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Environmental Diplomacy Historiography
Autobiographical and Biographical Revisionism

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New Editors for Diplomatic History

Mark Philip Bradley

I am delighted to announce the appointment of Nick Cullather, Professor of History at Indiana University, and Anne Foster, Associate Professor of History at Indiana State University, as the new Editors of Diplomatic History beginning in August 2014.

This appointment by the SHAFR Council follows a national search chaired by Frank Costigliola (University of Connecticut). He was assisted by committee members Richard Immerman (Temple University), Andrew Preston (Clare College, Cambridge), Emily Rosenberg (University of California-Irvine), and Naoko Shibasawa (Brown University). I thank all of them for their dedicated service on this important committee.

Cullather and Foster’s appointment in August 2014 will follow Thomas W. Zeiler’s current term as Editor, which has done so much to make Diplomatic History the premier journal in our field. Zeiler (University of Colorado) served as Executive Editor of Diplomatic History from 2001 to 2011 under Editor-in-Chief Robert D. Schulzinger (University of Colorado). In 2011 Zeiler became Editor, working with Nathan J. Citino (Colorado State University) and Kenneth Osgood (Colorado School of Mines) as his Associate Editors. Together they crafted a journal that has featured outstanding and innovative articles reflecting the increasingly diverse approaches to the study of American foreign relations. They oversaw a dramatic increase in submissions and subscriptions, a larger international presence for Diplomatic History in terms of both its contributors and audience, and the transition to our new publisher, Oxford University Press. They also shepherded Diplomatic History into the digital age seeing literally tens of thousands of downloads of past and recent articles that have further increased the journal’s global reach and influence (full-text downloads of Diplomatic History articles reached 160,000 in 2011). SHA FR as an organization, its members, and scholars in our field and beyond all owe an immense debt of gratitude for the diligence, savvyness, and innovativeness Zeiler, Schulzinger, Citino and Osgood brought to Diplomatic History.

As long time members of SHA FR know, Zeiler’s editorship of Diplomatic History is but one dimension of his sustained service to the organization. He is not only our immediate past-President, but has served as the Editor-in-Chief of American Foreign Relations Since 1600: A Guide to the Literature, which remains the go-to guide to the historiography in our field and is now moving to an on-line edition. Zeiler has chaired our Committee on Historical Documentation and served as a SHA FR representative for the Department of State Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation. He has been a member of the SHA FR’s Ways and Means Committee, Summer Institute Oversight Committee, Diplomatic History Contracts Committee, Bernath Lecture Prize Committee, Bernath Dissertation Award Committee and the Program Committee for our annual conference. As Chair of the Membership Committee, Zeiler oversaw efforts in recent years to increase our diversity and international membership in part through the development of the Global Scholars Grant and Diversity Grant programs that ease the burden of travel to present work at the SHA FR conference. I am sure all of you join me in thanking Tom for his incredible commitment to making SHA FR the strong and vibrant organization it is today, and in my hope that he will continue to play a key role our future.

Nick Cullather and Anne Foster each bring an impressive record of scholarship to their new positions as Editors of Diplomatic History. Cullather’s work has focused on the history of intelligence, development and nation building. He is the author of The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Harvard, 2010), which won SHA FR’s Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize; Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford, 2006); and Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 1942-1960 (Stanford, 1994). His work has appeared in the American Historical Review and the Journal of American History. Foster’s scholarship concentrates on American diplomacy in the age of high imperialism. She is the author of Projection of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941 (Duke, 2010); co-edited The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives (Duke 2003); and is completing a book-length study of the politics of opium in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Her work has appeared in the International History Review and the Journal of American-East Asian Relations. Cullather served on the Editorial Board of Diplomatic History, and both he and Foster have published in the journal as well as played an active role on various SHA FR committees.

Cullather and Foster are keen to build upon the strengths Zeiler and his Colorado team brought to Diplomatic History. They plan to continue and deepen efforts to publish work by a broad range of scholars working on American foreign relations history, in part by encouraging more articles that focus on periods before 1940. While they believe the scholarly research article must remain the mainstay of the journal, they will add pedagogical articles and revive the “research note” as a forum for addressing difficult methodological issues, exploring new or little-used sources or assessing the value of technological developments. Cullather and Foster also plan to introduce a new approach to roundtables, modeled on the American Historical Review’s “Conversation” feature, through which directed interaction by participants over several weeks will be edited into a manageable and readable article with the possibility of continuing the conversation in public after publication. They will also look for ways to take advantage of technological innovations to make the journal even more responsive to readers and appealing to a generation used to encountering texts in a variety of formats. Cullather and Foster wrote in their statement about plans for the journal: “The history profession is moving toward internationalism and placing culture, space, the state, borders and ideas at the center of inquiry. Diplomatic History can be a leading journal not only just in the field but in the broader discipline and the humanities. That is the challenge we would like to set for the journal and ourselves.” It is an exciting vision and one that honors the efforts of former editors of the journal since its founding in 1977 –George C. Herring, Alexander DeConde, Warren I. Cohen, Michael J. Hogan, Robert D. Schulzinger and Thomas W. Zeiler– to ensure that Diplomatic History speaks powerfully to all SHA FR members and to the wider historical community.
The year 2014 marks the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War, a major watershed in world history. The war destroyed the balance of power in Europe, accelerated the decline of Western Europe as the center of global affairs, created grievances that fueled later conflicts, and stimulated the rise of two revolutionary superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The war also gave rise to a powerful set of ideas known ever since as “Wilsonianism.” Advanced by President Woodrow Wilson and his allies during and immediately after the war, this package of sweeping reform measures called for nothing less than the remaking of the international order through collective security, free trade, and self-determination. Although this agenda was largely defeated by 1920, it made a remarkable comeback in the 1940s and became a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and global politics more generally thereafter. Indeed, Wilsonianism remains a powerful current in international relations in the twenty-first century.

These themes will be at the heart of the seventh annual Summer Institute of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, which will take place between Sunday, June 22 and Friday, June 27, 2014, almost exactly 100 years after the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The Institute, which will be held immediately after the SHAFR annual meeting in Lexington, Kentucky, will be hosted by Williams College, in Williamstown, Massachusetts, well known for its excellence in the study of international affairs as well as its scenic beauty and cultural opportunities.

Designed for advanced graduate students and junior faculty members in history, political science, international relations, and related fields, the program will feature seminar-style discussions and meetings with top scholars of the First World War and Wilsonianism. The Institute will also explore each participant’s research, discuss how young scholars can prepare themselves for the job market, and help first-time authors prepare their work for publication. Each participant will be reimbursed for travel, will be provided free accommodation and most meals at Williams, and will receive an honorarium.

The deadline for applications is February 1, 2014. Applicants should submit a c.v. along with a one-page letter detailing how participation in the Institute would benefit their scholarship and careers. Please send this material to both of the Institute’s lead organizers, Mark Lawrence, associate professor of history at the University of Texas at Austin (malawrence@austin.utexas.edu), and James McAllister, professor of political science at Williams (james.mcallister@williams.edu). Please direct all questions to the same two addresses.
Introduction

Fraser J. Harbutt

In this roundtable, Frank Costigliola’s recent book, *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War*, is reviewed by a panel that includes Kimber Quinney, Petra Goedde, Wilson Miscamble, and William Hitchcock. Costigliola declares his basic argument as being “to go beyond earlier studies by tracing the political consequences of the relationships, personalities, emotional lives, emotional dispositions, sensibilities and cultural assumptions of Roosevelt and other key figures. A close-up view of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin is critical to understanding how they interacted to create and sustain Allied unity.” (12) More conventional explanatory categories—national interests, geopolitics, strategy, and economics among them—are not ignored but they are kept in the background and subordinated as primary causative elements to the personalities and interchanges of the three leaders.

The emphasis is upon a searchingly explored range of emotion-based and psycho-cultural factors. These include prolonged childhood and youthful fixations, unacknowledged status anxieties, exhibitionist tendencies, barely suppressed sexual hang-ups and more. In its application to events, notably in the late stages of World War II and especially at the summit meetings of 1943-1945, this approach leads to a judgment that only FDR, in his tenacious personal cultivation of Stalin, held out a credible vision of postwar harmony. “The Truman administration” he concludes, “might have gotten further with Stalin had it expressed the dictator’s emotional needs, as Roosevelt had tried to do.” (352)

In some sense this might well be characterized as a revolt of the intangibles against the tyranny of the document and the formalism of diplomatic historiography. But the research reflected in Costigliola’s eighty-five pages of notes is impressive, his emphasis on the significance of personality is powerfully argued, and his deep probe into the often glossed-over “inner history” of the period is admirable in principle, whatever reservations it may inspire in performance. The reader will find, amidst the interpretative and methodological innovations, many familiar landmarks. As the title suggests, the book is firmly American-centric. Europe, as an arguably complex political theater with its own life and some pretense to significant autonomous activity, is scarcely visible. It serves functionally as a field of interest and concern in U.S.-Soviet relations, the diplomatic centerpiece, but otherwise it is mainly a projection of the personal mindsets of the two European leaders who are shown (Churchill persistently, Stalin eventually as he comes slowly to see the light) revolving in unflattering, moon-like fashion around the sun of Roosevelt. FDR is himself deeply dependent emotionally on close aides like Missy LeHand and Harry Hopkins. But his far-seeing vision and “magnetic charm” hold the only real promise, frustrated later by an insensitive Truman and his hard-line advisers, of genuine postwar tripartite cooperation. In essence then, this would appear to be a strongly psychologized study of Big Three personal relationships set in an Americanized portrait of World War II and early Cold War diplomacy.

The reviewers remind us that controversy, not consensus, is our natural element. Fashions in interpretation appear, disappear, and reappear. At present, for instance, we are seeing a revival of interest in geopolitics, a cherished staple of realist thinking. This tendency is very predictably coming under critical review from those who see in it an assault on the primacy of human agency. At the same time Costigliola and other champions of the human factor as the irreducible prime mover of significant events are bound to encounter resistance from more structurally-oriented scholars. But, for all the passion on display here one senses in what follows a shared commitment to the creation of an accurate record of human experience in this uniquely disastrous era, reflecting a moral responsibility that is falling ever more insistently into our hands as direct memory of the catastrophe passes away.


Petra Goedde

Even though foreign relations scholars long ago moved beyond the realist school of interpretation, most of us would still like to think of the origins of the Cold War as at least partially informed by rational assessments about national interest and power politics. Frank Costigliola’s
book takes those assumptions as the point of departure and then gently but decisively leads us over to the “other” side, the side of decision-making informed by the full range of human experience, from cognition to emotion. The result is a new model for doing foreign relations history that sounds the death knell for the rational actor model so elegantly yet incompletely formulated in Graham T. Allison’s 1971 book, The Essence of Decision. The 1999 edition of that book, though substantially revised, still clung to the idea that political leaders based their decisions on rational factors alone, ignoring the excellent new scholarship on the cultural aspects of international relations. Costigliola’s study of the rise and decline of the Anglo-American-Soviet alliance during World War II establishes a new standard for incorporating cultural and psychological analysis into international relations history.

Costigliola succeeds brilliantly in dismantling the concept of the rational actor. He convinces us that much of what transpired among the Big Three during the war was built on deep emotional connections that might not have left their imprint in the official government documents at the time but nonetheless are in plain sight and can be easily detected by those who care to look and listen. These emotional connections, held together by the sheer determination and charisma of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, collapsed after his death and thus had a direct impact on the rapid deterioration of the wartime alliance between 1945 and 1946. Costigliola lets Averell Harriman, who served as ambassador to Russia at the time of transition from world war to Cold War, express his larger point: “If Roosevelt had lived with full vigor, it’s very hard to say what could happen because—Roosevelt could lead the world” (428).

In order to understand fully the bond that held the Big Three together during the war as well as the fissures that tore them apart after the war, one has to embed the rational explanations of their actions in the broader context of their emotional and cultural environment. Costigliola probes deeper than any scholar before him into the ways that FDR, Churchill, and Stalin connected on an emotional level. His ultimate objective is similar to that of Allison and other foreign policy scholars: to explain how leaders arrive at particular decisions that determine future policies. But rather than focusing exclusively on the rational aspects of the “essence of decision,” as others have done, he shows how emotions played a central role in the evolution and transformation of the Anglo-American-Soviet relationships from wartime alliance to postwar adversity. In short, he reveals the “essence of emotion” within the “essence of decision.”

Costigliola’s analysis does not, of course, do away entirely with the idea of the rational actor. To the contrary, he is mindful of the convergence between emotional impulses and rational calculations in the formulation of foreign policy. Perhaps the most erudite articulation of this point is buried in a footnote to the introduction, where Costigliola explains that “the emerging consensus among both humanists and scientists holds that emotion and cognition are not contrasting modes of thought but rather intertwined processes.” In fact, Costigliola continues, “emotion is necessary to rational decision making” (441, n40). This statement encapsulates the essence of Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances.

The book provides a masterful narrative of the complex triangulation of the wartime relationship. It offers fresh interpretations of traditional sources familiar to most and uses new sources—among them diaries, personal memoirs, and material from archival collections of less well-known figures—that provide a fuller picture of the personal experiences of those within the inner circles of political leaders. Costigliola’s portrayal of Roosevelt’s cohort of advisers is by far the most detailed, recreating the atmosphere of intimacy among his closest confidantes at the beginning of the war and showcasing his gradual estrangement from one after another as a result of disease, discord, or emotional distance, beginning with Missy LeHand, his personal and political assistant, who suffered a debilitating stroke in June 1941. FDR’s increasing personal isolation over the course of the war affected his day-to-day decision-making ability as much as his declining health.

Despite the gradual disappearance of his inner circle, Roosevelt remained throughout a master at combining national policy objectives with emotional investment in personal relations. Costigliola chronicles FDR’s ability to turn on the charm with both Churchill and Stalin whenever necessary, sometimes “courting” Stalin at the expense of Churchill, at other times taking Churchill into his confidence to underscore the special Anglo-American relationship. Paying close attention to the use of language, he is able to reveal the subtle indicators of the psychological subtext of the interactions among the three men. Beginning with a concise character study of each of them, he documents with surprising precision the homosocial atmosphere at international meetings, which at times morphed into situations approaching the homoerotic. For instance, an enthusiastic Stalin kissed the American ambassador, William C. Bullitt, on the mouth at the close of one of his lavish banquets, and Churchill discussed politics in the nude with advisers and allies, including, on more than one occasion, President Roosevelt (49, 153, 259–260). A less skilled historian might have included these moments as interesting asides, but for Costigliola they are central building blocks of the larger argument he is advancing: that the wartime alliance could only succeed because the three leaders revealed to each other so much of themselves (literally and figuratively), including their innermost fears and desires. Those included the fear of not being able to defeat the enemy, the fear of being betrayed by their own allies, and the desire for loyalty and respect from those allies.

Throughout the book Costigliola documents this emotional rollercoaster ride between desire and fear, between trust and suspicion, between loyalty and betrayal. Churchill’s mood was often directly related to wartime circumstances and his personal sense of his relationship with FDR and Stalin. When things went well, as they did during his visit to the White House just after Pearl Harbor or during his meeting with Stalin in Moscow in August 1942, Churchill was “ecstatic” and full of positive energy (153, 176). At other times, when fortunes turned sour or fatigue set in, he could be moody, irascible and depressed (89, 401). Costigliola shows that a good deal of Churchill’s policymaking throughout the war and early postwar period was a result of the synergy between realism and emotionalism, between “cognition” and “emotion.” The Iron Curtain speech, which Churchill gave in March 1946, was an example of that synergy. This speech, of course, defined much of what transpired in the early Cold War, but it revealed more about Churchill’s fears regarding what could happen than about the geopolitical situation as it actually existed at the time. The speech acquired such fame because people in power, above all Truman, shared those fears and acted upon them. According to Costigliola, Churchill himself later acknowledged that his portrayal of East-West relations at the time was an exaggeration of the facts (415). The speech was not a realistic appraisal of those relations; it reflected the fears and prejudices that helped bring about the Cold War.

A little less detailed but equally convincing is Costigliola’s characterization of Stalin’s emotional baggage. The Soviet dictator could show the utmost cruelty, physical toughness, and hyper-masculinity one day and be reduced to insecurity, mental collapse, and cowardice the next, striking “some close observers as feminine and soft” (50). Stalin was probably the most vulnerable member of the
triangular relationship, acutely aware of the cultural and ideological kinship between the other two and fearful of being abandoned by one or the other or both. He proved extremely receptive to Roosevelt’s charm and thus built his part of the alliance on his personal relationship with the American president. But because his trust was personal rather than political, it could not survive the death of FDR. After FDR, there was no political basis to fall back on and thus no platform for Truman to stand on. Perhaps the most revealing aspect of Costigliola’s book is how devastating the loss of FDR was to the Soviet leadership (419). Skeptics might argue that his death coincided with the defeat of Germany and thus the loss of the main incentive for the wartime alliance. But Costigliola’s evidence shows that this change alone could not explain the origins of the Cold War. Although he is careful not to stretch his argument into the counterfactual, he provides sufficient evidence to suggest that Roosevelt could have brokener a more amicable relationship with the Soviets that would have survived well into the postwar period.

Suspicion and mistrust permeated the exchanges between Stalin and Truman almost from the beginning. Because their rapport failed on a personal level, Truman and Stalin moved inexorably toward the Cold War. This does not mean that Costigliola sees the Cold War as inevitable. To the contrary, he argues that the Soviets for quite some time remained hopeful that they could strike a deal with the West (391). Yet Truman failed to respond to any cooperative signals from the Soviet side. During the crucial period between April 1945 and March 1946, Truman seemed to show little initiative and instead relied predominantly on advice from the Soviet experts around him, particularly Harriman and Kennan, who receive much of the attention in the latter part of the book. Kennan’s Long Telegram, which he sent from Moscow in February 1946 while deputy chief of the U.S. mission, captures particularly well, in Costigliola’s eyes, the deep suspicions toward postwar Russia. These Soviet experts dominate the narrative and overshadow the role played by the president.

By the same token, Britain’s postwar prime minister Clement Attlee surfaces only briefly in the book (Attlee’s foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, even less), even though he takes over from Churchill during the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. Winston Churchill still commands center stage in Costigliola’s analysis long after he lost the prime minister post. Costigliola provides only the sketchiest outline of Attlee’s personal approach to postwar international relations leaving key questions unanswered. Did Attlee buy into Churchill’s specter of the Iron Curtain at the time? Did he still see an opportunity to come to an understanding with the Soviets? His views might have been quite close to Churchill’s by 1946, but Costigliola does not tell us. To be sure, Churchill remained a larger-than-life figure in postwar international relations and eventually returned to the post of prime minister in 1951. But during the period under scrutiny here, he was not determining British foreign policy. It would have been helpful to get a fuller portrait of the man who actually led Britain into the Cold War.

This minor shortcoming should not detract from the tremendous accomplishment of Costigliola’s work. It sets a new standard for the evaluation of the origins of the Cold War. It also provides an alternative to the myth of the rational actor by demonstrating that rationality does not exist apart from policymakers’ emotional and cultural thinking. Costigliola reveals that paradoxically the triumph of realism in the early postwar period was built to a large degree on non-rational emotional expectations and assumptions. Anyone teaching and researching the origins of the Cold War can no longer ignore these non-rational undercurrents.

The Lives (and Loves) of the Big Three

William I. Hitchcock

There is a certain irony at the heart of Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances. Frank Costigliola, one of our most inventive and imaginative historians, has written what is in many ways an old-fashioned book. Although it claims to break new methodological and interpretive ground, in the end it is a book about the intimate doings of a small number of powerful men making decisions about world politics in smoke-filled rooms. Of course, the book emphasizes the cultural, social and gendered valences of the encounters of the wartime leaders, and Costigliola offers much creative unpacking of these meetings. But it is in essence a return to great-man biography, with its focus on the personal lives and loves of the allied leaders. Not only that, but the book’s familiar revisionist argument—Truman, Harriman, Bohlen, Kennan and a few other key officials started the Cold War, while Stalin sought cooperation—enhances the feeling of déjà vu.

To summarize Costigliola’s thesis: Franklin D. Roosevelt, a master manipulator of people, developed a political and personal style that relied upon a powerful combination of charm, deceit, sexual magnetism, guile and wit to entice his interlocutors, whether they were voters in Dutchess County, reporters in Washington, crowned heads of state (recall his feeding hot dogs to King George VI at Hyde Park) or the mass murderer Joseph Stalin. No one could resist his charms, and indeed his emotional intelligence proved to be the glue that forged the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union into an effective alliance against Nazi Germany. Once he died, the alliance fell apart, for Harry S. Truman had none of FDR’s emotional gifts and was unable to maintain an alliance with the suspicious Stalin. Cold war ensued. Costigliola’s broader claim is that historians of power politics and foreign relations need to do a better job of revealing the place of emotion and personality in binding leaders and their nations together or in driving them apart. Personality matters in the shaping of world affairs.

There are two ways to read Costigliola’s book. On one level, readers can enjoy it as a well-researched account of Franklin Roosevelt’s personality, of his inner circle, and especially of the way he used his intuitive genius and charm in his diplomacy. (The research on Churchill and Stalin is by comparison quite thin.) Here Costigliola makes a persuasive case—indeed, few would wish to refute it—that the personal qualities of leaders can become essential to their effectiveness in the public arena. Anyone who has watched Bill Clinton speak to an audience of Democrats, for example, will know that even a flawed leader who repeatedly treats his closest family members and associates with disrespect can, by using superior communication skills and an acute emotional sensibility, always find a way back into the hearts of his followers. Costigliola shows that FDR had this quality in spades. FDR could be cold and even cruel to his most intimate associates, yet they remained devoted to him. So too on the world stage: though FDR deliberately sidelined Churchill at times in favor of building closer ties to Stalin, the British leader was profoundly devoted to the American president. Costigliola is surely right, then: the personalities of leaders matter and the better we know the inner lives of such figures, the better we can understand their political behavior.

The second level on which to read and consider Costigliola’s book is as a work of diplomatic and military-strategic history, and here I found the book unpersuasive. Costigliola’s emphasis on personality and interpersonal relations draws our attention away from what I consider to be the central underpinnings of Allied victory in World War II and of the immediate postwar order: state power,
ideology, and geopolitics. It is true that Costigliola does not dismiss these elements as irrelevant, but he does seek to raise personal relations to the same level of importance. He argues that “the functioning of the wartime alliance and the future of the postwar world pivoted on diplomacy inextricably personal and political” (3). He goes on to say that “the Grand Alliance cohered and then collapsed for reasons more contingent, emotional and cultural than historians have heretofore recognized” (4). I take this to mean that he believes that the wartime alliance was cemented chiefly by personal qualities—foremost among them FDR’s ability to coax and charm—and that once the president died, the alliance fell apart.

This argument places a great deal of weight on the role of one man in creating the global alliance and guiding it toward victory. Not only does this view underestimate the contribution of the British, who from the fall of France until June 22, 1941, fought Hitler alone and with great resilience, but it also overlooks the central role that Hitler played in cementing the Grand Alliance. Hitler is infrequently mentioned in the book, yet—and this seems almost too obvious to need stating—without Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, the Grand Alliance never would have been created. And once Hitler was dead, the alliance lost its raison d’être. Is it possible that the death of Hitler, rather than the death of Roosevelt, played a larger role in the breakdown of the wartime alliance? Costigliola does not address the issue.

Nor was FDR the only person whose skills were required to build the alliance and guide it to success. Two Americans who are rarely mentioned here—Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower—spent untold hours working with their British counterparts to develop a common strategy for waging global war. No one would equate the social skills of these two military men with Roosevelt’s, yet they did build a strong partnership with the British despite their profound disagreements about strategy. Anyone familiar with the Anglo-American military relationship will know that it pivoted not on FDR’s emotions but on power. The British armies had the preponderance of fighting capacity in 1942 and half of 1943, and their military leaders dictated Allied war strategy. From the middle of 1943 until VE-Day, the balance shifted decisively toward the United States, and Allied war strategy followed American priorities—the most important of which was to mount a cross-Channel invasion of France that the British had long opposed. FDR’s emotions cannot be said to have been decisive in these matters.

If Costigliola’s thesis cannot explain Allied military strategy, it also falters when explaining Allied planning for the postwar period. Costigliola pays close attention to Tehran and Yalta, the only meetings at which FDR and Stalin actually met. He carefully parses all their interactions, underscoring any gendered language, innuendo or social tension. He spends a good deal of time on FDR’s health: his blood pressure, his heart ailments, and so on. Yet he seems to miss the broader point of these two meetings: the alliance was visibly under strain not because FDR’s health was flagging but because Soviet power was rising. Stalin, by the end of 1943, had an army of 5.5 million men in the field, grouped into 480 divisions, and he felt confident in making certain demands about Eastern Europe and about postwar Germany. At Tehran in November 1943, FDR did his best to ingratiate himself with Stalin, mixing him martinis and making jokes at Churchill’s expense, but his charm offensive was successful only because Stalin got everything he wanted: he won from FDR a Second Front commitment, an agreement to treat a defeated Germany harshly, and—most egregious—Allied recognition of the partition of Poland that Stalin and Hitler had settled upon in 1939. Stalin even took the liberty of marking up their big map with his own pencil, in case anyone had any doubts about who was going to determine Poland’s future.

The Yalta meeting merely ratified Stalin’s demands for the harsh treatment of a defeated Germany. FDR’s famous social charm was certainly on display at these gatherings. It was, however, inconsequential before the realities of state power that shaped the deal-making.

The last third of the book, which turns to the origins of the Cold War, struck me as a valiant effort to breathe new life into the old revisionist argument, but to do so through the history of emotions and personalities. Costigliola argues that Roosevelt and Stalin, having built up a reserve of mutual good will through emotive diplomacy, were on the brink of an agreement that both men could accept: Stalin would have Poland, FDR would have Soviet participation in the United Nations and in a postwar balance-of-power security arrangement. Costigliola lauds this approach, not overly concerned with its underlying cynicism or its impact upon the Poles themselves.

But the promise of Yalta withered. What went wrong? According to Costigliola, after Roosevelt died, American policy fell under the influence of a handful of men (Averell Harriman, Chip Bohlen, and George Kennan, among others) who were driven not by sensitivity and restraint but by “emotionalism” (345). Harriman in particular comes in for rough treatment: his “anger, disgust and contempt” for the Russians showed that he lacked “emotional self-control” (293). His “incendiary advice” (355) to Truman drove the new president toward confrontation with the Soviets. For his part, Kennan was unable to offer dispassionate advice about Russia because he had been traumatized by his experiences in Moscow in the 1930s. Asking men like Harriman or Kennan for wise judgment about Russia was like asking “participants in a series of bad marriages to be the best judge of why those relationships failed. They were too involved personally to render fair judgments” (288). Perhaps their judgment was impaired, or perhaps Costigliola does not like the judgments they rendered.

None of this would have mattered if FDR had lived out the year. Instead, Harry Truman proved susceptible to the hardliners and drove the Cold War forward. Whereas FDR had always shown “patience” (316), Truman’s “assertive attitude sacrificed careful deliberation” (315). Costigliola posits that Truman was insecure in his new job and needed to show his confidence and determination by pushing back hard against the Soviets. He also adds some pop psychology, suggesting that Truman’s “desire to appear hardliners and drive the Cold War forward. Whereas FDR hard against the Soviets. He also adds some pop psychology, suggesting that Truman’s “desire to appear
do with these gifts of Western toleration? He extended and deepened his control of Eastern Europe, which had been his ambition all along. Had FDR lived, it seems likely that Stalin would have continued to profit from FDR's hand of friendship to expand his control into Germany, as he was planning to do well before FDR died. Had FDR lived, it is hard to see how the bitter struggle over occupied Germany, which proved the engine that would drive the Cold War in Europe, could have been avoided. In fact, FDR's policies might have made it that much easier for Stalin to assert control over all of Germany, or at least to neutralize it while unleashing Walter Ulbricht and his henchmen across the ruins of the defeated Reich. Why should we assume that cooperation with Stalin would have led to peace, security, stability and prosperity? There is no evidence for such a rosy scenario.

To my mind, Roosevelt's Lost Alliances seems like revisionism cross-dressed in double entendre. This is not to disparage the depth of research here, which is formidable, but there does come a point when repeated exegeses of words like “penetration,” “intrusion,” “violation,” “aggression,” “domination,” “perversion,” etc., etc., start to feel a bit tired. Further, the book is so narrowly focused on suggestive language, chance encounters, and romantic tangles that it overlooks the real war, one that registered upon millions of human beings in direct and unambiguous ways. There is a certain light-hearted knowingness in the book that some readers may find out of sync with the broader tragedy of the war, a tragedy whose epic scope could readily be glimpsed from the windows of the smoke-filled conference rooms of the Big Three.

Comment on Frank Costigliola, Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War

Wilson D. Miscamble, C.S.C.

Frank Costigliola's book promises to bring innovative methodologies such as emotion theory and gender analysis to bear on the much contested subject of the United States and the origins of the Cold War. The result is disappointing. When one wades beyond its methodological accoutrements and affectations, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances essentially offers an interpretation similar to the deeply flawed argument put forth by Diane Shaver Clemens and others some decades ago. The basic story is a familiar one and can be easily summarized as follows: The Cold War might have been avoided if only Franklin Roosevelt had lived on. Instead, a frustrated and angry Averell Harriman and his various associates turned FDR's deeply insecure successor away from the Rooseveltian path of conciliation to forceful confrontation in his first months in office. Thus Harry Truman and his supposedly hard-line advisers provoked the dissolution of the Grand Alliance and instigated the Cold War in 1945.

Implicit in Frank Costigliola's version of this sudden reversal thesis is the fanciful notion that a serious U.S.-Soviet conflict might have been avoided by further American mollification of Stalin mixed in with a dash of diplomatic finesse. He bizarrely speculates that "the Truman administration might have gotten further with Stalin had it addressed the dictator's apparent emotional needs, as Roosevelt tried to do" (352). The mind boggles at what might have been required to meet Stalin's true emotional needs, but in the Costigliola diagnosis additional geopolitical concessions were needed—the full extent of which is never specified—in order to make poor Joseph Dzhugashvili feel better about himself. Such thinking leads Costigliola to conclude that "with Roosevelt replaced by Truman, differences that might have been papered over during the postwar transition would instead blow up into an ideologically fueled, tit-for-tat conflict" (422).

Prior to offering this rather dated staple of revisionist historiography as his main conclusion, Costigliola provides a curious account of the personalities of the leaders of the Grand Alliance, along with an exploration of the dynamics of their relationships with each other and with their retainers. The portraits are occasionally quite entertaining, if rather idiosyncratic. Be assured that those concerned with FDR's supposedly androgynous appearance or his effeminacy will find some fodder for discussion here, although mercifully there is no detailed consideration of the president's use of a cigarette-holder. But in the end the portrait tells the reader more about FDR's character than about the origins of the Cold War. Costigliola's extensive tracking of the president's dependence on Missy LeHand and his subsequent refusal to contact the devoted woman after a stroke forced her from the White House unintentionally clarifies that a cold heart lay behind the president's surface conviviality. Yet it conveys little about his wartime diplomacy.

Numerous examples of similarly digressive excursions might be given. Costigliola's diligent effort to enumerate how many men Pamela Churchill was sleeping with at any one time hardly seems to produce a notable dividend for Cold War scholarship. Would Anglo-American wartime relations really have been different if Pamela had retired to a convent during the war to pray for her husband's well-being? Perhaps Pamela's father-in-law's occasional practice of engaging in conversation with FDR while partially dressed or nude tells us something about the British leader, but the intimacy of their relationship, such as it was, hardly seemed dependent on the prime minister stripping naked before the president. The “combination of high politics and homoerotic frisson” (155) that Costigliola discerns just doesn't appear decisive in the Roosevelt-Churchill story.

Costigliola does provide a fascinating account of a March 1942 exchange between Stalin and the British ambassador to Moscow, Clark Kerr, when the two men supposedly bonded while smoking their pipes and sharing their tobacco in Stalin's air-raid shelter during a German air attack. Costigliola assures us that “by exchanging, sniffing, talking about and inhaling a pleasurable substance, Clark Kerr and Stalin shared a sensuous intimacy while creating their own atmosphere or ‘reek.’” But this episode was only part of the story. Another key to their intimate relationship “was the exclusion of a feminized other, the cigarette smoker Molotov” (299). Of course, Clark Kerr's illusory “sensuous intimacy” with Stalin counted for little in Anglo-Soviet relations, and the description of Soviet foreign minister Molotov as a “feminized other” reveals much more about contemporary academic predilections than wartime relations with Soviet leaders. Indeed, this inane description of Molotov should certainly raise serious concerns about the ultimate utility of emotion theory and gender analysis in explaining the Cold War.

The use of such methodologies leads Costigliola to hold on to the “cutting edge” notion that the gendering of the Soviets as a hypermasculine foe bent on 'penetrating' with force, ideology and propaganda would become central to the Cold War imaginary” (329). But the Soviets hardly needed to be “gendered” in any way for a serious policymaker to appreciate that they represented a threat to the security of the West, one which was not imagined but all too real.

Furthermore, Costigliola's new methodologies fail to assist him in understanding either the objectives and content of the foreign policy developed under Truman or how and by whom that policy was fashioned. A listing of the flawed and confusing arguments of Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances would be a long one, but let me offer the following to provide a flavor. Costigliola exaggerates the role of Averell Harriman in Truman's early months in office and neglects or downplays the much more important roles
played by Joseph Davies and then by James F. Byrnes that would complicate his sudden reversal thesis. He fixates on Truman’s April 23 meeting with Molotov and vastly inflates its significance. Thoughtful historians who read Geoffrey Roberts’ insightful article on the meeting will truly appreciate how Costigliola just couldn’t resist trying to “sex up the Cold War.” The result is both embarrassing and misleading.

So too is the Costigliola argument that while FDR “could tolerate spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and other departures from the Wilsonian principles of Atlantic Charter” (316), Truman could not. This sadly misconceived contention is a tired chestnut that needs to be retired permanently. It will be quickly dismissed by any historian with a firm grasp on the realities not only of Harry Hopkins’ mission in June 1945 and the Polish political settlement he negotiated with Stalin but also of the sphere of influence settlement that Byrnes and Truman negotiated with the Soviets at the Potsdam Conference. Costigliola’s investigation of the Potsdam meeting is rather cursory and fails to acknowledge Marc Tractenberg’s investigation of the Potsdam meeting is rather cursory and fails to acknowledge Marc Tractenberg’s notable work clarifying that Potsdam constituted an important step toward the division of Europe into spheres of influence “as the basis of the postwar international order.”

Predictably, another hoary trope of revisionist historiography—namely, “atomic diplomacy”—is rehashed but without much conviction or consequence. One suspects that even Costigliola knows that it should be consigned to the historiographical dustbin but just can’t admit it. Regrettably, the explanation of the origins of the Cold War proposed in Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances is as problematic for what it excludes as for what it includes. It provides no sense that the period from the fall of 1945 until the late fall of 1946 constituted a transitional period during which the Cold War certainly had not been declared. It neglects to mention that the Truman administration formulated no coherent response to the Soviet Union during this year despite the public alarms raised by Winston Churchill and the private ones raised by George F. Kennan. There is no hint in the book that the United States demonstrated considerable hesitation and reluctance to counter Soviet influence in Europe in 1946. In doing so the United States caused much consternation for British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and like-minded Europeans, who rightly feared the expansion of Soviet power and recognized they no longer possessed the power to combat it. Admittedly the gruff Bevin is hardly a sexy character, and perhaps not an easy subject for gender analysis. But any attempt to explain the Cold War that ignores him while devoting pages to Missy LeHand and Pamela Churchill is, to be kind, unbalanced.

Ironically, Costigliola himself seems rather equivocal about his own principal conclusion because he simply can’t avoid Joseph Stalin and his abhorrent behavior. So the reader learns late in the book that “even when Roosevelt was around, Stalin had undermined the alliance with his merciless, obstinate, and narrow-minded policies” (392). On the next to last page Costigliola goes even further and admits that “the Soviets under Stalin did do terrible things.” Indeed, those things were “terrible” enough that he deems American diplomats justified in being angry at their isolation in Moscow, at Soviet arrogance, at the raping and pillaging of the Red Army, “at Stalin’s shared responsibility for the crushing of the Warsaw uprising, at the callousness towards the liberated POWs, at the clumsy pressure on Iran and Turkey, at the grabbing in Manchuria and Germany, and at the oppression of Eastern Europe” (427). Despite all these offenses, however, Costigliola can’t bring himself to see that Soviet actions were designed to extend the Soviet empire and Stalin’s vile control as far as possible. Nor can he concede that the Western powers could not offer sufficient concessions to soothe Stalin’s anxieties and insecurities without endangering their own freedom and security. So he is left holding stubbornly to his threadbare “imaginary” that the Cold War might have been avoided if only FDR had lived. This is grasping at a mirage.

Surely the time has come to acknowledge that the Truman administration missed no opportunity that might have satiated the Soviet tyrant’s appetite for power and control. David Holloway’s astute observation that “all attempts to imagine alternative courses of postwar international relations run up against Stalin himself” holds true. Ultimately, there was a leader who bears primary responsibility for the Cold War, and it wasn’t Harry Truman.

Perhaps Frank Costigliola would prefer that Henry Wallace had followed FDR into the oval office rather than Harry Truman, although he never says so explicitly. Wallace assuredly would have pressed for greater “understanding” of the Soviet position and for a much more “conciliatory” approach. He presumably would not have pursued the eventual Truman strategy of cooperation with allies and collective security designed to contain the Soviet Union and to safeguard liberal democracy in the West. He also would likely have provided for a 1940s version of appeasement to rival that of the 1930s, and the consequences may have been just as dastardly.

In the end, permit me to observe—without recourse to emotion theory or gender analysis—that decent and thoughtful historians who grasp the wartime and postwar realities will agree that the world is deeply fortunate that Truman rather than Henry Wallace succeeded Franklin Roosevelt in April 1945. I suspect that deep down, Frank Costigliola may even be one of them.

Notes:
6. I borrow this point from my own From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima and the Cold War (Cambridge, UK, 2007), 328–29.

The Prime Minister’s New Clothes: A Review of Frank Costigliola, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War

Kimber Quinney

Historians of U.S. foreign relations once either neglected culture entirely or captured mere glimpses of it. Times have changed. In his latest book, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War, Frank Costigliola sees nothing but culture. Culture is the lens through which he examines history: culture is at the heart of his thesis (FDR’s private emotional life shaped his wartime goals); culture dictates his methodology (linguistic analysis figures prominently); and culture—in very many guises—is the subject under his microscope. But when one uses a microscope to examine a culture, one tends not to see the bigger picture.

Instead of the bigger picture, Costigliola shows us culture from a remarkable number of angles. In Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances, Costigliola’s definition of culture includes
“personal and private relationships,” “emotion and pathology,” and “gender and sexuality.” Does “culture” really encompass so many different things? Perhaps; perhaps not. But one thing is certain: by defining it so broadly, Costigliola ensures that wherever he turns, he will find what he is looking for.

This self-fulfilling methodology is exasperating, because the historical myopia it creates can prevent the reader from seeing the merits of the author’s central and perfectly sensible argument: personal dynamics influenced diplomacy among the Allies in World War II, and the death of FDR dramatically changed those dynamics, thereby helping to start the Cold War. Sensibly enough, Costigliola builds a case for this argument by conducting an “internal” examination of FDR, Churchill, and Stalin (and, to a lesser extent, Truman) and by exploring their personal relationships with one another. Costigliola asks how their personalities and “emotional dispositions” affected their diplomacy during the war and its immediate aftermath. It is a good question, and his answer is also good: “Only by including the overlooked private lives of public statesmen, the emotional stakes of their diplomacy, and the cultural context of their ideology, can we arrive at a more holistic picture of how the Allies won World War II and then lost the security they had fought for. Examining the nexus between public and private helps us see the messy way that history really happens” (20).

“A more holistic picture,” however, is not what Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances gives us. It gives us a less holistic picture, one in which culture so dominates the stage that other actors in this wartime drama—geostrategy, politics, economics, and so forth—can barely be seen. Costigliola’s commendably meticulous dissection of a wide array of evidence does not, in fact, ultimately reveal the “messy way that history really happens.” On the contrary, the author gives us an all-too-tidy account in which any explanatory factor other than culture is swept up and tossed in a corner.

Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances scour through an extensive array of documents in search of cultural evidence for the relevance of culture and its impact on the dynamics of the Allied relationships. Costigliola looks in particular for signs of “emotion” and “intimacy.” And, given his industriousness and determination, it is not surprising that he finds them. “Emotional beliefs,” “emotional dispositions,” and “emotional reactions” are indexed separately and, in the case of “emotional reactions,” extensively. The word intimacy appears at least twenty-five times in the book.

The research is impressive, but the interpretation less so. The danger, of course, lies in interpreting a personal gesture as an historic event or, rather, in magnifying the impact of an emotional disposition on decisions that, as the decision-makers knew, could profoundly alter the world’s political and military makeup. Costigliola gets out of proportion the impact of culture on decisions of truly historic proportions.

This tendency to misinterpret, inflate, and otherwise exaggerate his evidence is especially pronounced in Costigliola’s analysis of the “homosocial” relations among “the Big Three”—FDR, Churchill, and Stalin.

All three leaders preferred women, Costigliola asserts. However, he points out that “behaviors that were not conventionally masculine enabled a wider repertoire of personal tactics and a broader charismatic appeal” (46). Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt “each deviated in some way from the generalized masculine norm that had come to prevail in all three countries despite differences in their national cultures” (97–98), FDR, for example “acted in ways that his contemporaries described as feminine,” and his “good looks” attracted members of both sexes (46–47). The bisexual Sumner Wells apparently found FDR “the most attractive—and the most beautiful young man—he had ever known” (47). Churchill behaved like an overgrown infant, often displaying “exhibitionist” tendencies: “Like a baby, and similar to Roosevelt and Stalin in their own ways, [Churchill] loved being in control” (48). Stalin was fond of kissing (45, 295–96). At all-male gatherings, the Soviet premier encouraged male couples to Waltz, and he “liked imposing humiliation with homoerotic overtones” (95).

Costigliola is particularly fascinated by the fact (if it is a fact) that Churchill “liked padding round nude before other men,” an emotional disposition that culminated in a widely referenced encounter between FDR and an unclothed Churchill in the White House.1 “A naked Churchill,” who was visiting the White House shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, “welcomed FDR into his White House guest room” (153). The result, according to the author, was the sealing of a bond of intimacy and trust between the two leaders. “Such nudity likely fostered a sense of intimacy and trust as they discussed intelligence secrets and atomic research.” Costigliola claims that this “combination of high politics and homoerotic frisson” created such “excitement” that Churchill had to double his dose of sleeping pills (155).

Costigliola uses the episode to reinforce the argument that the two men were extremely comfortable in one another’s presence. But the fact that Churchill was naked in front of FDR hardly proves that either man was suddenly seized by “homoerotic frisson.” Sometimes nakedness is just nakedness.

The encounter itself has been contested and portrayed far differently than Costigliola describes it. There are multiple references to the event, which was reported differently by the few people who witnessed it and by those who later wrote about it. For example, Richard Langworth, author of Churchill by Himself, the Definitive Collection of Quotations, concludes that Churchill was probably not stark naked in front of FDR but notes that the incident nonetheless did convey an “extraordinary lack of ceremony” and collegiality between the two leaders.2 In May 1945, Life magazine published a special issue devoted to the life and times of Winston Churchill in which the encounter was reported as accidental and unexpected: “Churchill’s fondness for doing his morning work in a dressing gown finally resulted in a scene unique in American annals. This was when Roosevelt was wheeled into Churchill’s room, only to find him in the nude, about to begin shaving. The Englishman was quick to point out the historic significance: ‘This is probably the only time in history,’ he declared, ‘when the Prime Minister of England has received the head of another great state in the nude.’”3

Costigliola, however, is looking for signs of intimacy, and so he sees the incident in a very different, very intimate light. Much like the subjects of the emperor in the tale by Hans Christian Andersen, Costigliola looks at a naked prime minister and sees a man robbed in homoerotic finery. The evidence he marshals to support this conclusion is indecently skimpy.

Moreover, even if Churchill was deliberately parading himself in the nude, perhaps he had motivations other than arousing FDR’s interest in “a bond of intimacy.” Greeting one’s guests in one’s boudoir has, after all, been a tactic favored by other leaders, and favored for its assertion of power rather than its invitation to intimacy. For example, Conrad Black describes Roosevelt’s penchant for “convening senior officials in his bedroom” and conducting meetings while his grandchildren jumped on the bed. Dean Acheson later wrote that he found the sessions in FDR’s bedroom “condescending” and reminiscent of the “levée du roi of Louis XIV.”4

But Costigliola is determined to see the encounter between Churchill and FDR as indicative of the intimacy shared by the Anglo-American allies: “This ‘mixing up,’ as Churchill called the various kinds of sharing and intimacy between Americans and Britons, forged political, military,
economic, and—not least—emotional ties that would endure for decades. The PM would later boast, “Never did any lover woo his mistress more determinedly than I did Franklin Roosevelt” (101). But sometimes a metaphor is just a metaphor. In other words, Costigliola can make a solid case that Churchill sought to seduce FDR diplomatically, but it is another thing altogether to dress up the evidence to show that the prime minister was trying to provoke a homoerotic attachment.

If Costigliola’s premise is correct—that the private and emotional lives of statesmen can reveal unseen truths about Allied diplomacy in the war—and emotional lives of statesmen can reveal unseen or homoeotic attachment.

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 spasms to his left hand, severe to the point of near crippling, had endured “near crippling” of his left arm and problems with his legs (46). All three men were subject to intense mental stress, which, Costigliola says, contributed to their emotional vulnerability. Costigliola does not, however, raise the possibility that such physical and mental stress may have had less to do with their emotional intimacy than with their “rush” to reach a compromise on the intensely divisive situation in Poland.

One place where Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances is on very firm ground is where it discusses the notion of ambiguity in diplomatic relations among the Big Three. Insightfully, Costigliola points to the ways in which ambiguity, ambivalence, and accommodation in the relationships among FDR, Stalin, and Churchill helped to bring about harmony (12, 252). Collaboration, he shows, is inherently full of ambiguity and nuance. FDR decided to accept the ambiguous nature of the relationships among the three leaders as the price to be paid for laying the foundations of what he hoped would be world peace. Truman had no such hopes. Once FDR died, Washington quickly showed that it was no longer ready to tolerate ambiguity in the Allied relationships and that it wanted certainty and predictability. By April 1945, the Truman administration (and in particular Undersecretary of State Orme G. “Moley” Sargent) preferred “the political and psychological certainty of having an irreconcilable rival” to the uncertainty surrounding some of its allies in the Roosevelt era (334).

Unfortunately, this judicious interweaving of cultural, diplomatic, and political factors and interpretations occurs too rarely in Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances. More common is the tendency to exaggerate the importance of individual factors and to overreach when it comes to conclusions. A little more circumspection would not go amiss. For instance, Costigliola asserts that “competing emotional dispositions” can exhibit distinctive—which is not determinable—unambiguous—“emotional dispositions.” Culturally and historically conditioned emotional dispositions influence the particular anxieties and imperatives of national leaders” (17). This is no doubt true—some of the time and
in certain cases. But in a book that focuses on a profound shift in U.S. foreign policy caused by the death of one leader and the installation of another, the notion of an enduring and distinctive American emotional disposition seems misplaced.

Notes:
1. For references to Churchill’s exhibitionism, see Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances, 48–49; 153–55; 176–77, 448, n155; for the reference to Churchill’s nudity to be nude in front of other men, see 153. For a description of the now infamous encounter between FDR and a towel-bereft Churchill, see 154–55.
2. Richard Langworth, Churchill by Himself, the Definitive Collection of Quotations (New York, 2008), xviii.
5. The 1945 Life magazine article portrays Churchill’s “Rolling Mississippi” policy of “mixing it up” quite differently, citing Lend-Lease as the perfect illustration of such a policy.
7. Costigliola’s description of FDR’s intimate circle of close confidantes can also be found in an earlier article, “Broken Circle: The Isolation of Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II,” Diplomatic History 5 (November 2008): 677–718.
8. Whereas guests of FDR’s inner circle could give the president a “good time,” Eleanor invited “reformers” who were no fun at all. Eleanor traveled the world to care for the wounded or ill, “stopping at every bed, speaking to every patient,” concludes Costigliola, but she “did not pay such close attention when her husband’s health deteriorated in 1944–45” (Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances, 81, 64).
10. Ambassador Davies has been harshly criticized, not least by the CIA, for his appeasement of Stalin. See https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no1/article02.html.
11. Harry Hopkins was chronically ill throughout much of the Anglo-American-Soviet negotiations. See Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances, 257.
12. References to physical fatigue and illness are far too many to mention, but they are particularly evident at the summit meetings. At Tehran, for example, all three men were ill upon arrival. Costigliola explains that FDR—who since 1938 “had suffered periodic nonconvulsive seizures that robbed him of consciousness”—was very ill beginning in December 1943 and grew worse in 1944–45 (Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances, 203–04, 206–09).
13. He also argues, less persuasively, that such physical crippling and mental distress was perceived as undermining masculinity. Costigliola points to Stalin’s physical and mental weakness to explain the dictator’s “tough” behavior (Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances, 50).

Response

Frank Costigliola


I am grateful that such esteemed historians as Will Hitchcock, Kimber Quinney, and Bill Micambale took the time to review my book so extensively despite the apparent dismay that reading it caused them. Together with Petra Goedeke, who managed to have a more positive experience, these reviewers raise important issues regarding World War II diplomacy and the origins of the Cold War. Their reviews are also valuable in offering striking demonstration of how emotional impulses, which are integral to human thought, can influence even careful scholars as they read books and other texts.

Let me start by quoting Hitchcock’s basic assumptions about my book, assumptions from which flow the remainder of his review. He writes:

To summarize Costigliola’s thesis: Franklin D. Roosevelt, a master manipulator of people, developed a political and personal style that relied upon a powerful combination of charm, deceit, sexual magnetism, guile and wit to entice his interlocutors, whether they were voters in Dutchess County, reporters in Washington, crown heads of state (recall his feeding hot dogs to King George VI at Hyde Park) or the mass murderer Joseph Stalin. No one could resist his charms, and indeed his emotional intelligence proved to be the glue that forged the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union into an effective alliance against Nazi Germany. Once he died, the alliance fell apart, for Harry S. Truman had none of FDR’s emotional gifts and was unable to maintain an alliance with the suspicious Stalin. Cold war ensued.

According to Hitchcock’s summary, the book is all about style and emotional intelligence disconnected from considerations of political, military, or economic power—disconnected even from ideology and culture. He then qualifies his summary a bit by acknowledging that “Costigliola does not dismiss [state power, ideology, and geopolitics] as irrelevant, but he does seek to raise personal relations to the same level of importance.”

He quotes as evidence for his overall appraisal two sentences: “The functioning of the wartime alliance and the future of the postwar world pivoted on diplomacy inextricably personal and political” (3), and “The Grand Alliance cohered and then collapsed for reasons more contingent, emotional, and cultural than historians have heretofore recognized” (4). From this he concludes that Costigliola believes “that the wartime alliance was cemented chiefly by personal qualities, mostly FDR’s ability to coax and charm; and that once he died, the alliance fell apart” (my emphasis).

But why collapse a complex argument into a caricature? Hitchcock puts the book’s equilibrium of causal factors out of kilter and then assails the imbalance. “Reasons more contingent, emotional, and cultural than historians have heretofore recognized” means precisely that: contingency, emotion, and culture were not the only reasons or even always the chief ones, but these factors were more important than the existing literature would have it. The word “inextricably” (as in “diplomacy inextricably personal and political”) is key to understanding both the book’s thesis and Hitchcock’s misreading of it.

Throughout the book, I stress that the way leaders perceived, interpreted, and acted on political issues was inextricably bound up with who they were as people—meaning their personal and cultural backgrounds and their emotional temperament and tendencies. For instance, Franklin Roosevelt’s tolerance (at times, preference) for ambiguity and ambivalence; his boyhood travels through Wilhelmine Germany, where he gained an impression of innate militarism; his agonizing experience as commander-in-chief in 1940–41, uncertain how to stop the conquering Wehrmacht, then relieved that Red Army soldiers were doing
much of that bloody work; and his irritation over what he saw as the important behavior of the Polish government-in-exile—all this fed into his political inclinations. In planning for the immediate postwar period, which he saw as a critical transition toward long-term stability, Roosevelt was inclined to choose Russia over Germany and Poland. He intended to focus on collaboration with the Soviet Union as well as with Britain and China, even if that collaboration was not continuous.

That goal required accepting, as FDR did, that the Soviets would exact a high level of reparations-in-kind from a defeated Germany and largely dominate postwar Eastern Europe. He tried to get Stalin to cloak such domination so as not to rouse loud opposition from the American public. According to Ambassador Averell Harriman, Stalin himself initially expected the Soviets to be greeted as liberators, thereby making it possible to square the circle of having “friendly,” “democratic” governments in most of the former cordon sanitaire. Although Roosevelt had served under Woodrow Wilson and realized that many internationally minded Americans still clung to the tenets of the World War I president, FDR’s efforts in 1943–45 to hammer out a peaceful postwar order convinced him that Wilsonianism remained impractical, at least for the transitional period, when containing rivalry among the Big Three was crucial.

Harry Truman, by contrast, believed most foreign policy issues came down to clear-cut, black-and-white choices. Having dealt with feelings of insecurity throughout his life and worried, with some justification, that he was unprepared for the presidency, he emphasized that he was the no-nonsense, the-buck-stops-here decision-maker. He had imbibed Wilsonian ideals as a soldier in World War I. He had always distrusted Bolshevism. While Roosevelt listened to the Russians’ stories of German atrocities and grew angry at seeing the destruction in the Crimea, Truman sympathized with the hapless Germans he saw in bombed-out Berlin and was appalled by the evidence around him of rape and pillage by the Red Army. Truman had neither the personal experience, the convictions, nor the temperament to challenge, as Roosevelt had done, the arguments of the State Department that facilitating German recovery took priority over huge reparations to Russia.

FDR’s ability to coax and charm would have accomplished little were it not backed by the rising military power of the United States. At the same time, the issues regarding where and how to apply that military might were so crucially important that Roosevelt—as well as Churchill, Stalin, and most of their military and political advisers—recognized that face-to-face interactions were essential. High-stakes diplomacy was inextricably personal as well as political. If these leaders did not think personal factors influenced political ones, they would not have taken such great trouble to arrange personal meetings when hashing out the most critical matters. As Churchill concluded after a summit with Stalin, it was “extraordinary how many many questions yield to discussion and personal talk”(3).

The belief that affects signaled underlying political intent led Roosevelt to send Harry Hopkins to appraise Churchill and then Stalin before committing Lend Lease supplies to Britain and Russia. Upon hearing of Pearl Harbor, Churchill wanted to leave for Washington immediately to use the force of his personality and his powers of persuasion to ensure that FDR persisted with a Europe-first strategy and that the American people embraced imperial Britain as a full ally. Roosevelt, who hated flying because he could not use his paralyzed legs to steady himself as the plane jerked up and down and had not flown since 1932, endured three flights as part of the journeys to Casablanca and Tehran in 1943 and to Yalta in 1945. Even Stalin, who had not ventured out of the Soviet Union since before the Revolution, traveled to Tehran (part of the way on a flight that he found extremely uncomfortable) and later to Potsdam to meet with Allied leaders. The belief in the importance of affect also led Stalin to press Sergio Beria, who compiled transcripts from the bugs placed in Roosevelt’s quarters at Tehran and Yalta, for the particular tone and emphasis of the president’s remarks. (Beria concluded from the bugging that Roosevelt, suspecting what was going on, was using the hidden microphones to get his message across to the dictator.) Harry Truman’s determination after the Potsdam conference not to engage in further Big Three meetings was a personal and political decision with serious diplomatic consequences.

Hitchcock also charges that Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances is “an old-fashioned book . . . . A return to great-man biography.” Of this “return” I stand guilty as accused. The frontiers of historical scholarship most often venture into new arenas and new eras, as is reflected by the current interest in non-state actors, globalization, and developments in the 1970s. It can also be exciting, however, to revisit old topics with fresh evidence and a fresh approach. For me, one of the most rewarding aspects of doing this book was discovering—to my surprise—significant new archival sources for a topic that I had assumed had been combed through decades ago. Many of the sources entailed commentary by women—FDR’s neighbor Daisy Suckley, New York Post publisher Dorothy Schiff (a frequent weekend visitor), and Anna Roosevelt Boettiger. There were also the papers and memories of Pamela Churchill and the FBI transcripts of the telephone conversations of Harry Hopkins’s wife, Louise. Still another trove yielded interviews and diaries that had been neglected. There were also nuggets of unused or underutilized evidence from the U.S. and British national archives, and I used a number of Russian sources, though I should have done more with them.

Using new sources and applying fresh approaches renders a “return to great-man [and great-woman] biography” exciting and is important not only for scholarship, but also for professional historians who want to publish books of interest to the reading public. Foreign/international relations historians can apply to the study of elites some of the methods and insights that social and cultural historians have used so effectively in studying history from the bottom up. In the past decade and a half, our field has, with reason, moved from a sometimes narrow focus on elite leaders to a broader look at the cultural factors and the non-state actors involved in foreign relations, thereby more broadly conceived. For instance, in The Bitter Road to Freedom Hitchcock examines the end of World War II from the perspectives of ordinary people caught up in the turbulence. My book is premised on the belief that leaders are not interchangeable automatons pursuing a purely objective national interest, but rather flesh-and-blood people influenced by their particular backgrounds, temperaments, identities, habits, prejudices, gifts, problems, and so forth. As Goedde points out, the “rational actor” model of decision-makers needs to be expanded to situate the “rational explanations of actions in the broader context of their emotional and cultural environment.”

A related aspect of the book’s thesis, ignored by the reviewers, pertains to why personal perspectives proved especially crucial in the months prior to and after the death of Roosevelt. The question of who happened to be in power from early 1945 to early 1946 packed special significance, because those months were a period of seismic change. Like 1914, 1949, and 2001, 1945–6 was a critical juncture in history. To quote from the book, “at such turning points, the otherwise immovable elements of strategic imperative, political ambition, cultural habit, economic interest, and geographic location suddenly loosen their grip, and, like the ground in a massive earthquake, temporarily become plastic . . . . As in 1914, 1949, and 2001, the particular leaders in charge [in 1945–6] made a decisive and lasting
Hitchcock links the book’s “old-fashioned” focus on “great-man biography” to what he criticizes as the “familiar revisionist argument—Truman, Harriman, Bohlen, Kennan and a few other key officials started the Cold War, while Stalin sought cooperation.” It all “enhances the feeling of déjà vu.” Here again, the attack is convincing as long as one ignores the evidence in the book and disregards stimulating debates. Those interested in the rise and fall of the wartime alliance should look at the book itself, but I will mention a few examples here.

The meaning and intent of the Yalta agreement on Poland has long been a contentious issue. My book presents the testimony of several U.S. and British officials, most of them not friendly toward Moscow, who acknowledged that the Soviets were correct in asserting that the understanding at Yalta had been merely to broaden, rather than to reorganize totally the pro-Moscow Lublin government. There is also fresh evidence regarding how far FDR had traveled by 1944–5 from his earlier endorsement of Atlantic Charter principles. The FBI transcripts from the Hopkins family telephone calls, along with Harry Hopkins’s letters to a son and to his wife, underscore the former “assistant president’s” evolution away from FDR’s approach to dealing with the Kremlin. This evidence, coupled with a close-up look at what Hopkins (accompanied by Harriman and Bohlen) actually said to Stalin in May-June 1945 before they patched up a deal on Poland, underscores the shift in priorities after Roosevelt’s death. Unlike Roosevelt, Hopkins told Stalin that Poland was a symbol that tested the entire U.S.-Soviet relationship, and that the Soviets had to permit Western-style democracy to prevail there as elsewhere.

According to the records of Isador Lubin, Richard Scandrett, and Ed Pauley, the altered stance toward the Soviets was also apparent in the 180-degree turn of U.S. policy toward German reparations to the Soviet Union, which was a matter of enormous material and symbolic interest to the Kremlin. Always attuned to matters of respect and protocol, Molotov could not miss the changed tone and attitude in his meetings with Truman and other Washington officials, which took place only two weeks after FDR’s death, while Hitler still lived. With regard to the relative responsibility of each side in abandoning wartime understandings, the book cites the many outspoken skeptics of continued cooperation with the Soviets, such as Averell Harriman, Douglas MacArthur, Frank Roberts, Chip Bohlen, and Jimmy Byrnes (after January 1946), who acknowledged that, yes, Stalin did seek continued collaboration. That meant cooperation on the basis of Soviet control of Eastern Europe, a deal that Roosevelt was largely willing to accept and that Truman, backed by most of the State Department, resisted as much as possible. As George F. Kennan commented years later, Roosevelt “couldn’t have cared less. He didn’t care what happened to the Baltic States. He didn’t care what happened to Poland.”

Hitchcock’s evident disapproval of Roosevelt’s understanding with the Soviet dictator is so strong that he slides past that reality. At the Tehran conference, he writes, the wartime alliance “was visibly under strain... because Soviet power was rising.” While Roosevelt tried to “ingratiate himself with Stalin,” the Kremlin chief “got everything he wanted”: a commitment to the second front, “an agreement to treat defeated Germany harshly, and—most egregious—the allied recognition of the partition of Poland that Stalin and Hitler had settled upon in 1939.” In this description (which is itself old-fashioned in its harking back to 1950s criticisms of the supposedly naive president) Roosevelt appears to be cravenly trying to “ingratiate himself.”

Hitchcock, with his expertise in both French and U.S. diplomacy, knows well, however, that face-to-face relations among men of power entail often subtle transactions in an economy of honor, respect, and humiliation. Roosevelt, who had few peers in such dealings, turned to advantage what he called Stalin’s “inferiority complex.” The reader gets no idea from Hitchcock’s depiction that Roosevelt actually favored harsh treatment of Germany and said, regarding the Soviet recovery of eastern Poland, “Yes, I really think those 1941 frontiers are as just as any” (191). Most significant—in terms of what was key to FDR and what Hitchcock leaves out of his listing of the various “egregious” agreements at Tehran—was Stalin’s pledge to enter the war against Japan after Germany’s defeat. That was hugely important to Roosevelt, who could not count on the atomic bomb. Moreover, the president had reason, as historian Waldo Heinrichs has emphasized, to worry that the American people would tire of a war that dragged on too long. A key assumption driving Hitchcock’s criticism is his belief that Stalin was insatiable. Historians will always disagree on this issue. Nevertheless, the dictator’s demands would change little from what he had outlined to Anthony Eden in December 1941, when German guns boomed in the Moscow suburbs and victory remained uncertain. Stalin liked to boast that he was smarter than Hitler because the latter had no limits.

I could cite further specifics, but the larger point here is that apportioning responsibility for the breakdown of the wartime alliance and the formation of the Cold War will always be a controversial issue among historians, regardless of whether Hitchcock suffers a “feeling of déjà vu” or Miscamble insists that “surely the time has come to acknowledge that the Truman administration missed an opportunity that might have satiated the Soviet tyrant’s appetite for power and control.” The evidence is too diffuse, the emotional investment in the issue too high, and the counterfactuals too counterfactual for historians to agree on any definitive interpretation of the origins of the Cold War. So the debate will continue. And while it does, we as scholars and as citizens can draw lessons regarding the dangers of sliding into other open-ended, highly emotional, and ethnically tinged international political/military conflicts that are aggravated by ideological and cultural differences.

I will return to Hitchcock’s other negative assessments a bit later, but the spirited criticisms of Quinney and Miscamble demand attention. Like Hitchcock, Quinney reduces the book’s argument to a caricature and then attacks the straw man. She starts off by asserting that “Frank Costigliola sees nothing but culture” and goes on to say that “[c]ulture so dominates the stage that other actors in this wartime drama—geopolitics, strategy, politics, economics, and so forth—can barely be seen... [A]ny explanatory factor other than culture is swept up and tossed in a corner.” Quinney apparently assumes that discussing the inextricable links between culture and politics blots out the latter. The book, in contrast, assumes that good history requires considering political issues in their fullest context, which means including cultural as well as military, economic, and other factors. Rather than subsuming all else into culture, my study examines how cultural and emotional factors influenced politics. Politics remains the ultimate topic. Note how each of the following sentences, taken from the book’s very first discussion of culture, ends up with the impact on politics: “Cultural differences excited emotional reactions and complicated political issues. Insecure pride, cravings for respect, anxiety about change, and fear of appearing fearful skewed political perceptions, making political compromise more difficult. Racialized cultural stereotypes of ‘semi-savage’ Soviets and of ‘conniving’ cosmopolitans eager to make ‘fools’ out of Russians hampered the formation of the alliance in 1941 and helped destroy it after the war” (5).

Quinney bases much of her criticism on what she
claims is my all-encompassing definition of culture. Without quoting me, because I did not write this in the book, she writes that “Costiglio has defined culture as ‘personal and private relationships,’ ‘emotion and pathology,’ and ‘gender and sexuality.’” I would not and did not define culture in this way. Instead, my understanding of culture, borrowed from Max Weber via Clifford Geertz and Andy Rotter, is that it consists of webs of significance that attach meaning to things, practices, attitudes, and ideas. Therefore, while the three sets of factors cited by Quinney are all affected by culture (and by other elements), they do not themselves constitute culture.

Quinney claims that I am “particularly fascinated by the fact (if it is a fact) that Churchill liked padding round nude before other men.” Yet it is Quinney who devotes some 23 percent of her review to a topic that takes up about 1 percent of the lines in my book. She underscores this focus by titling her review “The Prime Minister’s New Clothes.” Here, too, my analysis is reduced to caricature. I thought it important to contextualize and analyze an incident that is almost always cited in accounts of World War II Allied diplomacy but rarely if ever examined closely. One context for Churchill’s appearing nude before Roosevelt was his delight in showing off in a wide variety of ways, whether through inspiring oratory, the V-salute, the huge hats, or his famed “rompers.” Careful examination of the various primary accounts indicates that Churchill probably talked in the nude to FDR more than once and that he did so with other men as well.

Although the book describes Roosevelt and Churchill discussing intelligence secrets and atomic research while the latter was nude as a “combination of high politics and homoerotic frisson,” Quinney sees me as claiming something much more extreme: “that the prime minister was trying to provoke a homoerotic attachment.” A frisson is a momentary thrill or sensation. By discussing politics while nude, Churchill was temporarily lowering the barriers between the public and private, between the political and personal spheres. By appearing naked or nearly so, as if he were a family member or a lover, he may have hoped, on some level of reasoning, that he could tap into those associations of intimacy. Churchill might also have been testing Roosevelt’s willingness to get closer. The president could have registered shock and exited the room. But he did not so retreat and his behavior suggested that a range of other familiar personal and political ties might also be possible. “Mixing up,” as Churchill put it, with the American president, could be the motivating factor in his rushing to Washington after Pearl Harbor and a major part of his strategy in 1940–41 to enlist U.S. power in the struggle against Germany. While Churchill sees an opposition between an “assertion of power” and an “invitation to intimacy,” other leaders, according to the examples she herself cites, at times regarded the two maneuvers as mutually reinforcing.

Though matters of sexuality and intent are notoriously ambiguous and ambivalent, Quinney evidently prefers a polarized view: either Churchill’s appearing nude was an explicitly sexual gesture or it lacked any whiff of eroticism. As she puts it, “sometimes nakedness is just nakedness.” Sometimes, perhaps, but not between grown men who expect each other to remain clothed. If it were “just nakedness,” why did the incident provoke such sustained comment? Why did it produce what Churchill’s aide referred to as “a state of intense excitement” in an eyewitness? (153). Churchill was clearly proud of his performance, and it appeared to have the desired effect. The British ambassador in Washington reported that the prime minister “has got onto the most intimate terms with the president, who visits him in his bedroom at any hour and, as Winston says, is the only head of State whom he, Winston, has ever received in the nude!” (155).

Quinney faults me for making “surprisingly few references to Mrs. Roosevelt” and for assuming “that Eleanor had no impact whatsoever on FDR’s policymaking because of the lack of intimacy between them.” She adds that I also overlook the role of Joseph E. Davies and claims that these two are “neglected because [they are] irrelevant to [my] agenda.” This is a serious criticism. She charges that, rather than working with a thesis that is modified by the findings of my research, I cling to a rigid agenda. It would follow, then, that what I have published is more political than scholarship.

In actuality, however, I looked carefully at the archival record, including the logs of FDR’s daily routine, and weighed the observations of the Roosevelts’ daughter, Anna Boettiger, who lived in the White House in 1944–5. I did not find evidence that Eleanor influenced FDR’s foreign policy. The absence of such evidence marks a dramatic shift from prewar years, when Eleanor played a key role in shaping domestic policies. What changed was not the degree of intimacy between FDR and Eleanor, but rather her unease with military planning, her distrust in particular of Churchill’s influence, and the president’s turning more and more to Harry Hopkins for advice—until December 1943, when despite FDR’s objections, Hopkins moved out of the White House. Eleanor commented quite explicitly on this shift from her to Hopkins, and I quote her on page 82. During the preparations for the Yalta conference, Eleanor told her husband she wanted to accompany him. He said no, and instead took Anna, who had become a personal assistant with responsibilities that had spilled over into policy, especially with regard to regulating access to the president.

As for Davies, whose extensive papers I also combed through, he was trusted by FDR but he was not a principal adviser. FDR did send Davies to deliver a letter to Stalin in 1943, and he asked him to appraise what the dictator was thinking. Roosevelt also made use of Davies’s contacts with officials in the Soviet embassy in Washington. The president did not, however, turn to Davies for advice or bring him to the Casablanca, Tehran, or Yalta summit conferences. (While Davies did accompany Truman to the Potsdam conference, once there he was pushed to the sidelines by Jimmy Byrnes, who kept all such competitors away from the president. Davies’s main initiative, setting up a pre-conference meeting between Truman and Stalin, came to nothing when Truman backed out, as the book details.) Daisy Suckley, who saw FDR often in his last years and is a confidant, barely mentions Davies (or anything about Eleanor’s advice). Nor does Harold Ickes, whose unpublished post–1941 diary offers a detailed picture of who had access to the president.

Despite their criticisms, the reviews by Hitchcock and Quinney seem almost positive when compared to the one by Miscamble. His objections range from the book’s “methodological accoutrements and affectations,” to its “fanciful,” “bizarre,” “dated,” “digestive,” “inane,” “flawed,” “confusing,” “embarrassing,” “misleading,” “misinformed,” “tired,” “hoary,” “problematic,” “unbalanced,” and “threadbare” arguments and conclusions. A thesaurus of bad! But not just any bad. His adjectives and adverbs suggest a scholarship that is not merely inadequate and shoddy but, worse, transgressive in strange, frivolous, and disgraceful ways. (It is puzzling that Miscamble, despite his formidable vocabulary, does not seem familiar with the noun “imaginary.” Unlike the adjective, the noun does not mean something “imagined” as opposed to “real,” as he seems to believe, but rather an ideological creation for conceptualizing the world.)

Miscamble has published widely. His work includes a vigorously argued book on the transition from FDR to Truman that lauds the latter’s first year as president. Not surprisingly, then, his review focuses, with three exceptions,
on the book’s treatment of the Truman administration. He advises that “those who want a summary version” of the book “provided by Frank Costigliola himself should consult” an article published in Diplomatic History in 2010. It is telling that an article that he regards as a “summary version” of the entire book actually pertains to only two of the ten chapters. (If Miscamble had read over the rest of the chapters more carefully, he could not have failed to notice the repeated criticisms of Stalin’s brutality and crimes, a theme that he says I introduce only at the very end of the book.) He departs from his focus on the Truman presidency to deplore, with lingering detail, the discussion of Pamela Churchill’s network of sex and secrets, Churchill’s nudity, and what he, perhaps losing his edge for a moment, calls “a fascinating account” of an encounter between Stalin and British ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr in an air-raid shelter during a German attack. He recoups, however, by expanding an attack on one phrase of that account into a major critique of what he claims is my methodology.

My description of the exchange in the Kremlin air-raid shelter is based on Clark Kerr’s report to London. Both the ambassador and the dictator were in effect boasting about how manly they were. They compared and swapped their tobacco and pipes while ostracizing the odd man out, foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov, who was smoking cigarettes. Clark Kerr reported that the two tough guys were “chuckling all the more shamelessly because of the governess presence” of Molotov.” I read “governess presence” as a term clearly gendered in a negative way. I wrote that Stalin and the ambassador were bonding partly on the basis of “the exclusion of a feminized other, the cigarette smoker, Molotov”(299). Miscamble argues that this “ineane description . . . raise[s] serious concerns about the ultimate utility of emotion theory and gender analysis in explaining the Cold War.” Again, we have here a straw man. I do not make the absurd claim that gender analysis alone could “explain the Cold War.” Rather, gendered conceptions, along with cultural, ideological, and political ones, helped create the image of a potentially overpowering, irreconcilable enemy. I am not sure what Miscamble means by “emotion theory.” As I discuss a bit later, emotions are integral to thought, even supposedly rational thought. In analyzing the historical evidence, scholars can look for indications of strong emotions. These propositions seem to be more common sense than anything else, and difficult to dispute.

Although Miscamble disputes my emphasizing the influence of Averell Harriman on Truman, other officials, and top journalists in the weeks after Roosevelt’s death, I stand by that analysis, which is supported by abundant primary evidence. What was so important was that Harriman, acknowledged as the number one U.S. expert on dealing with Stalin, warned Truman that the Soviets were not fellow international policemen, as FDR had often depicted them, but rather international criminals or “barbarians” invading the West as they marched toward Berlin. He told the new president, who was anxious to prove his toughness, that Roosevelt’s policy of cooperating with Stalin arose from a disgraceful fear of the Soviet Union. Harriman also played a crucial part in molding Truman’s simplistic view of the Yalta agreement on Poland. Harriman warned a room of top officials that if Washington acquiesced to Soviet control of Poland, Americans would be a party to that cruel dominion. These arguments packed an emotional punch. So, too, did Harriman’s assurance, tragically wrong as it would turn out, that Stalin would back down if confronted. There appeared to be little risk in switching to a much tougher policy.

Miscamble sees in this analysis evidence that I “just couldn’t resist trying to ‘sex up the Cold War.’” What Harriman’s assertions had to do with sex, I cannot figure out. Because some human interchanges involve sexuality or intimations of it does not mean that all such interactions do. (For this reason, I also fail to see why Geoffrey Roberts, with whom I otherwise largely agree, titled his article in Cold War History “Sexing Up the Cold War: New Evidence on the Molotov-Truman Talks of April 1945.”)

If I were a new graduate student plowing through this roundtable, around this point I would probably be thinking, “Well, Costigliola seems to have answers to many of these criticisms, but, still, why are the Hitchcock-Quinney-Miscamble reviews so vehemently negative? Where there’s so much smoke, there must be fire.” Well, yes, why are these three reviews so very critical? Maybe this is a terrible book with a rigid “agenda,” faulty premises, exaggerated arguments, lousy research, gaudy but useless “theory,” etc. But if this is such a bad book, how does one account for Petra Goedde’s positive review? She sees “a tremendous accomplishment” in my helping to re-evaluate the rational-actor model of decision-making. How to explain the glowing blurbs on the jacket cover by Melvyn P. Leffler and by Richard Immerman, neither a practitioner of what Miscamble calls the “accoutrements and affectations” of “gender analysis” and “emotion theory”? Why the favorable reviews in an H-diplo roundtable? Why the stand-alone review in the New York Review of Books? Why the panel devoted solely to the book at the 2013 American Historical Association conference? And, most puzzling of all, why did a SHAFR committee pick Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances for the Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize for 2013? (The field of possible entries for the Ferrell Prize consists of all the books on foreign relations history published in 2012 beyond the first monograph of the author.)

Again taking the perspective of our perplexed graduate student, the question arises: “So what?” So what if the Miscamble, Quinney, and Hitchcock reviews find little of redeeming value? Disagreement and debate are fundamental to our craft. A further answer is that the reactions of these reviewers illustrate how emotions can influence scholarly judgments. This is the case with both Goedde’s enthusiasm for the book and the other reviewers’ antagonism toward it. And, of course, my feelings are also unavoidably engaged. We have here, then, an opportunity to venture, in a limited and imperfect way, into an examination of emotional influences, a kind of analysis that foreign relations historians might try with their own scholarship.

Scholars in other fields, particularly German history, are adding analysis of emotions to their tool kit of methodologies. Most of the emerging historiography premises that emotions are necessary rather than antithetical to rational thought. A second premise is that while rational and emotional impulses originate in different areas of the brain, they emerge as integrated thought, which is expressed through culturally inflected language and gestures. Neurobiological evidence concludes that human beings are not entirely rational actors. Feelings influence—not determine, but influence—the behavior of all of us, including the writer and the reader of these words. This is so even when policymakers, or historians, believe they are abjuring emotions. Historians studying the emotions do not need special training in neuroscience or psychology. Rather they need to read documents and other texts carefully and take seriously such evidence as discussions of emotion, words signifying emotion, emotion-provoking tropes, visual and other sensory cues, habitual behaviors, excited behaviors, ironies, silences—and the cultural contexts of these and other expressions. If a historian were writing a biography of these reviewers, she or he would want to interview them and examine their published works, unpublished letters, emails, and so forth. But for our purposes in this roundtable, we can make use of the limited evidence afforded by their apparent feelings as expressed in their reviews. I specify “apparent feelings”...
because we cannot, particularly at a distance of time and space, determine for sure another’s emotions.

While Miscamble, Quinney, and Hitchcock range widely in their criticism, their greatest irritation stems from what they seem to interpret as two transgressions: my attention to the personal and intimate aspects of the lives of the major players—what Miscamble calls the “diggresive excursions”—and my acceptance of the basic deal between Roosevelt and Stalin. (The dictator would cooperate in the postwar world if the president would accede to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and a return of Russia’s pre-1905 position in the Far East; the Soviets and the Americans would join with the British and perhaps the Chinese in guarding against renewed German and Japanese aggression.) Miscamble uses the word “dastardly” to refer to the consequences of carrying out such a deal, particularly if Henry Wallace became president. Quinney finds it “exasperating” that the book tries to stuff everything into “culture.” It is Hitchcock, however, who offers the most suggestive evidence of what appear to be underlying feelings.

Hitchcock sums up the book as “revisionism crossdressed in double entendre.” While deftly packing an emotional punch, this phrase is also revealing in its logic. “Crossdressed” refers to men wearing women’s clothes and vice versa—in other words, to behavior that violates social norms. Crossdressed scholarship, then, is transgressive; it violates and offends what is proper and normal. Understandably, reading a book that offends can be irritating. When irritated, we do not always think clearly. Perhaps that helps explain why Hitchcock decides that the revisionism is couched in double entendre. That of course means a word or expression open to two interpretations, one of which is risqué. This is a curious criticism. Regardless of its other faults, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances engages not in fostering double meanings, but rather in separating them out, and in other ways unpacking implicit or underlying meanings.

The next point of Hitchcock’s conclusion is that “repeated exegeses of words like ‘penetration,’ ‘intrusion,’ ‘violation,’ ‘aggression,’ ‘domination,’ ‘persuasion,’ etc. etc., start to feel a bit tired.” I would agree, especially if the book actually contained such repeated exegeses. But where are they? On page 343 and again on page 412, there appear single paragraphs that explain why the word “penetration”—as used by Harriman in informing top journalists about the “irreconcilable difference” with the Soviet Union and by Kerensky in his Long Telegram—was so powerful because it “suggested assault that was simultaneously ideological, political, and sexual” (343). The fact that journalists and officials immediately picked up on the word “penetration” and used it themselves suggests that it packed a punch on multiple levels. Pages 95 and 298–300 discuss the bizarre goings-on at Stalin’s all-night banquets. If there is any “exegesis” here at all, it is confined to the one paragraph on page 300. That’s it. I stand by the significance of this analysis in understanding Stalin’s personality. But the question remains as to what Hitchcock is implying here. He strings together a list of words that, used separately as they are in the book, connote all sorts of things. Linked together, however, they refer to kinky sex. Hitchcock’s list of words, like his phrase “crossdressed in double entendre” has the effect—only he knows the intent—of smearing the book as inappropriately and obsessively sexual, as dirty.

In his final two sentences, Hitchcock brings the discussion back to a perspective and concern that would seem to be close to him. His The Bitter Road to Freedom, which won the AHA’s prestigious George Louis Beer Prize and was a finalist for the Pulitzer, details the terrible suffering endured in the final stages of the war by “millions of human beings in direct and unambiguous ways.” From this vista, he faults my book, “so narrowly focused on suggestive

Notes:
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*Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam*

**Winner, 2013 Pulitzer Prize for History**
The U.S. Coup of 1953 in Iran, Sixty Years On

Ali Gheissari

The Event

At around 10:00pm on Saturday, 15 August 1953, a small contingent of armored vehicles led by Colonel (later General) Nematollah Nasiri, head of the Royal Guards, left Sadabad Palace in north Tehran. Its mission was to serve the Shah’s dismissal edict to Premier Mohammad Mosaddeq at his residence in central Tehran. Before calling on Mosaddeq, the convoy first went to Bagh-e Shah barracks in central Tehran. Arriving there at around 10:30pm, Nasiri spent some time consulting with a number of fellow royalist officers, making speeches and raising the morale of the soldiers.

Although a pro-Mosaddeq officer who had arrived at the barracks shortly afterward to inquire about the late-night visit was arrested by Nasiri’s cohorts, pro-Mosaddeq forces elsewhere in the capital had managed to consolidate. Sometime after midnight on Sunday Nasiri’s convoy arrived at Mosaddeq’s residence and delivered the royal dismissal. Nasiri was kept waiting for over an hour before Mosaddeq issued him a receipt. Then at around 2:30am Nasiri himself was detained on the orders of Colonel Ezzatollah Momtaz, who was in charge of guarding the house and had a superior force under his command.

Elsewhere in Tehran pro-government units coordinated by Mosaddeq’s chief of staff, General Taqi Riahi, also appeared to gain the upper hand. They took over the army headquarters, disarmed the Royal Guards and released pro-Mosaddeq officers who had been detained earlier. They also secured important locations around the capital and began to pursue anti-Mosaddeq officers who, in the words of a key CIA field agent that night, “lost heart and went into hiding”; some even took refuge in the U.S. Embassy. By dawn on Sunday, 16 August, news began to spread across town.

At 7:00am Tehran radio stopped its regular program and announced that a coup against the government had just been uncovered and foiled. The news prompted Mosaddeq’s supporters to take to the streets and march in protest. Among the demonstrators were organized cadres and sympathizers of the communist Tudeh Party as well as Mosaddeq’s own nationalist and centrist supporters, including university students and a considerable number of people from the Tehran bazaar. The Shah, who had already left the capital a few days earlier for his hunting lodge by the Caspian Sea, flew to Baghdad and then, two days later, to Rome. Thus the first coup attempt was thwarted.

On 18 August Mosaddeq ordered a ban on all demonstrations and withdrew most military units loyal to him that were stationed around Tehran. He was prompted to do so as a precautionary measure. He was both relieved by the Shah’s departure and alarmed by the increasing radicalism of the demonstrators, who were chanting anti-monarchist slogans and had pulled down the statues of Reza Shah and Mohammad-Reza Shah in Tehran and in the provinces during the preceding two days. He feared, too—rightly, as it turned out—that the radical turn in the tone of the slogans could have been stage-managed by agents of the coup-makers aiming at alienating conservative forces and frightening the people. The ban on demonstrations was also meant to show U.S. officials in Tehran that he had control over the situation and could send the crowds back to their homes just as swiftly as he could bring them out into the streets.

On the morning of Wednesday, 19 August, in defiance of the government’s ban on demonstrations, groups of seemingly unorganized mobs whose ringleaders were paid by the CIA and M16 through their local agents marched from south Tehran towards the center of the city, chanting “long live the Shah.” They vandalized pro-Mosaddeq and pro-Tudeh party facilities, including press offices, bookstores and meeting places, and intimidated bystanders. They were soon accompanied by pro-Shah units from the army and the police that were already stationed in the street, along with others who joined in spontaneously. Together they moved towards Mosaddeq’s residence. Initially units led by pro-Mosaddeq officers under Col. Momtaz put up a fierce fight, but they were ultimately overwhelmed, and the residence was stormed by the mob. At that point Mosaddeq ordered the forces guarding the compound not to resist, and with a few close associates he escaped to the garden of an adjacent house.

By 1:00pm the central telegraph office had been taken over by royalist forces; shortly afterward, they took the radio station, which then began broadcasting the Shah’s dismissal of Mosaddeq and his appointment of General Fazlollah Zahedi as the new prime minister. That broadcast was a conclusive turning point in the fall of Mosaddeq and the success of the coup’s second attempt. Mosaddeq and his associates surrendered themselves the next day at the Military Secretariat headquarters, under Zahedi’s command, and were placed in custody at the nearby Officers Club. The Shah (who, only a few days before, had appeared on CIA books as a reluctant partner in his own coup) returned, just as promptly as he had escaped a week earlier. A new chapter in Iran’s political history in the twentieth century opened and with it a new period in Iran-U.S. relations.

Technically the Shah no longer had the constitutional power to dismiss the premier without the approval or the request of the parliament (the Majles). Mosaddeq, on the other hand, had already obtained considerable emergency powers from the parliament in the previous year in order to strengthen his position. He could bypass the parliament and legislate by decree, and he could limit the powers of the Shah. Now, in early summer 1953, he was determined to hold new elections. First he would dissolve the parliament through a referendum. Many of his closest allies objected; nevertheless, he moved ahead with his plans.

To pave the way for the referendum, Mosaddeq suggested that his supporters, who made up the majority of the Majles deputies, resign their seats. They did so in mid-July. With no quorum, the House was effectively dissolved. Mosaddeq then called for a national referendum to dissolve formally the parliament and make way for new elections. Although the referendum, held on 29 July (and on 3...
August in Tehran), produced Mosaddeq’s intended results, questions about the way it was administered (for example, there were separate ballot boxes for “yes” and “no” votes, the boxes were out in the open, and the identity of voters was written on the ballots), allegations of irregularities, and the split vote among many one-time supporters diminished its overall credibility.

Various forces were directly involved in the making of the coup. These included the royalist and the Iranian military forces as well as the British and American “assets” and agitators inside Iran. Mosaddeq’s position was also weakened by groups that were once supportive of him but later defied him, such as the Tudeh Party, the Islamist groups, and deserters from Mosaddeq’s main parliamentary platform, the National Front. These forces did not act in unison; they all had different reasons for wanting to see Mosaddeq removed.

For the most part the official line in the United States, perhaps best formulated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, CIA director Allen Dulles, was that Mosaddeq was not a suitable partner in oil negotiations, that he was old and frail and personally too erratic, and that his government was too vulnerable to an imminent Soviet-backed takeover. In private, however, Secretary Dulles had made it clear to the Iranian embassy officials in Washington that the United States would not let Mosaddeq get away with nationalization lest others, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, get the wrong idea.

The official scenario—that Iran might be lost to the Soviet camp—became one of the most widely circulated pretexts for Mosaddeq’s removal. The fact of the matter, however, was that although Mosaddeq was not in complete control of the situation, he was not inclined to abolish the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran, nor was he passively in the pocket of the Soviet sympathizers. Although there were indeed domestic forces that were genuinely unhappy with the turn of events in Tehran, the coup was planned and financed jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom. They had no wish to reach an agreement with Mosaddeq. Although the United States was strongly motivated by the desire to block communism and by the geopolitical importance of Iran, perhaps the more imminent defining line for both powers involved was the control of Iran’s oil.

The Background

On 28 April 1951 Mohammad Mosaddeq was elected to the premiership of Iran with an overwhelming vote of the parliament after he played a key role in getting an oil nationalization bill passed on 20 March of that year. The Shah somewhat reluctantly went along with his appointment and gave his ceremonial assent. On at least three grounds the relations between the sovereign and his vizier were tense from the start. Generationally, Mosaddeq belonged to the old guard. The relatively young monarch, who had suddenly ascended to the throne in the early 1940s, mistrusted and perhaps even resented the old guard, most of whom he had inherited from his strong and much-feared father. The old elite, both civilian and military, with many of them among the top brass, had no reason to fear the younger Pahlavi. But Mosaddeq had a past that distinguished him from the mostly reticent and defused old guard of the first Pahlavi monarch.

In 1925, few years after the coup that brought the Shah’s father, Brig. Gen. Reza Khan (later Reza Shah), to the center stage of Iranian politics, a constituent assembly met for a pro forma ratification of the transfer of monarchy from the Qajars to the proposed new Pahlavi dynasty. In the preceding parliamentary discussions that led to that proposal, Mosaddeq, then a Majles deputy, was among the few to cast a negative vote. After joining in with everyone else to sing the praises of Reza Khan, he argued that it would be a pity to lose such an able soul who had done so much for the nation in such a short period of time to a position that, according to the constitution, would be a ceremonial one. And if, Mosaddeq went on, Reza Khan were also to assume the throne while maintaining his executive powers, then Iran would no longer be a constitutional monarchy but an absolute one. Such a turn of events would be a reversal of the country’s constitutional revolution some twenty years before.

Predictably, the Majles went ahead with the proposal, and the constituent assembly abolished the old dynasty and voted in the new one. Mosaddeq’s stubborn move earned him a black mark on the new Shah’s chart of who was friend and who was foe. Mosaddeq considered himself a constitutionalist, and on such principles he argued that in a constitutional monarchy the monarch should reign and not rule. In reality, however, Mosaddeq’s objection to Reza Khan’s ascension to the throne was not entirely based on abstract political theory. For the forty-three-year-old parliamentarian, Reza Khan, who was only four years his senior, was too much of a military bully and had not been groomed in court culture. Mosaddeq also feared (erroneously) that Reza Khan had been brought to power by the British. These issues continued to impact negatively Mosaddeq’s perception of both Pahlavi monarchs, and the feelings of distrust were mutual. While Reza Shah was in power Mosaddeq’s political fortunes ebbed.

The Impact

Prior to the Second World War the United States had a more positive record and reputation in Iran. It was often viewed as a faraway and benevolent super power with no colonial designs on the country, and Iranians acknowledged that it had its own anti-colonial credentials. On a few occasions Iran asked for U.S. assistance in administrative and financial reorganization of government programs. The United States also maintained a limited but overall positive posture in Iran in the field of education; most notably, U.S. educators had founded and for many decades administered the American College of Tehran, which was a Presbyterian all-boys high school and junior college. During the Pahlavi era a good number of Iran’s elite were graduates of this college. The coup of 1953 quickly changed the Iranian view of the United States. The public began to see it as a coup-maker and a supporter of leaders whose views and style of governance were far removed from the standards so overtly preached by the United States itself.

In the post-coup period Iran was firmly placed in the camp of U.S. friends in the region. Iran was a major component in the Eisenhower and Nixon doctrines and was a key member of the 1955 Baghdad Pact (replaced in 1959 by Central Treaty Organization, dissolved in 1979). In 1954, following the coup, the new oil consortium created a
regime to oversee and manage the proceeds of the Iranian oil industry. The industry was not de-nationalized, at least not on paper, but arrangements were introduced that placed control of its operational and marketing methods in the hands of Western oil companies. Under the new regime U.S. oil companies obtained a 40 percent share in the proceeds of the Iranian oil industry. Forty percent went to the old Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, now renamed British Petroleum, and the remaining 20 percent went to Dutch and French oil companies.

The coup also impacted U.S.-Iran relations in other ways. The restored Shah never managed to cast off the general belief that he owed his reign to the United States and that he was an obedient servant of Western interests in the region. However, the Shah’s own interpretation was that at the height of the Cold War, and with close to one thousand miles of common borders with the Soviet Union, the United States benefited from Iran as much as Iran benefited from the United States. Personality also played a role in history, and in the case of Iran the attitudes and characters of Iranian leaders played a significant part in dealings with successive U.S. governments. That was true as much of Mosaddeq and the Shah as it was of the Ayatollah at a later period.

From a domestic point of view the Shah and his overall style and performance in both national and international contexts were viewed as being in alignment with Western interests, even directed and dictated by them. For instance, in the eyes of the Iranian opposition and the general public, the Shah’s “rotten compromise” (to paraphrase Avishai Margalit) over the independence of Bahrain in 1970–1 was his way of thanking the West for his restoration in 1953. Yet the Shah always had the specter of foreign intrigue and threat with him. In the weeks and days leading to the revolution of 1979, for example, the Shah was constantly probing British and American officials in Tehran to find out why they were pulling the rug from under his feet.

Sixty years on, the 1953 coup in Iran continues to be divisive at home and abroad. Occasional declassification of archival materials in the United States and the UK has not revealed substantively new grounds to challenge the basic premises of existing scholarly research. In fact, the new documents have merely confirmed the existence of a joint American and British policy and the role played by their agents in the coup against Mosaddeq. However, there has been a semi-official line of argument, at times echoed by think tank analysts, that initially the West had decided that Mosaddeq should be removed, but when the coup did not go as planned, the CIA ordered its field operatives to abort.

This narrative suggests that it was in fact Mosaddeq who initially launched a coup of his own by defying the royal dismissal, then arresting the royal messenger and letting his supporters come out and demonstrate for him. According to this scenario it was Mosaddeq’s own impasse with forces at home as well as the support for the Shah by the Iranian military and the urban crowds that reversed the tide. Some Iranians have a neo-royalist perspective that distorts history in a similar way; they hold Mosaddeq’s supposed vanities and obstinacy responsible for the continued crisis and credit for the eventual success of the coup the popular national sentiments in favor of the young monarch, whom they regard as having been unfairly treated by his government and the communists who had managed to infiltrate it.

During the initial phases of Iran’s 1979 revolution Mosaddeq enjoyed tremendous popularity and a high place in its iconography. However, soon afterward an Islamist perspective, based mostly on propaganda and rhetoric, tried to downplay Mosaddeq’s role in nationalization of the oil industry and credit the religious forces instead. It further blamed Mosaddeq’s own heresies (secularism and nationalism) for sealing his fate. To date none of these arguments have succeeded in tarnishing Mosaddeq’s record or diminishing his popularity in the memory of most Iranians.

**Bibliographical Note**

There is a vast amount of primary and secondary material on the 1953 U.S. coup in Iran. For declassified U.S. State Department documents relating to the events of 1951–4, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol. 5: The Near East and Africa (Washington, DC, 1982) (hereafter FRUS); and FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 10: Iran, 1952–54 (Washington, DC, 1989). The British Foreign Office archives on Iran for the period 1951–3 are kept at the National Archives in London; the majority of them are filed under FO 371 and FO 248. The archives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are at the British Petroleum Library at Warwick University in England. For these and other bibliographical suggestions see Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and The Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations (New York, 2013), 259-64.

The following is a selective list of books and essay collections that have appeared in English. Thus far several personal accounts, memoirs and analyses by a number of British and American officials and field operatives who were involved in the coup of 1953 have appeared, which deal wholly or in part with the events in Iran. See, for example, Sam Falle, My Lucky Life: In War, Revolution, Peace and Diplomacy (London, 1996); Kermit Roosevelt Jr., Countercoup, the Struggle for Control of Iran (New York, 1979); Donald Wilber, Adventures in the Middle East (Princeton, Wilber, Regime Change in Iran: Overthrow of Premier Mossadegh of Iran, November 1952–August 1953 (London, 2006).


More accessible readings about the coup and its impact include Christopher de Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Tragic Anglo-American Coup...

Author’s Note:
I am grateful to Ervand Abrahamian, Homa Katouzian, and Ali Rahnema for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Introduction

Steven Casey

That the years between 1936 and 1953 marked a major watershed in U.S. foreign policy comes as no surprise to anyone. What Justin Hart does in Empire of Ideas is to demonstrate how important these years were to the emergence of American public diplomacy. The reasons, he observes, were various: the emergence of new forms of media, the need to foster support for the anti-Axis alliance, and the opportunity to project a particular image of the United States as it emerged as a global hegemon. The implications, he emphasizes, are profound. By locating the start of public diplomacy in the 1930s, he can show important continuities between the pre- and postwar periods. Because these origins predated the Cold War, he seeks to demonstrate in particular that this new “focus on America’s image in the world” did not need the impetus of anticommunism. As Nicholas Cull observes, such an approach fits snugly into the existing historiography as a “prequel” to the growing number of works that explore what happened during the Eisenhower administration and beyond.

Hart’s exploration of the origins of American “public diplomacy” is only one of the major contributions that the four reviewers highlight in the pages that follow. As David Snyder points out, Hart emphasizes “the full spectrum of cultural, economic, educational, and informational policies concerned with the image of America abroad,” and in so doing provides coherence to a story that hitherto had been “told largely in fragments.” Snyder further observes that although the book focuses on government officials, Hart explores the crucial intersection between “private sources of culture and the public management” without ignoring the competing visions held by different individuals and institutions. According to Donna Alvah, at the outset the most profound debate among public diplomatists centered on the nature of their work. Should their goal be “to represent the United States and its policies via a ‘strategy of truth,’ or to propagandize?” Snyder and Brian Etheridge, Hart’s biggest contribution is to connect public diplomacy to imperial practice. Both are particularly attracted by his claim that public diplomacy was “part and parcel of a postcolonial, imperial strategy to extend the influence of the United States while avoiding the costs of acquiring a large territorial empire.”

While all four reviewers find much to praise, they also stress what Hart has left out. For Cull, the book’s “disciplined focus on the evolution of thinking within the U.S. government” comes at the cost of exploring the output and field-level operations of the agencies involved in public diplomacy. For Etheridge and Snyder, the main drawback is the absence of a consideration of impact: what effect did Washington’s public diplomacy have on its target audience?

In a spirited reply, Hart addresses these and other comments. He concedes that impact is a worthwhile subject for further research but makes the unconventional and intriguing point that much work needs to be done on the “architecture of [Washington’s] policymaking—not just the content and impact of particular policies but where that content comes from and, most important, how and why policymakers make the choices they do.” He is also keen both to reiterate the importance of empire to public diplomatists—the idea that they were all keen to extend the United States’ influence—and to demonstrate how the cultural turn has influenced his thinking on this subject.

I Hart the History of Ideas

Brian C. Etheridge

Justin Hart’s Empire of Ideas is a welcome addition to our understanding of both the origins of public diplomacy and the creation and maintenance of American empire. His title appears to be a play on the title of Frank Ninkovich’s pathbreaking study, The Diplomacy of Ideas, in which Ninkovich, in a very different historiographical context, makes a powerful plea for the importance of
studying culture in foreign relations. In making his case for the significance of cultural diplomacy despite its apparent irrelevance to traditional decisionmaking, Ninkovich says, in one of his best turns of phrase, that cultural diplomats’ “consignment to the diplomatic basement, so to speak, gave them access to the foundations of U.S. foreign policy” (3). Writing about the same time period, but publishing in a very different context thirty years later, a context in which the study of culture in international history is no longer contested but mainstream, Hart is able to advance a more specific argument. This argument is simultaneously provocative and evocative—provocative in that it challenges us to think more concretely about the intersection of public diplomacy and empire, and evocative in that it conjures up ancient historiographical debates rooted in revisionist historiography.

Hart’s work is a useful corrective to some of the trends in the study of public diplomacy. Like Ninkovich, he traces the birth of public diplomacy back to the Roosevelt administration in the 1930s, which is a useful vantage point, given that much of the work on this subject focuses on the Cold War period. Like Ninkovich, too, and like Ken Osgood in his study of the public diplomacy of the Eisenhower administration, Hart isn’t content with just tracing the course of bureaucratic wrangling or following money trails. He argues, in a more robust and specific way than Ninkovich does, that the birth of public diplomacy contributed to an enlarged conception of the proper scope of government management of America’s interaction with the larger world. Making distinctions between the terms “diplomacy,” “foreign policy,” and “foreign relations,” Hart contends that policymakers over time broadened their view of their charge from just the interaction of designated high-level governmental representatives (diplomacy) to managing all of the different ways that the United States interacts with the larger world (foreign relations).

Hart’s most significant contribution, however, is that he develops the argument, as his title suggests, that the broadening definition of foreign relations was explicitly about attaining and maintaining global hegemony—not so much about advancing an empire of ideas, but advancing an empire facilitated or managed by ideas. For Hart’s protagonists, the key to the dilemma of “how to manage without ruling, or perhaps how to rule without managing” lay in “projecting America.” Put more succinctly, for them “Americanization became the antidote to colonization” (9). To achieve this objective, Hart essentially creates an intellectual history—an approach that has clear benefits but also some disadvantages.

One of the clear virtues of Hart’s approach and the narrative he constructs is that he is able to demonstrate continuity between the prewar and postwar periods. By beginning his narrative in the 1930s, he is able to trace the origins of American public diplomacy back to the nation’s interests in and interactions with Latin America, a move that offers a welcome perspective, considering that so much of the literature on public diplomacy and Americanization has been focused on Europe during the Cold War. He reminds us that in a world increasingly riven by conflict, the United States was looking for ways to stabilize Latin American republics and simultaneously strengthen American influence in the region. While publicly renouncing military intervention and extolling bilateral educational exchanges, Roosevelt and his advisors touted a new way of interacting with sister republics in the Americas. Here in the laboratory of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, policymakers such as Nelson Rockefeller began to articulate a vision for expanding American influence by exposing Latin Americans to American ideals through broadly conceived methods, including exchanges, technical assistance (later thought of as a modernization strategy), and information policy.

World War II provided the opportunity for scaling up these initiatives. There were sensible, pragmatic reasons for the United States to do so as it prosecuted the war effort. American officials knew they had to shore up support against the Axis powers and were keenly aware of their adversaries’ capabilities where influence was concerned. But there was also the forward-looking, opportunistic point of view advanced by the Henrys (Luce and Wallace), among others: the war presented an opportunity for the United States to outtake both friend and foe alike and emerge as a global hegemon. To emphasize this point of view and tie the globalization of American public diplomacy to the imperialist project, Hart highlights how China, the birthplace of America’s Open Door policy and the place that first prompted the nationalist school to articulate and develop the historical notion of American empire, became the first country America’s burgeoning cultural policy was exported to. World War II was also when theorists began to consider the full scope of the challenges presented by the Third World and the ways in which foreign policy had to be reconceived to meet those challenges. Hart uses the persistent position of those whom he calls the cultural purists—scholars and administrators who clung desperately to the idea of using cultural exchange to facilitate greater international understanding, not nationalist objectives (and certainly not American empire!)—to illustrate the growing distinctions made between foreign policy and foreign relations. Indeed, he casts the whole wartime reorganization of the State Department as an exercise in realizing this distinction. The purists did not necessarily welcome that reorganization, even though it represented a heightened appreciation of culture’s importance in foreign relations.

In one of the best chapters of the book, Hart details how the establishment of the Office of War Information (OWI) represented the full engagement of the United States in public diplomacy and delivered a victory, of sorts, to those who sought to chain cultural work to foreign policy objectives. In charting the birth, life, and death of the OWI, Hart effectively depicts the wartime organization as a critical link between the State Department’s turbulent and contested debates and the eventual emergence of the Cold War-era United States Information Agency (USIA). Building on the insights of New Dealer and renaissance man Archibald MacLeish, whom he calls “the George Kennan of U.S. information policy” (74), Hart describes how the governing consensus within the organization accurately understood the blurred boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs in the modern era. Most important, MacLeish engaged in a robust debate over the proper role of the propagandist in the formulation of American foreign policy—an issue highlighted by the problems that American race relations posed for American policy abroad. Concerns about how the OWI represented America foreshadowed the challenges that would plague efforts to tell America’s story in the postwar world.

Many of these story arcs continued into the postwar period. The Truman administration’s simultaneous efforts at selling American foreign policy at home while promoting America abroad illustrated the blurring distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs. Of particular significance were the administration’s efforts to sell the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan at home. Most important, however, Hart argues that the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War forced a recalibration of foreign policy and public diplomacy. These events signaled that information policy in the Third World would confront some difficult realities, most of which the United States had inflicted on itself by decades of Europe-first policies. These difficulties were compounded by the dawning realization that long-held fears about the attractiveness of the communist message in the decolonizing world
appeared to be coming true. Hart points out that in this white-hot environment, the political heat generated by the “loss of Asia” laid waste to the fragile postwar foreign policy consensus, with McCarthy’s incendiary attacks on the State Department, and more specifically on the Voice of America, the most visible and radioactive. All these events, both foreign and domestic, eventually led in 1953 to the creation of an independent agency, the USIA, to carry out public diplomacy.

As should be evident in this brief summary, Hart’s narrative underscores the virtues of his approach. By focusing on the evolving debates over these ideas in their shifting historical contexts, Hart is essentially able to re-periodize the era by bridging two interrelated conflicts that are often treated separately. His narrative allows us to see connections that are often obscured and, more particularly, reveals the enduring nature of some Cold War trends. It should also be pointed out that Hart tells his story with remarkable ease, managing to impart a sense of drama and pacing to internal debates among American policymakers about the future direction of foreign policy. In that sense his considerable storytelling gifts overcome one of the primary challenges of intellectual history; in the hands of a lesser author, this narrative could border on being boring.

Unfortunately, however, Hart’s enviable prose cannot make up for some of the limitations of intellectual history as an approach. Even as I found myself tapping my foot to Hart’s hypnotizing beat, my restless mind wondered (and wandered): what were the effects of these policies? How did target countries or populations respond to them? How did America’s Cold War allies respond to U.S. efforts to supplant their influence in the Third World? And while it is understandable that much of the focus is on the Third World, how does the Americanization of Europe, about which much has been written, figure into the overall narrative? Finally, if cultural policy was so darned important, why was it chronically backburnered and underfunded?

All of these questions point to a larger issue: although Hart’s study is about public and cultural diplomacy, its subject matter and methodology are largely untouched by the cultural turn of the last twenty years. As an intellectual history of policymakers, the book offers essentially a reboot of the revisionist school franchise. We learn how American policymakers conceived of the ways in which public diplomacy and American culture could facilitate the management of empire, but we don’t learn how American public diplomacy and/or culture actually created or facilitated this project. In this sense, the book as a work of intellectual history offers a way of breathing new life into and asking new questions of a timeless interpretation. The problem, though, is that by focusing on the history of ideas, and not on other facets of the empire of ideas, Hart has to resort to the simple assertion of hugely contested facts, as when he claims that the “focus on America’s image in the world would have existed with or without the Cold War” (108). Fully justifying such a claim, a claim that is central to Hart’s thesis, would require a more wide-ranging narrative than a history of ideas can offer.

To be fair, though, these comments begin to stray away from the book that Hart actually wrote toward a book that he did not aspire to write. Any work of history represents a series of choices, and the choices that Hart made here created a lively and vibrant interpretation that contributes significantly to the literature. His bold narrative has replanted the revisionist flag. Now it falls to those following up from the rear to carry out the reconquest.
The territorial aggression of Japan and Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s fueled a sense of urgency among advocates of “cultural diplomacy”10 to strengthen connections with nations such as China that the United States wanted to assist even before it officially entered World War II. According to Hart, policymakers and their advisers had already been thinking about expanding the scope of cultural diplomacy beyond Latin America for several years, through activities such as educational exchanges and technical assistance. Now that the war was changing world geography and politics, some Americans envisioned or actually began to promote the emergence of the United States as a global hegemon. Throughout the book, Hart frequently returns to Henry Luce’s “American Century” article in Life magazine (February 1941) as the “prescient” articulation of the vision of U.S. empire through “ideological influence” rather than territorial dominance. That empire would ensue from the war and was indeed already in progress, thanks to “American cultural forms.”11

Before, during, and after World War II, those involved in developing cultural and public diplomacy—nearly all of them male and many of them men who had already made careers in industry, advertising, academia, philanthropy, the humanities and the arts—advised government officials and often took positions in government. They vigorously discussed “the Projection of America”12 and were often, judging from Hart’s excerpts of meeting minutes and other documents, remarkably philosophical and incisive about the nature and goals of their work. Was the primary goal to represent the United States and its policies via a “strategy of truth” or to propagandize? To foster an atmosphere of international cooperation or to persuade the rest of the world to accept U.S. leadership, even hegemony? Where was the line between these positions, or was there one? Reflective public diplomats continued to grapple with these questions into the postwar years. Hart finds that during the war, it became more evident that U.S. government messages created for overseas audiences constituted foreign policy in and of themselves: “Every single time the Office of War Information spoke for the United States it effectively made foreign policy.”13 Moreover, during World War II, public diplomacy had come to encompass diverse domestic audiences as officials tried to solicit support for U.S. foreign policies.

One key development that stemmed from the war era was Truman’s decision in August 1945 to combine the Office of War Information’s overseas information programs with the existing State Department programs in public information, cultural diplomacy, and educational exchange. Thus, “by unifying under one umbrella all of the government’s initiatives for shaping the image of America in the world,” Hart writes, “U.S. officials formed the matrix of what is now called public diplomacy.”14 However, this “consolidation” of public diplomacy did not lead to simple answers about what the content and objectives of public diplomacy should be in the context of the emerging Cold War, decolonization, and the increasing momentum of the civil rights movement in the United States.15 The tendency of public diplomacy (not unchallenged) was to portray starkly the Soviet Union as the ideological rival of the United States. But the authors of Truman’s March 1947 speech to Congress requesting aid to the governments of Greece and Turkey to prevent the rise of communism there were tasked with “making the situation perfectly clear without mentioning Russia”16 so as not to jeopardize a mission to Moscow by Secretary of State George Marshall.17

Some projects were particularly daunting. Public diplomats labored to persuade people of color in nations liberated from colonization that the United States was the world’s champion of freedom and democracy. They had to acknowledge African Americans’ struggles to experience freedom and democracy, but they also had to avoid alienating Southern Democrats in Congress whose support was needed to fund their operations. And public diplomacy could do little to convince people in colonized and decolonizing countries that U.S. leaders had their interests at heart when they were heavily funding France’s war to retain its colonies in Indochina.

Hart demonstrates that while controversy over the content and goals of public diplomacy was not new, Senator Joseph McCarthy took criticism of it to new levels. For example, the employment of foreigners for Voice of America radio broadcasts—crucial because of their knowledge of the languages and cultures of the target audiences—drew allegations of enemy subversion. Hart shows that McCarthyism itself created an image problem for the United States. Producers of information for international audiences were forced to consider whether and how to depict it abroad.

Scholars of information and images generated by the U.S. government for domestic and foreign audiences will value Hart’s genealogy of people, ideas, offices, and politics. His book would have been very useful for my study of U.S. military families abroad after World War II, in which I analyze guidebooks and other official sources of information that instructed members of military families on how (and how not) to present themselves, and thus their country, in occupied and host nations.18 My book demonstrates that the idea that those representing the United States abroad had to do so in a way that, as Hart puts it, “generate[d] more friends than enemies”19 resonated so deeply with many U.S. military wives, servicemen, and even children that they took the initiative to represent the nation in a suitable way themselves, often with little guidance from U.S. officials. Empire of Ideas illuminates the naissance of the assumption behind such behavior, although it focuses primarily on U.S. civilian agencies. While Hart does make some references to connections and conflicts between civilian and military activities in public diplomacy, in reading this book I found myself wanting to know more details about the ways in which ideas about representing U.S. policies and American society more generally to foreign audiences made their way into and through the military realm. This is not a criticism of Hart’s book. There is only so much that an author can do in the two hundred or so pages that he or she is allotted for the main text of a monograph.

I agree with Hart that “if image represented a tangible component of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. foreign relations, then someone needed to monitor perceptions of the United States and establish the government’s objectives and the nature and goals of their work. Was the primary goal to represent the United States and its policies via a “strategy of truth” or to propagandize? To foster an atmosphere of international cooperation or to persuade the rest of the world to accept U.S. leadership, even hegemony? Where was the line between these positions, or was there one? Reflective public diplomats continued to grapple with these questions into the postwar years. Hart finds that during the war, it became more evident that U.S. government messages created for overseas audiences constituted foreign policy in and of themselves: “Every single time the Office of War Information spoke for the United States it effectively made foreign policy.”13 Moreover, during World War II, public diplomacy had come to encompass diverse domestic audiences as officials tried to solicit support for U.S. foreign policies.

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Some projects were particularly daunting. Public diplomats labored to persuade people of color in nations liberated from colonization that the United States was the world’s champion of freedom and democracy. They had to acknowledge African Americans’ struggles to experience freedom and democracy, but they also had to
both its attractive aspects and its flaws.

Yet on the other hand, by the late 1940s, many Americans took seriously the broad notion that impressions of the United States and its policies mattered in the world. Hart is right that “public diplomats” working in a complex bureaucracy, in the thick of domestic politics, could do relatively little to articulate coherent, consistent projections of the United States and its policies, let alone shape perceptions in an enormous world of images and information. Yet the fact that U.S. government officials today as well as many people in the public at large take it for granted that image must be taken into account in formulating policies and that leaders must make sincere efforts to explain and justify these not just to domestic audiences but also to the wider world is an accomplishment for which those who conceptualized early cultural and public diplomacy deserve at least partial credit.

Notes:
2. Hicks, Bayeux Tapestry, Chapter 1, paragraph 1; and Chapter 2, paragraph 5. For various recent discussions of possible audience for the work, see Hicks; also see T. A. Heslop, “Regarding the Spectators of the Bayeux Tapestry: Bishop Odo and His Circle,” Art History 32, 2 (April 2009): 223–49.
4. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 201.
5. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 7.
6. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 41.
7. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 45.
8. The term “Projection of America” originated with playwright Robert Sherwood, who ran the Foreign Information Service under William J. Donovan. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 89.
9. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 78.
11. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 108.
13. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 121.
15. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 201.
16. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 201.
17. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 95.
18. Quoted in Hart, Empire of Ideas, 61; also see 217n48.

Review of Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy

Nicholas Cull

This book has much to recommend it. Meticulously researched, well written and with great contemporary relevance, Justin Hart’s Empire of Ideas is an essential addition to the growing body of scholarship around U.S. public diplomacy. Hart’s book may be read as a prequel to such texts as Walter Hixson’s Parting the Curtain (1997), Scott Lucas’s Freedom’s War (1999), or my own two-volume history of the United States Information Agency (2008 and 2012). It is also a new riff on the period and material covered in Frank Ninkovich’s pioneering Diplomacy of Ideas (1981).

Attending to detail without losing touch with the big picture, Hart reveals the process by which the United States moved from its early steps in the field of cultural diplomacy in 1936, through its youthful adventures in the form of Nelson Rockefeller’s work in Latin America, the wartime activities of the OWI, and the stewardship of Archibald McLeish, to the moment in 1953 when a full-scale U.S. public diplomacy agency—the United States Information Agency (USIA)—came into existence. His narrative emphasizes a collective decision to reject the conception of drawing close to other nations—initially neighbors in Latin America—through a process of mutual learning fostered through cultural exchange in favor of a more assertive, unilateral approach. This evangelical turn sought to harness the power of U.S. culture and ideas as a component in a strategy to assert the United States on the world stage as a successor to the European great powers: hence the book’s title.

Highpoints within the text include Hart’s detailed recreation of the internal debates around the export of American ideas, including the input from such characters as historian Harvey Notter, who is quoted at length urging the department to embrace a pseudo-imperial destiny. It is also fascinating to see how themes that would loom large in the output of the USIA fare in the war years. Especially interesting are the attempts by the Office of War Information (OWI) to depict America’s diversity and its engagement with the issue of race. That theme was quashed in the war years but was later a mainstay of such work.

The book’s disciplined focus on the evolution of thinking within the U.S. government comes at a price. Hart has no room for field-level descriptions of particular operations, which I think are often the fun bits to read (and for that matter to research and write) in a book dealing with the engagement of public opinion. There is no discussion of the OWI’s output of documentary films; no photographs are reproduced; there is no attention to exactly what cultural affairs officers said or did; there is no content analysis of pamphlets or posters and no war stories of ingenuity in the field. The only actual Voice of America broadcasts described are those that attracted negative attention in the press. There is very little discussion of the operations undertaken to promote the Marshall Plan or the informational component of German or Japanese reconstruction, despite the fact that personnel and institutions from those efforts were transferred directly into the jurisdiction of the USIA. The reader who wants to know what was done to put flesh on the bones of the policies described by Hart will still need to consult the studies done by Richard Arndt, Alan Heil, Jessica Gienow-Hecht, or Susan Brewer, all mentioned in Hart’s bibliography, or new books such as Darlene Sadlier’s wonderful treatment of Nelson Rockefeller’s work in Latin America, which appeared around the same time as Hart’s volume.

Some omissions are more problematic than others. The legislative trail on Capitol Hill is drawn only with the broadest strokes, leaving the field clear for a volume on the legal aspects of this same story. Blogger Matthew Armstrong is reportedly at work on exactly such a volume. Hart is bold enough to address the creation and operation of the Fulbright Program with only a passing reference early in the book; moreover, it is a reference that frames the program as subsumed into an agenda to sell America (6). This characterization ignores the ample evidence that, whatever Congress or the State Department believed, Fulbright and his board really were as interested in changing America as they were in winning hearts and minds overseas. When Fulbright said “ignorance is the enemy,” he was not talking only about ignorance in Kandahar or Karachi. As several of his confidantes, including his wife Harriet, have told me, he well understood and spoke often of the need to counter American ignorance. “Heck,” he would say, “I’m from Arkansas!” More than this, Hart’s emphasis on the imperial thrust in America’s overt propaganda glosses over the extent to which the fault lines within the American information line-up endured. In my own research into the Cold War and post-Cold War experience of the USIA I found the differences of approach between the Voice of America’s broadcasters, the cultural and exchange elements, and the policy office at the USIA not only endured, they formed a principle dialectic of the agency’s history.
There is one major irritant in this book’s choice of language. Hart tells us in note 7 on p. 204 that his main run of State Department archive documents were in a box labeled “International Information Activities.” Despite this, Hart insists on imposing the anachronistic term “public diplomacy.” The phrase “public diplomacy” was not applied to this kind of work until 1965, when Dean Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School at Tufts coined (or more strictly speaking appropriated) it as a way of talking about the role of foreign public engagement in foreign policy. Hart does not discuss his own use of language, but should one really publish a book with “the Origins of Public Diplomacy” in the title without citing the name Gullion in the index or furnishing an explanation in the body of the text? The application of mid-Cold War and post-Cold War language to pre- and early Cold War language events may serve to overstate continuity and certainly obscures the terminology actually used at the time.

Finally, Hart’s carefully researched book falls down when he strays beyond the archive. His casual dismissal of contemporary U.S. public diplomacy (2, 236 n4) is not supported by any evidence within the text and does not reflect the reality of the experience of recent years. Since the middle of George W. Bush’s tenure in office, U.S. public diplomacy has benefited from structural reforms, improved morale, better budgets, better training, and innovative programming, especially in the field of new technology. The present generation of public diplomats and their able and energetic leaders, like James K. Glassman or the present under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, Tara Sonnenshine, deserve better and will certainly fare better when the history of the public diplomacy of our own era comes to be written.

Yet such quirks and quibbles pale beside the undeniable achievement of Hart’s account of a major shift in America’s approach to foreign policy. Omissions and oddities of terminology notwithstanding, this book will certainly be of great value to scholars, students, and anyone interested in the evolution of American foreign relations or the international history of World War II and the Cold War.

**Review of Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas**

David J. Snyder

In his finely wrought Empire of Ideas, Justin Hart repositions U.S. public diplomacy from the margins of traditional statecraft to “something that encompassed every aspect of U.S. foreign policy.” Public diplomacy—understood here as the full spectrum of cultural, economic, educational, and informational policies concerned with the image of America abroad—is thus far a story told largely in fragments.1 In making a bolder claim for the importance of public diplomacy than generally prevails in the growing and at times self-marginalizing public diplomacy literature, Hart asks historians to reconsider U.S. foreign policy generally. In this endeavor he clearly succeeds.

Like Frank Ninkovich in his pioneering Diplomacy of Ideas, Hart locates the origins of U.S. public diplomacy in the Roosevelt administration’s neighborly and internationalist concern for the stability of Latin America. However, unlike Ninkovich, who closely narrates the ideological battles of this first generation of American public diplomats, Hart focuses on economic development and technical assistance programs and emphasizes that they comprised a crucial part of the cultural overture to Latin America. This broader understanding of public diplomacy shows how that first generation of public diplomats was less interested in “selling” America than in binding the besieged nations of the New World more closely together economically as well as culturally—under the benign tutelage of the United States, of course. This internationalism would survive bruising ideological battles during the war and political battles after, comprising the foundation for a new postwar American geopolitics. By the end of the war, a broad consensus had formed within the Roosevelt administration that cultural relations and information—though not necessarily in that order—were essential fundaments of the “American Century.”

It is well known to most historians that public diplomacy activities always attracted searing political criticism, especially from conservatives who, in the name of fiscal prudence, were determined to keep a lid on vexing American domestic problems, especially the dilemma of race. Conservatives also fretted that a dedicated public diplomacy effort would require a full embrace of global cultural developments, which seemed too international, perhaps too Jewish, and definitely too modern. “In order to ‘project America’ one first had to define ‘America’—an inherently political exercise,” Hart observes (103). Especially after the war, with the informational and cultural stakes raised even higher, public diplomacy became a target for the McCarthyites, leading Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower to jettison the State Department’s carefully evolved public diplomacy apparatus. Hart ends his story here, but as Kenneth Osgood has shown, Eisenhower’s devotion to public diplomacy was so profound that he established an independent United States Information Agency (USIA). The USIA enjoyed much more direct conduits to power than the previous departments within State. McCarthy’s attacks thus ironically led to a more influential public diplomacy apparatus.

More interesting than these political battles, however, were the profound ideological tensions that shaped the work of successive public diplomacy agencies.2 These tensions comprised the public diplomacy DNA that would define the dilemmas public diplomats faced for decades. They included the “place of propaganda in a democratic society, the proliferation of access to mass communications, the relationship between foreign relations and domestic affairs, the distinction between propaganda and psychological warfare, and the relationship between public and private sources of information” (72).

Like all effective monographs, Empire of Ideas makes contributions to several scholarly conversations. Its first insight confirms one of the realities of World War II, easily lost in triumphalist imaginings of the war, and that is the essential democratic impulses animating American participation. This concern for the “common man” encompassed what Elizabeth Borgwardt calls a “new capacity for an integrated vision of social and economic rights.”3 Public diplomats were at the cutting edge of this new conception of a democratic world. They determined to harness modern mass communications to generate an American-led internationalist order that would vouchsafe a new democratic era for the world. As Robert Sherwood, one of the early architects of U.S. public diplomacy, observed, “We think today in terms of peoples rather than nations” (10).

As Hart details, with this notion of “the people” a new diplomatic era had arrived, an era in which American and global publics were no longer passive recipients of hegemonic U.S. power but had become active shapers of it. American mass culture had gone global, and to ignore the fact that “foreign relations [are now] domestic affairs,” as Archibald MacLeish put it, was to undermine U.S. foreign policy itself. But concern for democracy also meant that the temptations of American cultural power had to be mitigated and an often crude paternalism restrained. This is the heart of the finely tuned balance officials aimed for: to transform the world by the American example, but to do so by allowing the people of the world to elect to follow that example themselves.

The complicated interplay between private sources
of culture and the public management of it comprises an often-neglected dimension of public diplomacy, and Hart captures it well in his second important contribution: conceptualizing public diplomacy as something much more than policy-retailing and “branding.” U.S. public diplomacy occurred within and alongside a vast and pluralist private mass culture. As MacLeish knew, in the era of mass communications a nation’s domestic affairs could not be sequestered from its foreign policy. New communications technologies, coupled with the expanded reach of American interests, required officials to “to pay attention to the impact of domestic affairs on U.S. foreign policy” (58). The new “permeability of boundaries” (77) meant that the domestic would perforce be made foreign, perhaps most conspicuously in the area of America’s racial dilemma, which foreign audiences around the world observed with keen interest. 4

Whatever their scruples about propaganda, officials recognized that the relationship between the foreign and the domestic comprised the essential challenge as they came to learn that claims Americans made about themselves would be subject to a new global scrutiny. The democratic anarchy of American mass culture, now easily observable to a global audience, would engulf any attempt to fabricate material. The state could organize, certainly manage, and even nurture culture, but it could not produce it out of whole cloth in the Orwellian sense. Hence the top-down pressure to address the racial dilemma that was so ruinous to American foreign policy aims abroad. Following the work of Dudziak, Borstelmann, and others, Hart rightly emphasizes “the way the American Century redefined the nature of U.S. foreign relations and, in turn, reconfigured its domestic affairs as well” (13). The task of mediating between Americans’ often-problematic mass culture and the image of a responsible and mature power assuming global leadership resulted in the “anomaly” of Cold War-era public diplomacy, as Jessica Gienow-Hecht has put it, in which officials brought the full power of the state behind the effort to project a redemptive image of America to a fallen Cold War world unlike any period before or since. 5

Thirdly, Empire of Ideas is forthrightly imperial in its approach to the foreign policy of the early Cold War. Ninkovich introduced the conflict between the internationalist agenda of early cultural diplomacy advocates and the nationalist goals of policymakers concerned above all with pressing an American strategic advantage in the postwar world. By 1950, Ninkovich writes, “cultural internationalism was . . . an instrument of national policy.” 6 For Hart, public diplomacy implies not the subsuming of internationalism to the security demands of realpolitik but rather a broad spectrum of power that can be brought to bear in a way best understood as “empire.” State-backed cultural relations became “part and parcel of a postcolonial, imperial strategy to extend the influence of the United States while avoiding the costs of acquiring a large territorial empire” (3). Hart is correct that the goal of public diplomacy advocates from the outset was to “integrate economics, culture and information into a comprehensive, worldwide strategy” (37). Despite the recent surge in writing on empire, Hart’s book is one of the few that analytically connects “hard” power to “soft” power in a way that actually shows how an empire works.

The flagship postwar program of American national security, the Marshall Plan, was just such an explicit combination of economic aid, commercial modernization, technological know-how, propaganda, and culture and was intended to project the essence of what it meant to be American. Hart establishes that U.S. public diplomacy is not only the selling of a particular set of policies, but also the creation of the cultural substrate that makes foreign acceptance of those policies much more likely. It is this aspect of public diplomacy that makes it an imperial strategy. The two-way flows of information between multiple publics, the managerial role of the state as it attempted to control image-making within a much broader global context of mass communications, and the broad spectrum of operations subsumed under the heading “public diplomacy” show the analytical weaknesses of the prevailing “hard” and “soft” power paradigm. From the very beginning, public diplomats certainly understood that they had no independent power to deploy and that foreign publics would not be susceptible to propagandistic blandishments that contradicted plainly experienced “hard” policy. As Hart rightly insists, if a strategy of truth was going to prevail (even alongside a strategy of black propaganda), the policy itself has to be correct or at least appear to be correct in the hearts and minds of foreign targets of that policy. Hence information cannot be walled off in a separate category of “soft” power. Information is policy, and vice versa.

Because the American foreign relations of which public diplomacy was so conspicuously a part intended to bring about real changes in the way foreigners lived and worked, we need to know much more about the impact of public diplomacy “among the receivers,” as Rob Koes has put it. 7 Here, in what is one of the genetic infirmities of much public diplomacy literature, Hart’s institutional focus leaves us a little short. With only intermittent descriptions of actual public diplomacy programs, we learn little about what was happening on the ground. To be sure, very few works address the receiving end of public diplomacy. Even those few scholars who have undertaken analysis of pamphlets, films, radio programs, exhibitions, exchanges, and myriad other media programs rarely venture into the field. Important work on the American kitchen abroad, on exhibitions in Brussels, Moscow, and elsewhere, and on exchange programs does exist. Nicholas Cull and Laura Belmonte have painstakingly analyzed USIA output. But much more work in this vein could and should be done.

For example, a close analysis of Office of War Information, the State Department’s Office of International Information and Educational Exchange, and USIA press servicing and press relations has yet to be undertaken. The Marshall Plan constituted the greatest public diplomacy outreach of the era and comprises an ideal example of Hart’s argument that cultural, political, and economic influence was welded together within public diplomacy. But like most of the vast scholarship on the Marshall Plan, Hart’s study leaves most of the plan’s field-level operations, especially its massive information and propaganda arms, unexamined. These field-level operations are, to be sure, not part of Hart’s institutional focus, but the truncated richness of the story he tells reminds us that there is another world of research waiting to be undertaken.

Most important, Hart is one of the new generation of historians beginning to shift scholarly discussion of empire away from polemics and lurid accounts of black operations. Public diplomacy comprised that crucial nexus between image management—so vital to the essential ideological work of all empire—and the private cultural sphere from which this democratic empire sprang. Hence Hart’s key argument rings true: public diplomacy was not an accoutrement to foreign policy but the substance of policy in an avowedly internationalist and technologized age. Historians are increasingly comfortable with the word “empire” attached to post-WWII American foreign relations. By making the connection between public diplomacy and empire, Hart’s fine study helps justify that label with analysis rather than mere description.

Notes:
1. Key titles include Frank Ninkovich, Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950 (Cambridge, 1981); Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War In-

2. The main agencies were the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the State Department’s Cultural Division, the Office of War Information, State’s Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, the Marshall Plan’s information division, State’s International Information and Educational Exchange Program, and finally the United States Information Agency. See the prologue and chapter 1 of Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, for the best brief account of the complicated institutional history of U.S. public diplomacy prior to the creation of the USIA in 1953.


Response

Justin Hart

M y first reaction to these comments was simply to agree with all of them, partly because authors know better than anyone the contributions and limitations of their own work and partly because of the careful analysis offered by Donna Alvah, Nicholas Cull, Brian Etheridge, and David Snyder. But that would not make for a very interesting roundtable, and upon further reflection I find that of course I do have more to say about many of the points these scholars raise. I hope that my comments contribute to a continuing conversation and a critical dialogue on what is at stake in writing about the place of public diplomacy in mid-twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations.

There are several themes that appear in more than one of these commentaries—among them, the notion of public diplomacy as a tool of empire, the historiography of mid-twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations, and the various choices one makes in deciding how to narrate the history of public diplomacy during this period. To tackle the subject of empire first, there is some disagreement among the four reviewers as to how much the book succeeds in making the case for public diplomacy as an imperial practice, at least in the case of the middle-twentieth-century United States. Etheridge considers the focus on empire the book’s “greatest contribution,” and Snyder praises the book for being “forthrightly imperial in its approach.” Yet Cull worries that the emphasis on the imperial thrust” in U.S. propaganda obscures fault lines among public diplomats, and Alvah remains unconvinced that “cultural and public diplomacy managed to establish an empire of ideas,” even if some or many of those involved wanted to accomplish this.”

I suspect the disagreement on this point is due to the fact that the title of the book contains a certain amount of ambiguity and irony. There is no question that the vast majority of the policymakers responsible for shaping America’s image in this period wanted to facilitate the process of the United States succeeding Great Britain as global hegemon. Nor is there any question that they developed different methods for accomplishing this objective or that they frequently disagreed about tactics—even as late as the early 1950s, when the USIA was created. That is the main point I tried to make in the epilogue. However, they did not disagree on the ultimate strategy of extending the influence of the United States.

Cull’s anecdote about J. W. Fulbright should be understood in this context, since making Americans better global citizens through educational exchanges is not the antithesis of imperialism; indeed, it can facilitate that very process, as Snyder points out when he describes public diplomacy as the “crucial nexus between image management—so vital to the essential ideological work of all empires—and the private cultural sphere from which this democratic empire sprang.” In fact, it was precisely this insight that led policymakers to realize that if the United States was to flourish as an empire facilitated in part by ideas (to use Etheridge’s perceptive modification of my title), their own role in that process would be fairly limited. So Alvah is right that public diplomats were not themselves responsible for creating an empire of ideas—a fact that they understood probably better than anyone else. As her broader question about whether these policymakers ultimately succeeded or failed in their jobs, I suppose it depends on how we understand their mission—on how much they hoped to control the empire of ideas—but Alvah makes an excellent point in noting that the extent to which we today take for granted the importance of the nation’s image in the world is due at least in part to the principal characters in Empire of Ideas.

Another topic several of the reviewers raise is the methodological question of how we should write about the history of public diplomacy and, ultimately, the histories of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. foreign relations. Specifically, Snyder and Etheridge want to know how these programs played among foreign audiences, and Cull would have liked to see more detail on the particulars of the programs themselves. Since each of the reviewers was generous enough to acknowledge that I did not really set out to tell those stories and, moreover, that an author can only do so much in two hundred pages of text, it was here that I was most tempted simply to agree and move on. More knowledge is almost always better than less, and these are worthwhile topics for further research. At the same time, the more I think about it, the more I believe that these questions point to a broader historiographical conversation that might be worth sketching out in brief.

Over the past decade or so, our field has witnessed an explosion of brilliant studies of U.S. foreign relations conceived as international history; the clear trend has been to move away from studies relying solely on U.S. documents and focusing on why U.S. policymakers approached the world in the way that they did. This trend has also manifested itself beyond the boundaries of SHAFR in the current fascination among U.S. historians with transnational studies of the “United States in the world.” In writing Empire of Ideas, then, I felt a bit like a boat beating against the current, with my focus on the intellectual history of institutional change. To be clear, I think the proliferation of transnational/international history has been almost all to the good. Even if many of these studies still rely primarily on American documents while making broader claims, they have succeeded both in counteracting parochialism and in expanding knowledge. At the same time, I would like to suggest that we also need more studies that interrogate what I would describe as the architecture of policymaking—not just the content and impact of particular policies, but where that content came...
The political historian Julian Zelizer has recently called for a new kind of policy history as its own entity. He argues that focusing on the genealogy of policy often allows one “to perceive more complex chronological structures” and “to incorporate a more diverse group of actors into narratives.” In calling for attention to “policy communities,” Zelizer examines the interaction of party officials, leaders and experts from umbrella interest group associations, staff members of the executive and congressional branch, bureaucrats and administrators, university professors, independent specialists, editors and writers of the specialized policy media and think tanks. He notes that these communities “work across institutional lines and create some kind of consistency in the fragmented political system over time.” Although Empire of Ideas was largely completed before Zelizer’s book appeared, I always believed that it was my focus on the architecture of policy that enabled me to chart a new chronology for the history of U.S. public diplomacy—to upend the idea that it was primarily a Cold War phenomenon—while also introducing new characters and highlighting previously unnoticed interactions among well-known figures. In short, I think there is plenty of room to apply the model of policy history to studies of foreign policy without reinventing the wheel or simply documenting “what one clerk said to another.”

Let me also comment on the way that Empire of Ideas intersects with the other major trend in the history of U.S. foreign relations over the past couple of decades: the so-called cultural turn. It is entirely possible, as Etheridge suggests, that I have just replanted the revisionist flag, which certainly would not be the worst thing in the world, but I was very surprised by his conclusion that my approach is “largely untouched by the cultural turn of the last twenty years.” For years, we heard that the revisionists were economic determinists who had no interest in the non-economic dimensions of policy. Frankly, this interpretation was always a profound misreading of their work. William Appleman Williams was first and foremost an intellectual historian of economic ideologies; he was not an economic historian. Etheridge deserves credit for recognizing that.

At the same time, the scholarly interest in public diplomacy is almost entirely a product of the cultural turn of the last twenty years. Moreover, the cultural turn has consisted largely of applying the insights of cultural theory—particularly its emphases on race and gender and its fascination with popular culture—to ask different questions about the decisions made by elite policymakers. Sometimes new voices enter the story, as with the excellent work on civil rights and foreign policy (some of which gets incorporated into Empire of Ideas), but more often we get Kristin Hoganson or Frank Costigliola using methodologies of cultural history to say new things about William McKinley or George Kennan. I can state definitively that Empire of Ideas could not have been written without the many eye-opening studies of the cultural turn—regardless of how well that comes through in the book—particularly because of the ways that these works expanded the very notion of what constitutes foreign relations. If anything, Empire of Ideas represents my re-envisioning of the revisionist approach through the prism of the cultural turn.

I am also puzzled by Etheridge’s suggestion that intellectual history as a methodology leads (me) “to the assertion of hugely contested facts,” since his principal example here is my claim that the “focus on America’s image in the world would have existed with or without the Cold War” (108). Actually, this proposition strikes me as a perfect illustration of something that we can learn from looking at the architecture of policy that might go unnoticed.
in a study focused primarily on interstate relations or the movement of peoples and ideas across national boundaries. For one thing, it is important to note that my argument, as a counterfactual statement, is by definition an opinion rather than a fact, but it should not be hugely contested if one accepts the evidence presented in *Empire of Ideas*. What makes it a well-supported opinion, I believe, is the fact that U.S. policymakers were talking about how to use culture and ideas as tools of empire before the Cold War ever started, indeed before the United States even entered World War II. That struck me as fairly persuasive evidence that policymakers would have focused on America's image in the world regardless of whether the Soviet Union emerged as the nation's chief ideological and hegemonic rival. Either way, this is the sort of conclusion one could only draw through close scrutiny of the motives behind policies—examining how and why policies got adopted, not just what the policies did and how they were received abroad.

Finally, I would like to address Cull’s “quibble” with my use of the term “public diplomacy” to describe the policies covered in *Empire of Ideas*, because it is not a minor point and it speaks directly to the critical issue of periodization. I gave this matter quite a bit of thought because, as Cull notes, the modern usage of “public diplomacy” dates to Edmund Gullion’s appropriation of the term in 1965—long after the period covered by my book. In note 2 on page 225 I explain my decision to apply this arguably anachronistic term to the comprehensive approach to image management installed by the State Department in 1945 and to treat the events leading up to that moment as the “origins of public diplomacy.” I note that, although “official legend” credits Gullion with coining the term in 1965, “the phrase actually dates back to the mid-19th century, and it was commonly used both during World War I and World War II. . . . In my view, the U.S. government’s decision at the end of World War II to combine cultural and educational exchanges with domestic and overseas information programs marked the beginnings of a unified approach to the practice of public diplomacy.” (Cull is right that Gullion should have been in the index; that was an oversight on my part.)

In partial justification of my decision to use this term, I cite a wonderful little piece entitled ““Public Diplomacy” before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase.” The author of that piece is, of course, Nicholas Cull. Given his comments here, perhaps Cull would argue that I misread him—and, frankly, no one knows more about the history of U.S. public diplomacy than Cull—but that still does not answer the question of “origins,” or when the U.S. government can be said to have implemented a unified approach to what we now call “public diplomacy.” We could stick to 1965, but that seems inadequate, because the only thing that happened in 1965 was a new label for already existing practices. Alternatively, we could go back to World War I and the Creel Committee, which developed many of the techniques that would become staples of postwar public diplomacy. As I explain in the introduction, though, the problem with using the Creel Committee is that it was completely dismantled in 1919, and Creel himself regarded his operation “as a war organization only . . . without proper place in the national life in time of peace.”

In his roundtable comments, Cull refers to 1953 as “the moment . . . when a full-scale U.S. public diplomacy agency—the United States Information Agency—came into existence.” But if public diplomacy as a practice existed when the USIA was created, then it also existed well before 1953. What is really at stake in this discussion is how we define the essence of public diplomacy—what it represented and why it emerged when it did. Ultimately, for me, it was about image. In other words, U.S. public diplomacy originated as the government’s response to the growing recognition that the nation’s image in the world had become a bona fide foreign policy issue. If that is true, then the first time the U.S. government developed a comprehensive approach to international image management was in 1945, when it unified the disparate programs of the World War II period (although, as I argue in the introduction, “the basic patterns, philosophies, and, in many cases, the personnel for the postwar operation emerged during the late 1930s and early 1940s”).

Also remaining is the question of what to call the policymakers who worked on what is now understood as public diplomacy in the years before it was widely called public diplomacy. This is a difficult issue, because there was no one moniker that they applied to themselves. The simplest term would, of course, be propagandist, but these officials almost uniformly (if often implausibly) denied that they were propagandists, and in the case of those who sought to shape the nation’s image through exchange rather than the dissemination of information I do not think that label would be entirely accurate either. At various points in the text, I refer to cultural diplomats, propagandists, information specialists, and psychological strategists—as well as public diplomats—but none of these terms were widely used by U.S. officials to describe themselves. I suppose I could have crafted an entirely new term—“imagists” occurs to me now, since I argue in the introduction that the project of image management was ultimately at the heart of everything discussed in the book.” For better or worse, though, I often fell back on “public diplomats,” since that is a known entity and I am still convinced that, by 1945, the U.S. government had developed a comprehensive approach to what we today understand as public diplomacy, and the “origins” of that approach date to the mid-1930s.

Before signing off, let me again commend each of the commentators for their stimulating analyses of *Empire of Ideas*. I only hope that my response evinces something approaching the same level of care and consideration that they put into their essays, for the many issues they have raised are critically important not just to the history of U.S. public diplomacy but to the histories of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. foreign relations more generally. I would also like to thank Andrew Johns and the rest of the team at Passport for assembling such a fine group and for enlisting Steven Casey to introduce the roundtable. It has been an honor and a pleasure to participate in this conversation.

Notes:
3. See Empire of Ideas, 7.
4. In his own book, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (New York, 2008), Cull dates the practice of public diplomacy to 1945 (see his careful definition on page xv), although he generally avoids using the term to describe anything before 1965. There are exceptions, though, such as his comment on p. 23 that “U.S. public diplomacy never recovered from design flaws built into the system during the Truman years.”
5. Empire of Ideas, 5.
6. Ibid., 6.
Perhaps I was Mistaken: Writing about Environmental Diplomacy over the Last Decade

Kurk Dorsey

Perhaps I was mistaken. Perhaps there just is not much that diplomatic and environmental historians have to say to each other. In two earlier essays, I suggested that environmental issues would become more prominent in diplomatic history and that environmental analyses might help enliven traditional topics. I might have even called environmental issues the “great untapped vein of American diplomatic history.” Over the last decade or so, there have been attempts at rapprochement between the two fields, but it may be that the differences are irreconcilable. Environmental historians have written important books about international subjects, and several historians of science have contributed to what we might broadly consider to be a merger of environmental and diplomatic history, but only a handful of historians of foreign relations have found fruitful research questions in the ways that diplomacy has altered the state of the planet.

Lest readers think that I am merely being cranky, let me invoke John McNeill, the environmental historian from Georgetown University who has done more than anyone to bring the two fields together, particularly with his path-breaking book, *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620–1914*, which masterfully showed how environmental forces and imperial strategy were deeply intertwined. Writing in 2010 to open a collection of essays on the Cold War, McNeill and Corinna Unger observed that while not everything that happened between 1945 and 1989 was related to the Cold War, “it is hard to find much of significance in environmental history during the Cold War years that did not have some direct or indirect connection to the Cold War.” Yet Cold War historians and environmental historians “have studiously ignored one another’s work,” despite the obvious intersections throughout history of war and the environment. McNeill and Unger’s book is just one of two recent collections working to spotlight the intersections of diplomatic and environmental history, with the other being Erika Bsumek, David Kinkela, and Mark Lawrence’s *Nation-States and the Global Environment*. The roster of authors in both is light enough on diplomatic historians to allow to suggest that we are allowing the historians of science and environmental historians to set the agenda. Those interested in environmental diplomacy would do well to read both books carefully for examples of what is underway and what is possible.

McNeill and Unger wonder whether these “two ships passing in the night” are unable or unwilling to engage one another. I doubt that diplomatic and environmental historians are unwilling to take on new challenges or incapable of doing so; hence it seems that they are simply unable to find sufficiently interesting topics to compel them to merge the fields. In Michael Hogan and Tom Paterson’s *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (2004), nearly twenty prominent authors discuss new and traditional ways to focus research in diplomatic history, but only one touches on the environment. The collection suggests that scholars in our field are not opposed to appreciating the new, if they find it sufficiently important.

I suspect the problem, if it even is a problem, is that diplomates historians, or historians of international relations if you prefer, have no shortage of new approaches to consider and old debates to rehash. Every year, the journal *Diplomatic History* has a special issue that is frequently dedicated to these new approaches. One could not possibly keep up with all of them, much less master more than one or two. Meanwhile, in contemporary diplomacy, environmental issues do not seem that pressing—despite President Obama’s promises to address anthropomorphic climate change, not much is happening on that front—so it is not surprising that they have not risen higher up the pecking order of historical topics. At the same time, historians of science and environmental historians have long been dealing with transnational issues, so folding in diplomacy is not significantly different for them.

The opportunity is certainly there for diplomatic historians to go green, with important treaties and conventions that deal with environmental issues, as well as international movements and trends with policy ramifications. Environmental diplomacy might encompass either the Kyoto Protocol or the international struggle to define scientific and cultural understandings of forces that affect the earth’s climate—although the best book would be one that dug into both the formal diplomacy and the powerful cultural forces at work, not to mention the science and economics at the root of the issue. While that might seem like a tough book to write, it should not be appreciably harder than other great recent books that we seek to emulate, like Fred Logevall’s *Embers of War* or Erez Manela’s *Wilsonian Moment*, for instance.

In preparing to write this essay, I reviewed the last several years of *Environmental History* and *Diplomatic History*, the two flagship journals in their those fields, looking both at the articles and book reviews. *Environmental History* has been much more engaged in international issues than its counterpart has been in environmental topics, which no doubt reflects the submissions crossing the now-electronic transom, although not much of what has been covered in that journal would fit traditional definitions of diplomacy. The editors of *Diplomatic History* deserve praise for the innovative work they have done in the last decade to publish the aforementioned special issues on a wide range of topics, from music in diplomacy to the withdrawal of occupying armies. Mark Lytle and I had the privilege of editing such a special issue on the environment, and we were fortunate to pull together a fine collection of young scholars from several disciplines, as well as two academic stars, Don Worster and Akira Iriye, to serve as commentators.

Since that issue appeared in 2008, the journal has published one chapter that fits in the environmental framework, Ed Martini’s piece on herbicidal warfare in Vietnam, which appeared this year. The scarcity of reviews of books with...
environmental themes also suggests that the lack of articles reflects a general trend rather than some preference on the part of the editors and referees.

It is striking how many environmental historians still use national boundaries to frame their topics, given the benefits of thinking about nature in ecosystemic terms, but there are also good reasons for breaking complex topics along lines of political administration or national cultural norms. Still, the greater willingness to think about transnational and regional issues that environmental history fosters has probably made it easier for members of that group to write about hard and soft environmental diplomacy. Environmental historians could show us how to think creatively about using an environmental analysis to shed new light on our old debates, and in fact a few shafts of such light have already pierced the clouds (although perhaps we could use a seeding program, like the ones the U.S. government tried in Laos and India in the 1960s).

Most of what has been published on environmental diplomacy, defined broadly, in the last decade fits into three categories: the oceans and skies, development, and the Vietnam War.

The Oceans and the Atmosphere

Work on the oceans has moved well beyond the old maritime history and naturally lends itself to a combination of diplomatic and environmental methodologies, in part because the use of the high seas requires the input of diplomats, but also because the oceans present significant opportunities for scientists and resource managers. The most obvious resources are fish and marine mammals, which have great value and cause great headaches by moving across jurisdictional lines and in and out of territorial waters. Fisheries diplomacy is older than the United States and still ongoing around the world. It is hardly a new topic to diplomatic historians, having drawn the attention of such masters as Charles Tansill and Samuel Flagg Bemis, but it could use some rejuvenation. The study of the control of the weather as a diplomatic and military tool is, on the other hand, a prime example of how we can add new and fresh environmental analysis to diplomatic history.

Three excellent works on fishing the oceans show us what we might be able to add to fisheries diplomacy. Legal scholar Harry Scheiber has long been interested in fisheries management. His book on U.S.-Japanese struggles over fisheries access before and after the Second World War shows how the United States used its diplomatic power after the war to shape fishing regimes throughout the Pacific to favor U.S. fishermen and protect U.S. political interests. Brian Payne, a maritime and labor historian, has opened up our understanding of fishing in the North Atlantic, which he calls a borderless sea. Payne follows not just the paths of the fishermen in the nineteenth century but also the efforts of U.S. and British diplomats to resolve the thorny fisheries efforts left over from the 1783 Treaty of Paris. He does it by focusing not on the well-known story of the cod but on the humble baitfish that supported the cod industry. His book is a remarkable combination of diplomatic, labor, and environmental history. And Carmel Finley, from the perspective of history of science, has dug into the State Department’s post-1945 records to show how diplomats had as much to do as any scientists with the creation of the concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY)—a central idea in modern fisheries management and a critical point for fisheries diplomacy. She argues that the very idea of MSY was deeply flawed because it was fundamentally political, and yet it has been dislodged only because of its environmental ramifications, not its political origins.

All of these topics could just as easily have been taken on by diplomatic historians, who no doubt would have reached some different conclusions based on their points of emphasis. Together, Scheiber, Payne, and Finley remind us of the challenges of writing the history of the oceans, which requires knowledge not only of diplomacy but also of science, law, and labor. Even a large and powerful nation can control only a small slice of the ocean, so it must cooperate with or threaten its less powerful neighbors, and in the modern era of huge, far-ranging, and refrigerated vessels the neighborhood is essentially the globe. Diplomatic historians might have something to add to a discussion of such issues.

Finley is just one of several historians of science who have shaped our understanding of environmental diplomacy. In The Sounding of the Whale, Graham Burnett writes broadly about cetology in the last century, a task that required a close reading of the founding, structure, and workings of the International Whaling Commission. Burnett focuses on the scientific controversies surrounding whaling, but he also demonstrates the ways in which scientific knowledge became a tool for diplomats to use in their own battles. The whaling controversy is also central to Mark Cioc’s book, The Game of Conservation, which covers a set of wildlife treaties from before 1950. Cioc, a recent editor of Environmental History, argues that the treaties were little more than codified hunting regulations. Instead of lauding these agreements as advances for conservation, he urges readers to see them as missed opportunities.

The most prolific author on environmental diplomacy has been Jacob Darwin Hamblin, a veritable army of one, with more than a dozen articles and three excellent books on international environmental issues in the Cold War. Hamblin’s first book, Oceanographers and the Cold War, examines the role of Cold War competition in shaping investigation of the physical properties of the oceans—an exercise that had important implications, particularly for submarine warfare. Scientists from many countries vied to produce narratives that would serve their interests, shaping how people came to understand and use the oceans.

Hamblin extended his coverage of the oceans during the Cold War with his work on the dumping of radioactive waste at sea. In books and articles, he examines how various nations used the sea to absorb radioactive material that would have been too obviously dangerous, not to mention controversial, had it been left on land. Different governments devised different standards for acceptable disposal of wastes, but too often the standard for making decisions was public relations, not public safety. Nuclear waste was a product not just of the Cold War military competition, but also the Cold War economic competition to prove which system was superior. Likewise, attempts to frame international standards became a source of competition among and within alliance blocs. The social movement to curtail such dumping, brought to a head by the powerful images of fishermen pulling barrels and other packages of waste out of the sea, focused on such drama while ignoring the far greater amounts of radioactive material that was entering the ocean from Britain’s nuclear power station at Windscale.

Hamblin’s brilliant third book, Arming Mother Nature, moves beyond the oceans to a much larger tale of Cold War competition run amok. Scientists on both sides of the struggle, but especially in the West, looked to natural processes for weapons that could be used on a vast scale. Efforts to control not just the weather but the whole climate revealed the breadth of scientific imagination and the willingness of military leaders to discount the global consequences of their actions. These dreams were not confined to the Pentagon; NATO allies engaged in such discussions as well. In the name of winning the global ideological struggle, nature would be transformed into a weapon, rather than being merely passive. The original insight, of course, came from the recognition that nature
had hardly been passive in the first place; if anything, it was already armed and dangerous, having influenced the course of history forever. Instead of leaving nature in control, however, some scientists were intent on gaining control of it for themselves and their governments.13

Controlling the weather was not just about weaponizing it, as Kristine Harper and Ron Doel have shown. Writing, like Hamblin and Finley, from a history of science perspective, Doel and Harper argue that one reason that the United States sought to control the weather was to improve crops in countries that might be swayed to the West’s side in the Cold War. They point to President Lyndon Johnson, who became “the de facto desk officer for food aid to Indochina in 1964” because he was determined to manipulate that aid so as to weaken India off its dependence on American farmers and force it to focus as much on agricultural reforms as it did on its rivalry with Pakistan. U.S. officials also hoped to use the prospect of the scientific prestige that India would garner from successful weather modification to dissuade Indian leaders from developing a nuclear weapon. In the end, bold plans to seed clouds over India never came to fruition, although the United States did use the technology in Indochina to flood Communist supply lines.12

Development as (Environmental) Diplomacy

Lyndon Johnson also did more than any other president to export U.S. ideas about development, a catch-all term that covers efforts by industrialized states to export some of their norms and ways of thinking to states that are largely agricultural. The rhetoric of development is generally very positive: it speaks of sharing the blessings of modernity with those living in agricultural poverty. Surely any rational person would choose a higher standard of living over a lower one. Critics, of course, have pointed out the various ways in which development schemes have failed, practically and morally. Because these schemes require formal international agreements and informal cooperation among NGOs and quasi-governmental agencies like the World Bank, they have become important subjects for diplomatic historians. Yet ideas about development are built on assumptions that historians do not always address—assumptions about the best use of natural resources and ecosystems as a whole: is a river better free-flowing or dammed?

The mid-1960s food crisis in India is central to Nick Cullather’s powerful book, The Hungry World, and his related articles on the Green Revolution. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States engaged in a battle for the hearts and minds of peasants throughout Asia. Its efforts in Vietnam garnered a great deal of attention, but its efforts in India were equally important. American development officials brought a complex mix of sometimes contradictory ideas and goals to each of the countries they were trying to help. They engaged in attempts to erase the “irrational element” of hunger from an increasingly rational world while disposing of surplus crops in the United States through Public Law 480. They worked simultaneously to overcome natural conditions and deeply ingrained social habits (both theirs and the peasants’) while also competing against Communist development ideas and proposals.

Underlying these efforts to modernize peasant agriculture in Asia were ideas about nature and the proper use of resources, as well as a visceral revulsion at scenes of malnourished children. Cullather points out the enormous power of these assumptions and images by noting that President Obama, who claimed that as a boy in Indonesia he had rejected “Peace Corps” liberalism, promised a new Green Revolution for Africa in response to the same kind of problems that drove Lyndon Johnson forty years earlier to promise a new Tennessee Valley Authority for the Mekong River Valley. Not only was the Green Revolution a product of international relations, it also got greenwashed in the rush to refurbish the image of the United States in the early twenty-first century.13

Cullather’s work is just part of a growing literature on the means by which the self-identified modern states tried to export their worldviews to those whom they saw as laggards. Amy Sayward’s book on the World Health Organization, the World Bank, and the Food and Agriculture Organization provides a model for how to study agencies of global governance.14 Erez Manela’s articles on smallpox eradication provide another important angle, as he directly addresses environmental factors. As he notes, the United States had invested a great deal of money and prestige in eradicating malaria, which had complex environmental components, and made limited progress. Smallpox, because of the nature of its transmission and its similarity to non-fatal diseases, was comparatively easy to eradicate.15

There is some irony in the fact that just as the United States was moving into a campaign for more habitat protection at home in the 1960s, it was pushing for foreign governments to maximize their agricultural productivity, which undoubtedly had an enormous impact on habitat globally. This inherent tension in so-called modernist thinking has caught the attention of environmental historians such as Frank Zelko, whose book on the origins and first decade of Greenpeace, the international environmental organization, shines light on the intellectual and political challenges facing the international environmental movement.16 The great conservationist Aldo Leopold cut to the heart of the matter when he said that “breakfast comes before ethics.”17 It was futile to expect people to have what he called a land ethic, a long-term vision of land-use practices, if their children were hungry.

Prominent political leaders and development theorists would have agreed with Leopold’s insight that the land had to be much more productive if peasants were to accept Western concepts of political methods instead of unethical Communist versions. In effect, the United States was trying to export a hand-me-down version of the environmental ethics that it had recently outgrown. No doubt there was some hope that the shiny new ethos could be handed down later, once breakfast had been secured, but that was not an immediate concern of the government. Groups like Greenpeace challenged the wisdom of ethos 1 and ethos 2 and struggled to come up with a new vision for the world that addressed both the preservation of ecosystems and the reduction of poverty.

The discussion of development would not be complete without two sharp investigations of efforts to control population, Matthew Connelly’s Fatal Misconception and Tom Robertson’s The Malthusian Moment. In the neo-Malthusian calculations of most observers after World War II, food shortages were a problem largely because population was booming. Fairfield Osborn and William Vogt emerged in the late 1940s as prophets of a world on the verge of an even greater catastrophe than the one it had just survived, with a growing population leading to a struggle for resources that would be increasingly dear. These books, coupled with Aldo Leopold’s more subtle work, created a sort of Green Scare, a fear that sacrifices would be necessary to avert drastic environmental consequences for humanity. Two billion people later, Paul Ehrlich added to the sense of foreboding with his 1968 book The Population Bomb, which had even greater urgency in its call for population control to address the earth’s carrying capacity. Not surprisingly, calls for population control were about more than ecological factors on the planet.

Connelly’s book analyzes the population control movement stretching back to the late nineteenth century, when many Europeans began to see evidence that Malthus...
had been right. He argues that from the start, population control advocates were frequently motivated by attempts to improve the state of their societies, if not the world as a whole. Scientists and social reformers alike thought up schemes to curb population and better humanity, and often they drifted into barbarous acts. Various governments advocated a range of programs, and bruising conflicts often arose in international conferences, with the Roman Catholic Church most often leading the fight against family planning and population control, two phrases that gradually came to mean different things.18

Connelly does not emphasize environmentalist concerns, but they are clearly present throughout. There will be too many people, and resources are finite; a recurrent concern is that unfit people will take resources that would be better spent on those who can help society. In a short section of a long book, Connelly uses William Vogt’s Road to Survival as the fulcrum for a shift among conservationists toward the conclusion that “many poor people would not make it and must be left to die.” Still, in Connelly’s view, eugenics was more critical than environmentalism, and Planned Parenthood more powerful than the Sierra Club.

Robertson, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of the Malthusian moment after World War II and locates it in a feedback loop that links it to modern environmental concerns. Yet he also sees much of the formal diplomacy around population issues being driven by occupants of the White House (Richard Nixon in particular) who bought into the Malthusian notion that population had to be controlled because they could read the tea leaves of popular support for it. As one of just a handful of historians who consider themselves at home in both environmental and diplomatic history, Robertson is well qualified to analyze both the international roots of U.S. environmentalism and the impact of U.S. foreign policy on environmental thinking. With that background, he is able to demonstrate that many Cold War environmentalists were genuinely worried about the economic development ideas being exported by the United States, even as they tended to be more worried about people who were not like them socially and racially. He does not seek to judge those who were preoccupied with population growth; instead, he tries to provide a balanced account of their concerns. As he notes, he came “neither to bury nor to praise Paul Ehrlich . . . but to understand him.”19

Seeing Nature in the Vietnam War

Of course, Ehrlich’s book came out in the midst of the Vietnam War, which has provided opportunities for merging environmental and diplomatic history in part because nature seemed as much an enemy for the United States as communism. U.S. leaders literally launched a war against the natural forces that impeded their ability to bring the full strength of their technology to bear on the anti-government troops in the South. At the same time, because it was a counter-insurgency campaign, decision-makers found themselves invoking the rhetoric of development to convince the peasants that the United States and the government in Saigon offered a better path to the future. The environmental assumptions that informed much of the decision-making about the war and the damage that emerged from those decisions are closely intertwined with the larger diplomatic picture of the war.

Just as Robertson finds in his international topic an important piece of the puzzle that explains the rise of modern environmentalism in the United States—a subject of much discussion among environmental historians—David Zierler, in his book, The Invention of Ecocide, sees the broader implications of the campaign against Agent Orange in the United States. The outlines of the history of herbicidal warfare in Vietnam are generally known: the United States sprayed massive amounts of defoliants on the jungles of Vietnam to deny hiding places to the forces hostile to the government in Saigon; the environmental consequences of that defoliation were barely on anyone’s radar until late in the 1960s; and once those consequences became the source of discussion the public turned against the use of Agent Orange. Zierler places the decision to use defoliants into the well-known context of bringing a high-tech war to defeat low-tech guerrillas. Delving into the science of how Agent Orange worked to kill plants and the engineering of a rainbow of pesticides that were loaded with dioxin, he demonstrates why Agent Orange was both the most commonly used and the most harmful defoliant of the several available. He argues that ecologists grew increasingly concerned that the unregulated use of defoliants was going to cause ecocide: that is, the death of whole ecosystems in Vietnam. Such an outcome would be only a forerunner of what might happen globally without more careful thought. When President Nixon moved to have the United States join the 1925 Geneva Protocol, some scientists won a fight to define herbicides as chemical weapons. In the process, Zierler says, they “changed the way we think about the environment.”20

Zierler’s foray into the merging of environmental and diplomatic history should be paired with Ed Martini’s bold book, Agent Orange: History, Science, and the Politics of Uncertainty. Like Zierler, Martini recounts the origins and goals of Operation Ranch Hand and the sources of the dioxin contamination that made Agent Orange a longer-term problem than it might have been. He peels off from that story, though, first by emphasizing the role of uncertainty in almost every aspect of the defoliation campaign and then by showing how the Agent Orange challenge is truly international, spreading to New Zealand and Canada, for instance. Martini ultimately argues that U.S. leaders did not really grasp the environmental consequences of defoliation until Operation Ranch Hand was well underway. Indeed, growing environmental consciousness contributed to shutting down the program and complicated efforts by the U.S. government to deny that exposure to Agent Orange had been especially damaging. The power of uncertainty is one of the best parts of this fresh approach, because Martini demonstrates, in ways with which environmental historians will be familiar, that some interest groups are better than others at using scientific findings and disputes for their own ends.21

For all of the merits of the books on Agent Orange, they still tackle just small pieces of the longest war in U.S. history. Environmental historian David Biggs comes as close to an environmental history of the whole war as anyone may be able to with his sweeping Quagmire: Nation-building and Nature in the Mekong Delta. Biggs notes that even those historians who have tried to connect the experiences of Vietnamese revolutionaries and peasants to specific places have failed to consider the environments of those places. Only the final chapter deals with what most Americans think of as the Vietnam War, but Biggs shows that the attempts to bring development to the heart of South Vietnam, the Mekong River Valley, have important continuities stretching over decades. Moreover, the causes of their failures were largely the same over time: the landscape and its people resisted outside attempts to subjugate them. The war became a quagmire because of the literal quagmire of the delta, which swallowed up political initiatives of all types, sizes, and ideologies.22

A Model?

One of the more important recent books in environmental history is Mark Fiege’s Republic of Nature. Fiege takes well-known slices of U.S. history and reinterprets them through the prism of environmental
history. For instance, he considers the Supreme Court case, *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,* and argues that blacks moved to cities like Topeka for reasons that were at least partially environmental. Their neighborhoods were usually in low spots in the city’s topography, but those that were not in such low areas became more prosperous, which helps to explain why there were divisions among the African-American communities in town over how to deal with the challenges of the color line.

Fiege also offers a telling description of the walk to the bus stop that eight-year-old Linda Brown faced each day. Brown, whose family started the legal challenge to segregation in the schools, had to negotiate an active rail yard and an extraordinary set of environmental hazards left by modern industrialization. The route to the nearby school for whites was much less dangerous.

Fiege’s point is not that these environmental issues define the court case, but rather that we can’t really understand the origins and complexity of the case without exploring the underlying environmental factors that helped shape society on scales both large and small. My point is that if a case as well known as Brown can be refreshed with an environmental approach, then certainly the hoary chestnuts of diplomatic history can too. So, on second thought, maybe I was not mistaken after all. Perhaps diplomatic historians and environmental historians do have something to say to each other. Ultimately, it is a problem that diplomatic historians generally are leaving international topics to historians from other subfields and to political scientists. If we believe that we bring something unique to the field, then we should not leave the study of international political interactions with the biosphere in others’ hands, even as we acknowledge all that we can learn from them.

Notes:
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for panels and individual papers at its 2014 Annual Conference, to be held June 19-21 at the Hyatt Regency Lexington in Lexington, Kentucky. Proposals must be submitted via the on-line interface by December 1, 2013 in order to be considered.

SHAFR is dedicated to the scholarly study of the history of the U.S. in the world. This includes diplomacy, statecraft, and strategy, but it also includes other approaches pertaining to America’s relations with the wider world, including (but not limited to) global governance, transnational movements, religion, human rights, race, gender, trade and economics, immigration, borderlands, the environment, and empire. SHAFR welcomes those who study any time period of American foreign relations, from the colonial era to the present.

The 2014 meeting in Lexington, Kentucky, will feature a plenary session on Thursday evening, titled “The Fall of the Wall: A 25th Anniversary Reassessment,” featuring Jeffrey Engel (Southern Methodist University), Melvyn Leffler (University of Virginia), Mary Sarotte (University of Southern California), Tom Zeiler (University of Colorado), and Philip D. Zelikow (University of Virginia).

The keynote address at the Saturday luncheon will be delivered by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, National Editor of The Washington Post and author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone and Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan.

SHAFR is committed to holding as inclusive and diverse a conference as possible, and we encourage proposals from international scholars, women and minorities, and scholars from other disciplines (such as political science, anthropology, or American studies) or other subfields of history.

Applicants are strongly encouraged to apply as part of a panel rather than as an individual. A complete panel usually involves either three papers plus chair and commentator (with the possibility of one person fulfilling the latter two roles) or a roundtable discussion with a chair and three to five participants. The Committee is open to alternative formats, which should be described briefly in the proposal. Each participant can only serve once in each capacity. For example, you can only serve once as a chair, once as a commentator, and once as a panelist.

Since proposals for complete panels with a coherent theme will be favored over individual paper proposals, those seeking to create or fill out a panel should consult the “panelists seeking panelists” link on the SHAFR 2014 Annual Meeting web page or #SHAFR2014.

Graduate students, international scholars, and those participants who expand the diversity of SHAFR are eligible to apply for fellowships to subsidize the cost of attending the conference. Please visit the Conference Online Application Gateway for details and the online application form. The application deadline for these fellowships is December 1, 2013.

All proposals and funding applications should be submitted via the Conference Online Application Gateway at http://www.shafr.org/2014Conference. Applicants requiring alternative means to submit the proposal should contact the program co-chairs via email at program-chair@shafr.org.

We look forward to seeing you next June in Lexington!

SHAFR 2014 Program Committee

Andrew Preston and Sarah B. Snyder, co-chairs
Not What We Thought: The Paris Conference on Viet Nam

Lady Borton

Editor’s Note: The following essay is part of the Passport series, “A View from Overseas,” which features short pieces written by scholars outside of the United States, examining the views held by the people and government in their country about the United States. SHAFR members who are living abroad, even temporarily, or who have contacts abroad who might be well-positioned to write such pieces are encouraged to contact the editor at passport@osu.edu. AJ

Ha Noi was abuzz. January 27, 2013 marked the fortieth anniversary of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (“the Paris Agreement”). Visitors joining the commemoration came from two dozen countries and included a group of American peace and antiwar activists. Although I am an American citizen, the Vietnamese organizers asked me to join the international delegation since I have lived in Vietnam for many years.

For the past five years, I have been working in Ha Noi with participants from the “North Vietnamese” (Democratic Republic of Viet Nam or DRVN) and “Viet Cong” (National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam or NLF) delegations at Paris to label 150 professional photographs taken during the nearly five years (1968–73) of negotiations. Our group included Mme Nguyen Thi Binh, the head of the PRG delegation and, as PRG foreign minister, the only living signatory to the agreement; the personal assistant to DRVN Special Advisor and Politburo member Le Duc Tho; the personal assistant to the DRVN delegation head, Minister Xuan Thuy; and the liaison between the DRVN and U.S. delegations.

I was listener and challenger. I was also challenged. “You must understand!” the North Vietnamese liaison said. “You must understand that Ho Chi Minh was behind everything. He was the director. We were only actors.” I thought: But Ho Chi Minh died three years before the signing! Yet I knew to set aside what I thought I knew.

I started by looking at Ho Chi Minh’s poetry and prose from that time. Then I looked again at the photographs and the caption information we had gathered. I noticed that President Ho and the Politburo began by introducing first on the Paris stage the North Vietnamese delegation head Xuan Thuy, who was famous for his smile. There followed Special Advisor Le Duc Tho, the hard hitter. Third was Nguyen Thi Binh, a striking beauty who broke the “barbaric Viet Cong” stereotype. She wore an ao dai, the traditional Vietnamese dress that resembles an elegant Western evening gown. All three spoke with dignity. All three had endured torture in French prisons. All three held “doctorates” in commitment and endurance. Ho Chi Minh’s direction to these actors was clear: unify the international community behind our cause.

Unbeknownst to Americans, the choice of Paris was an early Vietnamese victory. Paris was the media capital of Europe. Ho Chi Minh had been a journalist his entire adult life. As president, he published regularly in Vietnamese newspapers under pseudonyms and occasionally under his own name. He understood public relations and media. It is no accident that Viet Nam’s best journalists accompanied the two delegations.

Ha Noi gathered news from Liberation News Service in the South and from the North and then radioed the information to Paris for the journalists to spread worldwide. Meanwhile, whenever asked, Xuan Thuy and Nguyen Thi Binh gave interviews to international journalists representing newspapers, radio and television. Their directives from Ha Noi included: “You are not to say our troops are in the South. You are not to say they are not in the South.” Using that guideline, Xuan Thuy, Nguyen Thi Binh, and their colleagues improvised their responses to persistent questions from Western journalists.¹

In her memoir, Family, Friends, and Country, Nguyen Thi Binh describes how President Ho urged everyone at Paris to build relationships with people and organizations. In Viet Nam, this is known as “people’s diplomacy.” American and international visitors to Ha Noi’s recent commemoration of the signing were surprised (and perhaps dismayed) to discover the depth to which they were actors influenced by Ho Chi Minh’s directive to unify the world behind Viet Nam’s cause. As Mme Binh writes, “We were present whenever we had an invitation and the wherewithal to travel.”²

Mme Binh’s activist efforts involved lobbying governments, particularly neutral countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). By careful strategy, again handed down by Ho Chi Minh and the Politburo, the NLF and the PRG were officially neutral. Thus, Mme Binh’s portfolio as the PRG foreign minister allowed her to attend NAM meetings, where she lobbied with NAM heads of state and foreign ministers for diplomatic recognition of the PRG. By the time of the signing of the Paris Agreement on January 27, 1973, the PRG had formalized relations with thirty-two nations; by the time Viet Nam was unified, on July 2, 1976, sixty-five countries had recognized the PRG.³

Ho Chi Minh’s strategy was simple and public. His New Year’s Greeting on January 1, 1969, which ran in Vietnamese newspapers and on the radio in both the North and the liberated areas of the South, included a four-line poem urging the Vietnamese on to victory. Yet Americans—both national leaders and anti-war activists—took scant notice of the quatrain’s second line: “Fight so the Americans leave. Fight so the puppets collapse.”⁴
On October 8, 1972, Le Duc Tho presented a draft agreement. He and U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger reached agreement on the draft on October 13. They discussed Kissinger’s schedule for the next two weeks—three days in Washington to report to President Nixon; a day in Paris with DRVN delegation head Xuan Thuy; three days in Sai Gon with Nguyen Van Thieu, president of the Republic of Vietnam (“South Vietnam”); and then two days, October 22–23, to initial the agreement in Ha Noi, with formal signing on October 29 or 30.1

These events never came to pass. Why didn’t Kissinger foresee the objections he would face in Saigon? Ego. The eyes of the entire world would focus on him if he could initial the agreement in Ha Noi. “Ah, yes!” Vietnamese friends in Ha Noi said when I pointed this out to them. “Paris was ordinary!” Ego blinded Kissinger to the obvious.

The draft agreement stipulated a complete U.S. troop withdrawal. However, North Vietnamese troops could remain in the South. In addition, the Thieu administration would be forced to release 30,000 political prisoners—that is, 30,000 Viet Cong political activists. The first condition of complete U.S. withdrawal would have been devastating to Thieu, but the last two conditions were death warrants. Understandably, Thieu balked. On October 22, he rejected “the entire plan or any modification of it.” He and his government later demanded sixty-seven changes, which the DRVN refused to accept. There followed weeks when Nixon and Kissinger pressured Thieu and pressured the Russians to pressure the DRVN.

To save face, Nixon and Kissinger began planning at least in early December to “bring about a stalemate” at Paris and begin “massive bombing.” But North Vietnam was prepared. Again, the strategist was Ho Chi Minh. The North Vietnamese Air Defense-Air Force had shot down their first drone (a BQM-34A) on July 26, 1965. Ho Chi Minh ordered General Phung The Tai to bring the drone in “for research.” On February 13, 1966, the Vietnamese shot down a second BQM-34A drone. On April 24, 1966, President Ho visited the accumulated wreckage of U.S. drones and fighter planes. “A pilotless drone like that one [a BQM-34A] flies very high, but you shot it down,” Ho Chi Minh said. “Therefore, you can hit B-52s.”

Two years later, early in 1968, Ho Chi Minh visited the Air Defense Headquarters. “Sooner or later,” he said, “the American imperialists will send their B-52s to strike Ha Noi. They will accept defeat only after they have failed in that effort.” No other nation had fought against B-52s. The Vietnamese secured SAM-2 missiles and training from the former Soviet Union. The scarcity of SAM-2 shells forced the North Vietnamese to develop their own methodology, which they printed in a mimeographed pamphlet known as “The Red Book.”2 Viet Nam’s narrative about the Ha Noi “Christmas Bombing” (December 18–29, 1972) describes initiative and determination. On December 26, General Vo Nguyen Giap—referring to the 1954 Vietnamese victory over France—called for “Dien Bien Phu in the Firmament.”

Today, those twins would be in their early forties, celebrating peace.

Notes:
11. Nhon Dan (The People), #4178, December 26, 1972.
The year 2013 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the world’s first nuclear arms control treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, as well as the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the world’s first nuclear disarmament agreement, the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Arms control and disarmament are not the same. The former is designed to regulate the development or use of armaments, while the latter is designed to eliminate them. Even so, such distinctions are often blurred by policymakers, commentators, and members of the general public. Moreover, throughout modern history, arms control and disarmament have often gone hand-in-hand, probably because both are driven by a concern with the dangers posed by weapons. This is certainly the case with respect to these two nuclear weapons treaties.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), signed by the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain in August 1963, prohibits nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. Entering into force in October of that year, it was signed by the overwhelming majority of the world’s nations. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations in July 1968, has two key components. The first stipulates that the non-nuclear signatories will forgo developing nuclear weapons, while the second declares that each of the nuclear signatories “undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” Signed by the vast majority of the world’s nations, the NPT entered into force in March 1970.

At the time, most people viewed these two treaties as dramatic breakthroughs in international relations—major advances in dealing with the terrible dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Hopes were high among government officials and ordinary citizens alike that the world was on the road to nuclear disarmament and that nations had put the menace of nuclear annihilation behind them.

Looking back on the decades since the signing of these treaties, we can see that these hopes were not entirely misplaced. Indeed, the LTBT and the NPT helped to produce some significant changes. Nuclear weapons testing above ground came to an end, and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibiting all nuclear weapons explosions was signed in September 1996. Furthermore, although many nations had the scientific and technological capacity to develop such weapons, only four of them (South Africa, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) actually did so after the NPT went into force, and one of these (South Africa) later destroyed its nuclear arsenal. In addition, building on these early arms control and disarmament treaties, nations signed subsequent agreements along similar lines (e.g. the ABM treaty, the SALT treaties, the INF treaty, and the START treaties) or simply acted unilaterally to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. The result is that in recent decades the number of nuclear weapons in the world has been cut by roughly 75 percent.

The LTBT and the NPT also appear to have contributed to broader—and very important—developments after they became international law. U.S.-Soviet détente, for example, really began with the signing of the LTBT in 1963. Although the Chinese government, eager to become a nuclear power, was angered by the treaty and adopted a more strident tone in world affairs, there was a noticeable warming in diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Soviet governments. Even more significant, in the context of nuclear constraint fostered by the LTBT, the NPT, and their successors, nuclear war—the greatest potential disaster—was averted.

On the other hand, there were also some significant failures. After the signing of the LTBT in 1963, the nuclear powers moved their testing to a place where it was not prohibited by the treaty—underground—and continued the arms race. Even after the signing of the CTBT, 33 years later, the governments of key nations (including the United States) still refused to ratify it. As a result, although almost all nuclear testing has come to a halt, the CTBT is not in force. Moreover, the NPT has been eroded by a small number of non-nuclear nations that have either built nuclear weapons or have flirted with that project. Also, of course, some forty-five years after pledging to divest themselves of their nuclear weapons, nine nations still possess more than 17,000 of them. Some 90 percent of these weapons are in the hands of the United States and Russia, while Britain, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea possess much smaller nuclear arsenals.

Thus, despite significant arms control and disarmament action, the existing nuclear situation remains potentially disastrous. According to a recent scholarly study appearing in Scientific American, a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan—employing only 100 nuclear weapons—would not only directly slaughter as many as twenty million people, but cause a “nuclear winter” that would bring on an agricultural collapse and mass starvation, thus killing as many as a billion more across the globe. Another study concluded that if only 300 of the weapons in the Russian nuclear arsenal were used to attack urban targets in the United States, 90 million Americans would die in the first half hour. Furthermore, given the attack’s destruction of virtually the entire U.S. infrastructure, the vast majority of Americans who survived it would die soon thereafter of disease, exposure, and starvation. What the explosion of more than 17,000 nuclear weapons would do to the people of the world and their environment is almost unimaginable.

Heightening the danger, of course, are these facts:
thousands of nuclear weapons are maintained on high alert: wars among nations remain common; nuclear weapons accidents have occurred and seem likely to occur again; and terrorists are constantly working to acquire nuclear weapons from the nuclear powers. In June 2005, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, then the Republican chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, produced a chilling committee report. Asked about the prospect of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world within the next ten years, the seventy-nine nuclear security experts he surveyed came up with an average probability of 29 percent. Four respondents estimated the risk at 100 percent, while only one estimated the prospect of nuclear attack at zero. In January 2013, the editors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, after a study of the nuclear weapons situation, set its famous Doomsday Clock at five minutes to midnight.

Admittedly, a substantial number of people cling to the notion that nuclear deterrence will save the world from nuclear catastrophe. But there is no solid evidence that nuclear deterrence has worked in the past or will work—sometimes or all the time—in the future. And even if it were a surefire remedy for aggression by nations, how will nuclear weapons deter terrorists, who do not occupy territory? Those who think the world is safe thanks to nuclear deterrence should ask themselves why the U.S. government, with its vast nuclear arsenal, has already poured well over $150 billion into “missile defense” systems. Or they might ponder why the U.S. and Israeli governments are determined to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Won’t the Iranians be deterred from nuclear aggression by the nuclear might of the United States and Israel?

To understand the contradiction between public policy measures for arms control and disarmament on the one hand and the willingness to tolerate immense nuclear danger on the other, it is useful to examine how nuclear arms control and disarmament came to appear on the international agenda. After all, for thousands of years governments did not make arrangements to get rid of their weapons or to otherwise limit their military options. Weapons were viewed as useful in a world of international conflict, thanks to the belief that they helped to safeguard national interests and, particularly, national security.

But modern science and technology produced weapons of great and increasing destructiveness: machine guns, battleships, poison gas, bombers, chemical weapons, and, finally, nuclear weapons. Although national security managers integrated these rather easily into their military plans, the public—which bore the brunt of the vast human and financial costs—grew increasingly restless. Peace movements sprang up, and activists began to demand arms control and disarmament. When it became clear that the general public agreed with the peace activists, government officials began to respond. They commenced discussing arms control and disarmament—sometimes even holding conferences and, more grudgingly, signing treaties for arms limitations. That, at least, was the general pattern that prevailed with the advent of nuclear weapons.

In the years before the barrage of public protest, government officials had few hesitations about nuclear weapons development and use. In the context of World War II, there was a fierce scramble by the great powers to develop nuclear weapons, and national leaders had no qualms about employing them in the conflict. U.S. President Harry Truman stated, when explaining his authorization for the atomic bombing of Japan, that “when you have a weapon that will win the war, you’d be foolish if you didn’t use it.” British Prime Minister Winston Churchill recalled his conversation with Truman at Potsdam about the bomb. “There was never a moment’s discussion as to whether the atomic bomb should be used,” he wrote. It was “never even an issue.” Joseph Stalin had a brief opportunity to discuss the bomb with his U.S. ally at Potsdam, when Truman told the Soviet leader about possessing a wonderfully destructive new weapon. According to Truman, Stalin replied that “he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make ‘good use of it against the Japanese.’”

Their successors had similar inclinations. When the Eisenhower administration came into office in 1953, it had no interest whatsoever in nuclear arms controls or disarmament. According to the record of a secret meeting of top U.S. national security officials in 1954, there was general agreement that the U.S. government “would not be drawn into any negotiations” for “the control or abolition of nuclear weapons.” Nuclear weapons, the president declared publicly, should “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”

In the Soviet Union, the new leadership was also enthusiastic about nuclear weapons. Nikita Khrushchev fostered a rapid Soviet nuclear buildup and, in November 1956, during the Suez Crisis, threatened the British and French with nuclear annihilation. According to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Moscow’s talk of disarmament at this time was “nothing more than a good piece of propaganda.”

And so it went. A key part of John F. Kennedy’s campaign for the presidency was his pledge to sponsor a U.S. nuclear buildup. Ronald Reagan, of course, entered office as an opponent of every nuclear arms control treaty signed by his Democratic and Republican predecessors. Furthermore, he talked glibly about fighting and winning nuclear wars. Until 1985, Soviet officials puffed and panted alongside U.S. officials in the nuclear arms race, while the leaders of other nations (including Britain, France, and China) plunged forward with nuclear weapons development programs. Still others toyed with the idea or placed themselves under the nuclear umbrella of their Cold War allies.

Sooner or later, however, government leaders came around to accepting nuclear arms control and disarmament measures. This reversal occurred primarily because of a massive, worldwide campaign of public protest against the nuclear arms race and nuclear war. Pacifists, scientists, physicians, professional groups, religious bodies, unions, intellectuals, and many ordinary citizens were horrified at the nuclear recklessness of government officials. Powerful antinuclear groups sprang up around the world. In Britain, they included the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament; in Japan, Gensuikyo and Gensuikin; in the Soviet Union, the Trust Groups; in the Netherlands, the Interchurch Peace Council; in Norway and Denmark, No to Nuclear Weapons; in the Pacific islands, the Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific Movement; in East Germany, the Swords into Plowshares movement; and hundreds of lively peace and disarmament organizations in numerous additional countries. In the United States alone, the large antinuclear groups included the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), Women Strike for Peace, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign. These groups demanded a halt to the nuclear arms race, progress on nuclear disarmament, and a rejection of nuclear war.

For the most part, the general public agreed with them. In the decades since 1945, opinion polls around the world showed overwhelming support for curbing the nuclear arms race and for negotiating nuclear disarmament. The winning of nuclear war inspired widespread popular revulsion.

This public rejection of nuclear weapons gradually convinced government officials to limit their nuclear ambitions. Harry Truman proposed a nuclear disarmament program (the Baruch Plan) and began to oppose further use of the bomb. His successors also grew more cautious. As U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles put it, there had developed “a popular and diplomatic pressure for
limitation of armament that cannot be resisted by the United States without our forfeiting the good will of our allies and the support of a large part of our own people.” When the Soviet Union began a unilateral halt to nuclear testing in 1958, the U.S. government could no longer resist. Nuclear testing was “not evil,” Eisenhower remarked in exasperation, but “people have been brought to believe that it is.” And so the U.S. and British governments joined the Russians in halting nuclear tests.

Kennedy ultimately turned to Norman Cousins, the founder and co-chair of SANE, and asked him to work out an arrangement with Krushchev for a nuclear test ban treaty. Cousins did so, and the result was the LTBT of 1963. Jerome Wiesner, Kennedy’s White House science advisor, gave the major credit for the treaty to SANE, Women Strike for Peace, and a leading scientific agitator, Linus Pauling. According to McGeorge Bundy, “Kennedy’s national security advisor, the treaty “was achieved primarily by world opinion.”

Even the hawkish Ronald Reagan had the good sense to get out of the way of the political steamroller advancing upon him. In an effort to dampen popular protest against his nuclear buildup, he endorsed a proposal to remove all intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe (the “zero option”). Then he agreed to abide by the provisions of the SALT II treaty—though previously he had condemned it as “appeasement.” Although Reagan did proceed to deploy U.S. missiles in Western Europe, he was so rattled by the massive protests against them that in October 1983 he made a startling suggestion to his secretary of state, George Schultz: “If things get hotter and hotter and arms control remains an issue, maybe I should go see Andropov and propose eliminating all nuclear weapons.” And, despite protests from his advisors, that is just what he did propose, in a remarkable speech in January 1984. Moreover, as early as April 1982, shortly after the introduction of a nuclear freeze resolution in Congress, he began declaring publicly that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” He added, “To those who protest against nuclear war, I can only say, I’m with you!”

Once Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, the way was open for significant arms control and disarmament agreements, for the Soviet leader was a movement convert. Gorbachev’s “New Thinking”—by which he meant the necessity for peace and disarmament in the nuclear age—came from a well-known antinuclear statement by Albert Einstein in 1946, reiterated in an appeal the scientist issued with Bertrand Russell in 1955. Gorbachev’s advisors have frequently pointed to the powerful influence upon the Soviet leader of the nuclear disarmament campaign. Gorbachev himself declared that “the new thinking . . . absorbed the conclusions and demands of . . . the public . . . of the movements of physicians, scientists, and ecologists, and of various antinuclear organizations.”

In response to antinuclear agitation, there were important shifts in other lands as well. West Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland scuttled plans to develop nuclear weapons. Japan banned the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory. New Zealand barred visits from nuclear warships, and Australia refused to test MX missiles. India halted work on nuclear weapons, while the Philippines adopted a nuclear-free constitution and shut down U.S. military bases housing nuclear weapons. South Africa scrapped its nuclear weapons program.

The impact of the antinuclear movement upon nuclear testing was even more direct. Since the mid-1980s, disarmament groups around the world had been working to end underground nuclear weapons explosions. Thanks to their pressure, and especially the development of a fierce anti-testing campaign within the Soviet Union, the Soviet government shut down its nuclear test sites. Meanwhile, sympathetic members of Congress effectively ended U.S. nuclear testing in 1992. Finally, in 1996, representatives of countries around the world celebrated the signing of the CTBT. Speaking at the UN ceremonies, U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright declared that the CTBT “was a treaty sought by ordinary people everywhere, and today the power of that universal wish could not be denied.”

By this time, however, the mass movement that had done so much to foster nuclear arms control and disarmament had ebbed substantially. The decline of the Cold War, the emergence of treaties and unilateral actions reducing nuclear arsenals, and the disappearance of the Soviet Union all contributed to popular relief and complacency during the late 1980s and 1990s. Some of the mass disarmament organizations (such as SANE and the Nuclear Freeze, which merged to form Peace Action) survived but dwindled in size and influence. Most, though, disappeared entirely. Nuclear weapons issues dropped out of popular consciousness and off the political agenda.

Naturally, this decline of public pressure for disarmament facilitated the revival of national nuclear ambitions. In 1998, the Indian and Pakistani governments conducted nuclear weapons tests and officially joined the nuclear club. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and began testing nuclear devices in 2006. In the United States, the Republican-dominated Senate, after stalling on ratification, rejected the CTBT in 1999, making it the first significant security-related treaty to be defeated in the United States since the Treaty of Versailles. In 2001, the new president, George W. Bush, riding a wave of militarism created by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, not only refused to reintroduce the CTBT but announced that the United States would abandon the ABM treaty, thus effectively destroying the START II treaty.

The Bush administration also abandoned the bargain struck by the NPT—non-nuclear powers forgoing nuclear weapons and nuclear powers divesting themselves of theirs. Pointing to the first half of the bargain, the administration used the alleged nuclear weapons program in Iraq to justify a bloody U.S. military invasion and occupation of that country. But it ignored the obligation the treaty placed upon the nuclear powers, for in 2002 it issued a Nuclear Posture Review based on the assumption that the United States would possess nuclear weapons for at least the next half-century. That review outlined an extensive range of programs to sustain and modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal. These U.S. nuclear weapons, it said, would “dissuade competitors,” “deter aggressors,” and “defeat enemies.” Less committed than the Bush administration to a nuclear weapons buildup, Congress rejected administration plans for nuclear “bunker busters,” “mini-nukes,” and the “reliable replacement warhead.” Nevertheless, during 2007, the United States voted against all of the fifteen nuclear disarmament measures that came before the UN General Assembly.

Thus, when George Bush left office in January 2009, the NPT was seriously damaged, the CTBT (successor to the LTBT) had no immediate prospect of ratification, and the entire nuclear arms control and disarmament process seemed to have ground to a halt.

In response to these developments, the struggle against nuclear weapons underwent a small-scale revival. In the United States, antinuclear demonstrations resumed, drawing thousands of people. In Britain, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament led a tumultuous campaign in 2007 against the British government’s development of a new nuclear weapons system. In 2007 and 2008, four former top U.S. national security officials (George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn) weighed in with op-ed pieces in the Wall Street Journal, calling for the development of a nuclear weapons-free world. In other lands, too, former members of national security elites began to champion nuclear abolition. And during the 2008
presidential campaign, the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, joined them by publicly committing himself to work for a nuclear-free world.\textsuperscript{17}

A flurry of antinuclear action followed Obama's election. Speaking in Prague on April 5, 2009, Obama proclaimed “clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{18} The antinuclear momentum was continued by a UN Security Council “summit,” chaired by Obama, that on September 24, 2009, affirmed a commitment to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and established a broad framework for reducing nuclear dangers.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, anxious to prove their sincerity, the two nations with the largest nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia, agreed in 2010 on a New START treaty, which set lower limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems for the two nations.

Nevertheless, the momentum slowed considerably thereafter. In the nuclear nations, advocates of maintaining national security through military strength were not at all eager to part with nuclear weapons. Thus, Republicans threatened to block Senate ratification of the New START treaty unless Obama agreed to measures that would compensate for the weapons reductions. In response, the administration pledged $185 billion over the next decade to modernize U.S. nuclear warheads and delivery systems,\textsuperscript{20} thus bringing the total cost of the U.S. nuclear weapons program for that period to an estimated $640 billion.\textsuperscript{21} Other nuclear nations also moved to modernize or expand their nuclear arsenals. In May 2012, Britain's defense secretary, Philip Hammond, announced contracts to begin the design of four new nuclear submarines carrying Trident ballistic missiles (a project that could ultimately cost more than $31 billion). The new subs, he said, symbolized “an important step towards renewing our nation's nuclear deterrent into the 2060s.”\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, in the face of Republican opposition to further arms control and disarmament agreements, the Obama administration dropped plans to submit the CTBT for Senate ratification and avoided beginning new negotiations with Russia on further nuclear arms reductions.

Meanwhile, the Iranian government's failure to report the full range of its nuclear activities to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, along with its stepped-up enrichment of uranium, raised fears that the leaders of that nation were embarked on a program to develop nuclear weapons. Negotiations with Iran to head off such a program and with North Korea to dispose of its tiny nuclear arsenal dragged on, apparently leading nowhere. In February 2013, ignoring the UN Security Council, the North Korean government conducted its third nuclear weapons test and, in response to U.S. efforts to tighten UN sanctions for this behavior, threatened a nuclear attack upon the United States.

Not surprisingly, the 2010 NPT Review Conference was unproductive. Its two most promising ventures from the standpoint of nuclear disarmers—the plan for a conference on nuclear disarmament in the Middle East and the endorsement of the idea of a nuclear weapons abolition treaty—came to naught. The Middle East conference plan was “postponed” (and probably abandoned) thanks to U.S. and Israeli objections to it, while a nuclear abolition treaty did not receive any serious consideration by the nuclear powers. When the subject of a nuclear weapons-free world came up at John Kerry’s Senate confirmation hearings on his appointment as secretary of state in late January 2013, he dismissed it as no more than an “aspiration” and declared that he personally favored a policy of deterrence and maintaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile. “We have to be realistic about it,” Kerry said. “We’ll be lucky if we get there in however many centuries, the way we’re going.”\textsuperscript{23}

Thus, despite the immense dangers and costs posed by nuclear weapons, the future of nuclear arms control and disarmament—and certainly the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world—remains uncertain.

Nevertheless, government leaders could move the disarmament process forward. After all, nuclear arms control and disarmament—and even complete nuclear abolition—remain quite popular with the public. A 2012 opinion survey found that 84 percent of Americans favored the still-unratified CTBT.\textsuperscript{24} In 2008, an opinion poll conducted in 21 nations around the world discovered that, in 20 countries, large majorities—ranging from 62 to 93 percent—favored an international agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Even in the only holdout nation (Pakistan), 46 percent supported it. In Iran, support for such a treaty stood at 68 percent of respondents. Among the nuclear powers, there was strong public support for nuclear abolition, including 62 percent in India, 67 percent in Israel, 69 percent in Russia, 77 percent in the United States, 81 percent in Britain, 83 percent in China, and 87 percent in France. On average, 76 percent of respondents in the nations surveyed favored such an agreement and only 16 percent opposed it.\textsuperscript{25}

Furthermore, numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations have come out in favor of a nuclear weapons-free world. Naturally, these include peace and disarmament groups like Peace Action, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Global Zero, and Mayors for Peace—the latter composed of the chief executives of over 5,250 cities in 153 countries and regions. But the nuclear abolition ranks also include organizations with broader constituencies and greater clout. In the United States, the U.S. Conference of Mayors has repeatedly called for the building of a nuclear weapons-free world.\textsuperscript{26} In the fall of 2012, the European Parliament added its weight to the campaign.\textsuperscript{27} The abolition of nuclear weapons is also backed by the International Trade Union Confederation, the International Committee of the Red Cross, environmental groups like Greenpeace, and a wide variety of religious faiths around the world.\textsuperscript{28} The World Council of Churches has declared that “the only ultimate protection against nuclear weapons is their total elimination.”\textsuperscript{29} Discussing nuclear weapons in late 2009, the National Council of Churches of Christ in America proclaimed that “the only thing they are capable of producing is ‘abundant death.’ The time has arrived to of producing is ‘abundant death.’ The time has arrived to of producing is ‘abundant death.’ The time has arrived to of producing is ‘abundant death.’ The time has arrived to.

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all its aspects.”

Such negotiations, however, have not been brought to a conclusion. In fact, forty-five years after the signing of the NPT, they have yet to begin.

Notes:
8. The following section of this article, dealing with government response to popular protest, is drawn from the three volumes (One World or None, Resisting the Bomb, and Toward Nuclear Abolition) that comprise the author’s scholarly study, The Struggle Against the Bomb (Stanford, CA, 1993, 1997, 2003), where more extensive citations are provided for the sources. A much-abbreviated version, without footnotes and bibliography, has been published as Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement (Stanford, CA, 2009).
Tackling the Wednesday Morning Quarterback: Autobiographical and Biographical Revisionism in Historical Research

Douglas Macdonald

The many critics of our Vietnam policy were not unpatriotic. I never thought of them in that light. Nor were members of Congress who supported our policy initially and later changed their minds. I never challenged our antiwar critics’ constitutional right to dissent, but I wish more of them had simply said, “I’ve changed my mind,” and not scurried around, misrepresenting what both they and the administration had actually done.

—former secretary of state Dean Rusk, 1990

Success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan.

—attributed to President John F. Kennedy

Secretary Rusk and President Kennedy were discussing different situations, but they were dealing with the same phenomenon: the tendency of all humans toward hindsight bias (HB), defined here as the “tendency to overestimate the extent to which one would have known (or did in fact know) the outcome of an event or the correct answer to a question” in retrospect, that is, once the outcome is known. This is also sometimes called for short the “knew-it-all-along” effect. Building upon the seminal articles from 1975 by Baruch Fischhoff of Carnegie-Mellon University (then living in Israel), researchers on decision-making have found this phenomenon to be quite robust across cultures and in widely varying environments. Though the intensity and type of response may vary across generations, cultures, and personalities, not to mention particular circumstances and the relative importance embedded in them, HB appears to satisfy a very common human need for most of us. Scholars, of course, are not excluded from the human family.

Much of this literature on HB is experimental or confined to everyday decision-making, but an increasing amount is dealing with historical political decisions and large events in the real world. Indeed, Fischhoff’s original studies were prompted at least in part by the HB that he found in some of the reactions to the surprise attack on Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In its aftermath, many people claimed it could and should have been easily predicted. Such widespread post facto certainty did not appear plausible. As Campbell and Tesser note, “when individuals learn the correct answer to a question or the outcome of an event, they are either unable or unwilling to retrieve that state of uncertainty that characterizes preoutcome [sic] judgments.”

I believe the insights from such decision-making heuristics can be helpful in historical and political research more generally. As Louie et al. note, the cognitive literature is divided into “studies that focused upon individuals observing others’ decisions [e.g., biography], and decision makers evaluating their own choices [e.g., autobiography].” Both can be filled with favorable and/or unfavorable HB.

Autobiography/Self-Relevance

One might well expect the presence of HB in autobiography, where every event is what social psychologists call “self-relevant.” Memoirs and autobiographies, after all, are expected to be somewhat defensive. But most historians and international relations scholars are aware of that and treat autobiographies as an obviously subjective source of information. This inter-subjectivity, of course, can create controversy. For example, Roger Hilsman, the former assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs in the Kennedy administration, took great exception to being accused by Robert McNamara of being a major player in the overthrow of Vietnam’s Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, an event that many believe (including many South Vietnamese at the time) deepened the American commitment to that war. Hilsman denied his role, or, for that matter, any U.S. role in the coup: “The coup that did happen on November 1, involving some of the same generals but not others, was a complete surprise to the US government.”

The problem is that the Kennedy administration was up to its eyeballs in the Diem coup; moreover, Hilsman was a major actor in the conspiracy, and the incident is well documented.

Was Hilsman lying? When I was a young man I would have responded to the question with an unqualified yes. Now that I am inching inexorably toward my dotage, I am not so sure. I am now far more open to the notion that memory really does play tricks on us. Maybe Hilsman came to see himself as a shrewd, uninvolved observer reacting to events and not causing them. His version of events might be an example of HB’s close cousin and typical companion: selective memory.

HB theory outlines two ways in which people deal with failures or disappointments in a “self-relevant” cognitive environment:

First, a “defensive information processing” school suggests that in order to avoid culpability for a negative outcome, people perceive—or at least report—the event as unforeseeable. A
said that the Chinese Communists aimed at “agrarian democracy,” although he admitted later that he had underestimated the role of ideology in China at the time.19

One does not hear such self-searching from the others, who stuck with their reputation for perspicacity. And Halberstam took hindsight bias one step further. He cited journalist Theodore White, who was close to Davies and in China during the war, as saying that Davies may have understood China’s future better than the Chinese did themselves.20 This is not merely HB, it is utter nonsense. The China Hands supported aid to the Chinese Communists because they believed, in large part, that the CCP was more liberal than Leninist. In that they were wrong, fundamentally wrong. In terms of avoiding American intervention in the Chinese Civil War, they were right in light of subsequent American policies in Asia. But it is a more nuanced story than the purveyors of hindsight bias for the China Hands suggest.

Halberstam’s treatment of Chester Bowles, liberal New Dealer and a kind of symbol of what Halberstam called “true liberal[ism]” in the postwar world—21—not that dirty, pragmatically ideological liberalism that misjudged China and got us into the Korean and Vietnam wars— is another example of the wholesale acceptance of the positive hindsight bias of aides and protégés concerning a beloved mentor.22 Halberstam’s primary source for his comments on Bowles was obviously the late James C. Thomson, Jr., a Harvard professor, NSC aide to McGeorge Bundy, Bowles protégé, John K. Fairbank student, and the primary purveyor of the China Hands myth. Other Bowles colleagues and protégés in this group who served in the Kennedy and Johnson years included Adlai Stevenson, Averell Harriman, George Ball, Roger Hilsman, Thomas Hughes, Michael Forrestal, and a number of lesser lights. They took some pride both then and later for having swept out the “Dulles people” and brought in “new thinking” on China and the Third World more generally. This amorphous liberal group portrayed itself in retrospect as consistently antiwar, pro-rapprochement on China, and in favor of economic and political answers to the security problems of the United States in the Third World.

Unlike the “Old Dealers” of the pre-New Deal era, the Bowles group was determined to shake up the bureaucratic and external world with their superior rationalism and energy.23 Unfortunately, some of their new ideas were somewhat harebrained. For example, Bowles proposed an Indian “Monroe Doctrine” for Southeast Asia. India would pledge to protect the area and all the countries of the region, including the Philippines and Indonesia, with their seething politics, and the embattled areas of Indochina. Presumably these countries would accept this state of affairs—as would China.24

There was an ideological assumption behind this idea; it was not an analytical proposal based on empirical reality. Moreover, Bowles was not as “dovish” as his autobiography and friendly biographers made him out to be. Twice in early 1961, Bowles commented on paper, in tense internal discussions about what to do in the Laos crisis, that the United States had to accept that war with China was inevitable in the next few years.25

This is not to say that Bowles and the other China Hands were “hawks.” In the context of the times they were not. I hope the examples I have cited will help younger scholars understand the mentality of the day: apart from the most extreme ideologues at both ends of the political spectrum, almost everyone at the time held positions that were simultaneously dovish and hawkish. This was not rank hypocrisy. The period was really confusing—more so even than our own. We should not allow HB to distort that historical record; instead, we should use our knowledge of it to establish a truer picture of the past.
Notes:
2. Dean Rusk, as told to Richard Rusk, As I Saw It (New York, 1990), 49.
8. Louie et al., “Tackling the Monday-Morning Quarterback.”
11. Full disclosure requires me to relate that I took a graduate course in the “The American Foreign Policy Process” from Hilsman at Columbia University in the late 1970s. I learned from the course, received a good grade (A-), and have no bad memories of the experience, but I should also note that Hilsman rather strongly opposed my choice of dissertation topic. Thankfully, it never mattered.
12. I would make the distinction between HB and selective memory thusly: selective memory simply means that one remembers certain things, usually more pleasant, and not others. HB actually blocks a disinterested exploration of the past psychologically. A bias suggests inherent cognitive dysfunction; selective memory does not.
17. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1992), 670. For the Davies hagiography, see pp. 379–92. This is a very frustrating book, as it has no footnotes and relied heavily on interviews. Yet Halberstam chose not to name most of the interviewees because he believed he might get them in trouble. This is hard to accept, especially for the edition that was published after the end of the Cold War. It is impossible to know definitively who is saying what, and this is especially important in the case of Vietnam, since the lines of dispute over the war were so sharply drawn. A careful reading, however, can alert the reader to the instances when he is using documentary sources such as the Pentagon Papers and interviews with what seem to be exclusively liberal Democrats. If this is an accurate appraisal, he undoubtedly passed on the hindsight biases of the critics of the war in spades.
22. For a laudatory biography of Bowles by a former State Department junior colleague in India, see Howard B. Shaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA, 1993).
23. For a laudatory and supportive account of the shift from the “Old Dealers” to the “New Dealers” in the State Department from 1919 to 1949, see Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service (New York, 1978).
The American Left:
Its Impact on Foreign Policy

Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones

American politicians and reporters have long belittled the Left’s impact on politics and society. The mainstream press, privately owned and, according to Reporters Without Borders, not excessively devoted to free speech, has been reluctant to give the Left credit for influencing foreign or domestic policy.1 Rivals on the liberal end of the political spectrum have had a vested interest in playing down its effectiveness. European socialists have confirmed this verdict. Suffering from an imperial hubris not far removed from that of their capitalist foes and given to mirror-imaging (they have been fixated on the need to have a large-scale political party based on labor unions), they have turned a blind eye to the contributions of their transatlantic cousins. The American Right, in contrast, has been alert to what it terms the “menace” of the Left, but its liberal/progressive opponents have rushed to denounce its perceptions as paranoid.2

An episode in Jack London’s career illustrates the dual themes of contribution and negation. In the aftermath of the war with Spain in 1898, London wrote an essay analyzing U.S. foreign policy. Titled “The Question of the Maximum,” it offered a left-wing critique. But he could not find a committed publisher for the piece. He said a respected editor initially accepted it with enthusiasm but “became afraid of its too radical nature, forfeited the sum paid for it, and did not publish it.” Not until 1905 did an updated version of the essay finally appear in the novelist’s War of the Classes.3

In his essay, London predicted that Britain would decline because it had become dependent on exports and that America would follow in its wake. The failures of external colonialism would lead to internal colonial exploitation and the amiseration of workers at home as well as abroad: “Predatory capital wanders the world over, seeking where it may establish itself.”4 His anticipation of declining living standards in the United States was premature (only in our own day is that taking place), but his viewpoint is notable for the date when it was expressed.

For London was in the vanguard. The British economist John Hobson, who was not a socialist, would more famously articulate the view that the American economy was about to be crippled by wealth polarization, underconsumption, and export dependency. And then the revolutionary Lenin added his gloss: American capitalists and their political representatives were postponing the hour of revolutionary reckoning by purchasing the loyalty of an elite among the workers—Samuel Gompers-style American Federation of Labor craft unionists—with liberal policies at home and pickings from the colonial feast. But these foreign writers were tardy commentators on American expansionism: Hobson’s Imperialism appeared in 1902, and a further decade passed before Lenin turned his attention to the American scene. London had anticipated the analysis in 1898.5

London’s foreign policy contribution remains obscure not just because of his difficulty with publishers, of course, but also because he became so famous for his other writings, such as The Call of the Wild (1903). The media certainly was unsympathetic, yet the Left’s critique of diplomatic practices and of the social bases of U.S. foreign policy became prominent over the decades. Arguably, it has been the main challenge to the foreign policy establishment and its way of doing things. The list of left-wing writers includes Charles Beard, William Appleman Williams and Edward Said. These were major shapers of historiography and thus endlessly fascinating to historians. But one can go further than that. If historical writing influences policy, these writers had an impact on American diplomacy.

World War I was the first major test of the American Left’s ability to influence foreign policy. One could argue that the Left wavered in its opposition to American involvement. The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) was too anarchistic to come up with organized, institutional opposition. Yet through the songs of Joe Hill, for example, the IWW revived the culture of America antimilitarism that stretched back to Tom Paine via Henry Thoreau. That antimilitarism left an indelible mark that was felt right through the protests against the Vietnam War.

As for the Socialist Party of America (SPA), the party’s presidential candidate, Eugene Debs, went to prison for opposing the war. Not many politicians, American or foreign, have gone to prison to uphold an ethical cause, and for his action Debs commanded the respect of many nonsocialists. But the party did not uniformly oppose the war; SPA Congressman Meyer London supported it once America became involved. Still, in spite of this lack of unanimity, the SPA’s mainstream position was antiwar. In contrast, its sister socialist parties in Europe abandoned their principles and lined up to support one of the most pointless massacres in the annals of mankind. The SPA resisted such peer pressure and kept the American commitment to anti-militarism alive. If American foreign policy leaders favored disarmament in the 1920s and have since shown an aversion to conventional military force and body bags and have chosen instead to influence policy by economic means, or clandestine methods, or via nuclear deterrence, the SPA’s stance must be credited with being part of the causative mix.

My argument is not that the Left has always had a beneficial impact on foreign policy, simply that it has had an impact. One controversial contribution of the Left was to 1930s neutrality legislation. Though he denied being a Marxist, Charles Beard was an acknowledged figure of the Left.6 In the 1930s, he argued that the United States had entered World War I for economic reasons and should avoid any trade that might drag it into another conflict. While he was not alone in taking that view, his word carried weight, as he was the nation’s leading historian. Opinion turned against him and he may well have been wrong, but he and his followers did have an impact in the years when neutrality was America’s official foreign policy.

American communists also played a controversial role. They followed the opportunistic line dictated by the Moscow Stalinists. They condemned Hitler, then supported the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of 1939, then did a U-turn when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union. Their unprincipled vacillation had a double effect. At home, it destroyed the credibility of the Communist Party. In foreign policy, it encouraged...
Americans never to trust Moscow.

The American communists also had an impact on civil rights. Their strenuous support for the African American cause contributed to the achievement of a fairer society at home but also publicized U.S. racial inequalities abroad. The United States lost the support of an increasing number of non-white countries within the United Nations—its own creation—and, failing to carry a majority, resorted to unilateral and increasingly illegal foreign conduct. None of those developments would have occurred had Jim Crow not existed in the first place, but the American communists played their part.7

The CIA’s “Opening to the Left” policy, the cultivation and encouragement of social democratic parties in foreign countries as a means of undermining support for communism, was a pragmatic response to the situation that confronted America in the Cold War. The CIA’s conservative critics nevertheless complained, with some justification, that the agency (or at least that part of it that cultivated the foreign Left) was flirting with socialism.8 It is fair to say that the flirtation would not and could not have taken place at all had there not been people in the CIA who understood socialism on the basis of American as well as overseas experience.

The degree to which the New Left contributed to the American withdrawal from the Vietnam War is a matter of debate. Neoconservatives have argued that the leftist opposition to the war was significant. For example, Guenter Lewy holds that New and Old Left factions were influential within the movement, although he thinks that the majority of demonstrators were “ordinary Americans.”9 The New Left may have helped to create a situation where people were no longer prepared to follow a president’s lead with their eyes shut. The historian Marilyn Young argues that post-1960s U.S. leaders have been aware of the historical memory associated with Vietnam and have usually been canny enough to limit the use of the Big Stick to small and brief encounters that did not involve the draft. They deployed the regular armed forces sparingly: no troops went to Nicaragua, and troops quickly exited Grenada in 1983 and Iraq following the Gulf War of 1991.10

One could go on in this vein. The Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) opposed President Reagan’s policy in Central America. The conservative magazine Human Events described CISPES as a “client” of a “far-left” organization. Whatever its character, it contributed to the climate of censure associated with the Iran-Contra scandal. Arguably that climate discouraged the Reagan administration from applying more extreme pressure in Nicaragua, El Salvador and other “backyard” nations. Closer to our own day, memories of the Vietnam experience helped spawn the anti-Iraq War, pro-Obama blogging generation of the 2000s.11

At the end of the Cold War, Ralph Dahrendorf announced, “Socialism is dead.” He and others argued that socialism had failed as a policy and had been defeated as a world force. A little earlier, however, Milton and Rose Friedman had complained that almost the entire political platform of the SPA had been achieved; Obamacare perhaps rounds out the picture. If moderate, democratic socialism is dead, it is not because of defeat but because it has achieved everything.12

The Left, however, has changed its character and has a broader and broadening agenda. For example, in the 1970s the Left, increasingly interexchangeable with progressives and liberals, agitated for and achieved a measure of open government. Increased openness had an impact on the making of foreign policy and became an American export affecting the environment in which American diplomats operated. And if (as conservatives say) cultural revolution is a leftist phenomenon, where will that take us? America already stands up for women’s rights in Afghanistan.
The Nixon Administration and the Yom Kippur War in the Foreign Relations of the United States Series

Guy Laron and Zach Levey


Guy Laron

From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the world’s most powerful nation and its small but resilient Middle Eastern ally found themselves fighting desperate wars against defiant Third World nations. Although American troops were fighting in the jungles and Israeli ones in the desert, and although the war in Vietnam was essentially a guerilla war while Israel’s wars were more conventional, there was one glaring similarity. Both countries assumed that despite the fact they were combating cunning and resourceful enemies, they would eventually prevail because of their technological superiority. One can find ample evidence of that in the volume under review here which deals with U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict during 1973. It shows that American decision makers projected a preconception about their own overwhelming superiority onto Israel and its war with the Arabs—a preconception that was mirrored by the exaggerated self-esteem of the Israelis, who had for decades been winning convincing victories against Arab armies. This preconception clouded the judgment of American policymakers before, during and after the 1973 October war.

The documents that survey the period from early 1973 to the outbreak of the war reveal that decision makers in the United States shared with Israelis the feeling that their Arab enemies were too backward ever to pose a credible threat. Thus a CIA handbook of Egypt claimed in 1971 that “a fundamental weakness of the Egyptian army continues to be the quality of Arab manpower . . . the average conscript lacks the necessary physical and cultural qualities for performing effective military service” (412). In other documents in this volume the Arabs were described as suffering from an “exaggerated sense of pride” and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat was depicted as “a very short-range thinker” (10). Kissinger himself said in May 1973 that the Arabs were prone to war “simply because of [their] irrationality” (58); while President Nixon, in noting “that the Israelis are just so damn good with what they have,” compared them to “their damn poor, stupid neighbors” (32). Similarly, American diplomats in Cairo, who were leaked secret information on Sadat’s conversations with foreign visitors, reached the conclusion that “[Sadat’s] general mood of anger and frustration leads him to make ill-advised war-like declarations to his official visitors which he himself may well believe at the time that he makes them” (67).

The only one to see what Sadat was doing was Joseph Sisco, assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs, who argued during a Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) discussion in May 1973 that “[the Egyptians are] trying to follow the Vietnamese Pattern. They need a little fighting to attract attention.” By the time Sisco said that, the State Department had ample information that war was part of Sadat’s game plan. In the document that opens this volume Sadat was quoted by Jordanian officials as saying that he was planning to renew a war of attrition against Israel in hopes that a heavy human toll would convince the Israelis that it was better to relinquish the occupied territories than to hold them (I). May 1973 was rife with reports that the chances of war were increasing. During a preparatory meeting with Brezhnev, Kissinger elaborated on a series of telling signs, such as a high alert in the Egyptian air force, the further deployment of commando units and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles near the Suez canal, and “information that at the Arab Chiefs of Staff meeting, April 21–25, there was an atmosphere of despair and foreboding because of the Egyptian determination to go to war regardless of the consequences” (53).

Despite all the available intelligence, Sisco’s speculation on May 15 was quickly rebuffed by Kissinger, who asked “what form of military move? . . . [The Egyptians ] have to start something that they could continue.” CIA director, James Schlesinger concurred. “Even if [the Egyptians] are talking about only getting a toehold in Sinai, the best estimate is that they could hold it only for a week” (57). For that reason a National Intelligence Estimate from May 1973 argued that the worst that the Egyptian army could do would be “small, brief Egyptian commando raids” which then be followed by “massive Israeli retaliation.” King Hussein’s attempts to warn both the United States and Israel about a massive Syrian and Egyptian offensive fell on deaf ears (61). As Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz explained to Kissinger, “We [in Israel] think that the King tends to exaggerate, to be alarmist” (51). Even after the war, as he had to grapple with the blindness he and his colleagues had shown, Kissinger still accused the Arabs of “starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect” (97, n. 3).

It would be wrong, of course, to depict American diplomacy as being completely unaware of the impending crisis and lacking in initiative. Nixon as early as January 1973 was anxious to do something to reignite the Middle Eastern peace process by forcing the Israelis to be more flexible. He described the reasons for immediate action in marginal notes he made on a memo that Kissinger submitted to him on February 23. Responding to Kissinger’s argument that it would be “difficult to argue that another few months’ delay in moving toward a negotiation [between Israel and Egypt] would be disastrous for U.S. interests,” Nixon wrote, “I totally disagree. This thing is getting ready to blow.” He then underlined another sentence dealing with the threat that Arab countries would use oil as a political weapon and scribbled, “This is the real danger” (25). But until the end of February it seemed that Nixon had no one to work with, as
he distrusted the State Department (for being incompetent) and his national security advisor (for being too pro-Israel) (6, 11).

But the arrival in Washington in late February of several Middle Eastern leaders—Egyptian National Security Advisor Hafez Ismail, King Hussein of Jordan and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir—produced new opportunities. Both Ismail and Hussein were anxious to solicit Washington's help in advancing new schemes for a Mideast settlement (28, 30). However, the real breakthrough happened during the talks with Golda Meir on March 1. Even before her arrival, Kissinger and Nixon had seriously considered taking steps “to cut off aid to Israel” (29). During a phone call with Kissinger on February 28, Nixon explained the rationale. “[B]efore we said, ‘Give ‘em the planes and keep giving the Israelis the planes so that they will not be bastards in the negotiations [with Arab countries].’ We’ve given them the planes, and they’ve still been bastards in negotiations” (32). During the same day Meir met with State Department and Pentagon officials to make the case that Israel needed to get more Sky Hawk and Phantom planes, but she hit a wall during all of her meetings (29). Despondent, she sat in the library at Blair House that evening telling her ambassador to Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, that she would rather return home than meet in the negotiations (28, 30). However, the real breakthrough seems, the effort stalled. Kissinger did not mention the embargo. Kissinger was anxious to reach a disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt sometime between the Egyptians—that will turn into a turkey shoot” (132). It was only on the morning of October 9, when Ambassador Simcha Dinitz met with Kissinger, that Washington learned the true state of affairs. Kissinger was clearly shocked to hear that the Israelis had lost 500 tanks (134). After the war ended, Ray Cline, head of Intelligence and Research at State, frankly admitted that “we really did not have an adequate intelligence base to work on, as to what was going on day by day in the Middle East” (250).

The 1973 October war stunned American policymakers. Their ally did not do as well as in previous encounters; Moscow’s Arab allies, on the other hand, acquit themselves well. Arab armies did not collapse under the weight of Israel’s formidable war machine, and they found ways to negate the IDF’s advantages by using anti-aircraft and anti–tank missiles. But the oil shock that followed the war was arguably more consequential and worse in its effect on U.S. standing in the world. While Kissinger and Nixon had referred before the war to an “energy crisis,” it does not seem that anyone took the problem seriously. On the first day of the war, Kenneth Rush, the deputy secretary of state, admitted that the administration had “no plans in the event of an oil embargo. If there is an embargo, we’re all in a helluva fix” (103). As late as October 17, Kissinger verbally punched his nemesis at the Pentagon, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements, by turning to him during a WSAG meeting to proclaim that “despite what your colleagues [in the oil industry] have done to screw us up with their messages, we don’t expect a cut off in the next few days” (198). That very same day the Arab oil ministers agreed to cut 5 percent of their production and to initiate further cuts each month until Israel withdrew to its pre-1967 borders.

Western Europe was more dependent on Arab oil than the United States. The rush of European state men to appease Arab countries and denigrate Israeli policies caused a major crisis in Atlantic relations. With the exception of Portugal and the Netherlands, the European countries refused to aid American efforts to ship weapons by air or sea to Israel during the war. In response, Kissinger did not mince words, calling the Europeans “jackals” and even “shits” (250, 261). Nevertheless, the joint pressure of the Europeans, the Japanese, and American oil companies meant that the oil embargo was a problem that the administration had to face. Once again, Kissinger was slow to understand that it was the United States that was in a bind, not the Arabs. Referring to the oil embargo on October 23, Kissinger defiantly promised that “[w]e will break it. We will not provide auspices for the negotiations until [the Arabs] end it” (250). Kissinger was in for a rude awakening. “It is ridiculous,” he complained, “that the civilized world is held up by 8 million savages [i.e. the Saudis]” (363). But eventually Kissinger had to build his postwar strategy around the oil crisis. As he explained on numerous occasions during December, it was his hope that if he pleased the Egyptians, the Saudis would agree to lift the embargo. Kissinger was anxious to reach a disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt sometime between late December and early January to avert a scenario in which the embargo continued throughout the winter (399). But despite his well-laid plans the embargo against the United States was lifted only in March 1974. And the rest, as they say, is history.
Belittling your enemies is never a smart thing to do, and Israelis and Americans learned the truth of this old adage during the fateful year of 1973. But something more significant was afoot. Post-colonial countries and liberation movements were learning quickly, especially during the 1970s, how to wield weapons such as diplomacy, conventional warfare, and international organization. This was certainly true for the Middle East, where Arab countries were able to organize for both conventional and economic warfare in ways that forced the United States and Israel to completely change their policies. The incidents recounted here represent, of course, only a sliver of a larger story told in this FRUS volume. This 1200-page tome reveals itself to be a very rich resource for researchers, and future historians will return to it again and again.

Notes:
1. The numbers given in parenthesis refer to documents rather than pages.


Zach Levy

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War is the main subject of this volume. Three principal themes dominate the period covered, which begins in January 1973 and ends in early January 1974 with the aftermath of that clash. First is the Nixon administration’s view of the Arab-Israeli conflict and progress toward its resolution. Second is superpower tension, which increased as the 1973 war subjected détente to a severe test. The third theme features both bureaucratic rivalry and a president in rapid political decline. Thus, although Henry Kissinger, the national security adviser, severely criticized the State Department’s approach toward the Arab-Israeli dispute, Nixon appointed him secretary of state in September 1973, and after the war began, Kissinger pursued a “step-by-step” diplomacy that brought about limited progress toward a settlement. By 20 October, two weeks after the outbreak of the war, Nixon was deeply embroiled in the Watergate affair. Kissinger, to whom Nixon assigned “full authority” in negotiations in Moscow over an Arab-Israeli ceasefire, took effective control of U.S. policy during the crisis.

Minutes of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) appear in this volume, along with transcripts of Nixon White House tapes that include the president’s conversations with Kissinger and other officials. In fact, many documents in this volume were declassified several years ago, and, as the editors note, much material relating to U.S. Middle East policy from 1969 to 1976, including topics such as U.S.-Soviet discussions about the region, oil and energy, and Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, can be found in other volumes. Moreover, this volume reveals little about Kissinger’s decision on 24 October to place all U.S. military forces on a Def Con 3 nuclear alert (741–2) and makes only one anodyne reference to Israel’s “nuclear threat” (732).

Yet the material here does shed light on five main U.S. policy concerns: competition with the Soviet Union, the airlift to Israel, the oil crisis, relations with clients in the Middle East, and interaction with rivals in the region. Nixon and Kissinger were intent upon demonstrating that only through Washington could the Arabs regain territory and Israel achieve security. At the same time, the sharply divergent approaches of the United States and the Soviet Union during the October 1973 crisis fueled Kissinger’s determination to outperform Moscow in its effort to supply arms to its Arab clients and to diminish greatly Moscow’s role in diplomacy after the war.¹

Nixon often reiterated his lack of confidence in the State Department, but he sometimes lacked confidence in Kissinger as well. He told Army Vice Chief of Staff Alexander Haig that Kissinger had a “blind spot” with regard to Israel. Nixon wanted to “squeeze the old lady [Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir]” (8) and in February 1973 complained to Kissinger that “we’ve given them the planes and they’ve still been bastards in negotiations” (101). In fact, Kissinger was impressed with the Egyptian national security advisor, Hafez Ismail, whom he received in Washington in February 1973, and thought that the proposals that Ismail presented could lead to direct Arab-Israeli negotiations. Kissinger suggested that “we could get responsible members of the Jewish community and turn them around against Israel” (86). In mid-April Nixon vented his frustration at the lack of any diplomatic progress, complaining that “the Israelis have not given a goddamn inch . . . it’s always . . . either our election or theirs” (146). Nevertheless, most of the U.S. intelligence community concurred with Israeli assessments, reporting to Kissinger that “given the weak Egyptian military capability against Israel, any move by [President Anwar] Sadat would be an act of desperation” (149).

On 6 October Kissinger said that he expected a quick Israeli victory despite initial Egyptian and Syrian gains. He told Haig that “we must be on their [Israel’s] side now so that they have something to lose afterwards” (344). Yet Nixon reminded Kissinger that “we don’t want to be so pro-Israel that the [Arab] oil states . . . break ranks” (346). Nixon told Kissinger that the Israelis would “win it, thank God, they should,” but added that they would then be “even more impossible to deal with” (389).

On 9 October Simcha Dinitz, the Israeli ambassador to the United States, told an incredulous Kissinger that Israel had already lost five hundred tanks (393).² That morning Kissinger told the WSAG that “we don’t want an Arab debacle . . . a costly victory [for Israel] without a disaster is best” (402). At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger demanded that the Israelis allow them to work without severe domestic pressure. Later that day Nixon agreed to send “some” M-60 tanks to Israel, “but the quid pro quo is to tell Golda to call off the Jewish community . . .” (412). Kissinger warned Dinitz of the consequences if the administration was portrayed as having “screwed up” a crisis (486).

The Soviet Union’s resupply of its Arab clients, the scope of which became fully evident to the administration by 12 October, prompted Nixon to order a dramatic airlift to Israel. On 13 October Kissinger was still hoping for an agreement that would limit arms to both sides, telling Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that the U.S. airlift was “not that massive” (493). The Soviets did not cooperate. Nixon acknowledged that damage to relations with Arab allies was inevitable. “I don’t think it’s going to cost us a damn bit more to send in more,” he said (498). On 16 October Kissinger told the WSAG that the United States airlift should deliver twenty-five percent more tons per day than the Soviet airlift, adding “[J]ust make sure the Soviet planners see that we’re getting in more equipment than they are to people who are better able to handle it than their clients” (553).

By October 19 Israel was in a position to destroy Egypt’s Third Army, and Kissinger agreed to fly to Moscow to arrange a ceasefire. On 20 October he assured Leonid Brezhnev that the United States had “no interest . . . in break[ing] an understanding with you” (639–40). Yet Kissinger cabled Dinitz that the United States “would understand if the Israelis . . . required some additional time for military dispositions before the cease-fire took effect . . .”
On 22 October he met in Tel Aviv with Israeli leaders, assuring them that the U.S. airlift would continue even after the fighting ended (654–60). At the WSAG meeting on 24 October Kissinger both talked tough and waxed ebullient. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries had on 18 October decided upon an oil boycott of countries “unfriendly” to the Arab cause (586–88). Kissinger told the WSAG that “with the Arabs . . . we will be hard as nails on oil . . . we will do nothing under pressure.” As for the Israelis, he continued, “[T]hey know they would have lost this war except for us. They were on their knees . . . ” He congratulated his colleagues, exclaiming, “[W]e have come out in the catbird seat . . . Everyone has to come to us . . . this has been the best run crisis we have ever had” (711–19).

The course of postwar diplomacy bore Kissinger out. Documents describe his rapport with Sadat, whom he met on 7 November at Heliopolis. The two men agreed on six points that would form the basis of an initial Israeli-Egyptian accord (905–10). At the 2 November WSAG meeting, Kissinger expressed his irritation with Golda Meir, who had displayed a truculent attitude in Washington the previous evening. Kissinger told his colleagues, “[W]e did not go through four weeks of agony here to be hostage to a nation of two and a half million people” (841). Yet the administration had already decided on a $2.2 billion military assistance package to Israel (587). Missing from this volume is a full account of Kissinger’s 7 December meeting with Moshe Dayan, Israel’s minister of defense. Kissinger told Dayan that it was “important that you recover your strength . . . essential that you look fierce.”

Dayan and Kissinger disagreed over the scope of assistance the United States had provided, the secretary insisting that at 100,000 tons it was at least as much as the Soviet Union had transferred to its clients (1032).

After the war Brezhnev conveyed to Nixon Soviet determination to play an equal role in diplomacy (938–40), and the Soviets were party to the 18 December Geneva Conference on the Middle East (1187–90). Syria did not attend. The longest document in this volume is the transcript of Kissinger’s 6.5-hour 15 December meeting with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Kissinger cabled the White House that Assad was “intelligent, tough, personable” (1091), but he told King Hussein of Jordan that he was not sure the Syrians were “in touch with reality” (1085–89). Nevertheless, Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy brought about an Israeli-Egyptian Disengagement of Forces Agreement, signed on 18 January 1974. Volume XXV concludes with a summary of Israeli-Egyptian talks on 10 January 1974 (1211–14). Absent from this volume is the agreement itself and the 28 February reestablishment, after nearly seven years, of diplomatic relations between the United States and Egypt.

Notes:
Council members present: Laura Belmonte, Mark Philip Bradley (Presiding), Carol Chin, Christopher Dietrich, Mary Dudziak, Peter Hahn, Rebecca Herman, Kristin Hoganson, Fredrik Logevall, Andrew Rotter, Michael Sherry, Sarah Snyder
Also in attendance: Matthew Ambrose, Paul Chamberlin, Frank Costigliola, Jim Grossman, Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Leopoldo Nuti, Chester Pach, Emily Rosenberg, Martin Sherwin, Jennifer Walton

Business Items

1) Welcome

Bradley called meeting to order at 8:20, after a delay caused by a fire alarm that sounded as Council members gathered.

2) Recap of motion passed by e-mail since January meeting

Bradley reported that since the January meeting, Council had passed by e-mail correspondence a motion to raise the annual compensation for the Executive Director from $16,500 to $18,500.

3) Mid-year budget update

Hahn summarized the detailed mid-year budget update that was circulated to Council members prior to the meeting. Hahn noted that the publisher would pay annual royalties in April and October and that the first 2013 payment was still pending given the transition in publishers. Hahn alluded to pending obligations and noted that the endowment could be tapped if needed before year's end. Hahn clarified that the publisher had prepared and Bradley had signed a contract addendum specifying the payment schedule. Hahn encouraged Council members to ask questions about any aspect of the written report.

4) Endowment Management

For the Ways & Means Committee, Rosenberg presented a report relating to the Council’s directive to investigate endowment management options. The Ways & Means Committee investigated three potential endowment managers and recommended that SHAFR transfer the management of the endowment to TIAA-CREF. The Ways & Means Committee interviewed Mr. Ero Johnson of TIAA-CREF and became highly satisfied with the potential of the firm to manage the endowment. TIAA-CREF has a niche among non-profits of SHAFR's size and profile. TIAA-CREF would recommend a strategy for asset allocation and adopt whatever risk level SHAFR decided upon; and also would provide a “socially responsible investment” (SRI) option that would meet a basic threshold for social responsibility without risking a substantial decrease in returns. Council members discussed the options with respect to asset allocations and SRI and the need for clarity in the conflict of interest provisions on the TIAA-CREF Investment Policy Statement. It was recommended that Bradley consult with the AHA and OAH on their conflict of interest provisions and that the TIAA-CREF contract be reviewed by SHAFR’s legal counsel.

Council discussed with approval the idea that the initial investment portfolio follow the 70-30 (stock/bond) allocation, and that the portfolio be based on SRI principles for a three-year trial period.

Belmonte moved (Chin seconded) that SHAFR transfer the endowment management to TIAA-CREF; and that Bradley clarify conflict of interest language and secure legal review before signing the final contract with TIAA-CREF. The motion carried unanimously by voice vote. Council members also discussed the need to consider best practices and governance regarding other SHAFR functions, and the possibility that it would be helpful to review the bylaws.

Bradley thanked Rosenberg for her hard work in writing the report and Council recognized her with a round of applause.

5) Diplomatic History editorial succession

Costigliola (committee chair) and Rosenberg (committee member) presented the recommendation of the Diplomatic History editorial search committee. The committee widely circulated a call for applications for an editorial term to start in August 2014. Two applications were received, one from Colorado and another from Indiana. The committee interviewed the applicants during the OAH conference in San Francisco in April and deliberated at length about the editorial visions, work plans, and financial resources of each application as well as the overall best interests of SHAFR. While acknowledging that both applications demonstrated considerable merit, the committee unanimously recommended the appointment of the Indiana team (comprised of Nick Cullather and Anne Foster) as co-editors. The committee cited the substance of their proposed plans, financial support offered by their universities, the chance to promote geographic diversity among DH’s locations, thereby sharing its benefits, and the potential synergy associated with locating DH at the same institution as the American Historical Review and the Journal of American History. Having made their report and answered questions, Costigliola and Rosenberg departed the meeting so that Council could discuss the recommendation in executive session.

Council thoroughly deliberated the committee's report. Frank discussion ensued on each of the potential benefits and potential drawbacks of the committee's recommendation, and on how best to weigh specific factors, including geographic synergy, the value of continuity in location over relatively more frequent turnover, and the need to establish precedents and procedures for a regular review of editor appointments. After a long discussion, Sherry moved (Chin seconded) to appoint Cullather and Foster as co-editors starting in August 2014, consistent with the committee's recommendation. The motion passed unanimously by show of hands.
Bradley then proposed that Council agree that the appointment of Cullather and Foster would be for five years (August 1, 2014 to June 30, 2019), with a review to be concluded by the end of year four (June 30, 2018) so that Council could decide on a potential renewal of the appointment. Belmonte so moved (Chin seconded), and the motion passed unanimously.

6) Report from Summer Institute Oversight Committee

Bradley stated that the SIOC received two applications to host the 2014 Summer Institute, one (on Wilsonianism) centered at Williams College and the other (on domestic politics) centered at Ohio State. The SIOC found both proposals to be meritorious and thus recommended approval of the 2014 Institute at Williams (owing to the anniversary of World War I) and of the 2015 Institute at Ohio State. Rotter moved (Logevall seconded) to accept this recommendation. The motion passed unanimously.

7) Compensation for Executive Director

Bradley stated that during the e-vote process regarding the Executive Director’s compensation, the question was raised regarding the process for future adjustments. Bradley recommended that the Ways & Means Committee be tasked with monitoring the rate, and Council indicated a consensus on this proposal.

8) Venues for future SHAFR annual meetings

Hahn reported that the 2014 annual meeting was scheduled for Lexington, Kentucky and that the 2015 meeting would be sited at a metropolitan Washington hotel (unless Council indicated that it wished to alter the usual cycle). Bradley reported that a bid received previously from the University of San Diego remained viable for 2016, and asked if Council wished to pursue that option or open up the process to new bids. Rotter stated that the San Diego proposal was strong and could be resubmitted with revisions. It was noted that officers should provide feedback to the San Diego proposers to help with a reapplication and that a conference venue in the western U.S. would be desirable for geographic diversity reasons. After discussion of the benefits of competition and how best to achieve geographic diversity in even-year SHAFR conference locations, Belmonte moved (Dudziak seconded) to open the process to a competitive bid. The motion passed unanimously.

9) Report from Committee on Women in SHAFR

Belmonte summarized a written report (previously circulated to Council) from the Committee on Women in SHAFR. The report found that women's membership in SHAFR had not shifted much against the historical baseline (last examined in 2008), although publication in DH and leadership in SHAFR by women have increased. The committee recommended that SHAFR regularly collect data via the membership process. Dudziak observed that almost all of the publications by women were labeled “non-traditional” in the report and this potentially signaled a broader problem in the field’s self-concept. Discussion ensued on the best means of data collection and the need to rely on self-reporting, and on the desire to improve the proportion of women in the membership. It was noted that SHAFR needs to work for more ethnic and racial diversity.

Bradley expressed, and Council agreed, that the report’s recommendations should be implemented as soon as possible.

10) Bernath Lecture Prize schedule

Hahn recommended that the Bernath Lecture Prize should be awarded annually during the American Historical Association conference so that lecturers would have 12 months to prepare the following year’s Bernath Lecture. He noted that this is a small adjustment of the grand scheme Council approved to shift all prizes from the OAH annual meeting to the AHA conference. Logevall moved (Belmonte seconded) approval of this proposal. The motion passed unanimously.

11) Language of submissions to prize and fellowship committees

Hahn reported that prize and fellowship committees had asked for guidance regarding submission of application and nomination materials in languages other than English. In light of the inconsistency in the foreign language skills of members of various committees over time and the expense of paying to translate non-English submissions, a rule requiring that all submissions must be in English would create consistency across the various competitions. Dudziak moved (Hoganson seconded) the adoption of a rule that applications and nominations for all SHAFR prizes and fellowships must be submitted in English. The motion passed unanimously.

12) Renaming the Gelfand-Rappaport Prize

Bradley indicated that the Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport Prize had been named to honor the dissertation advisers of Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson, given that Hogan and Paterson designated royalties from their book Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations to the SHAFR endowment. Now that Frank Costigliola had become a co-editor of that work for its revised edition, Costigliola proposed (and Hogan recommended) that the name of Costigliola’s doctoral adviser (Walter LaFeber) be added to the prize. Hoganson moved (Dudziak seconded) that the prize be renamed the Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport-Walter LaFeber Prize. The motion passed unanimously.

13) Petition regarding public higher education in the United States

Bradley brought up a petition (previously circulated to Council) signed by several SHAFR members relating to the funding of public higher education in the United States and the request from one of the petitioners for Council endorsement. While many Council members expressed their personal support of the petition, discussion ensued on whether it was appropriate for Council to endorse it officially, given that it pertained to an issue not directly connected to the history of American foreign relations. A consensus emerged that Council should endeavor to remain apprised of this issue in the future and that a more appropriate venue for addressing the issue...
might be a plenary, roundtable, or open meeting of the membership at a future conference. It was noted that some organizations, like the AHA, have an annual general meeting at the conference, which is where such petitions get discussed and voted upon by the membership.

14) SHAFR presence at OAH annual meetings

Bradley reported that several SHAFR members had expressed concern with the recent Council action of discontinuing the SHAFR luncheon and reception at the OAH annual meeting. Logevall was unable to schedule a presidential panel for the 2014 meeting. Bradley indicated that SHAFR would host a cash bar reception at the 2014 OAH meeting, in honor of Logevall’s winning of the Pulitzer Prize.

15) Teaching Committee

Chester Pach reported that the Teaching Committee would like to manage the teaching section of the SHAFR website. The committee envisions transitioning the documents posted there into a more focused, topical, interactive resource page. The committee would integrate its efforts into the lesson plans and primary documents projects. Other proposed initiatives included better outreach to secondary school teachers and beefing up their social media presence. Dudziak strongly agreed with the idea to realign the responsibility for the website content.

16) 2013 SHAFR Conference

Nguyen and Chamberlin (Program Committee co-chairs) and Walton (conference consultant) reported on the 2013 SHAFR Conference. The conference featured 84 total panels, with four composed from individual paper submissions. The Program Committee recommended the hiring of a grad student assistant and a revision of the on-line submission system to welcome PDFs. Hoganson noted that the declining acceptance rate might signal that the size of the conference should be increased. Walton reported that registrations in 2013 were likely to surpass 500 and might set an all-time record. AV costs continued to climb, ad revenue dropped slightly, but book exhibit revenue is up. Hahn, George Fujii, and Walton collaborated to implement and refine a new system for accepting credit cards for conference payments. Walton stressed the advantages of the present hotel contract. Bradley expressed Council’s gratitude for the excellent work invested in the conference. Council showed its appreciation with a round of applause.

17) 2013 Summer Institute

Sherwin and Nuti reported on the recently-completed 2013 Summer Institute, which they co-hosted with Christian Ostermann. The program (on nuclear weapons) went well. The 18 “students” (almost all doctoral candidates or assistant professors) selected to participate (chosen from 130 applications) included persons from India, Egypt, Israel, Switzerland, and Ireland as well as the United States and included two political scientists. Student evaluations were extremely positive, with the program’s interdisciplinary aspect coming in for particular praise. Bradley expressed gratitude on behalf of Council for the hosts’ planning and conducting the institute and indicated that he would welcome the hosts’ final report.

18) National History Center

Grossman reported that the National History Center of the AHA was undergoing restructuring and considering new strategic directions and he welcomed SHAFR contributions to this enterprise. Dudziak emphasized the importance of filming and posting on-line the lectures in the Washington History Seminar, recommended selecting speakers with broader geographic diversity, and recommended including a SHAFR member on the board of directors. Grossman endorsed these suggestions. Bradley indicated that any funding decisions must wait until January. There was brief discussion about the potential for future SHAFR collaboration with the NHC.

19) Reports on recent prizes and fellowships

Hahn reported that Jacob Eder had won the Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize (with an Honorable Mention going to Daniel Immerwahr); that Seth Anziska and Michelle Reeves had won the Dissertation Completion Fellowships; and that the Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize would go to Frank Costigliola.

20) Concluding remarks

Hahn indicated that Matt Ambrose was attending his last meeting as SHAFR assistant director and Council members thanked Ambrose for his service with a round of applause. Bradley thanked Council members in attendance. The meeting adjourned at 12:46 pm.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/ma
Recent Books of Interest


Koshiro, Yukiko. *Imperial Eclipse: Japan’s Strategic Thinking about Continental Asia before August 1945* (Cornell, 2013).


Mishra, Pankaj. *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia* (Picador, 2013).


Munro, Sir Alan. *Keep the Flag Flying: A Diplomatic Memoir* (Gilgamesh, 2013).


Woodroofe, Louise P. *Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden: The United States, the Horn of Africa, and the Demise of Detente* (Kent State, 2013).


Report on the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The 2013 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize committee consisted of Mark Atwood Lawrence (University of Texas at Austin), Anne Foster (Indiana State University), and Max Paul Friedman (American University). The committee received 23 nominations. Four of these submissions were disqualified because they were not the authors' first book. The pool thus consisted of 19 nominees.

The committee was deeply impressed by the range and quality of these books. It worked during January and early February to narrow the list to a handful of finalists and then deliberated intensively to determine a winner from among that group.

The committee was delighted to award the prize to Lien-Hang T. Nguyen for *Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam*, published by the University of North Carolina Press. The following citation was read when Professor Nguyen received the award at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians in April 2013:

*The Vietnam War has inspired a vast and incisive scholarship, and few aspects of the conflict have escaped close scrutiny. Yet historians have made little headway over the years in understanding the decisions that propelled North Vietnam into fighting a major war. In her extraordinary book, *Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam*, Lien-Hang T. Nguyen addresses this major gap in the scholarship and provides one of the freshest contributions to the study of the war in recent years. Drawing on more than a decade of research, including pioneering work in previously inaccessible North Vietnamese archives, Nguyen pieces together a sweeping and meticulous account of communist decision-making from 1959 until 1973. Yet *Hanoi’s War* is no simple exercise in archival recovery. Nguyen uses diaries, memoirs, and interviews to explore the lives and motivations of communist leaders. Key actors, long concealed behind veils of secrecy, come alive. Meanwhile, Nguyen convincingly debunks at least two dominant myths of the war – that the Vietnamese were objects rather than subjects of international diplomacy and that the Vietnamese communists were unified in a resolute struggle against the Saigon regime and its American supporters. For all of these reasons, *Hanoi’s War* stands out as one of the most important books on the Vietnam conflict in recent years. It will unquestionably alter the way the war is taught and help set the agenda for further research.*

--Mark A. Lawrence, University of Texas at Austin, Committee Chair for 2013

Samuel F. Bemis Dissertation Research Grant Reports

I am writing to express my gratitude to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations for the generous assistance provided to me through the Samuel F. Bemis Dissertation Research Grant. This grant enabled me to conduct three months of research in San Salvador, El Salvador, which wrapped up the international component of my dissertation research on the supporters of the Salvadoran Right throughout the Americas during El Salvador’s civil conflict in the 1980s.

During my time in El Salvador, I worked in the Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación located in El Salvador’s Universidad Centroamericana, and in the holdings of the university library. I compiled a diverse collection of sources that includes interview transcripts, political pamphlets, biographical materials from Salvadoran Rightists, over ten years of press materials, and analysis from Salvadoran scholars.

Thanks to the generosity of SHAFR, I was able to complete the international component of my dissertation research in a thorough and timely fashion. The sources I found in El Salvador will add a much-needed international perspective to the current scholarly understanding of the ideological views and goals of the Salvadoran Right, their civic and paramilitary organizations, and their ties to a regional network of state and non-state supporters.

Aaron T. Bell
American University
Dear Professor Hahn,

I am writing to let you know how grateful I am for the generous assistance provided by the Samuel Flagg Bemis Award. I was able to use the money to pay for trips to Washington D.C. to consult material at College Park and the Bolivian embassy during the spring and summer of 2012, and also allowed me to defray the cost of a trip that encompassed Bolivian and Guatamalen archives. During the Bolivian leg of my journey I was able to consult the papers of Bolivian Foreign Minister Walter Guevara Arze, which have yet to be incorporated into scholarship of the U.S-Bolivian relationship in the 1950s. The papers contained a rich variety of documents including revealing correspondence with the Bolivian ambassador in Washington (Victor Andrade), significant speeches, and reflections on meetings with U.S. officials that were not preserved in the cablegrams and memoranda that survive in the Bolivian Foreign Ministry archives.

I am pleased to report that the archives yielded a wealth of information, some from sources I expected to be fruitful, and some from sources I could never have guessed would be relevant. Archivists at NARA II in College Park, especially Tab Lewis, were very helpful in suggesting some of the agencies I had not previously considered. Over the course of my trip, I pulled records from numerous entities within the State Department, including the International Development Advisory Board, several Foreign Service posts, branches dealing with the American republics, and the Economic Policy division. I also found useful material in the records of the Commerce Department and the U.S. Information Agency. In all, I photographed over 4,500 pages of documents, which I am in the process of reading and cataloging now. The funds I received from SHAFR paid for my airfare, lodging, meals, and transportation costs, as well as the miscellaneous costs associated with photographing the documents. I have two more short trips to make this summer to other cities, but thanks to SHAFR the largest segment of the research for this project is complete. I look forward to writing up this research and sharing it at future conferences.

I am honored to have been chosen for this award, and I thank the Society for its generous sponsorship of my work.

Sincerely,

Joshua L. Goodman
Tulane University

Dear Professor Hahn,

I am writing to let you know how grateful I am for the generous assistance provided by the Samuel Flagg Bemis Award. I was able to use the money to pay for trips to Washington D.C. to consult material at College Park and the Bolivian embassy during the spring and summer of 2012, and also allowed me to defray the cost of a trip that encompassed Bolivian and Guatamalen archives. During the Bolivian leg of my journey I was able to consult the papers of Bolivian Foreign Minister Walter Guevara Arze, which have yet to be incorporated into scholarship of the U.S-Bolivian relationship in the 1950s. The papers contained a rich variety of documents including revealing correspondence with the Bolivian ambassador in Washington (Victor Andrade), significant speeches, and reflections on meetings with U.S. officials that were not preserved in the cablegrams and memoranda that survive in the Bolivian Foreign Ministry archives.

The research that I conducted will hopefully allow me to demonstrate that anticommunism played a surprisingly peripheral role in shaping U.S. policy towards Bolivia and its support for the revolutionary MNR government. Observers in the State Department and U.S. Embassy seem to have been more animated by the possibility of coopting transformative and popular nationalist movements into a U.S.-led inter-American system. Such a vision appealed to Eisenhower, who insisted on the importance of nationalism to his worldview on numerous instances: in his diary, correspondence with his brother Milton, during National Security Council meetings, and later reminiscences on the purposes of his administration's policy in Bolivia. What is perhaps most significant is that Bolivian diplomats understood the existence and significance of these pro-nationalist elements of U.S. leaders and their desire to project American power within the hemisphere. Bolivians were thus able to construct their diplomacy to appeal to these sensibilities whilst also demonstrating the MNR's symbolic (if ultimately superficial) acquiescence to U.S. requests over compensation for the former owners of nationalized mines and adoption of measures to convince American's that the MNR was not dominated by international communists even if its leaders were “idological Marxists.”

Thank you once again for the generous grants. I hope my project proves worthy of your support. I would also like to say how disappointed I was to miss the award ceremony at AHA, and the SHAFR conferences last summer, but am very much hoping to meet you and other committee members at SHAFR this summer or at AHA in January.

Yours sincerely and with very best wishes,

Oliver Murphey
Columbia University
Professor Hahn–

I am writing to express my gratitude for the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant that helped to fund my recent research trip to Havana. Although the main Cuban government and Foreign Ministry archives are not open to researchers, I was able to conduct research in several archives that yielded important documents to advance my dissertation on the international history of oil and revolution in Cuba. The National Library yielded a trove of Cuban oil industry publications unavailable anywhere else, which richly document the co-evolution of the Cuban oil industry and discourses of Cuban nationalism and modernization. The National Bank and other records in the National Archive provided insight into the oil policy of the pre-Revolutionary Cuban government and the relationship between small Cuban oil firms and large multinational oil companies. Finally, the archive of the Antonio Núñez Jiménez Foundation, through the papers of its eponymous founder who served as Executive Director of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform from 1959 through 1962, yielded a degree of insight into the Revolutionary Government’s economic and industrialization policies. I was also able to make contact with and interview a retired Cuban diplomat who had first-hand insight into some of the key events and themes of my project. These one-of-a-kind sources will be vitally important complements to the diplomatic archives I am consulting in the U.S. and other countries as I research the topic from a multinational perspective. I am very grateful to SHAFR for supporting my work.

Eric Gettig
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of History
Georgetown University
William Z. Slany headed the State Department’s Historical Office (HO) for 18 years, a time when the HO confronted increased public criticism of the quality and timeliness of its iconic documentary series, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). He played a, if not the, key role in addressing that confrontation, to the great benefit of our American society. For the very best of reasons, he received the prestigious Secretary of State’s Distinguished Service Award when he retired. He possessed unshakable integrity; he was a gentleman in the very best Old World sense. His life ended on May 13, 2013.

Bill Slany spent his entire professional life as an historian in the State Department, something akin to being a philosopher to a mens’ club. What Winston Churchill said about Britain and Europe could have described Slany and his relationship with the State Department: “We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not comprised.” His firm, unyielding conviction was that a democratic society had both a need and a right to have access to the records of its history. He loved the State Department, his home for so long. But the institution sometimes failed to live up to his ideals.

Born in Cleveland, Ohio, Slany spent over a year with the army in occupied Japan right after the Second World War, then majored in history at Ohio University in Athens, courtesy of the G.I. Bill. Even before he earned his Ph.D. (in Russian history) at Cornell in 1958, he had begun his 42-year career at the State Department. His first two years were in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, an assignment that acquainted him with what would become his greatest challenge as a staff historian – the conflict between openness and secrecy, between comprehensiveness and timeliness, as for as the Cold War intensified, the intelligence and “defense” communities became more and more involved in formulating and implementing U.S. foreign policy. The documentary record grew incrementally; the number classified documents became an ever-larger percentage of that total.

The Historical Office states that he “presided over the publication of 125 volumes” of the Foreign Relations series as director of that office. His own assessment was (for I have heard him say it) double-edged: All too many of those volumes should not have been published because integral classified information was not included; and, his office should have published many more volumes in the 18 years he was The Historian. What a dilemma. Meet the statutory requirement to publish documentary collections about thirty-year old events, but refuse to publish incomplete accounts of our government’s foreign policy.

By the 1980s, the intelligence and the defense communities were the bastions of the “securocrats,” agencies outside the reach of an unknown historian buried in a small corner of Foggy Bottom. But Slany refused to quit. He did hold up FRUS volumes, sometimes to the dismay of the compilers, because they were so incomplete as to be misleading. When the confrontation grew and went public (viral in today’s idiom), he helped draft the 1991 Foreign Relations statute that gave full and untrammeled access for State Department historians and the HO’s advisory committee to get the attention of Congress.

Implementation of that law found Slany at his most effective – bringing in this and that agency, then confronting them with the language of the law – that the HO historians and the advisory committee had a defined statutory “need to know.” In my thirteen years on the Historical Advisory Committee, working directly with him, he never wavered, never shifted course for the sake of expediency, never shifted blame to his staff.

Whatever the undeniable value and long-lasting effects of his work on FRUS, perhaps his most rewarding personal accomplishment was his coordination of an interagency, international project to identify so-called “Nazi Gold,” stolen assets deposited during the Second War in the financial institutions of various neutral states. Two narrative histories and an extensive finding aid were the invaluable product of that remarkable effort.

To the end, Bill Slany clung to his ideals. But let him speak for himself. In 2011, less than two years before his death, he sent me comments on the longue durée of secrecy in a democratic society and the future of the Foreign Relations volumes:

“The mechanisms developed to ensure the government’s and particularly the State Department’s “legitimate secrecy requirements” have had the perhaps unintended consequence of becoming a rather permanent illegitimate secrecy regime . . . . The inadequate declassification systems cannot catch up with the previously legitimately secret records. The FRUS [ability] to collect and have important individual records declassified is foundering. While adequate for an earlier age, what is needed . . . . is a government (or government-academy) program to create guides to the ever-expanding body of records. Such guides might best be created as early as possible, at the end of each presidential administration, for example, in order to fix some base lines for continuing “legitimate secrecy requirements.” . . .

“Unauthorized disclosures” like those by WikiLeaks emphasize the mounting intensity of public interest and consumption of information about U.S. foreign affairs. National Security Archive serves that interest. FRUS in its current form and timeline does not. A neo FRUS that starts say with Kennedy and presents guidelines resulting from a canvass of all foreign affairs related agencies would really undo much of the damage of unexamined legitimate secrecy requirements. . . .

One major lesson of the HAC experience is the need for much closer involvement of academic historians in putative government historical programs. It may be appropriate to think about “embedding” academic historians far more widely in government agencies to give direction to organizing, or at least of identifying, records for permanent protection –what one might call “legitimate public understanding requirements.”

As ever, his remarks were perceptive, longing, and sadly wise. Most historians and Americans may not have known him, but they will miss this good man.

Warren F. Kimball  
Rbt. Treat Professor (emeritus)  
Rutgers University
Edward Moore Bennett died on March 3, 2013 of a ruptured aortic aneurysm. He was 85 years of age. Born in Dixon, Illinois on September 28, 1927, his parents were John Francis (Frank) Bennett and Marguerite Marion Moore Bennett. He received his undergraduate degree from Butler University (Indianapolis) with a B.A. in history; he then received master's and Ph.D. degrees in history from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He taught one year at Texas A&M University before answering a call to Washington State University in 1961.

During his 33 year career at WSU, he served the university on numerous committees and was appointed by President C. Clement French in 1967 as Faculty Athletic Representative for WSU to what was to become the Pacific 10 Conference, serving as president for three terms. He also was appointed by the National Collegiate Athletic Association to serve on its Theodore Roosevelt Awards Committee and was pleased to support the candidacy of Jesse Owens. He also served on the executive council of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Society, and was a member and then chair of the Norman and Laura Graebner Prize committee for the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

During his career, he was editor, author, and/or co-author of eight books dealing with diplomatic history and contributing author on four others, including: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: American-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939 (1997); The Versailles Treaty and Its Legacy: The Failure of the Wilsonian Vision (2011, with Norman Graebner); and Diplomats in Crisis: United States- Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941 (1975, with Richard Dean Burns). During his WSU years, he was extremely pleased to have played a role as director of numerous M.A. and Ph. D. candidates in history and numbered among his students, a governor, several members of either Congress or the Washington legislature, and a federal judge. He received several outstanding teaching awards and was chosen by the Associated Students of Washington State University to receive its “Faculty of the Year Award” in 1979.

Edward Bennett was blessed to have had the most wonderful caring wife and son possible. A fellow historian and in-house editor and research assistant in all of his projects, Margery Harder Bennett married Bennett in Atwood, Illinois on September 3, 1950. She helped his research projects in such far flung places as the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY and the Public Records Office in London UK. Together they traveled the world—Japan, the Far Pacific, Latin America, and Europe—and she accompanied him to the Soviet Union twice. He was selected by the American Historical Association and the American Council of Learned Societies to be one of ten American scholars to fulfill the commitment signed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 to have ten scholars from each country examine the relationship of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. from the 1930s through World War II in a series of gatherings alternating between the two countries.

Their son Michael Dana Bennett followed in the academic footsteps of his parents and is a distinguished scholar in American studies and English at Long Island University in Brooklyn. Ed and Marge were avid bridge players and American Contract Bridge Directors. Both became Life Masters in the American Contract Bridge League in the early 1970s. Together they illustrated in their lives support for people manifested in the numerous charities they supported, contributions to the arts through donations to the WSU museum, and through life long support for democratic causes and Democratic causes. The family suggests memorials to the Congregational United Church of Christ (CUCC), 525 NE Campus St., Pullman, WA 99163 the Edward M. and Margery H. Bennett History Fellowship, WSU Foundation, PO Box 641925, Pullman, WA 99164 or a charity of their choice.

The Bennett Family
Where Have All the Diplomatic Historians Gone?

Timothy J. Lynch

Is diplomatic history dying? The question is provocative and exaggerates the parlous state of the subfield; some of the best historical research being done today is by diplomatic historians and students are hardly deserting its classes in droves.

But despite lying at the intersection of both history and international relations — two of the most popular disciplines in the contemporary arts academy — diplomatic history is seen as old-fashioned. New, trendier, and leftier approaches have risen. We have called this the “cultural turn.” Frank Schumacher contributed an excellent entry on it in my Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History (2013).

The locus is no longer dead white men – the demographic that predominates among diplomats. Indeed, the “cultural turn” is predicated on a resistance to their monopoly, not just in diplomatic history but across eras and issues. According to Schumacher, U.S. foreign relations history was “arcane, methodologically unsophisticated, void of theoretical reflection, [and] overly obsessed with the state and state power.” The “turn” of the last twenty or so years has delivered an “impressive re-invigoration,” says Schumacher, of what was becoming a moribund field.

There have, of course, been consequences. Consider that of the forty-five historians at the University of Wisconsin in 1972-2009, 13 specialized in gender, race, and ethnicity; only 1 studied diplomatic history or US foreign policy. Moreover, between 1972-2009, the Journal of American History published thirty-six articles that expressed some sympathy for American communism and not a single one which was critical.

One of the best and longest selling history “textbooks” remains Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States (1980). Zinn was unabashedly liberal-leftist in his approach; it is part of his enduring appeal. His book is currently the 833rd bestselling book in America, occupies the three top spots in its Amazon category (Tocqueville’s Democracy is a pleasantly corrective 4th) and is published in thirteen different formats (not including a Young People’s edition, Columbus to the War on Terror, which “brings to US history the viewpoints of workers, slaves, immigrants, women, Native Americans,” published in seven formats in 2009).

Paul Johnson’s A History of the American People, a conservative interpretation, is 15,662nd. This is not to argue over the academic merits of each book but to observe that Zinn’s leftism has necessarily affected how many students and their teachers understand US history – and what they expect to learn more about when they get to university. Despite over 40% of Americans describing themselves as “conservative,” less than 16% of academics identify that way. The American academy, no less American historiography, is a liberal hegemony in which diplomatic historians struggle to ply their trade.

Of course, the subfield has hardly been the preserve of conservative scholars. Perhaps the most important 20th century work of diplomatic history was William Appleman Williams’ Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959) — the inspiration for a wave of left-leaning revisionist histories of US foreign policy. Christopher McKnight Nichols and David Milne, my two associate editors for the Oxford Encyclopedia, would comfortably locate themselves on the progressive wing of modern politics. Liberal historiography is a very broad church.

So, while diplomatic history is not immune to the leftward, cultural turn, it does pose some problems for liberal professors who expect the various subfields of history to reflect their normative concerns – for fairness, equality, racial justice, gender neutrality and so forth.

One problem for these “turnists” lies in the necessary focus on the “great man” thesis of history — either implicitly or explicitly — in the work of many diplomatic historians. Men, and it largely is men, have been the key foreign policy makers until comparatively recently. They have lead nations, fought wars, and dictated the terms of peace. All the great commanders-in-chief in US history have been men because all 43 presidents have been men. The military interventionism of Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice, Hillary Clinton, and Samantha Power is too recent a phenomenon to see whether gender will make any difference to this trend.

As a way around this male dominance, university students are increasingly presented with impersonal forces and told these are responsible for injustice or are, conversely, the locomotives of progress. Racism, economic deprivation, and gender inequality color the research agendas of a substantial number of historians. Ameliorate these forces, run their argument, and we can enter the sunny uplands of progress and equality. It is not individuals that move history but forces, pressures, classes, sexes, races, cultures, even climate. Nations, led by individual leaders, are made to matter less than the United Nations, led by supposedly progressive impulses. Most students I teach in Australia, routinely laud the UN as a great bastion for human progress. “Why can’t Americans understand that?” they ask.

The diplomatic historian, of course, may be in sympathy with some of this. But he or she must also acknowledge the elite nature of much of what he or she studies: the president and his foreign policy principals, ambassadors and military commanders. And that elite, until the era of the Rices, Hillary Clinton, and Barack Obama, was overwhelmingly white and male.

This modern bias against elitism and “great men” and in favor of the explanatory power of impersonal forces is inherent in much contemporary historiography. Diplomatic historians find themselves having to bridge the divide. If only there were more of them — liberal and conservative — doing it. The University of Wisconsin’s numerical bias against diplomatic historians is one repeated more
generally across American campuses.

An interesting comparative example is the study of International Relations, especially since so much of what IR scholars study and teach relies on the labor, often unacknowledged, of diplomatic historians. (When historians lack knowledge of an area, they fill the gap with archival research; when IR theorists find a gap, they too often fill it with a theory.)

In International Relations, especially in IR Theory, conservatives can hide in plain sight by calling themselves Realists. Privileging state-level explanations is not a betrayal of unjustly excluded groups, but part of a socio-scientific approach that realists trace back to Thucydides (5th century BC). Liberal IR theorists, who grant much more weight to non-state actors, do not shun realists but, rather, have engaged with them in a rich debate about the sources of international relations.

Constructivists, a facsimile of the cultural turnists in IR, must defend their claims against competing paradigms – not least realism. An explanation rooted in culture is afforded no greater moral weight or protection than one grounded in a state-level explanation. Competition is expected in IR – both methodologically and normatively – in a way it once was in history.

Indeed, the most prominent realists of the modern academy have also been the most vocal in denouncing the missteps of recent US foreign policy. Realists like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have profited enormously, reputationally and financially, from their best-selling work bemoaning the war on terror, the Iraq war, and Israel. They have done this in far more compelling fashion than have liberal leftists in history and IR departments. Realism has not rendered them ideologically unclean – a perennial risk for the self-identifying conservative historian – but intellectually formidable.

Conservative historians have a trickier task. They necessarily eschew much of the cultural turn but risk all sorts of reprisal if they articulate that opposition – the beneficence of the turn is increasingly beyond the realm of debate. It is a given. In IR, realists can challenge liberals but conservative historians are an increasingly beleaguered minority distrusted by the liberals who dominate in their departments.

So, for a variety of reasons, diplomatic history has become uncool and a minority pursuit on campuses despite a market for diplomatic history in the general public, where conservatives and liberals exist in something like equal numbers. Academic fashion has dictated a more socially inclusive emphasis that diplomatic historians have developed comparatively late and will always lack the tools to pursue fully – there are just too many dead white men in the making of American foreign policy for the comprehensive writing back in of women and non-whites to be plausible.

Diplomatic historians – like their IR colleagues across the corridor – need to embrace the diversity of different approaches. Liberals should hire some conservatives. Try it. You may be surprised how much more intellectually alive a department can become. Equating the cultural turn with a moral revolution is to forget that historiography is never static, rarely privileges one approach for too long and will eventually itself become anachronistic.

Notes:
4. For an example of this see Barton J. Bernstein, ‘Understanding Decisionmaking, US Foreign Policy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review Essay,’ International Security 25, 1 (Summer 2000), 134-64.
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