In this issue

What is a Public Intellectual?
Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Relations
Roundtable on *Emperor of Liberty*

And more...
In This Issue

4   Contributors

6   Presidential Column: Exploring Borders in a Transnational Era
    Thomas “Tim” Borstelmann

7   A Roundtable on Francis D. Cogliano, Emperor of Liberty: Thomas
    Jefferson’s Foreign Policy
    Jay Sexton, Eliga H. Gould, Shannon E. Duffy, Robert J. Allison, Jeffrey J. Malanson, and Francis D. Cogliano

18  What is a Public Intellectual?
    Christopher McKnight Nichols and Jeremi Suri

25  Before the Water’s Edge: Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Relations
    Andrew Johnstone

30  Policy History and Diplomatic History: Together at Last?
    Grant Madsen

35  A View from Overseas: Teaching and Reflecting on U.S.-Israel Relations in Jerusalem
    Olivia L. Sohns

37  In Search of a Solution: SHAFR and the Jobs Crisis in the History Profession
    Nicholas Evan Sarantakes and Brian C. Etheridge

    Stephen M. Streeter

43  The Diplomatic Pouch

46  Dispatches
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Presidential Column: Exploring Borders in a Transnational Era

Thomas “Tim” Borstelmann

It is a true honor and a pleasure to offer this greeting to my fellow SHAFR members. I recall how, thirty years ago, as a first-year graduate student, I stood amid the scholarly journal section of Duke University’s Perkins Library and first picked up a copy of Diplomatic History. Something about the cover design and the font style hinted at the scholarly authority of the inside pages. I was quickly hooked and joined the organization soon thereafter, although I never imagined writing a presidential column for it.

SHAFR already carried a weighty legitimacy three decades ago, and it has expanded and improved in many ways since. The organization enjoys a much larger and more diverse membership. The journal’s articles are downloaded and read more widely, well beyond SHAFR’s membership and beyond U.S. borders. Our once-modest annual meeting has transformed into a robust, lively, and quite large affair. Most important, our scholarly inquiry has broadened its scope in dramatic fashion, as “diplomatic history” evolved into “America in the world” and cultural and transnational approaches shouldered into the SHAFR party alongside longstanding diplomatic, political, economic, and military methodologies. The end of the Cold War and accelerating globalization midwifed this transition.

One of the most impressive developments in SHAFR’s recent past has been the expansion of Passport from a once-straightforward newsletter to a more varied and highly informative source of historical debate, research advice, scholarly reviews, and more. Its very name—“Passport”—serves as a rich metaphor for crossing borders in all directions and for encountering and engaging other cultures. The name acknowledges a particular history of modern states trying to manage and control the movements of their citizens and of foreigners, with an eye toward barring potential political subversives but also toward providing and shaping a labor force. “Passport” thus calls our attention to the intersection of the history of U.S. foreign relations with the history of immigration into the United States, two fields that have developed mostly apart from each other but deserve more careful consideration together. Indeed, this will be the subject of one of the plenary sessions at SHAFR’s next annual meeting in June in Arlington, Virginia.

The name “Passport” also reminds us of one of the most enduring truths of human history: people move. They do not stay still. People and societies are organisms in motion. The United States has been perhaps the most mobile of all modern societies, filled with migrations, emigrations, and immigrations, and home to the first automotive and commercial aviation cultures. Yet too often historians have imagined people and their countries as stable. Traditional diplomatic history, for example, focused on established states dealing with other established states. But the continual movement of peoples has now filtered up to the top of historians’ agendas, and SHAFR is unusually well situated to surf the current wave of transnationalism. Transnational processes have seized our attention: flows and diasporas of people, capital, ideas, behaviors, weapons, diseases, and much more. Their importance seems obvious in a globalized era, but then globalization and transnationalism have a long, long history, which SHAFR members are also at the forefront of exploring.

Most SHAFR members teach college and university undergraduates, so let me offer one brief observation about this key aspect of our collective work. While continuing to strive mightily for objectivity, historians have in recent decades come to acknowledge more readily the significance of their own circumstances for the scholarly questions they ask of the past. The same is surely true of our teaching. Using analogies and comparisons to the present offers great potential for helping students reimagine the past as accessible, complicated, and human, rather than distant and remote—a particular challenge in a culture as present-minded and future-oriented as ours. Humans are comparative thinkers in a basic epistemological sense; we learn by comparing new information to what we already know. Students, in my experience, are intrigued to begin imagining people in the past as much like themselves, full of competing motivations and complicated priorities, even if in quite different circumstances and cultures.

Perhaps the best place for SHAFR members to talk and learn more about what works in their classrooms is at our annual meeting. There we are surrounded by fellow scholars who teach the same kinds of courses and address the same kinds of topics: a truly natural cohort. This year we will be meeting on June 23–27, just a stone’s throw from Washington’s National Airport at the very pleasant Renaissance Arlington Capital View Hotel. Our superb and energetic Program Committee co-chairs, Brooke Blower (Boston University) and Jason Colby (University of Victoria), are working to assemble an excellent array of diverse panels and social events. Plenary sessions will focus on important new work connecting U.S. foreign relations to both immigration history and environmental history. Our Saturday luncheon speaker, Prof. Brian DeLay (University of California, Berkeley), will explore the history of the global weapons trade.

I urge younger SHAFR members, in particular, to attend the annual meeting. I recall my own first conferences as a mixture of excitement plus feeling a bit like a wallflower at a high school dance, worried at first that I hardly knew anyone and unsure whether I fit in. That did not last long. SHAFR members, in all their diversity, are a far too amiable and extroverted group of people for newcomers not to find a place for themselves quickly. Best of all, along with the new contacts and friends you make, is the opportunity to hear new ideas and interpretations, see other people perform on their feet, pick up tips for teaching and answering questions, and learn about new sources and technologies for research. For many of us, SHAFR has provided an important second scholarly community to balance our home department or graduate student cohort. Please come and join us!
A Roundtable on
Francis D. Cogliano,
Emperor of Liberty:
Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy

Jay Sexton, Eliga H. Gould, Shannon E. Duffy, Robert J. Allison, Jeffrey J. Malanson, and Francis D. Cogliano

Introduction

Jay Sexton

Few concepts in diplomatic historiography have had the staying power of the binaries of realism and idealism. This has been the case particularly in the literature on the foreign policy of the early republic. This persistent framework has had such pull that even those seeking to escape its grasp have found it difficult to avoid engaging with the labels.

Frank Cogliano’s compelling and cogently argued Emperor of Liberty seeks to reframe rather than resolve the old idealist/realist binary. To be sure, Cogliano has much to say in response to the traditional argument that Jefferson was a starry-eyed idealist. “He was not a doctrinaire ideologue,” Cogliano contends (10). But the book’s principle objective is to avoid flattening Jefferson into either of these categories. Jefferson, Cogliano argues, was “an idealist when writing about the future but a realist when considering the world around him.” This argument takes issue with the very categories of idealist and realist and focuses instead on the interface between abstract ideas and the practical contexts in which Jefferson operated. The reader is presented with a Jefferson who held firm convictions and had consistent objectives (namely, agrarian expansion and the promotion of open commerce abroad) but used a wide variety of means to achieve them that were dependent upon circumstances.

In seven deeply researched case studies, Cogliano examines how Jefferson sought to square means with ends, restraints with opportunities, and interests with ideals. The reviewers praise Emperor of Liberty, though each brings to the discussion distinctive views of the relationship between idealism and realism in Jefferson’s foreign policy. Jeffrey Malanson finds much to like in the book but wonders if ideology played a more decisive role in Jefferson’s embargo policy than Cogliano allows. Likewise, Shannon Duffy finds that the book convincingly explains how and why Jefferson could embark upon certain ventures, such as military action in Tripoli and the Louisiana Purchase, that appear on their face to violate his political principles. But she wonders how Jefferson’s preconceived ideas dictated — indeed, distorted — his foreign policy. Eliga Gould’s review helpfully places Emperor of Liberty into historiographical context and points toward further ways in which ideology and realism can be seen as “two sides of the same coin.”

Another feature of Emperor of Liberty commented upon by the reviewers is its coverage. Rather than comprehensively examining Jefferson’s role in foreign policy, Cogliano structures the book through seven chapters that explore specific episodes in Jefferson’s career. One of the most interesting — and the one that will be the least familiar to non-specialists — is the first chapter, which focuses on Jefferson’s unsuccessful tenure as governor of Virginia (the lowlight of which was Jefferson falling from his horse while fleeing from a British advance on Monticello in 1781). This chapter is central to Cogliano’s argument in that it enables him to flesh out how early career experiences conditioned Jefferson’s views on the conduct of foreign policy and led this anti-statist republican to embrace strong executive leadership in moments of crisis.

Two of the seven chapters in Emperor of Liberty focus on the conflict with Tripoli in the Mediterranean. Cogliano demonstrates here both the significance of economic objectives to Jefferson’s overseas agenda and how the Tripolitan War, far from being an irrelevant sideshow, lay at the center of Jefferson’s foreign policy, not least in how it showed his willingness to use force. Robert Allison applauds these chapters, noting that Cogliano’s close engagement with the primary evidence helps him to avoid the anachronism of recent works that interpret the Barbary conflicts through the prism of U.S. interventions in the Middle East.

Cogliano picks up on the issue of anachronism in his response. He acknowledges that all books, his included, are products of the time in which they are written, before making the case for the need to avoid the trap of presentism. He also points out that he lived and worked outside the United States at a time when many American commenters and statesmen were going to great lengths to present their nation’s policies in ideological terms. Their work led many foreign observers to conclude rather simplistically that U.S. policy is the straightforward product of an exceptionalist, missionary ideology.

Cogliano shows how Jefferson’s foreign policy portended and paved the way toward the global power established by his successors. “It might be said that Jefferson’s vision for a capacious American empire outlived its author,” he writes (246). Yet in this superb book he repeatedly (and rightly) stresses the limits of U.S. power in the early republic, thus avoiding the anachronism inherent in so much of the scholarship on the United States in the nineteenth century. Jefferson’s “empire,” Cogliano notes, remained “a weak state on the periphery of the Atlantic world” (203). Indeed, he refers to Jefferson as “the father of the first American empire,” a qualification that illustrates the need to highlight the specific contexts of the United States in the world circa 1800, even as the historian looks toward the longue durée of rising U.S. power (6).

Between Is and Ought

Eliga H. Gould

Emperor of Liberty, Frank Cogliano’s new book about Thomas Jefferson’s foreign policy, opens with the story of a plaster bust of Tsar Alexander I that the president
received in 1804 from Levett Harris, the American consul at St. Petersburg. Although Jefferson usually did not accept such gifts, the likeness became one of his most treasured possessions and eventually found a home opposite a similar statue of Napoleon in the parlor at Monticello. To visitors, the sight of the European autocrats must have seemed odd. Jefferson, after all, was the popularly elected head of an “empire of liberty,” not a hereditary monarch or a self-appointed dictator. Then, as now, people associated him with the ideals of democratic republicanism. Yet in his approach to foreign policy, Jefferson was at heart a pragmatist. In this, writes Cogliano, he was “not unlike his contemporaries Napoleon and Alexander” (10).

As Cogliano notes, this is a contentious argument. Fans and detractors alike usually see Jefferson as an idealist and view his handling of foreign policy accordingly. In their influential 1990 study Empire of Liberty, Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson argue that the animating goal of Jefferson’s statecraft was to create a “new diplomacy” that eschewed traditional strategies based on war and balance-of-power politics andvalorized peaceful negotiation and the recognition of universal rights. During the Louisiana Purchase, which doubled the territorial size of the United States without shedding a drop of American blood, the strategy appeared to work. (There was bloodshed, of course; but the blood that was shed belonged to the former slaves of Saint Domingue/Haiti and the hapless soldiers that Napoleon sent to subdue them.) On the other hand, during the maritime crisis with Britain, when Jefferson naively antagonized the world’s leading naval power, the strategy decimated the nation’s shipping and manufacturing sectors and brought the Union to the brink of collapse. Though sometimes the beneficiary of others’ realpolitik calculations, Jefferson thought (and acted) like a moral “crusader.”

According to Cogliano, such claims miss the mark. Taking particular aim at Tucker and Hendrickson—the co-authors are mentioned in four different places in the text—he maintains that what their book depicts as naïve idealism in fact partook of a good measure of hard-headed realism. In the case of the Louisiana negotiations, Cogliano writes that Jefferson knew, and was sure that the French and Spanish knew as well, that American forces would have little difficulty taking New Orleans, should a military operation prove necessary. Although he preferred to gain the colony through diplomacy, force was an option too. Force was also an option during the long conflict with Britain over maritime rights. Cogliano is under no illusions about the disastrous effects of Jefferson’s embargo on the American economy, and he concedes that the United States was fortunate to emerge unscathed from the War of 1812. “The embargo was flawed by design,” he says (241). Rather than seeing those shortcomings as the product of moralistic naivété, however, Cogliano argues that the Union’s weakness and the difficulties that Americans would face in an open war with Britain meant that Jefferson had no alternative. He also maintains that Jefferson was well aware that the resort to economic warfare might lead to a shooting war. In late 1807 and 1808, writes Cogliano, “Jefferson had relatively few options available to him. He chose economic coercion, preparatory to war, as . . . the least bad” (240).

All in all, I find myself in broad sympathy with Cogliano’s argument. As the early chapters of his book show, Jefferson’s pragmatic foreign policy had deep roots. Three setbacks from his early career loomed especially large in this respect: his ineffective (and politically embarrassing) response to the British invasions of Virginia between 1779 and 1781; his failed attempt as U.S. minister to France to form a coalition of lesser powers against the depredations of the Barbary pirates; and his inability as secretary of state to contain the French Republic’s freelancing emissary, Edmond-Charles Genét. All three left him with an appreciation of the need to combine the high-minded pursuit of republican ideals in matters of domestic governance—where Cogliano concedes that Jefferson was an idealist—with hard-headed pragmatism in relations with other governments. According to Cogliano, one of the clearest signs of Jefferson’s thinking was the Tripolitan War of 1801–1805, which he launched to protect American trade and with it the national interest in a rather narrow, realpolitik sense. By attacking Tripoli, Jefferson also demonstrated a willingness to use armed force rather than engage in the nonviolent (albeit craven) practice of buying the liberty of American seamen by paying off their North African captors. Chastising the Barbary states was many things, but peaceful it was not.

If Cogliano is right to insist on the pragmatism of Jefferson’s foreign policy, as I am persuaded he is, there are some questions that I would like to hear more about. One in particular is whether Jefferson’s foreign policy was quite as non-ideological as his critique of Tucker and Hendrickson makes it appear. Insofar as the question involves what motivated Jefferson to act, Cogliano has already said as much as he needs to. Even during the embargo, which practically everyone agrees was a failure, Jefferson maintained a clear sense of the national interest, and he was prepared to use a variety of means, including brute force and old-fashioned power politics, to protect it. Yet in order to be historically significant, moral principles do not necessarily have to be used as guides for political action or to be matters of firm conviction or ardent belief. Just as often, ideals serve as rhetorical screens and weapons to justify policies that may or may not have an ideological origin.

Yet in order to be historically significant, moral principles do not necessarily have to be used as guides for political action or to be matters of firm conviction or ardent belief. Just as often, ideals serve as rhetorical screens and weapons to justify policies that may or may not have an ideological origin.
In Emperor of Liberty, Frank Cogliano makes a persuasive case for the pragmatic underpinnings of Jefferson's foreign policy. The diplomat that emerges is both flexible and realistic. To say that this flexibility and realism included the ability to invoke the ideals of the new diplomacy without becoming a prisoner of those same ideals does not, I think, detract from either the man or this latest account of his accomplishments. Emperor of Liberty is an important book that diplomatic and political historians of the early American republic will need to address.

Notes:

The Pragmatic Philosophe? Review of Francis D. Cogliano, Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson's Foreign Policy

Shannon E. Duffy

In Emperor of Liberty, Francis Cogliano—who has written a work on Thomas Jefferson's relationship to historical memory and edited a collection of Jefferson's writings—aims to show the basic consistency in Jefferson's thought about foreign policy and to rescue him from charges of being a starry-eyed idealist. The book is based on the author's extensive and deep knowledge of Jefferson's writings, as well as a thorough grounding in the recent historiography of events of the period. In contrast to historians who depict Jefferson as overly naïve and idealistic, Cogliano portrays him as a pragmatic realist who consistently approached foreign policy with a flexible, hardheaded recognition of the realm of the possible. Jefferson was “an idealist when writing about the future but a realist when considering the world around him” (10). For Cogliano, this realism was reflected in two key aspects of Jefferson's performance in office: his accurate recognition of America's military weakness on the world stage and his use of creative methods to attempt to compensate for it.

Cogliano builds his case for Jefferson as a pragmatic realist by systematically examining seven specific episodes in Jefferson's life, ranging from his time as governor of Virginia through his tenure as foreign minister, secretary of state, and finally, president. By starting with Jefferson's governorship of 1779–81, rather than in the 1780s or 1790s, Cogliano aims to show a fundamental consistency in Jefferson's thought and action. Historians generally pay little attention to Jefferson's governorship, aside from noting that it was not his finest hour, as the most notable event in it was Jefferson's rather frantic flight from the British, “scampering” away into seclusion after his capital was in it was Jefferson's rather frantic flight from the British, ensuring that his actions would be approved by his legislature retroactively. His wartime governorship taught him a basic (and very Roman) lesson: that the executive was morally justified in exercising an extraordinary amount of power in grave emergencies; but in order not to slide into despotism, he had subsequently to submit his actions to the judgment of his legislature. This lesson played a crucial role in shaping Jefferson's future behavior as a political leader, especially in the realm of foreign affairs, teaching him the need for quick and decisive action and a certain flexibility in constitutional principles.

Jefferson's greatest priority throughout his public career was the preservation and expansion of his agrarian republic—through the protection of free trade. He may have envisioned America as an agricultural nation, but he did not see it as a pre-capitalist utopia. Overseas trade was a key component of his ideal. By exporting their agricultural surplus to foreign markets, Americans could continue to enjoy manufactures without having to undergo industrialization themselves, thus staving off the corruption that Jefferson believed inevitably followed a nation's turn to manufacturing. The twin goals of promoting expansion and protecting the trade that would make agriculture economically viable guided Jefferson throughout his career.

Cogliano's text also explains another seeming inconsistency in Jefferson's thought: his readiness to resort to military action against the Barbary nations of North Africa, as opposed to his apparently deep resistance to go to war with either Britain or France. The latter led to his most controversial decision, the Embargo of 1807. While Jefferson believed (erroneously) that the Barbary nations would be easily crushed, and he entertained the possibility of war with Spain over Florida, he strenuously resisted engaging the United States in war with either Britain or France because of the danger such a war would pose to the fragile republic. His alternative methods of dealing with French and British insults were, in essence, stalling mechanisms designed to give the United States time to better prepare for military conflict.

Cogliano convincingly explains how neither Jefferson's military action against Tripoli at the start of his administration nor the Louisiana Purchase violated his constitutional principles, as some historians have claimed. With regard to the Tripolitan War, Jefferson began military action without congressional approval because a state of war already existed (Tripoli being the one to declare war on the United States); he then went to Congress to seek approval of his actions. He followed the same procedure in the Louisiana Purchase, taking decisive action in a time-sensitive crisis but then obtaining retroactive legislative approval. While Jefferson had not instigated the Louisiana Purchase, his excellent sense of timing and adroit diplomacy ensured that the surprise opportunity to purchase the land was not wasted, leading to the greatest triumph of his presidency.

Cogliano makes a strong case that Jefferson as a public leader responded to events pragmatically and flexibly rather than as a stiff-backed ideologue hopelessly constrained by his principles. However, his own text shows a certain Aristotelian pattern in Jefferson's underlying beliefs. Jefferson's day-to-day actions might have been motivated by practical considerations, but his fundamental understandings of the problems that confronted him throughout his life seemed to be based mainly in his ideology and abstract ideals.

For example, it is well known that Jefferson centered his dreams for America's future around a nation of yeoman farmers who would be able to maintain their virtue longer because they were financially independent and did not have to rely on the whims of a patron or employer. This ideal is at the core of Jefferson's vision for the country, the prize that all Jefferson's actions were geared toward preserving. What should be noted as well, however, is that Jefferson's elevation of the virtues of agrarianism can go well beyond typical contemporary criticism of manufacturing societies, into the realm of the mystical. His attitude is clear in such statements as “Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people. . . . It is the focus in which he keeps alive that
sacred fire, which otherwise might escape from the face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example” (46). Jefferson's methods for sustaining an agrarian republic might be practical and pragmatic, but his reasons for wanting that agrarian republic ultimately seem to be emotional and irrational. That farmers were an inherently better, more moral people than manufacturers seems to be a basic, unquestioned premise derived not from life experience but from Jefferson's philosophy.

What is most striking throughout Cogliano's text, in fact, is the number of times that Cogliano proves that Jefferson acted pragmatically and decisively but at the same time failed in his actions because his basic assessment of the situation, which was derived from his tendency to arrive at premises beforehand, was in error. In the case of the Barbary conflict, Jefferson decided from the outset, while serving as foreign minister in the 1780s, that paying tribute was not an option. His ultimate reasoning does seem to be moralistic in nature: giving tribute to “pyrrhal states” was morally wrong. Jefferson saw it as a betrayal of American virtue to behave like the corrupted nations of Europe and submit to blackmail. He responded to the Barbary threat first by proposing an overly optimistic scheme to enlist other nations in a joint military venture (which never materialized) and then, as president, with overly rosy assessments of how much damage could be inflicted by U.S. military blockades. Jefferson's efforts to embargo the Barbary states, even at their most intensive, were hardly an unqualified success, particularly given their cost, and ultimately resulted in at most a significant discount on the ransom eventually paid for America's sailors.2

Jefferson's thought also seems to reveal a certain cold-blooded element at several points in his career, as when he chided U.S. diplomats for making personal funds available to the Barbary captives and thus revealing American concern for their well-being to their captors, or when he dismissed the murder victims of the French Revolution (some of whom Jefferson had known personally) as unfortunate casualties of the fight for liberty. His rather famous (or infamous) "Adam and Eve" quote concerning the Parisian prison massacres of 1792 is a classic in point: "My own affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather than it should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated. [W]ere there but an Adam and Eve left in every country, and left free, it would be better than as it now is" (96). Cogliano suggests that the extremity of this quotation shows the extent to which the French Revolution polarized American opinion. To me it also suggests something rather disturbing about Mr. Jefferson. Violence in fact often seems an abstract concept to him. While his fellow diplomat in France, the more conservatively minded Gouverneur Morris, was undoubtedly less inclined to admire the French revolutionary republic to begin with, Morris's experience of being caught up in a revolutionary mob in 1792, complete with heads on pikes, doubtless brought home to him the dangers of violent revolution in a visceral way. That was an experience his Republican colleague never had.3

Jefferson’s gift for misunderstanding underlying causation and his blithe dismissal of others’ pain as necessary for the good of the republic both played key roles in the episode that Cogliano himself acknowledges was a debacle: the Embargo of 1807. Once again, there were several key misconceptions at the heart of Jefferson's policy. By forbidding all export of American provisions, Jefferson hoped to starve both France and Britain into submission and force both governments to drop their restrictions on neutral trade. He failed to recognize, however, that both empires had other possible sources for raw materials. Jefferson also completely underestimated Britain’s level of fear in the face of Napoleonic France, attributing British motives to a desire to squash the neutral shipping of the United States rather than true military desperation.1 Once popular resistance to the embargo began growing, Jefferson tended to attribute this resistance to declining virtue among his countryside rather than the genuine economic pain caused by the embargo.

Cogliano defends the embargo by claiming that Jefferson had few other options. He maintains that Jefferson ultimately expected war; the embargo was a stalling mechanism designed to allow the United States time to get ready while preventing more British and French insults and attacks. The fifteen-month-long embargo ultimately had little to no effect on British and French trade, but it wreaked havoc on the American economy. U.S. exports fell from over a hundred million dollars in 1807 to around twenty million in 1808 (238). Jefferson's failure lay not merely in his initial conception of the embargo, but also in his stubborn refusal to acknowledge its failure over the next two years. Cogliano details the economic and diplomatic aspects of this failure but puts less stress on its long-term political effects within the United States.

It is unclear if Jefferson ever realized the extent of the damage his embargo did. It exacerbated regional tensions—precisely the danger Jefferson tried throughout his entire presidency to avoid—and created lasting ill will towards the Republican-led federal government that would haunt his successor's administration. Ironically, for a president long opposed to a powerful centralized government, enforcement of the embargo required a governmental power that in many ways was more intrusive than any customs decree passed by the British during the colonial period.

It is unclear if Jefferson ever realized the extent of the damage his embargo did. It exacerbated regional tensions—precisely the danger Jefferson tried throughout his entire presidency to avoid—and created lasting ill will towards the Republican-led federal government that would haunt his successor's administration. Ironically, for a president long opposed to a powerful centralized government, enforcement of the embargo required a governmental power that in many ways was more intrusive than any customs decree passed by the British during the colonial period. American ports were effectively closed by their country's own navy, and federal port authorities were allowed to seize the cargos of ships suspected of violating the act. Northeasterners, whose economies were especially hard hit, came to feel that the federal government was willing to use despotic measures against its own citizens and was unconcerned with their well-being. The Embargo of 1807 did keep the United States at peace for another five years, giving the country more time to prepare militarily. At the same time, it created such serious tensions within the nation that by 1812, President Madison was leading a profoundly divided people into war.

That Jefferson never seems to have recognized the extent of his mistake, attributing the embargo's failure to declining American virtue instead of recognizing, as Cogliano points out, that he as president had failed to “sell” the plan, seems to me to be one of the strongest examples of that ideological stubbornness that too often lurked at the core of Jefferson's thinking. There have been times, in fact, when I have wondered if Benjamin Franklin's famous description of John Adams—that he was "always an honest man, often a wise one, but sometimes and in some things, absolutely out of his senses”—could have been more aptly applied to Adams's colleague and rival, Thomas Jefferson.
The Republic of Letters: The Corferson to Madison, June 27, 1810, in 1810: “At length Gr. Br. has been forced to pull off her mask and
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Age of Revolution
4. Jefferson was still maintaining that this was Britain’s true goal in 1810: “At length Gr. Br. has been forced to pull off her mask and
show that her real object is the exclusive use of the ocean.” Jef-
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Jefferson and Barbary

Robert J. Allison

Jefferson scholars, according to Francis Cogliano, have given too little attention to the Tripolitan War. Dumas Malone devotes five pages to the war in his six-volume biography; a dozen of Henry Adams’s 437 pages on Jefferson’s first term concern Tripoli; Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson’s book on Jefferson’s statecraft limits its discussion of the Tripolitan War to a footnote—though a five-page footnote. Cogliano devotes two of his seven chapters to Jefferson’s engagement with the Barbary states and shows how this engagement was central to Jefferson’s overall strategic vision for the American republic.

Jefferson had a clear ideological vision but was pragmatic about how to attain it. This is Cogliano’s main theme—not that Jefferson was an ideological ideologue or a philosophical visionary, but that his goals for the American republic were rooted in the practical. Jefferson’s interest in the Mediterranean was economic, not ideological. The Mediterranean trade was worth $10 million each year; by threatening that trade, Algiers presented an existential threat to the American republic (170–71).

In his Report on the Mediterranean Trade (1790), Secretary of State Jefferson calculated the value of American trade to the Mediterranean: one-sixth of the wheat and flour produced in the United States, and one-quarter of the cod caught off the New England coast were sold in the Mediterranean. The cod trade alone employed 1200 men, on 80 to 100 boats. Algerian attacks on American merchant ships limited this trade; resolving the problem of Algiers could double it.

“We ought to begin a naval power, if we mean to carry on our own commerce,” Jefferson wrote to James Monroe in November 1784. The Barbary states threatened American trade, and without outlets for American agricultural goods the republican experiment would fail. “Can we begin it on a more honourable occasion or with a weaker foe” (51)? American commerce was essential to American agricultural production; a navy would be essential to protecting the trade in American grain and fish.

In the spring of 1785 Congress charged Jefferson and John Adams, the minister to London, with resolving the problem posed by the Barbary states and authorized them to spend up to $80,000 for treaties. Algiers was threatening, and Morocco, which had recognized American independence in 1778, had grown tired of waiting for an American negotiator to make a treaty and had seized an American ship to get the United States’ attention.

Morocco was easy. Thomas Barclay, an experienced merchant and diplomat, took six months to reach Marrakech, but four days after he arrived he and Emperor Sidi Muhammad made a treaty. It cost $20,000, but there would be no annual tribute. “Send your ships and trade with us,” the emperor said, “and I will do everything you can desire” (54).

Algiers would be more difficult. Before Jefferson could send a negotiator, Algiers captured two ships and took twenty-one hostages. With no experienced agent at hand, Jefferson thought Congress meant him to send John Lamb, a Connecticut mule trader who carried Congress’s dispatches to Paris. “He has followed for many years the Barbary trade,” Jefferson told Adams, “and seems intimately acquainted with those states.” Although Lamb also brought a reference from Connecticut’s governor, Jefferson had “not seen enough of him to judge of his abilities” (55).

Lamb’s abilities included neither haste nor discretion. After “many little disappointments” in the seven months he took to trek from Paris to Algiers, Lamb clashed with everyone—American hostages, Spanish and French consuls, Algerian officials—except England’s consul, who had been humiliatingly abusive to the American prisoners. Richard O’Brien, the captain of a captured vessel who had emerged as the leader and spokesman for the American hostages (and later would be American consul-general in Algiers) “could hardly believe Congress would [have] sent such a man to negotiate so important an affair as making a peace with the Algerines where it required the most able Statesman and Politician” (58). But not even the most able statesman or politician could have made peace on the terms Lamb was authorized to offer: $4,200 to ransom the 21 hostages. Muhammad V ben Othman, the dey of Algeria, demanded nearly $60,000. Lamb left Algiers. A year later another correspondent reported to Jefferson that Lamb was “about to embark from Minorca with a load of Jack-asses for America. Sic transit Gloria mundi.”

Tripolitan envoy Abdurrahman’s arrival in London raised Adams’s hopes, and he urged Jefferson to London. “There is nothing to be done in Europe, of half the Importance of this, and I dare not communicate to Congress what has passed without your concurrence” (63). Abdurrahman could arrange peace with Tripoli for £30,000, and with all the Barbary states for £200,000. Of Abdurrahman Adams said, “This man is either a consummate politician in art and address, or he is a benevolent and wise man. Time will discover whether he disguises an interested character, or is indeed the philosopher he pretends to be” (63).

Jefferson was not very impressed. The cost of peace would be far beyond what Congress was willing to pay. He and Adams had “honestly and zealously” set out to buy a peace, as Congress directed, but Jefferson had “very early thought it would be best to effect a peace thro’ the medium of war” (66). He estimated that it would cost £450,000 to build and man a fleet and £45,000 a year to maintain it. It would be more expensive than buying peace, but Jefferson believed that other nations would contribute funds: Portugal, Denmark, Rome, Venice, Sweden, the German states, and ports in Malta and Naples. He met with the consuls and ministers from the potential allies, proposing a “Convention Against the Barbary States.” To bolster support in America, he had the Marquis de Lafayette propose it as his own idea to George Washington and Foreign Minister John Jay. Jay submitted it to Congress, where it slowly but quietly died.

Jefferson’s Barbary Convention, Cogliano says, came out of his recognition of American weakness. He sought to use the country’s limited power in collaboration with other nations. Together they could blockade the Barbary corsairs and force them individually to treaties. “I am of the opinion [John] Paul Jones with half a dozen frigates would totally destroy their commerce,” he wrote to Monroe, “not by attempting bombardments as the Mediterranean states do . . . but by constant cruising and cutting them to peices.
[sic]” (51).

Though his Barbary Convention came to naught, Jefferson held onto the idea of sending John Paul Jones to Algiers. When Congress opted to purchase peace rather than use military force in 1791, Secretary of State Jefferson commissioned Jones to be the American negotiator in Algiers. Jefferson did not expect a purchased peace to last, so he told Jones to study Algiers’s defenses as “we look forward to the necessity of coercion.”

Unfortunately for Jefferson’s strategy, Jones died before receiving those instructions, and years passed before the United States sent an agent to Algiers again. Meanwhile, Algiers resumed its attacks, and by the end of 1793 more than a hundred American sailors languished in captivity there. Jefferson now was in retirement in Monticello, and though his political allies opposed the move, the United States began to build a navy to fight Algiers. However, peace was purchased before the frigates were launched. The Barbary treaties cost the United States $1.25 million (about 20 percent of the federal budget) and required annual tribute in the form of naval supplies, including ships and weapons. President Washington thought this “disagreeable” but saw no alternative “but to comply, or submit to the depredations of the Barbary Corsairs” (149).

Congress was not happy with the treaties, and by 1800 neither was Yusuf Karamanli, the pacha of Tripoli. The American tribute was always late, and the treaty treated Tripoli as an Algerian satellite. In October 1800 Karamanli gave the American consul six months to deliver $230,000 plus $20,000 in annual tribute. This demand reached the United States just as Jefferson was assuming the presidency. On May 15, his cabinet discussed Tripoli’s threats to American commerce and unanimously agreed that the executive must protect American interests. Jefferson dispatched three frigates and a schooner to the Mediterranean to observe, to protect American commerce, and, if necessary, to blockade any states that declared war, if possible in collaboration with other powers. When Congress reconvened in December he would inform it of these developments. The cabinet did not know that on the previous day—May 14, 1801—Tripoli had declared war by cutting down the flagpole in front of the American consulate.

Jefferson would try to fight the Tripolitan War without expanding the federal budget. By 1803 this strategy’s flaws were obvious. Three or four ships could not both blockade Tripoli and cruise the Mediterranean protecting American commerce. When one of the American frigates ran aground off Tripoli in October 1803, the war went from ineffective to disastrous.

Jefferson responded to this disaster—the loss of the second-largest ship and the taking of 300 prisoners—by sending six more frigates, five schooners, and a brig to the Mediterranean. Congress authorized a “Mediterranean Fund,” created with an additional 2½ percent tariff to pay for the expanded war and build more ships. From William Eaton, the American consul in Tunis, the administration learned that the Tripolitans were “very discontented and ripe for revolt; they want nothing but confidence in the prospect of our success” (166). The administration authorized Eaton’s plan to ally with Yusuf Karamanli’s deposed brother Hamet and lead a force into Libya rallying the Tripolitan people to cast off Yusuf in favor of his brother. But Jefferson also gave the naval commanders discretion in their support for Eaton’s venture, making it clear that American policy was to free American trade in the Mediterranean, not establish Hamet Karamanli in power in Tripoli. Eaton and Hamet Karamanli captured the city of Derna in April 1805, but the Tripolitan people failed to rise up for Hamet, and the naval officers negotiated a treaty with Yusuf that was favorable to American trade.

A deeply embittered Eaton recalled that Attorney General LeVõ Lincoln, before the venture to Libya, “amused me with predictions of a political millennium which was about to happen in the United States. The millennium was to usher in upon us as the irresistible consequence of the goodness of heart, integrity of mind, and correctness of disposition of Mr. Jefferson. All nations, even pirates and savages, were to be moved by the influence of his persuasive virtue and masterly skill in diplomacy.”

Jefferson’s policy in the Mediterranean was not to secure a political millennium, but to secure American trade. The policy was consistent with his overall strategic vision for the United States, as Cogliano makes clear in this study. The Tripolitan War was not a minor distraction; it was the major chord in Jeffersonian diplomacy. It was not an inconsistent use of force by a pacific chief executive, nor a stretching of constitutional strictures. Jefferson in the 1780s had advocated military force in the Mediterranean—a multinational alliance if possible, but a lone American venture if necessary. American commerce was the essential instrument for developing the American republic, and a navy would be required to protect trade in the world’s oceans. Cogliano takes notice of the Jefferson books that have downplayed Tripoli; he also takes notice of the books written since 2001 that try to show Tripoli as a precursor to more recent engagements with the Middle East. All are anachronistic. Cogliano takes Jefferson on his own terms and by focusing on the primary documents recovers the world as Jefferson and his contemporaries understood it.

Notes:

Pragmatism vs. Idealism in Jeffersonian Statecraft: A Review of Francis D. Cogliano’s Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy
Jeffrey J. Malanson

The standard historical narrative presents Thomas Jefferson as the primary example of idealism in action in early American foreign policy. Rather than being a realist of the George Washington school, Jefferson believed in a set of principles (chief among them were free trade, western expansion, and the sanctity of American rights) and his desire to see those principles unerringly defended shaped his foreign policy, regardless of on-ground realities or other practical considerations.

Francis D. Cogliano skillfully and persuasively challenges this narrative in Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy. At the heart of his investigation is an effort to confront the realist-idealist dichotomy: he argues that while “Jefferson proclaimed himself an idealist,” he was not a “doctrine ideologue” when it came to foreign policy (9–10). Cogliano frames Jefferson’s understanding of America’s republican empire as being “premised on access to plentiful land and overseas trade,” and he contends that the strength of this republican vision and its centrality to Jefferson’s statecraft renders any realist-idealist assessment somewhat useless (5). He asserts that “Jefferson was an idealist when writing about the future but a realist when considering the world around him... [A]lthough Jefferson was guided by a clear ideological vision for the American republic, he was pragmatic about the means he employed to protect the republic and advance its strategic interests.” To phrase this slightly differently, “Jefferson’s ends were consistent, yet he was flexible about the means he employed to achieve them” (10). Jefferson as pragmatist within a
larger idealist context is a new spin on the third president. The force of Cogliano’s argument and evidence encourages serious engagement with and an honest reassessment of the concept of Jeffersonian idealism.

It appears that an early version of this project would have focused primarily on Jefferson’s presidency as the time when he could most directly shape the direction of U.S. foreign policy, but Cogliano wisely (I would argue) broadened that focus to investigate a series of different episodes stretching across forty years of Jefferson’s public career. “We can understand Jefferson’s actions as president,” Cogliano explains, “only if we appreciate how he came to understand power and international relations throughout his career as an office-holder: as governor of Virginia, minister to France, and as secretary of state, vice president, and president of the United States.” This longer-term, episodic analysis serves to more completely “illuminate [Jefferson’s] understanding of America’s place in the world” (7). In seven chapters Cogliano examines Jefferson’s conduct as governor during Great Britain’s 1780–81 invasion of Virginia; negotiations with the Barbary states while he was stationed in France; his handling while secretary of state of the Nootka Sound crisis of 1790 and the French Revolution; his near powerlessness as vice president during the “Quasi-War” with France and his more aggressive response to the Alien and Sedition Acts; and finally, his presidential statecraft during the Tripolitan War, the Louisiana Purchase, the impressment crisis, the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty negotiations, and the embargo of 1807.

While much of this list represents the necessary “greatest hits” of Jefferson’s foreign policy, the first three episodes in particular go a long way toward explaining the longer-term trajectory of Jefferson’s views and illustrating Cogliano’s argument about pragmatic means and idealistic ends. The chapter on Jefferson’s term as governor demonstrates the development of Jefferson’s views on the role of the executive. These views might run counter to what many would expect of Jefferson, especially given his later concerns about the powers of the president under the new Constitution. The events that occurred while Jefferson was governor, including the British invasion, the inquiry into his conduct, and Virginia’s flirtation with giving the governor virtually dictatorial powers in times of crisis, fostered in him a belief, Cogliano concludes, that “an executive must act decisively in crisis. In so doing he might sometimes have to exceed constitutional limits, provided he did so for the public good and in the spirit of the constitution and, crucially, sought retrospective legislative approval for his actions” (34). Jefferson’s gubernatorial experience might not have had much to do with foreign policy, but it gives the reader the right perspective from which to approach the rest of the book.

While minister to France from 1785 to 1789, Jefferson repeatedly pushed for the United States to build a navy and go to war against the Barbary states rather than relying on negotiation and annual tribute payments to preserve peace and safeguard American commerce. Jefferson’s contention that the United States should not have to play by the same rules as Europe in dealing with the Barbary states contains a stronger idealist streak than Cogliano would allow, but it is an example that suggests how messy these assessments of idealism versus realism actually are. So much depends on the angle from which the episode is viewed. The call for a naval buildup and for war represents a more martial version of Jefferson than we are accustomed to seeing.

Amongst all the events covered in *Emperor of Liberty*, I was especially glad to see Cogliano include the Nootka Sound crisis of 1790 as part of his analysis. Aside from the ongoing challenge posed by the Barbary states, the threat of an Anglo-Spanish war on the American frontier, along with the upheaval it might create in the balance of power in North America, was the first real foreign policy crisis faced by the United States under the Constitution. In the end the United States was not required to act, but the Washington administration’s responses to the crisis revealed a great deal about international diplomacy and the role of the United States in the world at a critical juncture in the country’s history. It was a formative experience for both Washington and Jefferson. Taken as a whole, these episodes contextualize Jefferson’s worldview before the United States had to confront the extreme challenges posed by the French Revolution and two decades of Anglo-French war.

*Emperor of Liberty* is full of surprises. The Thomas Jefferson writing at the end of his governorship about executive power and a Virginia citizenry perhaps not entirely suited for republican government reads like a Federalist statesman in the making rather than the future founder of the Democratic-Republican party. Jefferson’s flirtation with the overthrow of the government of Tripoli in 1804, while ultimately abandoned, foreshadowed a staple of America’s twentieth-century foreign policy. Cogliano also embraces Jefferson’s inconsistency in a way that is commendable. Jefferson has been criticized by some historians for his lack of consistency in many aspects of his life, but Cogliano views the inconsistency as a mark of Jefferson’s blend of pragmatism and idealism: “[Jefferson] was not concerned about consistency in his methods so much as expediency in achieving his ends” (93).

Despite the complex image of Jefferson that *Emperor of Liberty* presents, this is a highly accessible book that will work extremely well in a wide variety of undergraduate classroom settings. Cogliano challenges our understanding of Jefferson and the differences between idealism and realism in U.S. foreign policy in ways that should yield thoughtful classroom discussions. The book also features one of the best summaries that I have read of Jefferson’s views on agrarian virtue, the corruptions of manufacturing, and the importance of commerce to the republican empire.

This is a book deserving of praise, but I do have to quibble with the subtitle—*Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy*—as it is too limiting a description of Cogliano’s study. I think that the term Cogliano might have preferred to use is “statecraft,” as he cites the concept repeatedly when discussing Jefferson’s leadership and decision making. The opening chapter on Jefferson as governor of Virginia, the treatment of his response to the Alien and Sedition Acts, and even his handling of the Louisiana Purchase are not really concerned with foreign policy so much as Jefferson’s conception of the powers of the state (and states) and the contours of republican empire. This is not a criticism; rather it is a commentary on the strength of Cogliano’s vision of the elements of Jeffersonian statecraft, which exceeds the more narrow bounds of foreign policy. It is possible, of course, that Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson’s *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson* (1990) made the use of “statecraft” impractical.

My main point of contention with *Emperor of Liberty* is that even though I found Cogliano’s argument to be important and thought-provoking, I was ultimately not
... convinced by it in every case. There were greater elements of pragmatism in Jefferson’s worldview than I previously would have conceded, but I continue to believe that idealism played a larger role in determining Jefferson’s foreign policy than Cogliano contends. The specific point of departure here is Jefferson’s decision to reject the 1806 Monroe-Pinkney Treaty with Great Britain. Jefferson and his cabinet decided not to approve the treaty, which would have replaced the expired Jay Treaty and “won some significant concessions” from the British (224). They were troubled primarily by the treaty’s failure to address concretely the impressment of American seamen into service in the British navy. Cogliano asserts that Jefferson believed “that it was politically and ethically impossible to compromise over the impressment question” and that his refusal to submit the treaty to the United States Senate for ratification was a “means to continue the negotiations [with Britain], not close them off.” Cogliano concludes that “Jefferson’s response to the Monroe-Pinkney treaty was grounded in a realistic assessment of the situation, not excessive idealism” (226–27). The ultimate result of the failed treaty negotiations was the embargo of 1807, which “historians often ascribe . . . to misguided Jeffersonian idealism.” Cogliano rejects this assessment, as “this interpretation assumed that Jefferson had a range of options available to him but was blinded by his idealism or moralism. On the contrary, Jefferson had relatively few options available to him. He chose economic coercion, preparatory to war, as, he believed, the least bad of these” (240). In this isolated instance, Jefferson did not have many options open to him, but that was because he had severely limited his options by having rejected the Monroe-Pinkney treaty earlier that year.

James Monroe and William Pinkney pragmatically negotiated the best treaty that they could, given both the constraints under which Britain operated (Cogliano describes Britain as being engaged in a “death struggle against Napoleon”) and the relative weakness of the United States (235). I would argue that the decision to reject the treaty because of impressment was not a decision grounded in pragmatism. Whether one wants to ascribe the rejection of the treaty to Jefferson’s idealism about American rights, his inability to assess realistically America’s weight in the world (a blind spot he frequently succumbed to throughout his life), or an impractical expectation that the British would give in to American demands in subsequent rounds of negotiation, the decision was not one based on a pragmatic assessment of likely outcomes. A dozen years earlier, the United States confronted a strikingly similar set of circumstances in its relations with Britain; the Jay Treaty preserved peace, secured important commercial concessions, but sacrificed larger principles on impressment and neutral trade. George Washington signed the treaty, believing that peace and commerce were more important for a weak United States than was taking a stand in defense of principles that could not be defended. Jefferson faced the same basic decision, and acknowledged the same basic weakness, but was unwilling to sacrifice principles, even temporarily. He effectively backed himself into a corner where his options were limited and had to choose between destroying American commerce with an embargo (another decision in part premised on an overestimation of America’s weight in the world) or war.

Even if I was not fully convinced in every particular by Cogliano’s argument, I cannot stress enough how worthwhile I found Emperor of Liberty to be. This is a highly readable and highly valuable reconsideration of Thomas Jefferson and his foreign policy that forces its readers to approach with fresh eyes and a new understanding the statecraft of our third president.

The Lowest of the Diplomatic Tribe: Idealism, Realism, and the Perils of Presentism

Francis D. Cogliano

I would like to thank Andrew Johns and Jay Sexton for this opportunity to discuss Empire of Liberty. I am very grateful to Robert J. Allison, Shannon E. Duffy, Eliga H. Gould, and Jeffrey J. Malanson for their careful and generous reading of my book. By way of a response, I would like to reflect on how I came to write the book while addressing some of the specific matters raised by the reviewers.

I was gratified that Robert Allison was invited to comment on my book. Allison’s Crescent Obscured remains the definitive work on the early relations between the United States and the Islamic world.1 I profited greatly from his work in writing my own chapters on Jefferson’s attempts to solve the Barbary “problem.” He is correct that my study devotes greater attention—two out of seven chapters—to U.S.-Barbary relations and the First Barbary War (1801–5) than previous studies of Jefferson’s statecraft. To some extent the focus on that conflict places Emperor of Liberty in context. As I write this, and as I was writing those chapters, the United States is waging war in the Islamic world. As with the First Barbary War, the conflict (thus far confined to airstrikes in Syria and northern Iraq) has raised questions over whether the president or Congress has the ultimate authority to wage war and whether the United States should commit ground forces to the conflict.

These, of course, have been recurrent themes in American foreign policy since 2001. As I noted in Emperor of Liberty, a spate of books on the Barbary wars have appeared (or been republished) since 2001. Several of these seem to have been written and published with the “War on Terror” in mind and present the First Barbary War as the “First War on Terror.” This type of presentism does little to help us understand contemporary conflicts and distorts our understanding of the past. We need to be aware of the context in which a particular book appears but, armed with that awareness, wary of allowing present-day concerns to distort our understanding of the past.

While one must avoid the perils of presentism, I believe Emperor of Liberty is, like all works of scholarship, a book of its time. As a scholar of the United States living outside of the United States, I have, for more than twenty years—a period that began when Francis Fukuyama anticipated the “end of history” and that includes the 9/11 attacks and their prolonged and bloody aftermath—witnessed the degree to which American foreign policy shapes the world beyond the United States. Meanwhile, the core constitutional and political questions arising from the policy decisions of the George W. Bush and Obama administrations—particularly concerning executive authority in making foreign policy and deploying force—couldn’t help but inform the questions I asked when studying Jefferson’s approach to statecraft.

Put another way, I devote much more attention to the Barbary War than Robert W. Tucker and David C.
Hendrickson do in their fine study of Jefferson's statecraft, as Robert Allison notes in his comments. Writing, as they did, when the Cold War was coming to an end, Tucker and Hendrickson focused on the place of the United States in great power diplomacy and dismissed the Barbary War as the equivalent of a “police action” from the latter part of the twentieth century. By contrast, Jefferson's policy toward North Africa takes on different cast when a book is being written, as mine was, in an era of persistent (and seemingly permanent) American “small wars” in the Islamic world. This is not to say that Emperor of Liberty is “about” the “War on Terror” and its aftermath any more than Tucker and Hendrickson’s book is “about” the Cold War. Rather, one must appreciate the context in which a work of scholarship appears. Emperor of Liberty seeks to examine the origins, development, and implementation of Jefferson's statecraft. It does so informed by a rich historiography. My hope is that the major themes the book addresses will transcend the current moment even as that moment informs some of the questions that I sought to address.

Jefferson has often been portrayed as a misguided idealist who failed to understand the diplomacy and statecraft of the great European powers and pursued an unrealistic foreign policy that resulted in the War of 1812, which was nearly catastrophic for the new American republic. This is certainly one of the themes of Tucker and Hendrickson’s Empire of Liberty. Eliga Gould interprets my critique of Tucker and Hendrickson as suggesting that Jefferson's foreign policy was “non-ideological.” I think that interpretation overstates the case somewhat. While I don’t feel that ideology was as important a driver of Jefferson's foreign policy as Tucker and Hendrickson do, I do believe it was important to Jefferson. My main argument in Emperor of Liberty is that although Jefferson was guided by a clear ideological vision for the American republic, he was pragmatic about the means he employed to protect the republic and advance its strategic interests (10). His ends may have been ideological, but his means were pragmatic. My view is that Jefferson was neither an idealist nor a realist in his pursuit of foreign policy. Moreover, I believe that the idealist/realist dichotomy, which is a product of the historiographical debates over American foreign policy during the twentieth century, is not appropriate for describing foreign policy during the early republic.

Jeffrey Malanson addresses Jefferson’s idealism in his review. He argues that “Jefferson’s contention that the United States should not have to play by the same rules as Europe in dealing with the Barbary states contains a stronger idealist streak than Cogliano would allow.” I’m not sure that there is all that much between my view and Malanson’s on this issue. In chapter 2 I discuss the debate between Jefferson and John Adams over the Barbary question during the 1780s, when they were both diplomats in Europe. I stress that Adams pursued a more pragmatic approach, arguing that the United States should pay tribute to the North Africans; while Jefferson took the position, which he believed was grounded in principle, that the United States should lead a coalition of lesser naval powers and wage war against the Barbary states.

Later in his review Malanson writes that he continues to believe “that idealism played a larger role in determining Jefferson's foreign policy than Cogliano contends.” He cites my treatment of the negotiations over the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty and the subsequent embargo. My view is that Jefferson decided not to submit the treaty to the Senate for consideration because it failed to address the issue of impressment, arguably the most important point of contention in British-American relations. I argue that Jefferson’s response to the treaty was grounded in realism in the sense that he appraised the situation, judged the treaty to be politically unacceptable, and sought to prolong the negotiations in the hope that Britain might relent on the impressment question. As Secretary of State James Madison wrote of the situation, “As long as the negotiation can be honorably protracted, it is a resource to be preferred, under existing circumstances, to the peremptory alternative of improper concessions or inevitable collisions” (quoted on p. 227). I don’t agree with Malanson that Jefferson’s rejection of the treaty arose from an “inability to realistically assess America’s weight in the world.” Rather, he rejected the treaty because he made an accurate assessment of America’s relative weakness vis-à-vis Britain. As with the later embargo, I think Jefferson opted for the least bad of the limited options available to him.

Writing of Jefferson’s approach to the Barbary states, Malanson states that “it is an example that suggests how messy these assessments of idealism versus realism actually are.” I am in complete agreement with him here. Where Jefferson is concerned, the realist/idealist dichotomy obscures as much as it reveals and doesn’t really help us to understand Jefferson’s actions. I believe Jefferson was guided by an idealistic vision for both the United States and international relations, but his tenure as a diplomat exposed him to the realities of power politics and the limits of American influence. As president, Jefferson grounded his policies in an awareness of American weakness. I think he understood just how weak the United States was in geopolitical terms. His tenure as a diplomat in Europe provided almost daily reminders of American inconsequence. As he wrote to James Monroe in 1784, “we are the lowest and most obscure of the whole diplomatic tribe” at Versailles. This is perhaps the most important issue over which Malanson and I disagree, rather than where we place Jefferson on some imagined realist-idealist spectrum.

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Shannon E. Duffy seems more comfortable than Jeffrey Malanson with my argument that Jefferson’s actions were pragmatic and that he interpreted events from an ideological perspective. She writes that “Jefferson’s day-to-day actions might have been motivated by practical considerations, but his fundamental understandings of the problems that confronted him, throughout his life, seemed to be based mainly in his ideological and abstract ideals.” In this I think Duffy and I agree. She argues, however, that Jefferson’s idealism was frequently based on erroneous assumptions that led him astray in foreign relations. She attributes his failures to actions taken “because his basic assessment of the situation, which was derived from his tendency to arrive at premises beforehand, was in error,” and she cites his mixed success in North Africa and the failure of the embargo.

Yet Jefferson felt vindicated by the Tripoli Treaty that brought the Barbary War to an end. While the United States committed to a one-off payment of $60,000 to release the crew of the U.S.S. Philadelphia, it did not commit to annual tribute payments, which was the point of principle over which Jefferson had waged the war. Nonetheless, the Barbary War was expensive—so expensive that one might argue that it vindicated John Adams's 1786 view that the United States would have been better off paying tribute
than waging war. Jefferson, by contrast, felt that paying tribute would be more costly in the long-run. In addition to the annual payments, new, more expensive treaties would have to be negotiated periodically with all four Barbary states.

Although I feel that Jefferson may have had a surer understanding of the international situation than Duffy does, I agree with her that Jefferson could be callous and indifferent to the suffering of others. Violence, as Duffy notes astutely, often seemed like “an abstract concept to him.” Perhaps that shouldn’t surprise us. During the course of his long life Jefferson held approximately 600 persons in bondage—including his own children. His assumptions about the efficacy and the consequences of the embargo were faulty, and his leadership therefore seriously deficient, in part because he was indifferent to the suffering the embargo caused and didn’t appreciate its extent. It was, as I argue in the book, a failure and his greatest mistake as president, and it seems to me to be the strongest evidence for Duffy’s assertion that Jefferson made bad policy based on faulty premises. I don’t think that he did so quite as frequently as she does, however.4

Eliga Gould raises an important question regarding the relationship between idealism and realism. He writes that sometimes “ideals serve as rhetorical screens and weapons to justify policies that may or may not have an ideological origin. If we think of moral principles in this way, it seems to me that there were times when Jefferson did play the role of the idealist, albeit in ways that were both calculating and nationally self-interested.” Perhaps the best example of such behavior is Jefferson’s purchase of the Louisiana Territory. While it was undoubtedly in the strategic and economic self-interest of the United States, Jefferson sought to justify it in ideological terms. He did so in part, I believe, because he was uncertain about its constitutionality. He toyed with drafting a constitutional amendment to sanction the purchase during the summer of 1803 but gave up the idea when it became clear that delay might lead to the collapse of the deal. At the end of the year he authorized U.S. and state troops to attack the Spanish should they attempt to prevent the transfer of Louisiana from France to the United States.

After the formal acquisition of Louisiana, Jefferson played the primary role in drawing up the Breckinridge Bill, which vested considerable power in the unelected, presidentially appointed governor of the Territory of Orleans (the most populous part of the purchase territory). Despite the apparent “realism” underlying these actions, Jefferson saw the purchase as a triumph of republicanism and justified it as such. His efforts perfectly illustrate Gould’s apposite observation calling into question the (largely imagined) distinction that some historians draw between realism and idealism.

Curiously, none of my reviewers considers the Louisiana Purchase in detail. That omission might have surprised Jefferson and his contemporaries, who regarded the acquisition of Louisiana as one of the most important achievements of his presidency. It surprises me, because the Louisiana Purchase sits at the nexus between idealism and realism, which is such an important theme for my reviewers. I think Eliga Gould offers a timely reminder that, ultimately, it is impossible to categorize Jefferson’s motives and actions as strictly “idealistic” or “realistic.” Jefferson’s foreign policy fused elements of idealism and pragmatism with mixed results. I argue that those results were as much the product of factors beyond Jefferson’s control, such as luck and the relative weakness of United States, as his actions. The relative neglect of the Louisiana Purchase in this forum (and the consequent emphasis on the Barbary War) suggests that each generation can and should ask new questions of Jefferson and his time.

I am very grateful to my colleagues for their thoughtful comments and observations on my book. They have given me much to ponder and have elevated our conversation on matters of war, peace, and statecraft with intelligence and generosity. Indeed, one might characterize their contributions as Jeffersonian in the best sense of the word.

Notes:
4. Duffy writes that “Cogliano defends the embargo by claiming that Jefferson had few other options.” While I believe that Jefferson’s options were limited in 1807, I wouldn’t characterize that analysis as a defense of the policy. I think Jefferson scholarship needs to move beyond defending or attacking Jefferson, and I certainly don’t see myself or my book as a defense of (or an attack on) him.
The 2015 SHAFR meeting will be held June 25-27, 2015 at the Renaissance Arlington Capital View in Arlington, Virginia.

SHAFR is excited to launch a new conference schedule this year! We will still have eight panel sessions, but the time for each session has been reduced by fifteen minutes. This will allow us to accommodate two plenary sessions and finish a bit earlier each evening. The conference will kick off with the first panel session at 11:45 am on Thursday, June 25. The plenary session will begin at 4:15 pm. Entitled “Immigration and Foreign Relations: 50 Years since the Hart-Cellar Act,” it will feature Maria Cristina Garcia (Cornell University), Alan Kraut (American University), and Donna Gabaccia (University of Toronto). The welcome reception, open to all registrants, will follow from 6:00 to 7:30 pm.

Friday’s plenary, entitled “New Frontiers: Environmental History and Foreign Relations,” will feature W. Jeffrey Bolster (University of New Hampshire), Kate Brown (UMBC), and John McNeill (Georgetown), will also be held from 4:15 to 6:00 pm.

Luncheon speakers will be SHAFR president Thomas “Tim” Borstelmann, the E.N. and Katherine Thompson Professor of Modern World History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and Brian DeLay, Associate Professor of History at the University of California at Berkeley. Borstelmann will discuss “Inside Every Foreigner: How Americans Understand Others.” DeLay, author of the award-winning and widely acclaimed War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War, will speak about the history of the international arms trade.

This year’s Friday evening social event will be a return to Top of the Town in Arlington, a setting that features sweeping views of Washington landmarks across the Potomac River. Tickets will include a full dinner and open beer, wine, and soft drink bar and will cost $50 standard or $30 for students, adjunct faculty, or K-12 teachers. Space will be limited so plan ahead! Top of the Town is located within walking distance of the Rosslyn Metro (blue and orange lines). Round-trip chartered bus tickets will also be available for purchase.

The LEED-certified Renaissance Arlington Capital View is located at 2800 South Potomac Avenue, two miles from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (airport code DCA). There is complimentary hotel shuttle service every 20 minutes between 7 am and 11 pm to DCA and the Crystal City Metro (Blue and Yellow Metro lines). In the lobby, SOCCI Urban Italian Kitchen and Bar serves breakfast, lunch, and dinner, while Espressamente illy Coffee House serves coffee and light fare during the day. A 24-hour fitness center and heated indoor pool are also available on site, and there is complimentary wi-fi access in the lobby. SHAFR hotel guests will receive complimentary Internet access in their sleeping rooms.

Conference room rates are $159/night, single or double occupancy, plus tax. The tax rate is currently 10%. The deadline for receiving the conference rate is May 27, 2015. Please note that the hotel is required to honor the reduced rate until this date OR until all the rooms in the SHAFR block have been booked. Once the block is fully booked, the hotel will offer rooms at its usual rate, if any are available, or may even be completely full. Please make your reservation as early as you can. Hotel reservations can be made by calling 703-413-1300 and asking for the SHAFR room block, or by going online to http://bit.ly/1v8GCB4.

Printed program booklets and registration forms will be mailed out to all SHAFR members with a current domestic U.S. address in mid-April. Online registration will be available in mid-April as well.

For more details about conference arrangements, visit the conference website at http://shafr.org/conferences/annual/2015-annual-meeting or follow us on Twitter @SHAFRConference. For questions about registration and other conference logistics, please contact Jennifer Walton, the Conference Coordinator, at conference@shafr.org.

Arlington, VA
June 25-27, 2015
See you there!
Without a large platform fit the public intellectual profile? What is the relationship between proliferating conduits to potentially vast audiences and the role of the public intellectual? Journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates tackles these concerns in a pair of articles in The Atlantic that address assumptions about what constitutes a public intellectual, about race and gender, and hint at how much of this sort of work is obscured by its very volume and velocity. Coates claims that Melissa Harris-Perry is “the foremost public intellectual” in the United States and a perfect example of the diverse, deeply imperfect, yet thriving contemporary public intellectual landscape. She has gradually built up a well-received media presence (hosting an MSNBC program) founded on a bedrock of academic credentials, a professorship (she is now at Wake Forest), a strong publishing track record in both scholarly and public arenas, and a history of activism.2

The ensuing debate—on blogs, on Twitter, in print, on air, among scholars as well as pundits—illuminated an essential problem about the act of doing public work and about the presence of recognized public intellectuals in American public life today. The New York Times and other mainstream media outlets have far too limited a notion of what constitutes a public intellectual. The proliferation of social media commentary and new outlets for doing public work—embraced by numerous historians, foreign relations scholars, human rights activists, international lawyers, policy analysts, and practitioners of foreign policy—hardly registers, despite the tremendous inroads that have been made to push public discussion on national and global issues of reparations, incarceration, human rights, genocide, non-proliferation, sex work, anti-violence, indigenous communities, and much more. The distinction between doing intellectual work and being an intellectual in public, now perhaps more significant than ever before, is crucial to understanding the changing place of public intellectuals in American political discourse.

Recognition of individuals as public intellectuals has skewed and stubbornly continues to skew all too often toward elite, empowered individuals (namely, white men: think of Paul Krugman or Chris Hayes today, and Walter Lippmann, Bill Buckley, or Christopher Lasch in the not too distant past). So, too, it has tilted only so far toward “diversity,” including primarily those with elite credentials and enlarged platforms such as Melissa Harris-Perry, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Diane Ravitch. Even when the notion of the public intellectual and the subject matter they can address has broadened, recognition has remained constricted. In response, many academics and activists using Twitter and other social media today, like Andrea Smith and Michelle Alexander, seek to do public work, not necessarily present themselves as public intellectuals, even as they seek to critique the status quo, generate new ideas, and promote debate and change.3

Still, laments about the lost role of public intellectuals
and related decials of increasing or dominant patterns of anti-intellectualism, with corollary questions about which figures qualify, how to broaden democratic discourse, and how to enact meaningful change, are remarkably persistent. The relatively recent historical construction of the idea of the public intellectual, therefore, bears further scrutiny.

On Definitions

What, after all, are the characteristics of a public intellectual? That phrase is remarkably new. Sociologist C. Wright Mills seems to have coined the term and developed the idea in The Causes of World War Three (1958), when he challenged his colleagues “to act as political intellectuals . . . as public intellectuals.” According to Stanley Aronowitz, Mills and other allied academic-intellectuals were responding to what they saw as the excesses of McCarthyism and the constraints of Cold War culture and politics when they promoted the shift of political intellectuals toward wider publics. They were trying to encourage debate and deliberation, to widen the boundaries of political discourse by urging political intellectuals to go public, boldly, and to present thoroughgoing critiques of U.S. society.


Russell Jacoby, writing before the ascent of social media as we now know it, bluntly rejected Said’s claims. “Can we say that Derrida or Said or Henry Louis Gates Jr. lead unrecognized or marginalized lives? It would be more accurate to state the opposite: they and other oppositional intellectuals hold distinguished positions at major institutions.” Susan Jacoby’s work on anti-intellectualism and the sources of “un-reason” in America and Steven Biel’s historical analysis of independent intellectuals seem to confirm the observation that public intellectuals need not be outsiders, though perhaps they “should” be in order to be effective along the lines laid out by Hofstadter, Said, or Russell Jacoby. These and other historical studies also demonstrate that as intellectuals’ public profiles have increased, very often their radicalism has been diluted or they have become domesticated by the very institutional connections (e.g., media, university) that make their wider influence as public intellectuals possible. Randolph Bourne observed this dynamic in “The War and the Intellectuals,” which provided a scathing critique of John Dewey, Walter Lippmann, and fellow liberal thinkers who sold out their intellectual-outsider stance to support the wartime state. Similar persuasive critiques have been made regarding the gradual de-radicalization of New Left activists after they entered the academy.

For the physicist Alan Lightman, the core distinction between doing and being a public intellectual was about “invitation” and about the possibility of overreach. He argued that there are three levels for academics doing public intellectual work. Level I involves “speaking and writing for the public exclusively about your discipline.” Level II work involves “speaking and writing about your discipline and how it relates to the social, cultural, and political world around it.” Level III is “by invitation only. The intellectual has become elevated to a symbol, a person that stands for something far larger than the discipline from which he or she originated.” Level III includes such figures as Noam Chomsky, Carl Sagan, Susan Sontag, Henry Louis Gates, and Camille Paglia. It is at the third level that Lightman believes the most care must be taken, because for every scholar “there is great responsibility” in “speaking about things beyond his or her area of expertise.”

This divide still seems rather artificial. Yet recognizing that there can be no precise definition of—or perhaps even characteristic insider/outsider stance for—a public intellectual does not mean that trying to understand the basic contours as well as the pros and cons of doing public intellectual work in practice is unnecessary. Concerns about historians and foreign relations scholars in the public square persist.

Insights from the OSU Archives: William Appleman Williams On Historians as Public Intellectuals

Taking a position several years ago at Oregon State prompted me to look at these issues afresh while working my way through the William Appleman Williams Papers (he taught at OSU from 1968 to 1988 and was there almost twice as long as he was at the University of Wisconsin-Madison). Williams’ political activism, along with his cogent, often provocative analysis of imperial tendencies in U.S. foreign relations, frequently took him far from strictly academic audiences. He rushed into pricksy public quarrels. He called for a new constitutional convention and confrontationally
advocated a return to the Articles of Confederation.

While the positions he promulgated were varied, he resolutely clung to his stance as an “engaged” public intellectual, as he put it. Historians, Williams asserted, have a special role to play as educators, scholars, and as public intellectuals. In making this case he offered some interesting suggestions about how historians might best connect with wider public audiences.

Though professional historians have a tendency or even a deep desire to deploy their expertise when addressing non-academic publics, and though audiences often will find it easy to put experts on a pedestal of sorts, Williams felt historians should avoid speaking as experts. He asserted that it is most appropriate to comment of pressing issues as a citizen, not an expert-from-on-high, when engaging the democratic public square. He observed that in his experience “[t]he best historians have been perceptive in defining and raising the more central questions faced by human beings throughout their existence. But history in this root sense does not offer any answers.” Instead, he asserted, “men and women of the present must provide their answers. Hence the historian must return to his own society as a citizen, and, with no quarter asked or given, engage other citizens in a dialogue to determine the best answers to those questions.”

Williams held fast to the term “public intellectual” and the idea of the historian-as-citizen-public intellectual, yet his work reveals a recognition of the many forces that align to limit the types of citizens capable of doing such work in and for the public; narrowing who “counts” as a public intellectual and often pushing out those without expert knowledge.

As one might expect, given his political commitments, Williams emphasized the “subverting” and “radical” position of historians in public. Yet he also made it clear that in his view an “intellectual can be a conservative (even a reactionary), a liberal, or a radical.” He hoped, however, that through historical knowledge and introspection about the relationship of the past to the present, non-experts could become effective social critics. In a 1983 essay he argued that “history is thoughtful reflection upon critically evaluated human experience . . . resulting in policies pursued with vigor and courage.” To formulate those policies, “Americans of all classes used History to establish context; to perceive and define relationships; to discount the face value of the rhetoric of their rulers and other special interest groups; and to reach and act upon their own conclusions.”

To follow Williams’ call to increase public historical knowledge and thus enhance deliberative democracy, historians and foreign relations scholars would have to play a role in bringing historical knowledge to the public. But how should they do so? There are many reasons for them to be wary of such outreach.

**Insights from the SHAFR Conference on the Pros and Cons of Doing Public Intellectual Work**

At the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations conference in Lexington, Kentucky, in June 2014, I sought to put some of these questions and definitions to the test. I informally surveyed colleagues about how they viewed their own public work and the “proper” role of historians—and foreign relations scholars in particular—doing public work or being public intellectuals. Three clusters of responses emerged.

First, there was a key distinction made about whether one should actively seek to reach a wider public. One distinguished scholar represented a widely held view: he felt it was an “obligation” to work with the public, but only when asked. He had never turned down a phone or email request for an interview or a comment, or an offer to write a brief public piece, but he had never sought one out, either. Others, particularly junior historians, asserted that they felt personally motivated to “be out there.” They aspired to do active, entrepreneurial outreach beyond the academy and saw it as a duty for the professional historian, and doubly so for foreign relations scholars who have much to contribute in terms of the historical dimensions of pressing international diplomatic and military challenges. Several scholars noted that they queried editors and producers, wrote op-eds and blog posts, and felt a deep compulsion to speak to wider publics (even if a good number of these efforts never saw publication and amounted to “wasted” time). Among the benefits of this approach that people mentioned were “getting your name and ideas out there” to potential readers and listeners, to fellow scholars, to editors, to journals, to book and article buyers, and to prospective employers.

Second, with regard to Williams’ claim that historians should work in public as citizens and not so much as experts, not a single historian I spoke with made such an assertion. Instead, most thought that their knowledge and positions were the *sine qua non* for public engagement (a contradiction one often encounters in Williams’ writing; he was very comfortable with the role of expert). Similarly, many scholars did not see their public work as advocacy but rather as informational and educational. Thus, most of the people in my modest sample at SHAFR felt that they wanted to try to present evidence related to past debates, policymaking, and events regarding the history of America’s role in the world to enhance discourse and to counter untruths or oversimplifications, but not to explicitly advocate particular political positions or partisan causes.

To be sure, however, a number of SHAFR-sites did intimate that they felt personally impelled to make political claims and desired to more directly impact policy-making.

Third, there was a widespread concern that distilling complicated research into clear language designed to reach broader groups was not for everyone. Some worried that such initiatives could sometimes be detrimental to careers or could be at cross-purposes with the primary scholarly mission and governing disciplinary norms (for example, several people mentioned their uncertainty about publishing with non-peer reviewed journals, online venues, or trade presses).

Conversely, many historians I spoke with were under pressure from their institutions to reach wider publics with their work in whatever ways possible. Outreach in such cases, a few bemoaned, was not driven by intellect or interest but rather was compelled by the imperative—increasing in humanities and academic work generally—to quantify production by generating meaningful “impacts” and scholarly “deliverables” that can be measured for assessment and promotion. Publishers, too, push scholars to generate enlarged public “platforms” for work via the creation of new websites, social media outreach, and related efforts. Other scholars I talked with argued that “desperate” public outreach propelled by institutional pressures of various sorts might lead to speaking dangerously beyond one’s knowledge base and outside one’s discipline (as Lightman warned it could). Too much outreach, they feared, might well marginalize historians or undercut their research findings, thus serving to limit not only their intellectual results but also their effectiveness in public outreach. It might also reflect poorly on their peers in the field.

Another fear quite a few people expressed to me was that public pronouncements might have negative repercussions, especially if they are taken out of context. The more polemical and political the public utterances, whether made as private citizens or as professors leveraging professional expertise (perhaps a useless distinction, given the blurring effects of social media), the greater the possibility of an attack by administrators, colleagues, students, or others. The academy, and particularly and most problematically
college administrations and boards of trustees, has not yet sorted out how best to understand the Twitter, blog, and other public activities of professors in today’s multiform media landscape. This lack of understanding may be the single greatest impediment to doing public intellectual work today. The possibility of adverse institutional consequences for public pronouncements has been further heightened by the high-profile case of Steven Salaita at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, fired before he could begin teaching but after signing a contract and after resigning a tenured position at Virginia Tech, by most accounts because of remarks he made on Twitter related to Israeli and Gaza. The irony here is that while institutions are clamoring for scholars to increase their public profiles and show the relevance of history and humanities to broad audiences, these very same institutions are censoring and making it clear that there are or might be significant limits to what is acceptable to say in public.

The response I heard most often at SHAFR about the cons of doing public intellectual work included all these components: the overriding dread of censorship and institutional consequences, an aversion to an overweaning media culture pushing for strong positions that lack nuance and complexity, and a healthy dose of skepticism about institutional imperatives toward quantifiable public impact of any kind. These misgivings are well founded. Williams, though he died in 1990, clearly perceived elements of these trends and feared the institutionalization of the academy. He also feared complacency. He maintained idealistically that in the “process of presenting ideas widely and accessibly, the historian should be honored and listened to, not for raising the questions but for the quality of his answers as a citizen. And, for that matter, the most meaningful way to preach a hope for mankind, and a belief in improvement, is to commit one-self as a citizen to that dialogue and effort.”

Onward and Upward?

In private correspondence as well as public writing and talks, Williams opined that historians of foreign relations who want to provoke and promote debate as well as enhance public understanding ought to offer their own Weltanschauung as a way to challenge the public. If the public is a power in and of itself, then it follows, according to Williams, that people must speak “truth” to the public. As he explained it, “[T]he honorable responsibility of such people is to provide their various pieces of the puzzle that the intellectual then struggles to put together into a coherent whole.” He thus slightly contradicted his view of historians as coming to the public square first and foremost as citizens.

Williams’ thoughts on historians’ participation in the public sphere are worth further examination. He considered it in metaphorical terms: most people, on seeing steel, would think about metals and aspire to make a better steel alloy. A few, however, would envision it as a means of creating a zipper. It is an apt comparison. In this sense, public intellectuals are revisionist visionaries; indeed, they might very well cast aside the label of public intellectual altogether. But though Williams clung to the terms “revisionist” and “public intellectual,” it was the combination of the two in praxis that he cared most about, particularly in the latter quarter of his academic career. Disillusioned by his experience of the New Left and his individualism as his target, but it is also what one draws upon to generate authority, issue opinions, and thus to do public intellectual work.

That said, it seems to me that in thinking about the U.S. relationship to the world, foreign relations scholars are in a superb position to deploy historical context to challenge assumptions and thus to “translate private issues into public concerns.” This sort of public work, deploying history responsibly to frame contemporary issues, to challenge the status quo, or to address meaningful questions, is certainly not for all of us. Yet I think the claims that such efforts amount to “selling out” or by their nature must succumb to superficiality or devolve into shallow self-promotion are misplaced. Still, Giroux and others today rightly caution that in an “age of intense militarization, selfishness, commodification and widespread injustices, educators, teachers, artists and other cultural workers must find new ways to struggle against being reduced to what Gramsci once called ‘experts in legitimation’.”

It is true that any public pronouncements—but particularly those regarding controversial issues—put historians in a vulnerable place, as we have seen in the troubling case of Steven Salaita. At the most basic level, historians must craft their remarks carefully. Public presentations must be succinct and accessible, as the venues for them generally prize concision over complexity and tend to reveal—even revel in—political and partisan commitment. As we have seen, participation opens up avenues for censorship and even punishment; but historians also risk cooptation by the very systems that they are seeking at least to challenge, if not to disrupt. Finally, the analysis—bridging the gap between scholarship and its relevance to contemporary choices—is harder than many believe. Nevertheless, with turbulence and uncertainty in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia, it is clear that many of the most pressing challenges in the world today are issues that historians and scholars of U.S. foreign relations are better able to address, in many registers, than anyone else. Let us ask the uncomfortable questions in public.

Notes

The author would like to thank Elizabeth Sheehan, Andrew Johns, Jeremi Suri, and his research assistant, Steven McLain.


I am devoting this present week to the effort—primarily through an article in Foreign Affairs (drafted by Mac Bundy but signed by four of us)—to force our government to abandon the option of “first use” of nuclear weapons which it has insisted on retaining for the past 30 years, and to which I have always been opposed. . . . Should the effort succeed, I would regard it as the most important thing I had ever had a part in accomplishing.

—George Kennan diary entry, 7 April 1982

Although George Kennan began his career as a Foreign Service officer, attained fame for his 1947 “X” article on the “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” and served brief stints as chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Staff and ambassador to Russia and Yugoslavia, he had been out of government for almost twenty years when he recorded this diary entry. He had spent those two decades—as his diaries attest—reading, writing, lecturing, and brooding...brooding a lot! He was firmly ensconced at Princeton University’s Institute for Advanced Studies, and when that bucolic isolation was not enough, he retreated to a rural Pennsylvania farm or to family dwellings in Norway. Kennan remained a major figure in print, but he was self-consciously isolated from the daily work of government. He had become the quintessential public intellectual: a literary figure who drew on his unique knowledge, gained from research and experience, to comment on public affairs.2

Public intellectuals are defined by neither their ideology nor their efficacy in influencing policy or public opinion. Their effect is felt in their contributions to civil society. They are not shadow politicians nor are they commanding elites. They are public educators who shake their readers and listeners into thinking more deeply and creatively about matters that are often ignored or subjected to banal conventional wisdom. They are essential—as Kennan was—for raising awareness about important issues and pushing debate in new directions.

Public intellectuals take strong positions on public issues, drawing on deep and rigorous thinking that ordinary citizens have neither the time nor the resources to pursue. And just as ordinary citizens need public intellectuals to help them understand and evaluate what their elected leaders are doing, established policy leaders need access to the learned opinions of public intellectuals as they seek to make sense of difficult real-world problems. Public intellectuals are thus bridge-builders between the frequently separate worlds of policy, academia, and professional life in modern society. Thinkers like Kennan publish information and opinions that bring people together in argument, if not in consensus.

Although public intellectuals know enough to be well informed about a range of issues, they are distant enough from inside expertise that they can bring fresh eyes to complex problems. They interrogate unstated assumptions, test evidence, and evaluate the implications of common decisions. And, perhaps most important of all, they propose alternatives. Criticism from writers like George Kennan helps those who make policy think more rigorously and broadly about what they are doing. The best work of public intellectuals pulls readers outside the daily rules that govern their behavior to see themselves and their positions from a different perspective. More often than not, policymakers will not fundamentally change their programs because of what they have read or heard, but they will refine their thinking when tested by a vibrant public sphere of learned opinion.

The best scholars of the subject agree that few things are as important to democracy as a learned public sphere.3 American history reinforces this argument. From the founding of the United States to the present, the most important decisions on war and peace have involved vibrant and diverse debate, with major contributions from public intellectuals. Decisions on war with Great Britain in 1812, Spain in 1898, Germany in 1917, Germany and Japan in 1941, Vietnam in 1965, and Iraq in 2003 all involved intense public discussion and dissent. While some question how
much influence these debates had on the actual course of decision-making, almost no one would argue that public discussion weakened American policy. If anything, public debates frequently re-calibrated policy (especially in the aftermath of a decision for war), and more debate would probably have been beneficial.4

This is the appropriate historical context for considering the role of public intellectuals. More than experts, advisors, or iconoclasts (like Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams), public intellectuals are contributors to democracy. The positions they take are less important than the questions they ask, and the ultimate correctness of their judgments matters less than the pressure they place on readers to think clearly and creatively in the national interest.

Christopher Nichols captures the questioning role of public intellectuals in his excellent essay, and he discusses some of their contributions to public debate. His essay, however, posits a false choice. Individual historians can, of course, choose to refrain from contributing directly to the public sphere for many legitimate reasons. The discipline of history, and the sub-discipline of American foreign relations scholarship, cannot make that choice. History is simply too important to debates about war and peace, and most related issues, for policymakers and citizens to ignore it. They never have.

Policymakers and citizens might invoke poor history to justify their actions, and they are always very limited in their understanding of historical scholarship. Nonetheless, they repeatedly turn to history for help in explaining the problems they confront (“Where did this threat come from?”) and how to move forward (“What can we learn from past efforts?”). For very practical reasons, history is foundational to public discussions of policy, and historians—professional and non-professional—will always be part of the public debate.

Those who choose to engage the public energetically are doing work that is as fundamental to historical scholarship as reading sources in the archives, writing monographs, or teaching undergraduates. One set of activities should not be privileged over another. Historical scholarship is a dialogue with the past for people living in the present. The past is always unreachable, and we are always tainted by the bias of presentism in our efforts to understand it. Resisting the urge to fetishize the false “purity” of particular sources and suppressing the narcissistic impulse to attack less learned policymakers historians do their work best when they respect various points of view and think rigorously about their relationship to evidence, circumstance, and human capabilities—all of which should be broadly defined.

William Appleman Williams was insightful, as Nichols shows, when he emphasized the importance of interrogating a “worldview,” but he was too limited when he assumed that worldviews translate consistently into policy outcomes. Quite the contrary. Worldviews shift considerably—although not completely—when they confront new problems and circumstances. One can see the roots of current American thinking about the Middle East in past assumptions about anti-communism, oil, and Orientalism, but those past assumptions cannot by themselves explain the 2003 war in Iraq. American withdrawal, support for the Arab Spring, and renewed war against both Bashar Assad and the Islamic State in the Levant.

Historians need archival sources, research monographs, and engagement with current public concerns to understand these and other policy shifts. That is our bread and butter: the study of policy change over time. But excavating a historical worldview, however valuable, is not sufficient. Analyzing the evolving push and pull on worldviews from the past into the present is an equally essential historical enterprise. It involves meditating deeply on the sources and lifting one’s head to look at their resonances. The interplay between past sources and contemporary resonances is the space for the public intellectual work of historians.

This analysis brings us back to Kennan. His anti-nuclear writings and speeches in the early 1980s are a powerful example of what public intellectuals can do and what they cannot. The purported author of the containment doctrine had spent more than thirty years thinking deeply about nuclear weapons. He had corresponded with many of the scientists who designed the first atomic and hydrogen bombs, he read deeply in the emerging scholarship about these weapons, and he contextualized them in relation to the foreign policy pressures of the Cold War. In his years out of government, Kennan also studied the history of diplomacy in prior eras, particularly the decades after 1870, and he drew on the knowledge of that history to assess assumptions about and expectations of military power in his own time. By the early 1980s, Kennan was as serious a historian of nuclear weapons and foreign policy as anyone else in the United States.5

He used his studies and his experiences to spark public debate. Kennan’s opposition to the continued growth of the U.S. nuclear arsenal reflected both his deep understanding of the dangers inherent in the superpower nuclear postures and his observation that an escalating nuclear arms race undermined diplomatic efforts at reducing international tensions. The latter was a particular concern for Kennan because of the crises during the late 1970s surrounding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the deployment of new intermediate range nuclear missiles by Moscow and then Washington in the early 1980s.

Kennan’s writings in Foreign Affairs and other publications contributed to what historian Lawrence Wittner has identified as a period of heightened anti-nuclear activism within the United States and various countries around the world. Critics protested in major cities; they put nuclear freeze resolutions to a vote in numerous American states, with favorable results; and they even found sympathetic listeners in government—most surprisingly, President Ronald Reagan and future Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. A public climate favorable toward nuclear abolition, Wittner shows, encouraged Reagan and Gorbachev to push unprecedented arms reductions, even as their close advisers expressed skepticism. Public opposition to nuclear arms control, or public apathy, would have made the Reagan-Gorbachev breakthroughs of 1986 and 1987 more difficult. The rapid warming of relations between the superpowers emerged from a growing desire to escape fears of nuclear war, and related crises, in both societies.6

Public intellectuals like Kennan did not necessarily drive this process, and one can imagine similar outcomes without them. One can also, however, imagine the skeptics of deep nuclear arms control in each society dominating policy if public pressures and respected opinions had been different, as they were a decade earlier. As late as November 1987, then-Deputy Director of the CIA Robert Gates warned President Reagan against trusting the Soviet leadership with serious nuclear reductions.7 Reagan and his more cautious successor, George H.W. Bush, could discount Gates’ warnings and push forward with disarmament negotiations, knowing they benefited from a favorable climate of public opinion within the country.

The point here is not to attribute the end of the Cold War to George Kennan, or public intellectuals, or anyone else for that matter. Public intellectuals do not make policy, nor do they dominate shifts in popular opinion. In fact, they are often frustrated by the limits on their power and influence. What Kennan’s non-government role during the late Cold War shows is that public intellectuals matter because they can push issues to public attention and contribute to broader shifts in perception. They question assumptions, they challenge inherited policies, and they provide leaders...
with alternatives, if they wish to pursue them.

Christopher Nichols’ insights, inspired by William Appleman Williams, give pride of place to public intellectuals who are radical, or at least dissident from mainstream politics. As historians, we are inclined to embrace the criticism and deconstruction of power. That is, of course, a legitimate and often valuable position, but it is not the exclusive role for the public intellectual. Thinkers who bring historical knowledge to the public make enduring contributions to a democratic civil society when they help to broaden the discussion of policy, even without radicalizing the dominant paradigms. Kennan contributed to a wide public discussion of nuclear arms control that helped change how the United States conducted itself in the Cold War without challenging communist containment or American postwar primacy—two goals Kennan had helped to promote.

Public intellectuals add value because they bring serious thinking to big problems. Historians of foreign relations have a lot to offer, and the politics of their advice should not matter. Historical perspectives on contemporary foreign policy—derived from close attention to specific evidence, a deep study of contextual developments, or a rigorous questioning of historical assumptions—are essential for democratic discussion. No historian should feel obligated to write for a particular public group in a particular way, but all of us as historians should care about getting our ideas into the public sphere. The historian-as-public-intellectual is close kin of the historian-as-teacher and the historian-as-writer. Our thinking matters for those outside our discipline, our profession, and our nation. Our thinking, in all its forms and biases, is part of our democracy.

Notes:
2. Many historians have, of course, written about Kennan’s long career. The fullest and most revealing biography is John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York, 2011). Gaddis covers Kennan’s period as public intellectual in detail. See pages 577–675.
4. Public debate is crucial to how I understand the evolution of American policies toward areas of occupation in war. See Liberty’s Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama (New York, 2011).
The old adage that politics should stop at the water’s edge is attributed to Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg. In the early years of the Cold War, Vandenberg argued for a bipartisan foreign policy with the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, claiming that Americans should not play politics with foreign affairs. However, he did not mean that foreign policy issues were completely off the table. As he explained to a Michigan constituent in January 1950, “‘bipartisan foreign policy’ means a mutual effort, under our indispensable two-Party system, to unite our official voice at the water’s edge so that America speaks with maximum authority against those who would divide and conquer us and the free world. It does not involve the remotest surrender of free debate in determining our position. On the contrary, frank cooperation and free debate are indispensable to ultimate unity. In a word, it simply seeks national security ahead of partisan advantage.” Even for Vandenberg, it was impossible to completely remove domestic politics from foreign affairs.  

That said, there has been a sense that in the past couple of decades, some historians have sought to remove domestic politics from the study of foreign affairs. Twenty years ago, Ralph Levering wrote a piece for the SHAFR Newsletter (the predecessor to Passport) that was inspired by the publication of the first volume of Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations. He found much to admire in the book but felt that it had “one glaring gap: the failure of any of the authors to offer a serious, detailed analysis of the role of domestic politics in shaping American foreign relations.” Aside from Melvin Small’s chapter on public opinion, there were limited references in the volume to elections, Congress, interest groups, and the media, and that both puzzled and disturbed Levering. He challenged diplomatic historians to give greater emphasis to these factors. Quoting from his own history of the Cold War, he argued that “emphasis on domestic factors is vital for understanding the making of U.S. foreign policy” and that “those scholars who seek to minimize the role of domestic politics . . . betray a gross misunderstanding of how the American political system actually works.”

Levering acknowledged the editors’ admission that Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations did not deal with all possible topics, methods or frameworks, but he had a point about domestic politics being slighted. In the twenty years since he wrote that piece there is still a sense—even a heightened one—that domestic politics has been slighted as an interpretative framework. There are two main reasons for that state of affairs: the rise of the “cultural turn” and the concomitant decline of political history, and the increasing internationalization of the field of American foreign relations.

There is no doubt that these two trends helped revitalize the field and went some way toward addressing criticisms that the history of American foreign relations was methodologically unsophisticated. The cultural turn broadened the field considerably and opened the door to new actors and approaches. The move to internationalize the field sought to place the nation in a wider international framework and make America a little less exceptional. However, these trends also appeared to offer a threat to those who promoted a focus on domestic politics. The new actors—while politicized—were not always part of the traditional political process, reflecting a move away from a focus on elites. Similarly, the move to internationalize—while not entirely new—was seen as a move away from a focus on the nation-state and an attempt to look outwards, rather than inwards, which also meant a move away from domestic politics.

Yet while these new approaches broadened the scope of American foreign relations, they by no means eliminated interest in domestic politics. The historiographical developments of the last few decades certainly made historians who were interested in political history and domestic politics sensitive to their place in the increasingly crowded field of American foreign relations. In some instances they sounded rather defensive. However, a focus on domestic politics remains an important way of analyzing U.S. foreign relations. This essay seeks to survey some of the literature of the past two decades that focused explicitly on the relationship between foreign relations and domestic politics (as opposed to the many, many works that touch upon the subject in a less direct manner). It focuses on the years since World War II and largely on historical works that examine the role of Congress, elections, and public opinion. Despite revealing a rich literature, it concludes by suggesting that yet more could be done to integrate interest in domestic politics with the increasingly widespread interest in a broader political culture.

The ongoing importance of domestic politics is reflected in one of the most important recent surveys of the field, From Colony to Superpower. In the introduction, George Herring acknowledges that domestic politics is an important factor in the development of American foreign relations and that the American political system has given a distinct character to the nation’s foreign policy. He notes that “leaders must pay heed to the democratic process,” and he highlights the influence of congressional criticism and support as well as the role of public opinion and lobby groups. While this influence varies dramatically over time, there is no doubt that “foreign policy has often been the object of fierce partisan dispute.” Herring is by no means the only author to incorporate domestic politics into a broader survey: numerous other studies have been even more focused and strident in explicitly emphasizing the need to incorporate domestic politics into foreign relations history.

The most notable survey of domestic politics and American foreign policy in the past twenty years is Melvin Small’s Democracy and Diplomacy. In a general thematic
overview that takes a deliberately broad view of domestic politics, Small assesses how electoral and party politics, special interest groups, public opinion and the media all affect foreign policy decision making. The volume remains an excellent starting point for considering the impact of domestic politics. Small is not as defensive as Levering, possibly because the book makes his case so forcefully, though he highlights a key reason why domestic politics has been overlooked: there is little documentary material to support it explicitly. The reason for the absence of such material is that “few leaders would admit in public—or even to their diaries—that such self-interested motives lay behind their foreign policies.” In a field that is methodologically dominated by archival evidence, a lack of documentation is a significant issue. Approximately ten years after Levering’s provocative piece, a number of scholars made similar arguments about the importance of the seemingly neglected theme of domestic politics. In his 2003 Bernath Lecture, for example, Jussi Hanhimäki argued that “the influence and role of domestic politics has been, with few exceptions, either ignored or given short shrift in discussions of U.S. Cold War policies.” Hanhimäki agreed that the shift occurred because of positive transformations in the discipline as a whole but expressed the opinion that the search for new perspectives led to neglect of older yet still valuable ones. While his argument that domestic politics led to an exceptionalism characterized by unilateralism is somewhat underdeveloped here, his basic point—that “one simply cannot understand foreign policy and international relations without relating it to domestic contingencies”—closely echoed Levering.9

Although it was not his primary focus, Fredrik Logevall made a similar point in his 2004 Bernath Lecture. In the wider context of his critique of containment, Logevall expressed surprise that recent works on early Cold War history neglected the influence of domestic politics on Harry Truman’s foreign policies. He attributed that neglect to a number of factors, including long-term historiographical trends (neither realists nor revisionists had given great weight to domestic politics), more recent trends such as the move to internationalize, and the dearth of archival sources: the same issue Melvin Small raises—and he called for a greater appreciation of domestic politics, where appropriate.10

In a 2005 article, Robert McMahon drew connections between the fields of diplomatic history and policy history, noting that despite the fact that historians in the growing area of policy history focused largely on domestic matters, the two fields actually had a lot in common and a lot to offer one another. Recounting the development of the diplomatic history field, McMahon observed that its Janus-faced nature, which led it to look both inward and outward, had created tensions since the 1950s, and he contrasted the relatively outward-looking Samuel Flagg Bemis and Dexter Perkins with the more inward-looking Thomas A. Bailey and Julius Pratt. He pointed out that the dual nature of the discipline had created “healthy intellectual tension” as well as “the interpretive divisions for which the field has become notorious.” The outward-facing diplomatic historians were clearly in the ascendant, but there was potential for connections between the fields of policy and diplomatic history, which offered a way to “strengthen and invigorate the work of foreign relations historians”—especially those who focused on domestic matters.11

Thomas Schwartz argued in his 2008 SHAFR presidential address that “that domestic partisan politics, the struggle for power at home, has played, and no doubt continues to play, a substantial role in the making and direction of American foreign policy.” Using examples—or smoking guns—from recorded conversations of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, Schwartz made a strong case that presidents do consider the problems of domestic politics while grappling with foreign relations issues and that the biggest challenge facing historians is making the kind of direct connections he was able to make, thanks to the White House recordings. He reminded historians that the connections are there, and he quoted Bill Clinton’s national security advisor, Anthony Lake, who compared the discussion of domestic politics in foreign policymaking to the discussion of sex and the Victorians: “Nobody talks about it but it’s on everybody’s mind.”12

Schwartz also noted that a second edition of Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations was published in 2004, and despite the fact that it had grown from sixteen to twenty chapters there was still no chapter on domestic politics. Making things even worse, Melvin Small’s chapter on public opinion had been omitted for the second edition. Schwartz’s disappointment again echoed that of Levering a decade and a half before: domestic politics was being slighted, and the field was worse off for it. He likened “explaining the history of American foreign relations without carefully examining public opinion and domestic politics” to “explaining the functioning of a car without discussing the internal combustion engine.”13

Fredrik Logevall again emphasized the importance of domestic politics as an interpretive framework with his response to Thomas Zeiler’s historiographical survey of the revitalized diplomatic history field in the Journal of American History. Despite Zeiler’s statement that the study of U.S. foreign relations “stood at the intersection of the domestic and the international,” there was, as Logevall points out, “one gaping hole in Zeiler’s essay: an almost complete lack of attention to domestic politics.” For Logevall, the problem was not that historians minimized the role of domestic politics, but that they increasingly omitted it altogether and treated “professional politicians involved in foreign relations as though they were not politicians at all.”14

Hot on the heels of this burst of articles came two books that sought to provide a more in-depth treatment of domestic politics in U.S. Cold War foreign policy. First, Logevall followed up his articles with America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity, a survey of Cold War history jointly authored with Campbell Craig. The book consciously rejects attempts by internationally minded historians to “de-center” America and places its focus squarely on the United States. In weighing the reasons why the United States adopted the foreign policy course that it did after 1941, the authors argue that “for much of the Cold War the domestic variables predominated over the foreign ones.” This claim perhaps oversimplifies their case a little, as they also lament the loss in recent scholarship of what they refer to as the “intermestic” dimension of foreign policy: the close but crucial interconnections between international and domestic factors. The intermestic focus reflects the book’s argument more accurately, though this analytical theme could have been drawn out more explicitly throughout the text. Nevertheless, the book represents an ambitious attempt to return some of the historical focus back to the era’s most powerful nation.15

America’s Cold War was quickly followed by Julian Zelizer’s Arsenal of Democracy. Much like America’s Cold War, this book is a sweeping account of the tangled relationship between domestic politics and foreign affairs
since the eve of World War II. Like Logevall and Craig’s book, it focuses on the highest level of Washington politics, though Arsenal of Democracy is arguably even more U.S.-centric. Zelizer opens with four central questions: whether the president or Congress drives national security policy; whether the Republicans or Democrats have a national security advantage; how big the American government should be; and whether the United States should pursue a multilateral or unilateral foreign policy. As is the case with America’s Cold War, the bulk of Arsenal of Democracy could have focused more explicitly upon the analytical framework laid out in the introduction. Yet the two books together still work as a strong reminder of the significance of domestic politics as an important—if not necessarily the only—variable influencing U.S. foreign relations.16

While America’s Cold War and Arsenal of Democracy offer the most explicit calls for greater attention to domestic politics from recent years, they are by no means alone. In addition to these broader surveys, there have been a number of more focused studies that highlight the influence of domestic politics on U.S. foreign relations. Some of these focus on the years prior to World War II and include debates over imperialism and over the nation’s entry into both World Wars.17 However, much of the recent literature—reflecting the continued post-1945 emphasis of the field as a whole—focuses on the Cold War era.

Leading the way is Robert David Johnson, most notably with Congress and the Cold War. This book challenges the view that Congress was marginalized during the Cold War years by an imperial presidency, only to reappear for the end of the Vietnam War before quietly disappearing again. Johnson goes beyond looking at treaties and declarations of war to examine Congress’s spending power, the workings of congressional subcommittees, and the role and influence of individual legislators. In doing so, he complicates existing assumptions about the role of Congress in the Cold War, offering a broad overview but also acknowledging opportunities for future study.18

Other more focused examples examine the link between Cold War propaganda and domestic politics. Steven Casey’s Selling the Korean War looks at the Truman administration’s efforts to promote the Korean War at home and the challenges that Congress and the press in particular presented for the dissemination of the war message.19 David Krugler’s work focuses on the domestic propaganda battles that resulted from partisan political disagreement over the Voice of America.20 Both books highlight the importance of domestic politics in complicating foreign policy issues at a time when politics was supposed to stop at the water’s edge. Another work that emphasizes domestic politics, this time from a political science perspective, is Benjamin Fordham’s Building the Cold War Consensus. It examines the linkages between domestic and foreign policy in the crucial period between 1949 and 1951.21

On the Eisenhower years, a key text highlighting the domestic-international nexus is Ken Osgood’s Total Cold War. While it was not Osgood’s intention to examine only domestic political influences, one of the key themes running through his examination of psychological warfare operations is the linkage between domestic and international matters and growing state-private networks. Osgood’s analysis successfully “serves as a reminder that it is important to look at the role of the state in contributing to the cultural context of the Cold War.”22 Also examining the 1950s is David Barrett’s The CIA and Congress. Barrett’s conclusion is that Congress had a surprisingly close relationship with the CIA, though it was an area where for the most part there was a bipartisan consensus that secrecy was more important than democracy.23

Much of the recent literature that has explicitly considered the role of domestic politics has focused on the Vietnam War. (Given the timing of archival releases, that is no great surprise.) This literature largely relates to ongoing debates about the nature of Congress’s role in and responsibility for the war in Southeast Asia. Julian Zelizer has explored the role Congress played in limiting the options available to both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.24 In Elites for Peace, Gary Stone examines the role of the Senate between 1964 and 1968, emphasizing its significance as a forum for Lyndon Johnson’s critics.25 A similar but more focused story can be found in Joseph Fry’s Debating Vietnam, which examines Senate hearings involving J. William Fulbright and John Stennis in 1966 and 1967.26 Vietnam and the American Political Tradition: The Politics of Dissent, edited by Randall Woods, is another assessment of the role of congressional critics. Collectively, these works add a great deal to our understanding of the decline of the Cold War consensus.27

However, recent scholarship has also made it clear that Congress was not solely a home for criticism of the war. Fredrik Logevall’s Choosing War has critics of the war as the narrative’s “heroes,” but Logevall also stresses the limits and failures of domestic critics of escalation.28 Robert Mann’s A Grand Delusion offers a political history of the war that acknowledges congressional critics but emphasizes those who were unwilling to speak out in public against policies they were happy to criticize in private, largely because of domestic political pressures.29 Building on his earlier work, Melvin Small’s At the Water’s Edge explores the complicated way that “domestic political issues affected decision-making and how the war affected domestic political issues.”30

Congressional complicity in the war is also a defining theme in Vietnam’s Second Front, in which Andrew Johns argues that “members of Congress played an essential part in the escalation and duration of the Vietnam conflict.” In addition to underscoring the role of domestic political considerations, Johns focuses on divisions within the Republican Party and concludes that the war ensured conservative domination of it.31 This line of analysis has been extended by Sandra Scanlon in The Pro-War Movement: Domestic Support for the Vietnam War and the Making of Modern American Conservatism. Moving beyond the well-explored antiwar movement, Scanlon taps into the growing interest in the rise of conservatism by examining the war’s supporters and their legacy.32

The rise of conservatism is an issue that looms large in the literature addressing domestic politics and foreign relations, especially in the post-Vietnam era. In Hard Line, Colin Dueck takes a broad look at Republican Party views on foreign policy since World War II. Tracing four strands of conservative foreign policy thought through the postwar era—realist, hawk, nationalist, anti-interventionist—Dueck ultimately concludes that Republican foreign policy has been dominated by a hawkish nationalism, and has been largely defined by presidential leadership.33 However, a more focused study by Julian Zelizer actually highlights the limits of presidential power. His article on the link between détente and domestic politics in the 1970s argues that Nixon and Ford’s attempts at détente “failed to create a stable political majority” and were limited by both hawkish anti-communist Republicans and the growing neoconservative movement.34

The growing strength of conservatism is also an area of interest for scholars of the Ford and Carter administrations. In his examination of congressional debates over Angola in the 1970s, Robert David Johnson notes how even as Congress showed its strength in the aftermath of Vietnam, conservatives ensured that a less hawkish or interventionist policy would not necessarily ensue.35 Julian Zelizer examines the ways in which conservatives took full advantage of Jimmy Carter’s inability to build a centrist foreign policy consensus in the late 1970s.36 Similarly, David Skidmore in Reversing Course argues that Carter’s foreign
政策变化没有直接导致国际压力的更大影响，但最终对卡特的巴拿马运河计划进行了批评。41 在冷战和热战中，利益相关者的立场和政策的实践。42特别是，出售战争在一个媒体时代聚焦于国内传播手段和更为感兴趣于考察总统时期的国内政治。43 而且，很多历史学家倾向于考察广泛的国内力量，以此来理解美国外交政策的影响和意义。44

许多历史学家仍然认为国内政治是理解美国外交关系的一个重要元素。它也表明，国内政治的影响不仅没有被忽视，而是被一些人可能没有意识到的边缘化。45 许多学者也越来越多地认为，应该有更大的互动，尤其是那些在研究国内政治和那些对美国外交关系有贡献的学者之间。这种互动将使历史学家更加关注国内政治的互动，从而揭示出影响和显著性。

这样的例子表明，从表面上看，国内政治可能不那么重要，但它们实际上对国际政策有深刻的影响。46 亚当・克莱默分析了美国总统的外交政策如何受到国内压力的影响。47 公共舆论在历史研究中的日益重要性表明，这种历史研究的动态性是必不可少的；这项调查表明反对这种动态性是错误的，但同意这种动态性在历史上占主导地位。

历史学家们研究了各种主题，表明对国内政治的兴趣仍然非常大。48 即使在冷战中也是如此。49 一些学者对非国家行为体的作用产生了兴趣，40 当他们发现新的问题需要研究时，他们通常会有联系到美国政治体系的。41 公共舆论的影响当然在非国家行为体中占主导地位，他们可以被纳入美国外交关系的历史。

美国国内政治的重要性在不同领域得到了体现。42 带出了一些议题，但是它们往往与国际政策有关。38 在1980年代，虽然切斯特・帕克对1980年大选和外交政策的研究在《外交史》上发表了一篇关于关系的考虑。39 虽然在很多领域，非国家行为体通常在起作用，但它们通常会影响国内政策。43 例如，1992年迈克尔・亨特概述了历史学家寻求解决的问题，他们对不同领域和学科的研究进行了综述，认为国内政治变得越来越重要。

注释：
4. 这是当然的，但是国内政治从来没有像想象中的那么重要。44 通过建立非国家行为体的参与，历史学家们更加关注国内政治，因此研究非国家行为体的学者也更容易参与进来。
5. 也请注意，非国家行为体在国际政策中的作用仍然非常重要，即使在冷战中也是如此。46 杰森・帕克提出了一个相似的论点：‘如果国内政治’被认为是这种方式，那么在最有压力的领域——不仅涉及选举和政治文化，历史学家应该在讨论国内政治和国家政治之间的关系时，也应该考虑到这一点。47 帕克的论点表明，这种历史研究的动态性是重要的；这项调查表明，国内政治在国际政策中的影响非常大。

2015年1月


17. A number of works on the period prior to World War II have a substantial focus on domestic political debates, even if that is not their sole or primary focus, including Michael Patrick Cullinane, Liberty or Death: American Anti-Imperialism, 1898–1909 (New York, 2012); Justus Doenecke, Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I (Lexington, KY, 2011); Robert David Johnson, The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA, 1995); and Robert E. Jenner, FDR’s Republicans: Domestic Political Realignment and American Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD, 2010).


23. David M. Barrett, The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy (Lawrence, KS, 2005), x.


31. Andrew L. Johns, Vietnam’s Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War (Lexington, KS, 2010). 4. The majority of Vietnam’s Second Front is on the Johnson years, which reflects the fact that Nixon administration material is still limited. Useful works on the Nixon years, though by no means focused solely on domestic politics, include Larry Berman, No Honor, No Peace: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York, 2001) and Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, KS, 1998).


37. David Skidmore, Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy and the Failure of Reform (Nashville, 1996).


41. Andrew Johnstone and Helen Laville, eds., The U.S. Public and American Foreign Policy (London, 2010).


48. For example, see Helen Laville, Cold War Women: The International Activities of American Women’s Organisations (Manchester, UK, 2002).


Ten years ago Robert McMahon wrote that it was “difficult to imagine two fields of scholarly inquiry with so much in common and yet so little interaction as diplomatic and policy history.” The two shared everything from methodological commitments to a sense of isolation within the typical American history department, yet they remained largely uninterested in each other. Nevertheless, he argued, with a little encouragement the two fields might eventually develop a lasting relationship, and a “cross-fertilization” might ensue. “One need not be an inveterate dreamer,” he concluded, “to imagine a future in which more diplomatic historians present papers at the Policy History Conference . . . and in which more policy historians whose work touches upon or overlaps with the foreign relations field present papers at annual SHAFR conventions.”

McMahon’s call was soon seconded (if only implicitly) by a handful of scholars writing from the policy history perspective. In a celebrated article in the American Historical Review, William Novak suggested that “amid the torrent of exceptionalist analyses of the limits, weakness, and backwardness of the American state, American history has overlooked the elephant in the room—the steadily aggrandizing authority of one of the most powerful nation-states in world history.” Policy historians, he wrote, had somehow failed to account for the rise of “a legal-economic and geopolitical hegemon.” John Fabian Witt added to Novak’s insight in a follow-up discussion (also in the AHR): “What would be nice to understand is the relationship between the American constitutional order and the emergence of American power . . . . How has the American constitutional system shaped the emergence of American strength on the world stage?”

This call for a history of the global American state spoke to the rise of several additional research areas, particularly American empire (sometimes referred to as the “new imperialism”) and human rights. Interest in these fields no doubt had something to do with the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which created a greater desire to understand the American state in its international context. In a sense, empire and human rights spoke to two sides of the same coin: the former offered a framework for understanding the external expression of coercive state power, the latter a framework for understanding the external expression of a state’s legal norms. Whatever their emphasis, these interests showed a greater desire to better understand the American state in its global context.

In his article, however, McMahon did not focus on themes like “empire” or “human rights” (although he did suggest a “growing interest in America’s impact on other peoples, nations, and regions”). Rather, he focused on broadly methodological overlaps between diplomatic and policy history and suggested that “comparative perspectives” on the American state (“the subject at the heart of both fields”) could reveal the “truly distinctive as well as the not-so-distinctive ways in which the American state has ordered its priorities and has pursued particular policies.” Comparative perspectives might also enable historians to “identify more effectively some of the interconnections between domestic and foreign policy.”

McMahon also suggested that diplomatic history’s “cultural turn” in the 1990s might provide insights for policy history. Here, the analysis proved a bit more complicated since, after all, “insofar as it pushes toward a kind of internationalization of cultural and social history and jettisons the state as the prime subject of analysis,” the cultural turn seemed “unlikely to resonate with policy historians.” Nevertheless, McMahon suggested that since cultural approaches are “multidirectional,” they could, in a roundabout way, provide insight into the state and policymaking. “To the extent that some of this newer [cultural] scholarship aims to deepen our appreciation for the deep-seated connections between state actors and the wider society,” he explained, “significant points of convergence between the two fields emerge.” In short, “the influence of policy communities and the importance of the broader political culture” might allow for appraisals of the state from a broader international and cultural perspective.

Now, a decade later, it seems fair to take stock of the collaboration between diplomatic and policy history. To what extent did McMahon’s article prove predictive? Has its promise been realized—and to what degree?

The early evidence suggests that policy historians have indeed heeded McMahon’s suggestion and embraced international themes. For example, in 2006, roughly seven panels at the biennial Policy History Conference covered international themes. By 2012 that number had doubled. Similarly, the Journal of Policy History has seen a marked increase in the number of articles addressing international questions. In 2005, McMahon’s was the only article in its pages to address an international theme. By 2011, 10 of the journal’s 28 printed articles did so.

As for monographs that take up international questions, the picture is a little more difficult to assess. Consider, for example, Princeton University Press’s “Studies in American
Politics: Historical, International, and Comparative Perspectives.” This is a prestigious series for policy historians where we might plausibly look for an increase in international themes over the last ten years. The press’s website lists forty-four monographs published since 1997. A quick glance suggests that 2005 actually marked the last gasp of internationally themed analyses within the series. Having averaged a book a year that combined policy and international themes before 2005 (such as Ira Katznelson and Martin Shetter’s Shaped by War and Trade), the press soon afterwards simply stopped publishing books with international themes.13

However, it must be noted that in 2010 Princeton did start a new series, edited by Sven Beckert and Jeremi Suri, entitled “America in the World.” This series lists eight monographs, five of which offer a collaboration between diplomatic and policy history (see, for example, David Ekbladh’s The Great American Mission).14 Perhaps some monographs that would have appeared in the “Studies in American Politics” series instead migrated to the new series. If that is the case, then indeed there has been a slight uptick from Princeton in publications overlapping diplomatic and policy history, from one a year to roughly two.

Perhaps the most optimistic recent statement corroborating policy historians’ greater interest in international themes came from the Perspectives on History issue dedicated to “Political History Today” (2011). The contributors had a wide latitude in picking their topics, but in the end the editors observed that an interest in “aspects of foreign policy and international relations . . . appeared[ed] to occupy much intellectual space in the subfield today.”15 Thus, we can say with some confidence that policy history has, indeed, embraced diplomatic history.

The question becomes more challenging when we ask if the flow of interest has gone in the other direction. Have diplomatic historians embraced the questions and methods of policy history? Some examples suggest themselves immediately: Michael Hogan’s A Cross of Iron, Julian Zelizer’s Arsenal of Democracy, and Jeremi Suri’s Liberty’s Surest Guardian all acknowledge an overlap in policy and diplomatic history.16 But consider a book like Andrew John’s Vietnam’s Second Front. Is this an example of such overlap? Could it have been written without help from policy history? Put another way, since McMahon admits that a great deal of diplomatic history already overlaps in methodology with policy history, how would we recognize when a work of diplomatic history has been informed by policy history without explicit statements to clue us in? Perhaps the interest only flows in one direction. Perhaps policy history has little to offer to diplomatic history.

Turning to recent job postings provides little help in this regard. Many schools have, indeed, sought young scholars who blend policy and diplomatic history in their research. But diplomatic and policy history have typically represented just two out of a long list of collaborative and potentially collaborative specialties that schools have sought. One 2010 search is typical: “We are interested in social, political, or policy historians whose scholarship engages questions of work, inequality, the economy, or political culture. We are particularly interested in scholars whose work places the U.S. in an interdisciplinary, comparative, and/or transnational perspective.”

Indeed, as diplomatic historians are well aware, the labels for internationally oriented research continue to proliferate, leaving little sense of what each term means (or whether they provide useful distinctions when they do mean something specific).18 In the face of this terminological proliferation, “diplomatic history” seems to be declining, eclipsed by titles such as “U.S. in a Global Context,” “Transnational History” and “International Relations.”

While some diplomatic historians see the change in the wording of job descriptions as largely semantic, others see in the new terminology a substantive shift within not only diplomatic history, but the historical profession generally. “The maps now being drawn have a range of orientations and labels,” wrote Kristin Hoganson,

including littoral and borderlands history (each of which imply certain geographies); migration history (which focuses on particular groups); international history (which, like U.S. diplomatic history and other state-centered U.S. foreign relations histories, emphasizes relations between nations); imperial and colonial history (which explores specific kinds of power relations); the history of global connections (which de-centers the United States); the history of the United States and the world (which may re-center the United States a bit too confidently); and the history of the United States in the world (which strikes a better balance between the national and the global).19

Indeed, Mario Del Pero asked whether “it still makes sense to talk of ‘diplomatic history’ or even of ‘U.S. foreign relations’ as fields?”20

The question of terminology and disciplinary definition is relevant here because it suggests that diplomatic history is not quite the unified entity it appeared to be ten years ago. From the outside, a perusal of the debates within Passport, on h-diplo, and elsewhere suggests that diplomatic history is currently undergoing something like what happens when an empire dissolves into its constituent parts: the divisions among approaches and interests seem to be more prominent than the commonalities. If that is indeed happening, then (as the sociologist Andrew Abbott has argued) the ensuing realignment will not only draw boundaries between each constituent part but will also give rise to new alignments within the broader system of historical research.

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The reason is fairly straightforward. The current divide within diplomatic history largely echoes the older and broader eclipse of political history by social and then cultural history (in the 1960s through the 1980s). Indeed, policy history largely emerged from the ashes of the older school of “presidential-synthesis” political history, albeit in fits and starts, as a way to continue to investigate states and power politics while accepting the criticisms leveled by social and cultural history. Specifically, social and cultural historians argued that political history had oversimplified politics, ignored marginalized peoples, and therefore
implicitly supported an elitist and conservative status quo.22 In the face of these criticisms, historians who wanted to write about American politics developed new methods and avenues talking about states and political elites.

Diplomatic historians who remain interested in state archives, narratives about political elites, and state-to-state historical accounts might take a page from policy history and its response to cultural historians’ critiques. Among other advantages, it might help diplomatic historians cut the Gordian Knot they have tied on the question of political power. As diplomatic historians are deeply aware, no sooner does one scholar assert that “the state is relegated to a secondary role in American history at the peril of losing a sense of the nature of power” (Thomas Zeiler) than another scholar responds that “if state-centered historians cannot appreciate multiple kinds of power, their analyses will remain narrow” (Kristin Hoganson).23 And so on.

Policy history takes seriously the way culturalists broaden our sense of power operating in society. They can agree with M. Todd Bennett (who wrote in these pages last year) that “socially manufactured values and perceptions…determine…’how people see other people, how they construct and imagine them, [and] how they treat them.’”24 Culture, in this sense, does the most to upset the typical elite-centered approach because it gets behind those elites, as it were, in the causal chain. Rather than view state actors determining the course of policy, cultural approaches show how those actors are themselves shaped by cultural forces—forces the elites often only vaguely recognize. “The French sociologist Michel Foucault has argued,” concludes Frank Costigliola, “that even more powerful than governments is the pervasive power of discourse. Discourses are the unquestioned beliefs, practices, and rules that restrict . . . how people think.”25

Of course, by “how people think” culturalists do not mean the thought processes or justifications for arriving at policy conclusions. Rather, culture defines the boundaries of what is “permissible”; it defines what might be acceptable. And it does this at all for all strata within a social hierarchy. As Foucault explained, “there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations.” Instead, the power implicit within culture provides common frameworks for “families, limited groups, and institutions”—indeed, every element within a society.26 Power, in this sense, circulates everywhere—from the margins of the social body to its institutional center—informing all it touches with broad cognitive categories and biases.

Cultural approaches to history can therefore account for a wide variety of phenomena we might consider psychological as much as political. Indeed, the two terms no longer appear to describe clearly distinct domains. “By showing the importance of personal identities and social norms to decision making,” Kristin Hoganson wrote, “[cultural] historians have made men involved in foreign relations seem less like disembodied agents of the state, and more like “culturally situated human beings whose personal lives cannot be disentangled from their professional decisions.”27 In terms of historical analysis, cultural approaches have the advantage of engaging a wide variety of sources not directly related to the policy actors in question even while describing their actions.

To be persuasive, though, cultural approaches depend on showing where and how culture has something close to a determinative effect upon policymakers’ decision making. While cultural historians are careful to avoid being too deterministic—culture provides only “the field of possibility for what can and cannot be done” rather than a set of policy outcomes28—the cultural approach nevertheless must show some causal link between cultural assumptions and policy outcomes, otherwise it is hard to see what culture has to offer as a mode of analysis. On this last point policy history diverges from culturalist assumptions.

Specifically, policy historians argue that cultural history has missed an equally important strata of social organization that also has deterministic qualities. Like culture, state institutions provide “fields of possibility” for policymaking. Cultural history, from the policy historian’s perspective, tends to be too reductive, positing a commanding culture anonymously directing political elites into replicating particular cultural assumptions. Policy history, by contrast, suggests that state institutions sit between culture and policy elites, often mediating between them. Culture has an influence on policy. But state institutions also count for understanding policy formation. As Theda Skocpol argued, “political activities, whether carried on by politicians or by social groups” remain “conditioned by the institutional configurations of governments and political party systems.”29

As policy historians turned increasingly to the evolution of policy within state institutions, they found themselves able to jettison much of the elite-driven approaches common to the political history of the 1950s. Moreover, they came to discover the powerful influence of institutional history in shaping policy.30 The ensuing literature on “path dependency” ended up demonstrating that policymakers rarely had a free hand in shaping policy; rather they remained dependent on the institutional environment they worked within.31

At the same time, and perhaps ironically, by showing that policy remains constrained by its institutional setting, policy historians also showed how institutions allow political elites to evade some cultural constraints. Put simply (if paradoxically), institutional entropy created institutional agency. This insight helped answer an initial important research question: namely, how had “the liberal state become so removed from its electoral base” and how had “old government reforms from the Progressive Era turned into the new political problems?”32 In this way policy history discovered, through the “back door” of institutional structures, room for elites and the institutions they guided to act with a (limited) degree of agency. As Theda Skocpol concluded, by the 1980s “it became fashionable to speak of states as actors and as society-shaping institutional structures.”33

To be clear, though, when policy historians speak of institutional agency, they do not mean the same thing as realists who imagine the state as a “near-autonomous entity within U.S. society.”34 Institutions, after all, remain moored to their historical roots. Any new policy remains constrained by past policy. Yet policy innovation happens. To explain the relationship between new and old policy and its connection to cultural norms, policy historians identified a plurality of political institutions each with a history and logic of its own, and each subject to unique cultural and political pressures. Policy historians thus tracked “multiple histories taking place simultaneously.”35 They discovered that policy innovation often occurred along fault lines and at points of rupture that divide institutions. If older political histories assumed a “great man” whose charismatic authority defined the politics of his age, current policy history speaks of “policy entrepreneurs” who exploit strains and fissures
to innovate within a constraining institutional framework. As Adam Sheingate explained, policy “scholars emphasize how creative actors exploit the tensions and contradictions between institutions created at different times or promote incremental innovations that transform institutions over time.”

Institutional tectonics may allow for policy innovation, but because policy innovation usually emerges at points of institutional conflict, innovation always faces resistance. New policy must negotiate an institutional environment already designed to frustrate its dissemination. Put simply, political power rarely functions smoothly or easily. It rarely “flows.”

As “public bureaucrats . . . pursue expansive agendas in a context that constrains their legitimate exercise of power,” Elizabeth Clemens observed, we must expect that “complexity and interdependence should increase with projects of state-building.” This approach helps explain, for example, the emergence of the multiple bureaucracies that concern themselves with national defense, such as the State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the Department of Homeland Security, each of which has an agenda of its own.

To summarize these insights with an example, consider the American military occupation of Germany after World War II. Lucius Clay (the governor of the American Zone) functioned under the direction of the U.S. military and the State Department and in concert with the other occupying powers in Germany: the British, French, and Soviets. However, each of these had distinct interests and histories. Thus, Clay found himself able at times to ignore directives from his own government, manipulate those who were his “superiors,” and develop a degree of autonomy as military governor.

At the same time, his power remained constrained whenever he tried to implement policy, because he had the difficult task of overcoming the institutional inertia and overlapping institutional jurisdictions that provided for his autonomy in the first place. As a result, he could reject some policy instructions from Washington with relative ease; but he had a great deal of trouble implementing his own plans, especially for Germany as a whole. For example, he instructed his subordinates to develop a plan to reform and stabilize the German currency, but he eventually succeeded, but only at the expense of a permanently divided Germany.

Policy history thus involves a theoretical framework that provides room for considering state elites, power politics, and state-to-state relations. It also provides a vocabulary for speaking to culturalists who have their own jargon when discussing political power. Cultural approaches do a great job of showing how cultural categories such as race, class, and gender find themselves replicated in policy, often in subtle and unacknowledged ways. Cultural approaches tend to gain insight by flattening “high” politics into a broad and wide cultural context. Policy history blends those insights with a deep institutional history. As Steven Pincus and William Novak recently observed, policy history’s “synthetic” approach to “the political” accepts the culturally “negotiated” nature of state power while recognizing that “negotiation and bargaining take place ineluctably in an institutional context.”

With that in mind, we can return to Robert McMahon’s article from 2005. McMahon’s first suggestion was that policy historians might benefit from an orientation toward “the international” for comparative insight and perspective. So far, the evidence would suggest that policy historians agree. They have slowly but steadily accepted his good counsel and taken up research beyond American borders. On the other hand, policy historians seem less inclined to accept his second suggestion: that culturalist insights coming from diplomatic history might provide greater context for understanding the policy process. Here, policy historians respond that diplomatic history has something to learn from them. Indeed, the next step in collaboration between diplomatic and policy historians might involve diplomatic historians adopting more self-consciously the institutionally based insights, jargon, and methodology that policy historians have developed over the last three decades. Emulating policy historians would be especially beneficial for those diplomatic historians who remain dedicated to “traditional” approaches that focus on state elites, state-to-state relations, and high politics. Whether diplomatic history remains a unified sub-discipline or divides up into a new realignment of historical specialties remains to be seen. Either way, policy history offers a theoretical framework that should be of value.

Regardless of the answers to all of these concerns, the fact that we continue to discuss McMahon’s article a decade later says something about the prescience of his insights. Indeed, much of the reason we still talk about his article is that we are still trying to make good on the promise it offered. There is still room for fruitful collaboration between these two fields, which have so much in common.

Notes:
1. This article is a revision of a paper presented at the Policy History Conference in Columbus, OH, in 2014. My thanks to Robert McMahon, Mitch Lerner, William Hitchcock, and Andrew Johns for their comments during the panel, many of which have made their way into this article.
10. As noted above, the 2014 conference included a panel dedicated to this topic. Using Internet sources I could not obtain a conference schedule for 2004 or 2008. The numbers of panels for each year I could obtain are: 2006—7 international panels; 2010—13; 2012—14; 2014—11. (source: http://jph.asu.edu/conferences).
11. My methodology here was not particularly strict, so another reviewer might come up with slightly different conclusions. The trend, however, should be consistent. The numbers are:

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12. This series is edited by Ira Katznelson, Martin Shefter, Theda Skocpol, and Eric Schickler.
14. David Ekbliad, The Great American Mission: Modernization and...
18. This, it would seem, is one lesson to be drawn from the extensive discussion under the title “terminology” on h-diplo in 2009 (http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplomacy&month=0903&week=c&msg=RWOhObKQ1Y16VmJxi%2BOMXg).
29. Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge, 1992), 41.
30. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State, (Cambridge, 1982); Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers.
37. This might be where policy and cultural history are most distinct. It appears to me that a great deal of cultural analysis depends upon the notion that power/culture provide a largely stable, unified “field of possibility.” While Foucault and others assert that culture has within it fractures, fissures and points of resistance (what puts the “post” in post-structuralism), the analysis only makes sense if these points of fracture and resistance are not substantial (see, on this point Neil Brenner, “Foucault’s New Functionalism,” Theory and Society 23, 5 (1994)). Policy history suggests that institutions and policy actors find resources for resisting and reshaping culture in a way that cultural history seems uncomfortable with.
39. As Melvyn Leffler has observed, Truman’s “administrative disarray . . . forfeited leadership to powerful protoconsuls abroad.” See Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1993), 104.
40. For a discussion of this experience from a policy perspective, see Grant Madsen, “Becoming a State-in-the-World: Lessons Learned from the American Occupation of Germany,” Studies in American Political Development 26, 02 (October, 2012): 163–79. See also Carolyn Eisenberg 41. Pincus and Novak, “Political History after the Cultural Turn.”
A View from Overseas:
Teaching and Reflecting on U.S.-Israel Relations in Jerusalem

Olivía L. Sohns

Editor’s Note: The following essay is part of the Passport series, “A View from Overseas,” which features short pieces written by scholars outside of the United States, examining the views held by the people and government in their country about the United States. SHAFR members who are living abroad, even temporarily, or who have contacts abroad who might be well-positioned to write such pieces are encouraged to contact the editor at passport@shafr.org. AJ

As a postdoctoral fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a newly minted PhD from Cambridge, I taught my first seminar this year. On the first day of class, I asked the students in “The Creation of the U.S.-Israel Alliance, 1948–1969” why they had chosen to take my course. There were 27 Israelis, 2 Palestinians, and 1 American in the class, and their reasons for enrolling in the class varied. Some of the students explained that they had taken the course to satisfy Hebrew University’s English-language requirement, but others were enrolled because of their interest in the historical bonds between America and Israel. They were aware of the fraught relations between the Obama administration and the government of Benjamin Netanyahu after Netanyahu’s decision to support Mitt Romney publicly during the 2012 presidential campaign.1

As the students introduced themselves, I heard many names that were new to me, including Lior, Lital, Moriah, Neva, Gili, Shir, Yativ, Amit, and Itai, but also some that were familiar, such as Elliot, Max, Gregory, David, Miriam, and Rebecca. The majority of the students were older, as most Israelis, except for Arab Israelis, are conscripted into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for several years. The students’ backgrounds were diverse. Two French students had made aliya (emigrated) to Israel, and two other students had grown up in America but had made aliya to Israel.2 A number of the Israeli students explained that they had family in the United States near Los Angeles and New York City, where there are large Jewish communities. The American student was enrolled at the University of Wisconsin and studying abroad for the year at Hebrew University. One Israeli student’s family had business interests in the United States: his family sold thatched huts to Jewish Americans to celebrate the Jewish autumn harvest festival of Sukkot. Another student had lived in Washington DC for a time when he served as the personal assistant to Major General Gadi Shamni, who was, until recently, IDF military attaché to the United States.3

The class met for an hour and a half each week from February to June and was conducted in English. The seminar examined U.S. involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 to 1969, analyzing the cultural, political, and strategic reasons for the emergence of the alliance between Israel and the United States during that period. Our meetings generally consisted of discussions of the weekly readings, which included both primary and secondary source materials.

I had access to a classroom projector to show video clips, such as Abba Eban’s television appearances in the 1950s and 1960s, to demonstrate how media portrayals of the Arab-Israeli conflict affected American perceptions of it.4 We also discussed Eban’s writings on Israel from the 1950s, in which Eban argued that Israel and America’s “special relationship” was a manifestation of their shared political and cultural values.5 One of our classes was, in part, devoted to a discussion of the influence of the blockbuster 1960 film, Exodus, on Americans’ perceptions of Israel.6

The round table in the classroom was ideal for discussing the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1950s and 1960s and the origins of the U.S.-Israel alliance.7 Several Israelis in the class informed me they supported the concept of Eretz Israel, which is generally translated from its Biblical usage as “the Land of Israel” and includes the territories that Israel conquered in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Other students were outspoken in their opposition to Israel’s settlements in the occupied territories and believed that Israel’s permanent expansion of its borders would render it impossible for the nation to remain democratic and demographically Jewish in character, given the large numbers of Palestinians residing in the occupied territories.8

Class discussion would sometimes become quite intense. My students’ parents and grandparents had experienced the events of the 1950s and 1960s that we discussed in class, and those events still resonated strongly in Israeli and Palestinian society. Some issues elicited emotional reactions from the students, including the Palestinian refugee problem that originated in the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948. A short clip of an interview of United Arab Republic President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s, discussing Israel’s creation and the Palestinian refugees’ plight, proved provocative; one student even objected to having it shown in class.9 However, others felt that it was important to show both sides of the issues in the Arab-Israeli dispute. They noted that some of their own grandparents had been refugees from Europe during World War II.

My Palestinian students, who were young women from Beit Hanina and the Old City, both located in East Jerusalem, told me they did not feel comfortable speaking

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in class because of the politically charged atmosphere in Jerusalem. I agreed that they could submit written critiques of the weekly readings as a substitute for class participation. Both students chose to write about the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the causes of the Palestinian refugee problem. Their papers reflected their belief that the Palestinian refugee problem continues to embody the Palestinians’ and Arabs’ sense of grievance that Israel was established with British and American support in a land that the Palestinians had regarded as their own. One of them also wanted to write a more contemporary study of the problems confronting Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, as Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem do not enjoy Israeli citizenship despite living under Israeli control. East Jerusalem is considered occupied territory.

The class focused on the first two decades of U.S.-Israel relations, but often the conversation in class would turn to more contemporary developments in the Arab-Israeli dispute. During weeks when we discussed John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson’s first major arms sales to Israel, my Israeli students expressed their gratitude to the United States for its assistance to Israel in developing the Iron Dome missile shield technology that enabled Israel to neutralize most incoming missiles from the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, my Palestinian students confided in me that they felt frustrated with American policy. They believed that if Israel was going to claim to be democratic like America, the United States ought to exert greater pressure on Israel to grant full citizenship to the Palestinians living under Israeli control in the occupied territories or permit the Palestinians to establish a sovereign state.

While teaching last spring, I conducted research at the Abba Eban papers housed at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute at Hebrew University into Eban’s role in fortifying the U.S.-Israel alliance in the 1950s and 1960s. I also organized an international conference entitled “Beyond Reapportionment: Cultural, Religious, and Political Influences on U.S.-Israel Relations” at Hebrew University, which was sponsored by the Davis Institute and the Israel Institute of Washington DC. The conference, held on May 25, 2014, fostered a discussion among scholars based in Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the reasons for the emergence and durability of the U.S.-Israel alliance. Fellow SHAFAQ members Zach Levey and Andrew Preston delivered very well-received papers, Levey’s on “The United States, Israel and Nuclear Desalination, 1964–1968,” and Preston’s on “Ties that Bind: Religious Liberty and the American-Israeli Special Relationship.” The perspective of panel participant Eran Etzion on “miscommunication” between Israeli and American officials was especially interesting, given his former role as head of policy planning in the Israeli government. A shared conclusion emerged from the papers: religion, ideology, and political considerations underlie the U.S.-Israel alliance, but during the Cold War and in the post-9/11 period perceptions of U.S. strategic interests strongly reinforced U.S.-Israel cooperation.

I was fortunate to be able to teach my course before the violence in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip during this past summer. I reflected on the fact that Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis, and Palestinians from East Jerusalem have returned to their classes at Hebrew University this year, just as they have done throughout intermittent war and violence in the past. The university is one of the city’s few shared spaces—a place where Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis, and Palestinians from East Jerusalem can interact on an equal footing. The light rail train line linking the eastern and western halves of Jerusalem that I took to work every day was once another such shared space, but rioting destroyed the stations in three Palestinian neighborhoods in July of 2014, and very few Palestinians make use of the line now.

I learned as much from my students as they did from my course. Whereas most of my previous experience had consisted of researching the Arab-Israeli conflict and the U.S.-Israel relationship from an academic perspective, most of my students and colleagues at Hebrew University had been living the Arab-Israeli conflict their whole lives, and their viewpoints were illuminating. I am very grateful to the Davis Institute for enabling me to spend a very memorable year in Jerusalem.

Notes:
2. On the reasons for the increasing number of French Jews emigrating to Israel in recent years, see Dan Bilefsky, “Number of French Jews Emigrating to Israel Rises,” The New York Times, June 20, 2014.
5. In this connection, see Abba Eban, “Israel: The Emergence of a Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 29, 3 (April, 1951): 424–35; and Abba Eban, Voice of Israel (London, 1958).
7. In July 2014, the CIA reported a population of 2,731,052 living in the West Bank (East Jerusalem included), counting Israeli settlers. Eighty-three percent of the population is Palestinian, 17 percent is Jewish. See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html.
9. B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, reported that as of 2010, 39.6 percent of Jerusalem’s residents were living in areas of the city that Israel occupied in 1967 (39.3 percent of whom were Jews, and 60.7 percent Palestinians). See http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem.
10. The participants included Noam Kochavi of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Zach Levey of the University of Haifa, Ziv Rubinovitz of the University of Haifa, Joel Peters of Virginia Tech, Amnon Cavari of the Lauder School of Government, IDC Herzliya, Jonathan Rynhold of Bar-Ilan University, Andrew Preston of Cambridge University, Myron (Miko) Aronoff of Rutgers University, Eran Shalev of the University of Haifa, Piki Ish-Shalom of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Eran Ezion, visiting fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute, Claire Spencer, director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, and myself.
In Search of a Solution: SHAFR and the Jobs Crisis in the History Profession

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes and Brian C. Etheridge

For the past three years, I have been running a blog called “In the Service of Clio.” Its purpose is to share insights into career management that I learned on my way to becoming a full-time professor; how to get into graduate school; when and where to publish; how to write yourself into a better job; balancing teaching and service obligations; and tricks to make your job application letter stand out from others. A series in the blog called “The History Ph.D. as …” explored alternative forms of employment for the newly minted historian. These are the topics that professors do not tell you about in graduate school.

Even before I started this blog, it was clear to me that the job crisis is the biggest problem facing the history profession. One of my goals was to offer some constructive commentary rather than simply sit on the margins and complain, so I was really gratified when Brian C. Etheridge tackled this very issue in “SHAFR and the Future of the Profession,” published in Passport two years ago.

I had mixed reactions to Etheridge’s article, however. He proposes that SHAFR adopt Ernest L. Boyer’s four different categories of scholarship in the study of U.S. diplomatic history: the scholarship of discovery; the scholarship of integration; the scholarship of application; and the scholarship of teaching and learning. I will not repeat his suggestions in detail. Suffice it to say that he makes a stimulating argument, and interested individuals should read his short but provocative essay.

The problem with Etheridge’s proposal is that it does not really resolve the big problem facing SHAFR—the fact that there are more historians than history jobs. Even if we do change the nature of what we recognize as scholarship, it will not change that fact. I should note that one factor that is less important than many people might think is the question of bias. It is fun to sit at a SHAFR conference and complain about the hostility of our colleagues in other fields and how diplomatic historians are losing their standing in the profession. These complaints have a solid grounding in truth, but when 120 people apply for one job, 119 are going to leave the process with bruised feelings. All of them are smart enough to have earned a Ph.D., and many of those 119 are doing really good and innovative work, but there can be only one hire.

Etheridge’s article does offer some very good ideas, and it got me thinking about additional efforts that SHAFR can make to help individual historians. Etheridge accurately describes some of SHAFR’s strengths. It has enormous advantages over many other scholarly organizations. Because of the generosity of the Bernath family it is well funded—far more so than most comparable scholarly societies. It draws a great deal of interest from the outside world—or at least much more than most other academic organizations. It is well organized, and it is collegial in a way that scholarly communities should be but often are not. Many of these traits, I suspect, stem from the fact that we spend a good deal of time studying bureaucracies and understand, at least implicitly, how large organizations work. These assets can and should be leveraged to help the more junior members of our field find meaningful employment.

I would like to build on Etheridge’s article and offer the following recommendations:

1. Create two new committees and/or vice-president positions to oversee them. The first should be for schoolteachers. This committee can offer important advice to SHAFR members who want to go into this field on the requirements for getting teaching jobs, which usually vary from state to state. It can also offer summer workshops to help keep schoolteachers well versed in history. The second should be for professional practitioners: scholars who are using their degrees in government service or history out in the public sphere. This division should develop programming that helps bridge the divide between SHAFR members employed in academic institutions and those who are public historians or work in think tanks or for the government, etc. The goal would be to make it easier for individuals to move from one field to another.

2. Diversify and improve the visibility of the SHAFR conference. Most of what SHAFR does at its annual meeting is great and I want to see that continue, but there are certain things that we can do to offer more services to members. First, we can designate a certain percentage of sessions—for discussing the teaching of U.S. diplomatic history. There are many, many opportunities to teach at the college level as an adjunct or...
in temporary one-year positions. Continuation in these positions is often a function of quality, and those of us who have been in the classroom for many years can share insights that might help others. In this sense, improving SHAFR’s commitment to teaching is a win-win situation for all involved.

We could also have a series of “The History Ph.D. as . . .” sessions, where several historians who work at institutions other than history departments—think tanks, for example—discuss their experience with and answer questions about these environments. How do you find a job at one of these organizations? How much time do you have to work on your own scholarship? How well does it pay? What unexpected perks or problems are there in this type of work? Other alternative career fields could include government service, congressional staff work, official historians, publishing, public history, library science, fields other than history (sociology, education, political science, public policy, etc.), literary representation, archival work, documentary filmmaking, document editing, museum curating, community college teaching, and journalism. Each session should be devoted to a specific field and have several speakers, since experiences differ. These could be lunch sessions that take place every day during the conference, and the series could continue for several years at SHAFR meetings. Passport should publish articles reporting on these sessions for those members not able to make the conference.

The profession would benefit if we promoted the conference systematically. The more attention the organization and the field receive, the better for all concerned. Raising the profile of diplomatic history helps improve its standing with colleagues in other fields who often make the decisions on what positions a department will hire. SHAFR has done well in having C-SPAN show up and record a few sessions, but we need more than one or two sessions airing at 9 p.m. on a Saturday night. Conference organizers should make an effort to promote every session in some way. In addition to bringing in C-SPAN, SHAFR can let trade publications know about sessions that affect their interests. For example, if a session focuses on strategic air power in the Cold War, perhaps a press release to The Air Force Times might be in order. If the session focuses on U.S.-Australian relations, perhaps we should contact the U.S. correspondents for The Age, the biggest newspaper in Australia. Promoting these sessions is easier when the conference is in the Washington D.C. area, since most news agencies have correspondents in the nation’s capitol.

3. Provide access to scholarly databases as part of SHAFR membership. SHAFR should make an arrangement with the likes of JSTOR and Project MUSE to make access to these databases a benefit that comes with SHAFR membership. Most SHAFR members will not need this type of assistance, but it will be a real benefit to graduate students, those that have graduated and have lost their access to university libraries, or are doing adjunct work, which often comes with restricted access to university libraries and their subscriptions to these databases. This access will allow these scholars to keep up with their colleagues who have full time employment at colleges and universities and combat the subtle but extreme inability of some scholars to stay engaged with their colleagues. SHAFR will probably have to subsidize this feature, but it could also be limited to student and unemployed members.

4. Write letters. Despite what we like to think about faculty governance, deans rather than faculty committees make the final decisions about the fields in which a department will hire. SHAFR should leverage some of the phenomenal success it has enjoyed of late (three SHAFR members have won the Pulitzer Prize in the last ten years, and another three were finalists) to convince deans to authorize searches for diplomatic historians. This type of letter should be signed by leaders in the field of diplomatic history (the SHAFR president, well-known former presidents, and/or winners of major book awards).

5. Create summer job placement workshops. My final proposal is that SHAFR begin running a summer workshop for newly minted history Ph.D.s to help them find alternative careers. To be effective, this type of program would have to be a multi-week residential program that combines a mini-MBA course with some training in writing résumés and preparing for interviews. This summer institute should also help with networking and bring in corporate and not-for-profit recruiters to meet with the participants. History Ph.D.s are not normally what headhunters are looking for, but they often have multiple languages and very useful skills in writing, research, and analysis that can be used productively in any number of fields.

The objections to this type of program are understandable. Students went to graduate school because they wanted academic careers, and SHAFR is a scholarly organization. Job placement is outside of its mission. These objections are easy to answer. For most people in graduate programs right now, a meaningful academic career is not realistic. The statistics make that clear. The real choice is between a non-academic career (or perhaps it is better describe as an alternative career) or none at all. SHAFR is also in a good position to create such a program. Most colleges and universities have placement offices, which bring in recruiters, but they are usually looking for a specific type of person and it is not the history Ph.D. These services are not really going to do much to help the newly minted Ph.D. SHAFR can do that. Doing so is also in the best interests of those members of the organization employed as professors. A mass of unemployed or underemployed individuals will always keep salaries down. If you want to get paid more, you need to limit the options of deans to hire cheaper sources of labor. Academic administrations are responding to the basic elements of supply and demand; when there is a good deal of supply, demand—which in this case comes in the form of salary—will go down.

These ideas might not be the best ones, and SHAFR may not adopt these programs, but like Etheridge’s article, they should help get the conversation started. If you have some different, better ideas, I would love to hear from you in this venue or some other that SHAFR sponsors.

Canary in a Coal Mine

Brian C. Etheridge

I was deeply honored that Nick Sarantakes referenced my essay in sharing his thoughts about the role that SHAFR can and should play in the profession. As many of you know, sometimes after you spend a lot of time putting an essay together you wonder whether it was worth the effort. But Sarantakes’s thoughtful engagement with my ideas and his own stimulating suggestions has helped assuage, at least partly, some of my doubts and fears about the ways that I spend my time. I agree with many of the helpful suggestions that Sarantakes has offered about potential actions that SHAFR could take to strengthen the profession. I think his best idea is diversifying the program of the annual SHAFR meeting.

Notes:
Sarantakes is right that more time needs to be devoted to teaching the history of American foreign relations. After all, most professors at most institutions spend most of their time teaching, and most of us have had little or no formal preparation in how to teach effectively. He is also on target in encouraging sessions about employment outside of the academy, led by those who have successfully carved out careers for themselves in other related industries. Finally, I strongly endorse his idea of better promoting the conference to outside stakeholders. I believe that all of these actions would make SHAFR, and by extension the profession, stronger.

But I'm afraid that I must continue to differ with Sarantakes on the crux of the matter. In this regard, I don't disagree so much with his prescriptions as with his diagnosis of the problem. In Sarantakes's view, the really big issue confronting SHAFR is “that there are more historians than history jobs.” While I agree that the jobs crisis is a very real and difficult challenge confronting far too many young, talented historians, I see it as more symptomatic of larger ills facing the profession and discipline. And although I still believe scholarly organizations like SHAFR are the best equipped to lead the charge in rectifying the situation, I continue to fear that they are ill-prepared by history or temperament to deal with the challenges.

In my view, the jobs crisis in diplomatic history, and in the humanities in general, is a product of the larger dilemma facing the liberal arts. States from Virginia to California are in various stages of creating databases that enable them to track student progression through higher education and into the work force. With the growing emphasis in state legislatures on career and workforce development, the liberal arts are often dismissed, as is reflected in the rhetoric of many of the nation’s leaders.

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the role of the Nixon administration in the 1973 military coup that ousted Chilean President Salvador Allende remains one of the great mysteries of the Cold War. While Nixon's hostility to Allende is no secret, the importance of U.S. policies in fomenting the military coup led by Augusto Pinochet remains highly contentious. In 1975, U.S. congressional hearings chaired by Senator Frank Church detailed many of the CIA's attempts to undermine Allende, including the operation to stop him from being elected (Track 1), and once that failed, to encourage a military coup that would prevent him from assuming the presidency (Track 2). However, the Church committee stopped short of judging "the effectiveness of American covert activity in Chile." The release of thousands of U.S. documents on Chile resulting from the 1998 extradition case against Augusto Pinochet did little to settle the debate: two major studies based on materials from the Chilean Declassification Project came to opposite conclusions.

One major issue that the FRUS documents help elucidate is why the Nixon administration took so long to try and prevent Allende from being elected. In early January 1970, Ambassador Edward Korry dismissed Chilean politics as a "coffee klatch," claiming that there was "little that will endanger U.S. real interests" in Chile or in the hemisphere. By the end of the month, however, Korry was warning the 303 Committee that Allende might be worse than Castro. Yet the State Department would agree only to a spoiling operation to draw votes away from Allende's coalition, Unidad Popular.

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The risks of expanding the spoiling operation by stepping up anti-Allende propaganda and providing subsidies to the opposition, as well as devising a contingency plan to bribe Chilean legislators into voting against Allende in the event of a congressional runoff, were just "too explosive" (42). After the spoiling operation (phase 1 of Track 1) failed and Allende won the election, President Nixon bypassed the State Department and the 40 Committee and ordered the CIA on September 15 to block Allende from coming to power (93).

In his memoirs Henry Kissinger claimed "we did too little and acted too late" because the State Department had underestimated the chances of an Allende victory. Had he known of the real danger earlier in 1970, he would have advised Nixon to initiate a covert operation to support the opposition candidate, Jorge Alessandri, who nearly beat Allende. The FRUS documents suggest that Kissinger's counterfactuals amount to wishful thinking. Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee, which learned on March 5,
1970, that an “Allende victory would mean the emergence of a Castro-type government in Chile.” (29). The CIA warned Kissinger in mid-June that pouring money into Alessandri’s campaign would be ineffective (34). True, early polls projected an Alessandri victory by a thin margin, but U.S. officials repeatedly cautioned that the election was too close to call. Korry reported in early August that the “very possible” election of Allende “will have a tremendous impact on US interests in Latin America and elsewhere” (48). Given how Kissinger strongarmed the 40 Committee after Allende assumed power, it is hard to believe he could not have taken charge at any point prior to mid-September.

The FRUS documents also challenge some of the memories of Edward Korry, the eccentric U.S. ambassador to Chile who emblazoned his cables with long-winded literary references that confounded his superiors. In 1981, Korry claimed that he had not worked closely with the outgoing Chilean president, Eduardo Frei, to prevent the inauguration of Allende.7 Phase 2 of Track 1, also known as the “Rube Goldberg” Frei reelection gambit, was Korry’s plan to prevent Allende from being inaugurated by circumventing the provision of the Chilean Constitution that prohibited consecutive presidential terms. The scheme involved persuading the Chilean Congress to elect Alessandri, who would form a military cabinet before resigning, which would allow Frei to run for the presidency again.

Most accounts date the origins of this plan to mid-1970, but Korry may well have gotten the idea from a conversation with Frei back in March 1969. According to Frei, the military was so fearful of social instability resulting from the upcoming contest between Alessandri and Allende that it was proposing a coup while Frei went to Europe. After a brief “military interregnum,” during which the military would get rid of extremists, Frei would return to resume his presidency of moderation (6).

Korry may not have spoken directly to Frei about using a similar scheme in 1970 to stop Allende, but he did communicate with Frei’s intermediaries about the “formula” (presumably a codeword for the Frei re-election gambit). Defense Minister Sergio Ossa, for example, told Korry on September 12 that Frei had agreed to the formula. Korry assured Ossa that he would do all in his power to guarantee safe passage out of the country for the plotters and their families should their efforts fail (79). Korry also told Frei indirectly “to take out every skeleton in the crowded Christian Democrat closet to produce converts among his Congressmen, to be prepared at the opportune moment to have the Carabineros [national police] detain the leaderships of the Communist and Socialist Parties, to frighten the hell out of his Armed Forces and to panic the country into more dire economic circumstances” (83).

The extreme measures advocated by Korry and others raised the possibility that the effort to stop Allende might spin out of control. On September 19, the 40 Committee deliberated contingencies in case a coup attempt failed. Kissinger informed the committee that while Nixon would not approve turning off the operation, a plan was needed for providing military assistance to the Chilean military in the event that a civil war broke out (104). The National Security Council staff posed the problem as a trade-off: any coup attempt would need “external assistance,” but any exposure of U.S. interference would strengthen Allende and damage the U.S. image in the hemisphere by “reawakening” memories of the Dominican Republic and Czechoslovakia (106).

Once the Frei re-election gambit was pronounced dead, the Nixon administration had no contingency plan in the event that Allende became president, so it struggled initially with devising a policy toward Chile that would give the outward appearance of civility but would also contribute to the destruction of Allende’s government. At the NSC meeting on November 9, 1970, President Nixon established the “cool and correct” policy that was to govern U.S. policy toward Chile for the remainder of the Allende presidency.

The Nixon administration had no contingency plan in the event that Allende became president, so it struggled initially with devising a policy toward Chile that would give the outward appearance of civility but would also contribute to the destruction of Allende’s government. At the NSC meeting on November 9, 1970, President Nixon established the “cool and correct” policy that was to govern U.S. policy toward Chile for the remainder of the Allende presidency. The main thrust of the policy was to “maximize pressures on Chile” by isolating the Allende government in the hemisphere and by reducing U.S. economic aid and Chile’s access to international financing. The key was applying the right amount of pressure that would not backfire by provoking a reaction that would actually strengthen domestic and international support for Allende (175). Nixon and Kissinger agreed that it was important to avoid unproductive hostility but “not ‘slide off into mindless accommodation’” (180).

On Kissinger’s recommendation, the “cool and correct” policy was accompanied by covert action aimed at bolstering Allende’s political opposition, including the newspaper El Mercurio (179, 259, 295). Kissinger also favored keeping the U.S. military mission in Chile because it would provide contact with the “one element in Chile that has the best chance to move against Allende” (183). While the broad outlines of this “destabilization” campaign are well known, the FRUS documents provide a more complete record of it, except that the names of CIA assets and the dollar amounts that went toward specific operations remain censored.
To maintain the facade of being “cool and correct” while carrying out clandestine operations aimed at creating a coup climate proved to be a difficult balancing act. One problem was how to control the pacing of events, especially when it came to the financing of private sector organizations. In 1972 State Department officials worried that “adventurist” groups, such as Patria y Libertad, might encourage Allende’s opposition to launch a premature coup that would fail or, even worse, lead to a civil war (305, 326). The danger of leaks weighed heavily on the minds of U.S. officials. Kissinger wondered if Allende would not get suspicious about how the opposition was getting its funding when he was trying to dry up their sources (271).

U.S. intelligence also faced great difficulties in obtaining reliable information about coup prospects. For example, in mid-1972 the CIA made several overly optimistic predictions that a coup was going to be launched by General Alfredo Canales (293, 307, 309).

The FRUS documents confirm a growing scholarly consensus about the coup, which is that the CIA was not directly involved in either choosing Pinochet to lead the coup or in its timing. As Kissinger was cautioned by U.S. intelligence two months before Pinochet’s coup, the “US lacks powerful or reliable levers for influencing the final outcome” (336). The speculation that CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters was somehow in contact with the September 11 plotters is also not sustained by this volume. While the editors might be faulted for not including several CIA reports on Pinochet in 1971 and 1972, it does not appear that Pinochet received much, if any, attention from the Nixon administration until he launched his coup. The lack of a conspiracy does not mean that the Nixon administration can escape responsibility for Allende’s downfall. As Kissinger told Nixon afterwards, “We didn’t do it. I mean we helped them” and “created the conditions as great as possible” (357).

Notes:
4. Numbers refer to documents rather than pages unless otherwise noted.
8. See Kornbluh, Pinochet File, ch. 1; and Gustafson, Hostile Intent, ch. 4.
1. Professional Notes

Brian Etheridge accepted a position as Professor of History and Director of the Center for Teaching Excellence at Georgia Gwinnett College.

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh) is the recipient of the 2013 (UK) American Politics Group Richard E. Neustadt Prize for the “best book in the field of US government and politics (including political history) published in the previous calendar year.”


2. Recent Books of Interest

Anievas, Alexander, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, eds. Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line (Routledge, 2014).


Byrne, Malcolm. Iran-Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power (Kansas, 2014).


Cullinane, Michael Patrick and David Ryan (eds). U.S. Foreign Policy and the Other (Berghahn, 2014).


Doyle, Don H. The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War (Basic, 2014).
Fields, Jeffrey R. State Behavior and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (George, 2014).
Harjo, Suzan Shown, ed. Nation to Nation: Treaties Between the United States and American Indian Nations (Smithsonian, 2014).
Hasanli, Jamil. Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1918-1920: The Difficult Road to Western Integration (Sharpe, 2014).
Kirkendall, Andrew J. Paulo Freire and the Cold War Politics of Literacy (North Carolina, 2014).
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devil’s Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941 (Basic, 2014).
Moser, John E. The Global Great Depression and the Coming of World War II (Paradigm, 2014).
Nicosia, Francis R. Nazi Germany and the Arab World (Cambridge, 2014).
Paget, Karen M. Patriotic Betrayal: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Secret Campaign to Enroll American Students in the Crusade Against Communism (Yale, 2015).
Poole, DeWitt Clinton, Lorraine M. Lees, and William S. Rodner eds. An American Diplomat in Bolshevik Russia (Wisconsin, 2015).


Weeks, Jessica L.P. *Dictators at War and Peace* (Cornell, 2014).


Yorulmaz, Naci. *Arming the Sultan: German Arms Traders and Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire Before World War 1* (Tauris, 2014).

Dear Peter,

As a 2014 recipient of the SHAFR Samuel Flagg Bemis dissertation research grant, I am writing to express my appreciation to the Society for its support of my project over the past year. Since recently finishing the chapter based on my SHAFR-funded archival research, I have had the opportunity to reflect on how invaluable the grant was in jumpstarting my dissertation process.

The grant enabled me to travel to several archives around the U.S., including: Freer Gallery Archives in Washington, D.C.; Houghton Library and Harvard University Archives in Cambridge, MA; Manuscripts and Archives at the Yale University Library and the Special Collections of the Yale Divinity School Library in New Haven; Bancroft Library in Berkeley, CA; Hoover Institution Archives in Palo Alto, CA; and Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections at Cornell University Library.

Drawing from the research conducted at these institutions, I completed the first chapter of my dissertation on the history of Chinese art collecting in the United States in the early 20th century. This chapter focuses on the establishment and work of the American Asiatic Institute—a forerunner of groups like the Institute for Pacific Relations, China Institute, and Asia Society—promoting cross-cultural understanding between the U.S. and China during the 1910s through the professionalized study of Chinese art and culture. I will present a portion of this chapter at the Berkeley International and Global History Conference in February 2015.

Please convey my gratitude to the members of SHAFR for their generous support. I look forward to participating in other SHAFR programs and events in the future.

Best,

Ian Shin
Columbia University

Dear Prof. Hahn,

I recently concluded my 2014 summer research, and I’m writing to convey my thanks to everyone at SHAFR who helped make it possible. The Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant I was awarded earlier this year was especially important in helping to fund my trip to London and Geneva for research at The National Archives of the United Kingdom and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) archives in Switzerland.

The research I did in both places was in support of my dissertation project, which examines how American uses of law in the Second Indochina War played into the creation, during the mid-1970s, of new parameters for the legitimate application of violence in international life. In Geneva, where ICRC records are not currently open for the entire period of my study, I focused my research on how the ICRC interpreted US legal obligations and practices in the early years of heavy US involvement in Vietnam. In London, I concentrated on the decade-long process of international negotiation that led to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, which entailed quite fundamental revisions to the laws of war. The time spent and material gathered in both archives will allow me to adjust, refine and substantiate my arguments as I sit down to write them up into dissertation chapters over the coming months.

During my summer travels, I was also fortunate enough to take part in SHAFR’s annual meeting in Lexington and this year’s SHAFR Summer Institute in Williamstown. Both further showed, for me, SHAFR’s commitment to its younger members. Thanks, again, for the support.

Yours sincerely,

Brian Cuddy
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of History

I applied for the Michael Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship in order to enhance my ability to conduct primary research in Korean-language sources. Through my previous experience with Korean-language documents, I found that I would need to improve my grasp of advanced vocabulary and grammar as well my ability to read hanja to effectively conduct research. Therefore, using funds from the Hogan Fellowship, I undertook an intensive course of Korean language study in South Korea that included completing of a Korean language course at Yonsei University (Seoul) and receiving instruction in reading hanja. Additionally, I used my time in Seoul to familiarize myself with several relevant archives and libraries as well as establish contact with several scholars and potential informants for oral history research.
interviews.

The bulk of my time in Korea was devoted to taking classes at Yonsei University’s Korean Language Institute (KLI). I enrolled in KLI’s 10-week Regular Program (June 23, 2014 to September 2, 2014) that included 4 hours of instruction, five days a week in speaking, writing, reading, and listening. In addition to these classes, I took newspaper reading as my elective class, which exposed me to political and economic vocabulary. I was placed in and successfully completed the program’s level 5 course, which is the second highest level available. Through a wide range of assignments, tests, projects and daily practice, I gained a greater grasp of Korean grammar and vocabulary. While the course materials generally did not cover topics directly related to my research, they did provide me a linguistic foundation upon which to engage with Korean language materials such as newspaper articles, government reports, and secondary literature.

During my preliminary research, I realized that the ability to read hanja would be critical for conducting research in Korean-language sources. While the Korean language has long had its own alphabet (hangul), Chinese characters have long been employed in written sources like government documents, newspapers, and organizational records. To improve my understanding of hanja, I received private instruction from Dr. Yong-sook Lee (director of Gunam Museum and former lecturer of anthropology at Chonnam National University) in the reading of hanja. Together, we worked our way through hanja textbooks designed to teach widely employed Chinese characters to Korean students. Dr. Lee also helped me translate several documents that I obtained during my preliminary research. These lessons were an invaluable introduction to reading hanja; nevertheless, I will need to continue to my study of Chinese characters before becoming fully proficient in deciphering hanja texts. I plan to continue to work my way through hanja textbooks. Further, Dr. Lee has agreed to provide future assistance in translating documents that I encounter during the course of my research.

Finally, I used my time in Korea to establish a basis for future research in South Korea. I visited libraries and archives that I believe will be relevant to my research. In Seoul, I visited and familiarized myself with the holdings at the National Library of Korea, the Syngman Rhee Reading Room at Yonsei University Library, and the Kim Dae Jung Presidential Library. Additionally, I went to the National Archives of Korea in Daejeon. As well as visiting potential research sites, I contacted scholars as well possible informants for oral history interviews. I believe that establishing this network of contacts, in addition to my language study, will provide a solid foundation upon which to base my future primary research in South Korea.

Sincerely,

Patrick Chung

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Dear Dr. Hahn and the members of the SHAFR grant committee,

I am writing to you to express my sincere gratitude for the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant. I used the grant to defray the cost of my trip to Mexico and Cuba this summer. The trip was a crucial part of my dissertation research on U.S.-Cuban relations during the late Cold War years.

I believe that I made substantial progress toward the completion of my dissertation. During my stay in Mexico City, I gained access to the collections of Mexican ambassadors in Cuba and the United States at the Foreign Ministry Archive, as well as the papers of the Mexican special intelligence agency at the National Archive. In Havana, I managed to contact, meet, and talk with several former Cuban diplomats and exchange opinions with prominent Cuban scholars. At the central archive of the Cuban Foreign Ministry, I obtained the coveted Cuban governmental documents on the U.S.-Cuban talks on migration issues, which I consider as a critical part of my dissertation.

The trip was truly beneficial for my preparation for the writing of dissertation this year. I would like to thank again SHAFR for its generous support for my dissertation research in 2014.

Sincerely,

Hideaki Kami
PhD Candidate, History
The Ohio State University
For more SHAFR information, visit us on the web at www.shafr.org