardly any retrenchment occurred.

Similarly, it appears today to be almost beyond the capacity of the United States to cope with the numerous challenges of the post-9/11 world—foreign policy challenges as well as financial, economic and social challenges. Some significant policy differences, however, have emerged in the intervening period. The Nixon administration, for instance, kept encouraging European allies to participate in “equitable burden-sharing” to lessen America’s global leadership responsibilities but did not offer the Europeans any real participation in decision-making. To some degree this behavior has changed. In the 2011 war in Libya, the Obama administration insisted on taking a back seat while leaving the initiative and main responsibility to the British and the French and subsequently, on a formal level, to NATO. This tactic was soon referred to as “leading from behind.” It quickly became clear, however, that without American material and reconnaissance support the two European countries would have been unable to make much of a difference to the success of the so-called rebels against the Gaddafi regime. In a period of severe domestic austerity, both London and Paris found it very difficult to sustain a prolonged air campaign against Libya. Concrete U.S. military aid and technological expertise proved to be vital. As in the 1970s, the United States still seemed to be the “indispensable power,” as Madeleine Albright, the former U.S. secretary of state, expressed it during the Clinton years.

Nixon and Obama: the War Presidents

Both Nixon and Obama were elected president as a reaction to highly unpopular wars. During the election campaign of 1968 Nixon indicated that he had a “secret plan” for quickly terminating the Vietnam War. More than forty years later, in 2008, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan embarked upon by Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush, had become so unpopular that Obama’s severe criticism of Bush’s foreign policy raised the expectation among most of those who voted for him that the wars would be ended quickly if he were elected.

As we now know, Nixon and Kissinger believed that
they had no choice but to escalate the Vietnam War in order to end it. They engineered the secret invasion of Cambodia and Laos, the mining of Haiphong harbor, the Christmas bombing of 1972 and many other unfortunate steps to escalate the war. With this strategy they hoped to put pressure on the North Vietnamese and secure a better negotiating position for arriving at a cease-fire agreement. At the same time they had to exercise some restraint in order not to provoke China into entering the war directly. Still, Nixon and Kissinger’s famed foreign policy expertise, powers of analysis and imaginative thinking deserted them when it came to Vietnam. While both must be given a great deal of credit for the opening to China in 1971-1972 and for the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, the balance sheet on Vietnam looks very different.

The thinking of Kissinger and Nixon on the subject of Vietnam was above all muddled by an obsession with maintaining American credibility. The old domino theory was also very much alive in Kissinger’s mind. Already in an August 1966 article for Look magazine he had written that if the United States were to withdraw unilaterally from Southeast Asia, “the stability of areas geographically far removed from Vietnam” would be greatly affected. America was “no longer fighting in Vietnam only for the Vietnamese,” he wrote, “we are also fighting for ourselves and for international stability.”

Robert Dallek explains that what both Kissinger and Nixon overlooked was the extent to which international opinion would have seen a pullback from a failing action as an act of courageous realism that made America a more sensible ally and an adversary that would make better future use of its power. The Nixon administration would never entirely grasp this reasoning while in office.

In fact, even when President Charles de Gaulle, whom both Nixon and Kissinger greatly admired, made the same point during a conversation in the course of Nixon’s first trip to Europe as president in early 1969, they remained unimpressed. Drawing on France’s own crushing defeat and withdrawal from the region in 1954 and his own subsequent withdrawal from Algeria in 1967, the eminent president advocated a fast U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. He dismissed Kissinger’s emphasis on the importance for American credibility of remaining in Southeast Asia as a rather peculiar line of thought. When Kissinger replied that he feared American credibility might suffer in the Middle East in particular, the general said: “How very odd. I thought it was precisely in the Middle East where your enemies were the greatest of all.”

De Gaulle was right, of course. The vigorous spread of communism in the Middle East never occurred; instead, in 1972 Soviet military advisers were thrown out of Egypt by Egyptian president Anwar al Sadat. The domino theory, it turned out, was not a serious theory at all but just some fanciful speculative thinking.

De Gaulle made a similar point in conversation with Nixon himself. The U.S. president kept talking about ending the Vietnam War in a responsible way by not rushing out “in a panic,” as otherwise “the credibility of the US in the world would suffer badly.” Once again De Gaulle was not convinced. He believed that American “power and wealth was so great” that it could achieve a settlement “with dignity” and repeated that “it would be better to let go than to try and stay.”

That Nixon won nor Kissinger was persuaded by this line of thinking until it was too late and the United States was well on the way to wholesale defeat in Vietnam.

It is naturally much more difficult to pass judgment on Obama’s policy with regard to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. What became obvious within a short time after Obama’s inauguration, however, was that Bush’s wars quickly became Obama’s wars. The current American president became fully committed to America’s war efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan and indeed to the more-or-less secret “war of the drones” in Pakistan, Yemen and several other countries.

Still, Obama appears to have learned some lessons from the Vietnam War. He did his best to wind down the war in Iraq, and it has become clear that very few American troops and military advisers remained there beyond December 2011, when the president declared the war was over. The position in Afghanistan is more complex; in all likelihood the Americans will stay longer. No real end of the war in Afghanistan is in sight—despite Obama’s expressed intention to withdraw all American and allied troops by 2014. While both security and civilian conditions in the country have improved somewhat during the last eighteen months, military experts agree that a withdrawal of all U.S. and other foreign troops from Afghanistan would lead to a quick reversal of these successes and perhaps to the collapse of the government in Kabul. We ought to ask whether or not the war embarked upon in the aftermath of 9/11 has not actually been won already, at least to a significant degree. After all, Al Quaida seems to have disintegrated to a large extent during the last few years, and Osama bin Laden was killed in early May 2011. The stated objective of the politicians who embarked on the Afghanistan war was to protect America and the world from the threat of Al Quaida terrorism and from further terrorist attacks. This goal appears to have been largely achieved despite a recent surge of deadly Al Quaida attacks in Pakistan, Kabul, and elsewhere.

In hindsight it is clear that the Vietnam War could never have been won. It was a conflict against nationalism and certainly not a war against the spread of communism in which American credibility was at stake, as was frequently believed at the time. Based on the lessons of Vietnam, a negotiated solution with the local forces in Afghanistan—essentially the Taliban—appears to be the best option. Perhaps it is the only option, despite all the reservations and justified uneasiness we have about dealing with the unsavory Taliban. There is, however, very little time left to embark on serious negotiations before the accelerated withdrawal of western forces will make the Taliban even more unwilling than today to participate in such talks.

The end of the war in Afghanistan would clearly have highly beneficial effects for the United States. It would not only preserve the health and lives of many of the young men and women serving in the U.S. military but would also make a significant contribution to the U.S. budget deficit and perhaps also halt the militarization of U.S. society identified by Andrew Bacevich and others.

Nixon and Obama: Dealing with Economic Decline

The presidencies of both Nixon and Obama were also plagued by serious financial and monetary turmoil and an increasingly difficult economic climate, including rising unemployment figures and growing deficits. Those who voted for Nixon in 1968 and Obama in 2008 clearly expected that the man for whom they cast their vote would resolve the economic difficulties of their times.

Readers will be familiar with the financial upheavals and economic predicaments of the present Great Recession. The equally unsettling and deep economic and financial crisis of the early 1970s has largely been forgotten, however. The stable and predictable Bretton Woods international monetary system of fixed exchange rates that had led to a huge expansion of international trade in the first postwar decades began to unravel from the mid-1960s onwards. Between 1965 and 1969 the United States developed a serious inflation problem and an annual balance of payments deficit of approximately...
Inflation grew from 1.9 per cent in 1965 to 5.0 per cent in 1969. It reached 6 per cent in 1973 and more than 10 per cent in 1974/75. It was obvious that the worsening balance of payments deficit was a symptom of the relative decline of American economic power. Not only was the United States faced with increasing economic competition from Japan and Western Europe, but fighting the long Vietnam War proved to be expensive. Washington’s diminishing trade surplus made it increasingly difficult to finance military spending abroad. The U.S. overall trade surplus declined from $9 billion in 1964 to $3.4 billion in 1969. America’s first substantial trade deficit occurred two years later, in 1971. It was America’s first trade deficit in almost one hundred years. The Vietnam War did indeed deal “the Bretton Woods monetary system a blow from which it never recovered.”

The main monetary problem was that by 1971 America’s increasing balance of payments deficit had led to a formidable accumulation of unwanted dollars at several European central banks. The glut of dollars not only unbalanced the Bretton Woods system but also caused a lot of resentment in Europe, not least in France and West Germany. After all, the global reserve currency status of the dollar gave the United States the capacity, as State Department consultant Robert Osgood wrote in 1969, “to pursue its international political and economic objectives without regard to the wishes of its allies, while they are nonetheless expected to finance these objectives by accepting and holding dollars in unlimited amounts.” The situation encouraged speculators to invest their money in Europe. A downward devaluation of the dollar and an upward revaluation of the Deutschmark was generally foreseen—though of course no one knew when this would occur. The United States was not happy with the situation either. Still, the Nixon administration did not really know what to do and largely pursued a policy of benign neglect.

European leaders kept urging Washington to do something about the problem, but to no avail. “The dollar is our currency,” Treasury secretary John Connally told a visiting European delegation with a broad grin shortly after taking office in early 1971, “but it’s your problem.”

Still, both the president and his Treasury secretary were well aware that the United States had reached an economic threshold. Connally kept reiterating that the labor unions and the business world needed “to redress the decline in our competitive position and improve our economic position in foreign markets.” Nixon chimed in. It was essential, he proclaimed to the nation’s newspaper editors, that the American people “regain their competitive spirit and moral strength and stay ahead in the race for world leadership.”

Arthur Burns, the Austrian-born chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, recognized that the country was also faced with an entirely new problem, which soon came to be called “stagflation” (i.e., a sizable inflation in the midst of recession). Burns believed that a “new medicine” was “needed for the new illness.” To rely merely on a “more rapid expansion of the money supply” and thus on inflating the U.S. currency “cannot be the answer,” he thought. However, that policy was exactly the one Nixon had announced on August 15, Nixon proclaimed that he was shutting the gold window by severing the link between gold and the dollar. He thus abandoned the pledge of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference to convert dollars into gold at the rate of thirty-five dollars per ounce whenever a foreign government asked for it. The United States had been dangerously exposed to conversion requests from foreign governments. Nixon had expressed the risks bluntly during the Camp David meeting. “We can’t cover our liabilities, we’re broke, anyone can topple us.” His new policy paved the way for a major devaluation of the U.S. currency, the first one in modern American history. Transatlantic negotiations towards the end of 1971 eventually produced an agreement on this policy.

In his address on August 15, 1971, Nixon had also announced the imposition of a temporary ten-percent surcharge fee (or border tax) on imports into the United States to make such goods less attractive to the American consumer. He expected this fee would give U.S.-produced wares a shot in the arm. In addition, the president proclaimed a comprehensive package of wage and price controls. For electoral reasons, Nixon had swallowed his great dislike of such “socialist” policies.

At home the American voters were impressed by Nixon’s firm and decisive steps to bring the U.S. economy out of recession and protect it from those aggressive, unreasonable foreigners in Europe and Japan. Yet the “Nixon shocks” were in fact an unambiguous admission of the weak position of the dollar and the U.S. economy. Nixon’s New Economic Policy, as it was called (identical, as the same name in 1919, as the White House belatedly noticed with some embarrassment), symbolized the beginning of the end of America’s global economic hegemony. But to the American voter the president emerged as the champion of the little man, ready to take on the fight against inflation and against those greedy businessmen who kept increasing their prices. Domestically Nixon’s new economic course would prove a considerable success, and it clearly contributed to his impressive election victory in November 1972.

Externally, Nixon’s New Economic Policy was much more controversial. The unilateral way in which the administration had arrived at the decisions and the abrupt way it announced them caused America’s allies much anger and distress. Moreover, the United States expected the devaluation of the dollar to lead to an increase in U.S. exports at the expense of European exports, thus turning the annual American payments deficit of $9 billion into an annual surplus of $4 billion. In effect, the United States was pursuing a so-called “adjustment goal” of $13 billion within one to two years. Between the surcharge and their large holdings of U.S. dollars, the Europeans and the Japanese were being asked to contribute to turning the U.S. trade deficit into a surplus. They were not amused.
The Nixon administration’s economic and monetary strategy did not work, however. The multilateral transatlantic negotiations embarked upon in the aftermath of August 15, 1971, led to the Azores meeting between President Georges Pompidou and Nixon and then to the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971. New fixed but somewhat more flexible international currency exchange rates were negotiated. However, neither the United States nor the Europeans or the Japanese made much of an effort to stick to these rates, as doing so would have required domestic austerity programs. Thus, neither the Smithsonian agreement nor the imaginative European “snake in the tunnel” strategy of April 1972 was a success.\textsuperscript{33} In March 1973 an entirely new monetary phase was inaugurated by means of an agreement to allow all international currencies to float freely. In Bonn and the other European capitals it was quickly realized that “a completely new climate, a new era” had been inaugurated “with the end of the system of pegged currency rates.”\textsuperscript{34}

At first this new phase calmed the markets a little. However, the firm stability of the old Bretton Woods system would never return. In the long run the free floating of currencies took a stable factor out of the international economic system and fostered an inclination to rely on “easy money” and readily available credit. The United States, moreover, continued to be burdened with a serious inflationary problem. Nixon’s economic policy had only been successful insofar as initially it had led to a boom in the U.S. economy in 1972 and helped him to win the presidential election in November 1972 with a landslide. In essence, however, Nixon’s economic policy only prolonged the serious economic problems of the early 1970s, which were exacerbated by the first oil crisis in October 1973 and the second in the late 1970s. High rates of unemployment and inflation and significant U.S. trade deficits continued into the 1980s and beyond.

Nixon and Obama: Five Lessons

There appear to be five lessons we can draw from Nixon’s presidency that are relevant to our current economic predicament:

1. One of the main reasons for the economic problems of the United States during the Johnson and Nixon years was the cost of the Vietnam War. The most obvious lesson to be drawn from the military and economic troubles of the 1970s thus seems to be that U.S. military spending in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere and the cost of the sprawling Pentagon bureaucracy need to be significantly curtailed to bring expenditures under control.

2. One other reason for U.S. economic difficulties in the 1970s was that American industries and businesses were not competitive internationally. Their inability to compete was not due solely to the overvaluation of the dollar, though that did play an important role. While in the 1960s and 1970s the United States was resting on the industrial and economic laurels it had earned in the 1940s and 1950s, Japan and the leading European countries were pressing ahead with new production and management techniques and identifying new product niches they could fill. They were busily producing quality products, such as luxury cars, high-end household utilities and high-quality industrial machinery, that sold well. At the same time the United States was exporting much of its economic expertise and setting up factories abroad, which benefited the U.S. economy only marginally. The creation of expertise in the United States itself suffered greatly. There are clearly lessons to be drawn from this experience, particularly in the context of the economic rise of countries such as China and India.

3. U.S. presidents have only limited means to create jobs; however, they can influence the conditions that lead to the creation of jobs. Nixon managed quite successfully to manipulate the American people’s confidence in the U.S. economy. He created a more optimistic economic climate at home. In early 1971 he fired his economic team, which had served him for the first two years without achieving success in turning around the economy. After the congressional elections of November 1970, which the Republicans lost, and in view of the looming presidential election of November 1972, Nixon was prepared to adopt very radical measures. He panicked, one could say. Although John Connally had no economic expertise whatsoever, he was appointed Treasury secretary in February 1971. It was not Connally’s economic and monetary expertise that had impressed Nixon but his strong and forceful personality. Connally talked up America’s economic performance and explained robustly what was needed to overcome the crisis. He also talked rather bluntly and frankly to America’s competitors in Europe and Japan. The U.S. voters loved it. Federal Reserve chairman Arthur Burns had advised that the administration ought to find some way to create new confidence in the U.S. economy, and Connally did just that, albeit by fairly drastic means.

It might not be a bad idea for Obama to change his economic team. A radically new team might imbue the country’s business community with fresh confidence and optimism. After all, what is required when an economy is languishing is strong leadership—or at least the perception of it.

4. Nixon’s temporary incomes policy had the advantage of benefiting the consumer with stable prices. It also conveyed the impression that it curtailed profiteering, and the U.S. consumer appreciated that. Finally, it helped improve Nixon’s image; he appeared to be a president who cared about the man and woman in the street, who was considerate and fair to the average family. A similar improvement would be helpful to Obama and his re-election prospects. It would go a long way towards creating new confidence in the economy and the administration. The Obama administration would be wise, for instance, to find ways of making not only the taxpayer but also the banks and the bankers pay for the huge damage created by the near-meltdown of America’s financial system in 2008. “Too big to fail” is a rather unfortunate phrase. It conveys the impression that Obama’s sympathies lie largely with the bankers rather than with the ordinary American voter. Nixon’s temporary incomes policy conveyed a very different message, rightly or wrongly. No anti-Wall Street movement occurred during Nixon’s reign.

It is rather paradoxical that while Obama personally is a talented communicator, during much of his first term in office his administration has suffered from a lack of communication with the American people about its attempts to improve the U.S. economy.\textsuperscript{35} Nixon was personally a rather poor communicator, but his administration was much more successful in convincing the American voter of the great efforts his government was undertaking on behalf of the consumer to create new
jobs and make the economy boom again.

5. Nixon's unilateral monetary policy and the multilateral monetary negotiations in 1971 and in particular in 1972 and 1973 were a disaster. Obama's much more multilateral approach in the context of the deep financial crisis which is engulfing both sides of the Atlantic is clearly sounder and more promising than the Nixon administration's unilateral approach.

There is one other more hopeful lesson to be drawn from the past: all crises eventually end. That was the case in the 1970s and that will definitely be the case again sometime, one hopes in the not too distant future. It is, however, by no means clear that the crisis can and will be overcome in a satisfactory way that enables the United States to maintain its standard of living.

Notes:
1. This article is based on a lecture given at the John W. Kluge Center of the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, on September 29, 2011. The author wishes to thank Dr. James Billington, the Librarian of Congress, and Dr. Carolyn Brown, the director of the Kluge Center, for the invitation to pursue his research interests as a Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the library. In 2002–3 the author held the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress.
8. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 111.
14. Ibid.
15. For an interesting discussion of the issues involved, see Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia, and J. Alexander Thier, “Defining Success in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs 89 (July/August 2010), 48–60.
20. For the figures, see, for example, http://www. inflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/
21. The 1971 trade deficit was $1,302 million; it had risen to 6,082 million in 1976 but already in 1977, the first year of the Carter administration, it had shot to $27,246 million. In 2006, the trade deficit stood at an unprecedented $760 billion. See U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division: www.census.gov/foreign-trade/ statistics/historical/gands.txt.
25. Quoted in James, ibid. See also the illuminating book by Robert Leeson, Ideology and the International Economy: The Decline and Fall of Bretton Woods (Basingstoke, UK, 2003).
30. For Nixon’s address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1971 (Washington, DC, 1972), 884–891.
31. See, for example, Treasury undersecretary Paul Volcker’s conversations and discussions with European leaders in London and Paris on August 16 and 17, 1971: FRUS, 1969-1976, III, 469–484.

I wish to thank Bill Burr of the National Security Archive in Washington, DC for drawing my attention to this insightful article.
Modernization and Development in U.S. Foreign Relations

Daniel Immerwahr

The problem of development has emerged to become one of the most pressing concerns in the world today. Over ten percent of the world’s people live on less than the equivalent of a dollar a day, eighty percent make do with less than ten dollars, and about a billion adults in the world are illiterate. Such issues have been of concern for the prosperous nations of the global North, including the United States, for decades, but it is not clear how much help those nations have been. Living conditions in most parts of the world have improved since World War II, but economists have found it hard to ascribe that improvement to foreign assistance. Countries that have received a great deal of aid, such as India, are not doing better on the whole than countries that have received relatively little, such as China, which currently has a per capita GDP almost four times that of India. What is more, development aid since World War II has often turned out to be counterproductive, propping up authoritarian governments, subverting democracy, launching environmentally and socially destructive modernization projects, and shading uncomfortably into military repression.

Historians who have taken up the topic of development have acknowledged its failures and sought to explain them in terms of a single cause. Developmental efforts have failed, they argue, because those efforts have been technocratic, designed from an Olympian perch by experts with imperfect knowledge of the culture, politics, or even economies of the places they sought to improve. The imperfection in that knowledge was a consequence of the limited and flawed nature of the quantitative or abstract information that experts relied on to comprehend the global South. But it was compounded by their faith in numbers, in sociological abstractions, and above all in their ability to comprehend the basic forces of history. Working from a partial understanding of a few societies, and from a tacit and unquestioned set of biases stemming from their home cultures, they nevertheless extrapolated widely and with surprising confidence, secure in the belief that they had identified universal laws of history governing the transition of poor, tradition-bound, and agrarian societies into rich, modern, urban ones. Their confidence proved to be their undoing, or, more precisely, the undoing of the places in which they operated, because as planners built development campaigns around abstract sociological models or numbers-driven economic ones, they inevitably blinded themselves to conditions on the ground and triggered massive, disruptive, and often violent conflicts between metropolitan plans and local realities.

This understanding of development as a technocratic process draws heavily on the critical scholarship on empire and particularly on the work of the Subaltern Studies Collective, which has focused on the destructive clash of epistemologies between imperial and indigenous forms of knowledge. Indeed, much of the existing literature on international development regards it as an empire by other means—yet another way for the global North to intervene in and control societies in the global South. But the touchstone work that best encapsulates the basic approach that historians of development have taken is surely James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State (1998), which identifies a common predisposition among rulers to remake societies so that they will be legible to and governable by the center, however much havoc such a refashioning wreaks on localities. Scott argues that although many rulers have aspirated toward such “high modernist” state-building throughout history, it has only been since the Enlightenment that an unbounded faith in science and technology, plus greater technologies of governing, have unleashed social engineering projects upon a prostrate civil society. Working in a similar vein, Michael Adas has extended that point by arguing that the United States, which largely avoided the humiliations of the two world wars, emerged in the post-1945 period possessing an unusual amount of “technohubris,” especially when it came to its development campaigns in the Third World.

Within U.S. history, the development-as-technocracy thesis has been adopted by a group of historians who have clustered around the topic of modernization theory, which, they argue, is the specific form that the general high modernist push identified by Scott and others took in the postwar United States. Drawing together postwar developments in the academic fields of economics, sociology, political science, psychology, and anthropology, modernization theory emerged in the late 1950s as a sort of unified field theory for the social sciences, explaining how traditional societies moved along a convergent path toward a universal condition of modernity that, not coincidentally, strongly resembled the United States at midcentury. This was a propitious time, because just as social scientists were fastening upon a shared theoretical matrix, the appetite for academic wisdom among politicians was growing. Especially during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, policymakers came to depend on social scientists both for legitimation and for guidance, inviting many leading modernization theorists into the foreign policy administration. Not since the late eighteenth century had the life of the mind and the world of politics come into such close contact in the United States, and modernization theory was the bridge that joined the two.

But although the historians of modernization theory have focused especially on the social scientific complex in the 1950s and 1960s—and in so doing have forced diplomatic history to engage with fairly abstruse problems in high intellectual history—they also understand the fundamental worldview encompassed by modernization theory to have had a “wider, more enduring trajectory” than its academic expression. Modernization theory was not just a theory, some argue, but an ideology, one that has been deeply embedded in the basic thought patterns of U.S. leaders for much of the twentieth century. For Nick Cullather, the “ideals of modernization” took root...
in U.S. thought as soon as scientists began to understand the most basic component of development, food, in terms of the quantifiable and globally commensurable unit of the calorie in the late nineteenth century. Once qualitative questions become quantitative, international comparisons become not only possible but inevitable, and the notion of development as an attempt to bring poorer nations up to the measured standards of richer ones followed almost as a matter of logic. David Ekbladh offers a stronger and more controversial version of the longue durée modernization argument, insisting that the United States has since the New Deal been committed not just to abstract and quantitative modes of international comparison but to a specific mode of development: state-directed, top-down industrialization projects, modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority. Those who argue that the modernization impulse predated the Kennedy and Johnson administrations tend to take a wider view of the phenomenon in space as well as time and look beyond the State Department and the key Cold War universities toward other modernizing agents: philanthropic foundations, United Nations institutions, foreign governments, and networks of professionals.

The interpretation of modernization as an ideology has been a valuable contribution to our understanding of foreign relations. In response to earlier grand theories that have explained the postwar behavior of the United States in terms of a zeal for democracy, a desire to secure corporate profits, a quest for security, or a strong allergy to Communism, we now have a framework that explains U.S. policymaking in terms of the urge to modernize. Scratch a Cold War policymaker, recent scholars contend, and you will find an underlying layer of modernization theory that shapes his fundamental view of the world. Of course, the basic drive to replace traditional societies with modern ones was by no means incompatible with a Cold War agenda; the most influential formulation of modernization theory, W. W. Rostow’s *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960), defined the normative end-state of modernization as a market society with high mass consumption and regarded Communism as a pernicious deviation. But modernization was also capacious enough to accommodate five-year plans, exchange controls, and exactly the sort of market incursions that Cold Warriors found so intolerable domestically. Once one uses modernization as a lens through which to observe postwar history, the East-West axis, which divided the warring superpowers, seems less prominent than the North-South one, which united them. For all the intensity of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, when it came to development aid the two hegemons pursued remarkably similar strategies, often in the same countries. While the Cold War no doubt supplied the basic impulse of the United States to intervene in the Third World, the ideology of modernization justified and determined the shape of that intervention.

Modernization projects became simultaneously more violent and less tethered to local conditions. From the perspective of any number of emerging perspectives—including human rights, environmentalism, participatory democracy, pacifism, and peasant movements—modernization projects became harder and harder to justify. Modernization projects became simultaneously more violent and less tethered to local conditions. From the perspective of any number of emerging perspectives—including human rights, environmentalism, participatory democracy, pacifism, and peasant movements—modernization projects became harder and harder to justify. Policymakers turned away from them and toward alternative modes of development that focused on poverty alleviation, ecological sustainability, cultural pluralism, popular participation, gender issues, and, above all, market solutions. The study of the history of U.S. development has reached something of a natural resting place. One of the first historical investigations, which defined the agenda for the field, anticipating and triggering numerous studies of modernization, was Michael Latham’s *Modernization as Ideology* (2000). Latham recently published a second book on the topic, *The Right Kind of Revolution* (2012), which is not a monograph but the first real synthesis that the field has seen. Ably stitching together the recent literature in the field, it is perfectly suited for assignment to undergraduates. The twelve-year period between Latham’s two books can be taken as marking the first wave of writing on U.S. development. So what will the second wave look like? I have two suggestions, which fall somewhere between hopes and predictions.

**Beyond the Modernization Consensus**

The first step forward for scholarship is to map the boundaries of the modernization project. So much attention has been given to describing the magnetic pull of modernization as an ideology, and technocracy as a mode of operation, that it can seem from a casual reading of the literature that that is all there was to development. We are currently in a historiographical position that is not unlike that of the “consensus school” of U.S. political history, whose practitioners—Richard Hofstadter, Daniel Boorstin, Louis Hartz, David Potter—argued that the most interesting feature about U.S. politics was that all of its conflicts were contained within a tightly bounded ideological space. The price of admission to serious political debates, the consensus school argued, was subscription to the basic tenets of liberalism: individualism, property rights, representative government, and so forth. The consensus school exposed a durable and undoubtedly important trend with-
in the U.S. political tradition. But the cost of that insight was a homogenization of the past. Abolitionists, populists, Southern agrarians, and radical Jacksonians who did not seem to fit the consensus were ignored, deemed pathological, or explained only in terms of their relation to the overriding theme of liberalism. The consensus school of development history has focused less on liberalism than on modernization as the central strain of U.S. thought, but it has, like the original consensus school, stressed ideological coherence and continuity, at least up until the 1970s. But has development policy been governed so thoroughly by an ideological consensus, or were there other strains of developmental thought and practice that coexisted with modernization?

On the face of it, the latter seems plausible, especially given the sudden disintegration of the modernization project in the 1970s. It is likely that those rivals to modernization theory, which were strong enough to dispatch it in the 1970s, had earlier histories stretching back into the immediate postwar period. One suggestive study in this regard is Michele Alacevich's *The Political Economy of the World Bank* (2009), which examines the first experiments that the Bank made with development starting in the late 1940s. It is not entirely surprising that Alacevich finds disagreements, often heated, among U.S. experts about what development ought to look like. Such debates were largely about the scale of projects and whether they would prioritize production or distribution—questions that were orthogonal to the question of modernization. But Alacevich makes an intriguing observation about the structure of those arguments, which is that the dissenters were not so much defeated as pushed toward the periphery, where they often found a comfortable berth. When orthodoxy reigned in Washington, heterodox thinkers were able to gain recognition and support working directly with Southern nations.13

Joseph Hodge’s study of British colonial development policy in Africa, *Triumph of the Expert* (2007), notes a similar dynamic. Like the United States, Britain adopted top-down, expert-driven, centrally implemented development policies in many times and places. But Hodge argues that such development, which is obviously a form of the modernization project, was never uncontested within the Colonial Office. Rather, developers who pushed grand and radical schemes to transform traditional societies had to compete with seasoned colonial hands, possessing in-country knowledge, who favored a colonial policy that would preserve existing cultures and economies. The “conservatives” urged decentralized schemes, reliance on native institutions, and a general gradualism that is hard to square with modernization in its canonical form.14

It is likely, following Alacevich and Hodge, that modernization appeared to reign unchallenged during the first twenty years after World War II simply because we were looking in the wrong places. Many of the pathbreaking studies of modernization theory, including Latham's *Modernization as Ideology* and Nils Gilman's *Mandarins of the Future* (2003), are really studies of the metropole. They examine the plans of policymakers in Washington, not the work of politicians or U.S. officials in the developing world. But, as the scholarship on empire has shown, the imperial mind usually exhibits a great deal more coherence and purpose than does the imperial arm, and those operating from the centers of power often see things differently from those toiling in the fields. It is possible, indeed likely, that low- and mid-level development experts, living in-country and bargaining daily with foreign leaders, were not the high modernists that their superiors in Washington were. It is also likely that, even if U.S. experts were uniformly governed by the tenets of modernization theory, the foreign politicians with whom they dealt were not. As students of U.S. development turn increasingly to foreign archives, we will have a fuller sense of where and when the modernization consensus operated, and where and when it did not.

**Beyond Moral Accounting**

Since William Appleman Williams and the birth of the revisionist school of U.S. diplomatic history, much writing on the topic of U.S. foreign relations has been implicitly concerned with a sort of national soul-searching, in which the sins and hypocrisies of the United States—particularly those pertaining to its actions in the Third World—are laid bare. Indeed, one of the reasons that the modernization/technocracy focus has been so compelling is that it traces the failures of U.S. foreign policy to an ethical flaw: hubris, particularly the hubris to suppose that the rest of the world could be known and manipulated with ease by men whose understanding of global affairs came from abstract models rather than deep familiarity with other places. While ethical questions make for high moral drama, we must remember that, because the United States has been the predominant global superpower since 1945, its actions in the field of development are significant not merely as reflections of its moral character but as events in global history.

The suggestion that U.S. development assistance might look different when viewed from another perspective is sustained, to take one example, by the writings of Africanist Frederick Cooper. In a series of works, Cooper argues that the availability of foreign aid and the peculiar rhythm of African decolonization led together to the formation of “gatekeeper states,” governments whose strength derived not from popular legitimacy or even control of the interior but rather from their ability to “sit astride the interface between a territory and the rest of the world, collecting and distributing resources that derived from the gate itself,” including customs revenue, entry and exit visas, currency controls, and, most important, foreign aid and investment.15 Here the story is not about the exportation of U.S. scripts or the rule of experts, but about the role that foreign aid played in African state formation. As Cooper stresses, this is a joint history, not something that the global North “did” to Africa, but something that happened as the result of a confluence of forces, some internal to Africa and some not.

Rather than seeking merely to defend or condemn the modernization project on ethical grounds, we might, following Cooper, ask questions about how it contributed to the development of states and economies in the global South. Cooper’s account makes room for the larger contours of international history: decolonization, the rise of international institutions, the multiplicity of developers and the rivalries among them, and the Bretton Woods system of relative national autonomy in the international realm. By contrast, most studies of development by U.S. historians are based on a hub-and-spoke model according to which the agents of the United States circulate through the world and intervene in various places. That model pays little attention to connections between Southern nations or indeed to any part of the international system. Finally, by allowing themselves to move beyond moral accounting, U.S. historians might begin to take up the technical aspects of development projects. Currently, modernization is understood primarily as an ideology and assessed as such, but in fact many aspects of actual modernization projects were highly technical, with non-ideological dimensions that might be understood as episodes in the history of science and technology studies rather than solely in the history of U.S. foreign relations.16

Both of the suggestions I have made seek to transcend the development-as-modernization paradigm. They proceed, however, not from dissatisfaction with it, but from
an appreciation of what it has achieved. Development has risen in our estimation from being a special and largely peripheral subject within the study of Cold War diplomacy to a central feature of the postwar international system. Historians have used it to promote an entirely novel framework for understanding U.S. foreign relations throughout the twentieth century, one that has brought the history of social science into the field in an unexpected way. What remains is to consolidate the gains of the modernization literature, to probe its extent and to weave it into the larger fabric of international history.

Notes:
1. On the failures of development aid, see William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York, 2006).
9. A work that discusses the roots of that convergence is David C. Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development (Cambridge, MA, 2003).
10. See particularly Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton, 2006).
**Diplomatic History, the Journal of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, to be Published by Oxford University Press**

**New York City, March 27, 2012**—The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) announced today they have established a partnership with Oxford University Press to publish their scholarly journal, *Diplomatic History*, starting in 2013.

*Diplomatic History* regularly examines issues from the colonial period to the present in a global and comparative context and offers a variety of perspectives on economic and strategic issues, as well as those involving gender, culture, ethnicity, and ideology. The journal’s content appeals to a wide variety of disciplines, including American studies, international economics, American history, national security studies, and Latin American, Asian, African, and European studies.

“As one of the world’s foremost publishers of scholarly journals, OUP does not believe in simply amassing a large number of journals; rather we focus on the most influential publications in any given discipline,” said Niko Pfund, President, OUP USA. “As the most influential journal devoted to the history of U.S. diplomacy, foreign relations, and national security, *Diplomatic History* is an invaluable resource for scholars and provides a welcome complement to the OUP Journals and books programs.”

For librarians already subscribing to *Diplomatic History*, the changeover in 2013 will be seamless, and SHAFR members will begin receiving correspondence from OUP this fall with information about new membership benefits and renewal information. Member benefits will include exclusive discounts on OUP books and online products. All SHAFR members will have online access to *Diplomatic History*, including access to the journal in the Oxford Journals Digital Archive and will also receive print copies of the journal and *Passport* as benefits of SHAFR membership.

The Oxford Journals Digital Archive includes online access to all content on the Oxford Journals list, with published content ranging from 1849 to 1995 and representing more than 4 million article pages. Articles, essays, book reviews, illustrations, frontmatter, backmatter, and covers for each title are included. The current Oxford Journals Digital Archive offering consists of 177 titles, with 8 journal titles newly added for 2012.

As SHAFR’s Executive Director, Peter Hahn, noted, “SHAFR could not be more pleased to partner with Oxford. The Society has long been committed to the worldwide dissemination of historical knowledge about American foreign relations, and for nearly a half century, *Diplomatic History* has carried that mission around the globe. Because of OUP’s unparalleled international footprint and foremost reputation as a publisher of scholarly work, SHAFR welcomes this partnership as we launch a new era of reaching an ever widening audience of those interested in U.S. diplomatic history.”

*Diplomatic History* Editor in Chief, Tom Zeiler added that “the opportunity for the journal of record of the field of U.S. foreign relations history to work with such a prestigious press is both exciting and gratifying. It is validation of our mutual mission to expand readership of *Diplomatic History* to all corners of the globe and boost our effort to feature cutting-edge research and book reviews for students, scholars, and the public.”

For more information about *Diplomatic History*, SHAFR, and this publishing partnership please contact:
Christian Purdy
Director of Publicity
Oxford University Press
212.726.6032, christian.purdy@oup.com

**About SHAFR:** The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) is dedicated to the scholarly study of the history of American foreign relations. As such, it promotes the “the study, advancement and dissemination of a knowledge of American Foreign Relations” through the sponsorship of research, annual meetings, and publications. SHAFR.org extends this mission by providing an online forum for demonstrating the value of historical thinking to understanding contemporary foreign relations.

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David Tal

**Editor's note:** This is the first in a series of reviews of recently published volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. AJ]

SALT—the acronym stands for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that later became the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of May 1972—represents a major component of the chapter known in history as détente. **Détente** was the name given to the Soviet and American attempts to structure their relationship on a new basis, or, as President Nixon put it in his inauguration speech, to rely on negotiations, not confrontation. Volume 32 of the *FRUS* series is dedicated to the negotiations that led to the historic Nixon-Brezhnev meeting in Moscow in May 1972 and the consequent signing of the agreements that are part of SALT. The most important of those accords were the agreement on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and the interim agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

The volume covers the years 1969–1972. This periodization is called for by the very nature of the process it describes, but it is also a kind of statement, even if not necessarily intentional. Students of American-Soviet relations in general, and détente in particular, usually associate détente and SALT with President Richard Nixon and his powerful and influential national security advisor, Henry Kissinger. This volume, the first published collection of SALT documents, supports this association. However, such periodization does an injustice to Nixon’s predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, who actually planted the seeds of what became détente and SALT.

This reminder of Johnson’s underappreciated role in the making of détente and SALT is important not only because it does justice to him as Nixon’s predecessor, but also because taking credit away from his predecessors was exactly what Nixon was trying to do when he embarked on the journey that would lead to détente and SALT. This volume of *FRUS* thus supports Nixon’s claim to a unique role in the making of U.S. arms control policy. At the same time, though, the volume contains the documents that show how Nixon failed to create his own path in terms of arms control and how it was not long before he found himself walking in the footsteps of his predecessors.

Truth be told, the SALT volume of *FRUS* must be read in tandem with the *FRUS* volumes dedicated to the U.S.–USSR relationship during those years (Vol. XII, parts I and II, and Vol. XIV for the years 1969–1976). The latter volumes contain a lot of material pertinent to SALT, some of which is reprinted in the SALT volume. Still, there is enough in this volume to shed light on some issues that the reader of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s autobiographies and historiography might not see. One of these is related to the idea of linkage. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger believed in the value of disarmament or arms control as means to reduce tensions and to eliminate the risk of war. To the contrary: in February 1969, Nixon, inspired by Kissinger, told Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that “history makes it clear that wars result not so much from arms, or even from arms races, as they do from underlying political differences and political problems” (*FRUS* 1969–1976, XII, 39–40).

Nixon and Kissinger sought to use the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms as a tool to achieve two major goals. The first was to come to an agreement on what was already a fait accompli in the United States: halting the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the development of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM). The United States no longer produced ICBMs and had no interest in ABMs; the Soviets had lost interest in ABMs but continued their ICBM build-up. An agreement would stop the Soviet build-up and would provide an abiding basis for the halt in the build-up of ABM systems. “We are giving up nothing,” concluded Kissinger during the final phase of negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons (693). He meant that the United States would be signing an agreement to limit what it did not intend to develop in the first place. Still, the agreement would ensure that neither side would enjoy strategic superiority.

The administration’s second goal was to link the arms treaty to political objectives. Washington believed that the economic burden of the armament program had become too heavy for the Soviets and, surmising that they wanted to find ways to ease that burden, assumed that they wanted an agreement more than the United States did. Washington believed that the economic burden of the armament program had become too heavy for the Soviets and, surmising that they wanted to find ways to ease that burden, assumed that they wanted an agreement more than the United States did. Consequently Nixon and Kissinger decided to draw other outstanding political problems into the negotiations on strategic arms limitations. They were convinced they had enough leverage over the Soviets to force them to make concessions on what mattered most to the United States—Vietnam. “This concept became known as linkage,” Nixon later said. He was proud of what he described as a new construct.

The decision to integrate U.S. arms control policy—SALT—into détente marked a shift from the course of U.S. arms control policy as it was set by Eisenhower in 1958 and continued by Kennedy and Johnson. That course compartmentalized U.S. disarmament and arms control policy. The various components of disarmament and arms control—the nuclear test ban agreement, for example—
were negotiated separately, and the negotiations on disarmament and arms control agreements were disconnected from outstanding Cold War political problems.

Nixon and Kissinger reintroduced the “package deal” that typified U.S. disarmament policy until 1958: the association of U.S. disarmament and arms control policy with outstanding Cold War problems. This volume on SALT shows us how the linkage did not work, and how Nixon returned back to the compartmentalized approach that removed outstanding Cold War problems from the arms control negotiations and agreements.

The collapse of the linkage between SALT and (mainly) Vietnam was a gradual process that had started with the refusal of officials within the administration to cooperate with that approach. The most senior of these officials was Secretary of State William Rogers, who pushed to set a date for the beginning of the talks without linking them to outstanding political problems. This volume on SALT presents the pertinent documents in the direct context of the negotiation process that would lead to the signing in Vienna and Helsinki. But it was not only a matter of hierarchy; the disparity between the attention given to what happened in Washington and what happened in Vienna and Helsinki reflects also the real relationship between the administration and its emissaries to the negotiations.

Nixon was dismayed by the whole State Department apparatus and determined to run U.S. foreign policy—including SALT—from the White House. He did not trust his chief negotiator to SALT, constantly suspecting that Gerard Smith was conspiring to take from him the credit for achieving an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. “What he [Smith] wants is a completely free hand, so that he gets the credit for whatever is achieved,” he charged on one occasion (404). Smith was marginalized, kept out of the loop, and informed of significant decisions only after the fact. A typical instance of this treatment occurred when a joint American-Soviet announcement was made on October 12, 1971, that Nixon would visit Moscow in May 1972 to sign the SALT I treaty and discuss other issues. Smith learned of the news only after it happened. The following exchange took place between him and Kissinger:

“[Smith]: I read on the ticker that you and the President are going to negotiate SALT in Moscow.
K: Oh Jesus Christ, relax. For Christ’s sake! Read what the President said.
S: I am relaxed. I’m disgusted, but relaxed.” (622)

It is no wonder that Smith entitled his book on his experience as chief negotiator to SALT Doubletalk.

Another important aspect of this FRUS volume is its introduction of a relatively large number of documents dealing with the technical aspects of SALT. More detailed work has been done in the volume dedicated to U.S. national security (FRUS 1969-76, Vol. 34), but this volume presents the pertinent documents in the direct context of the negotiations. Thus, technical subjects such as payloads and numbers, ranges and kinds of missiles all give a concrete dimension to the negotiations that can help anyone interested in SALT understand not only the diplomacy and politics of SALT, but also its nuts and bolts. Although this volume, like all edited volumes, has limits, and it will not make a visit to the National Archives or to presidential libraries redundant, it is a most valuable tool both for scholars and students who wish to get a first but still thorough and enlightening glance at this fascinating topic.
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The Convergence of Military and Diplomatic History: A Roundtable

Thomas Zeiler, Brian McAllister Linn, Jennifer D. Keene, Phyllis L. Soybel, and Mark A. Stoler

Editor’s Note: The papers in this roundtable were originally presented at the American Historical Association conference in Chicago in January 2012. AJ

America in the World/America as the World

Thomas Zeiler

I will stand by the position I took in a Journal of American History forum four years ago: the general field of history, or at least American history, has simply followed the course set out by the subfield of U.S. foreign relations. We can refer to “new” Cold War history, “new” transnational history, or “America in the world,” but it is all “old” for us historians of American foreign relations—or should I dare to say, at risk of provoking frowns of disapproval—diplomatic history. Of course, I will be accused (as I was in that forum) of being a booster of the field, a circus ringmaster who brazenly promotes the “show.” I would like to speak to that criticism—and to show where the study of U.S. foreign relations has gone and is going—while leaving aside the obvious links of diplomatic to military history, because both fields have undergone such change.

It is true that we in our respective fields have been accused of all sorts of scholarly crimes by hordes of critics—“languishing” in the backwater of narrative history, allowing ourselves to be “marginalized” (a term used by Charles Maier over thirty years ago) along the shoreline of state-centric studies as the river of cultural and social history flowed by, sunk hopelessly in our fascination with the Cold War, national security, and bureaucratic intrigues, or chaining ourselves to the William Appleman Williams anchor of revisionism. We have reacted in rage, or with hurt feelings, accusing departments of passing us up in the sea of hires and promotions, denouncing major journals for neglecting us, and howling when the worst occurred and our field was turned over to political science departments. Some of these things did happen, but we were also so busy “self-flagellating” (another favorite descriptor for members of our field) that I long wondered if we should add a thirteenth station of the cross showing John Gaddis being nailed up alongside Christ’s compatriots.

To say that diplomatic historians were dismayed by Maier’s critique and by the ensuing perceptions of neglect by their colleagues in other fields is an understatement, but over the past two decades, they heard the deafening silence of neglect and responded with an outburst of scholarship that has made them champions of the international turn, vigorous proponents of cultural history, and leaders in joining the state with society. Globalization hit the profession, but it had long been the domain of many in the field of American foreign relations, and thus it was an easy jump to leadership. Sure, we did our own navel-gazing when it came to ministerial history, but we have embraced current trends, and if the rest of the profession would just stop, listen and read, they would see that we set many of these trends—not the least of which is bringing into SHAFR (and Diplomatic History) an international (and internationalizing) group of scholars, cultural studies students who otherwise stick to the American Studies Association, and the continued but expanding bulk of national security types. Would I like to see more economics at SHAFR? Of course! Do I think the profession still neglects us? In part, sure! But not only do students love us (think of the packed houses in courses on war, diplomacy, etc.), but historians in general have slowly come to realize that we are the experts on international and transnational affairs.

How can I make such a bold, seemingly unsubstantiated claim? Is this more Zeiler boosterism? Take a look at the SHAFR conference. For years now, program committees have struggled with an immense number of paper and panel proposals, many of them not just from grad students hungry for publicity but from hundreds of scholars “outside” the field of U.S. diplomatic history who see affinities with us. SHAFR’s Membership Committee has actively worked to internationalize the organization. And Diplomatic History has received an ever-greater number of manuscripts (and with an acceptance rate below 16 percent, ranks with the JAH and AHR in stinginess) that engage the transnational, the cultural turn, and other approaches. Yes, the “state” remains prominent, but we now include a broadly defined “state” with new actors: governors as well as presidents; agencies as well as diplomats; global bureaucracies alongside national governments.

We are not perfect. We still don’t use enough non-English sources (although by recognizing the need to do so we acknowledge that the field is flourishing abroad). We could synthesize more in broad paradigms. But it is also important, I believe, for scholars to write on what they like best; any type of history is fine as long as it’s good history. We are great when we write about state interactions and when we uncover the history behind current events; the war on terror and neocon diplomacy have been wonderful for our field in terms of attention.

But I stand by my view that historians of U.S. foreign relations are, in many respects, an advance guard who drive the bandwagon of internationalization that has so captivated the profession. There is reciprocity; our field has increasingly explored American ideas, society, and culture. The story of U.S. diplomatic history rests on its merger with the mainstream, while the mainstream has reached out to us to become more international. So marked are these trends that calls continue to be heard within the halls of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations for changing the name of the journal to reflect its breadth and diversity. Three years ago a SHA CFR panel on the topic attracted nearly every participant at the conference and split on whether to retain the name as Diplomatic History or add on “Transnational” somewhere.

OK, so what? Am I correct in my trumpeting of the
field’s leadership role? If we are studying American foreign relations, then the answer is a resounding “yes.” I know there are many voices among international historians who set the United States in a global context, as one player (and oftentimes not a very important one at that) among many. Think of Matt Connelly’s study of the Algerian independence movement, in which the United States is a figure lurking in the shadows of the Cold War (or consider his second book on population control). Think of Erez Manela’s *The Wilsonian Moment*, in which the president’s ideas catalyzed internationalism but certainly did not drive events and transformations around the world (and consider his second project on smallpox). These are *global* histories, not U.S. histories, yet both scholars are active in SHAFR and have much to say about the U.S. role in the world, the course of America’s rise to dominance and leadership, and the interaction of Washington with people around the world.

We should continue on this path. Much of international history is framed in a U.S. mindset: the issues seemingly begin and end with American people, policies, and/or events. It is a valid criticism, but I think that mindset merely reflects American historians engaging in the process of international history, just as diplomatic historians have embraced, and led the way, in absorbing the cultural turn into the study of U.S. foreign relations. Many of our international historians take Europe as their basis for study, and the United States and Europe have really become the springboards for scholarly forays into the rest of the world. A look through recent issues of *Diplomatic History* confirms this trend; reviews and articles focus on big issues (atomic bombs, war, imperialism, significant dates like 1948, human rights, exceptionalism) but most often, Europeans and Americans share these issues because of their common history and experiences. Language barriers are being overcome as students (mine, certainly) explore the roots and course of Euro-American imperialism in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. I would also point to Anne Westad’s work as exemplary in this regard, although it might be viewed as more “traditional” in its state focus.

Should we really care about how we are perceived? Of course: we need jobs. But we are kidding ourselves if we think we are not relevant. We just need to keep producing great scholarship and keep marketing ourselves. We should continue to reach out for new methods in an interdisciplinary fashion and for new topics (faith and foreign relations, broadly defined, including grand strategy, diplomacy, and issues involving gender, culture, ethnicity, and ideology. It examines U.S. relations in a global and comparative context, and its broad focus appeals to a number of disciplines, including political science, international economics, U.S. history, national security studies, and Latin American, Asian, African, and European studies.”

Thus our field is not restrictive, but it is *American*. I think historians who criticize or ignore the field forget that it is about U.S. history, already very broadly defined by us! In the rush to internationalize, they take potshots at a field that has never pretended to be anything more than the study of American foreign relations, although that includes the totality of American interactions, as Tom Paterson and Dennis Merrill have said, “economic, cultural, political, military, environmental, and more—among peoples, organizations, states, and systems.” In other words, we are doing and have always been doing what the rest of the profession is finally getting around to: studying America in the world.

**The State of U.S. Military History**

Brian McAllister Linn

For this roundtable, I was asked to provide an overview of the state of military history. There are a number of ways to approach this challenge, ranging from collecting an exhaustive amount of data on publications and job hires to a disorganized and rambling summation of my idiosyncratic impressions. I naturally chose the latter.

Let me first define the field in simple terms: military history is the study of armed conflict. A Marxist might argue that history reflects humanity’s relationship to the means of production. A military historian would probably counter that history reflects humanity’s relationship with the means of destruction. Violence, and the threat of violence, has been a prime mover in explaining social change and continuity, cultural interaction, the evolution of government, and the rise and decline of nations and empires.

Military history has been, and still is, essential to understanding not only the past, but also the present. It has been around for a long time—over 2,500 years—and has been perhaps the most multidisciplinary of all historical fields. Military events inspired much of Western literature—the *Iliad*, Shakespeare, innumerable war poets, and such recent Pulitzer Prize winners as Rick Atkinson. The first anthropologists, Herodotus and Tacitus, centered much of their analysis of diverse cultures on how each organized for conflict. Both sociologists and military historians share a common parent in Thucydides’ *The Peloponnesian Wars*. Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, often cited as the foundation of modern political science, argued that a prince’s (or government’s) main concern should be war. The father of modern economics, Adam Smith, wrote extensively on war and debt. Furthermore, military history’s influence extends far beyond the Western intellectual tradition, particularly in literature (Ramayana, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, Héike Monogatari), politics (Kaufiyya, Ssu-ma Chien, Nizam al-Mulik), and culture (Ibn Khaldun). In short, not only is military history the foundation of history, it has inspired and influenced all
the liberal arts. What is the current state of military history? That topic has generated a great deal of discussion within the military history community. The field’s professional organization, the Society for Military History, has roughly 2,400 dues-paying members—a number that has remained consistent for the last five years. As a point of comparison, the AHA has about 14,000. The International Commission on Military History—which has delegations from over forty nations—annually hosts a conference that draws several hundred participants. There are three major English-language journals that publish exclusively in military history and are indicative of the field’s international appeal. War and Society is published in Australia, War in History in Great Britain, and The Journal of Military History is published in the United States. The latter has about 2,400 individual subscribers, averages some 350 pages an issue, received 130 article submissions last year and published 28 articles and 284 book reviews. Beyond that, a simple turn around the book displays at the AHA’s annual meeting will show that military history is among the most popular sub-genres of history.

For several years military history’s relationship with academic history has been the subject of some concern. In the last decade articles in various magazines, including the National Review, New Republic, and U.S. News and World Report, have alleged that military history is being driven out of existence on colleges by political correctness. This view is also prevalent in the blogosphere (witness titles such as “Academia’s Jihad Against Military History”). There have been some excellent articles on the subject of the marginalization of the military history in academia. One article by John Lynn revealed the damning statistic that, barring a few articles on war’s victims, the American Historical Review did not publish a single article specifically on military history for thirty years. But in March 2007 the AHR published an extensive study of the state of the field, and almost simultaneously the Journal of American History published an equally broad article by Wayne Lee. The Historical Society and its excellent journal, Historically Speaking, have had numerous articles and roundtables on military history. And a recent overview of military history on college campuses pointed to recent hires of chaired professors at top-tier universities and argued that military history had begun a slow recovery. The very presence of this panel indicates a change in attitude on both sides.

One important result of the discussion over military history’s place in academia has been that military historians have recognized the diversity of their membership. There is a recognition that the majority of those who define themselves as military historians are not on college faculties. Many teach or conduct research for the armed forces, for the government, or for private think tanks. They are far more engaged with the public, the military community, and the current defense studies analysts than they are with academia. And, to be quite candid, the public, the military, and defense analysts may be more interested in these military historians than in the academics. The participation of military historians in the discussion on national security has increased in recent years for a variety of reasons, the most obvious being the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. But for the last three decades the most significant debates in American defense policy—the Revolution in Military Affairs, military culture, the American way of war, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policy—have been shaped by historical inquiry.

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Beyond the internal and external discussion on the place of military history, what else has characterized the field? One thing I learned in my recent tenure as president of the Society for Military History is that the field is diverse, multidisciplinary, and vibrant.

For almost three decades there was a perceived split in the military history community between “traditionalists” who focused on battles, generals, and military institutions and supporters of the “new” military history who were shaped by the academic turn towards social history and focused on the experience of the common soldier, the impact of religion or ideology, the social composition of armies, the impact of war on civilians, and other socio-cultural topics. However, as Robert Citino and Wayne Lee argued in two recent articles, this longstanding division is no longer relevant. Indeed, in retrospect it was a false dichotomy, much like the purported Realist-Idealist division among scholars of American foreign affairs. Although there are clearly studies that are more operational or more social, scholars freely move between social and organizational research topics and seldom self-define any more as operational or cultural military historians.

In the last decade—in part spurred by the influence of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars—military historians have been drawn, somewhat unwillingly, into the debate over current events. This is particularly true in the case of the American Way of War and the counterinsurgency debates. Military historians have been debating the American Way of War for some time. Some historians interpret a “way of war” very narrowly, as how a nation or a military service conducts wartime operations. Others define it as “military culture” or as the way in which a nation executes military policy. Further complicating the issue, the term “way of war” has been and still is being used to promote current political or military agendas. Certainly there was an agenda attached to the neocon-inspired “New American Way of War” argument that a technologically-inspired military revolution enabled the United States to become the global arbitrator—capable of destroying any opponent rapidly, cheaply, and decisively.

Another topic that historians became intimately involved with as a result of the Iraq-Afghanistan conflicts was counterinsurgency. Historians were asked to define it, to provide case studies, and to determine why the perceived lessons of past conflicts had been ignored. The lead author of the controversial Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual was a Stanford-educated military historian.

Currently, there are three topics that I anticipate will serve to further unite military historians and historians of foreign policy:

1. Transitioning from war to peace and peace to war. Already a crucial issue in the United States armed forces, this is a subject that military historians bring a unique perspective to. At best, historians may provide some guidance for understanding this transition process that will allow our military colleagues, policymakers, and
2. Civil-military relations. This is a huge topic, and I will touch on only two aspects of it that are arousing renewed interest: the militarization of American foreign policy and the interagency process. Despite the pioneering work of scholars such as Richard Challener and William Reynolds Braisted, there has been a tendency by both military and non-military historians to impose a rigid and false division between the military and civilian leadership, to regulate the formulation of policy to civilians and the execution of policy to the military.

3. Military coalitions. We have a real opportunity to have an international dialogue that will explore some of the more vexing questions we have witnessed in recent years. Why do governments and military forces create coalitions? Why do Big Powers seek the aid of smaller, far weaker nations? More important, why do smaller military powers join coalitions? Is it for immediate protection or is it to provide access to the resources—financial, technological, or military—for the dominant partner?

These are only a few of the topics that I see military historians and historians of foreign affairs exploring in the near future. In the meantime, I think that military history is in pretty good shape and will remain so for the next 2,500 years. And if humanity succeeds in blowing itself up, you can be sure that the first historian to explain the how and why will be a military historian.

The Convergence of Military/Diplomatic and Social/Cultural History: The American Experience in World War I

Jennifer D. Keene

In the last two decades social and cultural historians have begun examining the military experience more closely. In the process they have helped to redefine our understanding of internal relations in the military and the international relationships that are formed when armies serve overseas. But what is the value of examining military and diplomatic history “from the bottom up”? Examining the American experience in World War I offers some intriguing answers to this broad question. Exploring the intersections between military and diplomatic history from a social and cultural history perspective also helps reframe the traditional narrative in ways that may help scholars, who are currently eschewing the nationally focused and even the comparative approach in favor of emphasizing the global, understand the conflict better as a world war. It is difficult to write a global history of anything, let alone something as vast and complex as the First World War. The bird’s-eye view, however, is not the only way to globalize the history of the war or to connect military and diplomatic history.

Distinct military and diplomatic goals shaped the American experience of war. Having entered the war late, President Woodrow Wilson wanted the American army to make a visible and independent contribution to the eventual victory, thereby ensuring that the president would have a prominent voice in the peace process. Seeking to demonstrate his own leadership abilities on the battlefield, General John J. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, steadfastly resisted any formal amalgamation of the American army into the Allied forces. In the postwar period both leaders declared that they had met their goals: an independent American army won several pivotal battles, and Wilson played a leading role at the peace conference. In subsequent years these twin “successes” provided the storyline for both the military and diplomatic history of the war. The military history focused on the national story of creating a wartime army from scratch that eventually fought decisively on the Western Front. The diplomatic story recounted Wilson’s activities at the peace conference and the Senate’s failure to ratify the peace treaty.

This was the American version of events. But Americans were not alone in emphasizing their own trials and accomplishments. In writing the history of the First World War, all combatant nations tended to concentrate primarily on their own nation’s goals, experiences, successes, and failures. Yet the experience of armies on the ground suggests a different military and diplomatic storyline, one that focuses on the global and collaborative nature of the war. Looking at how the war was actually fought shifts the focus of the narrative from the national to the international. And once the narrative shifts in this direction, the interactions among the soldiers from different nations become not just interesting side shows but essential elements for understanding the war’s military and diplomatic trajectories.

The American army fought as part of a coalition, and pursuing coalition warfare required a nearly constant diplomatic dialogue between General John J. Pershing and his counterparts in the British and French armies. Coalition warfare also necessitated daily interaction among ground troops. The extent of interaction varied. Some American troops were placed directly under foreign command. These included two divisions that fought under British command and therefore spent the war alongside British, Canadian, and Australian troops. Four African-American regiments were integrated into French divisions for the duration of the war, fighting with French weapons and eating French rations. Multitudes of troops entered the frontlines for their baptism of fire under the tutelage of French and British units. Allied artillery supported many American operations, while billeting in French villages ensured constant contact between U.S. troops and French civilians. Some soldiers spent time receiving instruction from French and British trainers in domestic training camps but never made it overseas.

To keep the whole operation going, the Allies appointed a slew of liaison officers to the American forces. Ostensibly there to offer translation services and technical advice, these liaison officers also provided invaluable intelligence on the training, morale, and deficiencies of American divisions to French and British headquarters. “Spying on your friends” was only one way that French commanders derived valuable information about their American allies. After the 1917 mutinies in the French army, officers began compiling reports that contained excerpts from their troops’ censored letters to assess the state of morale. French soldiers’ views on American troops became an increasingly important part of these reports in the final year of the war. The U.S. army was no less vigilant in using liaison officers and surreptitious assessments of its own soldiers’ opinions as a way to measure the health of the wartime alliance. The Americans relied less on censored letters and more on rudimentary opinion polls and undercover investigators who queried soldiers directly.

For the average soldier, the war was not just an exercise in building an American mass army; it also meant taking part in a larger, collaborative military operation in which foreign supplies, tactics, and strategic goals directly impacted where, how, and when they fought. The battle for the “hearts and minds” of American soldiers continued throughout the war, with their learning curves heavily influenced by the coalition partners they fought alongside. Aware that U.S. troops would return home with firsthand accounts of their interactions with both Allied and German populations, the U.S. army waged a furious internal propaganda campaign to try to shape troops’
views of these foreign peoples. Concerned that a negative view of the French, for example, might adversely influence the fate of the peace treaty, French and American authorities collaborated to send U.S. troops home loaded down with Croix de guerre and fresh memories of visiting picturesque resorts in southern France.7 Two other examples that reinforce how exploring the intersections between military, diplomatic, and social history help internationalize our approach to the American wartime experience involve the experiences of African American soldiers and the handling of American war dead. African-American civil rights activists took the lead in placing the American experience in a global perspective. The disjunction between Wilson’s call for the war to spread democracy and the reality of racial discrimination at home became central to the wartime civil rights crusade.8 Activists repeatedly compared the French, who employed African colonial troops in combat, and the Americans, who preferred to use black soldiers as laborers, in order to portray American racial practices as out of step with those of other civilized powers. The re-uniting of members of the black diaspora in France gave rise to Pan-Africanism, a transnational movement that envisioned challenging the global color line collectively. And finally, civil rights activists viewed every African American soldier as an ambassador abroad—a role that many black troops enthusiastically embraced. Putting their best foot forward, preventing American racial practices from spreading overseas, creating a foothold in Paris for a future expatriate community—all these activities impacted diplomatic relations between the United States and France. Indeed, the perception of France as a racially tolerant society (well publicized by German propagandists after the war) became one more reason for many white Americans to reject the idea of a formal defense treaty between the two nations.9 With postwar relations fraying between the United States and France, keeping American war dead buried on French soil became even more important to France. Retaining this symbolic link was seen as a way to ensure that cultural contact continued, contact that reaffirmed the shared wartime sacrifice.10 Most American war dead were brought home at the request of grieving families, but pilgrimages to gravesites in newly constructed overseas cemeteries and battlefield tourism became a critical part of a postwar diplomatic environment in which private American citizens played a crucial role in maintaining cultural contacts with Europe.

Examining military and diplomatic history “from the bottom up” in the case of the First World War is not just an exercise in trying to tell the complete story. Instead, it is an approach that allows—or even demands—a reframing of the traditional narrative. The above examples illustrate how this approach immediately internationalizes the American experience of war by emphasizing coalition warfare and thus furthers our appreciation of the First World War as a global event. In these ways, the subfields of military and diplomatic history converge with social and cultural history to reshape our understanding of the American experience of war dramatically.

Notes:
1. Pershing took the lead in establishing this interpretative school of thought with his two-volume autobiography, My Experiences in the World War (New York, 1931). This memoir championed Pershing’s tenacity in overcoming Allied resistance to build an independent army that, after a few trials by fire, evolved into a first-rate fighting force that played a critical role in winning the war. Historians such as Harvey A. DeWeerd, President Wilson Fights His War: World War I and the American Intervention (New York, 1968) and Edward Coffman, The War

To End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New York, 1968) added some qualifications to this tale of glowing success, but it wasn’t until the 1970s and 1980s that revisionist scholars began to fully attack the Pershing narrative. James W. Rainey, Timothy K. Nenninger, Donald Smythe, and Paul Braim instead portrayed the AEF as a poorly trained, led, supplied and deployed force whose slow improvements over time did not excurse the initial mistakes made by AEF commanders. Despite the more critical view of Pershing, the focus remained on telling the national story.

2. Diplomatic historians have scrutinized Wilson’s inability to prevail over his opponents both overseas and at home. The literature is vast, but useful accounts include Thomas R. Pickering, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992) and John Milton Cooper, Jr., Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (Cambridge, MA, 2001).

3. David Trask, The AE.F and Coalition Warmaking, 1917–1918 (Lawrence, KS, 1993), pioneered this approach to understanding the war.


5. Mark E. Grotelueschen, The AE.F Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I (Cambridge, MA, 2006) and Edward G. Longell, To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918 (New York, 2008) move the spotlight away from top-level leadership and instead focus on the learning curve underway within divisions and companies among the officers and men directly involved in the fighting. Rather than painting the British and French as corrupting forces within the AEF, these two emphasize how commanders and men adapted their methods of fighting based on actual combat experiences and interaction with Allied instructors and liaisons. Robert B. Bruce, in A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War (Lawrence, KS, 2003), traces the close coordination between the American and French armies along the Western Front.


Diplomatic-Military History Roundtable Comments

Phyllis L. Soucel

When I was a little girl, my dad was busy establishing a medical practice in Waltham, Massachusetts. On his free Saturdays or Sundays, my family might do something together (we lived in Lexington, a very historic part of the country), but if my dad was on call, he would stay home and read or watch old movies. Those of you who are thirty-five or older may remember the limited station choices we had. Inevitably, the movies that caught my dad’s attention were the war movies he had grown up with. In order to spend time with
my dad, I found myself watching them with him. Over a number of Saturdays and Sundays, I watched John Wayne escape from the inescapable, and Robert Mitchum tell a jeep driver to run him up the hill to go after more Germans. Thus began my interest in—indeed, it was almost a love affair with— the Second World War.

My interest in diplomatic history probably started with a strange episode one Saturday when a Bugs Bunny cartoon was interrupted by some really old guys signing lots of papers. Since it was a cold day outside and I had no book to read (and again, only three major channels and four independent ones), I continued to watch, fascinated, as these old guys signed their papers. It turns out I was watching the signing of the Paris Peace Accords that ended U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

When I began my graduate career I still found the WWII era fascinating, and I tried to find a way to marry my military (particularly naval) interest with the scholarship needed to make something of myself in my profession. That search brought me to the second passion of my adult scholarly life: diplomatic history. I had been interested in the Great Britain of the early twentieth century, and I became intrigued by the increasing weakness of a great power and its seemingly immediate replacement by another great power. Hence, I arrived at what has been my scholarly interest (and passion for twenty years), Anglo-American relations in the twentieth century with a specific interest in the wartime era, 1939–1945.

As you can see, my field is a perfect match for this panel: I must study the various angles involved in military/naval considerations and see how they affect the diplomatic considerations of both wartime exigencies and postwar interests. The war for me is a catalyst for various ways of looking at the United States pursued traditional great power politics and supplanted a waning British imperial presence—a presence that had enabled Great Britain to dominate global and European politics for over 150 years.

As with the WWI-era Supreme Command structure, certain areas were heavily controlled by each country—especially intelligence. For the two countries, sovereignty trumped alliance, and consequently the Allied Command structure was cumbersome, unwieldy and fraught with suspicion. The result was certainly predictable, especially after the Germans showed how very differently they were fighting this war than the last. The Sheridan Press

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Once the problems with the Command structure became clear, the truly interesting question (particularly for a military/diplomatic historian) became “How did the Americans and the British manage to avoid this pitfall, this common trap of coalitions?” In my work, the intersection of the diplomatic with the military/naval is of course apparent. To study coalitions of any kind, one must examine political expediency and social and cultural norms as well as military considerations. In looking at Anglo-American cooperation, we must also add necessity. Coalitions oftentimes discovered too late how necessary they were. For instance, during the Revolutionary/Napoleonic period, it took the British, Austrians, Prussians and Russians nearly twenty-five years to discover that they all had to work together to defeat the French. The Anglo-American alliance was seen as necessary even before the United States was actually at war. The meeting at Placentia Bay in 1941 included military representatives who held preliminary conversations about how they would cooperate in case the United States and the British found themselves engaged against a common enemy.

While the British and French discussed cooperation in April 1939, the best they could do was a recreation of the 1914 structure. The United States and the British included intelligence in their conversations to an extent not really seen with the Anglo-French effort two years earlier. The rest, as they say, is history. We know the Americans and British created an extraordinary partnership in wartime, even though a common language at times divided them (my apologies to Mr. Wilde).

For me, two elements of this partnership stood out. The wartime cooperation, which was of necessity based upon
truly common goals, was remarkable in its complexity; and the degree to which the two countries were militarily intertwined in the North African and European theaters (far less so in the Pacific) was exceptional. This realization then led to more recent research, which has looked at the degree to which the military necessities of fighting the war hid the traditional power politics played by both nations in their diplomatic dealings with each other and with other countries or regions. For instance, the relationship glossed over very competitive instincts in places like Greece and India. Both of these countries were seen as traditional British spheres of influence; yet the United States had been trying to make inroads, certainly in Greece, for the previous twenty to thirty years. In both cases, the United States utilized wartime exigencies to carve out (or at least attempt to carve out) a postwar place for itself.

In the end, I think the connection or interrelation of both traditional interpretations (the diplomatic and the military/naval) adds a dimension to the history of this era that yields truly rich results: results we would miss in the context of the American position in the world today.

**Commentary**

*Mark Stoler*

There are two separated yet related issues for me to deal with in this roundtable: the state of the two fields of military and diplomatic history and the present degree of confluence between the two of them. The first issue has been more than adequately dealt with by our four panelists. In a nutshell, and to paraphrase Mark Twain, rumors of our death have been greatly exaggerated. In truth these two fields are flourishing—both in terms of broad, award-winning scholarship and in terms of student and public appeal as both our courses and our public lectures consistently fill the lecture halls. SHAFR, which began as a tiny organization less than 45 years ago, now has over 1,500 members and is doing so well financially that a few years ago it was in danger of losing its tax-exempt status! The Society for Military History (SMH) is even larger, with approximately 2,500 members, and is somewhat older; it began under a different name in 1933 and adopted its present name in 1990. Both societies have scholarly journals of very high quality that would be (and probably are) the envy of other historical fields. And both have for many years been incorporating newer trends in the profession into their scholarship. Indeed, as Brian Linn pointed out, military history may be the oldest and most multidisciplinary of all fields. And as Tom Zeiler has noted, the “new” Cold War, transnational, and international histories are old hat to diplomatic historians, who in turn have made their own “cultural turn” in recent years and connected with other fields of history.

The comments by Jennifer Keene and Phyllis Soybel vividly illustrate these facts. Indeed, the only arenas in which diplomatic and military have not flourished have been in academic hiring and in the journals and at the annual conferences of large historical organizations, where visibility has been a problem for both fields. That is quite a change from the past, when diplomatic and military history were dominant. Can you imagine an army chief of staff addressing the AHA today, as George C. Marshall did in 1939, and drawing an audience of over 1,000 people (and lecturing them as well on their shortcomings as history teachers)? Yet even here there are signs of a turnaround, as witnessed by important recent academic hiring in both fields and by two events at the 2012 AHA conference: this roundtable and the George C. Marshall lecture by Andrew Bacevich, which I encourage all of you to read.

In all likelihood, this turnaround is at least partially the result of the changed international environment since the demise over the past decade of the euphoria of the late 1980s and early 1990s that accompanied the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those events led many to believe they were witnessing the end of significant international conflict or, in Francis Fukuyama’s famous words, “The End of History.” Samuel Huntington wrote in 1996 that during this time the president of “arguably the world’s leading university” (presumably his own, Harvard) had “vetoed appointment of a professor of security studies because the need had disappeared.””Hallelujah! We study war no more because war is no more.”

As for the second issue, the confluence between diplomatic and military history, when I began my graduate work in history in the mid-1960s, both were very strong fields but they were also quite separate, with different professors, courses and historiography. From the start I found this separation to be artificial and tried to fuse the two in my own scholarship by exploring the foreign policy views of military officers and their impact on U.S. strategy and foreign policy during World War II. One reason I may have been successful in getting that scholarship published is how rare this fusion was in the historical profession forty years ago (indeed, one of the pioneers in the fusion, Bernard Brodie, was in political science rather than history, as was the field itself originally as “national security studies”). I also made sure I belonged to both the SMH and SHAFR, eventually served on both councils, and even entitled my 2004 SHAFR presidential address “War and Diplomacy: or, Clausewitz for Diplomatic Historians.”

Over the last four decades the number of us who fuse the two fields has gradually expanded. Brian and Tom fuse them in much of their scholarship, and Brian has accurately noted three topics that he anticipates will further unite historians in the two fields: transitioning from war to peace and peace to war; civil-military relations; and military coalitions. Jennifer Keene’s and Phyllis Soybel’s comments are excellent examples of some of the recent scholarship being produced in these areas that further fuse the two fields—and others as well. Jennifer’s work fuses military history with diplomatic history from a “bottom up” cultural and transnational perspective for World War I. I can reference one sidelight to her point about the impact of billeting U.S. soldiers in French villages. George Marshall in September 1944 asked General George S. Patton to check (“When you have nothing else to do except invade Germany”) on Madame Jouatte, in whose home he had been billeted during WW I. He also paid her a surprise visit in 1948, when he was secretary of state. On that same trip he took his wife Katherine to a recently constructed cemetery to view the grave of her son (and his stepson) Alan Tupper Brown, who had been killed in the Italian campaign during WW II. In light of the fact that the cemetery was in a “state of reconstruction,” he then took the “precaution,” as he touchingly informed Alan’s widow, of making sure Katherine saw two older and “unusually beautiful” World War I cemeteries in France (Belleau Woods and Romagne) to show her how the much newer cemetery with her son’s grave would eventually look.

Phyllis also fuses diplomatic with military/naval history in her work, albeit with a focus on the development of the Anglo-American “special relationship” and coalition warfare during World War II. And she does so by researching in one of the most exciting recent additions to both fields: intelligence and intelligence sharing—a field that has exploded since the revelations of the 1970s.
and 1980s regarding the so-called Ultra Secret. As she notes, World War I had given the Americans a lesson on how not to fight a coalition war, a lesson they and the British took to heart as they developed their diplomatic and military collaboration even before the outbreak of World War II. The failure of the 1939–1940 Anglo-French coalition provided another such lesson. Consequently the British and the Americans included intelligence sharing in their 1941 conversations. That sharing dramatically expanded after Pearl Harbor. It included the formation of a Combined Intelligence Committee within the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff organization and the exchange of personnel as well as information, the entire effort culminating in the 1943 BRUSA accord. As Bradley Smith has noted, such cooperation was unprecedented in warfare, and it both cemented their relationship and virtually guaranteed its continuation after the war; for any end to the “special relationship” would henceforth compromise the security of both nations. 8

The excellent comments by our panelists should not lead anyone to the incorrect conclusion that the two fields of diplomatic and military history are becoming one. They maintain very distinct identities, as they should, with some very different focal points. But that should not stop SHAFR and SMH members from “crossing over” and combining the two when appropriate, as all five of us have done; or from doing so using new trends in historical study in general, as Jennifer and Phyllis have done. We should also, for that matter, collaborate with members of the Peace History Society as well. Indeed, I urge all of you to do as I have done and join all three associations—for how can war, diplomacy and peace be separated?

SHAFR Job Search Workshop

To help better prepare our graduate student membership for the job market, SHAFR will host a hands-on job search workshop on Friday, June 21 from 7:00-9:00am during the 2013 SHAFR conference in Arlington, Virginia. Students will have the opportunity to receive individualized feedback on their cover letters and CVs, whether for academic jobs or those outside of the academy. At the workshop, each participant will be paired with recently hired and more senior scholars for one-on-one conversations about their materials. Graduate students (and newly minted Ph.D.s) must express their interest in participating in the workshop, indicate whether they anticipate applying for jobs in or out of the academy, and attach a Word version of their cover letter and CV to jobworkshop@shafr.org no later than February 15, 2013. Those wishing to participate should apply early as space will be limited.

Notes:
3. See in particular my Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000).
The Historical Advisory Committee to the Department of State (HAC) embraces two principal responsibilities. First, it oversees the preparation and timely publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Second, it promotes public access to records that are 25 or more years older than the date of issue. The Foreign Relations Statute of 1991 (Public Law 102-138 [105 Stat. 647, codified in relevant part at 22 U.S.C. § 4351 et seq.]) mandates these responsibilities. It calls for a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of United States foreign policy. That statute evolved from the public controversy precipitated by the Foreign Relations volumes published in 1983 and 1989 that covered the events surrounding U.S. interventions in Guatemala in 1954 and in Iran in 1953, respectively. Both volumes omitted documentation on U.S. covert activities that either was not made available to the Office of the Historian (HO) researchers or was not cleared for publication. Knowledgeable scholars rightly criticized the two volumes for falling short of the standard of accuracy and thoroughness, dealing a serious blow to the series’ credibility and stature.

More than two decades have passed since the Foreign Relations Statute of 1991 became law. During that time, HO has conscientiously strove to compile volumes that are as “thorough, reliable, and accurate” as possible. The HAC appreciates that this standard is a challenging and complex one for the HO to meet in view of the explosion of important government documents pertaining to foreign relations produced by a wide spectrum of departments and agencies during the 1960s and later decades, and in view of the parallel requirement that volumes be published no later than 30 years after the events they document. HO has struggled to meet these complementary obligations, finding much greater success in achieving the quality objective than in achieving the goal of timeliness. Notwithstanding HO’s commendable efforts over the past year, the gap between its publication of the Foreign Relations volumes and the 30-year target remains substantial.

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute also mandates that the HAC monitor and advise on the declassification and opening of the Department of State’s records, which in large measure involves the Department’s implementation of the operative Executive Order governing the classification and declassification of government records. E.O. 13526, issued in December 2009, which supplanted E.O. 12958, issued in 1995 and amended in 2003 by E.O. 13292, mandates the declassification of records over 25 years old—unless valid and compelling reasons could be specified for not releasing them.

Publications of the Foreign Relations Series

During 2011, the Office of the Historian published seven volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. These are:


This is one more volume published than last year’s number, which doubled the 2009 total. Some nineteen additional volumes, moreover, are currently compiled and undergoing declassification. This progress reflects the stabilization of HO following several years of managerial disruption and internal tumult. The office is finally once again fully staffed and is benefiting from the appointment of an Assistant to the General Editor, a fourth Foreign Relations division chief, and a Joint (State-CIA) Historian. All the “orphan” volumes left unfinished by departed staff have been assigned to current staff. HO has formulated a more coherent plan for reviewing compiled volumes, and it is addressing the bottleneck at the editing end. With the appointment of Stephen Randolph as General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, HO’s new leadership has been superb, elevating morale and intensifying throughout the office a determination to fulfill its statutory responsibilities.

The HAC congratulates HO on these achievements. It likewise applauds the new effort to digitize and make available on the office’s website all Foreign Relations volumes dating to 1861. Nevertheless, it recognizes the need for greater and more accelerated progress in the future. Despite improved publication processes and strategies and a rebuilt and increasingly more experienced staff, HO has been unable to meet the target of publishing eight volumes per year that it set for itself in 2009. More fundamentally, it has not met the 30-year publication requirement for any of the twenty-eight volumes that will document the Carter years, and the Reagan years, on which work has only recently begun, will present even greater challenges. Therefore, while commending the HO for its efforts, HAC is not optimistic that the series can be brought into compliance with the 30-year statutory requirement in the near future.

The Challenge of the 30-Year Requirement

The HAC is acutely aware of the challenges to publishing the Foreign Relations volumes in a sufficiently timely manner. The most salient obstacle, ironically, stems
from the 1991 legislation. That statute, and a subsequent memorandum of understanding between the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, mandated and greatly facilitated research in intelligence files and the incorporation of intelligence documentation in Foreign Relations volumes. A State-CIA-NSC committee established in the late 1990s, the “High-Level Panel” (HLP), provides guidelines for the publication in the Foreign Relations series of documentation relating to covert actions and other sensitive intelligence activities that had a major impact on U.S. foreign policy. That more than 40 covert intelligence activities have now been acknowledged for publication in the series is evidence of the success of the HLP. Because the Foreign Relations series serves as the primary venue for publishing documentation on the role of intelligence activities in U.S. foreign relations, it has become renowned internationally for its openness. This universal acclaim has well served America’s national interest.

This invaluable barometer of openness has, however, created substantial delays in the declassification and publication processes. HO estimates that any Foreign Relations volume with an HLP issue (CIA, we must emphasize, is but one of multiple agencies with equities in sensitive intelligence-related issues) will spend at least one additional year, and often many more than one, in the declassification pipeline than will a volume which does not contain an intelligence issue requiring consideration, the drafting of guidelines, and clearance by that inter-agency panel. Appealing negative decisions about documents is a time-consuming process. On occasion, moreover, the CIA has reclassified documents that it judges were improperly released previously, and it resolutely resists declassifying documents that entered the public domain through irregular channels. These documents are widely known to scholars, and thus CIA’s policy presents a special challenge for the HO to publish volumes that meet the standard of a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of United States foreign policy.

The failure of agencies to meet the 120-day deadline, set by statute, for reviewing documents chosen for inclusion in Foreign Relations volumes has exacerbated this problem. Along with CIA, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Justice, the National Security Council, and other government organs have been delinquent in the past. The HAC is encouraged by recent evidence of improvement. Seemingly small measures, such as regular informal meetings between the HO and CIA, more frequent contact with DoD, and the assistance provided by Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), have had salutary effects. Still, the time and effort required to gain release of documents deemed vital to producing a thorough, accurate, and reliable history of U.S. foreign relations continues to constitute a serious roadblock to publication.

These issues intensify the challenge of hastening publication of the Carter and Reagan administration volumes. HO estimates that at least half of the Carter volumes will require resolution of HLP issues; the Reagan administration records at the Reagan Presidential Library contain approximately 8.5 million classified pages. Juxtaposed with the exploding number of all documents generated during this era, HO will continue to struggle to meet the 30-year target for publication.

Declassification Issues and the Transfer of Department of State Records to the National Archives

During 2011, the committee continued to review the State Department’s classification guidelines and to monitor the application of those guidelines to further the declassification process. It also monitored the transfer of the Department’s records—electronic as well as paper—to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). It notes with concern that notwithstanding the outstanding efforts of the Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS), the Department’s Systematic Review Program was unable to achieve its annual goal of completing the declassification review of 25-year old records. Further, the transfer of records is trending toward a 35-year line rather than the 30-year target, and making these records available to researchers takes even longer. The HAC appreciates the challenges of understaffing, particularly at NARA, and the increased volume of documents, but it stresses that solutions must be developed.

The HAC will continue to engage extensively with IPS, NARA, ISOO, and National Declassification Center personnel to identify problems, particularly those concerning electronic records and the still-substantial backlog of documents needing declassification, and to thrash out solutions. It will also continue to meet with representatives of the Office of Presidential Libraries to discuss its declassification efforts. The HAC strongly supports the collective efforts of the able staff members of these offices to promote a more rational and streamlined approach to the declassification and accessibility of governmental records pertaining to foreign affairs.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The HAC is convinced that HO can and must address its statutory responsibilities to comply with the 30-year requirement to publish the Foreign Relations series. Eighteen volumes from the Nixon-Ford years remain unpublished, only about half of the 28 projected volumes from the Carter administration have at present been compiled, and the research and compilation has begun on only 11 of the projected 46 Reagan volumes (scaled down from 56). That in 2011 HO completed the declassification of 10 volumes signals commendable improvement. Yet the time required for declassification and publication is a minimum of two years.

The HAC is working closely with HO to accelerate the rate of publication. Management has embraced the committee’s recommendation that staff adhere to a two-year ceiling on the time required to compile a volume, and that the office focus its attention on those aspects of the process over which HO can exercise control. These aspects include greater adherence to page limits when initially compiling a volume, and measures that expedite the compiling, review, and declassification of the volume. The HAC has also supported management’s initiatives to improve oversight, integration, and quality control, and to formulate a more effective procedure for identifying an HLP issue and streamlining the HLP process. On a parallel track, the HAC and HO management are in frequent dialogue in an effort to arrive at a consensus judgment about when a volume meets the standard of “thorough, accurate, and reliable,” notwithstanding the continued classification of some documents. In such
instances the HAC encourages HO to take advantage of online publication and carefully crafted editorial disclaimers.

The HAC appreciates HO’s commitment and capabilities. It is also confident that the anticipated move to a more secure and expansive facility on Navy Hill in 2013 will improve efficiency. Although in the short term reaching the 30-year line of publication remains out of reach, by making that achievement its highest priority, the Office of the Historian should be able to do so by the end of the decade.

Richard H. Immerman  
*Chair, Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

Committee Members:

Laura Belmonte  
Trudy Huskamp Peterson  
James McAllister  
Robert McMahon  
Katherine Sibley  
Peter Spiro  
Thomas Zeiler

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**In the Next Issue of *Passport***:

- Roundtable on the Nixon administration and the Vietnam War
- Roundtable on Matthew Jacobs, *Imagining the Middle East*
- Report on the 2012 SHAFR Summer Institute

and more...
The Foreign Relations Series: A Sesquicentennial Estimate

Stephen P. Randolph and Kristin L. Ahlberg

The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, published by the Department of State since 1861, is currently in the midst of a positive, exciting transition. The Department’s Office of the Historian is witness to a time of great opportunity related to a number of factors: the recruitment, hiring, and training of a new generation of historians; an increasingly rich and complex historical record; and the harnessing of technologies certain to revolutionize the series. These factors will all improve the office’s ability to fulfill its mission of compiling a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary history of U.S. foreign relations while meeting the increasingly demanding thirty-year timeline defined in the law.

Personnel and Infrastructure

For the first time in years, the Office of the Historian is at full strength, with a reconstructed core of compilers and a full management team. Last summer, the office reorganized to build a new division and to add a special assistant to the general editor, with two goals in mind: to ensure adequate supervision of the newly arrived historians and to conduct timely reviews of the volumes after their compilation.

This new generation of compilers, an almost equal blend of historians of U.S. foreign relations and area specialists, has brought a new energy to the Foreign Relations series. Many staff historians specialize in the global themes ascendant during the second half of the Cold War, making them ideally suited to shape the structure and content of the Reagan-era Foreign Relations volumes and beyond, just as an earlier generation of department historians had formulated a plan for the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administration volumes. Historians conceptualized volumes along “core,” “crisis,” and “context” lines. “Core” volumes included documentation on the Vietnam war, the Soviet Union, China, national security policy, foreign economic policy, and the intellectual foundations of U.S. foreign policy. “Crisis” volumes focused on the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, 1971 developments in South Asia, and the Iranian hostage crisis. Traditional regional and bilateral relations, as well as emerging global issues such as hunger, terrorism, human rights, women’s issues, the environment, and space policy, comprised the “context” volumes. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter subseries were designed in this way to emphasize the changing nature of the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in an increasingly interdependent global environment. The office also set the number of volumes compiled for the Nixon-Ford administrations at fifty-six (the Johnson administration had thirty-four) to account for the projected explosion in documentation beginning in the Nixon period. Fewer volumes were planned for the Carter years, but the Carter volumes conformed to the basic organizing principles for both the Nixon and Ford subseries. New crises substituted for old ones, and coverage of certain core topics was condensed to allow for expanded coverage in the form of context volumes.

When planning began in 2007 for the Reagan administration subseries, the office had to balance the demands of fully documenting an eight-year administration and researching and publishing the volumes within a reasonable amount of time. The office conducted a series of planning efforts, in collaboration with the Historical Advisory Committee, seeking the right balance between these competing requirements. In 2011, the office set the number of Reagan volumes at forty-six, and historians began researching the first Reagan volumes during that year. Our compilers are now about equally divided in their work between the Carter and Reagan subseries, and we expect to begin work on the first Bush administration volumes within two years.

The Nature of the Historical Record

Research for the series has evolved concurrently with the reconceptualization of the Foreign Relations volumes because of both the format of the historical record and its archival preservation. Beginning with the Lyndon B. Johnson subseries, historians had to take the White House taping system into account. Many of the Johnson and virtually all of the Nixon administration volumes include transcripts of White House tapes, which took hours to review, transcribe, and re-review. The Nixon administration also marked the transition in the
Department of State from cataloging telecommunications and papers within the Subject-Numeric Central File to the Central Foreign Policy File’s (CFPF) Automated Data System (ADS), a “hybrid recordkeeping system.” The ADS included electronic texts of department telegrams, computer-output microfilm (COM) of these telegrams, microfilmed versions of paper documents (P-reels), and some paper files of bulky items. Beginning in July 1973, the department began preserving both the computer-output microfilm telegrams (D-reels) and electronic telegrams and in January 1974 began microfilming paper copies of memoranda. To facilitate access to this archival record, the department devised the Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject (TAGS)/Terms system, a method of searching within ADS consisting of four-letter abbreviations (TAGS) and words/phrases (terms), which, combined with other metadata about the documents, comprised an electronic index within the ADS. In the 1990s, the department changed the name of the system to the State Archiving System (SAS) and upgraded its electronic search capability, but the SAS retained the basic components of the ADS. Starting with the 1973–1976 subs series, historians began using the SAS to examine the full text of digital telegrams and obtain the P-reel citations required for microfilm research. The ADS and its successors are now changing the way in which the public obtains access to the CFPF. The Access to Archival Database (AAD) of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) allows researchers access to the declassified telegrams and indexes of hard copy documents contained within the CFPF. The Department of State transfers these materials to NARA after the documentation undergoes a twenty-five-year declassification review as mandated by Executive Order 13526.

While the format and the organization of the Ford and Carter documentation did not differ substantially from that of the Nixon administration (with the exception of the White House tapes), the office for the first time used the Remote Archives Capture (RAC) electronic system locally in order to obtain copies of Carter presidential documents. The RAC, established in 1996 and sponsored by NARA’s Office of Presidential Libraries and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), makes it possible to scan classified presidential records held at the presidential libraries to facilitate declassification review of these materials in Washington. The RAC proved to be somewhat of a mixed blessing for department historians: on the one hand, it allowed them to conduct much of their classified research in Washington and devote more time to examining open records held at the Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia; on the other, organization of these materials in the RAC complicated accurate identification of a document’s provenance and often resulted in attachments to the paper documents ending up as separate documents within the system. Ultimately, however, conducting research in the RAC has been most effective as a supplement to research at the Carter Library.

Researching the Reagan administration has posed new challenges for the Foreign Relations series. The classified foreign policy record of the Reagan administration is easily three and a half times that of the Nixon administration (there are approximately 8.5 million pages of classified documents for 1981–1989). In addition, the organization of the National Security File (NSF) for the second Reagan term is substantially different from that of the NSF for predecessor administrations as well as for Reagan’s first term. In 1985, the administration established a new filing system based on system file numbers rather than subject headings. The recordkeeping of the second half of the Reagan administration is also punctuated by the use of e-mail (Professional Office Email, known as the PROFS system), which will require the office to consider how electronic communications will be treated within the series. Finally, the office had to consult the extensive and relevant Bush vice presidential records for possible inclusion in the series.

To meet these challenges the office first negotiated an agreement with NARA to allow for the use of a subvention at the Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, in order to copy documents selected by historians during their research trips. Subsequently, the office negotiated a separate agreement under the Presidential Records Act to access the Bush vice presidential records at the George H.W. Bush Library in College Station, Texas. In late March 2012, the office sent three of its most experienced compiling historians to the Bush Presidential Library to conduct team research in the vice presidential materials to obviate the need for each compiler to undertake individual research in these collections.

Declas sification Challenges

Under the 1991 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (22 U.S.C. 4351 et. seq.), all documents selected for inclusion in the Foreign Relations series must be submitted to the originating agency for declassification review. The principle guiding declassification reviews mandates that all information be released subject only to current requirements of national security. The law stipulated that each agency would have 120 days to complete its reviews. In addition, if the office determined that any deletions could be misleading or lead to an inaccurate or incomplete historical record, the office could propose steps to resolve the impasse. During the early 1990s, many agencies did not meet the 120-day declassification review schedule. However, delays are now rare.

The 1991 statute also permitted department historians to collect sensitive intelligence information dealing with covert activities. However, the law’s provisions with respect to declassification failed to account for the unique nature of such documentation. Efforts to document key covert actions in the Foreign Relations series during the first several years after enactment of the law were stymied by the agencies holding equities in the documents, which refused to declassify the documentation on the grounds that a political decision had to be made before any information could be released. In 1997, the Department of State, CIA, and National Security Council (NSC) established a High Level Panel (HLP) consisting of high-level representatives of those agencies to acknowledge officially for publication in the Foreign Relations series historical covert actions and other sensitive intelligence information. The HLP went into effect in 1998.

Because the law did not account for a process for acknowledging covert actions in advance of declassification, the HLP mechanism has proven to be protracted and often delays declassification of volumes by two years or more. However, since its establishment, the HLP has acknowledged 43 major, separate covert actions in 34 Foreign Relations volumes, including three retrospective volumes.

The Reagan administration employed a range of covert operations as a major instrument of foreign policy, and the challenges of declassifying these operations pose a significant issue for the office. In the past months, we have undertaken a thorough review of the processes by which we decide on our approach to declassification and the criteria we use in those decisions. We have also reached out to our colleagues in the interagency community to find means of facilitating the review and decision making in these matters. This will be an issue for the office through the foreseeable future.
Publishing

Beginning in the mid-1990s, the office opted to make electronic versions of hardcover Foreign Relations volumes available to the public and began posting HTML versions of many of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon volumes on its website. In terms of format, these volumes bore little resemblance to their print counterparts. At the same time, the office leadership recognized that it would be difficult to produce print Foreign Relations volumes within the timeframe specified by the 1991 statute. Therefore, the office determined that a percentage of the Nixon volumes (and volumes proposed for future subseries) would be compiled and published as electronic-only volumes. These volumes would consist of a document list, document summaries, minimal annotation, and PDFs. Electronic-only volumes would comply with the terms of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), allow for downloading and keyword searching, and contain a wider array of documentation than a print volume.

The office posted the first two “e-pubs”—Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972 and Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972—on its website in June and September 2005, respectively. Since 2005, the office has made a variety of technological improvements in the publishing process that have allowed for greater refinement and flexibility. Electronic publications are now compiled in the same way as print volumes, substituting detailed annotation for document summaries. The electronic-only versions also visually mirror the print volumes in terms of layout. Print volumes continue to be published on the website as downloadable PDFs of the hardbound book. Additionally, the office has been engaged in a digitization project that will enable the posting on the website of all Foreign Relations volumes dating back to 1861. The office has posted some of the Truman and Eisenhower administration volumes, as well as all of the published Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford volumes. Earlier volumes are available digitally on the University of Wisconsin’s Digital Collections website.

A significant revamping of the office’s website, completed in 2009, has revolutionized the way the public uses these volumes. The website allows for full-text keyword searches both within individual volumes and across the series, in addition to providing information about the history of U.S. foreign policy and the Department of State. Users can now be notified instantly about new publications by subscribing to the office’s feed. The website also exposes the series as raw data to data.gov, in fulfillment of the Obama administration’s Open Government Directive.

In order to improve the efficiency of the website, the office moved to a faster, cloud-based server, in keeping with the administration’s “Cloud First” policy. The most exciting initiative is the office’s decision to make Foreign Relations volumes available through e-reader devices such as the Amazon Kindle, Barnes and Noble Nook, and Apple I-Pad. The historians responsible for the continued refinement of the website undertook this initiative during 2011; the pilot project placed five Foreign Relations titles on the website for downloading. Currently, twenty-six volumes—still in beta stage—are available on the website (www.history.state.gov), covering the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations. The office is also using Twitter to alert the public of Foreign Relations volume releases, conferences, and other upcoming events.

Looking Back While Looking Forward

Last year marked the sesquicentennial of the publication of the first Foreign Relations volume. To commemorate this event, the office leadership supported a major research initiative into the origins of the series, how it has responded to various crises, and how it has evolved over time. Under the direction of the chief of the Special Projects Division, several historians conducted research in numerous collections at NARA and the Library of Congress, as well as in personal papers held at Reed College and the University of Oregon, with the goal of producing a comprehensively researched and engaging book-length study that will serve as the definitive history of the Foreign Relations series. Concurrently, historians drafted a series of twenty-three short research articles, posted to the website, that detail the public debates surrounding the series in relation to the Civil War, the Lansing Papers, the 1957 establishment of the HAC, and the 1991 FRUS statute, among other topics.

Historians also undertook an ambitious public outreach program in 2011 that has carried over into 2012. In conjunction with the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, the office hosted two public presentations, one on government secrecy and another on aspects of the Nixon administration volume covering the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). Recently, the office and Williams College partnered to host a conference focused on the SALT I volume and the Nixon administration National Security Policy volume. Historians also gave presentations about the series and the sesquicentennial at the New York Public Library, the Government Printing Office, and the Lincoln Cottage. More detailed information about these events, as well as several brief posts to the Department’s “Dipnote” blog, is available at www.history.state.gov/frus150.

The Office of the Historian remains firmly committed to the editorial precepts outlined by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg in 1925 and the spirit of the 1991 statute that requires us to produce a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of significant diplomatic events. We are in a time of visible change in the office, and all the various aspects of that change—in our structure, personnel, facilities, processes, and technology—lead us to expect a bright future for the full range of our activities.

Notes:
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for panels and individual papers at its annual conference to be held June 20-22, 2013 at the Renaissance Arlington Capital View Hotel in Arlington, Virginia. Proposals must be submitted via the on-line interface at http://www.shafr.org/conferences/2013-annual-meeting/ by December 1, 2012 in order to receive full consideration.

From its birth, the United States has been enmeshed in currents of global change. From the beginnings of the Columbian Exchange, to the wars of the British and French empires, to the two world wars, to the emergence of the postcolonial world and the era of “globalization,” transnational forces have had a profound impact on U.S. history. At the same time, the United States has played a key role in shaping international affairs throughout its past and to the present day. As increasing numbers of scholars in SHAFR have come to focus on these interactions, the horizons of the field have expanded. While the foundations of the field in the study of U.S. foreign policy remain strong, increasing numbers of transnational and international historians as well as area studies specialists have become involved in the organization. It may now be said that SHAFR’s members have become scholars of “America and the World” and the “World and America.”

The 2013 meeting in Arlington, Virginia, will feature a plenary session on Thursday evening, titled “America and the World - the World and America: Writing American Diplomatic History in the Longue Durée,” which will put leading scholars of eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century American diplomacy in conversation with one another. John W. Hall (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Jay Sexton (Oxford University), Kristin Hoganson (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) and Paul A. Kramer (Vanderbilt University) will all address the question: “What recent findings, interpretations, and methods in your field should SHAFR colleagues who research twentieth century topics take note of and why?” Erez Manela (Harvard University) and Anne L. Foster (Indiana State University) will respond from a twentieth century perspective. George C. Herring (University of Kentucky) will chair the plenary.

The keynote address at the Friday luncheon, “Legacy vs. Access?: The Challenges of Researching Presidential History,” will be delivered by Timothy J. Naftali, former director of the Nixon Presidential Library and Senior Research Fellow in the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation.

We encourage proposals relating to America’s interaction with the world and the world’s interaction with America for SHAFR’s 2013 Annual Meeting. Although the Program Committee will give preference to panels that address the conference theme, it also welcomes proposals on other topics pertaining to U.S. relations with the wider world, including (but not limited to) state-to-state relations, global governance, transnational movements, and histories of mobility, borderlands, and empire.

Since proposals for complete panels with a coherent theme will be favored over individual paper proposals, those seeking to create or fill out a panel should consult the “panelists seeking panelists” link on the SHAFR 2013 Annual Meeting web page or at twitter hashtag #SHAFR2013. A complete panel usually involves either three papers plus a chair and commentator (with the possibility of one person fulfilling the latter two roles) or a roundtable discussion with a chair and three to five participants. The Committee is open to alternative formats, which should be described briefly in the proposal. We request that applicants have no more than two roles at the conference, and only one presentation of their own research. Graduate students and first-time participants are eligible to receive fellowships to subsidize the cost of attending the conference. Please see the announcements below for details.

All proposals should be submitted via the web at http://www.shafr.org/conferences/2013-annual-meeting/. Applicants requiring alternative means to submit the proposal should contact program-chair@shafr.org.

**SHAFR 2013 Program Committee**
Lien-Hang Nguyen and Paul Chamberlin, co-chairs

**Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants**
In 2013, SHAFR will offer several Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants to assist graduate students who present papers at the conference. The following stipulations apply: 1) no award will exceed $300 per student; 2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and 3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The Program Committee will make the decision regarding all awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal. Applications should consist of a concise letter from the prospective participant requesting funds and an accompanying letter from the graduate advisor confirming the unavailability of departmental funds to cover travel to the conference. These two items should be submitted to divingeants@shafr.org at the time the panel or paper proposal is submitted. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee’s decisions on panels, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s panel is accepted by the program committee in a separate decision. Requests must be Application deadline: December 1, 2012.

**SHAFR Diversity and International Outreach Fellowship Program**
SHAFR also offers competitive Diversity and International Outreach Fellowships that will cover travel and lodging expenses for the 2013 annual meeting. The competition is aimed at scholars whose participation in the annual meeting would add to the diversity of the Society. Preference will be given to persons who have not previously presented at SHAFR annual meetings. The awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR meetings, scholars who offer intellectual approaches that may be fruitful to SHAFR but are under-represented at annual meetings, and scholars from outside the United States. “Scholars” includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further acquaint the winners with SHAFR, they will also be awarded a one-year membership in the organization, which includes subscriptions to *Diplomatic History* and *Passport*. Applicants should submit a copy of their individual paper proposal along with a short cv (2-page maximum) and a brief (2-3-paragraph) essay addressing the fellowship criteria (and including data on previous SHAFR meetings attended and funding received from SHAFR). Please submit your application to diversityprogram@shafr.org. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee's decisions on panels, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s panel is accepted by the program committee in a separate decision. Application deadline: December 1, 2012.
Williams College and the Department of State’s Office of the Historian cosponsored a conference on March 2–3, 2012, that was the final event in a year-long commemoration of the sesquicentennial of the FRUS series (see http://history.state.gov/frus150). The conference focused on two recently released volumes: National Security Policy, 1969–1972 and SALT I, 1969–1972. A selected list of invitees read the volumes beforehand and prepared remarks. The presentations and subsequent discussions featured stimulating give-and-take among all participants, including constructive criticism about the volumes’ contributions to the field, a careful situating of the volumes’ documents within the extant literature, and discussions about the challenges of producing and declassifying FRUS volumes. The agenda and video links to the conference sessions are provided at the Office of the Historian conference webpage (http://history.state.gov/conferences/2012-national-security-policy-salt). Consequently, rather than provide a summary report of the proceedings, I asked participants to write a brief account of their “take-away impressions” of the conference. Compiled below are the statements of those who responded. The Office of the Historian is interested in partnering with other institutions to replicate the success of this conference by examining other recently released volumes. For further information please feel free to contact me at mcallisterwb@state.gov.

**Thomas Schwartz, Vanderbilt University**

The conference provided a rare opportunity to bring together a group of scholars (and one contemporary participant, General Robert Pursley) to assess the compilation of historical documents produced by the State Department Office of the Historian. Although I had prepared a paper discussing the constraints the Nixon administration faced in conducting its foreign policy, constraints that were centered on political, economic, and military concerns, the overwhelming impression I came away with was the powerful psychological impact of nuclear parity upon American leaders of the time. We may tend to forget, partly because he seemed perpetually involved in government, that Richard Nixon first left power in 1960, when the United States still enjoyed overwhelming nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. He watched as his rival John Kennedy was able to use that superiority during the Cuban Missile Crisis to pressure the Soviet Union for an outcome favorable to American interests. At his first meetings on the subject of national security after becoming president in 1969, he seemed to feel genuine shock and consternation at how much the American position had changed. He recognized that the Soviet achievement of nuclear parity fundamentally challenged many of the assumptions of American foreign policy, including the concept of extended deterrence, and acknowledged bluntly that the “nuclear umbrella in NATO is a lot of crap.” It seems to me now that Nixon knew that American foreign policy had to adapt to nuclear parity and that many of the actions of his administration over the next four years were rooted in this understanding. As he put it, “Our bargaining position has shifted. We must face facts.”

**Robert Jervis, Columbia University**

The FRUS volumes on Nixon’s national security policies and SALT negotiations reveal significant ironies. From the very start, Nixon and Kissinger understood four important facts. First, the Johnson administration’s arms control plans could lead to prohibiting missile defense systems without reining in weapons that could attack strategic nuclear forces, a combination that could leave the United States—and perhaps the USSR—vulnerable to a first strike. Second, the United States had major advantages in technology, and controls here probably were not in the American interest as well as being very difficult to implement. Third, there were links between arms control negotiations and the general status of Soviet-American relations. Finally, the rigid but porous nature of the American bureaucracy required that foreign policy be led from the White House, with much of it kept secret from the rest of the government as well as the public. The administration’s understanding of these facts produced dramatic foreign policy successes but in some cases took the United States to destinations that Nixon and Kissinger had feared and in other cases produced desired results through unanticipated channels. To make a long story short, the administration ended up following much of the path of the Johnson administration and agreed to ban effective missile defense while leaving unrestrained the ability to attack strategic forces. The result would have been American vulnerability had the administration’s pessimistic assessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions been correct. They were not, however. The administration was then saved from its worst nightmare not by intelligent policies but by its misjudgment of the adversary. Part of the problem stemmed from excessive secrecy and centralization. In his last-minute negotiations at the Moscow summit, Kissinger agreed to what he thought was a minimal expansion of the size of Soviet missile silos without understanding that this would in fact permit a new generation of much more deadly missiles, something the experts on the SALT delegation would have told him had he been willing to keep them informed. The other major irony was that while Nixon and
Kissinger were correct about the role of linkage among disparate issues in Soviet-American relations, they got the main factor wrong. They believed that arms control was more important to the USSR than it was to them and that they could therefore demand appropriate behavior from the USSR in other areas as the price for an agreement. But as it turned out, the Soviets did not cooperate, refusing in particular to put pressure on North Vietnam, and in the end it was the SALT negotiations that improved Soviet-American relations and allowed for progress in other areas, most notably Berlin and Germany.

Historians are likely to find this less surprising than political scientists because they have a better appreciation for the gaps between intentions and outcomes and for the propensity for events to unfold in ways that confound even leaders who start with the clearest and most sophisticated of ideas.

Melvyn P. Leffler, University of Virginia

I thought the conference at Williams College on the two FRUS volumes was really stimulating. The volumes were put together with great professionalism, and the documents were quite revealing. The documents I found most illuminating were the tapes of conversations, the minutes of NSC meetings, the minutes of the Defense Program Review Committee meetings, and the minutes of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. What also was apparent to me was how important it was to read these volumes in conjunction with the volumes on Vietnam, on the Soviet Union, on economic policy, etc. The intersection of issues was extraordinary. One sees clearly how domestic constraints were operative, how congressional attitudes, public opinion, and budgetary constraints were shaping national security policy preferences. And yet, notwithstanding the great value of these documents, I also think that they largely underscore interpretive frameworks put forward in recent years by Jussi Hahnimki, Frank Gavin, Bill Burr, and Fred Logevall, among others.

I was asked to talk about “perceptions,” and, for me, the documents underscored the difficulty of differentiating between “perceptions,” “beliefs,” “assumptions,” “realities,” and “goals.” Policymakers and historians alike need to interrogate constantly how “assumptions” and “beliefs” shape perceptions; they (and we) also need to question whether “perceptions” accord in any way with “realities.”

What is so striking in the documents is the degree to which Nixon and Kissinger (and many of their colleagues) fundamentally believed that an effective foreign policy depended on military capabilities. Nixon stated it succinctly: the purpose of force is diplomatic wallop. They believed everyone—allies and adversaries alike—was judging the United States in terms of its military capabilities. Forces had to be configured to practice nuclear coercion and blackmail; if we were not vigilant our adversaries would get the best of us and our friends and allies would lose faith in us. War, U.S. officials believed, was unlikely, but the struggle with strong, powerful adversaries with different ideological predilections persisted. Military capabilities were essential to conduct an effective diplomacy.

Déteinte with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China, strategic arms talks—these were all tactical calibrations in light of economic and domestic political constraints. In the minds of Nixon and Kissinger, the Cold War was not over despite all the talk about the diffusion of power, the need to avert nuclear war, and the lessons of Vietnam.

Sir Lawrence Freedman, King’s College London

The conference was important to me because the FRUS volumes covered the topics that were central to my time as a research student in Oxford from 1972 to 1975. My thesis was on U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet strategic threat and was eventually published as a book with that title. As I read through the volumes I was struck by the extent to which the rationale for the Safeguard ballistic missile system was recognized to be problematic within the government, but in general I found it encouraging that there was nothing in the documents to suggest that I had gone badly astray with my original research. Obviously if I had the documents at the time I would have told the story with less speculation and greater granularity and probably more color.

In retrospect it is notable just how much was leaked at the time. The sources I used in the 1970s included newspaper articles and specialist journals, including that great treasure-house of leaks, Aviation Week & Space Technology, and Scientific American, with its crisp articles by leading members of the fraternity of nuclear scientists that had built the bomb and were now constantly trying to get it under control. There were many books and articles written by participants and congressional hearings where many of the key players gave evidence, often in secret session. Part of the fun of research was to find what had been redacted in one transcript but released in another. Recalling that research leads to an observation. Having the documents would have saved me a lot of time in principle, but it would have been a mistake to ignore the other stuff. The debates in the wider political arena provided the context for the insider deliberations.

I have always been a scavenger when it comes to sources and worry that contemporary historians who have an expectation of so much more documentation also disregard too much that they dismiss as “secondary” and become archival fetishists. I remain a great believer in secondary sources.

Brendan Green, Williams College

The Williams conference on the latest Nixon-era FRUS volumes underscored the high standards and judicious editing decisions for which the series is known. The documents selected by the compilers portray the dramatic story of the first Nixon administration’s attempt to wrestle with the implications of nuclear parity and conventional inferiority. Most panelists zeroed in on a similar set of quotes that illustrated the key dynamics of the administration’s debate: the meaning of “nuclear sufficiency,” the political and military merits of missile defense, the state of NATO ground forces, and the political effects of strategic parity. Discussion revealed an administration that saw real value in nuclear superiority but no way to obtain it and sensed correspondingly real risks to the American position vis-à-vis the Soviets that had no feasible military solution. Déteinte was, in a sense, the Nixon administration’s answer to these conundrums.

For me the most powerful part of the conference came during an exchange between panelist Melvyn Leffler and audience members Sir Lawrence Freedman and Jeremi Suri. Leffler contended that while perceptions of the American strategic position were changing during the period, the basic assumptions, goals, and theories animating American strategic decision making showed great continuity with the early Cold War. Freedman argued, by contrast, that the Nixon era represented a time of genuine strategic transition, especially from a European perspective. Suri ended up between the two, arguing at first that Leffler’s thesis was too strong, and later calling in his keynote speech for a re-evaluation of the
SALT I process among diplomatic historians. This highly spirited and productive exchange highlighted the central question of the period: how are we to interpret détente? Was this a momentary tactical shift within a larger American strategy of preponderance or an attempt at an enduring global modus vivendi? Wherever the historical community comes down on this question, the latest FRUS volumes and the Williams conference have done a splendid job framing the debate.

Mark Lawrence, University of Texas

How profound a shift in the course of the Cold War occurred in the years from 1969 to 1972, the peak years of Richard Nixon’s pursuit of U.S.–Soviet détente? The question underlay much of the discussion at the recent conference at Williams College and warrants attention from any reader of the two recently published FRUS volumes on U.S. national security policy and arms control in the early Nixon presidency. On the one hand, the volumes contain numerous suggestions that a major watershed had been reached. Nixon repeatedly expressed astonished despair in 1969 that the Soviets had erased the five-to-one advantage in nuclear weaponry that the Kennedy administration had enjoyed during the Cuban Missile Crisis just seven years earlier. “We may have reached a balance of terror,” he asserted at an NSC meeting in February 1969. The key question for policymakers throughout the volumes was how to respond to the transformed situation. Their answers included the SALT I and ABM treaties, the opening to China, and other bold gestures. Yet the documents make it clear that little changed in the fundamental nature of the rivalry between Moscow and Washington. The president and his aides consistently viewed the Soviets as a military and political threat and regarded military force as the key to protecting U.S. interests. Although Nixon regarded the possibility of nuclear war as “remote,” he also insisted in a revealing conversation with aides in 1971 that managing relations with Moscow and Beijing “will depend on our military strength.” Nixon and Kissinger, the new volumes show, conceived of their new initiatives not as major departures from the past but as ways to wage the Cold War under changed circumstances.

Joshua Rovner, United States Naval War College

Williams College recently hosted a conference to discuss the new FRUS volumes on security policy and arms control in the Nixon administration. While the new volumes did not change my basic views about deterrence and détente, the conference reinforced a few important ideas. One was the importance of mixing historians and political scientists who know how to speak plainly. Interdisciplinary gatherings work best when both sides are forced to condense complicated ideas into digestible presentations for one another. In this case the happy outcome was a two-day conversation that avoided trivial history and impenetrable theory. While some topics were arcane—the estimated flight characteristics of Soviet ballistic missiles, the complexities of defense budget debates—the participants explained why these particular details mattered, diving into the details without getting lost in trivia. The conference also succeeded by encouraging creativity and guaranteeing flexibility. Participants spoke on broad thematic panels rather than being shoehorned into specific topics, and the result was a series of pointed debates on important issues. This might sound trite, but there is something to be said for bringing together a group of smart people and letting them riff on the same material.

Joshua Botts, Office of the Historian, United States Department of State

Among the many insights that I took away from the Williams conference on FRUS, 1969–1976, SALT I, 1969–1972 and National Security Policy (NSP), 1969–1972, three stand out. The first was provided by a pithy synthesis of postwar American strategic culture made (unconsciously) by Henry Kissinger during a June 1972 Defense Program Review Committee meeting (NSP, Document 216) and emphasized (quite consciously) by Melvyn Leffler in his remarks during the “Problems of Perception” panel: “sufficiency means superiority.” Kissinger’s throwaway remark succinctly encapsulates a premise embedded within arguments advanced by Nixon administration officials throughout both the NSP and SALT volumes, but I was struck by its broader applicability to Truman administration policymakers, who institutionalized preponderant U.S. strength in the international system in the late 1940s; to Eisenhower and his advisors, who forged sustainable domestic foundations for American globalism in the 1950s; and, later, to Reagan administration officials determined to reassert U.S. dominance in the 1980s. For U.S. policymakers throughout the Cold War, superiority provided the only reliable foundation for the foreign and defense policies required to sufficiently safeguard American interests and security.

Second, I received a compelling reminder of the interdependence of volumes in the FRUS series. In addition to noting the synergies between the SALT and NSP volumes, conference participants made frequent references to other volumes, principally those covering relations with the Soviet Union, the Vietnam War, economic policies, and European security issues. The conference provided clear evidence that the series as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The Office of the Historian could enhance FRUS’s value by exploring new ways of exposing the rich connections that exist among published volumes.

Finally, as a historian just beginning the planning process for compiling my first FRUS volume, I appreciated the valuable perspective the conference provided on how several different scholarly constituencies use the series. Hearing renowned historians and political scientists discuss the volumes with leading younger scholars made me more aware of the expectations that readers will bring to my volume when it finally makes its way into their hands. Although I am not yet sure of all the ways this awareness will influence how I select and annotate documents or how others in the office will engage in the tricky calculus of securing their declassification, I do know that it will make me a better compiler and help future volumes in the series live up to the standard of Todd Bennett’s and Erin Mahan’s terrific work.

Chris Tudda, Office of the Historian, United States Department of State

As the historian who coordinated the declassification of the FRUS SALT I and National Security Policy volumes, I focused on how challenging the declassification process was for these volumes. Not only did declassification require expertise in the Nixon administration’s national security policies, but I had to develop, relatively quickly, the ability to convince reviewing agencies such as the CIA and DOD to release as much information as possible detailing intelligence analysis, strategic objectives and analysis, and nuclear capabilities. I remain amazed at how strong, if imperfect, our nation’s commitment to openness and transparency is, given the complexities of these volumes and the sensitivity of the information contained therein.
Normally, the nuts and bolts of the declassification process are the perfect cure for insomnia. Luckily, the group assembled for the conference evinced significant interest in the process. Many scholars have little idea just how complicated the declassification and publication processes can be. My colleagues and I in the Office of the Historian share their frustration with delays. To the extent that I could do so, given the need to keep certain information classified, I am glad that I had the chance to shine a little light on the process and explain why the wait is often worthwhile when the tradeoff is the publication of more documentation.

M. Todd Bennett, East Carolina University

Williams College’s conference successfully bridged a divide in the diplomatic history community. Having worked on both sides—I now hold a university position after serving with the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian, where I edited several volumes in the FRUS series, including *National Security Policy, 1969–1972*—I can say that the divide between academic and public historians harms the field. Based on a false hierarchy, the split not only inhibits communication among professionals but also undervalues the work of the scholars who produce the FRUS series. FRUS volumes don’t make themselves, and the study of the history of U.S. foreign relations would be demonstrably poorer without the documents selected, declassified, and edited for publication by State Department historians.

Peer review is necessary if FRUS is to maintain or improve upon its high level of quality: not formulaic tributes to the series’ greatness or patronizing, dissertation-like defenses, but rigorous, open dialogue among peers, such as that ideally found in publications or at conferences. It is a good sign that *Diplomatic History* and H-Diplo have recently reviewed FRUS volumes. The Williams conference should be a model for similar undertakings, because it brought the series’ producers and consumers together as colleagues, on an equal footing, for discussions of common topics, in this case the Nixon administration’s national security and arms control policies. To the extent that those conversations lowered barriers to communication, demonstrated the good scholarship that goes into and grows out of each FRUS volume, and sharpened the series’ editors by subjecting their work to real-time peer review, the conference strengthened the professional community.
An Introduction to Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State

David A. Langbart

One record group in the National Archives that contains documentation useful for the study of U.S. foreign relations is Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. As its title indicates, this record group contains records from U.S. diplomatic and consular posts overseas and U.S. missions to international organizations. The value of those records varies over time and depends on the researcher’s focus.

The National Archives holds records dating back to the late eighteenth century from over 850 posts and missions. The records are far from complete, however. There are very few records from American diplomatic and consular posts for the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Recordkeeping had not been regularized at that time, and many diplomatic and consular officials took the records with them upon leaving their posts as they considered the documents their personal property. While the department provided diplomatic and consular personnel with guidance on the creation and maintenance of records, it said little about how to handle old records no longer needed for current business. Ultimately, the Department of State did not formally address the accumulation of records overseas until the early twentieth century. Some records were lost as a result of natural disasters, wars, or other emergencies, and more recently records have been destroyed in accordance with archival appraisals wherein the National Archives determines which records to preserve and which files agencies should destroy.1

While records of Foreign Service posts contain documentation pertinent to the study of U.S. foreign affairs, it is important to note their limitations. For most research topics in U.S. foreign policy, the most comprehensive and authoritative documentation is found in the central files and decentralized files from the Department of State in Washington, DC. While records of Foreign Service posts contain documentation pertinent to the study of U.S. foreign affairs, it is important to note their limitations. For most research topics in U.S. foreign policy, the most comprehensive and authoritative documentation is found in the central files and decentralized files from the Department of State in Washington, DC.

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As noted earlier, there are very few post records from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, even though posts were in operation. For example, even though the United States opened a legation in Great Britain in 1792, the earliest records from that post date from 1826.3

The records at diplomatic posts generally include instructions from the department; despatches to the department; notes to and from the government where the post was located; communications back and forth with subordinate consular posts; miscellaneous letters received and sent; telegrams sent and received; records of passports and visas issued; and records of births, deaths, and marriages of American citizens. The records from consular posts generally include similar records as well as records of a purely consular nature. Seaport consulates often include records resulting from their unique responsibilities. Those special series include records noting arrival and departure of U.S. vessels; records of services performed for American ships and seamen; lists of seamen shipped, discharged, or deceased; and records of marine protests. Not all posts have all types of records described and other types of records may exist. For the most part, all of the records from this time period that survived when the Department of State began addressing the accumulation of overseas records in the 1920s were eventually transferred to the National Archives.
2. 1912–1948

In August 1912, U.S. diplomatic and consular posts began using a new filing system. A simplified version of the system used by the Department of State for its central files since 1910, it was a numerically based prearranged subject filing system in which all communications on a particular subject were kept together, rather than being filed by type of record and thereunder chronologically. Records were bound annually until the 1940s, at which point they were maintained in file folders grouped annually. Documentation was filed in nine subject classes (the filing manual is online at http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/state-dept/finding-aids/correspondence-1924.pdf):

Class 0: Miscellaneous
Class 1: Administration
Class 2: Extradition
Class 3: Protection of Interests
Class 4: Claims
Class 5: International Congresses and Conferences
Class 6: Commerce and Commercial Relations
Class 7: Relations of States
Class 8: Internal Affairs of States (this class contains records on political affairs; public order, safety, health, works, and charities; military affairs; naval affairs; social matters; economic matters; industrial matters; communication and transportation; navigation; and public press and science and philosophy)

In some cases, the more sensitive files were kept in a parallel series of “Confidential Files,” and beginning in the 1940s, Top Secret documents usually were filed in a separate, parallel file. The records include despatches, telegrams, airgrams, notes to and from the local government, correspondence, and internal memorandums, among other types of documents. For security purposes, true readings of telegrams were kept out of the files and paraphrases substituted. The true readings were often preserved as a separate series within the records of a post.

The National Archives carried out two appraisals of these records, the first covering the records from 1912 through 1935 and the second for the records dating from 1936 through 1948. While the records throughout the period 1912–1948 were generally the same, there were some differences in the determination of value from the two periods. In the first appraisal (covering 1912–1935), the National Archives determined that only records from classes 3 through 8 (except file 811.11 covering visa matters) warranted preservation in the National Archives. The records from classes 1 and 2 and file 811.11 were destroyed, unless they were bound in a volume along with permanent records. For the later period (covering 1936–1948), the following records were determined to warrant preservation: File 121: Diplomatic Branch; File 124: Embassies and Legations, Class 2: Extradition, Class 3: Protection of Interests, Class 4: Claims, Class 5: International congresses and conferences; File 631: Trade relations; File 690: Other administrative measures affecting export trade (embargo), Class 7: Relations of State, and Class 8: Internal Affairs of States (except 811.11).

During the implementation of the appraisals, however, some records designated as permanent were mistakenly destroyed and some records designated as temporary were preserved, the latter usually because of the joint binding of permanent and temporary files.

In addition to the main files, posts created and maintained separate series of records of a specialized nature. Typical of these separate series are registers of correspondence, chronological files of telegrams sent and received, citizenship records such as passport applications, and “Miscellaneous Record Books.” The files of some posts include records resulting from specialized work. For example, the World War I-era files of a number of posts include files relating to U.S. representation of the interests of one or more nations at war before the U.S. became involved in the conflict.

3. 1949–1963

In January 1949, Foreign Service posts began using a new filing system. A numerically based prearranged subject filing system, like the system used previously, it was a complete revision of the earlier system and had no relationship to the decimal filing system used by the department for its central files. The files were generally maintained in multi-year blocks, usually of three years. Documentation was filed in seven subject classes (the filing manual is online at http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/state-dept/finding-aids/records-classification-1948.pdf):

Class 0: Miscellaneous
Class 1: Administration, Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States
Class 2: Citizenship, Immigration, Protective and Legal Services
Class 3: Political and Governmental Affairs
Class 4: National Defense Affairs
Class 5: Economic, Industrial, and Social Affairs
Class 6: Informational, Cultural, and Scientific Affairs

More sensitive files continued to be kept in separate, parallel series of “Confidential Files” and Top Secret files. The types of documents found in the files are similar to those of the 1912–1948 period.

A National Archives appraisal that was based on what turned out to be an imperfect understanding of U.S. foreign policy during these years and of the contents of the department’s central file and the relationship of those files to the records of the posts, regulated the preservation of these records. Under this appraisal, records of diplomatic posts (embassies and legations) were handled differently from those of consular posts.

For most diplomatic posts the following records were designated as permanent: File 030: Prominent Persons; Class 3: Political and Governmental Affairs; and Class 5: Economic, Industrial, and Social Affairs, in addition to “Miscellaneous Record Books” and files on participation in international conferences and commissions. At seven special diplomatic posts (Sofia, Bulgaria; Prague, Czechoslovakia; Budapest, Hungary; Warsaw, Poland; Bucharest, Romania; Belgrade, Yugoslavia; and Moscow, U.S.S.R.) the following additional files were designated for preservation: File 030: Visits and Tours; File 040: Entertainment, Ceremonials and Ceremonial Communications, Condolences, Felicitation; File 100: Administration-General; File 120: Foreign Service of the United States; File 200: Citizenship, Immigration, Protective and Legal Services-General; File 220: Citizenship and Passport Matters (General); and File 230: Protection and Welfare Services.

Most notably for this era of numerous mutual defense treaties, Class 4: National Defense Affairs, was not designated as permanent. At the time of the appraisal (1971) cultural relations were not seen as a field of future academic research. Class 6: Informational, Cultural, and Scientific Affairs, was designated for destruction, too.

For consular posts, only File 050: Prominent Persons; File 310: International Conferences and Organizations; and File 510: Trade Relations, were designated as permanent, in addition to “Miscellaneous Record Books” and
files on participation in international conferences and commissions.

As with the records from the earlier period, during the implementation of the appraisal some records designated as permanent were mistakenly destroyed and some records designated as temporary were preserved. Files from United States Information Service (USIS) offices are present among the records from some posts.

4. 1963–1980s

In 1963, the Department began using another new filing system in both headquarters and field offices. It was revised and reissued in 1965 and saw use at headquarters through 1973 and at posts into the 1980s. Records are arranged in seven broad subject classes, each of which is further divided into several primary subjects each with its own designator:

- Administration (15 primary subjects)
- Consular (4 primary subjects)
- Culture & Information (8 primary subjects)
- Economic (18 primary subjects)
- Political & Defense (4 primary subjects)
- Science (3 primary subjects)
- Social (3 primary subjects)


In two appraisals covering the records, appraisal determinations were made about each primary subject. The arrangement of the records allowed for a more selective approach in determining which records to preserve and which to destroy. Again, the records of diplomatic posts (embassies and legations) were handled differently from those of most consular posts.

For all diplomatic posts, the following primary subjects were designated as permanent:

**Administration:**
- ORG: Organization and Administration

**Economic:**
- AV: Aviation
- E: Economic Affairs (General)
- ECIN: Economic Integration
- FN: Finance
- FT: Foreign Trade
- LAB: Labor and Manpower
- PET: Petroleum
- STR: Strategic Trade Control
- TP: Trade Promotion & Assistance

**Political and Defense:**
- CSM: Communism
- DEF: Defense Affairs
- INT: Intelligence
- POL: Political Affairs & Relations

**Social:**
- REF: Refugees and Migration
- SOC: Social Conditions

**Science:**
- AE: Atomic Energy
- SCI: Science & Technology.

For all other consular posts, only the file BG: Buildings and Grounds was designated as permanent. Once again, cultural relations were not seen as a field of future academic research, and all the records in that subject class were designated for destruction.

During the implementation of the appraisal, some records designated as permanent were mistakenly destroyed and some records designated as temporary were preserved. Records from some United States Information Service offices are present.

**Mission Records**

The records maintained by U.S. missions to international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States are part of this record group. The records of those offices may be filed according to one of the filing systems described above, or records may have been filed in a manner unique to a mission. Perhaps the most important and certainly the most voluminous of the separate mission records are those from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN), which maintained its records in a unique manner. Also included are the records of the U.S. Mission, Berlin (USBER), which represented U.S. interests in occupied Berlin from 1945 to 1990.

**Records not included in RG 84**

The files in RG 84 consist largely of documents sent to and from the Department of State and created within its Foreign Service posts. The files generally do not include
comprehensive collections of documents and reports of representatives of other agencies assigned to a given post, such as agricultural attachés, military attachés, naval attachés, and legal attachés. While those officials were attached to a post, from an organizational standpoint they worked for another agency, and their documents were not routinely incorporated into the Department of State files of Foreign Service posts.

Unless an attaché worked collaboratively with Foreign Service staff or sent something to the Foreign Service office for action, generally the most researchers are likely to find among the records in RG 84 are occasional documents from other agencies. In some cases, a number of attaché reports may be in the files; the situation varies from post to post. In rare instances, the files may include a larger aggregation of reports by attachés of other agencies.

It is important to remember that there is no consistency from post to post or even from year to year in the files of the same post, but the files in RG 84 are generally not the place to look for documents of attachés. For more comprehensive collections of reports by and documentation about attachés of other agencies assigned to Foreign Service Posts, researchers should search the records of the parent agency.

Access

Archival and declassification processing of these records continues. While most of the files dating through 1961 are open to public use and the National Archives has an ongoing project to process the records dating through 1975, before making a research visit, researchers should contact the Archives II Reference Staff at archives2reference@nara.gov to find out the status of the specific records of interest and the ensure that files even exist. Even though files are declassified, they may still require screening for documents that are otherwise restricted. At the present time, such reviews are done on an as-requested basis. Inquiries should be sent at least four weeks in advance of a planned visit. Even then, the records may not be processed for use in such a short period of time. To ensure that records are ready for use, you must contact the National Archives.

Citations

An archivally sound citation should include sufficient information to enable a reader to locate the original document easily. It is a sad fact that most published citations to Record Group 84 leave out one or more key pieces of fixed identifying information, thus making it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to locate the cited document. Because of differences in recordkeeping, the elements to include in a good citation vary slightly from period to period.

For records dating up to 1912, a good citation will include seven pieces of fixed identifying information. The key pieces are:

1. From
2. To
3. Date
4. Document number (This is the despatch, instruction, or note number. Not all documents are numbered, but where they are, the number should be included in the citation to distinguish between documents of the same date.)
5. Series title (Examples: “Despatches to the Department of State,” “Instructions from the Department of State,” “Notes to the Foreign Ministry,” “Miscellaneous Letters Received,” and “Miscellaneous Record Book.”

The contemporary volume number in the series may be included, but since most records are arranged chronologically it is not necessary.
7. Citation to record group and repository

Thus, a typical complete citation for this period might look like this:

Department of State to Legation Great Britain, March 2, 1864, Instruction No. 859, Instructions from the Department of State, Legation Great Britain, RG 84, National Archives.

For records dating from 1912 to 1963 and from 1963 to the 1980s, a good citation will include eight pieces of fixed identifying information. The key pieces are:

1. From
2. To
3. Date
4. Document number (This is the telegram, despatch, airgram, instruction, or note number. Not all documents are numbered, but where they are, the number should be included in the citation to distinguish between documents of the same date. This is critical for the records of these time periods, as most files contain multiple documents.)
5. File number (1912-63); File designator (1973/1980s); Title
6. Series title (Examples: “General Correspondence,” “Confidential Correspondence,” “General Records,” and “Classified General Records.”)
7. Name of post (Examples: “Embassy Peking,” “Consulate General Moscow,” “Consulate Lille.”)
8. Citation to record group and repository

Following these guidelines, a sound citation will look like this:


If you are not sure how to cite the records or these examples do not address your situation, please be sure to request assistance from a NARA records specialist.

Contact

For more information, please contact the National Archives and Records Administration:

Archives II Reference Section
(RD-DC)
Room 2400
The National Archives at College Park
8601 Adelphi road
College Park, MD 20740-6001
eemail: archives2reference @nara.gov

The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect those of the any agency of the U.S. Government.

Notes:
1. For a study that illustrates some of these points, see: David A. Langbart, “‘No Little Historic Value’: The Records of Department of State Posts in Revolutionary Russia, Prologue 40, no. 1, Spring 2008, 14-23. Also online at http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2008/spring/langbart.html.

3. RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, which contains headquarters records, generally includes the despatches from and instructions to posts for periods when there are no records in RG 84.

4. The records authorized for destruction were, at the time of the appraisal, considered to be largely duplicative of the department’s central files or of an administrative nature.

5. The content of the “Miscellaneous Record Books” varies from post to post. They generally contain documentation and information that did not fit other categories of files at a post. They can include notes on the history of a post; reports on administrative changes; listings of seamen; reports on deaths, births, and marriages of Americans overseas; lists of distinguished visitors; and inventories of post property.

6. Because the consecutive numbers assigned by the National Archives to each volume of records from a post are not fixed and may change, those numbers should not be used in citations.

SHAFR congratulates the following 2012 prize and fellowship recipients

Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize: Jeffrey Engel


Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant: Rebecca Herman

Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship: Lauren F. Turek

W. Stull Hold Dissertation Fellowship: Alexander Noonan

Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship: Helen Pho

SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship: Sara Fieldston and David Wight

Norman and Laura Graebner Award: Melvyn P. Leffler

Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize in International History: Toshihiro Niguchi
1. Personal and Professional Notes

Heather Dichter has accepted the position of Assistant Professor in the Department of Sports Media at Ithaca College.

Jeff Engel has accepted the position of founding Director of the Presidential Studies Program and Associate Professor in the Clements Department of History at Southern Methodist University.

Ryan Irwin has accepted the position of Assistant Professor in the Department of History at SUNY, Albany.

Christopher McKnight Nichols has accepted the position of Assistant Professor in the School of History, Philosophy, and Religion at Oregon State University.

Brad Simpson has accepted the position of Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies at the University of Connecticut beginning in the fall of 2013.

Kathryn Statler has been promoted to Professor at the University of San Diego.

2. Research Notes

FRUS Release

On May 16, 2012, the Department of State released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVI, Soviet Union August 1974–December 1976. This volume, the final of five covering relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Nixon-Ford administrations, presents documentation on how matters as diverse as strategic arms limitation, European security, the Middle East, Jewish emigration, and Angola intersected to influence the course of Soviet-American relations during the presidency of Gerald R. Ford. Documents published here reveal that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger retained the central role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy on the Soviet Union that he occupied during the Nixon administration and that his influence remained undiminished in meetings between Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev at Vladivostok in 1974 and at Helsinki in 1975. The volume devotes considerable space to the struggle in Washington between politicians and policymakers over détente, and in particular the October 1974 negotiations leading to the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, which linked the extension of most favored nation status to an increase in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. These negotiations highlighted the domestic political implications of détente. Although the Secretary of State was the driving force in Soviet affairs, the documents reveal that President Ford also played an important role in policy making. While Ford supported Kissinger's objectives, he also advocated close consultation with Congress, demonstrating that Ford—at least in style, if not in substance—pursued anything but a continuation of his predecessor's approach to foreign policy.


FRUS E-Books

The Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State is pleased to announce the release of its Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series in a new e-book format that is readable on popular electronic devices such as the Amazon Kindle and Apple iPad. The e-book edition combines many of the benefits of print and web publications in a new form that is portable and extremely convenient. During the pilot phase of the FRUS e-book initiative, five selected FRUS volumes are available. The public is invited to download the new e-books and provide feedback to help improve the FRUS e-book edition. At the conclusion of the pilot phase later this year, the Office will work to offer e-book versions of many more FRUS volumes both through the Office website and on a wide array of e-bookstores. The Office will continue to expand and enhance its e-book offerings, as part of the ongoing FRUS digitization effort.

The FRUS e-book initiative is an outgrowth of the Office of the Historian’s efforts to optimize the series for its website. Because the Office adopted the Text Encoding Initiative's open, robust XML-based file format (TEI), a single digital master TEI file can store an entire FRUS volume and can be transformed into either a set of web pages or an e-book. The free, open source eXist-db server that powers the entire Office of the Historian website also provides the tools needed to transform the FRUS TEI files into HTML and e-book formats.
The Institute for Advanced Study is a community of scholars focused on intellectual inquiry, free from teaching and other university obligations. Scholars of all nationalities are offered membership for up to a year, either with or without a stipend. Extensive resources are provided including offices, libraries, restaurant and housing facilities and support services. The School of Historical Studies’ principal interests are the history of western, near eastern and Asian civilizations, Greek and Roman civilization, history of Europe (medieval, early modern, and modern), the Islamic world, East Asia, history of art, science, philosophy, modern international relations, and music. Residence in Princeton is required. Members’ only other obligation is to pursue their own research. Eligibility requirements: a Ph.D. and substantial publications. Further information is available on the School’s web site (www.hs.ias.edu) or by contacting the Administrative Officer at mzela@ias.edu. Deadline: November 1, 2012.

Launched in 1967, the International Affairs Fellowship (IAF) is a distinguished program offered by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) to assist mid-career scholars and professionals in advancing their analytic capabilities and broadening their foreign policy experience. The program aims to strengthen career development by helping outstanding individuals acquire and apply foreign policy skills beyond the scope of their professional and scholarly achievements. The distinctive character of the IAF Program lies in the contrasting professional experiences fellows obtain through their twelve-month appointment. Selected fellows from academia and the private sector spend fellowship tenures in public service and policy-oriented settings, while government officials spend their tenures in a scholarly atmosphere free from operational pressure.

CFR awards approximately ten fellowships annually to highly accomplished individuals who have a capacity for independent work and who are eager to undertake serious foreign policy analysis. Approximately half of the selected IAFs each year spend their tenures working full-time in government; the remaining half are placed at academic institutions, think tanks, or non-profit organizations. CFR’s Fellowship Affairs Office assists all fellows in finding a suitable affiliation for the year. In addition to providing the opportunity to carry out research, the IAF Program integrates all fellows into the intellectual life of CFR. Fellows who are not placed at CFR during their tenure are invited to attend and participate in select CFR meetings and events. Alumni of the program stay connected with CFR and its prestigious network of professionals and leaders, and convene at CFR’s annual IAF Conference in New York City each spring.

Interested candidates who meet the program’s eligibility requirements can apply online between June 1 and October 1 on an annual basis. Candidates who are selected as IAF finalists will be notified between December and January, with finalist interviews scheduled in Washington, DC, and New York City between January and February. Official selections and announcement of IAF awards will be made between February and March.

The IAF Program is only open to U.S. citizens and permanent residents between the ages of twenty-seven and thirty-five who are eligible to work in the United States. CFR does not sponsor for visas. While a Ph.D. is not a requirement, selected fellows generally hold an advanced degree and possess a strong record of work experience as well as a firm grounding in the field of foreign policy. The program does not fund pre- or postdoctoral research, work toward a degree, or the completion of projects for which substantial progress has been made prior to the fellowship period.

Selection as an IAF is based on a combination of the following criteria: scholarly qualifications, achievements and promise, depth and breadth of professional experience, firm grounding in foreign policy and international relations, and an application proposal that focuses on solutions to identified problems in U.S. foreign policy. Applicants are encouraged to plan a systematic approach to assessing the major substantive and process issues of their planned research. The proposal will be judged on the proposed work’s originality, practicality, potential, likelihood of completion during the
fellowship period, and the contribution it will make to the applicant's individual career development.

The selection process is highly competitive. CFR's Fellowship Affairs Office processes the applications, and the IAF selection committee reviews all applications to identify the most promising candidates. About one-third of the most qualified applicants are selected as finalists to be interviewed by several IAF selection committee members. Based on the overall application and the results of the interviews, the selection committee chooses approximately ten finalists to be fellows.

The duration of the fellowship is twelve months, preferably beginning in September. Though deferment is not an option, requests to do so, for up to one year only, will be considered on a case-by-case basis and under special circumstances. The program awards a stipend of $85,000. Fellows are considered independent contractors rather than employees of CFR, and are not eligible for employment benefits, including health insurance.

If you are interested in the fellowship, please contact fellowships@cfri.org or 212.434.9740. For more information, please visit www.cfr.org/fellowships.

Call for Papers: St. Antony's International Review

Following successfully publishing wholly themed issues between 2005 and 2010, forthcoming issues of the St Antony's International Review (STAIR) will also include a General Section. STAIR therefore invites authors to submit original research manuscripts on topics of contemporary relevance in international affairs. Submissions from the fields of political science and international relations, philosophy, and international history will all be considered. Articles may take either a theoretical or policy-oriented approach. We caution, however, that STAIR has a broad readership and therefore prizes accessibility of language and content.

STAIR is the only peer-reviewed journal of international affairs at the University of Oxford. Set up by graduate students of St Antony's College in 2005, the Review has carved out a distinctive niche as a cross-disciplinary outlet for research on the most pressing contemporary global issues, providing a forum in which emerging scholars can publish their work alongside established academics and policymakers. Distinguished past contributors include John Baylis, Valerie J. Bunce, Robert O. Keohane, James N. Rosenau, and Alfred Stepan.

Please note that STAIR will continue to devote at least half of each issue to a special theme of contemporary significance. Authors should therefore refer to the themed Calls for Papers available at www.stair-journal.org to determine whether their particular areas of interest are covered by upcoming special issues. All articles that do not fit with the upcoming special themes listed here should be submitted to the General Section.

STAIR will review manuscripts that contain original, previously unpublished material of up to 6,000 words (including footnotes with complete bibliographic information). Authors are asked to include a word count and an abstract of no more than 300 words. Submissions are sent to external reviewers for comment. Decisions can generally be expected within three months. For further information on manuscript preparation, referencing, and diction, please refer to the “Notes for Contributors” available at www.stair-journal.org.

Please send submissions to stair@sant.ox.ac.uk.

Call for Applications: Smith Richardson Foundation

The Smith Richardson Foundation's International Security and Foreign Policy Program is pleased to announce its annual grant competition to support junior faculty research on American foreign policy, international relations, international security, military policy, and diplomatic and military history. The Foundation will award at least three research grants of $60,000 each to support tenure-track junior faculty engaged in the research and writing of a scholarly book on an issue or topic of interest to the policy community.

These grants are intended to buy-out up to one year of teaching time and to underwrite research costs (including research assistance and travel). Each grant will be paid directly to, and should be administered by, the academic institution at which the junior faculty member works. Projects in military and diplomatic history are especially encouraged. Group or collaborative projects will not be considered.

Procedure: An applicant must submit a research proposal, a maximum of ten pages, that includes the following five sections:

- a one-page executive summary;
- a brief description of the policy issue or the problem that the proposed book will examine;
- a description of the background and body of knowledge on the issue to be addressed by the book;
- a description of the personnel and methods (e.g., research questions, research strategy, analytical approach, tentative organization of the book, etc.); and
- a brief explanation of the implications of the prospective findings of the research for the policy community.
The applicant should also include a curriculum vita, a detailed budget explaining how the grant would be used, and a work timetable with a start date. A template for a junior faculty proposal is available at the Foundation’s website.

Proposal Evaluation Criteria: Proposals will be evaluated based on the following criteria: the relevance of potential analysis and findings to current and future foreign and security policy issues; the potential of the project to innovate the field and to contribute to academic or policy literature on the chosen topic; the degree to which research questions and analytical methods are well defined; the degree to which the project will develop valuable new data or information through field work, archival work, or other methods; and the applicant's publication record.

Eligibility: An applicant must have a Ph.D., preferably in Political Science, Public Policy, Policy Analysis, International Political Economy, or History. He or she also must hold a position as a full-time tenure-track faculty member of a college or university in the United States. An applicant should explain how he or she meets all of these requirements in a cover letter to the proposal.

Deadline: The Foundation must receive all Junior Faculty Research Grant proposals postmarked by June 15, 2013. Applicants will be notified of the Foundation’s decision by October 31, 2013.

Please e-mail your proposal to juniorfaculty@srf.org as a single document, ideally in PDF or Microsoft Word .doc/.docx format, or mail an unstapled hard copy to:

Junior Faculty Research / International Program
Smith Richardson Foundation
60 Jesup Road
Westport, CT 06880

Call for Papers: New Book Series, International Encounters: Diplomatic and Transnational History in the 20th Century, Continuum
Editor, Thomas W. Zeiler

The series offers the old and new diplomatic history to address a range of topics that shaped the twentieth century. Engaging in international history (rather than global or world history), the series will appeal both to historians and international relations/politics specialists and high-level students. It has a dual function of appealing to researchers and upper level students. “International Encounters” incorporates current, cutting-edge research that reflects new trends in international history (such as the cultural turn and transnationalism), as well as the classical high politics of state-centric policymaking and diplomatic relations. It does so, however, in a way that makes the history accessible to students for classroom use. The series focuses on topics in diplomatic history, views them through either new or traditional lenses, and allows advanced students to peer at the twentieth century’s complex and manifold international relations in fresh, thought-provoking ways. Senior and more junior scholars welcome.

If interested in obtaining more information, or to submit a proposal, contact Tom Zeiler, at Thomas.zeiler@colorado.edu, or Claire Lipscomb, Commissioning Editor, History, Continuum, Claire.Lipscomb@bloomsbury.com.

Envisioning Peace, Performing Justice: Art, Activism, and Cultural Politics in the History of Peacemaking
October 25-27, 2013, Southern Illinois University Carbondale

The Peace History Society seeks proposals for panels and papers from across the humanities, social sciences, and fine and performing arts disciplines that reveal both the artistic and performative dimensions of peacemaking and the vital roles that artists and activists have played as visionaries, critics, interpreters, and promoters of peacemaking efforts around the world.

Artists of all kinds—from celebrated professionals to folk, outsider, underground, and guerilla artists—have long put their creative powers in the service of initiatives for peace and justice. At the same time, politicians and peace activists have continually crafted modes of communication, confrontation, celebration, and commemoration that employ elements of theater, fashion, music, dance, visual art, creative writing and, more recently, digital media. These “exhibitions” and “performances” have been presented to audiences of all kinds, in venues as varied as the world’s great museums and performance halls, formal ceremonies and tradition-steeped rituals, university commons and the Internet, as well as coffeehouses, houses of worship, and the streets.

Prospective participants are encouraged to conceptualize “artistry,” “envisioning,” “performance, “representation,” “activism,” and “memorialization” in broad terms that will expand historians’ view of peacemaking and activism as art forms and of artistic production as peace activism. We invite critical reflections on, as well as appreciations of, the intersections of oppositional politics with visionary and performative identities and acts.

Included among the many questions we hope to explore within this conference theme are:

How have “peace” and “justice” been envisioned in the arts? How have artists (professional, outsider, folk, guerilla, underground, etc.) participated (or attempted to participate) in peacemaking processes?
In what ways can peace activism be considered an art form?

How has peacemaking been “staged,” “choreographed,” “scripted,” “narrated,” or “pictured” in political institutions, at negotiating tables, in public rituals (such as the Nobel ceremony), or at sites of struggle such as demonstrations, strikes, or occupations?

How have various forms of artistic expression intervened in prevailing political discourses on conflict and peace?

How have major social movements such as labor, feminism, the counterculture, and anticolonialism shaped the ways in which groups like The War Resisters’ League, Women Strike for Peace, YIPPIE!, School of the Americas Watch and others developed distinctive languages or modes of performance in their activism? How have activists strategically “performed” race, class, gender, and/or national identity to convey specific messages about peace or achieve specific forms of justice? To what degree did such groups create distinctive cultures of peacemaking?

How have specific moments in peace history been presented, re-presented, promoted, altered, commemorated, contested, or misremembered through works of art?

How does a performative conception of peacemaking and peace activism either empower or hinder peace activists who wish to speak truth to power?

How do we critically analyze performative visions of peacemaking while remaining alive to these visions’ potential to revitalize peace activism and keep it culturally relevant?

The Program Committee wishes to emphasize that the theme of “artistic production” is intended to be broadening, not restrictive. Proposals for papers that address variations of the conference theme or issues in peace history outside of this specific theme are also strongly encouraged.

Strong conference papers will be considered for publication in Peace and Change to be co-edited by the program co-chairs and Robbie Lieberman, Southern Illinois University Carbondale.

For conference updates, visit the PHS website, at http://www.peacehistorysociety.org/phs2013/

Please forward proposals for individual papers or a panel to both program committee chairs by November 1, 2012. Email submissions are greatly preferred.

Heather Fryer
heatherfryer@creighton.edu
Department of History
Creighton University
2500 California Plaza
Omaha, NE 68178

2014 OAH Richard W. Leopold Prize

The Richard W. Leopold Prize is given biennially by the Organization of American Historians to the author or editor of the best book on foreign policy, military affairs, historical activities of the federal government, documentary histories, or biography written by a U.S. government historian or federal contract historian. These subjects cover the concerns and the historical fields of activity of the late Professor Leopold, who was president of the OAH 1976-1977.

The prize was designed to improve contacts and interrelationships within the historical profession where an increasing number of history-trained scholars hold distinguished positions in governmental agencies. The prize recognizes the significant historical work being done by historians outside academe.

Each entry must be published during the two-year period January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2013.

The award will be presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the OAH in Atlanta, Georgia, April 10-13.

Submission Procedures

The winner must have been employed as a full-time historian or federal contract historian with the U.S. government for a minimum of five years prior to the submission. If the author has accepted an academic position, retired, or otherwise left federal service, the book must have been published within two years of their separation date. Verification of current or past employment with the U.S. government must be included with each entry.

One copy of each entry, clearly labeled “2014 Richard W. Leopold Prize Entry,” must be mailed directly to the committee members listed below. Each committee member must receive all submissions by October 1, 2013.

Bound page proofs may be used for books to be published after October 1, 2013 and before January 1, 2014. If a bound page proof is submitted, a bound copy of the book must be received no later than January 7, 2014.

If a book carries a copyright date that is different from the publication date, but the actual publication date falls during
the correct timeframe making it eligible, please include a letter of explanation from the publisher with each copy of the book sent to the committee members.

The final decision will be made by the Richard W. Leopold Prize Committee by February 1, 2014. The winner will be provided with details regarding the OAH Annual Meeting and awards presentation, where s/he will receive a cash award and a plaque.

Submission Deadline: OCTOBER 1, 2013

Richard W. Leopold Prize Committee

Kevin Adams (Committee Chair)
Kent State University
Department of History
Kent, OH 44242

Jeffrey A. Engel
Southern Methodist University
Clements Department of History
PO Box 750176
Dallas, TX 75275

Gregory Mixon
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Department of History
209 Garinger Hall
9201 University City Boulevard
Charlotte, NC 28223-0001

4. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines

Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of $2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award will be announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the selection committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

To nominate a book published in 2012 for the 2013 prize, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Professor Mark Atwood Lawrence, Department of History, University of Texas, GAR 3.220, Mailcode B7000, Austin, TX 78712. Books may be sent at any time during 2012, but must arrive by December 1, 2012.

Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of $1000 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee’s c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture
Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee’s excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year’s OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer’s specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded $1,000 plus up to $500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in Diplomatic History.

To be considered for the 2013 award, nominations must be received by **February 28, 2013**. Nominations should be sent to Professor Michelle Mart, Department of History, Pennsylvania State University-Berks, Tulpehocken Road, P.O. Box 7009, Reading, PA 19610 (e-mail: mam20@psu.edu).

**Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize**

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of $1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article’s acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in Diplomatic History will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2012 for the 2013 prize, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Professor Donna Alvah, Department of History, St. Lawrence University, 23 Romoda Drive, Canton, NY 13617. Deadline for nominations is **February 1, 2013**.

**Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize**

This prize is designed to reward distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. The prize of $2,500 is awarded annually. The Ferrell Prize was established to honor Robert H. Ferrell, professor of diplomatic history at Indiana University from 1961 to 1990, by his former students.

Eligibility: The Ferrell Prize recognizes any book beyond the first monograph by the author. To be considered, a book must deal with the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. Three copies of the book must be submitted.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate a book published in 2012 for the 2013 prize, send three copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Professor Cary Fraser, Department of African and African-American Studies, The Pennsylvania State University, 133 Willard Building, University Park, PA 16801 (e-mail: cff2@psu.edu). Books may be sent at any time during 2012, but must arrive by **December 15, 2012**.

**Norman and Laura Graebner Award**

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of $2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

Eligibility: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient’s career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Procedures: Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee’s major
scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate’s career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate’s classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate’s services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-nominations are accepted.

Graebner awards are announced at SHAFR’s annual meeting. The next deadline for nominations is **March 1, 2013**. Submit materials to Penny Von Eschen, Department of History, University of Michigan, 1029 Tisch Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.

The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize

The Betty M. Unterberger Prize is intended to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by graduate students in the field of diplomatic history. The Prize of $1,000 is awarded biannually (in odd years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years, on any topic in United States foreign relations history. The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference.

The Prize was established in 2004 to honor Betty Miller Unterberger, a founder of SHAFR and long-time professor of diplomatic history at Texas A&M University.

**Procedures**: A dissertation may be submitted for consideration by the author or by the author’s advisor. Three copies of the dissertation should be submitted, along with a cover letter explaining why the dissertation deserves consideration.

Directions for submission of dissertations for the 2013 Unterberger Dissertation Prize will be available in late 2012.

The Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize is awarded for outstanding collections of primary source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents and set them within their historical context. Published works as well as electronic collections and audio-visual compilations are eligible. The prize is not limited to works on American foreign policy, but is open to works on the history of international, multi-archival, and/or American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy.

The award of $1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best work published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

**Procedures**: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Send three copies of the book or other work with letter of nomination to Professor Cary Fraser, Department of African and African-American Studies, The Pennsylvania State University, 133 Willard Building, University Park, PA 16802 (e-mail: cff2@psu.edu). To be considered for the 2013 prize, nominations must be received by **January 15, 2013**.

**SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship**

SHAFR invites applications for its dissertation completion fellowship. SHAFR will make two, year-long awards, in the amount of $20,000 each, to support the writing and completion of the doctoral dissertation in the academic year 2011-12. These highly competitive fellowships will support the most promising doctoral candidates in the final phase of completing their dissertations. SHAFR membership is required.

Applicants should be candidates for the PhD in a humanities or social science doctoral program (most likely history), must have been admitted to candidacy, and must be at the writing stage, with all substantial research completed by the time of the award. Applicants should be working on a topic in the field of U.S. foreign relations history or international history, broadly defined, and must be current members of SHAFR. Because successful applicants are expected to finish writing the dissertation during the tenure of the fellowship, they should not engage in teaching opportunities or extensive paid work, except at the discretion of the Fellowship Committee. At the termination of the award period, recipients must provide a one page (250-word) report to the SHAFR Council on the use of the fellowship, to be considered for publication in Passport, the society newsletter.

The submission packet should include:

- A one page application letter describing the project’s significance, the applicant’s status, other support received or applied for and the prospects for completion within the year
- A three page (750 word) statement of the research
- A curriculum vitae
• A letter of recommendation from the primary doctoral advisor.

Applications should be sent by electronic mail to dissertation-fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line should clearly indicate “Last Name: SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship.

The annual deadline for submissions is **April 1**. Fellowship awards will be decided by around May 1 and will be announced formally during the SHAFR annual meeting in June, with expenditure to be administered during the subsequent academic year.

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**Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant**

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of up to $4,000 is intended to help graduate students defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Holt, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in **Passport**.

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**W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship**

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in **Passport**.

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**Lawrence Gelfand – Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship**

SHAFR established this fellowship to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of **Diplomatic History**.

The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in **Passport**.

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Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants

The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote dissertation research by graduate students. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to $2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Gelfand-Rappaport grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is October 1. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of Diplomatic History.

The Hogan Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is October 1. Submit materials to hogan-fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants

The William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants are intended to promote scholarly research by untenured college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. and who are working as professional historians. Grants are limited to scholars working on the first research monograph. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to $2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is October 1. Submit materials to williams-fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship was established by the Bernath family to promote scholarship in U.S. foreign relations history by women.

The Myrna Bernath Fellowship of up to $5,000 is intended to defray the costs of scholarly research by women. It is awarded biannually (in odd years) and announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applications are welcomed from women at U.S. universities as well as women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and those within five years of completion of their Ph.Ds.
Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found at www.shafr.org. The biannual deadline for applications is October 1 of even years. Submit materials to myrnabernath-committee@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

5. Recent Publications of Interest


Cairo, Michael F. The Gulf: The Bush Presidencies and the Middle East (Kentucky, 2012).

Callahan, James Morton. The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy (CreateSpace, 2012; reprint).


Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan (Knopf, 2012).


Crist, David. The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty Year Conflict with Iran (Penguin, 2012).


Gibson, David R. Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Princeton, 2012).


Harrington, Daniel F. Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War (Kentucky, 2012).


O’Hern, Steven. *Iran’s Revolutionary Guard: The Threat that Grows While America Sleeps* (Potomac, 2012).


Rust, William J. *Before the Quagmire: American Intervention in Laos* (Kentucky, 2012).


Tsygankov, Andrei P. *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin* (Cambridge, 2012).


Wirtz, James and Peter Lavoy, eds. *Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats* (Stanford, 2012).


Dear SHAFR,

As a scholar of American foreign relations, I periodically travel to the national archives and presidential libraries in order to seek out pertinent documents to my research. But most recently, I received a notification from the Lyndon Baines Johnson library that informed me that my mandatory review had been rejected on the basis that I was a foreign national.

The letter reads, “The agency to which we sent your request has returned it to us unreviewed because they are no longer processing declassification requests from foreign nationals and/or their governments.” The letter went on to cite Section 3.5(h) of Executive Order 13526, which states, “this section shall not apply to any request for a review made to an element of the Intelligence Community that is made by a person other than an individual as that term is defined by 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(2), or by a foreign government entity or representative thereof.”

I was quite taken back that I had been denied a MR request on the basis that I was not an American, I am Canadian-born and study at a British school, the London School of Economics. I wrote back to the LBJ library and asked to challenge the order and they responded sympathetically, adding that I “could ... write the President.” On the advice of a colleague, I took the matter to Bob Jervis at Columbia, who is Chairman of the CIA’s Historical Review Panel, who agreed that “the interpretation of the law is made above the level of CIA” and said he would look into the matter. He has since written to me to say that he has raised the matter with the review panel and that they are looking into it.

To be fair, it is not as if this is even a highly sensitive document. It is two pages from Current Intelligence Digest from February 1964 dealing with the Kurds of Iraq. Given this date, the article almost certainly discusses a ceasefire declared in the Kurdish revolt a few days earlier. In fact, I am certain that I have a declassified copy of the document in question, but from a different source (via CREST).

At this point, I imagine you are asking, “why not have an American friend put forward the request?” In all likelihood this is what I will do. But I am writing to all of you because I think this presents a systematic bias against non-American academics who study intelligence matters. To me, this is a matter of principle and academic freedom. I view the blocking of my request as being somewhat discriminatory against non-American scholars of intelligence matters. And there is no doubt there are plenty of us. The whole point of declassifying these documents is to advance our knowledge of how America conducts its foreign policy around the world. That is all I want to do.

I am perplexed by this decision and think that an exception to this rule needs to made in the case of bona fide scholars. It seems remarkably chauvinistic and discriminatory for the American government to allow American-born scholars to seek the declassification of intelligence documents while barring the rest of us. I hope that by writing this letter something can be done to help rectify this unfortunate situation.

Sincerely,

Bryan R. Gibson
MA, BA, BSS, PhD Candidate
Department of International History
London School of Economics

June 6, 2012

Dear Professor Hahn,

I’m writing to express my thanks for the Samuel Flagg Bemis research grant I received from SHAFR last year. This spring I visited a number of libraries, archives, and government ministries in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. I found a variety of invaluable sources for my dissertation on the oil crisis of the 1970s, and I’m grateful for SHAFR’s help in making that research possible.

With best regards,

Victor McFarland
Yale University
2012 Bernath Book Prize Report

Twenty books were submitted for consideration for the 2012 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize, awarded annually for the best first book by an author on the history of American foreign relations in the previous year. The committee members concur that it was an impressive pool of books that represented the wide range of approaches and topics that are the hallmark of SHAFR's membership. Notably, almost half of the works (nine) were concerned with period prior to 1945.

From this diverse and rich group, the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize Committee—David F. Schmitz, Chair (Whitman College), Mark Lawrence (University of Texas, Austin), and Anne Foster (Indiana State University)—selected one book for honorable mention along with the Bernath Book Prize winner.

Honorable mention goes to Jason Colby, *The Business of Empire: United Fruit, Race, and U.S. Expansion in Central America* (Cornell University Press, 2011). Colby's book, based on extensive research in international archives, business records, and an examination of public discourse, is a compelling, multifaceted study that integrated ideology, race, economics, and state power in a convincing manner to explain the expansion of American power and influence in Central America at the end of the nineteenth century and the first four decades of the twentieth.


Based on impressively deep research in the archives of several countries and international organizations, Sarah Snyder's *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War* provides insight into one of the most momentous questions of recent international history: why did the Cold War end when it did? Snyder argues convincingly that the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 gave rise to numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations in many countries dedicated to implementing provisions calling for expanded protection of human rights across Europe. Engaging the literature on human rights and superpower policies to craft an original analysis of a difficult topic, Snyder demonstrates the important of human rights in promoting change and that for more than a decade an increasingly elaborate network of organizations in both East and West demanded reform in the communist bloc, ultimately realizing their goals after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and opened political space where the human rights agenda could take root. Soviet acceptance of human rights norms, Snyder concludes, marked a crucial stage in the collapse of the Cold War order and the rise of a post-Cold War leadership in Central and Eastern Europe. International history at its best, the book is a major addition to the literature on human rights and the collapse of the Cold War order, and merits the careful attention of scholars in a range of sub-fields.

David F. Schmitz
Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize Committee chair
In Memoriam:
Betty Miller Unterberger, 1922-2012

Terry H. Anderson

Betty Miller Unterberger, a founding member of SHAFR and its first female president, died peacefully at her home on May 15, 2012. She was 89.

Betty was born in Scotland and raised and educated in the United States. She won a forensics scholarship to attend Syracuse University, but was bored with the curriculum, so took a citizenship course from the only woman professor she ever had in college, Marguerite J. Fisher. The professor provoked the young student, and Betty developed an interest in history and political science. She received her B.A. and enrolled at Harvard University for an M.A., where she took classes from Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., and was influenced by Howard Mumford Jones, dean of the Graduate School. Betty had a number of jobs while at Cambridge, including modeling; later she would complain that she was stunned that she could make more money standing in front of a camera than being a professional historian.

Dean Jones took a special interest in Betty, who had met another graduate student studying physics, Robert Unterberger. He fell in love and proposed, but initially she was more interested in her academic career than in marriage. Betty later told Lee W. Formwalt in a 2005 interview for the Organization of American Historians, that when she was sick with the flu, Jones came to visit her, and asked, “Why don’t you say yes to Robert?” In a “weakened state” Betty responded, “OK. I’ll say yes,” and the dean rushed to the telephone, called Bob, and declared, “Betty will marry you. You better get here and clinch the deal.” He did, they eventually had three children and a wonderful marriage for over 65 years.

At Harvard, Betty took American, British, Russian, and Asian history, but was most inspired from a course that she took from a visiting professor from Stanford, Thomas A. Bailey. His lectures provoked her, and he became one of her heroes. It was from Bailey that she first learned about American troops in Russia at the end of the Great War, a topic that she would pursue for her Ph.D. dissertation.

Bob joined the military and after the war in 1946 he and Betty enrolled at Duke University. A course there that had an impact on her career was a seminar with historian Charles Sydnor. He encouraged her to revise and submit her seminar paper for publication, and that resulted in her first article in the Journal of Southern History in 1947. Meanwhile, she and Bob completed their research and wrote their dissertations in history and physics, completing their degrees in 1950. Her dissertation became her first book, which she published in 1956, America’s Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920: A Study of National Policy, (Duke University Press) which won prizes from the university and from the Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA.

In 1950, the young couple got jobs in California, and she eventually became a faculty member at Whittier College. The early 1950s, of course, was the zenith of McCarthyism, and Betty taught a class on U.S. international relations that included reading the Communist Manifesto. That made the college president uneasy, and he told her that he might have to terminate her employment. Betty asked to talk with one of the board members, and he took her to lunch at his country club, where she convinced him that a college education was based on honest discussion of different ideas, something the Soviet Union would never tolerate but was mandatory in the United States. Impressed with Betty, the board member enrolled in one of her courses, eventually a second one, and he became a convert; he observed Betty’s students analyzing different ideas and ideologies and their excitement with the learning process.

After a decade she left Whittier for California State University at Fullerton. By this time she had published her book and a series of significant articles which made her one of the leading experts on President Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy in Europe. She was a full professor at Fullerton and also won the first distinguished teaching award in the state university system.

In his 2005 interview, Lee Formwalt asked Betty about being a woman in a male-dominated profession and specialty of foreign relations. She said that during her graduate education she often was asked what she was doing in a profession, not having children, and one time a male complained about the money the university spent on her. “You’re taking bread out of the mouths of deserving male students.” Such comments hurt her, but also increased her inner strength and resolve, “I’ll show him,” she said to herself. She did, but many times during...
these years she had to put up with sexism, sarcasm, and being called “Mrs. Unterberger” while her male faculty colleagues were called “Doctor.”

In 1968 her husband Bob received an excellent offer from the Geophysics Department at Texas A&M University. Betty was reluctant to make the move to a campus that was beginning its transition from an all-male, military, segregated institution to one that accepted and hired all citizens. She met with President Earl Rudder, the World War II leader of “Rudder’s Rangers” who scaled the Normandy cliffs on D-Day 1944, and with the vice president for academic affairs, Horace R. Byers. They convinced her that she was needed in the history department to begin the process of internationalizing the curriculum and developing the graduate program. She accepted, and became the first woman in that department and the first female full professor at Texas A&M.

Texas A&M was the fastest growing university in the nation during the 1970s, expanding from about 8,000 to over 32,000 students, and she immediately had an impact on the institution, winning teaching awards and teaching classes on the United States and the World. She also was having an impact on the profession, for in 1967 she was a founding member of the new professional organization, SHAFR. In the early years, she later reported, the organization was “99 percent male,” but she quickly became very involved, especially concerning fund-raising. During the next decade a young historian, Stuart L. Bernath, died, and SHAFR enlisted Betty to meet with that generous family. She and others convinced Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath to become the first benefactors of SHAFR, and the result was the Stuart L. Bernath book, lecture, and article prizes. Eventually, the family provided funds for the best book written by a woman on U.S. foreign relations, the Myrna F. Bernath Prize.

In 1986, SHAFR’s membership rewarded Betty for her hard work by electing her as the first female president of the organization. As she told me many times, this was a capstone in her career; she loved SHAFR, where she developed many of the strongest friendships of her life. Those friends reciprocated again for Betty in the late 1990s. H.W. “Bill” Brands and I began the drive to collect the necessary funds that established SHAFR’s Betty Miller Unterberger Dissertation Prize, first awarded in 2004.

Meanwhile, she continued her academic career, publishing dozens of articles in venues from Diplomatic History to the Russian Review to The Nation. In 1987 she gave a series of lectures published as Intervention Against Communism: Did the United States Try to Overthrow the Soviet Government, 1918-1920? (Texas A&M University Press) and in 1989 her major work, The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (University of North Carolina Press), which appropriately won SHAFR’s first Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize. In 1991, Texas A&M honored her with the Patricia and Bookman Peters Professorship and the next year she accepted an appointment at Charles University in Prague, where she was the one of the first Western scholars to gain access to Czech and Russian documents after the end of the Cold War. Toward the twilight of her career the university again honored her by naming her Regents Professor.

As Betty rose in prominence she was asked to serve on many national advisory committees--The Organization of American Historians committee on Research and Access to Historical Documentation, and similar committees for the U.S. Army, the State Department, Defense Department, and the CIA. Always a strong defender of the Freedom of Information Act, she often was frustrated trying to get the federal bureaucracy to release documentation for historical research. Nevertheless, upon her retirement at age 81 from Texas A&M in 2004, then-CIA director Leon Panetta sent her a personal letter commending her for her service to the CIA, and to the nation.

Betty is survived by her husband, Bob; her daughter, the Reverend Dr. Gail Unterberger; her son, Gregg Unterberger, M.Ed; two grandchildren; three great-grandchildren; and numerous friends. Betty was a path-breaker in our profession, but much more. Her warm smile, passion for learning, steady determination, meant that Betty led by her own example. She enhanced our profession--and our lives.
The Last Word:
SHAFR is from Mars...

Kelly J. Shannon

Anyone who has attended a SHAFR conference over the last several years knows how this organization is grappling with important issues relating to its future. The Council and its various committees, including the Committee on Women in SHAFR which I currently co-chair, have worked hard to recruit new members and make historians in related fields realize that the scholarship presented at the SHAFR conferences and in Diplomatic History is far more broad, innovative, and (dare I say) relevant than they ever imagined.

To a large extent, we have been successful in our mission to keep SHAFR dynamic. Our current president Tom Zeiler did a fantastic job of detailing our successes in his Passport column in January 2012. And our successes have been many. Due to unprecedented numbers of proposals the last several years, our conference now boasts an expanded number of panels and roundtables. The 2012 conference in Hartford featured panels on topics ranging from traditional diplomatic history to NGOs to postcolonialism to legal history to women and gender, from the 18th through 20th centuries, dealing not only with the United States, but also with South Asia, Latin America, Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. No other field is as comprehensive in its geographic scope. Our recent conference participants are the most diverse in the organization's history, not just in terms of methodological approach or research interests, but also in terms of gender, race/ethnicity, and career path. SHAFR has funded both cutting-edge and more traditional research in our field, and we have debated fruitfully whether or not to change the name of Diplomatic History. I could go on.

We have spent the better part of the last decade examining where we have been and how we can make SHAFR even better in the future: more attractive to potential new members, especially women and other under-represented groups; more expansive and welcoming of methodological variety in our scholarship; more supportive of graduate students and early career scholars; more connected to the needs of our students, the academy, and our society; and more capable of keeping up with the changes in higher education and foreign policymaking. Truly, SHAFR is an exciting—and welcoming—organization to be a member of, and I believe that our willingness to engage in self-reflection and friendly debate is one of our greatest strengths. Can we do more?

I am not convinced that most historians in other fields are aware yet of how much SHAFR has changed in recent years. I have a sneaking suspicion that we still suffer from an image problem, that other historians may perceive diplomatic history as a narrow, fossilized field that is either sliding into oblivion or is irrelevant to their own work. We know we are neither, but do they?

I first began to suspect this as I conducted research for my dissertation in the summer of 2009 (travel courtesy of a SHAFR Bemis grant—many thanks!). One of my trips was to a women's history archive in New England, which houses the records of an international NGO that were crucial to my project and that I had corresponded with one of the archivists, I told her I was getting my Ph.D. in the history of American foreign relations from Temple University. She replied, “Really?” – with a raised eyebrow – “We don’t get many of you up here.” How odd, I thought. I was suddenly self-conscious. Then I told her what my dissertation was about: the integration of concern for Muslim women’s rights into U.S. foreign policy since the late 1970s. She looked at me like I had just landed from Mars. Was I absolutely certain, she wanted to know, that they had records of use to me, since their repository has only women’s history collections? Apparently, U.S. foreign relations and women’s history seemed mutually exclusive. I assured her that they did have collections of crucial importance to my project and that I had corresponded with one of their archivists in advance of my trip. After that, she and the other archivists were quite friendly and extremely helpful. It was a productive trip, and I enjoyed working there. But still, as I sifted through boxes of documents day after day, I could not help but wonder what the other researchers there—all working on projects related to domestic women’s history—would think of my project or of SHAFR. Would they see me as a Martian, too?

Around that time, those of us on the Committee on Women in SHAFR were brainstorming for new ideas...
about how to attract more women to SHAFR, and I kept thinking about my trip to that archive. It was so unusual for a foreign relations historian to do research there that not only did the archivist find my presence remarkable, but the NGO collection that I used was unprocessed despite being accessioned in the 1980s, indicating to me that the internationally-oriented materials at the archive were not terribly in-demand with researchers. Hmm. I knew that historians of U.S. foreign relations and international history were increasingly examining women and gender. It stood to reason that women's historians must also be expanding their field and producing more scholarship that placed women in an international context. But where were they?

To get a sense of how many women's historians worked on topics that might fall under the SHAFR umbrella, I decided to look at the past programs of the Berkshire Conference of Women Historians, a.k.a. the “Big Berks.” The Berks is a massive conference convened every three years that includes panels and roundtables on every type of scholarship imaginable related to women's history. I discovered that the vast majority of panels from 1974 through 2005 were national in scope, mainly focused on the United States or Europe. Each conference, only a tiny percentage of panels dealt with transnational/international topics, and an even smaller fraction dealt with what could be considered American foreign relations. I was surprised.

I wondered if the lack of SHAFR-type work represented at the Berks indicated a lack of interest in foreign relations by women's historians, if SHAFR members were choosing not to present there (or perhaps had not considered presenting there), or if it was a combination of those two factors. I knew I would not come up with an answer on my own, so I mentioned my thoughts to some SHAFR colleagues. I learned that no prize from any Women's Studies organization or the Berks had ever gone to a book or article focused on foreign policy, even when such scholarship centered on women. One colleague also recalled overhearing a women's historian disparaging diplomatic history as unfriendly to women's history when talking to a student. This person's attitude recalls the New York Times editorial by Patricia Cohen (“Great Caesar's Ghost! Are Traditional History Courses Vanishing?,” June 10, 2009) and the H-Net discussion about the state of the field that informed it. This image problem is exactly why we need to let other historians know how vibrant and welcoming of diversity our field actually is.

Perhaps, I thought, women's historians interested in international topics and foreign relations did not know that SHAFR could be a scholarly home for them. The Women's Committee decided that we would propose a panel exchange with the Berks. We put together a panel sponsored by SHAFR for the 2011 Berks conference, and we invited them to send a panel to our next annual meeting. Our panel was accepted, although we never received a reciprocal proposed for a panel at the SHAFR conference. Thus, in June 2011, Naoko Shibusawa, Helen Laville, Katie Slattery, and I took SHAFR on the road and presented at the Berkshire Conference in Amherst. We lucked out, as that year's conference program boasted more international and foreign relations-themed panels than ever before—nearly two dozen out of 190 panels. We presented to a packed room with an engaged audience, indicating that there was, indeed, a high level of interest in the kinds of work we at SHAFR are doing.

Seeing that SHAFR officially sponsored the panel, I hope, helped raise our profile with some women's historians. But it was just one panel at one conference, a small step in the larger project of spreading awareness in other fields about the work we are doing.

In addition to our ongoing efforts to recruit new members and conference presenters, I propose that we undertake more initiatives like the Berks panel exchange. I know that our members do present papers at other conferences and that SHAFR sponsors panels at the AHA and OAH, but why not also officially sponsor panels at conferences of organizations like the Middle Eastern Studies Association, Association for Asian Studies, National Women's Studies Association, African Studies Association, etc.—as well as the 2014 Berks—that showcase new research in our field and demonstrate (implicitly or explicitly) how our field and theirs intersect. Heck, why not even have a roundtable? Or have an informational table at their book exhibits? Taking parts of SHAFR on the road will not just attract new members, it will put us into a broader, in-person conversation with historians from other fields. We have a lot to learn from one another, and maybe we won’t be seen as narrowly-focused dinosaurs (or Martians) anymore.

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