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A Roundtable on
Nicole Phelps’s U.S.-Habsburg
Relations from 1815 to the Paris
Peace Conference:
Sovereignty Transformed

Roundtable Introduction
Thomas Schwartz

If you teach a survey course on the history of American foreign relations, chances are that you don’t spend very much time on the Austria-Hungarian Empire, or “the Habsburgs,” as Nicole Phelps refers to that multinational empire in her remarkable new book. My own 19th century lectures frequently deal with Great Britain, since Britain presented the greatest challenge to the young republic, and occasionally France, which was nice enough to sell us Louisiana but then tried to take advantage of the Civil War by playing around in Mexico. Czarist Russia enters the picture when John Quincy Adams sought to scare it off with the Monroe Doctrine, and I love reading the passage from Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s predicting a confrontation between America and Russia sometime in the future. Finally, Spain gets a nod as well, and its defeat by the United States in the Spanish-American War helps to cap off the 19th century and allows me to plunge into the more comfortable surroundings of 20th century American power. Austria-Hungary then gets a brief mention, playing second fiddle to their German ally in talking about World War I. The break-up of the Empire only gets discussed in trying to make the Versailles peace conference understandable to my students. As Rodney Dangerfield may have put it, the Habsburgs get no respect.

Phelps is out to change that perception. Her elegantly written and presented argument is captured in the subtitle, “Sovereignty Transformed.” It is an ambitious task for a book about U.S.-Habsburg relations, and the commentators in this forum express some skepticism as to whether the book fully succeeds in its ambition. Phelps emphasizes three central points. The first is the degree to which in its relations with the Habsburgs, the United States adopted the norms and accepted the rules of the Great Power system established by the Congress of Vienna. Phelps takes this story through the 19th century, providing a particularly insightful take on American popular enthusiasm for the Hungarian revolutionary Lajos Kossuth, which threatened the diplomatic relationship with the Habsburgs. Yet after the Civil War the United States increasingly adhered to the international norms, a practice that ultimately reinforced Habsburg legitimacy.

The second and most innovative point deals with the topic of immigration, something that foreign relations scholars should realize is too important to be left to the social historians. Phelps deals with the establishment and development of American consuls in Austria-Hungary and their counterparts, the Habsburg consulates in the United States. Both ended up having plenty of business, even though trade between the two countries remained modest. The real activity of the consulates came in dealing with the hundreds of thousands of people from the lands of the Habsburg Empire who came to the United States, some of whom stayed and many of whom traveled back and forth in an era of increasingly less expensive transatlantic voyages. This created a significant connection between the United States and Austria-Hungary which has been below the radar of most diplomatic historians. Phelps wisely chooses to tell this story by using some fascinating case studies—for example, a workman’s compensation case in which the Habsburg consulate represented an Austrian citizen suing the city of Spokane; and a criminal case involving an American who claimed dual citizenship but was being prosecuted in Krakow, then part of the Empire. As World War I approached, Phelps documents other cases of men claiming American citizenship to avoid military service in the Imperial Army. For this part of her book Phelps has done exhaustive research in the consular records of both countries, and she provides a model for exploring this very human and grassroots way in which foreign relations affected thousands of ordinary men and women.

The third point which Phelps provides is a strong critique of Wilsonian diplomacy coming from, as Phelps admits in the roundtable, her sympathy for the multinational Habsburg Empire compared to the more racially and ethnically pure successor states that took its place. Woodrow Wilson’s refusal to see the new Habsburg ambassador in 1916 opened the door for various nationalist groups to lobby for their goal of statehood. Wilson, like many presidents since, cut out the State Department for advice on dealing the Habsburg territories at the Versailles conference, instead relying on academic experts, many of whom were influenced by the scientific racism of the time. The cry of “self-determination” led to the attempt to create monolingual, ethnically pure states in a region in which the mixing of peoples made this an impossibility. The result, encouraged by Wilson and the Americans, was to create the seeds for future conflict.
Although I certainly recognize the racial issues which Phelps emphasizes, allow me to make the claim that what she really is demonstrating is the degree to which the United States, even in the Wilsonian era, found its foreign policy heavily influenced by grubby domestic politics. The various ethnic groups in the United States—the Czechs, Poles, and others who lobbied for their national states—represented votes in the Democratic coalition, and whatever else American politicians respond to, votes matter. By contrast, how many votes would the Habsburgs command?

The commentary in this roundtable provides for a vigorous debate about the book’s arguments and the strengths and weaknesses of its approach to such topics as sovereignty, race, and the new international order. Alison Frank Johnson, whose specializes in Central and East European History, focuses her commentary on the issues of race and nation and the importance of American understanding of these ideas for the ultimate fate of the Habsburg Empire. Benjamin Coates, whose research has examined international lawyers and American power, examines the Phelps book in light of its claims for the transformation of sovereignty. Alan Sked, an internationally known expert on the Habsburg Monarchy, is the most critical, calling the Phelps book “intellectually misconceived and mostly derivative.” Phelps, however, defends her work in an able and erudite response that highlights the issues at stake in this debate.

Coates concludes his review by noting that Phelps’s book “demonstrates that this overlooked relationship should be overlooked no longer.” On this point I think readers of this roundtable will agree. Let me conclude with a personal anecdote that reading this book caused me to recall. My paternal grandfather died the year before I was born, but there was considerable family lore about him. He came from what was then Austria-Hungary, the area near the city of Lembach, now Liviv and part of Ukraine. A bricklayer and bartender in America, he and his family were among the thousands of people Phelps writes about who went back and forth between the United States and the Habsburg Empire. But fortunately he found himself in the United States in 1914 when he received his notice for military service for the Emperor. According to family legend, he loudly replied with a string of colorful obscenities and the simple statement, “I’m an American now.” There may be many ways to interpret my grandfather’s decision, but I remain grateful he made that choice.

Notes:
1. Donna Gabaccia makes exactly this point in her book, Foreign Relations: Global Perspectives on American Immigration (2012). I want to thank my friend and graduate school classmate, the distinguished Austrian historian Günter Bischof, for this reference and sharing with me his thoughts on this book.

Review of Nicole Phelps, U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference: Sovereignty Transformed

Alan Sked

This book is clearly written and contains some enjoyable anecdotes. However, it is intellectually misconceived and mostly derivative. The only original chapters are those three that deal with either U.S. consuls in Austria-Hungary or the consuls of the Habsburg Monarchy working in the United States. All other chapters are based on the works of others. The impression given is that the author, having done research on the consular systems of both powers, needed to set it into some sort of wider context and so came up with the idea of placing her three chapters on consular work between others—one a general history of diplomatic practice, one a general survey of nineteenth-century history, one on disputes over diplomatic formalities, a later one on the history of U.S. policy regarding peacemaking in 1917–19, and the conclusion, which deals with enforcing the Versailles settlement in Central Eastern Europe.

The trouble is that there is no real theme or thesis to all these general chapters. Moreover, they betray a lack of authority. In the chapter on diplomacy we are told several times of notes verbales instead of notes verbales (the term is also in the index); the chapter on general history is based on an uncritical reading of Paul Schroeder’s views and gives an inflated view of Talleyrand supposedly based on Kissinger’s A World Restored (1957), in which Talleyrand’s reputation is deflated. The chapter on the diplomatic disputes over formal procedures is also rather shaky in parts. Phelps believes that the United States gave more support to the Hungarians in 1848–9 than anyone else, although knowledge of the key works by Istvan Hajnal or Domokos Kosary (admittedly in Hungarian) might suggest otherwise. Nor is there any use of either William H. Stiles’s two-volume Austria in 1848–49 (1852) or John Lotroth Motley’s two stout volumes of published correspondence, which might have added some color. However, the main failing in this chapter is the assumption—made also in the introduction—that it was only relations with the Habsburg Monarchy that drew the United States into the “Great Power System.” That assumption is, to say the least, highly unlikely. America’s diplomatic relations with Britain and France were what shaped her understanding of diplomacy.

The real problem with the book is that it is not about U.S.-Habsburg relations at all. Since the United States had little trade and few treaties with the Monarchy and since U.S. diplomacy is considered obtuse and amateurish throughout, Phelps has absolutely nothing to say about U.S. policy. What the State Department or White House thought of Habsburg actions in the nineteenth century, we never discover. All we are told about is difficult individual cases that consuls dealt with. Great power diplomacy itself is totally omitted until we arrive at 1917 and find out about some of Wilson’s not-too-bright advisers on Central Europe, although we are still not told how Wilson developed his policies. There is a little discussion of British diplomacy after 1917, but the diplomacy of all the other great powers is passed over.

In the final analysis, the book does not add up. Exactly what it is trying to argue is unclear. The thesis seems to be that consular problems with the Habsburg Monarchy dragged the United States into the “Great Power System,” but that argument is surely bizarre. So this mixture of four discrete chapters on diplomacy, history, diplomatic protocol, peace-making, and enforcement in 1919–21 with three original chapters on consular work leaves this reviewer perplexed.

Exploring the Transnational Origins of International Order

Benjamin Coates

Intertwined histories of crisis and war make some countries natural pairs for historical analysis. One thinks of Russia and Germany, France and Great Britain, or the United States and any of the dozen or so countries it confronted or occupied in the twentieth century. But the United States and Austria-Hungary, the subject of Nicole Phelps’s U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference: Sovereignty Transformed, do not at first glance make an auspicious couple. The two had little trade and fewer diplomatic crises. Even as America’s enemy in World War I, Austria-Hungary played second fiddle to Germany. As Phelps admits, Austria-Hungary and the United States
“did not have the kind of relationship that has traditionally attracted diplomatic historians” (1).

In Phelps’s capable hands, however, U.S.-Habsburg relations reveal nothing less than the transformation of sovereignty itself. Focusing in particular on the consular services of each power, this wide-ranging and copiously documented book is in some ways very traditional: the old history of “what one clerk said to another.” But by situating these clerks at the center of changing discourses of race and nation, Phelps mixes transnational and international history to demonstrate how new conceptions of sovereignty led to the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the transformation of world politics in 1919. The result is a brilliant and original account of how the United States at first embraced and then fundamentally transformed the “Old Diplomacy” of the Concert of Europe. It prompts us to reconsider just how “American” Wilsonian diplomacy actually was.

Phelps plots her story in a narrative of Rise and Fall. She begins with a brief and accessible history of diplomatic practice, culminating in the creation of what she calls the “Great Power System” at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. This arrangement—often referred to as the “Vienna System”—recognized state sovereignty. Treaties and laws were attached to territorialized states, not princes or peoples. The system promoted non-interference, political equilibrium, and continental peace. It also upheld the legitimacy of the multiethnic Habsburg empire, which incorporated people of many cultures and languages, including Poles, Austrians, Magyars, Czechs, and many more.

But this equilibrium collapsed amidst the chaos of World War I, and by 1919 both the Great Power System and the Habsburg empire were no more. In place of a recognized, cooperative community of territorialized, quasi-dynastic empires, the new “Paris System” (as Eric Weitz has called it) recognized ethnic nationalism as the ideal basis of statehood. Meanwhile, the hyphen connecting the dual monarchy of “Austria-Hungary” became a comma dividing separate nation-states, while other Habsburg territories were parceled out to new states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) and old ones (Italy, Romania). Yet instead of promoting peace through self-government, as its creators hoped, the new system witnessed worse horrors, culminating in ethnic cleansing amid a second, even more terrible, world war.

Phelps is not alone in lamenting the passing of the Vienna system. But she offers several new perspectives. She begins by taking the elaborate diplomatic procedure of the Great Power system seriously. Its carefully scripted behaviors were not simply aristocratic frivolity, she argues. Drawing on the work of international relations theorist Alexander Wendt, Phelps emphasizes the importance of behavior, norms, and ritual in constituting the system. In performing various rituals and stylized practices—presenting themselves to a head of state with a formal letter of introduction, referring to sovereigns as “Your Excellency” in correspondence—diplomats recognized each other’s legitimacy and created expectations of cooperation. In social settings, meanwhile, diplomats cultivated personal relationships that allowed them to smooth the rough edges of great power competition. In great measure, style was substance; Phelps suggests: court behavior maintained international peace and order.

By tracing U.S.-Habsburg diplomacy in detail, Phelps shows how the United States learned to stop worrying and love the Vienna system. At first, many in the young United States rejected Vienna’s stylized diplomatic behavior as the illegitimate fruit of aristocracy. In 1849 U.S. government officials openly rooted on Hungarian nationalists, demonstrating—at least implicitly—that they favored a Habsburg collapse. But by 1903 Washington and Vienna had raised their diplomatic representatives to the level of “ambassador,” signaling mutual recognition and America’s official membership in the club of Great Powers. Phelps tells this story through a series of lesser-known diplomatic exchanges through which the United States gradually accepted the dominant diplomatic protocols to which it had earlier objected. Washington even agreed to seek Austria-Hungary’s pre-approval of ambassadors to ensure they would fit in socially at court.

By the turn of the century, then, the U.S. State Department had become “the American institutionalization of the Great Power System” (9). This is an important and useful perspective: by examining the nation’s rise through Habsburg eyes, Phelps reminds us that in “Becoming a Great Power” (the title of her second chapter), the country was not simply charting a new, exceptionalist course toward global domination; in important respects, it was adopting behavior already modeled by European empires. This notion contributes to a growing body of work revealing the United States’ sustained if uneven engagement with international law in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By emphasizing the changing forms of U.S. diplomacy, Phelps puts another stake into the heart of the isolationist myth.

However, by focusing on form, Phelps leaves hazy the role of power—and especially imperial power—in the “Great Power System.” In this era, being a Great Power meant not only obeying diplomatic norms, but also ruling others against their will (Japan illustrates the truth of this maxim clearly: the nation earned international legal equality only after becoming an empire in its own right). Phelps alludes briefly to those Americans who drew on concepts of “civilization” and “Anglo-Saxonism” to make the case for engagement with the Great Power system (91-2). But I wanted to know more about the role that the increasing willingness of some Americans to identify as “imperialists” played in promoting U.S. participation in the Vienna system. A more direct engagement with empire might also qualify the sometimes elegiac tone that surfaces in Phelps’s writing. Without explicit stating it, Phelps sometimes gives the impression not only of defending the Habsburg empire in comparison to the exclusionary nationalisms that replaced it, but of making the case that a conservative politics of empire is the most desirable way to deal with diversity. Though the Great Power System’s norm of non-intervention helped to keep the peace between empires, it did little or nothing to mitigate violence against colonial subjects.

The strongest part of the book is Phelps’s explanation of the “Fall” of the Great Power System. In some ways it follows the conventions of the genre: Woodrow Wilson plays a central role, emerging in 1918 with a “New Diplomacy” that vanquishes the “Old” and takes the Habsburg empire down with it. But while critical of Wilson, Phelps does not dwell on his personal beliefs nor take the kind of entrenched positions on the hoary debates over “realism” or “idealism” that so often accompany analyses of this period. Rather, she expertly fills in the institutional and intellectual environment that surrounded the president. In so doing, she reveals that the Habsburg collapse was not an inevitable result of the weakness or illegitimacy of Habsburg rule, but rather the outcome of a complex interaction between governmental and nongovernmental actors. It was not merely an international story of negotiations between governments, but also a transnational one shaped by individuals who crossed and re-crossed borders.

These two forces came together in the work of the U.S. and Habsburg consular service when migrants sought aid from representatives of their home government. Phelps explores the workings of this system in often meticulous detail. She argues that the expanding volume of migration (and return migration) in the late nineteenth
century produced increasing tension between two kinds of sovereignty. When governments argued over citizenship and protected their subjects abroad, they “expected their claims to sovereignty over the bodies of their citizens to trump territorially based claims to jurisdiction” (107). The experience of migration—and the multiplicity of organizations serving migrant groups—encouraged the rise of the “racial” nationalisms that later split the Habsburg empire. Austria-Hungary stressed the political citizenship of its subjects: after the rise of the Dual Monarchy, they were either Hungarian or Austrian, based on their territory of residence. The U.S. State Department recognized these categories, but the U.S. Bureau of Immigration did not. Instead, it grouped migrants from Habsburg realms under frequently shifting racial categories, including “Bohemian and Moravian,” “Dalmatian, Bosnian & Herzegovinian,” Magyar, Slovak, Hebrew, and Syrian. Meanwhile, benevolent societies that had formed to aid migrants to the United States also organized themselves along ethnic lines and often encouraged Bohemians or Magyars who returned home to push for national rather than imperial rights. Thus the interaction between the U.S. administrative state and the migrant experience contributed to the rise of nationalism among Habsburg subjects. Phelps quotes historian Ernest Spaulding’s judgment that Czech nationalism—and with it, the eventual Czech state—was “made in America” (181).

Phelps’s study of U.S.-Habsburg relations thus reveals the broader conditions of possibility for the postwar emergence of a “Wilsonian world of conformity and immutable and all-important racial identity” (281). For instance, Phelps shows that The Inquiry—the group of experts formed to advise Wilson on postwar plans—had almost no real knowledge of Austria-Hungary. In their ignorance, Inquiry experts relied subconsciously on the type of “race thinking” that dominated American academic and official discourses and were easily manipulated by nationalist groups. Most strikingly, the Czecho-Slovak council managed to convince them of the “patently false” claim that Czech and Slovak were essentially the same language and that the two groups thus ought to be united in an independent nation (249). While military and political considerations obviously weighed heavily in 1919, the basic “racial” assumptions of key policymakers make it possible to explain the specific lines of decimation that divided former Habsburg domains. Phelps thus helps us to see Wilsonian diplomacy not as a pure reflection of an “isolated” or innocent United States, but rather as emerging from a deeper history of interaction between the New World and the Old.

The narrow shoulders of the U.S.-Habsburg relationship are not strong enough to bear the entire weight of the global transformation of sovereignty. Many other actors and processes—including minority protection treaties and imperial civilizing missions—contributed to the idea that populations and not just territory should form a legitimate interest of the international system. But Phelps convincingly makes the case that the intersection between Austro-Hungarian migrants, Habsburg bureaucracy, and U.S. officials played a fundamental role. Whether or not one agrees with Phelps’s estimation of its causal importance, U.S.-Habsburg Relations demonstrates that this overlooked relationship should be overlooked no longer.

Notes:
7. Weitz, 1328.

“Our American Model”: U.S.-Habsburg Relations and European Race
Alison Frank Johnson

I n U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference, Nicole Phelps makes an observation that might seem obvious to U.S. readers in the opening decade of the twenty-first century but would have seemed utterly perplexing to Austrian and Hungarian statesmen one hundred years earlier: the opinions that Americans—including statesmen and diplomats, but also simple citizens—held of the Habsburg Empire and its citizens mattered. They mattered because, at the peace conferences in Paris that followed the First World War, President Wilson’s views on the “right to national self-determination” became accepted as the fundamental guideline for settling the question of disputed European frontiers. These were not the views of Wilson alone, but rather reflected a broader range of American ideas about race and nation. National self-determination was a concept built largely on the ruins of Europe’s most notoriously multinational empire: it was not considered compatible with the existence of Austria-Hungary.

The notion of 1919 as a global “Wilsonian moment” has been elaborated elsewhere. So have the myriad ways in which the effort to organize Europe into self-determined nation-states was wrongheaded, poorly executed, and led to a disastrous constriction of individuals’ rights to determine their own nationalities and the states to which they belonged. But nowhere has the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire been tied so tightly to developments in the United States. The author of the phrase “Wilsonian moment,” Erez Manela (whom Phelps cites repeatedly and respectfully), argues that it was the anticolonial nationalists, not Wilson, who must be recognized as the main protagonists of 1919. Wilson does not stand at the center of Phelps’s story, either, but U.S. policy towards the Habsburg empire and its citizens on U.S. soil emphatically does: “During World War I and the subsequent peace conference, years of thinking [in] racialist terms manifested themselves in the actions of the American delegation and ultimately resulted in the ‘right to self-determination’ of the Habsburg Empire” (198, emphasis added). Thus it was not Wilson alone who racialized European political legitimacy, but dozens, scores, hundreds, perhaps thousands of American civil servants, judges, lawyers, bureaucrats, and other employees of the U.S. government who collectively refused to accept the political sovereignty of a hodgepodge empire like Austria in the presumptively modern era of nations.

Some readers may almost reflexively rebel against this argument, in particular those who object to the form of American exceptionalism that places the United States at the center of every story. When Phelps describes the preemtpory dismissal of the Austrian ambassador in November 1915, a full two years before the United States declared war on Austria-Hungary, and proposes that “not trying to send another ambassador then may have been
the Austro-Hungarian government’s biggest mistake of the war,” some readers may immediately be tempted to list half a dozen alternate blunders. But this is not an irresponsible book, and Phelps will convince even the most skeptical reader that there is much to be said for her argument. Indeed, the conclusion to Phelps’s monograph (modestly called “After the Peace” rather than something more appropriate like “All Prior Understandings of 1919 Upended”) is stunning. A reader may bridle at the assertion on page 277 that “the Wilson administration had also achieved the removal of the allegedly autocratic and oppressive Habsburg Empire from Central Europe and its replacement with states that conformed more thoroughly with their vision of the ideal state,” as if Britain, France, and a handful of dynamic nationalist movements had just stood idly by. But any real resistance to Phelps’s argument is quickly disarmed by a lesson in its origins. Twenty-first century readers have been trained not to see the influence of the United States in the postwar settlement, in part by the participants, who “began to write themselves out of the story of the country’s break-up almost immediately” (279). After all, the consensus that “the roots of both World War II and the Cold War” were to be found in the Paris treaties “did not encourage many American historians to embrace American agency in their construction,” as Phelps puts it. Blame was shifted away from “the larger [American] society that so many more people had a role in shaping” and onto 1) a few lone individuals or 2) the unwieldy empire itself, now painted in the anachronistic colors of “decline, twilight, eclipse, fall, and backwardness” (280).

Phelps explains the obduracy of this silence by pointing to the organization of academia, which placed U.S. history and European history into separate fields, and the relative lack of interest in bi-national histories in favor of national histories. She could have added the racial extremism that became the defining characteristic of German Europe’s twentieth century, and, within the United States, the shift away from overtly racial understandings of different European nations in favor of a single-minded division of the world into “white” and “colored.” Phelps asks her readers to sweep away all their preconceived notions about American innocence and inevitable Habsburg deterioration. Doing so, she argues, will reveal that “the nation-state system is historically contingent . . . and human beings—including many Americans—were essential agents in its creation. It is a product of long-term debates over sovereignty, identity, and diplomatic culture and the specific circumstances of World War I. The outbreak of World War I, coupled with Wilson’s election, brought people to the fore who were willing to change and created the opportunity for change to occur” (281, emphasis added). And what did Wilson believe to be the most fundamental attributes of the new nation-states that would make up the redesigned international system? “They were democratic and they were capitalist, and to be democratic, they first had to be racially pure.” Ultimately, it is the final characteristic that Phelps finds most salient, as her concluding sentence makes clear: “The Habsburg central government’s commitment to diversity, consensus, and political citizenship had no place in a Wilsonian world of conformity and immutable and all-important racial identity” (281).

This observation comes at the end of a monograph in which Phelps painstakingly reproduces the emergence of “racial identity” as “all-important” in a United States beset with immigrants from the Habsburg Empire. “The movement of people from the Habsburg Empire to the United States and back again provided a conduit for ideas about racial nationalism and the specific categories adopted by the U.S. government to make their way back to the Habsburg Empire, where they contributed to the development of national identities at the expense of Habsburg political citizenship” (7, emphasis added). This interaction between Austria and the United States may have contributed in dramatic fashion to the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire, but the most profound cause, Phelps finds, was a changing understanding of sovereignty and the international political system: away from the Great Power diplomatic culture based on territorially bounded political citizenship and towards a post-1919 racial-national organization of states.

By the time the war was over, Phelps argues, no one in the United States really believed in the political integrity of Austria-Hungary. Nationalists from various constituent parts of the empire had been agitating for independence (for Czechs, for Poles) or redrawn borders (for Italians, for Romanians) for much of the war. Phelps stresses that once diplomatic relations between the United States and Austria-Hungary ceased (which happened functionally in November 1915, when the United States insisted that an unpopular Habsburg ambassador be recalled, although not formally until the United States declared war on Austria-Hungary in December 1917), there was no one left to argue the case for the empire’s continued existence.

But the battle for Austria-Hungary’s legitimacy in U.S. opinion seems to have been lost much earlier. Phelps shows that most Americans had stopped believing in the Habsburg monarchy long before the war began. Austria-Hungary simply did not make sense within the racial framework on which Americans constructed their world. The political categories of “Austrian” and “Hungarian” were the pillars on which the empire’s domestic organization had rested since 1867. Within Austria, the existence of many different “peoples” (or “nationalities,” or “ethnicities,” or even “races,” or in the original German used in the constitution, Volksstämme, “tribes”) was famously acknowledged in Article 19: “All the peoples of the state shall have equal rights, and each people shall have the inviolable right of protecting and cultivating its nationality and language.” There was no attempt to force homogeneity on this heterogeneous population; no one felt it necessary to create a uniform, racially “pure” “Austrian” nation. Nor was there any legal hierarchy among the state’s peoples. The first article of the Austrian constitution of 1867 (which, out of deference to the absolutist sensibilities of the monarch, was called the “Fundamental Law”) proclaimed that “for all people belonging to the various kingdoms and countries represented in the Reichsrat there exists a common right of Austrian citizenship.” Article 2 declared that “all citizens are equal before the law.”

Hungary had a different set of laws and a different set of expectations regarding the primacy of the Hungarian language; within Hungary, homogenization was the goal. Austro-Hungarian consuls represented both halves of the monarchy—the Austrian and the Hungarian—with equal care. In the United States, they were forced to reiterate constantly that “Austrian” and “Hungarian” were the only political categories that should be recognized in diplomacy/foreign affairs. The consuls were splitting into the wind long before the war began. “Hungarian” was a category that Americans could understand (but only because the word had both political and “national” meanings) —but “Austrian”? The commitment within the United States to primarily racial social organization—the category “American” was not nearly as interesting as the contrasting groups “black” and “white,” or “Catholic” and “Protestant,” or “Anglo-Saxon” and, well, anything else—made “Austrian” a challenge. “Austrian” was clearly not a race. For people raised in the United States in the post–Civil Rights era, racialist thinking is formally unacceptable (even if still functionally hegemonic). But racialist thinking survives in the concept of “ethnicity” that many Americans hold dear to this day. In his superb study of the coal-mining community in Ludlow, Colorado, for example, Thomas Andrews bemoans
the use of “Austrian” in company statistics, noting that “the categories employed often obscured more than they revealed—‘Austrian,’ to cite just the most notable example, masked such disparate ethnicities as Tyrolean, Croatian, Slovenian, Polish, Ruthenian, and German.” When Andrews lists the workers tallied by the Colorado Fuel and Iron company in 1903, he puts scare quotes around “Americans,” “Austrians,” “Mexicans,” and “Colored,” distancing himself from these problematic categories, but does not employ them for Italians, Irish, English, Slavs, Hungarians, Welsh, Scots, Germans, Swedes, Poles, Greeks, French, Swiss, Belgians, Finns, Bohemians, or Dutch. What is it that the words “Finn,” “Slav,” or “French” can reveal that the word “Austrian” obscures? Andrews’s frustration that historical documents calling a worker “Austrian” prevent us from knowing something important about who that worker really was reflects the extent to which a watered-down version of “national identity” that was developed in the late nineteenth century survives in the views of “heritage” and “ethnicity” prevalent in the U.S. today.

This racialized understanding was not limited to pseudo-scientists like Madison Grant or now-stigmatized “national identity” that was developed in the late nineteenth century. What is the difference between a chargré d’affaires and an attaché? The Great Power system was hierarchical; it was deeply cultured; it required finesse and training (if not professional training, then training in the habits of European nobility). It was a system designed for the Habsburg Empire, and resented, if temporarily accepted, by the United States.

The second chapter covers the formal diplomatic relations between the Habsburg Empire and the United States (as opposed to consular work) and includes the pivotal years around the revolutions of 1848–49. Phelps gets at the heart of U.S.-American sympathy for the Hungarian revolutionaries: “Like their American, French, and Viennese revolutionary predecessors, [Hungarian revolutionaries] spoke in universalist, Enlightenment terms, but, in reality, they envisioned a state governed by a particular group of like-minded people” (54). Theirs was just the type of revolutionary conservatism that appealed to a U.S. population that “viewed the Hungarians as fellow progressive, republican, Protestant revolutionaries and the Habsburgs as backward, arbitrary, Catholic despoits” (67). This image was reinforced by the Hungarian revolutionary, Louis Kossuth, in lecture after public lecture during his extended stay in the United States and was embellished in Daniel Webster’s vision of “our American model upon the lower Danube and the mountains of Hungary.” (Although Kossuth’s welcome in the United States would eventually wear thin, Istvan Deak has called his tour through Western Europe and the United States “a triumphant journey the likes of which the world had never seen.”)

Like the first chapter, the second continues in the informative vein: what were the general points of friction between the two states? On what basis did they have diplomatic relations at all? Phelps takes the reader from a period in which the Habsburg Ministry of Foreign Affairs might have considered diplomatic relations with the United States “not necessary” (17) to a period in which the United States considered not just diplomatic relations with but the very existence of the Habsburg Empire as nothing more than a nuisance.

In the third and fourth chapters, Phelps turns her attention away from diplomats and towards consuls. Although consuls’ duties have often been imagined—not only by historians, but also by consuls themselves—to focus primarily on the promotion of and facilitation of trade, Phelps’s research suggests that this was true neither of U.S. consuls in the Habsburg empire nor of Habsburg consuls in the United States. “The duties of a consul,” she writes, “had expanded over the course of the [nineteenth] century from trade facilitation to trade promotion and, finally, to the protection of citizens abroad” (107). In the first half of the century, when trade was most important, it made sense for consulates to be based largely in port cities (the first U.S. consulate in the Habsburg monarchy was in Trieste, not Vienna), but by 1880, complications surrounding sovereignty and territoriality had so eclipsed the limited commercial relations between the two states that the most typical duties of U.S. consuls in the Habsburg Empire involved the representation of citizens’ legal rights in “criminal and civil cases, with divorce proceedings and patent investigations being the most common” (116). Consuls could also pursue investigations for Americans back home.
Could a Missouri button manufacturer rightly assert that his Austrian competitors’ buttons were manufactured by “convict labor,” as he hoped? Not any more: convicts had not been used to make buttons in Bohemia for ten years and for fifteen in Vienna (117).

When Ralph Busser, the U.S. consul in Austria’s largest Adriatic port, Trieste, boasted in 1915 that “Trieste is undoubtedly the business Consulate in Austria” (128), the period when Austria could have claimed to be or hoped to become one of the leaders of global maritime commerce lay decades in the past (Phelps dates the transition, perhaps generously, to 1880). When Phelps claims that “the Habsburg Empire has never been famed for its maritime prowess . . . and it is difficult to fathom that overseas trade was the driving force behind the [consular] service’s creation and expansion” (153, emphasis added), however, her claim is more appropriate to the last forty years of the empire’s existence than the period when the consular corps was actually created. The questions of greatest interest to Phelps revolve around sovereignty, territory, and the complications that arose when a person’s physical location and citizenship were not aligned with one another. It is appropriate that her own research concentrates most heavily on the period after 1880, when these were also the questions of greatest significance to her historical subjects. Her story is actually more interesting and more important when viewed as describing a transformation from a period when overseas trade could be imagined as the driving force behind U.S.-Habsburg relations to a period when the anticipated movement of goods had been entirely overshadowed by the actual movement of people.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, and in particular from the 1830s through the 1850s, the Habsburg Empire was indeed famed for its maritime prowess. Its largest shipping line, the Austrian Lloyd, was among the most famous and prestigious of European merchant marines. (When the North German Lloyd was founded in 1857, it was named after the more famous Austrian, or South German Lloyd. The name Lloyd is preserved to this day in the HAPAG Lloyd, the product of a merger between the North German Lloyd and the Hamburg-Amerikanische Paketfahrt AG in 1970.) The nineteenth-century Habsburg consular service was massive—Phelps correctly notes that it is nearly impossible to account for all the temporary, permanent, honorary, and general consulates that the monarchy maintained between 1718 and 1919, but they numbered in the hundreds and a great many of them were in port cities. Philatelists have found evidence of nearly three dozen Austrian and Austro-Hungarian post offices operated out of different Habsburg consulates in the Ottoman Empire alone (with another forty-three post offices operated out of the offices of the Austrian Lloyd in the Ottoman Empire). Some of these consulates seem to have been of short duration, but their existence suggests the degree of penetration into Ottoman commerce that Austria was prepared to attempt. In its relative lack of engagement with trade, the daily experience of Habsburg consuls in the United States, therefore, is not typical of the consular corps at large.

Phelps’s book has self-imposed limits that are both geographic and temporal. It invites the thoughtful reader to speculate on how its arguments could be expanded in future scholarship that picks up threads left at its edges. The implications of the argument could fruitfully be extended into the interwar period. If the Wilsonian moment was really about the emphasis not only on democracy over empire and capitalism over socialism but also on racial purity, what does one make of W.E.B. DuBois’s argument that the version of white supremacy epitomized by the Jim Crow South was globalized in the aftermath of the First World War? After the First World War, DuBois, who had decades earlier studied abroad in Germany and felt himself liberated by a society in which he was not recognized as black, looked at Europe with nothing but disgust. “The World War was primarily the jealous and avaricious struggle for the largest share in exploiting darker races,” he wrote in “The Souls of White Folk.” He saw a link between the domestic racism of the United States and the global racism of European empire. The United States, he wrote, stands today shoulder to shoulder with Europe in Europe’s worst sin against civilization. She aspires to sit among the great nations who arbitrate the fate of “lesser breeds without the law” and she is at times heartily ashamed even of the large number of “new” white people whom her democracy has admitted to place and power. Against this surging forward of Irish and German, of Russian Jew, Slav and [Italian] her social bars have not availed, but against Negroes she can and does take her unflinching and immovable stand, backed by this new public policy of Europe. She trains her immigrants to this despising of [Negroes] from the day of their landing, and they carry and send the news back to the submerged classes in the fatherlands.

DuBois’s insight into the transmission of racism differs from Phelps’s: it is not that Austrians were redefined as Jews, Slavs, or Italians, but that Americans (as well as Europeans’ own colonial adventures) taught Europeans to perceive themselves primarily as “white,” to move beyond the differences between them and to imagine themselves superior to everyone who was not “white.” It remains to be seen how Phelps’s insight affects DuBois’s and how these different forms of racial orientation fed off or detracted from one another.

The confusion about the false equivalencies of English words like race, nation, tribe, and people with German words like Rasse, Nation, Volksstamm, and Volk worked its way into not only the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, but also into the Minority Treaties that Lucien Wolf and others hoped would protect those left on the wrong side of Europe’s new “ethno-national” borders. This suggests the need to think about the role of U.S. racial categories in the tragic fate of Jews in interwar Austria who were denied citizenship because they could not prove they belonged to the German “race” But there can be no presumption of direct causality or responsibility here. Phelps acknowledges that the discourse about racial and national identity included interlocutors from the British and French empires, but she stays true to her commitment to focusing on multiple dimensions of U.S.-Habsburg relations without being distracted by this incontrovertible fact. Taking up more thematically limited studies with a broader range of international actors would allow not only more investigation of the way that traditional imperialism contributed to this conversation, but also the way that antisemites’ increasing emphasis on the racial rather than the religious distinctiveness of Jews may have created a greater responsibility for some of this transition in Germany, Russia, and the Habsburg Empire itself.

Phelps has done a great service to both the fields she represents: Habsburg history and U.S. history. Few historians could claim to represent them both so well. This is a useful book, it is an interesting book, it is a provocative book. It opens fields of inquiry that transcend categorization and deserves to be recognized for its combination of care and courage.

Notes:
2. Criticism began before the Paris conferences had even ended; one of the most prominent critics was John Maynard Keynes, who voiced his concerns in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London, 1919). Arno Mayer’s Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York, 1967) stands out as one of the most formative later
accounts. A criticism directed specifically at the impact of “national self-determination” on Austria can be found in Istvan Deak, “The Habsburg Empire,” in After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, eds. Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (Boulder, CO, 1997), 133.


6. Madison Grant’s notorious The Passing of the Great Race was first published in 1916.

7. For a discussion of the multiple interpretations of 1848 in the United States, see Timothy Mason Roberts, Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism (Charlottesville, VA, 2009). Roberts, like Istvan Deak before him, notes that opinions about Hungary changed over time and were influenced by the supposed implications of the revolutionary rhetoric of liberty for U.S. slavery. For a different image of U.S. slaveholders, who in some cases saw themselves as the defenders of liberty (which they understood to mean Protestant anti-clericalism, republican anti-monarchism, and free trade), see Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge, MA, 2013), esp. 303–29.


Author’s Response
Nicole M. Phelps

Many thanks to Andrew Johns for arranging this roundtable and to the scholars who contributed to it. With the book, I aimed to speak to historians working in a number of fields, and it is a pleasure to see responses from different types of historians brought together in one place.

Alison Johnson very kindly remarks that U.S.-Habsburg Relations “is not an irresponsible book,” and when quoting from it she often adds italics to highlight the specific word choices that give precision and nuance to my arguments. That nuance is important, because, as Benjamin Coates and Alan Sked point out, U.S.-Habsburg relations can only wield so much causal power. I argue that there are three important areas of conflict in the U.S.-Habsburg relationship: “diplomatic norms, a multitude of legal problems stemming from the migration of several million people back and forth between the two countries between the 1870s and World War I, and, of course, the crisis of the war itself.” I also argue that “these conflicts had a dramatic effect on both American and Habsburg political culture, and the clash between their contrasting approaches to managing their diverse populations contributed decisively to the transition in international politics from the post-1815 Great Power System to the post-1919 nation-state system. Their relationship demonstrates the international and transnational aspects of the construction of sovereignty” (2).

Contrary to Sked’s reading, I explicitly state that “neither the American acceptance of Great Power diplomatic culture nor the increasing salience of racial-nationalist categories in the Habsburg Empire was produced exclusively by the U.S.-Habsburg relationship, but they were significantly influenced by that relationship” (7). I also say that U.S.-Habsburg conflicts over diplomatic norms “helped to further” U.S. integration into the post-1815 Great Power System (4, emphasis added). Where I do make a claim about the uniqueness and indispensability of U.S.-Habsburg relations is in regard to their influence on the specific outcomes of the Paris treaties dealing with Central Europe at the end of World War I. Even there, I am not suggesting that the U.S.-Habsburg relationship was the only thing that mattered. However, it did matter a great deal, and we cannot fully understand the settlement without taking it into account.

In asserting that the book “is not about U.S.-Habsburg relations at all,” Sked raises the extremely important question of what constitutes legitimate objects of study for diplomatic historians. My understanding from Sked’s comments is that he would point to the highest level of activity—that among foreign ministers and secretaries of state, kings, prime ministers, and presidents—as the place where “diplomacy” happens and “policy” is created. In the study of modern European history and later U.S. history, that formulation can yield a great deal. For the United States in the long nineteenth century, however, it misses the vast majority of the action. Scholars are uncovering all sorts of activities undertaken by private American citizens that integrated them into a wider world and often required the reactive rather than proactive assistance of the state.

In my project, I opted for a middle ground. I generally restricted myself to what could be found in State Department and Foreign Ministry documents, so everything I looked at definitely had an element of official state involvement. Employees of the State Department and Habsburg Foreign Ministry in central offices and in the field generated thousands and thousands of documents. What are those documents evidence of, if not a relationship? (I suppose one thing they are evidence of is bad French: in the vein of U.-Habsburg correspondence I drew from, the common usage was note verbale, so I kept it. The correspondents also used despatch rather than dispatch, much to the dismay of one of my copyeditors.) Much of what is in those documents never made it to the White House, but that does not render the material unimportant or uninformative. Those documents allow us to see many things, including how everyday people interacted with the state. They also show us the steady accumulation of interactions that tied the U.S. and Habsburg governments together and shaped what actions were possible in times of crisis. This constructive approach to international relations lends itself well to integrating transnational and cultural approaches to diplomatic history with approaches centered on elite state actors.

Benjamin Coates and Alison Johnson note that I take diplomatic ceremony and consular activity seriously, and that is definitely something I set out to do. When I began to research pre-World War I U-S-Habsburg relations, I had little idea of what I would find, and I was very open to the idea that I might find evidence of only a “normal” relationship. But I saw my investigation as an opportunity to find out what “normal” was: how did two governments that were basically friendly interact, and, more important, why did they put in the time, money, and effort to maintain a relationship if they did not expect anything to come of it? In the book, I think I have shown the value of diplomatic ceremony for reinforcing legitimacy and the necessity of consular activities for exercising sovereignty and determining citizenship status. Consuls also, of course, dealt with trade matters, and Johnson provides a
fascinating glimpse into earlier Habsburg consular activity in this realm. I look forward to seeing more fruits of her research along those lines, and I very much hope that my work encourages the growing number of scholars who are investigating consular activity. The sources are there, and they are unquestionably rich. If we opt to dismiss them as merely administrative, we are letting an important opportunity pass us by.

Another of my primary goals with this project was to bring the reevaluation of the Habsburg Empire that has been underway for the past twenty-five years or so among Habsburg historians to the attention of the community of scholars engaged in diplomatic history and international relations. In that reevaluation, the Habsburg Empire is more viable—politically, economically, socially—and less crowded with ethnic nationalists yearning for independence. Coates notes that I am generally sympathetic to the country, and that is definitely true in the sense that, both on the whole and relatively speaking, the Habsburg government was better at protecting individual rights than the U.S. government at the turn of the century. Neither was perfect! But I do think the idea of Habsburg success is helpful in getting people to rethink their assumptions and reevaluate their prior knowledge.

Part of the challenge comes from the name. What to call the Habsburg lands has long been a conundrum. Austria-Hungary works only from 1867, and even then, the official post-1867 name for “not Hungary” would not fit on a bumper sticker. The two common options among scholars are Habsburg Monarchy and Habsburg Empire. Both have problems: monarchy suggests that the ruler had more power than he actually did and that the country was more uniform than it was, while empire suggests a colonial relationship. Both monarchy and empire have negative connotations in U.S. culture, contributing to an image of the Habsburg lands as backward and unimportant.

I have opted for empire, but I do not see the government as uniformly “imperial” in the sense that one might use the term when talking about, for example, British or American overseas colonies. This is another place where nuance is essential. After 1878, the Habsburg government administered Bosnia and Herzegovina, and people there one might consider those policies in light of work on settler colonialism in other areas of the world. For the Austrian part—where, ironically, the Habsburg ruler was styled as “emperor”—comparisons with other contemporary empires may be least appropriate; although the analogy of empire seemed more viable in the Habsburg—especially Hungarian—efforts to repatriate migrants and care for them after their return would be fruitful areas of investigation. And, as Johnson suggests, studies that focus on a particular theme in a shorter time span but with a broader range of actors would be most welcome. I believe my book demonstrates that the United States and the Habsburg Empire deserve a place alongside Britain, France, and Germany as we continue to explore international and transnational elements of the fin de siècle.

Notes:
1. See, among numerous other examples (including those listed by Benjamin Coates), Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire (Cambridge, UK, 2005); Kristin Hoganson, Consumers’ Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865–1920 (Chapel Hill, 2007); and Robert E. May, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill, 2002).
3. For a list of previous scholarship, see footnote 1 in the introduction to U.S.-Habsburg Relations.
Call for Applications . . .
Editor-in-Chief, SHAFR’s Guide to the Literature

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHA FR) published a magisterial, two-volume guide to the literature in the history of American foreign relations in 2003. Since 2007, the two paper volumes have been updated by the regular, on-line publication of section updates.

SHA FR is now searching for a new editor-in-chief for the digital version of the Guide. Duties will include recruiting section editors to provide regular updates of content, working with a commercial publisher or developing an on-line publishing platform to host content, and providing overall strategic management of the project.

The position will be compensated at the rate of $3,000 per year. The successful applicant ideally will be appointed to a multi-year, renewable term.

Applicants should submit a letter (2 pages maximum) and a c.v. The letter should explain the applicant’s academic and professional credentials that qualify her/him for the position and indicate the applicant’s objectives and/or vision for the project. All application materials should be sent to Peter L. Hahn, Executive Director of SHA FR, at shafr@osu.edu. Questions should also be directed to Dr. Hahn. Deadline for applications is May 15, 2014. The SHA FR Council intends to make an appointment by July 1, 2014.
A View From Overseas

Filling the Empty Chair: France and the United States from Geneva

Jayita Sarkar

Geneva, which has been the center of international negotiations since the 1872 Alabama Arbitration, has been witness to many a diplomatic tussle, gaffe, impasse, and resolution. As European headquarters of the United Nations, this small Swiss city of under sixteen square kilometers has more peace accords and negotiations to its name than McDonald's outlets. While it observed numerous clashes between the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, Geneva was also privy to probably the most significant rift within the Western bloc—that between Paris and Washington.

Throughout the 1960s, Charles de Gaulle’s “empty chair” policy—named after the French president’s decision in 1963 to bring European Economic Community proceedings to a halt by recalling France’s representative to the EEC Council—spilled over to various platforms of international diplomacy, including the nuclear nonproliferation treaty negotiations in Geneva. The Franco-American differences that had prevailed throughout the Cold War then seemed to dissipate gradually. Yet disputes still occurred. The P5+1 negotiations in Geneva on Iran’s nuclear program in November 2013 were a case in point: French insistence on the Assemblée Nationale.

Within a decade of Yalta, in 1954, the Geneva Accords had terminated the French role in Indochina, and the anticolonial movement had gained momentum in Algeria. The sun had only begun to set on the French Empire. If the stigma of Yalta was not enough, the French also had a “Manhattan complex.” Feelings of inferiority emerged from France’s inability to participate in the Manhattan Project, the Allied wartime endeavor to build the world’s first atomic bombs, despite being at the forefront of nuclear fission research before the Second World War. Such feelings were exacerbated when, in April 1960, days after the second French nuclear test, U.S. Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates was quoted in the New York Times as saying that “the United States did not regard two nuclear explosions as qualification for French admission into the nuclear club.”

The aggressive French nuclear export policy and, in later years, the politique proliferatrice of the French atomic energy commission had a strong Gaullist cast, the nature of which was most evident in the mid-1970s disagreements over French commitment to nuclear nonproliferation between President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and his prime minister,Jacques Chirac, who was the leader of the Gaullist faction in the Assemblée Nationale.

The Manhattan complex perhaps is comparable to the “Fashoda syndrome,” a pattern of behavior that is said to have emerged from feelings of battered pride after the French, embroiled in a contest with Britain for territory in Africa in 1898, had to back down and withdraw their forces from Fashoda in present-day South Sudan, leaving much of that region to the British. The term is most often used now to describe French interventions in Africa that are prompted by apprehensions of losing out to Anglophone encroachment. Thus, just as the Anglo-French rivalry of yesteryear transformed itself into French competition against the “Anglo-Saxons” after the Second World War, so the French insecurities that contribute to Franco-American differences probably have older roots. De Gaulle and Gaullism may make more sense in this light.

Last August, while calling for support for military intervention in Syria, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called France “our oldest ally,” thus invoking images of the Franco-American alliance against the British during the American War of Independence. The era of “freedom fries” seems to have passed with Jacques Chirac’s political exit, and the United States and France seem to be converging more and more on their foreign policy aims. The readiness of President François Hollande in the Syrian case is telling. Yet the Cold War era earned Paris the label of an unreliable ally. Certainly the legacy of Gaullism, together with differing interests in regions like the Middle East, may lead the two countries to disagree every now and then. However, the United States can improve its chances...
of accord through a better understanding of the historical underpinnings of some French foreign policy positions. France has been more than willing to fill its empty chair at international platforms in Geneva and elsewhere over the past decade or so, and the climate may be just right to initiate a sustainable Franco-American entente.

Notes:
3. Memorandum for the President on Proposed Nuclear Offer to de Gaulle from George W. Ball to John F. Kennedy, 22 July 1963, Box 46, Folder 23, France, George W. Ball Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ.
5. See Frédéric Bozo, La Politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945 (Paris, 2012); Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham, MD, 2001).

Announcing a new site for SHAFR online

A multi-year effort to create a dynamic new online presence for foreign relations history will culminate with the launch of SHAFR’s new website in July 2014. SHAFR is working with Liefa Communications, a firm that has created award-winning designs such as the Gulag Exhibit for the Global Museum on Communism. The site will be more than a location to find information about annual meetings and publications. It will be a place for teachers to collaborate, and for researchers to share their ideas. It will showcase SHAFR’s publications and programs. It will be a place for scholars, policy-makers and the public to find resources and expert opinion on foreign relations history.

Visit our booth at the SHAFR Annual Meeting for a preview of what’s to come. Meet our web designers. Find out the ways SHAFR’s new website can support your research and teaching. Find out how you can help make this new site a success.

Committee on SHAFR and the Web: Laura Belmonte, Mary Dudziak (chair), George Fujii (webmaster), Jacob Hamblin, Rebecca Herman and Chester Pach
In 2013 Southern Methodist University became one of but a handful of schools to host a presidential library on its campus. Housed inside the George W. Bush Presidential Center, the George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum opened on April 25, 2013, with President Obama and every living former president in attendance. The museum has shattered previous attendance records for a presidential site, a testament to the tumult and transformation of the Bush years, and archivists have begun the long process of making the Bush administration’s records, the lifeblood of historians, available to future researchers.

Six months before this presidential hoopla, in November 2012, SMU opened a related center on campus, albeit to less fanfare: the Center for Presidential History (of which I am the founding director). This center’s goals are no less ambitious: to further the study of the world’s most powerful office; to further the university’s aspiration to be recognized as a national-level research institution; and to help integrate the Bush Center and its in-house policy institute into the broader culture and milieu of campus life.

Three missions underlie these goals. First, the CPH actively promotes scholarship on the presidency by SMU faculty and by scholars around the country through research grants, an ongoing and growing post-doctoral fellowship program, and promotion of campus and public lectures and visits by scholars studying the presidency. The center also coordinates conferences and symposia for historians to explore and discuss issues cooperatively. To date more than thirty scholars have presented their work in such venues, including SHAFR members Bill Brands, Melvyn Leffler, Matthew Jones, Frank Costigliola, and William Hitchcock; and the CPH has coordinated three conferences: “The Four Freedoms: FDR’s Legacy of Liberty for the United States and the World,” “Faith in Obama’s America,” and “When Life Strikes the White House: Death, Scandal, Illness, and the Responsibilities of a President.”

Oxford University Press will publish volumes from the first two of these events and Harvard University Press will publish a volume from the third, furthering the center’s second major mission: engagement with the public, both in Dallas and beyond, to meet its seemingly insatiable appetite for presidential history with work grounded in the latest scholarship.

The CPH’s third mission is a gift to generations of scholars still to come. The center coordinates an active and expansive “Collective Memory Project” that is designed to capture and archive personal experiences during the Bush years. Brian Franklin, previously of Texas A&M University, directs the Collective Memory Project, aided by in-house scholars Aaron Crawford (on leave as associate editor of the Ulysses S. Grant Papers) and William Steding (a recent graduate of University College-Cork) and national fellows Michael Nelson, Melvyn Leffler, Thomas DeFrank, and Sylvia Hoffert.

The goal of this broad-based oral history project is not only to record the reflections of Bush administration alumni—though that is a dominant part of the project—but, more synthetically, to compile accounts of lives and events from the years George W. Bush held office. Similar oral history projects abound, some devoted to cataloguing memories from top administration officials, others dedicated to preserving the human experiences found in the stories of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. Ours differs in two ways. First, the Collective Memory Project seeks to answer key questions about the Bush years, such as the role of faith in the White House, the inside dynamics of the 2004 election, and the role of the First Lady’s Office in coordinating the president’s diplomatic schedule and thereby furthering his diplomatic agenda. Second, we go beyond the men and women who served the administration by interviewing their allies and opponents outside government, journalists who covered the major events of the day, experts whose work influenced policy debates, and those whose lives were directly affected by decisions and policies whose development the public will in time be able to examine when documents currently in process at the Bush Library are released. These interviews are preserved in video and transcript form, but will be withheld from public use for a minimum of ten years, time enough to allow subjects to feel free to speak to the historical record. No one can say with certainty what questions future historians may wish to pose of the Bush years, but our goal is to provide material for historians perhaps not yet even born.

These programs directly intersect with SHAFR’s mission to further understanding of American foreign relations, because the presidency and executive power feature, if not prominently then subtly, in the work and writings of most SHAFR members. Indeed, the center’s first faculty fellow, Thomas Knock of SMU, whose forthcoming study of George McGovern will be furthered by dedicated writing time provided by the center, is a long-time member of the organization. I am also a member, and like my fellow center leaders, I take an expansive view of the term “presidential history,” believing that anything that intersects in any small way with federal power and with the executive branch of the United States government falls within its domain.

We encourage SHAFR members—and the historical community more broadly—to look to the Center for Presidential History as a possible venue for disseminating ideas and for furthering individual and collective projects. Our programs are expanding (in particular our two-year post-doctoral program, which will quadruple in size over the next two years), and we are ever eager to accept proposals and ideas for conferences, lectures, topics for the Collective Memory Project, and additional ways to help the scholars who help the nation and the world understand its most powerful political office. If you have an idea, give us a call. Further information can be found at www.smu.edu/cph.
2014 SHAFR Conference

Please plan to join old friends and new at the 2014 SHAFR annual meeting in Lexington, Kentucky, the Horse Capital of the World!

The 2014 conference will be held June 19-21 at the Hyatt Regency Lexington and the Lexington Convention Center. Nestled among the beautiful rolling hills of horse country, Lexington is serviced by Blue Grass Airport (LEX), which is just 15 minutes from downtown. Larger airports in Cincinnati and Louisville are about a 90-minute drive from Lexington.

HOTEL INFORMATION

The Hyatt Regency is attached to the Lexington Convention Center. Hotel amenities include a complimentary airport shuttle, a 24-hour fitness center, a heated indoor pool, and an outdoor sun deck. The SHAFR rate for reservations at the Hyatt Regency is $122/night single or double occupancy, plus 13.4% tax. You can visit the conference website, listed below, to book online, or call the hotel directly at 859-253-1234 and request the SHAFR rate.

Registration will be $80 standard or $30 student/adjunct faculty/K-12 teacher before June 1. After June 1 registration fees increase to $105/$45. You can register for the conference online at our website, listed below.

WINE AND DINE

The Bluefire Bar and Grill in the Hyatt lobby is a full-service restaurant operating from 6:30 am to 10 pm daily. The bar is open from noon until 11 pm daily, and serves a late night menu until closing. You can grab a Starbucks’s to go at the bar all day until 11 pm. The bar area features several large flat-panel TVs and the staff has promised to broadcast World Cup games during the conference upon request!

The Shops at Lexington Center includes a food court featuring fast casual eateries like Cosí, Arby’s, and Subway, as well as Yesterday’s Bar and Grille, a full-service restaurant and bar open nightly until 1 am – another nearby spot to watch the World Cup.

There are also many restaurants, bars, and shops in downtown Lexington within close walking distance of the conference. You will find the following places in a three block by four block area just a short 10-15 minute walk from the Hyatt Regency and the Lexington Convention Center:

- Saul Good Restaurant and Pub, 123 North Broadway between Main and Short.
- Shakespeare & Co., 367 W. Short Street near Broadway.
- Table Three Ten, 310 W. Short Street near Mill. Focused on small plates and a local, seasonal menu.
- The Village Idiot, 307 W. Short between Broadway and Mill. Lexington’s first gastropub.
- Parlay Social, 257 W. Short between Mill and Market. Live music Thursday-Saturday nights.
- Goodfella’s Pizzeria, 110 N. Mill Street near Short Street.
- Wild Cat Saloon, 123 Cheapside between Main and Short, another place likely to have sporting events on the TV.
- Cheapside Bar and Grill, 131 Cheapside at West Short Street, features a large outdoor seating area and would be another good spot to catch World Cup broadcasts.
- McCarthy’s Irish Bar, 117 S. Upper between Vine and Main.
- Alfalfa, 141 East Main between Limestone and Martin Luther King Blvd. Focused on local food, vegetarian-friendly.
- Lexington Beerworks, a bit of a longer walk at 213 North Limestone between 2nd and 3rd Streets, but a good spot for craft beer lovers. Outdoor seating available.
For those feeling a bit more adventurous, another popular area with an up-and-coming restaurant scene can be found along Jefferson Street, about a 15 minute walk from the Hyatt:

- Nick Ryan's Saloon, 157 Jefferson Street between Short and 2nd, fun neighborhood feel.
- The Grey Goose, 170 Jefferson Street between Short and 2nd, popular for pizza.
- Lexington's burgeoning food truck scene is known to congregate in this area on weekend evenings.

Both of the above districts are serviced by COLT, Lexington's free downtown circulator service. COLT has two routes: the Blue Route, which operates 11:30 am – 2:30 pm Monday through Friday and Thursday, Friday and Saturday from 6:00 pm – 1:00 am, and the Green Route, which runs Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights from 9:00 pm -3:00 am.

The 5/3 Bank Pavilion at Cheapside Park hosts Thursday Night Live, a free community event every Thursday from 4:30 – 8:00 pm featuring live music. Cheapside Park is also the site of the Lexington Farmers Market, open Saturdays from 7 am to 3 pm. Cheapside Park is located at Main Street between Upper and Mill Streets, a short walk from the Hyatt and the LCC.

**HISTORY and CULTURE**

You can't visit Lexington without learning a little bit about its rich history in equestrian pursuits. Keeneland Race Course, which hosts world-class horse races every April and October, is a quick 15-minute drive from downtown Lexington and is open daily for self-guided tours. Kentucky Horse Park is a 1,200 acre state park and working horse farm. It is open daily for tours, horseback trail rides, pony rides, shows and competitions. The Smithsonian-affiliated International Museum of the Horse is also on site.

Lexington has non-equine treasures to share, too. The Aviation Museum of Kentucky is located at Blue Grass Airport, and the Kentucky Military History Museum is a short drive away in Frankfort. Ashland, the Henry Clay Estate, and the Mary Todd Lincoln House are both within walking distance of the Hyatt Regency. Gratz Park is not just a park but a historic district comprised of many lovely 19th century homes. The Art Museum at the University of Kentucky includes many fine works by American and European artists as well as African and pre-Columbian artifacts. Camp Nelson Heritage Park, about 20 miles south of Lexington, is a National Historic Landmark and was a Union Army supply depot during the Civil War where more than 10,000 African American troops trained. And finally, what would a visit to Lexington be without a distillery tour? Town Branch Distillery is just a ten minute walk from the Lexington Convention Center, and distillery tours also include a peek at the brewery that produces Kentucky Ale and Kentucky Bourbon Barrel Ale.

If you are curious about Lexington, download the free downtown audio walking tour! Get the app, download the mp3 file, or watch a video of the tour at http://www.visitlex.com/audiotour/index.php.

**SHAFR SOCIAL EVENT**

This year's social event will be held Friday evening at Buffalo Trace Distillery, the oldest continually operating distillery in the country and a recently designated National Historic Landmark. The distillery sits on 130 acres in the heart of bourbon country. The log cabin-style clubhouse was built by distillery employees during the Great Depression, and features a covered wraparound porch and access to the beautifully maintained grounds. We hope you will join us for a casual social event featuring picnic-style fare, complimentary beer and wine, bluegrass music, and, of course, a bourbon tasting. This will be a uniquely Kentucky experience!
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

If research is on your mind, the University of Kentucky Libraries are a rich resource featuring manuscripts, still photographs, video, and sound recordings related to Kentucky history. They also include several outstanding special collections, including:

- The Louie B. Nunn Center for Oral History includes more than 8,000 oral history interviews on topics such as political history, Appalachia, the history of broadcasting, World War II, and Vietnam.

- The Public Policy Archives contains manuscript collections related to the history of Kentucky politics and government, including the papers of U.S. Senator and Vice President under Truman Alben W. Barkley, U.S. Senator John Sherman Cooper, who also served as the American ambassador to India and Nepal and East Germany, and U.S. Senator Walter D. Huddleston, a member of the Church Committee.

Visit libraries.uky.edu for more information.

Other local research venues include:

- Berea College, Special Collections and Archives (859-985-3262), Berea, KY  
  http://www.berea.edu/hutchinslibrary/specialcollections/default.asp

- Kentucky Historical Society, Special Collections and Library (502-564-1792), Frankfort, KY  
  http://history.ky.gov

- Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives (502-564-8300), Frankfort, KY  
  http://kdla.ky.gov

- Transylvania University Library, Special Collections (859-233-8225), Lexington, KY  
  http://www.transy.edu/academics/library.htm

- The Filson Historical Society (502-635-5083), Louisville, KY  
  www.filsonhistorical.org

- Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Archives and Special Collections (502-897-4573), Louisville, KY  
  http://archives.sbts.edu

- Eastern Kentucky University Libraries, Special Collections and Archives (859-622-1792), Richmond, KY  
  http://www.library-old.eku.edu/new/content/archives/archives_index.php

We hope you can join us in Lexington in June! Visit the conference website for up-to-date information on the program, conference logistics, and ticketing: http://www.shafr.org/conferences/annual/2014-annual-meeting/, “like” us on facebook at www.facebook.com/shafr, or follow us on twitter @SHAFRConference, #SHAFR2014. You may also contact the Conference Coordinator, Jennifer Walton, at conference@shafr.org.

SEE YOU IN LEXINGTON!
The Historiography of American Intervention in the First World War

Andrew M. Johnston

Where would British historians be today if Michael Gove, the Minister of State for Education, hadn’t recently accused Cambridge history professor Richard J. Evans (along with Captain Edmund Blackadder, the eponymous hero of the BBC comedy series) of corrupting British youth with their cynical views of the First World War?10 Sadly, for Americans, the anniversaries of that war are unlikely to produce a similar frisson of controversy, but on the other hand, Americans have had much to say about Woodrow Wilson. It was once routine to debate George W. Bush’s foreign policy debt to Wilsonianism.2 Even Glenn Beck weighed in on February 3, 2012, appearing on TV in military fatigues to commemorate the anniversary of Wilson’s death in 1924, calling him a “son of a bitch” who “tore our country apart.”3

Yet as John A. Thompson points out, historians do not agree on the meaning of Wilsonianism as a “historical commitment”: is it about promoting democracy or international law or collective security or all three, even when they contradict each other? The protean character of the term has allowed Wilson to be appropriated (and scorned) by all parts of the ideological spectrum.4 I do not wish to use these pages for this particular debate. My aims are more modest: I want to take stock of the state of the field on the question of why the United States entered the Great War since 1914 and only got caught in a technical casus belli forced Wilson into the war, which ended in a victory that restored the forces of reaction in Europe and crushed American democracy in the process. There was no moment of betrayal at Paris, only the logical unfolding of what came before.15

Revisionism became the dominant strain of American thinking in the 1930s. It was a broad tent, though, and while the progressive left predominated, there were various strains of conservatism within it. The revisionists were attacked, of course, by Wilson’s defenders in the 1930s, notably by Seymour.15 His argument would come to be known simply as the “submarine thesis,” because he asked the simple question: would the United States have gone to war if there had been no submarine warfare? To him the answer was self-evident; but revisionists answered that pro-Entente interests in the United States had forced the Germans into submarine warfare first; even if submarines were a technical casus belli, the United States had been “intervening” in the war since 1914 and only got caught in 1917.

By the mid-1930s this quarrel was taking place against the backdrop of another possible war in Europe. It was thus hard to tell whether the positions taken in the debate were actually about 1917 at all. The two most influential books to emerge were Walter Millis’s Road to War (1935) and Charles Beard’s The Devil Theory of War (1936). Millis was a columnist for the New York Herald Tribune. He wrote that, while American intervention in 1917 may not have been a mistake, it was clear that Wilson had been cornered by a fatal combination of unscrupulous economic interests, Anglophile advisors, and submarine warfare. His book was widely used as the basis for the Neutrality Acts and the Nye Commission, making historians front-line players in foreign policy. For those who wished to keep the Wilsonian flame alive at the outset of the Second World War, the promotion of this view was hardly good news.18

Beard’s slim book was more complex. He rejected the conspiratorial view of intervention but made much of a March 5, 1917 memo from Wilson’s pro-British ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, on the desperate position of Anglo-French finances. The memo was proof that U.S.
interests involved more than submarines; the administration feared an American economic collapse would entrench the Entente capacitulate. Beard needed no cabal of financiers in his version of events, because loans to the British and French sustained the consumption of U.S. goods that was keeping the economy afloat.

Beard’s sense was that the forces that led to belligerency amounted to little more than a desire on the part of American politicians to avoid facing up to a domestic economic crisis.

The Second World War shifted the national mood against any of the arguments that sustained prewar isolationism and toward those positions resolutely supportive of American intervention. Walter Lippmann argued in 1941, before Pearl Harbor, that the United States had always had a “security” interest in the European balance of power. This new “realism” was still accompanied by conflicting interpretations of the decision to intervene in 1917. Lippmann insisted that Wilson was not the naive crusader his critics charged; he understood that the real reason to go to war was to defend the balance of power against German hegemony. On the other hand, Edward M. Earle, George F. Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and Robert E. Osgood started in the late 1940s to argue in classical realist terms that Wilson pursued the right policy (containing Germany) but for the wrong reasons (moralistic reform of an unreformable system). Osgood thought Wilson’s altruistic impulses had “but a tenuous relation to broad and enduring national policy.”

Realism emerged against the backdrop of partisan debates over the Marshall Plan, membership in NATO, and whether a new American internationalism meant a more or less permanent American presence in Europe. It was, in other words, an intervention against the specter of neo-isolationism and the universalist rhetoric that had crept into Harry Truman’s internationalism. Historians were a bit more cautious about reinterpreting 1917: the Second World War may have made the German threat obvious to Americans, but whether they saw Prussian militarism in precisely the same way they saw Nazi (or Soviet) hegemony was another question.

At the height of the 1951 “Great Debate” over Truman’s decision to send U.S. soldiers to be part of a NATO command, Selig Adler offered a historical critique of the revisionist school’s emergence in the 1920s. American intellectuals, he believed, had been swayed by the self-criticism of British and French liberals and socialists (Marx’s grandson, Jean Longuet, among them). He attributed their repudiation of American values and standards to the zeitgeist of the Jazz Age, Freudianism, behavioral psychology and the like. He also noted that most of the revisionists were “amateurs” rather than professional historians (not true of Barnes or Beard, of course). American interwar isolationism should therefore be blamed on the distemper of the left and on shoddy scholarship. It was a cautionary tale for the 1950s.

The Cold War saw a growing interest in Wilson that culminated in 1956, the centennial of his birth. Arthur S. Link’s massive five-volume biography of Wilson was started in 1947 and finished in 1963. Link’s position on intervention began in a revisionist mode, but he soon became more sympathetic to Wilson’s ideals and credited them with a form of “higher realism” all their own. The Cold War demanded strategic sobriety from Americans, but the dramatization of the ideological chasm between communism and capitalism also required a restatement of the principles worth fighting for.

Link was certainly the leader of this interpretive trek. His brief book, Wilson the Diplomatist (1957), argued that the president was neither dreamy nor indifferent to a German victory but rather linked the desire for a permanent reform of the international order to his perception that Germany, more than the Entente powers, was the state most likely to impede this reform. Ideologically, which side won the war did matter. Similarly, Edward H. Beuhrg and Ernest May created a more complex picture of Wilson’s foreign policy apparatus, as did Daniel M. Smith in his study of Robert Lansing. On the question of neutrality, May saw that while “moral” factors played a part in foreign policy decisions, the response to the British differed from the response to the Germans because of national interest: namely, trade. Wilson delayed intervention partly because he hoped the war might end first (and on terms that would obviate the need to endanger the fragile progressive American nation-state with mobilization), partly because he knew U.S. opinion was dangerously divided, and partly because he still hoped he might act as peacemaker. But he knew where America’s interests lay. The very security of the United States rested on constructing a particular form of international economic order that was more compatible with some types of states than others.

May’s multi-national history paralleled Arno Mayer’s Political Origins of the New Diplomacy (1959). While Mayer’s book dealt mostly with wartime decision-making, it connected the war to the currents of unrest that threatened to sweep away the old order. Although the deterministic account of Innenpolitik could be overblown, as it was, for example, in Fritz Fischer’s 1961 account of German war aims, Mayer brought attention to the idea that the “national interest” was contested by different ideological communities in each nation, communities that also had ties to each other. Mayer showed that Wilson’s appropriation of non-annexationist anti-imperialism came from the “parties of movement” in Europe rather than his pious American roots. The new diplomacy was a transnational program of the progressive left.

Mayer’s work dovetailed with other New Left histories that followed the publication of William Appleman Williams’s The Tragedy of American Diplomacy in 1959. The new social movements of the 1960s eventually opened up breathing space for new accounts of American foreign relations. If some of them were clumsy and reductionist, others were innovative and filled critical gaps. There was more attention given to peace movements and war resistance, which in turn allowed scholars to see how anti-militarism at home kept Wilson wary of intervention. It was, however, N. Gordon Levin’s Bancroft award-winning Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (1968) that had the most impact. His book was a deft blend of Williams, Mayer, and Louis Hartz that saw Wilson positioning the United States as the defender of the liberal via media between “autocratic imperialism and revolutionary socialism.” Levin’s rejection of the realist-idealist dichotomy was also provocative: Wilson, he said, had “ideals” that tied constitutionalism to the expansion of capitalism and to American exceptionalism, but he pursued these because he understood that the European order stood on a knife’s edge between a conservative restoration and a radical anti-capitalist alternative.

The role of capitalism posed a challenge for historians with no affinity for the New Left. In 1971, Ross Gregory voiced something of a rough consensus that “national need and interests were such that it was nearly impossible to avoid the problems which led the nation into war.” That economic dependence cut both ways, and no doubt Wilson hoped it might make the British more receptive to his efforts at mediation. John M. Cooper’s look at the House-Grey memorandum from London’s side showed how the financial desperation of the British led Lord Grey to seriously consider Wilson’s mediation. Only preparations for the Somme offensive and fears of appearing weak prevented the Cabinet from acting. But a clearer picture of the private-public dynamic in American neutrality policies was finally emerging. Cooper, again, showed that when the British and French went to the United States in September 1915 to procure a loan, they found American
John A. Thompson’s parsing of the heterogeneous commitments of progressive publicists showed a spectrum of social beliefs that explained the fracturing of progressivism during the war but also helped illustrate why so many of them—even radicals—came to provide critical domestic support for Wilson in 1916–17.44 The “war liberals” were armed with a reform vocabulary for Wilson’s tilt toward belligerency and helped persuade the left wing of the progressives to support the decision. Walter Weyl joked that American peace plans were based on “cornfed, tepid idealism,” which nonetheless was the raw material of national greatness.45 Thompson also tempered but did not wholly abandon Christopher Lasch’s earlier view that progressives were attracted to belligerency by the opportunity for “mastery” that it offered, a rejuvenating will-to-power that appeared in their arguments. Roosevelt’s was perhaps the most extreme version of the idea that the war could serve as an antidote to American softness, but traces of it, in less overtly masculinized form, could be found in the *New Republic* and elsewhere.

All of this is to say that social and cultural history were slowly shedding light on the entanglement of meaning with material life, forcing a number of historians to reconsider how to understand international history. The cultural turn would not be embraced by all diplomatic historians, by any means, but methodological challenges since the 1960s were producing casualties. Thompson had come to believe that the realist-idealist dichotomy, a descendant of the overcharged rhetoric that emerged from European intellectuals during the peace process, was dead and buried. He was more attracted to Buehrig’s idea that Wilson’s policies were reactive and that the grand ideas attributed to him and judged to be somehow metaphysically preordained were borrowed, provisional, or developed with imperfect knowledge of the world. Thompson summed it up this way: Wilson was driven by the need to reconcile the internal forces of pluralism in America with the pressures exerted by the war and by the way the war posed real challenges to the continuation of the American way of life.46

This complex view of Wilson was lost in the triumphalism of the Cold War. The 1990s may have been a decade of foreign policy uncertainty, but they generated overly schematic interest in Wilson’s internationalism. This was, after all, the age of “democratic peace theory.”47 Ironically, Lloyd Ambrosius, the most rigorous realist critic of Wilson, opened the decade with a dismissive brief on liberal internationalism that juxtaposed the president’s liberal, anti-autocratic idealism with the pluralist reality of the world.48 To this, one of Link’s students, Thomas Knock, had a ready reply: none other than George Kennan himself, Knock reported in 1991, described Wilson as “ahead of his time.”49 Knock then produced the most important study of the decade, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (1992). He placed Wilson’s foreign policy less in the exigencies of the war, less still in a realist/idealist struggle, and more in the Progressive Era’s “search for order.” The rhetoric of mission was neither new nor unique, and so Knock looked for the development of Wilson’s ideas in the cleavages of progressive politics and in his courtship of the liberal left after 1914. It was from them that Wilson acquired his “progressive internationalism,” a theory that connected interstate peace to social justice and industrial democracy.50

This idea was in fact a revival of a notion from the 1960s: values in some sense constituted material interests. Enter Frank Ninkovich’s two books, *Modernity and Power* (1994) and *The Wilsonian Century* (1999).51 Ninkovich audaciously described Wilson as an anxious modernizer who struggled against the “normal internationalism” of the nineteenth century. “As the war’s dangers became clear, Wilson closed the gap between self-interest and selflessness by tying his supranationalism closely to the imperative of survival.”52

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Ninkovich anchored this argument in a rejection of the idea that material security and national ideational values are ontologically different. Ideologies are not epiphenomenal but are the very stuff that gives meaning to materiality. This interpretation made Wilson both more important and more prophetic.

The lauding of liberal internationalism—all very fin-de-la-guerre-froide—was probably too hasty, but its theoretical reorientation toward transatlantic histories of what Daniel Rodgers called progressive “social politics” was overdue. Some of that potential was derailed again by debates over American empire in the aftermath of 9/11. The turn of the century had softened the teleological certainty of democratic peace theory, but there was still more disputation about what Wilsonianism really meant. Most of it was quite partisan and had little new to say about the decision to bring the United States into the First World War.53

The disillusionment some Americans felt about the Bush administration’s open-ended conception of globalization may have contributed to a rejuvenation of the realists. Since 2007, three new studies of American neutrality policy were published, two by self-identified realists. Robert W. Tucker’s Wilson and the Great War (2007) argued that America’s neutrality policy was flawed because of Wilson’s particular design of it, not because of German policy.54 Ironically, this was a position that could have given support to the old revisionists. In 2007, political scientist Benjamin O. Fordham reexamined America’s export trade and congressional voting patterns during the war and, in a conclusion that was consistent with liberal interdependence theory, declared that economic ties shaped American politicians’ views of the war, just as they drove the Germans toward submarine warfare.55

Ross Kennedy emerged as a new voice in the field with an important essay in 2001 and a monograph in 2009 that showed the influence of Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism.56 Kennedy agreed that Wilson was “realistic” enough to recognize Germany as a security menace to the United States, but because the president thought the answer was to remove structural anarchy, he articulated unrealistic war aims that were doomed to failure and set in motion an commitment to globalization that produced the very militarism at home that he and his allies wanted to avoid.57 In his 2009 book, Kennedy identified three different tendencies dominating American thinking: liberal internationalism, Atlanticism, and pacifism. (Thompson developed a similar classification earlier; so did Priscilla Roberts, in a series of articles written between 1997 and 2005).58 Kennedy believed Wilson’s justification for engagement in Europe was an unsustainable paradox: he felt that the United States had to use power politics to end power politics. True enough, but the paradox created by the realist security dilemma (in which the pursuit of security by one nation or group of nations undermines everyone’s security) was equally insurmountable. Kennedy may also have overstated the divisions among internationalists, Atlanticists, and pacifists. One has only to look at Christopher Nichols’s intellectual history of the “isolationism” at the beginning of the twentieth century, which was a veritable histoire croisée of different ways to conceive of internationalism and isolationism.59

One could also challenge the degree to which Wilson had a coherent vision of a new diplomacy to replace the old. If he was critical of the balance of power, he merely shared the opinion of most Americans at the time.60 Here again Thompson’s cautionary account of Wilsonianism as a “conflicted concept” should remind us of how much of Wilson’s policy was ad hoc and in need of proper historicizing. And how much it drew on non-American sources. If I fault Kennedy for anything, it is the extent to which his survey is grounded in the view from the White House, a tendency that reinforces the exceptionalism he faults in Wilson.

In 2011, Justus Doenecke, one of the best-known historians of mid-century American anti-interventionism and another student of Link’s, promised a “new history of American entry into World War I.” Giving deep attention to public opinion and creating rich profiles of key decision-makers, Doenecke’s book repeats the anti-realist position that Wilson’s insulated mind roughly reflected American opinion.61

So where are we now? There is, thankfully in my view, no final consensus on the causes of American intervention. Realists, liberals, and radicals continue to disagree, even if we have a richer empirical foundation for that disagreement. The reasons for these divisions are not hard to fathom. Aside from the diverse ideological commitments we take to our reading of documents, the meaning of past events is invariably filtered through the question of “what happened next.” We intuitively engage in a genealogical (even idolatrous) quest for the origins of our present condition, and as that condition changes, our genealogy takes different shapes.

I would, however, like to offer these two broad observations that engage what I think is the main theoretical architecture of this literature and the ways in which, perhaps, its foundations can be more explicitly debated.

**Culture, Psychology, and Unspoken Assumptions**

The literature on American intervention has not, to my mind, fully explored the possibilities of James Joll’s discussion of the “unspoken assumptions” of 1914.62 With some important exceptions (I would include Beard, May, Mayer, Levin, Thompson, and Ninkovich), the debates here have been traditional in method—driven by the normative impulse to try to locate American foreign policy in a single tradition that stems from or rebels against Wilson. This ideological investment in the meaning of intervention as a kind of instruction for future citizens and policymakers naturally lends itself to narrative history as well as to judgments about individual leaders (to retain the virtues of agency) and lessons to be learned. There are always traces of nationalist commitment in such efforts, which makes a transnational or post-national history harder to articulate.

The literature also tends to toward a de-historicized account of the era. We need to trace carefully how this era was structured by normalized (and transnational) assumptions about racial hierarchy, civilization, progress, order, science, and manliness.63 It is not that these ideas were hidden or unspoken, but we don’t yet know how to make them causative in understanding international politics, even though it is precisely the instinctive, taken-for-granted, assumptions about reality that make all the difference to behavior. The history of Wilson’s foreign policy, for example, has been notably silent on the structuring role of gender. A number of works talk about romanticism, strength, or honor but manage to avoid locating these in the sexual binaries of the age. Such binaries were everywhere, so common, indeed so normal, that many historians continue to believe that the absence of women in international affairs is actually proof of the irrelevance of gender rather than gender per excellence. Yet in one of his 1971 essays, Arthur Link furiously rejected (and rightly so) the Freud-Bullitt psychological biography that described Wilson as “underscored” and characterized by “feminine passivity.” Link’s apoplectic reply was that “Wilson was in fact extremely virile . . . [his] sexual drive was probably primarily responsible for his tremendous inner drive and burning intensity.”64 One hardly knows where to begin with this gem, but clearly, even for so detached a scholar as Link, the relationship between masculinity and idealism was a subject of grave concern. The suggestion that Wilson...
was anything less than virile was a charge that had to be answered. Why it had to be answered was another one of those unspoken assumptions.

The word “honor” was also frequently invoked, of course, by partisans in the pre-intervention debate, but its heuristic meaning has been insufficiently studied by American historians. It had, at the time, clear links to the fluid standards of manliness and masculinity. A little text-mining of Wilson’s statements would likely reveal a fairly steady diet of references to self-control. On August 3, 1914, for example, while his wife was dying, Wilson told the press that he wanted “to have the pride of feeling that America, if nobody else, has her self-possession.”66 His August 19, 1914 message to Congress urging impartiality spoke of the “fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action.”67 In speaking to the Associated Press after the March 28, 1915 sinking of the Falaba, he said that he was “interested in neutrality because there is something so much greater to do than fight; there is a distinction waiting for this Nation that no nation has ever got. That is the distinction of absolute self-control and self-mastery.”67 Self-possession was one of Wilson’s favorite character traits, and it carried with it a conception of manhood that he wished to see incorporated into America’s global image.

More could be done along these lines, then, to deepen our understanding of both culture (collective meaning) and cognitive psychology (individual meaning). Seven years ago, Samuel Williamson and Ernest May wrote a brilliant cognitive psychology (individual meaning). Seven years into America’s global image. Wilson’s favorite character traits, and it carried with it a conception of manhood that he wished to see incorporated into America’s global image.

International and Transnational Histories

The most compelling histories, to my mind, have been those that show the role played by socio-political forces within the nation-state and the way leaders defined the national interest in light of those forces. The literature on the outbreak of the First World War has long debated the role of those forces and arrived at no conclusive agreement.70 But the difference between studies that look at the distant consequences for what Americans defined as the national interest and demonstrating it through the moment of crisis in which the old diplomacy (with elites defining the national interest and demonstrating it through the will to power and secret diplomacy) was being attacked from within. In my view, the realist account is weakest on this question. Because they viewed power politics as a timeless, invariant feature of international affairs rather than a historically contingent one (what Alexander Wendt would call one of many “cultures of anarchy”),71 the realists imagined, like some Metternichian ghost, that resistance to this democratization could somehow be sustained without consequences for what Americans defined as the national interest. Mayer in particular made the case that diplomatic history had to be understood as a dialectic between inside and outside; that the real issue of the war was not German war guilt but the forces of revolution and counter-revolution that had been building in the late nineteenth century and were unleashed by the demands and the violence of the war. Situating American intervention in the confluence of these transnational streams of social conflict would, I think, help us better understand the meaning of Wilsonianism.

Notes:

5. The debates on intervention have been situated in other currents of professional history in both Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge, 1988) and Jerald Combs’s American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations (Berkeley, 1983), as I note below.


10. Albert J. Nock, The Myth of a Guilty Nation (New York, 1922); John Kenneth Turner, Shall It Be Again? (New York, 1922). Nock had worked for The Nation during the war and was a founding editor of the eclectric postwar journal The Freeman, which Turner published. Nock’s intellectual odyssey took him from Henry George socialism to libertarianism.

11. If this seemed an extreme view for those who lived through the war, Denna Fleming’s 1940 review of the debate reminded his readers of his foreign policy and that Wilson had been only barely concealed. He described Turner’s book as a “faithful reflection, from the radical side, of the wrath which had swirled around Wilson during the election of 1920.” Denna Frank Fleming, “Our Entry in the World War in 1917: The Revised Version,” Journal of Politics 2 (Feb. 1940): 75–86.

12. Hans J. Morgenthau, “Seven Herbs of History against the Germans,” New Republic 38 (1924): “Assessing the Blame for the World War,” Current History 20 (1924): 171–95; and The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt (New York, 1926). Barnes’s book was given rough treatment by University of Michigan historian and veteran of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace Ernest S. Van Alstyne in the American Historical Review 32, 2 (January, 1927): 319–31. The formidable edifice of documentary evidence Barnes marshaled was also rejected by fellow historian Bernadotte Schmitt, who, had served in the war and been a Rhodes Scholar, argued that the structure of two coalitions and the incipient influence of military cliques turned defensive alliances into a conversation of bluff and counterbluff that the opportunistic militarists took advantage of. Because these militarists were more at work in Germany than elsewhere, the lion’s share of blame rested with Berlin. Schmitt published this view in The Coming of the War, 1914 (New York, 1930) but presented it at an AHA meeting in December 1923 and published it in early form in “The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902–1914,” American Historical Review 40 (1935): 449–73.

13. Grattan, Why We Fought (New York, 1929). The role of propaganda was also explored by Harold Laswell, Propaganda Techniques in the World War (New York, 1927) and James D. Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in the United States from 1914–1917 (Cambridge, MA, 1935). The financial ties that drew the United States out of neutrality and toward a material interest in the Entente were studied by Richard W. Van Alstyne, Private American Loans to the Allies, 1914–1916, Pacific Historical Review 2 (June 1933): 180–193.

14. Frederick Bausman, Facing Europe (New York, 1926) and Charles Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938). Tansill was best known for Back Door to War (1932), a critique of Franklin Roosevelt’s foreign policy. He was less hard on Wilson and Tansill instead saw the lurking figure of Secretary of State Robert Lansing assiduously working to limit the president’s options. Tansill was also a southern segregationist of Irish descent, a contributor to the John Birch Society, and founder of the International Association for the Advancement of Ethnology and Eugenics. He was relieved from his academic posts for his pro-Nazi statements.


18. A poll by George Gallup (whose company was then called the American Institute of Public Opinion) taken on the twentieth anniversary of the intervention found that 70 percent of respondents thought it had been a mistake for the United States to enter the war. Gallup said in 1939 that “this conviction has been the great master principle of the post-war period in the United States.” Fleming, “Our Entry in the World War in 1917: The Revised Version,” 75–86.


27. The centenary of Wilson’s birth generated a flurry of biographies that looked at the president’s mental constitution. The picture was decidedly mixed, as one might expect, with John Garraty and John Morton Blum’s short introductions drawing on psychological insights to suggest that Wilson was rigid and lacking in realism but in the end siding with Seymour’s submarine thesis as the 1918: 120; 1939: 24. Nock, The Devil Theory of War, 1939 Is Not 1914. Millis, Road to War (New York, 1935). The first volume of Waldorfs’s book won the Pulitzer Prize for Biography in 1959.


33. Roberta Alberti Dayer, “Strange Bedfellows: J.P. Morgan & Co., Whitehead, and the Wilson Administration during World War I,” Business History 18 (July 1976): 14–35. Edward Parsons contended that the United States deliberately withheld its intervention to prevent a decisive Allied victory that might shut the United States out of the postwar economic order the Entente powers were planning. Edward B. Parsons, Wilsonian Diplomacy: Allied-American Rivalries in War and Peace (St. Louis, 1978). Jeffrey Salford’s history of the dramatic rebuilding of America’s merchant marine under Wilson and McAdoo also showed that the administration was conscious of what was at stake economically for the United States and that national mission and national interest went hand in hand. In 1914, only 10 percent of U.S. trade was carried by American merchant ships. From 1915 to 1918, the government rebuilt the merchant marine by leasing American shipping from Britain, leaving Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy, 1913–1921 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1978).


38. Kathleen Burkh, Britain, America and the Sineius of War, 1914–1918 (Boston, 1985).


41. Robert Dallek, for example, postulated that the heating up of domestic anxiety about American democracy made promoting democracy abroad a way of bolstering the nation’s internal self-confidence. This was interpretively unstable ground for sure, but its orientation toward cultural context was promising. See “The Progressive Era’s Foreign Policy: Woodrow Wilson,” in Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (New York, 1983).


43. The theme of masculinity, fin-de-siècle cultural anxiety, and imperialism would be best developed by Kristin Hoganson’s groundbreaking Fighting American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, 2000). There is, as yet, no equivalent study of Wilson and the First World War.

45. Ibid., 127.


56. Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism emphasizes the structural constraints of international anarchy on state behavior. States, the theory claims, are functionally undifferentiated and are therefore only different from each other because of their unequal capabilities. Power, in other words, is the only thing that affects the balance sheet of a state’s calculations in an anarchic environment. This parsimonious model was influenced by macroeconomic theory and market behavior rather than essentialist assumptions about the immorality of human nature. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, 1979), “Realist thought and neo-realist theory,” Journal of International Affairs 44, 1 (spring/summer 1990): 21–37.


60. See the H-Diplo roundtable at http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-10.pdf; and Kendrick Clements’ review in Reviews in History (December 2009), http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/843.

61. We have also been provided in the past year with A. Scott Berg’s new biography. It is a great read by a celebrated biographer, but it does not deviate from the conventional wisdom. His account of the final decision for war follows what previous biographers have said: in its first meeting after the inauguration and in the wake of the first Russian Revolution and the Zimmermann telegram, the Cabinet was united; even Secretary of the Navy Joseph Daniels, a pacifist, supported a declaration of war. Berg’s position is similar to Wilson’s: he believes that by March 1917, the president could see no alternative. A. Scott Berg, Woodrow Wilson, (New York, 2013). 430–38.


63. Still less often do we as scholars take account of our own unspoken assumptions in that same reflexive way, as we decide what we see and don’t see in the traces of the historical record, what counts as evidence and what does not. Finding assumptions that are “unspoken” requires an ontological leap.

64. Arthur S. Link, The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays (Nashville, 1971), 149.


69. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185, 4157 (September 27, 1974): 1124–131. Kahneman also co-wrote with Jonathan Renshon a contribution to foreign policy discussions in 2007 (“Why Hawks Win,” Foreign Policy [Jan/Feb. 2007]) claiming that preexisting psychological biases in human cognition tend to favor hawkishness in ways that make “starting wars easier than it should be.” Their argument is not that suspicion and conflicting interests are not real, but that psychological biases tend not to allow decision-makers to fully understand the objective conditions of the dispute. They respond, instead, according to preset psychological pathways.


David S. Painter

The period covered by this volume witnessed significant changes in the world oil economy. The sharp rise in the price of oil in international markets from $1.80 per barrel in 1969 to $11.65 a barrel in 1974 (prices in current dollars) was the most noticeable change, but three other related changes were equally if not more important. First, the disappearance of spare productive capacity in the United States meant that the United States could no longer supply its allies as well as itself during supply interruptions, ending what had been an important element in U.S. influence in international affairs. Second, the major exporting countries began taking over ownership of their oil industry and establishing national oil companies, a process largely completed by the end of the decade. Full ownership of all aspects of their oil industries gave producing countries greater control over such factors as the pace of development of their reserves, the rate of production, and the destination of their exports. Third, instability in the Middle East, rising economic nationalism, the decline of British power, and the changing dynamics of the Cold War raised questions about the ability of the West to maintain access to Middle Eastern oil.

The 362 well-chosen documents in this volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States series illuminate the events, the decisions, and, to a lesser extent, the processes that drove these changes. The profusion of documents from the Nixon Presidential Materials collection reflects the growing influence of the White House, and especially the National Security Council.

The volume covers a wide range of topics and countries. This review can only focus on a few of the key issues, however, so many interesting topics will not be discussed, such as Venezuelan oil developments, U.S. energy relations with Canada, and a possible deal with the Soviet Union involving liquefied natural gas. Researchers should also note that there are documents relating to the ability of the West to maintain access to Middle East oil that are in other volumes of the FRUS series.

In February 1969, President Richard Nixon appointed a task force to carry out a comprehensive review of the decade-old Mandatory Oil Import Program, which set quotas on oil imports. Changing the program raised major domestic political problems, pitting independent oil companies and the major oil producing states against the petrochemical industry, independent refiners, and consumers, especially in New England, where oil was widely used for heating as well as for transportation (3, 33). There were also international concerns: Canada and Mexico wanted to preserve their special access to U.S. markets, and Venezuela and Iran argued that they also deserved special treatment (16). A majority of the task force recommended replacing the existing oil import quota system with a system of preferential tariffs favoring Canada and other Western Hemisphere producers. A December 1969 memorandum from the president to his assistant for domestic affairs, John Ehrlichman, suggests that Nixon decided to defer a decision on the issue for domestic political reasons (22).

Oil imports made up 22.6 percent of the U.S. oil supply in 1969, and the issue of dependence on foreign sources of oil raised questions about the security of supplies for the United States and its allies. An August 1969 study by the Central Intelligence Agency noted that “the most likely source of a serious disruption of world oil supplies that would affect US access to oil” was the Arab world, which produced over half of the oil moving in world trade. Arab states would probably attempt to deny oil to the United States in the event of another Arab-Israeli war, and most major Arab oil exporting states were “susceptible to domestic strife.” Nevertheless, the report concluded that it was “highly unlikely that the US would encounter serious difficulties in obtaining its foreign oil requirements over the next 10 to 20 years” (8).

In September 1969, a military coup in Libya replaced the conservative regime of King Idris with a radical nationalist regime led by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. The new regime demanded higher prices for Libyan oil and a greater share of company profits. Libyan oil was favorably located in relation to oil markets in Western Europe and the United States, and its low sulfur content and high API gravity (the oil density standard set by the American Petroleum Institute), better than most crude oil from the Persian Gulf, made it more especially valuable to refiners.

After months of difficult negotiations, the companies gave in to Libyan demands. There was little excess capacity in world oil markets; and high tanker rates stemming from the continued closure of the Suez Canal, the shutdown of the Trans-Arabian pipeline that carried around 12 percent of Saudi production to the Mediterranean, and the on-going dispute between Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company, which limited the flow of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean, gave Libyan oil a considerable transportation advantage. Libya also possessed sufficient financial reserves to do without oil revenues for an extended period of time. In these circumstances U.S. policymakers were reluctant to force a showdown with Libya that could result in a disruption of world oil supplies and/or nationalization of U.S. firms (45, 50, 51, 55, 59, 61, 64).

The Libyan success emboldened other members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to demand price and tax increases. In response, the oil companies decided to present a united front to OPEC. Under the guidance of oil company counsel John J. McClcy, and in cooperation with the Departments of State and Justice, the companies informed OPEC that they would negotiate only if the settlement covered all companies and all countries. The Justice Department issued business review letters permitting U.S. companies to take collective action without violating the antitrust laws, and
the companies operating in Libya signed an agreement pledging to support each other in case of cutbacks by Libya (65, 66).

Analyses prepared by the State Department and the NSC staff concluded, however, that it was not clear if the companies could win a confrontation with the producing countries and warned that adopting a strong position in favor of the companies could further erode the U.S. position in the Middle East. Moreover, to an extent, higher oil prices were in the U.S. economic interest. The United States was a major oil producer and home to five of the seven great international oil companies (the so-called Seven Sisters), so higher prices benefited some sectors of the U.S. economy. As far as U.S. companies with production in OPEC countries were concerned, higher oil prices were not a problem as long as they applied to all companies. Higher oil prices for Western Europe and Japan would also reduce the economic advantage over the United States they had enjoyed as a result of low oil prices. Finally, the companies were not opposed to higher prices so long as they could achieve some assurance of stability (68, 69, 80).

National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger warned Nixon that if the companies held the line against Libyan OPEC demands, the producers might shut down production. Libya, in particular, would probably cut off oil exports and could be joined by Iraq and possibly other Arab states. A Libyan-Iraqi shutdown would cause significant oil shortages in Europe. The United States no longer had the spare capacity to help compensate for a cut-off of oil supplies to Europe and could free oil for Europe only by rationing oil domestically. Disruptions in oil supply could also damage the international economy, lead to the nationalization of U.S. oil company holdings, impair European security, and increase pressure on the United States to change its policies toward Israel. In addition, the Europeans might try to head off shortages by striking government-to-government deals with Libya, at the expense of U.S. and British companies (73).

Reinforcing this message, the shah of Iran told U.S. envoy John Irwin II that that it would not be possible for Iran and the other Persian Gulf producers to dictate terms to Venezuela or the radical Arab producers and therefore negotiations with the Persian Gulf producers should be held separately from those with Mediterranean producers (Libya, Algeria, and Iraq; the latter delivered some most of its oil exports to the Mediterranean by pipeline). The Saudis agreed with the shah's position, and the Mediterranean producers, led by Libya, refused to negotiate until after the negotiations with the Persian Gulf producers were concluded (74, 75, 81, 82). Therefore, the Nixon administration decided to accept separate negotiations.

Negotiations between the companies and the Persian Gulf producers resulted in a price increase of 35 cents a barrel, a tax rate of 55 percent, and regular increases in prices between 1971 and 1975 to offset inflation. In April, the Mediterranean producers and the companies signed an agreement that raised prices an additional 90 cents per barrel for the Mediterranean producers. A month later, Nigeria, which had recently joined OPEC, received terms similar to those the Mediterranean producers got. 4

In addition to prices and taxes, OPEC countries began to assert themselves on questions of ownership and control. In 1968, OPEC adopted a resolution declaring that producing countries had the right to participate in the ownership of their oil. At the end of July 1971, Venezuela passed a Hydrocarbons Reversion Law, which provided for an immediate increase in government control of the oil companies and for a complete government takeover of the oil industry when the companies’ concessions expired in the 1980s. In September, OPEC called for member countries to begin negotiations with the oil companies on the question of participation in the ownership of their oil operations (91, 143).

The oil companies and the U.S. government viewed participation as little more than negotiated nationalization, but there was little the United States, Britain, or the oil companies could do to oppose it (98, 112). Negotiations went slowly until actions by Algeria, Libya, and Iraq provided an indication of what non-negotiated nationalization would entail. Algeria had nationalized 51 percent of the assets of the French oil companies operating in Algeria’s oil industry in February 1971, and in December, Libya nationalized British Petroleum’s holdings in retaliation for Britain’s alleged role in permitting Iran to seize islands in the Persian Gulf. In June 1972, after an eleven-year dispute, Iraq nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company.

The Iraqi nationalization, in particular, convinced the companies to reach an agreement. In October 1972, the Arab Gulf states and the oil companies signed a General Agreement on Participation that provided for 25 percent government participation to take effect on January 1, 1973, with scheduled increases leading to 51 percent government ownership by the beginning of 1982. The agreement compensated the companies on the basis of updated book value and guaranteed them the right to purchase most of the production of the oil that now belonged to the governments. Iran, which had technically owned its own oil industry since 1951, reached an agreement with the consortium in the spring of 1973 that provided for Iranian management and control of the industry, with the companies continuing to provide operating services and purchasing the bulk of Iranian production at prices equal to those received by the other Gulf states. Not to be outdone, the Libyan government nationalized 51 percent of all the companies operating in Libya in August and September 1973 (124, 130, 131, 134, 170).

In a widely circulated paper not printed in this volume, James Akins, head of the State Department Office of Fuels and Energy, argued that the world oil economy had entered a “seller’s market” and that the best short-term policy was to allow prices to rise and gradually cede control over ownership in order to forestall the use of oil as a political weapon and avoid a cut-off of oil supplies. Accommodating the producing countries would also buy time until the United States could develop alternative sources of oil and thus lessen OPEC’s leverage. Although higher oil prices could feed inflation and slow economic growth, they could also stimulate increased investment and production, especially in such high-cost areas as Alaska, off-shore fields, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the North Sea, and eventually make the West less dependent on Middle East oil. Higher oil prices could also encourage conservation, increased efficiency in oil use, and increased utilization of alternative sources of energy such as coal and nuclear power. 7 Secretary of State William P. Rogers sent Nixon a draft of Akins’ study in March 1972 (16).

A July 1972 NSC memo responding to the Akins study warned that the changes in the balance of power between oil producers and oil consumers had the potential to become a security problem. The Arab states were gaining the ability to apply “serious pressure” on U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict; in particular, they were building up the financial capacity to sustain a total embargo over a long period. 8 The memo recommended giving top priority “to addressing the overall foreign policy ramifications of oil policy.” Some NSC staff members were opposed to action at the time, however, and Nixon and Kissinger were preoccupied with other matters such as the Vietnam War, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the opening to China. As a result, Nixon did not approve a study of oil issues until March 1973 (127, note 5; 171).
In May, while the NSC was preparing its study, the CIA issued a National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum concluding that although "there probably will be some small interruptions of oil supply during the 1970s . . . a major and sustained embargo on oil shipments by the Arab states working in concert is highly unlikely" (185, emphasis added). The NSC study, NSM 174: "National Security and U.S. Energy Policy," was completed in August. It warned that increasing oil imports made the United States increasingly vulnerable to short-term supply interruptions. While the United States could still meet its military needs for oil, a sharp reduction in oil supplies caused by war in the Middle East or "a politically motivated decision" to embargo oil shipments to the United States could cause severe economic problems.

NSC staff memos on NSM 174 noted that growing frustration among the Arabs over lack of progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, pressure from radical Arab states, or a radical takeover of Saudi Arabia or another Gulf state could result in the use of oil as a political weapon to force a change in U.S. policies toward Israel. To avoid this situation, the United States had to "show some movement on the Arab-Israeli problem" and try harder to accommodate the security and economic concerns of the "moderate" Arabs. The "overriding concern" should be to prevent Saudi Arabia from becoming radicalized or "falling under the control of a Qaddafi" (192, 193).

The volume documents increasing indications that the Saudis were becoming more and more upset about U.S. policy on the Arab-Israeli dispute. It contains examples of warnings by Saudi officials that unless the United States put pressure on Israel to reach a settlement with the Arab states, Saudi Arabia would be forced to use its oil resources as a political weapon (176, 178, 183, 199). The volume also includes documents showing that some high Saudi officials undercut those warnings by giving assurances that the kingdom would not use oil as a weapon against the United States (181, 189, 197).

Over one-third of the volume documents the U.S. response to the oil embargo and production cuts imposed by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in October 1973. It is important to emphasize that the production cutbacks and embargo were undertaken by OAPEC, not OPEC. Non-Arab members of OPEC, such as Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia, did not cut back production or embargo shipments to the United States and the Netherlands. Calling the embargo "the OPEC embargo," as is common in both scholarly and popular studies, obscures the specific political circumstances that led to it.

One of the more controversial issues covered in the volume is U.S. military intervention against the Arab oil producers. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and National Security Advisor Kissinger both made public statements of military options. Kissinger, who also became secretary of state in September, wrote in his memoirs that "these were not empty threats" and that contingency plans were prepared. Schlesinger later told interviewers that the United States planned to make use of already scheduled military exercises in the Persian Gulf as a cover for intervention in Abu Dhabi.

The volume contains several documents where the possibility of intervention is mentioned (229, 247, 251, 253), and there is an extensive editorial note (244) on the issue. Also included is a heavily redacted NSC memorandum, dated 30 November (255), that summarized a CIA study of U.S. options for ending the Saudi oil embargo and probably included military options.

The British government took Schlesinger's statements seriously and commissioned a study on the possibility of the United States using force against Arab oil producers. The study concluded that if the United States intervened before exhausting all possibilities of a peaceful settlement, the consequences for European interests would be "disastrous," especially if the intervention curtailed rather than expanded access to oil.

In the end, the United States did not take military action, probably because analyses indicated that military action would probably result in destruction of the oil facilities they were trying to control. The Saudis made it clear that, if attacked, they would destroy their oil facilities, thus denying the West access to their oil for many years. In addition, most European countries would have opposed the use of force except as a last resort.

The volume also contains several documents that demonstrate that the United States sought to use the oil crisis as a way to regain leverage over Western Europe and Japan. A June 1973 NSC paper had pointed out that U.S. leverage in energy matters stemmed from its economic and political influence with Saudi Arabia and Iran, two of the richest oil exporters; its lead in most fields of energy-related technology; and its status as the only major consumer nation with significant domestic oil resources (187). Similarly, NSC studies in August and early October called for the United States to capitalize on energy-related issues to gain leverage over its allies (193, 208).

During the crisis, the State Department Policy Planning Staff pointed out that the United States, as the only major Western country that could not be shut down by an oil embargo, had an opportunity to "revitalize" its alliances (256). What "revitalize" meant is clear from an NSC memorandum written in early December 1973, which noted that "the unique role of the U.S. in the current oil crisis and in the longer term oil situation gives us some leverage with the Europeans. We have the power to make their oil situation better or worse" (261). A National Intelligence Estimate made similar points (262).

Most European countries, including the United Kingdom, recognized what the United States was doing. In addition, most viewed the crisis as the result of U.S. policies. Most, however, with the significant exception of France, went along with U.S. plans to establish a consumer group to balance the power of the producers.

The documents also trace Kissinger's efforts to convince the Saudis to end the embargo by working for ceasefire agreements between Israel and Egypt and Syria. A telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger on 11 March suggests that they saw such measures as a way to influence Saudi oil policies. Most Arab states agreed to end the embargo on 18 March. On that same day the Saudis announced that they would immediately increase oil production by one million barrels a day. Syria and Israel signed a ceasefire agreement on 31 May.

The last section of the volume deals mostly with the economic impact of higher oil prices, especially on oil-importing developing countries (346, 351, 356). There are also documents that illustrate the differences between the shah and the Saudis on oil prices (353, 360, 361).

FRUS volumes are not a substitute for archival research (though they are an invaluable guide to archival sources) or a firm command of the secondary literature. Nevertheless, this outstanding volume demonstrates why FRUS remains an indispensable resource for serious students of international relations. By making a wide variety of well-

Christopher R. W. Dietrich

This FRUS volume, edited by Steven Galpern, covers U.S. foreign policy from August 1974 to January 1981. Through a mélange of memoranda, minutes, policy papers, and telegrams, the superb collection reconstructs the various and often disjointed strategies employed to mitigate the damage of rising oil prices to the U.S. and global economy. The decision to traverse presidential administrations is a good one, because it allows readers to reflect on the continuities that swirl beneath the umbrella of the “energy crisis.”

The decision by the State Department historians to so designate this volume may seem strange to some. After all, a number of scholars, following in the footsteps of MIT economist Morris Adelman, who in 1974 likened the oil price increases to “the sound of one hand clapping,” have recently argued that no crisis existed. Social theorist Timothy Mitchell discusses “the crisis that never happened,” geographer Matthew Huber emphasizes its “qualitative,” and “refined” nature, and Middle East historian Toby Jones writes that “the initial shock” of high prices wore off quickly for U.S. officials. The crisis deniers may be right on the technical level of supply and demand, although many economists disagree. For diplomatic historians concerned with the opinions and policies formed within the Ford and Carter administrations, crisis denial makes a subtler point. An impersonal emphasis on economic strictures cannot explain the crisis or the shadow it cast. An economist definition of the crisis marginalizes the politics so central to it.

A “Psychologically-Induced Shortage”

Energy Crisis makes it clear that emotion and psychology are central to understanding the mentality that performed and often drove U.S. policy towards oil prices. In this case, the political psychology of emotion cuts in at least two different directions: first as a category of analysis and second as a strategy.

High oil prices led to what Joseph Nye called in 1980 a new “rhetoric of energy security,” which confirmed a collective anxiety about the status of the international economy. The emotive thrust is most viscerally revealed in sentiments expressed by Henry Kissinger. The weight of his personality dominates the first half of the volume—whether he is carping about the “feckless and gutless” Saudis, proposing the Egyptians use stones from the pyramids to dam the Nile, calling Zbigniew Brzezinski a “total whore,” or dealing with substantive concerns (2, 56, 95). His bombast turns agonistic over and over again, especially when he invokes the future well-being of the West. Expensive oil narrowed “opportunities for governments to control their countries’ own political and economic destiny,” he wrote the Japanese, British, and French foreign ministers in 1974 (18). The crisis threatened to cause “the moral and political disintegration of the West,” he told the French foreign minister (24).

Others shared this sentiment. “Since it is a matter of psychological confidence, there is no such thing as a moderate increase,” Alan Greenspan said in 1976 (112). The Iran shortfall after December 1978 threatened a “more serious, psychologically-induced shortage,” Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger warned (181). That the psychological aspect of the crisis was so discernable indicates its strategic value, and emotion was used as a diplomatic weapon of various degrees of bluntness.

In their most incisive moments, policymakers pitted the “theological,” “irrational,” and “demagogic appeals” of the oil producers against their own more sober assessments (41, 47, 53). Most often, those assessments responded to the universal values of the free market. High oil prices were “not the result of economic factors . . . the free play of supply and demand,” Kissinger told the UN General Assembly in 1974 (8). The “irresponsible behavior of OPEC” was little more than the “repeated distortion of the world’s economic structure,” another official wrote in 1977 (116). “The 1973-1974 oil embargo and massive price increase which followed, caused a major global economic disruption,” Brzezinski told Carter (121).

This dramatic dialectic identified “OPEC unilateralism” as an illiberal bogeyman, a negative counter-image of the free market. American policy not only demonized OPEC, it also made the parallel argument that the “free market” was the only rational system capable of meeting the challenges of the new global economy. William Simon, the ideologically driven Treasury secretary who later coined the term “conservative counterintelligentsia,” was more rabid than any other administration official on this point. “[P]rices will come down soon, if we just let the market work,” he told Kissinger on one occasion. When Kissinger questioned his analysis, the response was simple: “Well, there’s a lot of oil in the world” (39). It was this faith in the market that led British Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey to
complain that Simon was “far to the right of Genghis Kahn and totally devoted to the freedom of markets.”

But Simon was not alone. Many others accused OPEC of skewing the “the objective conditions for equilibrium in the oil market” (56). Its December 1976 decision to increase prices—“citing artificial economic justifications and ignoring the destructive consequences of their actions”—reflected a lack of “international responsibility,” Gerald Ford said (113). “The OPEC cartel pushed prices far beyond the level that economics would dictate,” Kissinger told a group of congressmen in June 1975. The price rise was the result of a “political decision made possible by the cohesion of the oil producers group” (65). Price increases were “unwarranted by market conditions and harmful to the world economy,” Cyrus Vance wrote in a 1977 démarche (136).

Such public and private rhetoric about “universal economic goals” skimmed over a more complex reality, one that is most evident in discussions about U.S. currency depreciation and the potential for a “serious attack on the dollar” (178, 148, 153, 161). Those conversations capture an insecurity that had begun to permeate American economic culture long before the price increases, resulting largely from problems with the American balance of payments and, subsequently, the U.S. gold stock and value of the dollar. The psychology and emotions of the crisis are evident to varying degrees in a number of other topics, including the new function of private finance in the international economy, the role of the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf, and U.S. relations with its European allies, key oil producers, and the “less-developed countries.”

“Armageddon as Fun City”

Energy Crisis presents a reservoir of evidence affirming the overarching concern of U.S. officials about the price of oil. High prices rang the dread bells of anxiety for the international financial system in particular, as the yawning current account surpluses of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates “created international financial uncertainty” (130). Large loans would be needed to offset “oil debt” and restore “confidence in the financial system and the creditworthiness of participating governments,” Kissinger wrote German chancellor Helmut Schmidt in November 1974 (17). “We’ve got to come up with ways to soak up their dough,” Kissinger told Simon and his economic staff. “If those Bedouins want to use all of their money to build soccer stadiums, that’s fine with me” (39).

“To be effective in combatting fear,” Treasury officials designed a number of mixed public-private capital programs to promote loans to European and Third World nations. Loan availability would be conditioned upon judgment “that a prospective borrowing nation was following reasonable policies of self-help” (15). The 1979 proposal for an “International Energy Finance Corporation” reveals the contours of those policies in its emphasis on the free flow of capital, reduced deficit spending, and tighter monetary policy measures (165, 205, 211).

The invocation of American military power also exposes the high emotional stakes of the crisis. Too much has been made of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s alleged consideration of a Saudi oilfield invasion, but Kissinger undoubtedly believed the military threat was diplomatically useful. The New York Times reported in January 1975 that Kissinger had told Business Week that he could not rule out the use of force against oil-producing nations “in the gravest emergency” (30). Two weeks later, he asked CIA Director William Colby and Secretary of Defense William Clements about the use of force in the case of a “total” oil embargo. “I’m not saying we have to take over Saudi Arabia,” he said. “How about Abu Dhabi, or Libya?” (32).

The ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James Akins, rebuked that public policy in one of the most interesting documents Galpern has dug up. The memo, entitled “War for Oil: Armageddon as Fun City,” called into question two central premises of U.S. foreign policy: first, that expensive oil stood at the root of the world’s economic problems, and second, that the United States had the “right to take the oil.” Invasion was folly, Akins wrote, “something one would expect to read only in standard communist propaganda describing the moral bankruptcy of America.” Furthermore, to believe that a forced reduction in prices would miraculously solve global economic woes was to “share the fairytale beliefs of certain academicians newly converted to the dubious pleasures of militarism” (52).

Kissinger told European heads-of-state that such threats put the producers on notice that they could not “underwrite the oil price increases for free without paying an economic and political price” (88). But after a forceful Saudi response, he and other members of the U.S. government immediately backpedaled from their bellicose stance. He also fired Akins.

“Unholy Union”

The energy crisis left European consumers “scared to death” and created disarray in U.S. relations with the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (15). In that context, the United States consistently sought to forge “consumer solidarity” in order to “shift the balance of power vis-à-vis the producing countries,” offsetting a weakness that threatened to “destroy the cohesion of the Western world” (6, 9). Policies for collaboration ranged from conservative, “financial solidarity measures,” and pressure on the oil producers to lower prices (7). There was a marked difference between the United States and its European allies, however, and the documents emphasize British, German, and especially French opposition to American proposals regarding the merits of cooperation. At the root of that opposition was a strategic disagreement about whether the United States would participate in the consumer-producer conference proposed first by Saudi Arabia and then by France. The United States refused to do so until the consumers showed “greater solidarity” and “progress on financial cooperation” (26, 28). To fail to present a cohesive Western front “would legitimize current high prices.” Ford told his counterparts (88).

When the United States did agree to producer-consumer meetings, it sought to do so from a position of relative strength vis-à-vis OPEC and, more broadly, the developing world. As documents from the recent FRUS volume on the United Nations reveal, the success of the OPEC nations in controlling the price of energy was depicted and received as a greater victory for the raw-material producing Third World. The developing countries saw the oil price increases “as legitimate exploitation of market power rather than unfair use of monopoly power,” Healey explained to Kissinger (9). Those countries, which British Prime Minister Harold Wilson called the other “PEC’s;” saw the oil producers as an exemplar of raw material solidarity, and they worked to create production agreements for phosphate, copper, and other minerals (38).

The “unholy union” between OPEC and the Third World, to use a phrase shared by Schmidt and Kissinger, unnerved policymakers for a time (88). But after the National Security Council and the State Department confirmed the security of “non-fuel, industrial raw materials,” Kissinger decided to pull back from his aggressive and wholesale denunciation of the New International Economic Order. He instructed the U.S. delegation to the first producer-consumer conference not to debate the Third World position. “The art here is to look positive without getting carried away by your rhetoric,” he said (49). Later he told
a congressional delegation that the goal of a more serene policy was “to break up the LDC coalition so that we can deal with each issue separately” (65).

That was also the rationale behind the creation of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. Its objective was to emphasize the “severe impact” of high oil prices on the non-oil developing countries and to explore “new ways of financing raw material development” (62, 98). The conference would also help increase the oil producers’ perception of their direct stake in the economic and political well-being of the industrialized countries and their need to take into account of their new responsibilities for the well-being of the world economy” (122). In addition, the Carter administration used the conference as a “cooperation program” to emphasize the “role of private capital” and the need for the developing nations to improve “their investment climate” (120, 125).

“Persian Gulf Chips”

The longstanding American objective “to break the political and economic power of OPEC” involved cooperation with fickle partners in Europe and the Third World (40). Algeria (and to some extent Iran) had led “a crusade on behalf of the Third World” in the previous half-decade, linking the “artificially low oil price for petroleum in the past” to a powerful internationalist rhetoric condemning neo-colonialism (47, 48). That policy, at least as the State Department saw it, sought to bind the producers together even as it divided the consumers (40). Policymakers in the State and the Treasury departments spent much of the decade searching for ways to “put straights on OPEC” and push for “greater friction among OPEC countries” in order to limit the “common desire” to maintain high prices and take away “some of [OPEC’s] confidence” (47).

Despite some success in the long-term goal of diversifying its oil supply, the United States still had to negotiate with the major players in OPEC, which was, after all, “playing with Persian Gulf chips,” as Kissinger said (88). No country had as much oil as Saudi Arabia. “No international agreement on oil pricing or on use of OPEC reserves can have any meaning without Saudi support,” NSC official Robert Hormats wrote. For this reason, policymakers in the Ford and Carter administrations consistently worked to convince the Saudi government to increase its production, which would ease pressure on the market (56, 166, 185). But the Saudis stood their ground in talks with the Americans. The three conversations between Kissinger and Saudi Minister of Petroleum Ahmed Zaki Yamani that are included in this volume reveal a tense but respectful relationship, with Kissinger often deferring to Yamani (41, 55, 81). It appears that Yamani even helped persuade Kissinger to reverse U.S. policy on the linkage between oil and other raw materials in mid-1975 (55, 61, 64).

An about-face in Cold War tactics provides another indication of the extent of the power of the oil producers. Just a decade earlier, the Nixon administration had lamented the Saudi tendency to depict the Soviets as “ten feet tall” and reminded the Saudis that “indigenous factors rather than Moscow-directed Communist conspiracies” played an important part in regional politics. Now Ford told the Saudi ambassador that high oil prices could embolden “Soviet influence in the Middle East” (111). The Carter administration also emphasized the potential Cold War fall-out, reminding Saudi leaders of “the real danger to political stability in Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Italy, and several key developing countries if economic conditions deteriorate further” (131).

The other producer that dominated the official mind in the United States was Iran. By late 1974, officials began to depict relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia as a zero-sum game. This was a long cry from the bridge-building efforts that began in the Johnson administration and climaxed with the Twin Pillars doctrine. Most telling, perhaps, is a June 1975 discussion between Kissinger and Alan Greenspan about the benefits of a bilateral oil agreement with the shah. The United States had railed against “rapacious” European bilateralism since October 1973 but began to seriously consider their own bilateral deals in late 1974 (56, 96, 99). Greenspan worried that the proposed agreement, by which excess Iranian oil would be traded for Treasury notes at a discount, would “be at Saudi expense.” But he believed in the risk because such an agreement would have a “devastating impact on OPEC” (67). Kissinger agreed and wrote Ford that the deal “could lead to a break in OPEC prices reflecting market forces” (77). “What I mean is the symbolism of the Shah breaking the OPEC line,” he told other officials (95).

Historians do not know when or how Saudi Arabia got wind of these negotiations, but Yamani effectively pressured the Ford and Carter administrations to accept Saudi power to control the price of oil (81, 188, 200). Before the OPEC meetings in Vienna, Bali, Doha, and Abu Dhabi between 1975 and 1978, American officials worked to influence the Saudi position on price, a stance they believed had paid dividends when the Saudi government began to increase production after December 1976 (82, 98, 116, 180). The Carter administration used a number of “Petroleum Supply Vulnerability Assessments” to encourage a closer military relationship with the Saudi monarchy in hopes that arms sales would provide further incentive for price moderation in the face of “the over-riding decision of Saudi Arabia to maintain OPEC unity” (152, 127). The administration also continued the nascent Kissinger policy of “Saudi financing of U.S. arms sales to other countries” to mitigate the sense that U.S.-Saudi interests were “diverging on energy” (202). The correspondence between Carter and King Fahd after 1979, and especially upon the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, lays bare the extraordinary level of importance the Saudi price power had in the formulation of U.S. policy (277, 281, 291).

“Abnormal ‘Distress’ Prices”

Notwithstanding the recent claim that 1979 marked “the birth” of this century, the year was characterized as much by continuity as by change in international oil politics. To be sure, the shah fled Iran, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and Iran went to war with Iraq (166, 257, 288). But those events sharpened preexisting concerns about oil prices as much as they spawned new ones. The Iranian Revolution revealed “the fragility of the market balance” and the need to pressure Saudi Arabia to increase production (182, 183). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan augmented fears about the security of Gulf oil supplies, and the identification of the Persian Gulf as a keystone in the “arc of crisis” reinforced preexisting commitments to supply (229, 276). The argument against OPEC continued to be the same. Price increases “would imperil the fragile global economic recovery” and were “not justified by the current market supply and demand balance for oil,” Hormats told Vance (130). The State Department continued the policy of “convincing the OPEC countries of their stake in the health of the world economy,” as letters from Carter about “the extremely delicate” international monetary system to leaders in Indonesia, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia made clear (199, 141, 163, 176).

If anything, the Carter administration invoked with greater intensity the emotional international politics of energy, which Warren Christopher self-consciously called a “shortage psychology” (200). “Abnormal ‘distress’ prices should not be used to justify” a price increase, the State Department wrote its ambassador in Riyadh (188). The anxiety of the Carter administration produced a knotty
and often disorganized policy response, reflected in an almost farcical discussion over the definition of “extreme moderation” on oil prices in November 1978 (168, 178). When the administration did take decisive action, it emphasized the same set of problems and solutions as its predecessor. The U.S. ambassador in Brussels, Anne Chambers, captured the parallel when she described the “spectacle” of 1979 as giving her “an uncomfortable feeling of ‘déjà vu’” (189).

**“World Economic Health”**

To discuss these and other issues, Energy Crisis plumbs the depths of wonderful sources, including the controversial Kissinger Papers and another closed set of papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, those of James Schlesinger. (Alas, one continues to wonder what documents lie under lock and key in the Brzezinski papers at the library and in the personal papers of George Shultz, located at the Hoover Institution.) In the realm of records open to historians, Galpern has looked in all the right places in the presidential libraries and the records of the Department of State at the National Archives. Researchers may also find much of interest in two records he did not consult: the papers of Winston Lord and Anthony Lake, who directed the Policy Planning staffs of the State Department under the Ford and Carter administrations.

*Energy Crisis* is also an exciting collection because it points to scheduled FRUS volumes on the Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia, foreign economic policy, and the United Nations. It also suggests a number of topics for fruitful exploration. In terms of the national histories of the major oil producers and consumers, many questions arise. How deep were the internal divisions in Saudi Arabia and Iran over oil prices? Why did the Saudi government increase production to restrain the price increases in January 1977? Did Algerian diplomacy contradict its strong public rhetoric linking oil prices to broader Third World questions? What was the effect of the petrodollar surplus on the region? How did the crisis change the processes of European integration? What did the key oil-producing nations say to each other? Scholars like Roham Alvandi, Victor McFarland, Jeffrey Byrne, Giuliano Garavini, and David Wight have already begun to examine these questions and others.14

The psychological and emotional costs of expensive oil were also evident in domestic politics, as revealed by the “increasingly heated controversy . . . over the price of oil and gas, and its consequences for the economy” (72, 73, 87). Can the January 1977 rise in prices to $3.50 be compared with his political detriment (175, 187, 196)? But it is difficult to adduce other aspects of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, especially because little mention is made of the important Senate investigations into the oil industry and its “windfall profits” by Frank Church and Edward Kennedy.15 These may be beyond the purview of the volume, but the documents indicate a tantalizing space between domestic and foreign policy. Still, scholars will be able to use the volume to build on the relationship between cheap oil, American political culture, and the role of the market in foreign policy.16

Of great interest is the fuzzy relationship between the ideology of the free market and the formation of foreign policy. In one of the droller quotes of the volume, William Simon tells Kissinger, “We don’t have to do uneconomic things to solve this. We are soon going to be swimming in oil” (23). Simon eloquently defended the free market in a speech to the Independent Petroleum Association in October 1974. For some people, he complained, “the idea of free enterprise” seemed to have “lost its sheen” in the face of expensive oil. Simon believed this reaction was overblown: I totally disagree, and I do so on the very solid grounds of economic realism and American tradition. A nation that can tame the wilderness, that has the most dynamic free market-place in the history of man, that can lift the standard of living to heights hitherto unknown, and can then place men on the moon—that nation, if it allows free enterprise full freedom, is not going to be cowed by the sudden threat of blackmail.17

Simon’s vision of an inimitable United States may have been matchless in its ideological determination, but that speech captures the emotion that governed American policy towards expensive oil.

Galpern presents U.S. policy as “primarily multilateral” in his preface, as a search for “a common strategy” to deal with high oil prices, but that assertion does not imply that an overriding attentiveness led policymakers to sacrifice the national interest on the altar of global well-being. Galpern enables us to view matters through a more skeptical lens. Policymakers railed against “bilateralism” and “unilateralism,” but their emotional emphasis on “world economic health” was no less unilateral than the policies of their interlocutors from Europe, Latin America, or the Arab world.

Notes:
18. U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings before the Subcommittee on...

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The Chinese Expeditionary Army: Reclaiming China’s Forgotten Veterans

Zach Fredman

Imagine if the American veterans of Iwo Jima and Okinawa had returned home after Japan’s surrender to face imprisonment or execution. Even those who escaped jail or firing squads would live the next three decades in fear; branded traitors by the state, they would never mention their wartime service. Films, television, and history books would ignore them completely. Not until the 1980s would political reforms clear their names and allow other Americans to learn the truth about the war. By the early 2010s, with the few remaining veterans mostly in their nineties, a nationwide network of scholars, veterans’ descendants, volunteers, local government officials, and businesspeople would join together to raise money and awareness in order to allow the last veterans to live their final years with dignity. Yet the veterans themselves would still await a public apology and pensions from Washington.

Not even the most grotesque counterfactual history could envision our “Greatest Generation” enduring such a fate, but as I discovered while researching my dissertation in China, this is the tragedy of China’s Expeditionary Army, some 380,000 men who fought two long campaigns against the Japanese in Burma and the western part of China’s Yunnan province between 1942 and 1945. But thanks to more than two decades of grassroots work by brave Chinese seeking to reclaim their history from the state, two Chinese Expeditionary Army memorials have been erected in southwestern Yunnan: the Chinese Expeditionary Army Statues in Longling County and the West Yunnan War of Resistance Memorial in nearby Tengchong. The Chinese Expeditionary Army can never be erased from public consciousness again, but more work must be done to honor the memory of these veterans and compensate the last survivors.

The Chinese Expeditionary Army’s wartime experience was no less ghastly than the fate of its veterans during the Mao era. More than half of the 100,000-strong original force perished during the botched Allied defense of Burma in 1942, most of them dying as they retreated to China and India, having been abandoned by their American commander, Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell. With American air support, liaison officers and equipment, the Chinese Expeditionary Army knocked the Japanese out of northern Burma and west Yunnan during the Second Burma Campaign that began in 1944. But as they had done in 1942, American and British commanders acted without consulting the Chinese. They diverted resources from the urgent defense of central China against Japan’s ICHIGO offensive, causing needless suffering among the troops in Burma. Civil War engulfed China after Japan’s surrender, driving Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists to Taiwan and dooming the Chinese veterans of the Burma campaigns to live or die as “counterrevolutionaries” in a communist tyranny.

After Mao’s death, the government released those veterans still languishing in prison, and in the early 1980s, it quietly overturned its verdict branding the men counterrevolutionaries. But state-manufactured popular memory persisted: Mao and the Communists, the story went, had led the heroic War of Resistance Against Japan.

For Ge Shuya, a former history major working in Tengchong, something didn’t add up. As a student, Ge had learned that Mao’s Communists did all the fighting. The Americans, teachers told him, had always been imperialists. Yet in Tengchong, a city utterly devastated by the war, Ge met many Expeditionary Army veterans. None had ever fought under the Communists, and they praised the American pilots and liaison officers they had served with. Ge’s discovery launched his unlikely career as a Renaissance Man of World War II’s China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater: equal parts historian, explorer, translator, caretaker of elderly veterans, and liaison for American CBI veterans returning to Yunnan.

Many others have joined Ge in reclaiming China’s wartime history and assisting its forgotten soldiers. A slew of memoirs, scholarly monographs, and archival compilations has been published over the past decade. Popular histories of the Expeditionary Army are becoming as common in China as D-Day stories in the United States. And on television, the 2009 drama Soldiers and Their Commander (Wo de tuanzhang wo de tuan), based on the experiences of the Chinese Expeditionary Army, earned wide acclaim. Now awakened to a more honest interpretation of their country’s wartime history, thousands of ordinary Chinese have come to the aid of the country’s elderly veterans. More than 4,000 volunteers from the Shenzhen-based Caring For Veterans Network have traveled the country, seeking out veterans, recording their stories, and raising money to support them.

In Longling County, Yunnan, these efforts culminated in the September 3 unveiling of the Chinese Expeditionary Army Statues war memorial. Sponsored by the county government and built by sculptor Li Chunhua, the memorial...
sits on the slopes of Songshan Mountain. Nearly 8,000 Chinese died here in 1944 as they fought to regain the high ground overlooking the strategic Huifong Bridge—China’s only land link to the outside world—along the Burma Road. The memorial itself features 402 statues arranged in twelve groups that include commanders, child soldiers, infantry, female troops, and China’s American allies. At the center of the memorial stand twenty-eight statues of living veterans, each accompanied by a plaque noting the soldier’s hometown and wartime service. Several of the veterans immortalized in the monument were on hand for the event.

Following the ceremony, the crowd returned to Longling for a meeting where historians, veterans, members of veterans aid societies, and others had a chance to speak. Stumbling nervously through my first-ever speech in Chinese, I discussed my dissertation research on relations between American soldiers and Chinese interpreters in wartime Yunnan. Zeng Damin, the son of an Expeditionary Army regimental commander, broke down in tears as he thanked the Longling County government for building the memorial and expressed his gratitude to others among the crowd for reviving this once-forgotten history. “China has no future,” Zeng said, “if it can’t face history.” Kunming historian Wu Baozhang praised the veterans aid societies for their work and noted that “our country is opening up step by step, especially about this period of history.” Zhang Dongbi, another writer, pointed to work that remains to be done: “Many of the last veterans are still desperately poor; we must help them live more comfortably in their final years.” Zhang also lauded the bravery of local governments like Longling County for giving money to veterans, while the central government in Beijing has yet to do so.

In Tengchong, just an hour and a half up the road from Longling County, the West Yunnan War of Resistance Memorial opened on August 15. Located next door to the Tengchong Memorial Cemetery, which was built by the Chinese Nationalists in 1945, destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, and then rebuilt in 1985, the War of Resistance Memorial is composed of two parts. Separating the older cemetery from the newer complex is the Chinese Expeditionary Army Wall of Names. Etched into the wall are the names of 103,141 Chinese and allied soldiers who served in the 1944–5 West Yunnan Campaign. Like the statues in Longling, the Wall of Names is a fitting and long-overdue memorial. The fact that both the provincial and central governments funded it makes it even more impressive.

The other half of the memorial is a museum dedicated to the Chinese Expeditionary Army and wartime Yunnan. With superb maps, photographs, and hundreds of artifacts, the museum covers China’s war with Japan from the 1931 Mukden Incident to victory in 1945. The displays emphasize the heroism of China’s soldiers fighting in Burma and west Yunnan—the typical story of valor common to nearly all state-sponsored history in China—but also stress wartime cooperation between China and the United States. The final display reminds us that “the world today is still in the shadow of war and not in peace. In particular, the Japanese right-wing forces are expanding rapidly.... Therefore, it is quite necessary to alert [the world] to the revival of the Japanese Militarism.” Photographs of recent military parades in Beijing and naval maneuvers near the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands line the walls. Competing Chinese and Japanese claims to these islands are beyond the scope of this article, but the inclusion of so much government propaganda about the dispute in the Tengchong museum underscores the limits to China’s remembrance of its Expeditionary Army.

Many of China’s modern grievances against Japan stem from the belief that Japan has failed to admit the truth about the extent of its crimes against China during World War II and to offer sufficient apology. This position is understandable. Trying to refute the Nanjing Massacre, the existence of comfort women, or the scope of wanton cruelty in Japan’s war against China is no less loathsome than Holocaust denial.

Yet nothing in the Tengchong museum mentions how much China’s Expeditionary Army veterans have suffered at the hands of the Chinese government. When China cultivates anti-Japanese nationalism through its education system, museums, and popular culture while at the same time ignoring the suffering of its own people at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, its accusations against Japan reek of hypocrisy. Formally apologizing to the remaining Expeditionary Army veterans, compensating them for their suffering, and acknowledging their plight would bolster Beijing’s moral standing when it insists that Japan face the truth about World War II. More important, it would show that China is now strong enough to cast aside its longstanding fear of the past and has recognized that greater openness about its history can be no less a source of strength than a skyscraper, high-speed train, or gross domestic product figure. The grassroots movement to uncover the truth about China’s Expeditionary Army shows that Beijing’s efforts to conceal its past mistakes are doomed to failure anyway.
Records relating to American foreign policy and relations and conditions overseas can be found among the files of agencies other than the Department of State and those closely associated with that agency, such as the United States Information Agency and the Agency for International Development and its predecessors (Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), Mutual Security Agency (MSA), Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), International Cooperation Administration (ICA)). Among the records of the Foreign Agricultural Service (Record Group 166), the Narrative Reports prepared by Agricultural Attaches, consular officers, and others at U.S. posts overseas are of particular note. In general, the reports document agricultural production, technology in the agrarian sector, agricultural labor, and foreign agricultural policies, among other subjects.

The United States Government has long been interested in foreign agricultural activities. In 1894, that interest was institutionalized when the Department of Agriculture established the Section of Foreign Markets to formalize the collection of information on the production, consumption, and prices of foreign farm products. For the next 25 years, a number of offices within the department handled statistical functions: the Section of Foreign Markets (1894-1902), the Division of Foreign Markets (1902-1903), the Bureau of Statistics (1903-1914), and the Bureau of Crop Estimates (1914-1921). In 1913, the Department established a new organization to handle marketing functions. Over the next 8 years, that function was handled by three offices: the Office of Markets (1913-1915), the Office of Markets and Rural Organization (1915-1917), and the Bureau of Markets (1917-1921).

In 1921, the statistical and marketing functions were merged to form the Bureau of Markets and Crop Estimates. That organization merged with the Office of Farm Management and Farm Economics in 1922 to form the Bureau of Agricultural Economics/Division of Statistical and Historical Research. In 1930, responsibility was transferred to the newly formed Foreign Agricultural Service Division of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics that was created to administer the Foreign Agricultural Service.

The Foreign Agricultural Service remained part of the Department of Agriculture until 1939, when Federal Reorganization Plan II transferred it to the Department of State in an effort to consolidate like functions of government. Some of the Service’s personnel and functions, primarily those relating to economic research, remained with the Department of Agriculture where they were concentrated in the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, a separate unit within the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture. In March 1953, the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations was redesignated as the Foreign Agricultural Service. The primary function of the Foreign Agricultural Service has been to develop foreign markets for U.S. farm products and to report on agricultural activities overseas. Through the network of agricultural attaches stationed around the world and agricultural marketing specialists making investigations abroad, the Service collected information on world agricultural production, foreign agrarian policies, and trade competition. It also made available to American farm and business interests published information concerning agricultural commodities in world trade. While the duties changed somewhat over time, agricultural attaches were responsible for agricultural reporting and analysis, trade promotion and market development, participating in negotiations with foreign government, advising the local U.S. ambassador, assisting official visitors, and explaining U.S. agricultural policies and programs to the host government and local population.

The Records

The files are arranged by former classification level and thereunder in a number of chronological segments, thereunder by geographic unit such as a region (“Southeast Asia”), country (“USSR”), or colony (“Northern Rhodesia”) and thereunder by subject. Listings of the chronological segments and of the major subject headings are found below. The 1960s saw changes to the recordkeeping system. Several new headings, most notably “Fairs,” “Utilization Reports,” and “Attaché Services,” were added. In addition, a significant number of files documenting international organizations such as the EEC, the ECE, the OECD, and the FAO, were added under “Europe” or “Special Index” at the geographic organization level. The most significant change occurred in 1968 when the Service began requiring certain standard, or “DR” reports. Those reports are filed at the beginning of each geographic area and contain information about all aspects of the agrarian sector; they are arranged chronologically and not by topic.

In addition to the reports sent to the Department of Agriculture by agricultural attaches, the files contain significant numbers of related reports prepared by U.S. diplomatic and consular officers that also will be found among the files of the Department of State. Arrangement of these Narrative Reports might make research easier and more effective than use of Department of State records, depending on the research focus. The files might also contain reports missing from Department of State files. Beginning with the 1971 files the documents are almost exclusively of Department of Agriculture origin.

The following list (see next page) of subjects indicates the topics generally covered by the Narrative Reports. The files for a given country do not necessarily include reports under every subject heading (in the 1960s, the subject heading “Grains and Feeds” replaced “Feed Stuffs”).

The central files of the Department of State overlap the Narrative Reports found among the records of the
Foreign Agricultural Service. For example, the “Agriculture” section of the 1950 Department of State filing manual contains headings for agriculture, soil, pests, field crops, grains, fibers, alkaloidal plants, forage crops, sugar-yielding plants, garden crops, fruits, flowers, trees, animal husbandry, and wild animals. The files under those headings are often broken down even further. The section on “grains,” for example, includes sub-files on wheat, buckwheat, oats, rye, corn, barley, rice, hops, and “other field crops.” The complete filing manuals are available on the NARA website describing the central files of the Department of State: http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/state-dept/rg-59-central-files/.

**Chronological Segments**


**Other Records**

In addition to the Narrative Reports, there are numerous other records in RG 166 that will be of interest. Some examples are:

**Textual Records**

- Records of the International Institute of Agriculture, 1922-1941 (RG 166 Entry NC-113-13)
- Records Concerning International Agricultural Conferences, 1922-1941 (RG 166 Entry NC-113-14)
- General Correspondence, 1942-1949 and 1950-1972 (RG 166 Entries A1-1A and 1B)
- Attaché Reports Relating to International Agricultural Conferences and Congresses (“Special Index”), 1931-1958
- Reports Relating to International Agricultural Conferences and Agreements, 1960-1965 (RG 166 Entry A1-5)
- Reports Relating to Trade Missions, 1954 (RG 166 Entry A1-6)
- Reports Relating to Tariff Negotiations, 1947-1956 (RG 166 Entry A1-7)
- Policy Correspondence, 1951-1964 (RG 166 Entry A1-17)

**Electronic Records**

- Global Agriculture Information Network (GAIN) Reports, 1998-2011. The records consist of reports that provide information on a range of subjects relating to agricultural trade, production, and polices.
SHAFR Council Meetings Minutes
Friday, January 3, 2014
Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, DC

Members present: Robert Brigham, Carol Chin, Christopher Dietrich, Penny Von Eschen, Rebecca Herman, Fredrik Logevall (presiding), Alan McPherson, Sarah Snyder, Thomas Zeiler

Others present: David Hadley, Peter Hahn, Andrew Johns, Kelly Shannon

Business Items

(1) Welcome, introductions, and announcements

Logevall called the meeting to order at 8:19 AM. He welcomed new Council members Brigham, McPherson, and Von Eschen. Logevall made brief introductory remarks expressing the honor he felt at being selected to serve as president, and his desire for SHAFR to seek ways to reach out to other organizations while continuing the efforts of past years to internationalize SHAFR.

(2) Resolutions of thanks to retiring Council members

Logevall expressed admiration for the four recently retired Council members Andrew Rotter, Laura Belmonte, Mary Dudziak, and Marc Selverstone. Brigham moved a resolution of thanks to these four recent members. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

(3) Recap of motions passed by e-mail vote

Hahn read into the minutes a summary of the four motions that Council passed by e-mail correspondence since the June 2013 meeting: the approval of minutes of June meeting; the final approval of transfer of management of SHAFR endowments to TIAA CREF; the approval of extending the terms of Andrew Johns as Passport editor and Mitch Lerner as Passport consulting editor to December 31, 2017; and the approval of the NCH petition in favor of maintaining the CIA’s open source information program.

(4) Motion to accept 2013 financial report

Hahn presented oral and written reports on the finances in 2013 and a budget for 2014. He explained that the checking account showed a negative balance in 2013, and that after consulting the Ways & Means Committee he had transferred funds from the endowment to cover any immediate shortfalls. He further explained that the growth of the endowment significantly exceeded the deficit in the checking account. The budget for 2014 reflected continuity with recent past operating budgets. Another deficit in the operating budget was anticipated in 2014, as was sufficient Endowment growth to cover it.

A thorough discussion on revenue and expenditure expectations and patterns ensued. It was clarified that the Bylaws do not set a cap on withdrawals from the endowment and that the only part of the endowment that was restricted would be the original amount gifted, which current activity did not begin to approach. Discussion also touched on the pros and cons of altering membership dues and on recent trends in the membership levels.

Chin made a motion to accept the report, which was seconded and passed unanimously.

(5) Motions from Ways & Means Committee

Hahn introduced a proposal to change SHAFR’s fiscal year to a November 1 to October 31 basis, to ease year-end reporting. Hahn explained that it would be relatively easy to manage the change via the accountant and the endowment manager. Von Eschen moved to approve the proposal. Herman seconded the motion and it passed unanimously.

Zeiler discussed SHAFR’s past support of the Transatlantic Studies Association with an annual subsidy. In June, Council delayed a decision on a 2014 subsidy pending clarification of financial balances. Discussion followed as to whether SHAFR should continue the subsidy, and to what purpose. A consensus emerged that, as SHAFR desired to foster connections with fellow historical organizations, the subsidy should continue as long as it served the goal of promoting SHAFR/TSA connections. Zeiler moved that SHAFR fund $2,000 annually in 2014-2016, to subsidize the TSA annual conference on terms to be approved by the SHAFR president. The resolution passed unanimously.

Council discussed SHAFR’s subsidy to the National History Center. SHAFR had provided subsidies in 2010, 2011, and 2013 to support NHC’s lecture series at the Wilson Center. In 2013, Council discontinued the subsidy based on various concerns with the administration of the series. The NHC renewed its request. Discussion followed about the merits of the subsidy, with a consensus emerging that it would be worthwhile if SHAFR’s contribution were recognized and if the content of lectures featured foreign policy. It was moved that SHAFR renew its support for up to three years with the stipulation that Wilson Center talks be related to foreign policy, broadly defined, that SHAFR’s contribution be recognized, and that the president of SHAFR approve the second and third year renewals based on the management of the series. The resolution passed unanimously.

Council discussed a recommendation from the Membership Committee that membership in SHAFR should be mandatory for scholars presenting at the annual SHAFR conference. Questions were raised about the impact of this
requirement on non-members and about the number of non-members who presented at recent conferences. Logevall moved to table the item until further information on participation at SHAFR conferences could be garnered. The motion passed unanimously.

Council heard recommendations from the Web Committee and Ways and Means Committee regarding compensation to the SHAFR webmaster appointed in 2013. The first year of the position revealed that the position required significantly more work than had been anticipated. Von Eschen moved to double the salary of the webmaster as recommended by the Ways and Means Committee. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

The Council also heard the recommendation of the Ways and Means Committee that the compensation for the Executive Director should be increased by four percent in 2014. A motion was introduced to that effect, was seconded, and passed unanimously. (Hahn vacated the meeting room for the discussion on this item).

(6) Governance issues

Recalling that Council recently had approved the extension of the terms of the Passport editor and consulting editor to December 31, 2017, Logevall noted that Council members had asked for clarification of appointment and renewal procedures in the future. A consensus emerged that a formal process for appointments or renewals should be established. It was moved that no later than June 2016, Council should welcome applications for a term as Passport editor(s) beginning on January 1, 2018; that a request for renewal by the current editors would be welcomed at that time; and that a decision would be reached by January 2017. The resolution was seconded and passed unanimously.

A discussion ensued about the possibility of empowering the president to sign petitions on behalf of the Society. In light of the speed with which presidents could consult Council members by e-mail, it was agreed that presidents should continue to engage in this practice of seeking Council approval of all petitions.

(7) The SHAFR Guide to the Literature

Council heard a report from the ad hoc Committee on the SHAFR guide. The Committee reported that SHAFR members expressed great appreciation for the Guide but considerable concern about the difficulty in accessing it on-line. Strong support was expressed for continuing the Guide and addressing access issues. It was noted that the Guide would require a dedicated editor-in-chief and the services of numerous chapter editors. It was decided that a posting for the position of editor should be made in the pages of Passport with a deadline of May 15, 2014, and that a final decision should be reached by July 1, 2014. Chin moved to approve these recommendations. Von Eschen seconded the motion, which was approved unanimously. In confidence, Council directed Hahn to explore legal matters pertaining the Guide and report to Council by e-means.

(8) Report from the Web Committee

Herman presented a report from the Web Committee, which unanimously recommended that Council approve a proposal from Liefa to redesign the SHAFR website. Herman explained the several benefits that Liefa would provide by way of justifying the recommendation. Zeiler moved to approve this recommendation. Logevall seconded the motion, which was approved unanimously.

(9) Liability insurance and employee dishonesty bond

Hahn reported on SHAFR's liability insurance policy and employee dishonesty bond. Noting that these policies had been in force for many years, Hahn recommended that Council review both policies for the purpose of ensuring that they provided appropriate coverage at appropriate prices. Hahn offered to conduct the review, or to assist a committee thereto, and report back to Council in June, before the next renewal deadlines.

Brigham moved that Council empower Hahn to investigate the issues and report via the Ways and Means Committee to Council in June 2014. Herman seconded the motion, and Council approved it unanimously.

(10) Use of SHAFR's e-mail list

Logevall introduced a proposal from Kristin Hoganson and Richard Immerman authorizing use of the SHAFR e-mail to send advocacy messages pertaining to the work of the National Coalition for History, or authorizing them to solicit members to sign up for email advocacy messages. A consensus emerged that the SHAFR e-mail list should not be used for advocacy messages, but should be reserved for SHAFR business only.

(11) Nominating Committee proposal on tie-breaker procedures

Hahn noted that the 2013 SHAFR election included a race decided by a single vote and that the Bylaws contain no tie-breaker provisions. After consulting Mark Bradley, he had recommended to the Nominating Committee that they recommend a tie-breaker procedure for Council to consider. The Nominating Committee recommended that in the event of a tie, the election would be decided by the SHAFR Council at its next meeting. When discussion clarified that this procedure would make it impossible for the winner to attend that meeting, Hahn suggested that the proposal should be amended to empower the current Council to resolve a tie within one week of the close of the election. A motion was made and seconded to amend the Bylaws by adding this sentence to Bylaws, Article 2, Section 5(e): “In the event of a tie, the current Council, with the exception of the President, will vote to elect one of the candidates. This vote will take place by electronic means, by secret ballot, and within one week of the conclusion of the regular election.” Council passed this
motion unanimously and directed Hahn to place a referendum on this item on the 2014 election ballot.

(12) Copyright on contents of Diplomatic History and Passport

Logevall introduced the question of whether Diplomatic History and Passport should allow authors to retain authorial copyright. A consensus emerged that the current system, in which Diplomatic History and Passport hold the copyright, should remain in place.

(13) Discussion of strategic plan for Passport

Logevall noted that Passport is in strong condition and that, in the interest of time, a planned discussion of a strategic plan for Passport would be postponed to June.

Reports

(14) Summer Institute Oversight Committee

Zeiler reported that the plans for the 2014 Summer Institute at Williams College are proceeding as made clear by a written report from co-hosts Mark Lawrence and James McAllister circulated in advance of the meeting. Zeiler also reported that the 2015 Summer Institute will be held at Ohio State University, as approved by Council previously. He reported that the recently-received final report on the 2013 Institute indicated another successful year and affirmation that the program continues to reach high achievement.

(15) Diplomatic History

Council accepted a report on Diplomatic History circulated in advance of the meeting.

(16) 2014 SHAFR annual meeting

Snyder reported on the progress made by the Program Committee to solicit proposals for the June 19-21, 2014 annual meeting in Lexington, Kentucky. She noted that logistic arrangements were proceeding well and that the number of submissions was the highest ever for a meeting held outside of Washington, D.C. She reported that the local arrangements committee had secured some $10,000 in funds from the University of Kentucky.

(17) 2015 and 2016 SHAFR annual meetings

Hahn reported that the 2015 SHAFR annual meeting would be held in the same hotel as the 2013 meeting—the Renaissance Arlington Capital View in Arlington, VA—on June 24-28, 2015. Hahn further noted that a call for applications to host the 2016 meeting has been published in Passport with an April 2014 deadline and that Council would be able to decide a host at its June meeting.

Logevall noted that the Membership Committee has recommended holding an annual meeting outside of North America in the future. He recommended that, rather than decide one way or the other, Council should consider proposals from outside North America to host the 2016 meeting.

(18) Prizes and Fellowships

On behalf of the selection committees, Hahn announced the winners of various 2014 fellowships and prizes: the Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship was awarded to Patrick Chung; the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant was awarded to Nguyet Nguyen; the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship was awarded to Zach Fredman; the Lawrence Gelfand - Armin Rappaport - Walter LaFeber Dissertation Fellowship was awarded to Heidi M. Krajewski; and the Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize was awarded to Lien-Hang T. Nguyen. Council members expressed congratulations to the awardees.

Other Business

(19) Announcements and other business

Logevall thanked the Council for its work. The meeting adjourned at 11:55 AM.

Respectfully submitted,
Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/dh
Recent Books of Interest:


Bunch, Clea. *The United States and Jordan: Middle East Diplomacy during the Cold War* (Tauris, 2014).


Cogliano, Francis D. *Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy* (Yale, 2014).


Crandall, Russell. *America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror* (Cambridge, 2014).


Cunliffe, Philip. *Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South* (Hurst, 2014).


Kaplan, Robert D. Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (Penguin, 2014).
Kazuhiro, Takii. Ito Hirobumi - Japan’s First Prime Minister and Father of the Meiji Constitution (Routledge, 2014).
Mariager, Rasmus, Kjersti Brathagen, and Karl Molin, eds. Human Rights in Europe During the Cold War (Routledge, 2014).
Maurer, John and Christopher M. Bell, eds. At the Crossroads Between Peace and War: The London Naval Conference of 1930 (Naval Institute Press, 2014).
Migdal, Joel S. Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East (Columbia, 2014).
Risso, Linda. Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War: The NATO Information Service (Routledge, 2014).
Sills, Peter. Toxic War: The Story of Agent Orange (Vanderbilt, 2014).
Wilson, James Graham. The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War (Cornell, 2014).
W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship: $4,000

Winner: Zach Fredman, Boston University

“Dissertation Title: A Wary Embrace: American Soldiers and the People of China, 1941-1947”

Making use of new and rarely-used sources across China, Burma, England, and the United States, Fredman is developing a fundamental reappraisal of the wartime relationship between the United States and China. Focusing on the transformation in the Chinese reception of and relationship with American troops from cooperative to hostile, he convincingly makes the case for the limitations of the U.S.-centric scholarship. In the process, Fredman argues that including local Chinese sources and Chinese historiography offers a new perspective on how and why the relationship deteriorated over the war that will force reconsiderations of the traditional narratives. Equal parts international history and local history, Fredman’s dissertation makes painstaking study of municipal and personal records to reimagine the wartime alliance from the bottom up. Fredman is well equipped to undertake this ambitious project, having spent years in China and Taiwan and developed fluency in Mandarin. After years in Chinese archives, the fellowship will help Fredman complete the domestic side of his research, facilitating trips to the National Archives, Hoover Institution, George C. Marshall Library, US Army Heritage and Education Center, and the Marine Corps Historical Center.

Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Fellowship - $4,000

Winner: Nguyet Nguyen

Dissertation Title: “The world is on our side”: the Vietnamese Diaspora and People’s Diplomacy during the Second Indochina War

Nguyen’s dissertation presents a fascinating and ground breaking examination of Vietnamese exiles’ efforts at international diplomacy with anti-war activists in the United States and Western Europe aimed at convincing Washington to end its intervention in the Vietnam War. Her work represents a highly original example of transnational history “from below” that explores the actions of individuals, social movements, and NGOs while still focusing on the crucial role of the state in international conflict. Her research emphasizes the all-too-often-ignored Vietnamese component in the global struggle for “hearts and minds” during that divisive war, as well as the transnational element in a struggle that “crossed borders” both literally and psychologically on a number of levels. The Bernath Fellowship will help finance Nguyet’s ambitious research schedule in American, Vietnamese, and French archives, as well as her planned oral interviews with a wide range of participants in her subject matter. Her fluency in Vietnamese, French, and English will greatly enhance her work and also speaks to the kind of multi-archival sophistication that so many young and pioneering scholars in our field are bringing to foreign relations history. Nguyen’s project promises to set a high standard in this exciting direction.

Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport-Walter LaFeber Dissertation Fellowship: $4,000

Winner: Heidi Krajewski, Tulane University


Equal parts local and transnational history, Heidi Krajewski’s dissertation imaginatively employs both time-honored and cutting-edge research methods to reconceptualize how and where developmentalism figured into the fall of Nicaragua's Somoza dynasty. Focusing on several Managua neighborhoods most affected by the earthquake that devastated the country in 1972, her work combines multinational archival research with GIS mapping technology to chart the spatial relationship among U.S. and Nicaraguan-led redevelopment efforts, the urban poverty that persisted despite those uneven efforts, and growing anti-Somoza political activity. Such mapping of the geography of development (or the lack thereof) reveals the importance of developmentalist discourse even though developmentalism itself failed, Krajewski finds. That is, U.S.-Nicaraguan plans initially raised expectations. When the promised redevelopment never materialized, however, that fact frustrated, and further radicalized, Managua’s poor neighborhoods, which were every bit as central to rural areas to the success of the Sandinista Revolution. This fellowship will help Krajewski, who is proficient in Spanish, undertake an extended research trip to Managua, where she will examine records housed at the Nicaraguan National Archives, the National Bank of Nicaragua, and the University of Central America.
networks. In fact, these collections have generated new materials surrounding Costa Rica's 1948 Civil War as well as the
items revealed movements of exiles and the country's foreign relations as well as domestic and international intelligence
understudied topic, I had the opportunity to open never-before-consulted embassy files and consulate reports. These
collections and archives with me, such as the documents of Dominican exile leader Horacio Ornes at the Museo Memorial
War. Such insights were further strengthened when the descendants of Dominican exiles shared their parents' personal
facilitating the overthrow of Venezuela and supporting Guatemalan exiles, largely independent of the international 'Cold'
Guatemala in 1954. My research has determined that these regimes pursued their own wars and foreign policy, such as
war against the governments in Guatemala, Venezuela, and Costa Rica in the 1940s and early 1950s before the US coup in
the "Foreign Relations" section that has been largely unexamined by Dominican and American historians. Opening these
were completely unknown and seemingly lost in the system's organization. The vast majority of these files derived from
the project "Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Rosary Beads: The United States, the Philippines and the Making of Global Anti-
American South and owed much to a regional transnational dialogue about agrarian reform that emerged through U.S.-
Mexican relations in the early twentieth century. Dr. Olsson’s dissertation advisor was Dr. Shane Hamilton, University of
 Georgia.

Colleen Woods, Asst. Professor, University of Maryland, was awarded $2,000 to conduct research in the Philippines for
the project “Agrarian Crossings: The American South, Mexico, and the Twentieth-Century Remaking of the Rural World,” in which
he argues that the Green Revolution, far from being a product of the Cold War, had its origins in the post-emancipation
Colleton Woods, Asst. Professor, University of California, was awarded $1,000 to conduct research at the Library of
Congress, Washington D.C., for the project “Exporting the Racial Republic: African Colonization and the Transformation
of U.S. Expansion,” in which he demonstrates convincingly that African colonization movement redefined the ways in
which Americans thought about race, citizenship and nationalism, and linked them not just to the question of slavery but
to ideas about U.S. expansion, global power, and American empire. Dr. Mills’s dissertation committee co-chairs were Dr.
Kristin Hoganson and Dr. David Roediger, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Tore Olsson, Asst. Professor, University of Tennessee, was awarded $1,000 to conduct research in Mexico City for the project
"Agrarian Crossings: The American South, Mexico, and the Twentieth-Century Remaking of the Rural World," in which
he argues that the Green Revolution, far from being a product of the Cold War, had its origins in the post-emancipation
American South and owed much to a regional transnational dialogue about agrarian reform that emerged through U.S.-
Mexican relations in the early twentieth century. Dr. Olsson’s dissertation advisor was Dr. Shane Hamilton, University of
Georgia.

Respectfully submitted by Barbara Reeves-Ellington, November 18, revised November 21, 2013

Samuel Flagg Bemis Grant Award Final Report

“The Transnational ‘Cold’ War in the Greater Caribbean Basin: Revolutionary Exiles, Presidents, Counter-Revolutionary
Exiles, Dictators, and the United States, 1944-1954”

Awarded in 2013, the Samuel Flagg Bemis grant from SHAFR has been a critical source of support for my international
research. At the University of Arkansas, my dissertation is an international and transnational examination of exiles,
presidents, and dictators in the greater Caribbean Basin in the 1940s and 1950s and how numerous battles between these
groups shaped the region’s ‘Cold’ War and foreign relations. SHAFR’s support through the Bemis grant allowed me to
pursue my research in never-before-consulted files and newly-discovered collections in the Dominican Republic, Costa
Rica, and Cuba over the past months. It is because of SHAFR’s support and the Bemis that I have had my success during the
last six months and established the foundation for my upcoming dissertation and forthcoming articles.

In the Dominican Republic, I began my work at the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) in Santo Domingo at the beginning
of July. After a couple weeks, archivist Oscar Feliz suggested that I look at some foreign relations collections, some of which
were completely unknown and seemingly lost in the system’s organization. The vast majority of these files derived from
the “Foreign Relations” section that has been largely unexamined by Dominican and American historians. Opening these
never-before-consulted files, I uncovered embassy dispatches, spy reports, exiles’ documents, intelligence networks, and
far more, such as confirming that Alberto Bayo, a Spanish exile who trained Fidel Castro and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara in
guerrilla warfare in the 1950s, betrayed Dominican exiles to the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo in 1949. Most importantly,
these collections contained new documents that revealed how Trujillo, alongside other dictators, waged an international
war against the governments in Guatemala, Venezuela, and Costa Rica in the 1940s and early 1950s before the US coup in
Guatemala in 1954. My research has determined that these regimes pursued their own wars and foreign policy, such as
facilitating the overthrow of Venezuela and supporting Guatemalan exiles, largely independent of the international ‘Cold’
War. Such insights were further strengthened when the descendants of Dominican exile leader Horacio Ornes at the Museo Memorial
de la Resistencia Dominicana.

In San José, I worked at the Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica (ANCR). As Costa Rica’s foreign relations too remains an
understudied topic, I had the opportunity to open never-before-consulted embassy files and consult reports. These items
revealed movements of exiles and the country’s foreign relations as well as domestic and international intelligence
networks. In fact, these collections have generated new materials surrounding Costa Rica’s 1948 Civil War as well as the
1955 conflict with Nicaragua. While in Costa Rica, I had the opportunity to talk with the daughter of Honduran exile leader Jorge Ribas Montes, Costa Rica’s United Nations ambassador in the late 1940s and foreign relations minister in the mid-1950s Alberto Cañas, and former Costa Rican president Rafael Angel Calderón Fournier. Together, these investigations have provided both new sources and a new perspective regarding Costa Rica’s foreign relations history. Thanks to the support of David Díaz-Arias at the Universidad de Costa Rica, I also had the opportunity to present my research and receive some useful feedback.

Finally, I went over to Cuba. In Havana, I worked at the Archivo Nacional and the Instituto de Historia de Cuba (IHC). At the IHC, I accessed Cuban military and naval attaché reports from the 1950s that, alongside US reports, illustrated how a broad movement of exiles and presidents, more than just those alongside Fidel Castro, pursued a war to oust the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Furthermore, many of these exiles and presidents had waged their battles against dictators since the Second World War, showing a longer history that moved from the early 1940s into the Cuban Revolution. At the Biblioteca Nacional de Cuba José Martí, I read the newspapers put out by Dominican exiles in Havana. Finally, I was granted permission to work at the Archivo Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores in Havana. Once again, I had the unique opportunity to access never-before-consulted and largely-unexamined files that have provided new insights into exiles’ movements, regional actors’ foreign policy, and an international history of the greater Caribbean Basin. Before leaving Cuba, I shared a part of this investigation in a presentation at the IHC.

I again want to express my gratitude to SHAFR for having supported my research. Without the Bemis grant, I would not have had the opportunity to work in newly-discovered collections in the Dominican Republic, never-before-consulted files in Costa Rica, and never-before-utilized items in Cuba.

Aaron Coy Moulton, University of Arkansas, acmoulto@uark.edu

Dear Professor Hahn,

I am writing to express my gratitude for the assistance provided to me through the Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grant. I was able to use the funds to defray the cost of trips to New York and Boston, where I consulted archival materials at Columbia University, the United Nations archives, MIT and the Massachusetts Historical Society respectively. My dissertation, tentatively titled, “The Pursuit of Multilateral Economic Development Aid: the United Nations, the U.S. and the Third World, 1957-1961,” examines the triangular relationship between leading figures within the UN Secretariat, US policymakers in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, and key Third World member states at the UN. It investigates the extent to which each party attempted to frame and direct the debate on economic development aid to underdeveloped countries as offered by, or channeled through, the United Nations during a period where the Organization’s activities dramatically shifted towards North-South issues.

The sources I accumulated have specifically reinforced my hypothesis for my current chapter on food aid and the pre-history of the UN World Food Programme. They revealed the pivotal role played by those within UN Secretariat, like Hans Singer, who helped redefine the motives and purpose of food aid from ‘surplus disposal’ to ‘surplus utilization’ and from ‘food aid for the alleviation of poverty’ to ‘food aid for economic development’. The not-so-subtle changes in the food aid discourse had meaningful significance for donor and recipient countries at the launching of the First UN Development Decade in 1961. Moreover, this change showcased the intellectual capacity of both the UN and US policymakers as food aid was now enmeshed in a wider debate on various doctrines of development.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not mention what I considered to be the highlight of my trip, an interview I held with Richard N. Gardner, an emeritus professor in the Law Department at Columbia University. Gardner served alongside Harlan Cleveland as the deputy assistant undersecretary of state for international organization affairs for the Kennedy Administration. Gardner, who was 33 when he joined the Administration, is one of the last surviving policymakers from those that Kennedy brought on-board in 1961. Gardner was highly involved in the Administration’s effort to internationalize its foreign aid efforts through the UN and the interview was extremely insightful.

Again, I thank you for the generous award and the opportunities it afforded.

Sincerely,

Aaron Rietkerk

PhD Candidate
International History Department
The London School of Economics (LSE)
For more SHAFR information, visit us on the web at www.shafr.org